

SKETCHES FROM
A SECRET WAR
A POLISH ARTIST'S
MISSION TO
LIBERATE
SOVIET UKRAINE
TIMOTHY SNYDER

**Sketches from
a Secret War**

This page intentionally left blank

Sketches from a Secret War

A Polish Artist's Mission
to Liberate Soviet Ukraine

Timothy Snyder

Yale University Press
New Haven and London

Published with the assistance of the Frederick W. Hilles Publication Fund
of Yale University.

Published with assistance from the Mary Cady Tew Memorial Fund.

Copyright © 2005 by Timothy Snyder. All rights reserved. This book may not be
reproduced, in whole or in part, including illustrations, in any form (beyond that
copying permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law and except
by reviewers for the public press), without written permission from the publishers.

Printed in the United States of America by Sheridan Books.

The Library of Congress has cataloged the hardcover edition as follows:

Snyder, Timothy.

Sketches from a secret war : a Polish artist's mission to liberate Soviet Ukraine /
Timothy Snyder.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-300-10670-X (cloth : alk. paper)

1. Ukraine—History—20th century. 2. Ukraine, Western—History—
Autonomy and independence movements. 3. Anti-communist movements—
Ukraine, Western—History. 4. Ukraine—Ethnic relations. 5. Ukraine—
Relations—Poland. 6. Poland—Relations—Ukraine. 7. Józewski, Jan
Henryk, 1892–1981. I. Title: Polish artist's mission to liberate Soviet Ukraine.
II. Title.

DK508.812S625 2005

947.7'084—dc22

2005044034

ISBN 978-0-300-12599-3 (pbk. : alk. paper)

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of
the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council
on Library Resources.

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Mirze
gwoli
źródeł

This page intentionally left blank

Contents

Maps, ix

Prologue: Interrogations, xiii

Introduction: Cubism and Conspiracy, 1

Part One **An Artful Ascent**

1 Matters of Trust, 23

2 Promethean Ukraine, 40

3 Theaters of Politics, 60

4 Spies of Winter, 83

Part Two **A Political Descent**

5 Stalin's Famine, 99

6 The Polish Terror, 115

7 A Revolution Prepared, 133

8 Revindications of Souls, 147

Part Three **The Local World War**

- 9 Glass Houses, 171
- 10 Nazi Occupation, 193
- 11 Conspiring Women, 213
- 12 Communist Prison, 235
- Epilogue: Representations, 247
- Codes and Characters, 263
- Abbreviations, 265
- Archives, 267
- Notes, 269
- Acknowledgments, 337
- Index, 339









Prologue: Interrogations

The Polish painter composed himself in his cell. It was September 1953, and thus far Henryk Józewski was pleased with his performance in communist prison. After thirteen years underground, resisting Hitler's and Stalin's occupations of his country, Józewski had been arrested by the security forces of communist Poland that March. At first, his interrogators seemed rather disoriented. Józewski was arrested only two days before the death of Iosif Stalin, and after a few disorderly weeks his interrogators had retired. Józewski, who had expected a quick death from the communists, instead enjoyed a summer of delays. He read philosophy books, and had long discussions with a loquacious cell-mate. By September, however, the communists had learned something important about the painter's political life, about his career in independent Poland before 1939. Józewski had been a leading anticommunist. His interrogator produced documents: the painter had been sent to the eastern province of Volhynia in 1928 to stop the spread of communism from the Soviet Union to Poland. Soon thereafter, the interrogator was able to prove that Józewski, in 1919 and 1920, had directed intelligence operations for a Polish paramilitary organization in

Ukraine in the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution. Since communist criminal law was retroactive, all of this was a crime.

The Polish-Bolshevik War of 1919–1920, when Warsaw and Moscow fought for the borderlands of the defunct Russian Empire, was the first great international conflict between communism and anti-communism. Józewski, a Pole from Kyiv, played a special role in the Polish war effort. Aside from his intelligence work in Ukraine, he served as a vice minister in a Ukrainian government in Kyiv, and was charged by Poland's supreme commander Józef Piłsudski with partisan operations in Warsaw in the event of a Bolshevik victory. Poland won the war, thereby drawing the western boundary of the Bolshevik Revolution. By the terms of the 1921 peace treaty, Ukrainian lands were divided between Poland and the Soviet Union. Volhynia, Poland's most Ukrainian province, became the scene of Soviet attempts to penetrate and weaken Poland, using the slogans of land reform and Ukrainian national self-determination. The communist movement was popular, as these ideas spoke to the social condition of the Ukrainian peasant population. When Józef Piłsudski came to power in Poland by military coup in 1926, he summoned Józewski from his artist's studio, asked him to oversee the work of the Polish government in Warsaw, and then dispatched him to govern Volhynia. Against European trends and Polish popular opinion, Józewski initiated a policy of national concessions to the Ukrainian majority, a program known as the Volhynia Experiment. His work in interwar Volhynia was part of a state policy to use national questions to weaken communism.¹

OBLIVION

Volhynia was a borderland, Ukrainian in its majority, Jewish in the towns and cities, ruled by Poland.² For Józewski, nationality was less a matter of demography than of politics, less a matter of counting populations than of believing that one could count upon them in time of need. The painter's Volhynia Experiment can be seen as an attempt to hold back the tide of time, to preserve the native Ukrainian-Polish-Jewish social order, while tolerating emerging modern national differences. It can also be understood as a kind of alternative modernity, a multiculturalism *avant la lettre*, in which state policies were designed not to build a single nation, but rather to accommodate the inevitable differences among several. The experiment, however defined, was overwhelmed by forces beyond Józewski's control. The changes came first on the Soviet side of the border. As governor of Volhynia, Józewski witnessed the death by famine of millions in Soviet Ukraine in 1932–1933, the ethnic cleansing of tens of thousands

of Poles in Soviet Ukraine in 1935–1936, and the execution of about one hundred thousand Soviet citizens accused of spying for Poland in 1937–1938. Then came the collapse in Poland. As Poland moved to the right and its national minorities were presented as threats, Józewski lost favor and was forced to resign his position. He followed from afar persecutions of Volhynian Ukrainians by Warsaw in 1938–1939. Underground after the joint German-Soviet invasion of Poland in September 1939, Józewski wrote in his illegal newspapers about the Soviet deportation of Polish elites in 1939–1941, the Jewish Holocaust in 1941–1942, the ethnic cleansing of Poles by Ukrainian nationalists in 1943, the Soviet deportations of Poles and Ukrainians in 1944–1946, and the ethnic cleansing of Ukrainians by Poland's communist regime in 1947.

The Volhynia Experiment has been forgotten, or rather purposefully obliterated. In September 1953, when Józewski's communist interrogators connected his postwar resistance to the communist regime with his interwar policies, they meant to consign the entire endeavor to the dustbin of history. From their point of view, a new order had triumphed, and the old was to be forgotten. Theirs was the latest of several such attempts at oblivion. Soviet agents had tried to assassinate Józewski in 1932, Ukrainian nationalists in 1934, Polish nationalists in 1942, and Polish communists in 1943.³ The first two attempts were made on Józewski while he was governor of Volhynia. The Soviet men were caught by Józewski's handpicked police, killed by night, and left in a graveyard as an example. The Ukrainian nationalists were apprehended by the Polish police and sentenced to prison. The next two attempts were made upon Józewski as an underground activist during the Second World War. The Polish nationalists missed their opportunity when Józewski was warned by colleagues in the Home Army, the mainstream of Polish resistance to the German occupation. Józewski fled to the countryside, but was later followed by a team of five Polish communists, who emptied two clips at him and some friends as they played bridge by candlelight. Józewski escaped with a leg wound from the grenade his would-be assassin tossed through the window before fleeing into the night. Once in power, Polish communists hunted the "painter with the limp."⁴

The political extremists who wished to kill Józewski when he mattered created a history in which he did not. Communism and nationalism, the ideological currents Józewski opposed, took their revenge on the man thereafter. No extremist group managed to kill Józewski during the years of his political activity, but the far Left and the far Right conspired in a retrospective annihilation of his policies. Soviet historians justified the Soviet annexation of Volhynia by portraying interwar Polish policy as the exploitation of the honest Ukrainian peas-



Figure 1. Zbigniew Chomicz, Portrait of Henryk Józewski with Paintings.

ant. Much Ukrainian historiography has followed this line, and few Ukrainian national historians have shown much patience for Polish compromisers such as Józewski. Polish nationalists, for their part, resisted Józewski's policy of national concessions from its inception. In interwar Poland, Józewski was despised by Poles of the Right. Communists, of course, controlled his country after 1945; they hunted Józewski for years, and arrested him in March 1953.

SOURCES

By September 1953, four scripts of Józewski's prison performance had emerged. Józewski had begun to compose his memoirs during his interrogation, seeking in what he called his "Composition of Existence" or his "Tale of Existence" a sense of the shape of his life. The interrogation protocols, a second script, reveal a communist state security apparatus that had time and resources on its side. Attached to several of the daily interrogation protocols, which Józewski had to sign, are the pertinent secret documents, raided by the communists from Poland's prewar archives, which describe his struggle with communism. A third script was a collective performance. Before Józewski was sentenced, he had to listen to a chorus of interwar intelligence officers who, out of fear or desire for shorter sentences themselves, revealed a few details about their shared endeavor of earlier years. A fourth and final script was written by Józewski's talkative cell mate, an informer who wrote regular reports of their conversations.

Józewski's memoirs saw the light of day only after his death. Copies of the interrogation protocols and trial materials, as well as the documentation of the long manhunt for Józewski (alias The Professor, The Lawyer, Uncle, Olgierd, Niemyrycz, Mazurkiewicz, Święcki, Jan Piotrowski, Jan Florewski, Jan Florkowski, Jacek Florkowski, Jan Jankowski, and Przemysław Pawłowicz), are now available in Poland's Institute of National Remembrance. Some interrogation materials are presently in a Warsaw criminal court, where proceedings are under way to clear his name. These four scripts of Józewski's life—the memoirs, the interrogations, the testimony, the denunciations—invite the investigation of other sources pertaining to his policies: the records of his administration in Volhynia; the files of interwar Poland's Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, and Religion; the memoirs of Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians; Communist Party documents on the struggle to master Ukraine; the files of the intelligence organization that employed Józewski while he was underground in Stalinist Poland. These additional sources bring the outline of Józewski's grand design into focus. His interrogators were quite right that Józewski aimed to eliminate communism in eastern Poland. They failed to understand, however, that his policy was part of a strategy to destroy international communism by hastening the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In this endeavor, Józewski was perhaps the most zealous Polish participant. His own commitment to the destruction of the Soviet Union, and his own faith that communism would be defeated, survived Stalinism, occupation, and the victory of communism in Poland.

The source that is most useful in placing Józewski's policies within this larger

endeavor are the records of interwar Polish military intelligence, the Second Department of the Polish general staff. Józewski began his political life in espionage, as the director of intelligence for the Eastern Command of the Polish Military Organization during the Polish-Bolshevik War. As vice minister for internal affairs in the Ukrainian government of 1920, he was also Piłsudski's agent. When his patron Piłsudski returned to power in 1926, Józewski returned to positions of responsibility, at a moment when intelligence was a preoccupation of the new regime. Józewski's former colleagues in the Polish Military Organization made great careers in the Second Department. The Second Department oversaw the secret re-creation of a Ukrainian General Staff (and intelligence service) on Polish soil, and cooperated with Ukrainian agents in missions inside Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s and 1930s. Some of the Second Department's files were read for the last time in 1950, not by historians but by security officers. When, in 1950, an apprentice of Józewski published an article about prewar espionage in Soviet Ukraine, the Soviet secret services asked their Polish colleagues to summarize the work of Polish intelligence outposts.⁵ Some of these files seem not to have been read previously at all.⁶ These and similar sources, such as the records of the counterintelligence sections of the Polish army's field commands, can now be read in a different light. They suggest the degree of Polish penetration of the Soviet Union in the late 1920s and the early 1930s, and the political design that lay behind the border crossings, the sabotage, and the support of local nationalists. For a time, Poland wished to use national questions against the Soviet Union, and placed particular hopes in Soviet Ukraine. The larger design was known as Prometheanism: after the titan who blessed humanity with light, and cursed humanity with hope.

MILIEU

Taken together, these sources reveal why the Polish painter could be pleased with his prison performance, even after the revelations of September 1953. His interrogators uncovered the secrets that he could not hide, but remained ignorant of his deeper political purposes and his personal motives. Józewski was part of a milieu of cosmopolitan Poles, often hailing from Ukraine, who favored policies of reconciliation with Ukrainians, guided in this enterprise by an unwavering anticommunism. Józewski's milieu was liberal and tolerant, included women and Jews, and was associated with progressive lodges of Polish Freemasonry. Such Polish intellectuals believed that state officials should exemplify high culture, and that people of high culture had a responsibility to the state. Józewski's

father was an engineer in Kyïv in the Russian Empire, and Józewski's mathematics degree prepared him for a similar career. But his father was also a friend to artists, and hung some three hundred paintings in his home. Józewski's mother died young. One of her sisters, who had studied at the Sorbonne, taught Józewski to paint. Józewski, who played piano very well in his youth and who later in life designed one spectacular building, considered music and architecture as careers before settling upon painting and scenography.⁷ This serious devotion to arts and letters was typical of his friends and comrades. Józewski's political mentor Stanisław Stempowski, with whom he served in the Ukrainian government, was a writer and translator (of Tolstoy, Chekhov, and Saint-Exupéry.) Stempowski's eldest son Jerzy Stempowski worked for Polish intelligence in the west while Józewski carried out missions in the east. He was Józewski's confrère in a small artistic fraternity in an abandoned monastery in Volhynia, and returned with him to Warsaw after 1926 to take up positions of responsibility in the Polish government. He later became one of the best Polish literary critics of the twentieth century. Maria Dąbrowska, the most popular novelist of her day, was lover to Stanisław and lifelong friend to Jerzy and Henryk. This smaller circle of intellectuals serves, in this study, as a shorthand for the milieu as a whole.

This Polish milieu tended towards nostalgia about Ukraine, and was sympathetic to Ukrainian culture. Within Poland, such people believed that cultural concessions could resolve tensions with the large Ukrainian national minority, perhaps underestimating the importance of social resentment and economics. Some of them, such as the designer of the Promethean project Tadeusz Hołówko, understood that no political appeal to Ukrainians could work without land reform in Poland. Józewski, in an early sketch, portrayed the Ukrainian peasant as a crucified victim of his Polish landlord. Yet even Hołówko and Józewski failed to understand the two relevant social transformations taking place in the Soviet Union: first, that the redistribution of land in the 1920s gained the regime real support from the peasants; second, that the collectivization of land in the 1930s was part of a program of industrialization that would make the Soviet Union a great power. Józewski's Volhynia Experiment flowed from the ideas of this milieu, and was embraced by it. It included some land reform, but its main direction was cultural concessions for Ukrainians, combined with a vague promise to liberate Soviet Ukraine from Moscow.

The main purpose of Józewski's policy of concessions was international. He was one of several intellectuals involved in intelligence work who believed that support of Ukrainian culture in Poland could weaken the Soviet Union. His mi-




Figure 2. Henryk Józewski, *Visions: On a Country Road*, 1924. Warsaw University Library.

lieu understood the connections between domestic and foreign policy. Many of them, such as Józewski and Jerzy Stempowski, were intelligence officers at one time or another. Some of them, such as Jerzy Niezbrzycki, were spies first and pseudonymous writers second. Niezbrzycki served under Józewski in 1919 and 1920 in the Polish Military Organization in Ukraine, worked in Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s as an officer of the Second Department, and made his career in the 1930s as the director of the Department's eastern operations. His pseu-

donymous writing, in Russian and Polish, was meant to serve the grand Promethean design. Tadeusz Hołówko, coordinator of the Promethean project, hoped that Józewski's policy in Volhynia would serve as a model within Poland, and draw Ukrainians in the Soviet Union towards Warsaw. Like almost everyone of this milieu, Hołówko was a onetime socialist who was born a Russian subject. He and Józewski had met as students in the Russian Empire.

Józewski was both exemplary and unusual: exemplary of his milieu in his eastern origins and orientation, but unusual in his dedication to its ideas, and in the degree of political power he disposed. For Józewski as for others of this group, the defining experience of youth was conspiracy against the Russian Empire, and then combat against communism in the Polish-Bolshevik War. On the one hand, these experiences taught them that great risks were rewarded, that great deeds could be done, that the world could be changed. (The Bolsheviks, their great foes, shared these experiences and drew similar conclusions.) Independent Poland, after all, had been created in 1918, after more than a century of imperial rule. On the other hand, this faith in the timely deed was coupled with a particular disappointment. Like many in his milieu, Józewski was dissatisfied with the outcome of the Polish-Bolshevik War: Poland was victorious, but the Bolsheviks survived, and built their Soviet Union. These Poles believed that Ukrainians in the Soviet Union deserved independence; and were frustrated that the right-wing Polish governments of the early 1920s had no program for Poland's national minorities and no sense that the Ukrainian question was essentially international. After Piłsudski's coup of 1926, Józewski, Hołówko, Niezbrzycki, and other comrades joined in the undertaking to strengthen the Polish state by gaining the loyalty of Ukrainians, and to weaken the Soviet Union by fomenting rebellion in Soviet Ukraine. Józewski's Volhynia Experiment united these two goals, supporting Ukrainian culture in Poland, while serving as a base for espionage operations with the Soviet Union.

STRUCTURE

The hopeful early stages of this Polish policy are considered in the first part of this study, "An Artful Ascent." In the second part, "A Political Descent," circumstances escape Józewski's control. Stalin's second revolution in the Soviet Union reduced Polish influence, at enormous cost to Ukrainians and Poles on the Soviet side. Most Poles, even those of Józewski's milieu (but not Józewski himself), withdrew from the idea of intervening in Soviet affairs. The Ukrainian minority in Poland began to appear, in the second half of the 1930s, as a threat

to Poland's own survival rather than as an opportunity to weaken the Soviet Union. After the death of Piłsudski in 1935, his camp moved to the right, leaving Józewski behind. Józewski was driven from office in Volhynia in 1938, then watched from the sidelines as his experiment was quickly reversed. The new masters of Polish policy believed that war with Germany was ever more likely, and they were correct. Józewski believed that war with the Soviet Union was probable, and he was not mistaken. Poland's two neighbors, Europe's pioneers of state terror, jointly invaded in September 1939. The wartime occupations of Volhynia and Poland are the subject of the third part of the study, "The Local World War." Józewski's Polish successors had undone his policies; Poland's Soviet and Nazi successors destroyed Volhynian society as such. The Jews were exterminated, the Poles were ethnically cleansed, and the Ukrainian majority, although promised liberation by both occupiers, suffered horribly.

This third part of this book, like the first, describes years of conspiratorial work by Józewski and his allies, though in entirely different circumstances. After the Second World War, Poland was ruled by a communist regime supported by Moscow. Its territory was moved to the west, and its society was made homogenous. Most of the Jews had been killed in the Holocaust, and most of the survivors fled postwar anti-Semitism and pogroms. Most of the Ukrainians were deported to Soviet Ukraine, and those who escaped were forcibly resettled within Poland. The Germans were expelled. The outcome of the Second World War could hardly have been more different from that of the First. After the First World War, Józewski and his milieu saw Poland's eastern position and its national diversity as an advantage for an independent Poland, believing that only a Poland that exploited national questions in eastern Europe could thrive. After the Second World War, Poland was no longer easterly, no longer multinational, and no longer free. Yet despite the changes wrought by the Second World War, the milieu and its ideas endured. Józewski declined to leave Poland with the Polish government in 1939; he joined instead the anti-Nazi and then the anti-Soviet resistance. He remained underground for an almost inconceivably long period of time, evading German, Soviet, and then Polish communist secret police from 1939 until 1953. For more than thirteen years, he was aided in his largely solitary work by surviving associates, who sent him money from London, granted him shelter in Stalinist Poland, worked as his couriers, and remained his companions. Friends, family, colleagues, artists, and veterans who had supported him in the 1920s and 1930s reappeared in the communist Poland of the 1940s and 1950s.

The constancy of an idea should not be confused with historical continuity. Indeed, the very qualities that made eastern Europe special for Józewski and his milieu, the local virtues that had to be protected from international communism, were largely destroyed in his lifetime: the variety of religion, the intimacy of village life, the beauty of nature, the possibility to cultivate artistic life in hamlets far from great cities. Józewski was a politician and a spy, but he was also an artist who whiled away years painting in a monastery. The politics of his milieu were based in experience and in reflection rather than in ideology. He and his comrades affirmed a certain kind of individuality, rather than simply rejecting in principle a political alternative. Their orientation was certainly Polish, but they did not affirm every idea of Polishness, and indeed rejected Polish nationalism. They endorsed a vision of Poland, one which was already defeated in Poland itself in the 1930s, but for which they fought all the same, against crushing odds, in the 1940s and 1950s. While their main preoccupation was communism, they fought against the Nazi occupation as well. Such a concrete and personal anticommunism, antithetical as it is to the historical schemas that have survived the traumas of the twentieth century, demands that we begin at the beginning. The most important of experiences, for communists and anti-communists alike, was the destruction of Europe's old order during the First World War.

This page intentionally left blank

**Sketches from
a Secret War**

This page intentionally left blank

Introduction: Cubism and Conspiracy

The explosion sounded the end of the old Europe. In August 1914, the young Polish painter Henryk Józewski left the Austrian empire by one of the last trains. Austria's army demolished the bridge just after the train passed, to slow the expected advance of Russia's armies.¹ For Józewski and many young Poles, this was a joyful noise. Generations of resistance to Poland's imperial rulers in Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Berlin had failed to bring independence. Now, after a century of complicity in the partition of Poland, these empires were at war. Two of Poland's partitioners, Germany and Austria, would make war on the third, Russia. Józewski had traveled from Kyïv to Cracow, from the Russian to the Austrian empire, to receive orders from the leader of Poland's patriotic revolutionaries, Józef Piłsudski. Polish university students in Kyïv had chosen Józewski to make the risky journey. Even as he crossed imperial borders, from a city ruled from Moscow to one governed from Vienna, Józewski imagined himself to be traveling from one Polish city to another. His mental geography was that of the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, extinguished in 1795 by the three empires, but once reaching east to embrace Kyïv from its capital

cities Warsaw and Cracow. As the new Europe beckoned, Józewski heard a summons to recreate an independent Poland, a great power that would take its place in the east.

Piłsudski was another eastern Pole, with a similar Europe of the mind. Over his long career as a revolutionary, he had come to believe that war was the best opportunity for independence. Over the course of a quarter-century of political life in eastern empires and western emigration, he had shifted his concerns from educating the proletariat for revolution to training young men for battle. He petitioned Austrian authorities to allow him to found Polish Legions to fight with the Central Powers, Austria and Germany, in the war against Russia. Though his Legions would fight for one empire to help destroy another, their ultimate purpose was to train the soldiers of a future Polish army. Because the Legions were subordinate to the Austrian General Staff, and because Piłsudski's hopes extended beyond an Austrian military victory, he needed another military force. His secret Polish Military Organization grouped young men and women who were prepared to fight for Poland, but could not or would not enlist on the side of Austria. It was organized in all three partitioning empires, in Austria and Germany, but also in the Russian Empire, whither Józewski was returning on that August 1914 train. Soon after Józewski's return from Cracow, Polish students in Kyïv joined the Third (Eastern) Command of the Polish Military Organization and began reconnaissance work. At the beginning, the intelligence they gained about Russia served the Legions and thus Austria. Polish students in Kyïv and in the Russian Empire knew, however, that they were preparing for their own confrontation with imperial rule as such, gaining skills for the struggle for independence. Such were the instructions Józewski received from Piłsudski's officers and transmitted to his friends upon his return. Poles were to prepare for a long war, with the independence of Poland as the final aim.²

While young Poles conspired, the three empires made war. As Józewski made his journey from empire to empire, Russia's rail stock was commandeered to mobilize Europe's largest army. One of the young men called into service was Józewski's brother Przemysław. Shortly after Józewski returned to his home in the east, Russian armies made their first venture into the west. After the initial Russian advance was halted, the Austrian army made its way east into Russia's Ukrainian lands in early 1915. Józewski journeyed east as well, not out of choice, but as a result of Russian state policy. In this total war, civilians were treated as military assets. The Russian Empire deported people deemed dangerous from its western frontiers to inner Russia: Germans, Jews, and subjects of the Aus-

trian crown.³ Józewski's father Walery was an Austrian subject. When Walery was ordered to leave Kyïv for Saratov in November 1915, his son Henryk joined him in exile. Henryk Józewski was himself, it seems, a Russian rather than an Austrian subject (born 6 August 1892 in Kyïv), and thus in all likelihood need not have joined the transport. His mother had died young; his brother Przemysław was killed in action. Perhaps Henryk believed that he should share his father's hardship. Perhaps he was instructed to join the transport eastward by the Polish Military Organization, or by his political party, the Revolutionary Fraction of the Polish Socialist Party. His pseudonyms were his brother's first name and his mother's maiden name. In his Russian exile of 1915–1917, Józewski served the Polish cause and was caught up in the Russian Revolution.⁴

The Polish Socialist Party had long stood for both revolution and independence, the liberation of the working classes from bourgeois oppression and the liberation of Poland from imperial rule. The Revolutionary Fraction, led by Piłsudski, was its right wing, believing that independence was a good in itself, as well as a prerequisite to social justice. Saratov was Józewski's moment of revolutionary solidarity. In February 1917, as the Russian monarchy fell, he joined the city's revolutionary committee, which included Russian, Jewish, and Polish socialists. Józewski was stirred in March 1917 as soldiers offered their arms to Russia's democratic revolution. Vladimir Lenin returned to Russia that April, and his Bolsheviks pressed forward to complete the revolution, to exploit chaos and bring about communism.⁵ While Józewski was plainly swept along by Saratov's radicalism, he was uncomfortable with the dominance of Russian comrades. He hoped that the revolutionary movement could be reconciled with national independence for the subject peoples of the Russian Empire. He found himself in agreement with a Jewish comrade who worried that communist internationalism provided rhetorical cover for Russian nationalism. Józewski worked, secretly it seems, among Polish refugees and prisoners of war. He found Saratov alien and cold, and was glad to return home to Kyïv in June 1917.⁶

POLISH MILITARY ORGANIZATION

In summer 1917, Józewski returned home to find the Polish Military Organization well established in Kyïv. Its officers were under orders to take no direct action against the Russian Empire in the war, which Russia was losing in any case. Soon Russia withdrew from the war entirely. After the Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917, Lenin's new regime made a separate peace with Germany at

Brest in March 1918. Germany was granted Ukrainian territories by this treaty, and dissolved the native Ukrainian Central Council in April 1918. Russia's former allies, Britain and France, then defeated Germany on the Western Front, with American help. Germany was the master in the east, but its troops were called home. Germany's ally Austria disintegrated, the leaders of its nationalities preparing for independence. In the final reckoning, all three empires that had partitioned Poland were defeated, two of the three were destroyed, and Poland was reestablished as an independent state in 1918. After 123 years of partition, a moment of good fortune had arrived. Polish patriots knew that new-found independence would have to be defended, and Poland's state borders defined, by force of arms. The Polish army was formed in October 1918, absorbing the Legions and most of the Polish Military Organization. Because Piłsudski and his followers expected a Russian resurgence, the Third Command of the Polish Military Organization remained intact, continuing its reconnaissance in Ukraine.⁷

The fate of Ukrainian lands was open. The withdrawal of the German army left a vacuum of power between Russia and Poland, themselves very much in a state of uncertainty. Poland was a newly independent state with undefined frontiers; Russia was a vast empire at war with itself. Ukraine might be absorbed by a Russian state: either the Bolshevik Russia declared by the Bolsheviks and their Red Army, or the restored Russian Empire desired by their foes, the Whites. The Bolsheviks had denounced the Brest treaty in November 1918, thus asserting their claim to Ukraine. The Whites ever regarded Ukraine as part of Russia. Yet Ukraine might still, Ukrainian patriots believed, join Poland in the ranks of independent European states. They organized a rebellion against the satellite regime of the Germans, and profited from the German withdrawal to take Kyiv. A Ukrainian army led by Symon Petliura took the city in December 1918.

Józewski and like-minded Poles believed that Ukrainian independence was a requirement of Polish security, and endorsed the Ukrainian cause. This demanded a certain amount of strategic thinking, since Ukrainian rule was of no obvious immediate benefit to Poles in Ukraine. The Bolshevik Revolution was especially hard on Polish landholders in Ukraine, and Ukrainian authorities were powerless to protect Poles from soldiers who called themselves Bolsheviks. In Volhynia, for example, countless Polish noble families fled, and many were murdered.⁸ The Bolsheviks promised land to the peasants, which in the Kyiv region and westward was synonymous with a rebellion against Polish landlords. Ukrainian patriots had to respond politically to the Bolsheviks' claims upon

Ukrainian territory and the Bolshevik program of land for the peasantry. They did so by declaring the state independence of Ukraine in January 1918, and by promising peasants much the same thing as the Bolsheviks.⁹ Most Poles in Ukraine were not nobles, but most nobles in the western half of Ukraine were Poles. The Bolshevik Revolution thus revealed a class struggle that would render any Polish-Ukrainian alliance difficult. Yet Józewski and like-minded patriots of the Left had little interest in the problems of wealthy Poles. If anything, Polish landowners were a barrier to future Polish-Ukrainian understanding.

The bet on Ukraine was geopolitical: that independent states in Kyiv and Warsaw could together defend themselves against Moscow. Thus the most important problem was perhaps not the multilateral civil war among Whites, Reds, and Ukrainians, or the emerging class struggle between Ukrainians and Poles, but the absence of a dominant Ukrainian political orientation in Ukraine. The territory was a multinational borderland, central to Polish, Russian, and Jewish as well as to Ukrainian culture. Kyiv itself provided some of the best examples. After his return from exile, Józewski studied painting with his mother's sister Maria, née Świącka Salinger-Gierzyńska, who had finished the Sorbonne. Her studio was on Andriivs'kyi Spusk, not far from the home of the Russian novelist Mikhail Bulgakov.¹⁰ That Russian and Polish families would inhabit Kyiv's most colorful street was characteristic. Bulgakov would write *White Guard*, a novel set in the Kyiv of 1918, sympathetic to the White armies. Yet Bulgakov's cousin was a Ukrainian poet, who saw Kyiv as the capital of Ukraine. One of Józewski's Ukrainian friends at this time, Oleksandr Shul'hyn, became a minister in the independent Ukrainian government. Shul'hyn's uncle was a prominent Russian reactionary. Iurko Tiutiunnyk, a Ukrainian partisan, had a brother fighting for the Whites. Dmytro Dontsov, the Ukrainian nationalist, had a Bolshevik brother. Wilhelm of Habsburg, an Austrian archduke, fought for Ukrainian independence, even adopting a Ukrainian identity. This was a time and a place where grand political ideas left room for daring personal decisions. By the same token, it was a moment of social chaos, in which no group in Ukraine could be easily defined, let alone organized by and for a polity.

In a moment when many nations gained independence, Ukraine did not. The Ukrainian Central Council had declared the independence of its state in January 1918, but its administration did not control territory. After the German withdrawal, the armies of the Ukrainian People's Republic were opposed by both the Russian Whites and the Bolsheviks, who were also fighting each other, and who both considered Ukraine a major theater of battle. General Anton

Denikin's Whites took Kyïv from the Ukrainian army in July 1919, and tried to hold it against the Red Army. Poland was the fourth party in this dispute. It had no interest in a Bolshevik victory, which would spread communist revolution to the west; but also no interest in a White victory, since the Whites considered Poland part of the Russian inheritance. The Third Command of the Polish Military Organization, in which Józewski now served, watched as the two Russian armies fought, providing the intelligence that would help Warsaw decide when to intervene.¹¹ In the meantime, Józewski returned to his art. On 15 October 1917, just before the Bolshevik Revolution, he had his first exhibition in Kyïv, presenting his still lifes and his oil paintings of flowers in the Salon d'Art.¹² As he stood at his easel, he could see the naked corpses of White officers rotting outside on the street. In 1918 and 1919, as he assumed positions of responsibility in the Third Command, he also worked as a scenographer for the experimental Polish Theater. He was praised for the scenery for Charles Dickens's "Cricket on the Hearth," and celebrated and criticized for a minimalist rendering of the Polish Romantic poet Juliusz Słowacki's "Balladyna." Some of the locals found his stage designs too modern, too "Cubist."¹³

He soon had to devote all of his attention to war. Poland joined the war against the Bolsheviks as the Red Army began to prevail against the Whites. In 1919, the Polish army drove eastwards towards Vilnius and Minsk, but Kyïv remained far behind the lines. Józewski directed political intelligence for the Third Command, and was placed in charge of all operations that summer. He published propaganda in the spirit of a Polish-Ukrainian federation, organized reconnaissance behind enemy lines, and led a partisan brigade that carried out diversionary actions against the Red Army.¹⁴ He also recruited Bolshevik personnel for the Second Department of the Polish general staff, the intelligence arm of the new Polish state. In one case he believed he had recruited an Armenian Bolshevik, who agreed to go to Warsaw to sell his services. The route led through Odessa, where the Armenian and his Polish officer escort were joined at the dinner table by Russian officers. These were the Whites then fighting the Bolsheviks in the Russian Civil War, and they controlled Odessa at the time. The Polish escort quarreled with the Russians at dinner: he smeared the face of a Russian officer with mustard and poured borscht on his head. A formal duel was to follow, but the Polish officer made himself scarce, and so the Armenian recruit was lost.¹⁵

Much of the serious reconnaissance work of the Third Command was carried out by young Polish women, university and high school students. The Polish girls all spoke Russian, of course, but sometimes had to exert themselves to

blend in with the revolution around them. In order not to stand out from other local women, they had to leave their handkerchiefs and toiletries behind in Kyiv. Instead they traveled with kielbasa, vodka, and garlic, which they called “proletarian perfume.” Their travails were many. One Miss Niewirowska was sent to establish an outpost in the town of Zhytomyr. Caught by the Bolsheviks, she convinced them that she was a nurse. Recognized by an acquaintance, she was arrested again and sentenced to the firing squad. Sent first to Cheka headquarters for interrogation, she met a Polish Bolshevik who arranged for her to be sent to a concentration camp instead. En route to the camp, she jumped from the train, made her way north to Latvia, and thence onward to Warsaw. Other women were less quick or less lucky: twenty-one were later awarded Poland’s *Virtuti Militari* for their work in the Third Command; sixteen of the commendations were posthumous.¹⁶

In 1919, the young men and women of the Third Command in Kyiv were in a most awkward position. Poland was now at war with Bolshevik Russia, but Polish armies were still far to the west. The Red Army, having driven out the Whites and overwhelmed the Ukrainian army, provided the basis for Bolshevik power in Ukraine. Józewski and his Third Command required guidance. As the year ended the Red Army neared the gates of Kyiv. The Cheka was hunting for the operative who used the pseudonyms “Przemysław” and “Święcki”—Henryk Józewski.¹⁷ He left Kyiv for Warsaw in December. Just before his departure he married a fellow artist and comrade-in-arms, Julia Bolewska, and placed her brother, Jerzy Bolewski, in charge of the Third Command’s intelligence operations.¹⁸ Five years after his first trip west to see Piłsudski, Józewski undertook a second journey.

MARCH ON KYĪV

In 1914, Józewski had received orders from Piłsudski’s confidants in Cracow, but had not met the man himself. By 1919, Piłsudski knew of the painter’s exploits. When Józewski reached Warsaw, Piłsudski invited him to the Belvedere Palace for dawn-to-dusk conversations in December 1919 and January 1920. Having made his case for military intervention, and made friends with the most powerful man in Poland, Józewski took a painting vacation. In early 1920 he made for the gentler streets of Cracow to design the set for a production of a contemporary drama, “Mercy.” The director of a Cracow theater sought to retain him as a set designer. Józewski also awaited further word from the director of the Polish Theater in Warsaw about plans for staging the *Undivine Com-*

edy, a Polish classic.¹⁹ Meanwhile, Józewski recruited operatives and prepared them for a Polish-Ukrainian offensive that would take Kyïv. He ordered female operatives to establish networks in West Ukrainian towns. The “great and honorable task” of all Polish Military Organization members, Józewski optimistically instructed, was to build the basis for lasting Polish-Ukrainian “fraternity.”²⁰

Scarcely was the canvas on the easel in Józewski’s Cracow studio when the phone rang. The call was from Warsaw, said the operator: it might have been the director of the Polish Theater; it was the commander of the Polish army. Piłsudski was summoning Józewski back to war. In April 1920, Piłsudski had arranged an alliance with Symon Petliura, the commander in chief of the army of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. Petliura’s state was all but destroyed by the Red Army, and he needed whatever allies he could find. Petliura found Piłsudski ready to endorse a joint invasion of Ukrainian lands to drive out the Bolsheviks, followed by the reestablishment of an independent Ukraine. In this arrangement, Józewski had a special role, as Piłsudski told him in a private meeting in Warsaw. Although a Pole, Józewski was a native of Kyïv, and spoke Ukrainian and Russian. He had excelled in reconnaissance in the Polish Military Organization. He was now to join the Ukrainian government as vice minister for internal affairs. Józewski would be one of Piłsudski’s “men of trust” in the Ukrainian government, in the ancient and lofty phrase of Polish conspirators.²¹ He was joined by Stanisław Stempowski, a populist and writer of an older generation, another trilingual Pole from Ukraine.

The allied Polish and Ukrainian armies raced eastwards through Ukraine in May 1920. Józewski bivouacked with Petliura at the fortress town of Kam’ianets’ Podil’s’kyi. Had Józewski remained in Poland, he would have been asked to draw the castle at Kam’ianets’, the setting of the *Undivine Comedy*. Instead, the painter found himself before that ancient fortress, perhaps considering how it might be rendered for the stage.²² A few days more and Józewski was home in Kyïv, aiding in the preparation of a civilian administration and carrying out special tasks for his Ukrainian and Polish commanders. He saw himself as a “man of trust” of both nations. The Kyïv population saw him as an improbable leader: a Polish painter with the portfolio of a Ukrainian minister.²³ Yet Józewski’s humanist background served him well when Petliura ordered him to prepare the Ukrainian cultural elite for the return of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. Józewski was to recruit the circle of Serhii Iefremov, the Ukrainian literary historian. Iefremov, a member of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian People’s Republic before the Bolsheviks had arrived, promised Józewski his



Figure 3. Henryk Józewski and Stanisław Stempowski, 1922. Museum of Literature, Warsaw.

support.²⁴ The Red Army had retreated from Kyïv without defending the city. Polish infantry and cavalry now arrived. Soldiers marching through the main avenue were drowned in flowers. The cavalry seemed to march in endless ranks—riding out to the suburbs, about-facing, and proceeding down the main street again and again. The artifice worked, for the moment.²⁵

Yet this new Ukrainian-Polish Kyïv, the Kyïv of Petliura and Piłsudski, of Iefremov and Józewski, was not to last. The Red Army regrouped, and drove the Poles and their Ukrainian allies from the city in June 1920. Bolshevik propaganda effectively exploited the Polish-Ukrainian class struggle, portraying the March on Kyïv as an imperialist attempt to restore property to Polish landlords. Józewski retreated for a second time from Kyïv, while Iefremov hid in the suburbs under a false identity.²⁶ Now the Bolsheviks were on the march. For

Poles and Ukrainians, this was a war for the political definition of the giant borderland between Poland and the emerging Bolshevik state. Yet the Bolsheviks themselves, in summer 1920, had even more ambitious aims. While Polish and Ukrainian patriots wished to establish states, the Bolsheviks worked for general revolution. As the Red Army moved west, the leading Bolsheviks believed that a successful offensive could destroy Poland and open the way to European revolution.

Józewski acquired a personal sense of what such a revolution would mean. The Bolsheviks had occupied Kyïv soon after his departure for Warsaw in December 1919. Their political police, the Cheka, had already penetrated the Polish Military Organization, and in early 1920 arrested most of its officers. While the Polish and Ukrainian armies advanced through Ukraine in May 1920, the Cheka executed dozens of Third Command operatives. When Józewski returned to Kyïv, little remained of his Third Command.²⁷ He found that 108 of his men and women had been executed, including his brother-in-law Jerzy Bolewski.²⁸ Many of them had been taken to Kharkiv first, where they were in all likelihood tortured. The Cheka in Kharkiv was known for the “glove method”: placing a person’s hands under scalding water until the skin fell away, leaving the victim with bloody flesh below the wrists and the torturer with “human gloves.”²⁹ By the time that “the Polish army occupied Kyïv,” wrote Józewski, “all that remained of the Third Command was a bloody shred.”³⁰ This was the great shock of his life, the “open wound” that never healed.³¹ Exile in Saratov had left him uncertain that the revolution could respect the rights of nations to self-determination. The experience of combat provided him with a clear understanding of the nature of Bolshevik rule. Bolshevism was a new kind of “mass terror, no longer a reaction during the passion of battle, but a constant administrative function, applied systematically, with premeditation and with expertise.”³² Józewski remained a man of the Left, but any sympathy for communism had been extinguished.

The losses to Polish intelligence were even worse than they appeared. In 1919, Poland probably had better intelligence on Bolshevik Russia than any other European power, thanks to the work of local Poles (and some Ukrainians and Russians) in the Third Command. Of these operatives, only a few remained alive and free in 1920. As the Red Army drove westwards in June 1920, former Polish Military Organization assets were used against Poland. Nine members of the Third Command had been recruited by the Cheka, including the outstanding operatives Ignacy Dobrzyński and Wiktor Steckiewicz.³³ Dobrzyński, sent on a special mission from Kyïv to Moscow, had been captured and turned

by the Cheka. The Cheka was directed by the Pole Feliks Dzierżyński. Dzierżyński, it seems, personally recruited Dobrzyński, who revealed the framework and membership of the Polish Military Organization. Then, Dobrzyński and Steckiewicz set to work on operations against independent Poland.³⁴

WINTER MARCH

While Lenin stood at the head of the Bolshevik Party, with Trotsky as his commissar for war and Dzierżyński as the director of the Cheka, Stalin took political responsibility for the southern or Ukrainian front in the war against Poland. Stalin's commissars called on Polish soldiers to change sides, saying that there was no sense in dying for capitalism, since Poland was simply a lackey of the great capitalist powers. The Red Army reached the suburbs of Warsaw in early August 1920, and Piłsudski summoned Józewski for another assignment. On 12 August, Piłsudski confided to Józewski that Warsaw might be lost, and entrusted to him the task of organizing the partisan struggle for the city. The two men shared a silent handshake before Piłsudski left the Polish capital in his open car.³⁵ During the partition period, Russian forces had occupied the city after Polish uprisings of 1794, 1830, 1863, and 1905, but this time the enemy was kept at bay. Moscow had overstretched its supply lines and failed to coordinate its armies for an offensive. The Polish population, including the peasantry and working class, surprised the Bolsheviks by its hostility.³⁶ Piłsudski planned and led a brilliant counteroffensive, driving the Bolsheviks deep into Ukraine and Belarus. The Red Army's response was poorly coordinated. Polish independence was saved. There would be no European revolution. In Lenin's words, the Bolsheviks had "suffered an enormous defeat."³⁷ Stalin had to take some of the blame.³⁸

Poland was victorious, but both armies were exhausted, and leaders began to talk peace. The Polish-Bolshevik peace settlement signed at Riga in March 1921, an unusual compromise, revealed the immaturity of the Polish state apparatus. The Bolsheviks benefited from a disagreement among Poles about the desired eastern border of the Polish state. Piłsudski and his supporters wished to separate Russia from Poland by states allied or federated with Poland. The National Democrats, the most popular political party in the new Poland, had an incompatible vision of geopolitics. They understood national survival in social rather than military terms, and saw the greatest threat to Poles from Germans and Jews. While Piłsudski and his camp regarded Ukrainians as a nation, the Na-

tional Democrats saw them as ethnic raw material, as future Russians or Poles. They believed that any Ukrainian state would be a German puppet. The National Democrats concluded that Russia would be appeased if Warsaw sacrificed the lands and people between Poland and Russia, taking for itself only assimilable borderlands.³⁹

Piłsudski's camp won the war against the Bolsheviks, and lost the peace to the National Democrats. At Riga, the Polish delegation was dominated by National Democrats and their allies, who conceded eastern territories to Moscow. The treaty also ended the Polish-Ukrainian alliance against Bolshevik Russia. Poland was required to intern its former Ukrainian allies: Symon Petliura, his officers, and his soldiers. Opponents of the Riga Order rebelled against its obligations. Jerzy Kowalewski, one of Józefowski's few surviving officers in the Third Command in Ukraine, continued his covert work on the Soviet side of the new border after the treaty was signed. He helped Ukrainian allies establish a political center in Ukraine, five outposts awaiting the signal for armed rebellion, and a Ukrainian National Organization for agitation. These efforts began in January 1921; by the summer a Ukrainian Insurgent Command had been established in Lwów, and major preparations for an incursion had been made.⁴⁰ Iurko Tiutiunnyk, the Ukrainian insurgent commander, would attack from Poland, another force from Romania.⁴¹ Kowalewski and Tiutiunnyk went to Warsaw, hoping to gain the support of the Polish general staff for their plan. Kowalewski had shifted seamlessly from the Polish Military Organization to the Lwów command of the Second Department. From Lwów, he had made his case in a series of telegrams and reports to his superiors. The Ukrainian resistance is real, he had written that spring, but cannot be left without the guidance of professional officers. By summer he reported that the uprising needed only the help of a small expeditionary force, which he and Tiutiunnyk had prepared. The stakes were high: success would bring down Bolshevik power in Ukraine.⁴² Tiutiunnyk added his voice, reporting that he had forty-one units armed with 3,350 rifles waiting on the Soviet side, as well as twenty-eight insurgent organizations awaiting his signal. Tiutiunnyk added the plaintive appeal to Polish patriotic duty. Was the Treaty of Riga really the end? Had Poland abandoned its faithful Ukrainian allies for good?⁴³

As Kowalewski and Tiutiunnyk knew, this was hardly a venture that would win public support. The previous Polish-Ukrainian march into Ukraine had been followed by the Red Army's march on Warsaw in August 1920. Just a year before, Warsaw's citizens had seen off the Red Army, and had no wish to invite a revisit. The National Democrats, in the ascendant in Polish politics, favored

reconciliation with Moscow. The Polish general staff, closer to Piłsudski and the federalists, might have supported Kowalewski's scheme all the same, provided that Poland's role could be kept secret. This seemed ever less likely. Reports from Kowalewski's own officers indicated that the Bolsheviks knew about his Ukrainian Insurgent Staff. Other intelligence sources indicated that the Ukrainian national underground on the Soviet side remained uncoordinated, and that Tiutiunnyk had only two decent battalions on the Polish side. The Polish general staff delayed its approval, and appears finally to have washed its hands of the whole matter.⁴⁴

The Second Department went forward with its operation regardless. In Warsaw, Kowalewski and Tiutiunnyk stopped at Józewski's apartment, to discuss their plans with a trusted friend. Kowalewski and Józewski were comrades from the Polish Military Organization, and Józewski, as vice minister of internal affairs in the Ukrainian People's Republic government, had met Tiutiunnyk. Tiutiunnyk understood that Józewski was Piłsudski's representative for Ukrainian affairs.⁴⁵ Józewski remembered Kowalewski's broad smile before he bounded down the stairs and into the street. It was the last time the two men would meet. Kowalewski and Tiutiunnyk led their forces from the Polish province of Volhynia into Bolshevik Ukraine without the official approval of Kowalewski's superior officers, and perhaps without their unofficial approval as well. At 1:30 A.M. on 4 November 1921 they surprised Polish border guards with fifteen hundred men. Kowalewski flashed his Second Department pass and led his men across. General Władysław Sikorski, the Polish chief of staff, claimed to have learned of the border crossing after the fact. He ordered the entire Lwów command of the Second Department closed. Had Kowalewski returned alive, he would have been arrested.⁴⁶

The Winter March was a disaster. Like so many invasions of the east, it began too late in the season. By November the terrain was difficult, and the nights were cold. Famine had plagued Ukraine all year, and by late autumn Ukrainian peasants were less able to help and fight than in summer and spring. The intelligence situation was even worse than the Polish general staff had suspected. The Bolsheviks had arrested Ukrainian insurgents on their side of the border in May 1921, and thereafter penetrated the organization with their agents.⁴⁷ A Ukrainian courier captured by the Bolsheviks in July 1921 had revealed the positions of partisan forces inside Soviet Ukraine. Another courier sent by the partisans to Tiutiunnyk's staff in September was a Bolshevik agent. An officer who reported for orders later that month was also a Bolshevik agent.⁴⁸ Two staff officers close to Tiutiunnyk also seem to have been working for the Bolsheviks.⁴⁹

Oleksandr Shums'kyi, a Ukrainian revolutionary representing the Bolsheviks in Warsaw, received reports from his own agents. When Tiutiunnyk and Kowalewski began to deploy their forces in late October, Shums'kyi sent an immediate report.⁵⁰ Awaiting Tiutiunnyk and Kowalewski, the Bolsheviks, it appears, set a trap. Kowalewski and Tiutiunnyk made easy progress at first, gaining supporters but not weapons. They needed to take a Soviet garrison and gain heavy arms, since Poland had supplied them with nothing. On 20 November, after days of pitched battle, they were soundly defeated at Olevs'k. Some troops retreated to Poland, others tried to take Korosten. Here they were surrounded by artillery and cut to pieces. The Bolsheviks executed 359 prisoners at Bazar, then took revenge on civilian populations thought to have supported the incursion. The Polish village Bolarka was encircled and pounded by artillery fire. The survivors were herded into barns, where they were burned alive.⁵¹ Kowalewski was killed. Tiutiunnyk retreated to Poland. In early 1923 he was apparently persuaded by Soviet agents that a resistance organization on the Soviet side of the border awaited his leadership. Once he crossed the border, he was arrested.⁵²

THE RIGA ORDER

The disastrous Winter March ended, for the moment, the hopes of Piłsudski and his camp for a federal eastern Europe led by Warsaw. It was a diplomatic as well as military fiasco. Polish diplomats had been courting Ukrainian communists, in the hopes of drawing Bolshevik Ukraine away from Bolshevik Russia. The military adventure destroyed their credibility.⁵³ Soon thereafter, Polish parties friendly to Piłsudski's vision lost free elections. Piłsudski's opponents on the right then designed a constitution with a weak presidency, knowing that Piłsudski would win any direct election to such an office. Piłsudski thereupon retired from politics.⁵⁴ Such was the new order that emerged in this part of eastern Europe by 1922: a formal peace, allowing the Soviet Union to be established by the Bolsheviks with a component Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and Poland to be defined by the National Democrats as a centralized state despite its large minorities. The nominal federalism of the Soviet Union and the constitutional centralism of Poland were two attempts to address a glaring problem of postimperial eastern Europe: the national question. Imperial rule was discredited, and politicians from Woodrow Wilson to Vladimir Lenin supported some version of national self-determination. Yet no one believed that all

nations could be accommodated with their own states, and no border arrangement could satisfy everyone. Ukrainians had no state.⁵⁵ Poles had little reason to be thankful for the Riga Order, if it left them on the wrong side of the border. More than a million Poles fled the Soviet Union in the early 1920s.

The heartland of Jewish Europe was also divided at Riga. European Jews had migrated to the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the medieval and early modern periods. For centuries, the center of gravity of Jewish life was the Commonwealth. When the Commonwealth was dissolved in 1795, Polish Jews were divided among three empires. When Russia and Austria collapsed at the end of the First World War, Jews fell victim to lawless violence. Tens of thousands of Jews were murdered by soldiers, insurgents, or bands. The worst perpetrators were Ukrainian soldiers and insurgents, forces that ceased to exist after the Soviet-Polish settlement at Riga.⁵⁶ Jews thus had every reason to welcome peace, and good cause to worry when Moscow or Warsaw tried to exploit the Ukrainian question. Both Warsaw and Moscow seemed capable of exploiting known anti-Semites in the hope of gaining the loyalty of Ukrainians. Sometimes they exploited the same people, taking turns. Tiutiunnyk's partisans, for example, had killed several hundred Jews in Ukraine in 1919.⁵⁷ Yet Tiutiunnyk was supported by some elements of the Polish government in 1921. After 1923, he was engaged by the Soviet Union. A Polish agent reported that "the Jewish population's reception of Tiutiunnyk's return has been the most unwilling and hostile."⁵⁸

ELSINORE BELVEDERE

Perhaps only the National Democrats truly respected the Riga Order. They had no wish to provoke the Soviet Union, and believed that Poland could assimilate its five million Ukrainians and one million Belarusians. They had no positive program for Poland's three million Jewish citizens, and increasingly believed that they should emigrate. Piłsudski and Józewski were hostile to the Riga Order because they represented a different tradition of Polish political thought: etatist and suspicious of Russia. For them, all of Poland's citizens owed the state loyalty, but should be allowed to preserve distinct languages and cultures. Their great enemies were Russia and communism. They believed quite correctly that the Bolsheviks would violate the Treaty of Riga, and had no intention of observing it themselves. Although Piłsudski ostensibly withdrew from politics in 1922, his men in the ministry of war quietly plotted grand strategies that were at

odds with the ideas of the governing nationalist Right. Tadeusz Hołowko, a close ally of Piłsudski, expressed a general sentiment when he said that Poland had betrayed Petliura at Riga.⁵⁹

In the first years of Polish independence, Józewski rescued what he could from his commitments to Ukraine. He personally recommended that Jerzy Kowalewski be commended posthumously for his role in the Winter March.⁶⁰ Józewski lent Petliura his own government apartment, then found him lodging on Mokotowska Street, in an apartment owned by a sympathetic Kyiv lawyer. Petliura and Józewski took evening walks near the Belvedere Palace, speaking wistfully of power. Józewski's wife taught Petliura's wife French in preparation for emigration to Paris.⁶¹ A Ukrainian Central Committee was quietly reestablished in Warsaw in 1921, with Józewski again shadowing the Ukrainian minister of internal affairs, as had done in Kyiv in 1920. Stanisław Stempowski was also a member of the Ukrainian Central Committee.⁶² Józewski was still Piłsudski's envoy to Ukrainian leaders at this time, entrusted with the disbursal of funds.⁶³ Because the Ukrainian People's Republic regarded itself as the legitimate state authority in the territories of Ukraine, Polish support of its officials and institutions meant a rejection of the Riga Order.

In 1923, Polish nationalists and populists formed a coalition government, and funding for Ukrainian projects was eliminated. When Petliura moved to Paris in 1923, it might have seemed that Józewski's Kyiv adventure was complete. Like his patron Piłsudski, Józewski retired from Warsaw to the countryside. As a veteran of the Polish-Bolshevik War, Józewski was given a small plot of land in Poland's eastern province of Volhynia, in a military colony that bore the name of Gabriel Narutowicz, independent Poland's first president. Narutowicz had been elected in 1922 by the votes of the Left and the national minorities in the parliament, and was then promptly assassinated by a nationalist fanatic. The creation of a unified Poland, as was becoming obvious, would be a tremendous problem: neither the national assimilation of the Right nor the national toleration of the Center and Left would prove uncomplicated in practice. Volhynia had voted for the Minorities' Bloc (79%) which had elected Narutowicz in 1922. It was the district of Poland most directly affected by Soviet border raids. The Polish policy of military colonization was an attempt to secure the eastern provinces by settling some reliable veterans in uncertain regions. Volhynia received about 44% of all Polish military colonists. Józewski was one of perhaps thirty-eight hundred Polish veterans who received land in about 665 colonies in Volhynia.⁶⁴

Józewski made his living as a gentleman farmer, working his own plot as well

as one his wife Julia had inherited. He continued to draw and paint. From an untutored province in eastern Poland, he was able to follow European trends in avant-garde art. He maintained a friendship with Stanisław Stempowski, his onetime Polish colleague in the Ukrainian government. Józewski called the older man “father,” in Russian. Stanisław’s son Jerzy had spent the war years abroad, and arrived in Volhynia having tasted Italian Futurism and the Dada movement.⁶⁵ Józewski took over an abandoned monastery, and the two men referred to themselves as “brothers” in their new artistic order. Signing themselves Brother Hubert and Brother Serafin, Józewski and Stempowski published three books of satire, philosophy, and art in 1923 and 1924: *Pilgrim*, *Hamlet*, and *Visions*. The third member of their order, Władysław Korsak, had served as minister for Polish affairs in Petliura’s Ukrainian government. The three young men opened the monastery to friends, offering seclusion and warm company to those of similar spirit.⁶⁶ They could regard Volhynia as an interlude in a life still full of promise. Stempowski was still an optimist, and his pilgrim was on a “pilgrimage to better times” in a common Europe. The young men’s “visions” were biting and satirical, but also playful.⁶⁷

Having missed his chance to work for major Polish theaters, Józewski the veteran built his credentials anew, informed by the experience of war. He began with *Hamlet*, a play he regarded as universal, introducing his proposed scene design by his own interpretation of the drama. Having shifted from a life of action to a life of contemplation, Józewski defined the essence of tragedy in these Aristotelian terms. Like other artists of his generation, Józewski wished to connect the internal world of experience and the external world of nature, without resorting to outmoded notions of human rationality. His approach, rather than actually resolving this tension, situated it within each individual. Action, he maintained, takes reality as it appears in the given moment, accepting the convincing illusion provided by the pressing urgency of sensory information. The person who acts changes reality in an infinitude of imperceptible ways, as a stone that falls into the sea casts waves below the surface. Contemplation considers reality, but includes an immediate awareness of its own limitation. A person who contemplates sees the boundaries of his understanding, defines the surface below which his eyes will fail him. Yet it is precisely these limits, Józewski argued, that allow for the sensible apprehension of events. Furthermore, people can and do strive for a harmony between their natures of action and contemplation. Yet the very striving for harmony within one individuality has inevitable and unpredictable consequences for the external world. A tragedy, in Józewski’s conception, occurs when an action defies contemplation, altering



Figure 4. Henryk Józewski, *Visions: In the Service of a Lady*, 1924. Warsaw University Library.

the world so much and so strangely that the previous frameworks of perception seem no longer to hold. For scenographers of the tragedy of Hamlet, Józewski proposed, the challenge is to present the lines of physical objects so as to suggest the simultaneous power and mutability of these limits of perception.⁶⁸

For individuals concerned with power, Józewski continued, tragedy is opportunity. The tragic moment, the experience of disorientation, is the chance



Figure 5. Henryk Józewski, Stanisław Stempowski, and Julia Józewski, 1925. Museum of Literature, Warsaw.

that must be seized. “The specter of Elsinore,” the ghost of Hamlet’s father, he wrote, “has appeared in my room.” This is not a moment of fright but a moment of purposeful consideration. At one level, Józewski was comparing the murder of Poland’s first elected president to the murder of Hamlet’s father. The withdrawal of Piłsudski from political life after the assassination of Narutowicz is like Hamlet’s unwillingness to act directly against his father’s murderers. Just as Hamlet would not slay his uncle while the uncle was praying, Piłsudski would not move against the National Democrats so long as their institutions seemed to be working and their party enjoyed public support. “Behind the ghost,” Józewski continued, “come figures well known to me, people from whose dead but open eyes shines the kingly specter of the deed. . . . I remember how they perished in a terrible struggle in the aureole of otherworldly courage.” Józewski recalled the death of his friends from the Polish Military Organization, murdered by the Bolsheviks. Like Hamlet, Józewski had looked into the




Figure 6. Henryk Józewski, *Hamlet: Cemetery*, 1924. Warsaw University Library.

graves of those he loved, and there found his warrior spirit. Such was the opportunity of tragedy, and the logic of Józewski's lifelong existential optimism.

Józewski's moment of contemplation was brief. In 1925 he won a grant from the ministry of education to support his painting. He returned with Julia to Warsaw, rented an apartment in the northern neighborhood of Żoliborz, and set to work in a studio at 24 Koszykowa Street. Józewski began to make the preparations for his own departure for Paris, where he was to study art. His aunt had studied in Paris; Julia spoke French; and a sojourn in Paris was very much in keeping with the artistic life they wished to lead. In the Warsaw of the 1920s, Paris was palpably close, still a model in the era of modernism. The poets and painters whom the couple saw in Warsaw wished them a bon voyage. Then one morning in May 1926, as he took the tram south to his studio, everything changed.⁶⁹ As Józewski contemplated his day's painting, action intervened. His patron, Piłsudski, made another play for power. Józewski left behind thoughts of Elsinore, and took his place in Belvedere.

Part One An Artful Ascent

This page intentionally left blank

Chapter 1 Matters of Trust

Józef Piłsudski's coup d'état of May 1926 has the strange character of an old silent film, somehow played too slowly and with too few actors. It was a violent affair in the end, although Piłsudski believed that his personal authority would suffice to prevent any opposition. It was a military putsch, although the army never really took sides, or rather took both sides. It was a civil war, fought mainly in Warsaw, or rather in a few neighborhoods. Both Piłsudski's troops and government loyalists were concerned to avoid casualties. Traffic police told pedestrians which streets to avoid because of the bullets. Citizens trapped in apartment buildings by gunfire found ways to bring tea to nearby soldiers. Józewski heard talk of the flying bullets on his southbound tram, and got off a few stops early. With brushes and paints in hand, he marched to Saxon Square, to the general staff, and reported for duty.¹ The brushes and paints remained in the staff room. In Józewski's terms, contemplation met action. Piłsudski seized power; Józewski watched—and gave away signed copies of his study of Hamlet.

The tragedy of the end of democracy presented the opportunity for government by a trusted few. Trust was central to Piłsudski's thought.

Piłsudski was a lifelong conspirator who had succeeded. In his youth, he had been exiled to Siberia, and brought back a native mastery of the Russian language and a native distrust of Russian institutions of power. During a quarter-century of illegal work among Polish socialists, Piłsudski had trusted his comrades and only his comrades. It was they who distributed his socialist newspaper in the 1890s, they who set him free from Russian captivity in 1900, they who followed him during the Revolution of 1905 when he chose military conspiracy over proletarian revolt. Generations of conspirators were formed around and formed by Piłsudski, the youngest being the soldiers of the Polish Legions and Polish Military Organization he commanded during the First World War. Józewski, who finished university in 1914, belonged to the last generation to conspire with Piłsudski to build and defend an independent Poland. His intelligence work in Ukraine in 1919 and 1920 had made him one of Piłsudski's youngest "men of trust."²

After the coup, Piłsudski faced a political task rife with contradictions. He had come to power promising to end the chaos of parliamentary government, but had no ready substitute for democracy. He claimed with some justice to speak for the country, but knew that the National Democrats would win free elections. He believed that Poles had to be educated to be prepared for democracy, but his own actions during and after the coup were hardly edifying.³ He was a former socialist who believed that communists threatened the existence of the Polish state. He desired to create some simulacrum of a political center, but had no political party of his own. At every stage of his career he had burned bridges, the coup itself being the latest daring move to enchant some and alienate others. The ideas of the 1920s offered little to Poland's leader. Piłsudski was increasingly suspicious of ideals and theories as he aged. He offered no transcendence, no end of history, and precious few plans. Piłsudski was charismatic but had no inclination to show himself in public. He was no Mussolini. Rather than praising the nation, he expressed his disappointment that independence had turned out so badly.

Poland was too important to be entrusted to the Poles. Piłsudski sought to govern by way of personal connections, by the comrades he still trusted in 1926. He encouraged his "men of trust" to build small conspiracies within and around official state institutions, to settle affairs in his chambers in the Belvedere or in their apartments in Warsaw.⁴ It was at about that time that members of the Soviet politburo, other old conspirators of the Russian Empire, fell back into the same habit.⁵ Piłsudski met the Soviet envoy in the private apartment of his foreign minister. In Warsaw, it was difficult to understand the

workings of power in terms of offices and titles. Piłsudski set the tone by winning an election to the presidency but declining to hold the office. Józewski, thought to be a member of Piłsudski's real cabinet, monitored the work of the government for two years after the coup. He considered this, the period of his greatest power in Poland as a whole, to be a transitional moment of enlightened absolutism.⁶ In the evenings, he would drop by to see his friend Maria Dąbrowska. Józewski and Dąbrowska also made daytime appointments to walk in the gardens of Wilanów Palace or to see Charlie Chaplin films. Among trusted friends, Józewski would speak of politics; in her diary Dąbrowska recorded none of the content of such discussions. About form, though, she was eloquent: "He is an uncommon man, entirely absorbed in politics, but in politics of the high style, beautiful, cold, noble, devoted to ideas, yet as crafty as they come. I see in him a phenomenon very rare in Poland, perhaps aside from Piłsudski he is the only such."⁷

Hidden within Piłsudski's and Józewski's distrust of the nation was a certain idea of the state. Some people could be trusted, and others could not. Those who could be trusted were thought to represent the destiny of the nation, even though they had in no sense been elected by the people, and even though they disdained ideologies that would provide theoretical sanction for rule by elites. Piłsudski considered his victory in the coup of May 1926 a verdict of history. History, though, was made by individuals. This was programmatic irrationalism, grounded in shared experience rather than ideological commitment. These conspirators had won Polish independence, as they knew, despite the indifference of many Poles. In the 1920s, the Polish nation disappointed them again by choosing the National Democrats and therefore national mediocrity. After 1926, they believed the more strongly in the importance of individuals. Since Poland was so weak, individuals had to find a way to protect her.⁸ This was no modern creed that privileged a class or a nation, or sought to harness the power of the masses to the institutions of a state. It was neither prodemocratic nor antidemocratic; it distrusted the people, but proposed no ideological vanguards or organized paramilitaries to rally or replace them. There was no young seed of totalitarianism here, but rather a weary devotion to independence. In practice, this meant mildly authoritarian rule by the anointed few, and a slightly ham-handed cult of Piłsudski.

All three members of the Volhynian artistic fraternity quickly found positions of responsibility in the new regime. Yet one of them, Jerzy Stempowski, found the new regime distasteful. Stempowski, like Józewski, had moved from their artists' commune to the council of ministers in 1926. He soon retired to



Figure 7. Henryk Józewski, *Visions: Man of Trust*, 1924. Warsaw University Library.

more apolitical work in the state agricultural bank. Watching from the wings the drama of Piłsudski's regime, Stempowski became an excellent critic of theater. He wrote a study of a classic Polish Romantic comedy that included an analysis of Piłsudski's regime. Action itself, he argued, was no substitute for an ordered worldview, and irrationalism, no matter how charming, was ultimately self-defeating. "On the surface it might appear," he wrote, "that the act itself, done from the sheer irrational joy of action, should possess the simplicity, reso-

nance, and transparency lacking in the superficial activities of the rationalists, bound by logical coherence to be concerned with thousands of side effects. Yet this is not the case. We know that the actions of tyrants, based in conditions of unlimited freedom, are in fact half-measures, hesitations, unexpectedly reversing upon themselves and destroying their own premises.” Where Józewski imagined hidden depths, Stempowski saw meaningless transience. “If the world is taken to be chaos denuded of form and content, an act taken in chaos is written in water. The irrationalist is uncertain of his own action.” “The fragility and inconsistency of the irrational act make tyrants impatient and jealous as they attempt to stage their works.” “The great stage director is very impatient and jealous.”⁹ He meant Piłsudski.

A secret policeman wandered with this text through the cafés of Warsaw, trying to find someone who would explain the offending reference.¹⁰ The anecdote, as Stempowski told it, was funny not because a secret policeman was reading literary criticism, but rather because the secret policeman could not understand the essay. Although the hero of this story was none too bright, in the early Piłsudski era intelligence work could be seen as an occupation fit for a Warsaw intellectual. (Stempowski himself, the critic, had once collected intelligence. He was active in western Europe during the Polish-Bolshevik War. Posing as a journalist, he gathered intelligence from open sources on the Near East and the Caucasus.¹¹ In what was apparently his last mission, he posed as a Scandinavian journalist in order to interview the Bolshevik delegation at Riga in 1921. Although Stempowski knew Greek, Latin, English, French, German, Russian, Ukrainian, and Polish, he knew no Scandinavian language, and his cover as “Rajmond Nihölm”—a name that only looks Scandinavian—seems not to have lasted long.)¹² In some sense, intelligence was the perfect occupation for the traditional intelligentsia of Poland, which had long desired to convert cultural attainment to political achievement. Indeed, officers of the Second Department complained to their superiors that their complimentary places in the theater were too far from the stage.¹³ Piłsudski, who took a keen interest in intelligence work, hoped that Poland’s intelligentsia could be kept between the two options represented by Stempowski and his less artful pursuer: service to the state, or friendly critique from the Left.

POLISH COMMUNISTS

Socialism was accepted. What had to be excluded from Polish life was communism. In the 1920s, communism was at once a temptation to Poland’s literary

elites, a radical program for Poland's evident social and national inequalities, and the ideology of a hostile foreign power, the Soviet Union.¹⁴ While the National Democrats and their allies had governed Poland after 1923, the Soviets had founded their Communist International, which subordinated national communist parties to the demands of international revolution (as seen from Moscow). Communism could not be defined so easily as a Russian threat, when the Communist International included three parties based on Polish soil: the Communist Party of Poland, the Communist Party of West Belarus, and the Communist Party of West Ukraine. In 1926, Piłsudski and his allies still had their wary eyes on Moscow, but realized that their first step was to confront communism in domestic political life. Their settling of accounts with communism began at home.

The Bolshevik Revolution had forced a choice upon Poles of leftist politics. Some, like Józewski, became anticommunists after a direct confrontation with Bolshevik methods. Others accepted Russia as the homeland of the revolution, and subordinated themselves to the Communist International. Socialists around the world faced the same choice: to become communists and accept direction from Moscow, or to work within a given nation-state to win elections as social democrats. In Poland, the choice was more dramatic, as the Soviet threat to the country's existence was immediate; and socialists, whether they chose communism or anticommunism, had few illusions about Moscow's methods. In Paris or New York, one could afford to be ignorant, or fickle, or narcissistic, or wrong. In Poland, the communist choice meant supporting the immediate partition of Poland and the attachment of its eastern lands to the Soviet Union. A French communist was not asked to concede Alsace and Lorraine; an American communist need not endorse the return of California and the Southwest to Mexico. In Poland, communism was not a theory that could be supported in principle, but a revolution that could be anticipated as a real possibility in one's own lifetime in one's own country.

Yet partly because the communist choice was so obviously imminent and weighty, Moscow had difficulty controlling Polish communists. The Communist Party of Poland had been formed from two socialist parties, each older than Lenin's Bolshevik Party. Because the Polish revolutionary tradition had been directed against Russian rule, subordination to Moscow was not an automatic reflex. Polish socialists had known the Bolsheviks as obscure and exiled revolutionaries before 1917, and could not be overawed by their personalities. Moreover, the Communist Party of Poland operated in an environment of free expression, and had to contend with rival parties for membership. It had trouble

subordinating itself to directives from afar while appealing to constituencies in Poland, and this problem grew worse with the passing of the revolutionary moment. After Lenin's death in January 1924, Moscow's demands began to resemble the side effects of an internal struggle for power. Polish communists were too well oriented in Bolshevik politics not to notice this, and fell into the habit of treating their own party as their own affair. This brought them into conflict with Stalin, who took responsibility for Polish affairs in the Communist International.¹⁵

Until 1926, Poland's communists could at least orient themselves against Polish governments of the Center-Right. Piłsudski made their situation more complicated. During the coup d'état, Polish communists supported Piłsudski in Warsaw and the provinces, some of them on the barricades. Party leaders offered Piłsudski their services, and rail strikes prevented hostile troops from reaching Warsaw.¹⁶ Moscow (probably Stalin) instructed Polish communists to support Piłsudski, on the logic that Piłsudski could then be overthrown, and the communist revolution in Poland completed. This did not happen: as Piłsudski put it, he made a "revolution without revolutionary consequences."¹⁷ As during the Polish-Bolshevik War, the Bolsheviks were disappointed with the Polish laboring masses, who again failed to see the communist revolutionary imperative. As Piłsudski discretely installed his new regime of trusted men, the Soviet politburo ordered Polish communists not to support Piłsudski for president, as they wished to do.¹⁸ Stalin then distanced Moscow from the whole affair, blaming the Polish communists themselves for the "very great error" (his own) of supporting Piłsudski.¹⁹ Polish communists had indeed supported Piłsudski, some because they saw him as a man of the Left, some because they preferred his rule to that of the National Democrats, some because of Moscow's instructions. This was Piłsudski's first, and paradoxical, victory over communism, which he owed to reputation. As Stalin blamed the Polish communists for his own mistake, party unity suffered. By June 1926, a few weeks after calling them to the barricades to support Piłsudski, Moscow required Polish communists to call him a "fascist."²⁰ In these circumstances the Second Department penetrated the party, reporting in 1926 that "we're now sitting very deep inside and have every possibility of observing their behavior."²¹

Within the Communist Party of Poland operated a Communist Party of West Ukraine, active in southeastern Poland (Galicia and Volhynia) where Ukrainians were a majority of the population. It called for revolution against Polish landlords and the annexation of Poland's southeast by the Soviet Union.²² It was the greater threat to Polish security, since a regional Ukrainian

rebellion was vastly more likely than a communist revolution in Poland as a whole, and social unrest in these borderlands could be exploited by Moscow as justification for military intervention. Ukrainians in Galicia had fought a war of independence against Poland in 1918–1919. The Communist Party of West Ukraine was especially popular in Volhynia. Tiutiunnyk was placed, nominally at least, in command of Soviet partisan operations in Volhynia. Under Tiutiunnyk, these operations increased rapidly in intensity and duration.²³ In 1924 raids were so frequent in Volhynia that on two occasions, Soviet partisans robbed Polish trains on which Second Department officers were traveling. This was embarrassing.²⁴ Partisans carried out hundreds of attacks against Polish border police, landowners, and property. Communists called Poland's southeastern territories "West Ukraine," and presented their future unification with Soviet Ukraine as the equivalent of national liberation. In the Soviet Union, they truthfully maintained, Ukrainian culture was supported by the state, and Polish lords were suppressed. As the Polish government closed Ukrainian schools, allowed the Roman Catholic Church to reclaim churches from Orthodox dioceses, and dispatched military colonists to the east, these appeals to popular feeling found a ready audience.²⁵ Józewski, one of these colonists, had noted the internal and external sources of communist success. If this borderland was to be secured, he concluded, the social and national bases of communism would have to be addressed with ambitious reform.

INSPIRATION

In the meantime, Poland would have to improve its shoddy intelligence and military position at the eastern border. Poland had to regain the initiative in intelligence work lost in 1920 with the destruction of the Third Command of the Polish Military Organization. In the first half of the 1920s, the intelligence and counterintelligence contest with the Soviet Union went very poorly. When Piłsudski came to power in 1926, Poland's main source of human intelligence was a Russian anti-Bolshevik organization known as MOR-Trust.²⁶ The Trust was in fact a massive disinformation and deception operation of the counterintelligence section of the Soviet secret police, the Cheka, and then the GPU. For years, some forty Trust agents ran some four hundred activists, who were welcomed as authentic representatives of an opposition movement.²⁷ Between 1922 and 1926, the Trust leaked massive amounts of false information to Polish, British, German, French, Estonian, and Latvian intelligence agencies.²⁸ The richness of the materials apparently overwhelmed the better judgment of Euro-

pean intelligence officers. This was military disinformation *en plus*, designed to present an exaggerated image of the Red Army's capabilities and thereby deter intervention. It was also political disinformation *en minus*, meant to encourage complacency. Trust agents maintained that domestic resistance to Soviet rule was growing, and that Bolshevik power would be overturned. In light of all this, Trust agents counseled, Western powers should not intervene in Russia, as this was the only thing that could rally the Red Army and unite the masses with the communists. In Poland, Trust agents insinuated themselves so deeply into intelligence work that they received Polish passports, used the Polish diplomatic post, and in at least one case arranged to send a message in a Polish code.²⁹ (A coded message with contents known to an outsider should never be sent, as the encrypted text can then be compared to the original, and the code cracked.)

In 1923, a Polish intelligence officer in Estonia, Władysław Michniewicz, expressed his doubts about the Trust. He was apparently ignored. Stefan Mayer, director of the Intelligence Bureau of the Second Department, began to notice discrepancies between reports gained from Trust and other sources he had cultivated in the Soviet Union in 1925. Once in power, Piłsudski ran an operation to test the information supplied by the Trust. Having compared a Soviet mobilization schedule he received from the Trust to another from his own sources, he returned the former to his general staff with a one-word notation: "fake."³⁰ After a moment of shock, the Second Department began to use Soviet-variety operations against the Soviets. What the Soviets called "disinformation" or "maskirovka" the Poles called "inspiration." Rather than simply arresting Soviet agents, they began to release false information to known informants. The goal was not only to sow confusion, but to "inspire" Soviet organs to make policies counter to their own interests. Henceforth Poles and Soviets "inspired" each other, releasing falsified documents that over- or underestimated actual military capabilities.³¹ (Polish and German military intelligence also engaged in an inspiration contest, the Germans after 1933 preferring to inspire *en plus*, exaggerating military capabilities.)³² Piłsudski also took the diplomatic corps in hand, appointing known quantities to important eastern posts.³³ He also oversaw efforts to regain control of the border from the Soviet state security police. In the early 1920s, neither Poland nor the Soviet Union reliably controlled movement across their shared border. While the Poles failed to catch revolutionaries, the Soviets failed to catch smugglers. The Soviets had begun in 1923 to demarcate and control border zones. Whereas Poland had perhaps enjoyed comparable ability to send armed groups across the border in 1921 and 1922, between 1923 and 1926 the Soviet position seems to have been far superior. The

chaos Józewski had observed in Volhynia was the result of the relative superiority of Soviet border control, which permitted offensive as well as defensive policies. Poland's belated response was to create a Border Defense Corps.³⁴

A LITERARY DISCUSSION

Piłsudski announced a change of policy towards Polish minorities, including the Ukrainian minority. He understood that Moscow had used the Ukrainian question against Poland by supporting Ukrainian culture, and by promising the future incorporation of Volhynia and Galicia into Soviet Ukraine.³⁵ Piłsudski took part in a 16 August 1926 meeting of the council of ministers which ordered a wholesale revision of Poland's policy to its national minorities, with the goal of "drawing these people into the Polish state system."³⁶ The National Democrats had imagined that the Slavic minorities could be nationally assimilated; Piłsudski's team wished to make state institutions attractive to different cultural groups. Henryk Józewski was one of the main engineers of this new policy. Józewski was dispatched to the eastern border provinces to study the conditions there, and was then sent to Volhynia in 1928 as governor to carry out a program of toleration to that province's Ukrainian majority. As minister of internal affairs, Józewski took responsibility in 1929 for a new round of negotiations with the Orthodox Church, meant to regulate its status within the Polish state and to make loyal Polish citizens of its 1.5 million Ukrainian believers.³⁷

Tadeusz Hołówko, another of Piłsudski's men of trust, was charged with the design of general policies meant to change Ukrainian perceptions of Poland. Hołówko, like Józewski, was an old socialist conspirator from the Russian Empire. Hołówko intended to challenge Soviet intellectual hegemony on the Ukrainian question by presenting alternative sources of information and analysis on events in the Soviet Union. Immediately after the May 1926 coup, a major news service (the Polish Telegraph Agency "Express") hired Ukrainians to edit its coverage of the Soviet Union.³⁸ The state founded an Institute for the Study of Nationality Affairs, as well as a Ukrainian Scholarly Institute.³⁹ To stock the libraries of these new institutes, Polish diplomats in the USSR bought Soviet editions of Ukrainian literature and sent them by regular post to Warsaw. Since 1923, the Soviets had published the classics of Ukrainian literature, as part of a program to draw the population of Soviet Ukraine to communist rule by way of national culture. For Warsaw, the Soviet project was a kind of mail-order labor-saving device.⁴⁰

A path once laid can be followed in both directions. Since 1923, Moscow had

been using the Ukrainian question against Poland, supporting Ukrainian culture in Soviet Ukraine, and calling for Poland's eastern provinces to be joined to the Soviet Union. Within Poland's borders, the Communist Party of West Ukraine had exploited the Ukrainian national question to increase its own support, thereby improving Moscow's strategic position in eastern Europe. In 1926, Warsaw tried to reverse the direction of influence. If the perception of Polish oppression could weaken the Polish state, then the perception of Polish toleration could strengthen it. Like their Soviet counterparts, Piłsudski and his allies believed that culture was politics, that domestic policy was foreign policy, and that any gain for one side was a loss for the other. Concessions in national culture, they believed, created loyalty in politics; loyalty in politics among Ukrainians necessarily crossed the Soviet-Polish border, and it was impossible to be loyal to both Moscow and Warsaw. Polish concessions would weaken the appeal of communism inside Poland, and the hold of Soviet power in Soviet Ukraine.⁴¹ Tadeusz Hołówko's new guidelines for regional governors, sent in late 1926, mandated that Ukrainians receive "complete equal rights, de jure and de facto" in the aim of "awakening a Ukrainian national movement in Soviet Ukraine in the spirit of West European culture and civilization."⁴²

In an apparently happy coincidence for Polish policy, a national revival was already underway in Soviet Ukraine. Polish diplomats, Polish spies, Ukrainian patriots, and the Soviet secret police all registered the same impression: that Soviet ukrainization policies had opened the way for a fabulous renaissance of Ukrainian culture, in which a new generation of Soviet Ukrainian writers was choosing a European course.⁴³ A popular Ukrainian communist writer, Mykola Khvył'ovyi, called Europe a "psychological category that thrust humanity forward," and dismissed Ukrainians who followed Russian examples as "illiterate weasels." In his article "Apologists of Scribbling" of February and March 1926, Khvył'ovyi asked: "by which of the world's literatures should we set our course?" And answered: "*On no account by the Russian*. This is definite and unconditional. Our political union must not be confused with literature. Ukrainian poetry must flee as quickly as possible from Russian literature and its styles." He continued: "The point is that Russian literature has weighed down on us for centuries as master of the situation, as one that has conditioned our psyche to play the slavish imitator. And so, to nourish our young art on it would be to impede its development. The proletariat's ideas did not reach us through Muscovite art; on the contrary, we, as representatives of a young nation, can better apprehend these ideas, better cast them in appropriate images. Our orientation is to western European art, its style, its techniques."⁴⁴ Ukraine

can only fulfill its socialist mission, he concluded, if it is allowed to develop its national culture, and to become a national state. These are the stages of European development.

THE SHUMS'KYI AFFAIR

The Soviet Ukrainian "Literary Discussion" initiated by Khvyl'ovyi was linked to a Soviet power struggle known as the Shums'kyi Affair. Oleksandr Shums'kyi was a Ukrainian national communist who had joined the Bolsheviks in 1920. In 1921 he had done his new comrades a great service, reporting from Warsaw on plans for the Winter March. In 1923, he had helped to organize the Communist Party of West Ukraine.⁴⁵ After his return to the Soviet Union, he was appointed commissar for education of Soviet Ukraine in 1924. In Moscow in October 1925, Shums'kyi complained to Stalin about the pace of ukrainization, and in particular about the low numbers of Ukrainians in high party positions. He was apparently troubled by the appointment of Lazar Kaganovich, a Jew, as general secretary of the Ukrainian section of the Bolshevik Party.⁴⁶ It seems that he was displeased that Moscow sent people to govern Ukraine who, in his opinion, did not understand the Ukrainian question. Kaganovich, like communists of Jewish origin generally, maintained that he had left religious and national questions behind by becoming a communist.⁴⁷ Matters were not so simple as this. In fact, nationalism would color the Soviet system from the beginning to the end, Kaganovich himself exemplifying its unavoidability. A fervent communist who served Stalin without reserve, Kaganovich supported ukrainization as a way to stabilize the Soviet system. Yet in Soviet Ukraine he was often regarded not only as part of the ruling elite, but also as a Jew. Revolutionaries such as Kaganovich might believe that they had abandoned the traditions of their families, but they could not erase their public association with their larger groups. Regardless of the lack of emotional importance of group affiliation to individual communists, it mattered in Soviet society.

Yet the basic problem was not the background of this or that communist leader, who after all could be rotated and purged. The fundamental issue lay within the ethical and institutional structure of the Soviet Union itself.⁴⁸ The disappearance of national identity was close to the center of the communist ideal, yet its appearance was unavoidable in policies designed to bring about that ideal. Any policy favoring one nationality, whatever its ultimate purposes, had to work to the detriment of other nationalities. Ukrainization created openings for people defined as Ukrainians, but reduced prospects for Russians

and Jews.⁴⁹ Precisely because Kaganovich was Jewish, he could advance ukrainization without accusations of anti-Semitism.⁵⁰ Such affirmative action policies required not only that the population be identified as belonging to one nationality or another, but also that party activists, as politicians, consider the gains and losses to themselves. They could choose to ignore such considerations on principle, but not without forfeiting opportunities for patronage. As with any policy of affirmative action, ukrainization raised questions of ethics—who was it right to promote; identity—who belongs to what group; and politics: which leaders will gain and lose support as a result. Communists had to be alert to these local consequences of ukrainization: the careers made or broken that earned loyalty, the national identification choices that would define census results and perhaps even republican borders, all of which were still at this time in flux.⁵¹

Kaganovich was indeed an author of ukrainization policies, but his very presence meant that the ukrainization of the party, as Shums'kyi saw matters, was far from complete. Affirmative action for Ukrainians seemed to have a glass ceiling. Shums'kyi was not entirely unreasonable in expecting some support from Stalin, who considered himself an expert on nationality questions. Yet Kaganovich was Stalin's close ally. He was perhaps the first Stalinist; he apparently coined the term. He referred to Stalin as "our father."⁵² Stalin asked Kaganovich to reply to Shums'kyi's complaints, a challenge Kaganovich ably met. In order to convey where hasty ukrainization might lead, Kaganovich sent Stalin clippings from Khvyl'ovyi's article "Apologists of Scribbling." Kaganovich knew that Stalin believed, personally, in the superiority of Russian culture, and would be stung by Khvyl'ovyi's venom.⁵³ Khvyl'ovyi wrote in an extravagantly literary Ukrainian, full of Latin citations and obscure references. There is little chance that Stalin actually followed Khvyl'ovyi's argument. It cannot have helped that Khvyl'ovyi, though a convinced Marxist, cited with approval Dmytro Dontsov, the "most intelligent and consistent of the Ukrainian fascists" (in Khvyl'ovyi's words).⁵⁴ Stalin probably did not know that Khvyl'ovyi's position was quite extreme even among the western-oriented Ukrainian writers, and that Kaganovich had selected the most provocative passages. Judging by the underlining, Stalin was angered by what he read. In April 1926, Stalin endorsed Kaganovich's leadership of the Ukrainian party, while granting that the ukrainization of the party should proceed as quickly as possible.⁵⁵

Shums'kyi did not concede. In June 1926 the Central Committee of the Ukrainian section of the Bolshevik Party rejected the view, attributed to Shums'kyi, that only ethnic Ukrainians could direct a Ukrainian party. Shums'kyi contin-

ued to insist that the ukrainization of the party and society in Soviet Ukraine had only begun, and that the party had embarrassingly little to offer to the Ukrainian people. In February 1927, the Ukrainian Central Committee convened to put an end to the matter. The speeches had been written, the motions had been prepared, and Shums'kyi's fate should have been sealed. And yet, to the surprise of the assembly, Shums'kyi found support from certain Ukrainian comrades: leaders of the West Ukrainian Communist Party, guests from Poland. West Ukrainian communists were unused to the ruthless party discipline of the Soviet Union, and perhaps did not quite understand the nature of the meeting. They certainly grasped, however, that a matter of vital importance was at stake. For them, the Ukrainian question was a political issue of the first importance. These communists knew that a condemnation of Shums'kyi would be poorly received by cadres and constituents in Poland.⁵⁶

This disagreement within the communist camp coincided with heightened Soviet concerns about Polish intervention. The spring of 1927 was a high point in the Polish "war scare."⁵⁷ Soviet leaders may or may not have known that Warsaw had secretly reestablished the general staff of a Ukrainian People's Republic army in February 1927, and that its intelligence operations had commenced in March.⁵⁸ It is certain, however, that they suspected that Piłsudski's new openness to the Ukrainian minority in Poland was part of a larger international design. In April 1927 Poland intentionally revealed that it had cracked Moscow's Trust operation.⁵⁹ That was the moment when the Shums'kyi Affair reached its crisis. The Ukrainian section of the Bolshevik Party failed to force the West Ukrainian Communist Party to condemn Shums'kyi.⁶⁰ Then, in May 1927, Great Britain revealed that its signals intelligence had been reading Soviet diplomatic correspondence, and announced that in view of its awareness of hostile Soviet actions it would sever diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. In public at least, Soviet leaders treated this British step as a hostile maneuver presaging an imminent attack by Britain's supposed ally Poland. The assassination, in June 1927, of the Soviet envoy to Poland in Warsaw was assimilated to this larger plot of world capitalism against the homeland of revolution.⁶¹

As Stalin used the war scare to cower opposition, authorities in Soviet Ukraine found themselves in a difficult position.⁶² Although in principle the Ukrainian section of the Bolshevik Party supported Ukrainian culture, during the Shums'kyi Affair the Ukrainian question became freighted with an association with Polish military aggression and international imperialism. Since the party line now emphasized the risk of war with Britain and Poland, and since

Soviet Ukraine was seen as the theater of war, Soviet Ukrainian communists were required to redouble their criticism of comrades inside Poland. Most of them probably believed the war scare; even if they did not, they had to disassociate themselves from the Communist Party of West Ukraine's "national deviation" if they wished to safeguard their careers. In June 1927, the Ukrainian section of the Bolshevik Party lectured West Ukrainian communists that Shums'kyi's position "works in favor of Piłsudski's government and its national policy in western Ukraine, which is dictated in its full force against the USSR and which covers up the preparations for war against the Soviet Union under the flag of a real 'independent' Ukraine."⁶³

This failed to persuade, and the crisis continued. In autumn 1927, Kaganovich and other Ukrainian Bolsheviks explained that Piłsudski had copied the Soviet program of ukrainization, was attracting the Ukrainian middle classes in Poland to his program, and intended to use Ukrainians in a war of aggression against the USSR.⁶⁴ The Communist Party of West Ukraine, they claimed, believed that only those of "Ukrainian blood" could be good Ukrainian communists. (In the heat of the moment, some Ukrainian Bolsheviks committed a similar error, suggesting that the only good communists within the West Ukrainian Communist Party were Jews.)⁶⁵ Yet the leading West Ukrainian communists, Ukrainians and Jews alike, remained unmoved. Their own political survival in Poland required popular support. If they wished to retain support in Volhynia, they had to treat nationalism as a local issue rather than an international menace. They believed they understood their terrain better than Kaganovich in the Soviet Ukrainian capital of Kharkiv, 750 kilometers away. They could defy their Soviet comrades for a time, although in doing so they risked denunciation. In November 1927, a minority fraction of the West Ukrainian Communist Party denounced the leadership, noting that the leaders had been unimpressed by the extent of ukrainization in Soviet Ukraine. The threat from the Right, wrote the minority to Kharkiv, was real.⁶⁶

Soviet Ukrainian communists probably awaited just such a denunciation, so they would know who to place at the top of a purged West Ukrainian party. In January 1928, the West Ukrainian communist leaders found that their party had been dissolved. Most of them refused to submit, and reestablished their party on their own initiative. This majority fraction, during its brief existence, sent a letter to the Communist International in February 1928 claiming to be the orthodox communist party, and arguing that the Ukrainian section of the Bolshevik Party represented a Russian national deviation. This daring appeal took seriously two questionable ideas. The first was that the party line could ac-

tually be debated by comrades of various countries. In fact, the party line was a matter of political dispute only among a few comrades in Moscow, and was to be accepted by other parties without dissent. The second questionable idea was that the Communist International was a free union of various communist parties which could independently adjudicate disputes among them. It was in fact a transmission belt conveying Soviet policies to obedient organizations around the world. In a furious response to this appeal, the Soviet Ukrainian leadership called the West Ukrainian communists allies of Polish fascism and tools of international imperialism. The alliance of communist parties collapsed amidst mutual recriminations and factional struggle.⁶⁷ It would be years before Ukrainian communism would again pose a serious problem in Poland.

CONTRADICTIONS

By 1928, Warsaw had seized the Ukrainian national question and used it against the Soviet Union. Soviet Ukrainian leaders now said that Poland's southeast, which they called West Ukraine, had become a magnet for discontent within Soviet Ukraine.⁶⁸ West Ukraine was no longer an outpost of revolution in Europe; instead it was a *place d'armes* where "world imperialism concentrates the preparation of war against the USSR."⁶⁹ The Shums'kyi Affair had illustrated two painful contradictions within the idea of Ukrainian communism itself.⁷⁰ One was in domestic politics, in the consolidation of the Bolshevik Party's ability to rule the multinational Soviet Union. In the early 1920s, party leadership and membership in Ukraine was largely Russian.⁷¹ As late as 1929 Ukrainians held only 26 % of high party posts in Soviet Ukraine.⁷² To gain support for communism, communists supported Ukrainian national culture. Yet Ukrainians who expressed themselves in their own language, including leading Ukrainian communists, sometimes took positions that were politically intolerable. Khvył'ovyi, and quite possibly Shums'kyi, wanted Ukrainian independence.

The second contradiction was in foreign relations, or rather in the Soviet attempt to channel domestic national questions against neighboring states. In the 1920s, national desires that could not be satisfied at home were diverted abroad. The creation of the Soviet Union in 1922 had addressed national questions by way of formally national republics; the national strategy in foreign affairs of 1923 had sought to direct the attention of unsatisfied national populations to Poland and other neighbors. Nationalism was defined as progressive when it was beyond the borders of the Soviet Union, and might weaken its cap-

italist and imperialist enemies. So long as Poland was governed by center-right coalitions, from 1923 to 1926, it had presented an inviting target. It lacked policies that appealed to its own national minorities, and could be presented as a bourgeois state. Yet in using the Ukrainian question against Poland, the Soviet Union had opened a Pandora's box.⁷³ If communists could use nationalism to appeal to Ukrainians as a nation, perhaps Piłsudski and his camp could do the same. If the Bolsheviks could use national questions instrumentally to attract social groups that had no class interest in Soviet rule, perhaps Poles could copy the tactic to equal effect. Worst of all, if the Soviet Union could transform domestic national questions into weapons in international affairs, then Poland might do the same thing. After all, if Ukrainians in Poland could speak of national liberation, why not Ukrainians in the Soviet Union? If Moscow could inspire Ukrainians in Soviet Ukraine to criticize Warsaw, why could Warsaw not inspire Ukrainians in Poland to criticize Moscow? That indeed is what Piłsudski and his men of trust intended.

Piłsudski and his men of trust understood that Soviet ukrainization was an opportunity, and chose domestic policies that exploited Soviet strategies. The Shums'kyi Affair revealed Moscow's Ukrainian fears. Warsaw understood the Shums'kyi Affair as an invitation to probe further. The Polish foreign ministry's nationalities bulletin claimed that Soviet Ukraine was not, contrary to the Soviet line, national in form and socialist in content. It was national in form and nationalist in content.⁷⁴ In foreign affairs, Poland's men of trust went a step further. They encouraged Ukrainians in the Soviet Union to draw political conclusions from cultural progress, to organize an independence movement within the Soviet Union. This policy was named after Prometheus, the titan who gave Pandora that troublesome box in the first place.

Chapter 2 Promethean

Ukraine

The Promethean Movement was an anticommunist international, designed to destroy the Soviet Union and to create independent states from its republics. While Moscow tried to use communist parties in European countries to protect its own interests, Prometheans tried to use national questions within the Soviet Union to undermine communism. The name of the movement was ambiguous: to some suggesting the ancient culture of the oppressed nations themselves, to others the idea of bringing fire from outside to the darkness within the Soviet Union. It brought together grand strategists of Warsaw and exiled patriots whose attempts to found independent states had been thwarted by the Bolsheviks. Symon Petliura and his exiled Ukrainian People's Republic joined forces with other defeated patriots from the Caucasus and Central Asia.

The exiled patriots needed help from states that wished to undermine Soviet rule.¹ Prometheanism was supported by European powers hostile to the Soviet Union, morally by Britain and France, politically and financially by Poland.² It resembled initiatives taken during the First World War to support national minorities against enemy empires (the League of Oppressed Nations of Russia, the Congress of Op-

pressed Nationalities), from which Poland had benefited and Polish Prometheans had learned.³ There were, however, three important differences. First, Prometheanism was an intellectual response to an ideology, not simply a mechanism to dissolve an enemy empire. Russia was portrayed as an eternal empire suppressing its nations, but Polish Prometheans understood that the Soviet Union was more than an emanation of Russian imperialism. They were eager, in fact, to turn Soviet nationality policy against the Soviet Union. Second, Prometheanism was a project undertaken during peacetime, sustained over fifteen years. It was not a momentary tactic exploiting a wartime conjuncture, but a concerted strategy to weaken international communism. Third, although Prometheanism involved certain elements of propaganda, its most important activities were secret. Earlier attempts to exploit national questions had their secret aspects, but their essence was the loud promise of future independence in exchange for immediate military support. Poland kept its alliances with national leaders as quiet as possible, while offering them substantial help.

Prometheanism was never an official policy of any Polish government, and had no support from Polish political parties, who were never consulted. In the early 1920s, the idea was developed in the Second Department of the general staff and the Eastern Department of the foreign ministry. Piłsudski had withdrawn from politics in 1922, but continued to exercise considerable influence in these ministries. In the early 1920s, Piłsudski hosted exiled leaders of the non-Russian nations (Crimean Tatars, Georgians, and Ukrainians) in his private home, and put them in touch with his trusted colleagues.⁴ For a time, the Promethean project was largely a matter of preserving personal connections. Henryk Józewski and Stanisław Stempowski remained in close touch with the Ukrainian political emigration in Poland. Jerzy Stempowski maintained contact with Ukrainian exiles in France. In June 1924, he also met with the Turkish scholar and politician Zeki Velidi Togan in Berlin. He listened to Togan's description of the suffering of the Central Asian Turkic peoples, and counseled the Turk to join forces with the other non-Russian nations.⁵ By 1925, Piłsudski wished to organize Prometheanism, a project he entrusted to Tadeusz Hołówko. Hołówko remained the chief Promethean after Piłsudski's coup of May 1926. After 1926, the project was coordinated by Piłsudski's trusted men across several ministries, not only Foreign Affairs and Defense, but also Internal Affairs and Religion. It was also given covert funding. The budget for the Promethean project, distributed among these ministries, was 900,000 zlotys for 1927, peaked at 1,450,000 zlotys in 1932, and was 900,000 zlotys in 1939.⁶ The Polish Prometheans met regularly in clandestine interministerial sessions.⁷

Hołowko's formal position was director of the Eastern Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After Piłsudski's coup, the non-Russian nationalities sent appeals to the Polish government, and Piłsudski sent Hołowko to them. Hołowko helped to organize the representatives of the non-Russian secessionist movements in Paris, and sponsored their French-language publication *Prométhée*.⁸ With the help of his own trusted men within the Polish diplomatic corps, Hołowko also attended closely to Ankara and Teheran, where permanent Promethean outposts were established. In the Near East, Hołowko wished to enlist Turkish support for a pan-Turkic rebellion in the southern Soviet Union, and Iranian support for a Caucasian federation that would remove Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Caucasian mountain regions (such as Chechnya) from the Soviet Union. Two Polish ambassadors to Turkey were old socialist comrades of Piłsudski. The diplomat in charge of Promethean activity in Ankara was Tadeusz Schätzel of the Second Department.⁹ The director of the Second Department, Tadeusz Pełczyński, ordered studies of the history and demography of the Caucasus.¹⁰ Warsaw sponsored the would-be Caucasian Confederation, and paid especial attention to the possibility of an independent Georgia.¹¹ The Polish consulate in Tblisi was famously active, despite the absence of a Polish population to justify traditional consular work. When some of Hołowko's Georgian contacts were tried in the Soviet Ukrainian capital of Kharkiv in 1927, his role became widely known. Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet commissar for foreign affairs, made a habit of protesting Hołowko's initiatives.¹²

The Promethean project revealed a preoccupation with the Soviet rather than the German threat. Piłsudski and the Prometheans knew that Poland was surrounded by two hostile powers, but underestimated Germany. Piłsudski believed that Germany was too weak economically and militarily to pose a threat in the decade to come. This idea, perhaps appropriate when Piłsudski left politics in 1922, was out of date when he returned to power in 1926. Germany was reclaiming its status in Europe. At the Locarno Conference in October 1925, Germany was readmitted to the West European system. Meanwhile, Germany hid an *Ostpolitik* inside its *Westorientierung*, cooperating with Moscow on the assumption that borders in the east could be revised. Soviet leaders found a partner for their proposition that "the ethnographic principle" should prevail in the east: that Moscow had a right to eastern Poland, just as Berlin had a legitimate claim to the Baltic coast and the Free City of Gdańsk. In April 1926, just prior to Piłsudski's coup, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a neutral-

ity pact.¹³ The two powers then intensified secret military cooperation.¹⁴ Warsaw had good information about this relationship, but assimilated it to the Soviet rather than the German threat.

When the Polish Prometheans looked west, it was often to Paris, where many of their contacts had emigrated. Hołowko shuttled between Warsaw, Paris, and Ankara. He might once have slipped across the border to Soviet Ukraine. In Warsaw he received correspondence in half a dozen languages, but mostly in Russian, the common language of Moscow's enemies. He had to resolve national quarrels between his many clients, decide which émigré publications to support, and make judgments about which politicians could plausibly take power. In other words, he had to manage a kind of alternative geopolitics, a giant imaginative preparation for a world without the Soviet Union.¹⁵ Prometheanism was the grand idea that Piłsudski's confederates brought to bear against the grand idea of world communism, but it was an idea that was demanding in practice. Hołowko found Promethean connections taking his organizations very far afield: checking the possible Bolshevik past of a library assistant in Cairo, sending twenty dollars to a mysterious princess in Paris. . . .

ANTICOMMUNISM AND ANTI-SEMITISM

Hołowko's most important contact in Paris was Symon Petliura, leader of the Ukrainian People's Republic. Hołowko saw Piłsudski's return to power as a chance to make good on old promises.¹⁶ Piłsudski's coup brought a dizzying rise and fall of hopes. For ten days in May 1926, it appeared that the old accord between Piłsudski and Petliura would be revived, that Petliura might return from Paris to Warsaw and perhaps thence to Kyiv and power. Yet on 25 May Petliura lay bleeding in the Quartier Latin, mortally wounded by an assassin's bullets. Although no connection between the assassin, Samuel Schwartzbard, and Moscow has been proven, Poles (and Ukrainian patriots) took for granted that Petliura was killed because he had become dangerous to the Soviet Union. Schwartzbard, who had fought in the French Foreign Legion and with the Bolsheviks, claimed that he killed Petliura as revenge for the pogroms that had wracked Ukraine seven years earlier. Although there is no evidence that Petliura had ordered pogroms, or that he was an anti-Semite, his person was associated with the crimes of the armies he commanded.¹⁷

In 1919–1920, tens of thousands of Jews had been murdered in Ukraine, most of them by troops that were either under Petliura's formal command or as-

sociated with the Ukrainian state. Heartbreaking tales of Jewish survivors created a sense of righteous indignation that was turned against the party to the affair who could no longer speak for himself. A French jury acquitted Schwartzbard on grounds of justifiable homicide.¹⁸ Petliura's wife Ol'ha had to pay the court costs, and was awarded one franc in civil damages for the murder of her husband. Many Ukrainians found their grief infected by anger: a national leader had been assassinated, and the verdict of the court in a European republic was that he deserved death. Schwartzbard's motives remain a mystery. It is possible that he meant to sacrifice himself to avenge Ukrainian Jewry, as he claimed.¹⁹ It is also possible that the assassination was planned by the Soviets, who in decades to follow would murder several exiled Ukrainian politicians.²⁰ These two possibilities are not mutually exclusive: the motives of controllers and agents need only coincide at the point of action, they need not be identical in every respect. If a goal of the planner of the assassination was to worsen Ukrainian-Jewish relations in Poland and Europe, then the operation was a success.²¹ Whatever Schwartzbard's intentions, this consequence of his trial was feared by many who wished both Ukrainians and Jews well. Jerzy Stempowski, for example, had organized a meeting between the Jewish and Ukrainian defense committees before the trial.²² After the trial, Petliura was associated first and foremost with anti-Semitism.

If the goal of the assassination was to prevent Polish-Ukrainian cooperation by removing the main Ukrainian partner, then the action was a more qualified success. Petliura, an old partner of Piłsudski with some popular support in Soviet Ukraine, had been eliminated. Yet the connections between the Ukrainian People's Republic and Piłsudski and his men of trust remained strong. Józefski's boyhood friend from Kyiv, Oleksandr Shul'hyn, served as the foreign minister of the exiled Ukrainian People's Republic in Paris. Petliura's successor as leader of the Ukrainian People's Republic, Andrii Livyts'kyi, had negotiated the original Polish-Ukrainian alliance with Piłsudski in 1920. After the assassination, Livyts'kyi appealed for Piłsudski's help. The Polish foreign minister, August Zaleski, reactivated contacts with the Ukrainian People's Republic across Europe. Zaleski urged Polish diplomats to stay abreast of developments in the Ukrainian emigration. Hołówko continued undaunted in his program to rebuild the Polish-Ukrainian alliance.²³ The Second Department, following Piłsudski's orders, continued its Promethean program to build "political cooperation" with Ukrainian and other organizations "based on the common aspiration to shatter Russia into a series of nation-states."²⁴

THE HETMAN OUTPOST

The political cooperation included secret military cooperation. About thirty-five Ukrainians were brought into the Polish army as contract officers.²⁵ In the greatest of secrecy, the army of the Ukrainian People's Republic was reestablished on Polish soil on 28 February 1927. The Ukrainian General Staff's primary goals were the rapid recruitment and training of a military force, and the creation of conditions in Soviet Ukraine favorable to outside intervention.²⁶ The staff was divided into three sections. The First Section, commanded by Pavlo Shandruk, was responsible for war planning. It recruited and listed real and potential Ukrainian officers and soldiers, and redrew mobilization plans for another war against the Soviet Union. War planning included schemes for the occupation of Soviet Ukraine.²⁷ The Second Section was responsible for intelligence and counterintelligence. Its main task was the organization of clandestine cells in Soviet Ukraine from Kyiv westward, reliable people to be exploited in case of war. It was also expected to run Ukrainian agents from Poland to Soviet Ukraine.²⁸ The Third Section was responsible for the production of propaganda to be distributed on the Soviet side of the border.²⁹

By this time, the Second Department had established a covert intelligence outpost in Soviet Ukraine, codenamed "Hetman." It was directed by the Ukrainian intelligence specialist Mykola Chebotariv. Chebotariv, an unusually shadowy figure in a world of mysterious characters, had been the head of Petliura's bodyguard during the March on Kyiv in 1920.³⁰ He was on the payroll of the Second Department no later than 1924.³¹ In 1927, Chebotariv assumed command of the Ukrainian army's Second Section.³² Although the Ukrainian Second Section was funded by the Polish Second Department, their interests were by no means identical. Warsaw had reestablished a Ukrainian army for its own purposes; the leaders of the Ukrainian People's Republic wished to exploit this opportunity to recommence their political lives. It was natural that Chebotariv would work for both institutions, and inevitable that each might wonder where his ultimate loyalties lay.

Chebotariv had the relevant experience to lead Outpost Hetman. He had been crossing into Soviet Ukraine on Polish orders since 1924 at the latest, and understood the opportunity afforded by Soviet ukrainization policies. In a letter of January 1925, he wrote that these policies had backfired, creating an intelligentsia and a new generation that supported Ukrainian independence. "These are entirely our people," wrote Chebotariv, "and the authorities are not

foolish to call them Petliurites.”³³ The Soviets had sponsored a cultural life that recalled the dreams of the Ukrainian People’s Republic for national self-expression in an independent Ukraine. The first known report from Outpost Hetman, of February 1927, abounds in optimism that this flourishing Ukrainian culture could be oriented towards the struggle for full political independence: “Contemporary Ukraine has changed beyond recognition, and to our benefit. In a word, a national Ukraine has been reborn, and slowly but steadily moves towards the attainment of full independence from Moscow.”³⁴ At a time when all observers mentioned the renaissance of Ukrainian culture, Chebotariv’s reports were exceptionally enthusiastic. His assertion that cultural revival was connected to political organization was unusual, but presumably he was in a position to know.

Chebotariv communicated with Warsaw by couriers sent across the Polish-Soviet border in Volhynia. Chebotariv and other Ukrainian officers in Polish service were sent to Kharkiv, Soviet Ukraine’s capital and the scene of the Shums’kyi Affair.³⁵ Kharkiv was almost certainly the center of Outpost Hetman. Warsaw watched the Shums’kyi Affair through the eyes of its Ukrainian agents, who offered some insight. Chebotariv understood, for example, the special role of Stalin’s close associate Lazar Kaganovich. He or another Ukrainian officer described Kaganovich as a “Ukrainophile Jew,” which meant that Kaganovich understood the political necessity of ukrainization, without seeing Ukrainian culture as an end in itself. Kaganovich opposed Shums’kyi, on the grounds that an overhasty ukrainization of the party and the working class would risk Ukrainian secession from the Soviet Union. But Kaganovich also supported the ukrainization of culture and of the state apparatus, as a requirement for the durability of Soviet rule in the republic. This was still the line of the Ukrainian section of the Bolshevik Party after the Shums’kyi Affair, and it was a position that the Second Department meant to exploit.³⁶

Intelligence gathering was the least important of Hetman’s activities.³⁷ Its main task was apparently to exploit the Ukrainian question against Soviet rule. As early as 1924, Chebotariv reported that he had encountered an organization called the Alliance of Struggle for an Independent Ukraine, in Kharkiv. He wrote in 1925 of the organization as a native growth, sympathetic to the exiled Ukrainian People’s Republic but organized within Soviet Ukraine.³⁸ By early 1927, Chebotariv described himself as carrying out important organizational work for the Alliance. He reported that he had “renewed in the larger centers the political organizations liquidated by the Bolsheviks. The going is all the easier, since the national liberation movement already includes all Ukrainian ele-

ments, including some circles of Ukrainian communists; indeed this movement has taken on such impetus and such shape, that there is today no force that could restrain it.”³⁹ The Alliance, he wrote, was not associated with any party, and was intended as a pan-national paramilitary organization with one simple task: “the political and technical preparation for an All-Ukrainian Uprising to win by force of arms an Independent Ukraine.”⁴⁰

In autumn 1927, Chebotariv distributed the first issue of a publication, almost certainly designed by the Third Section of the Ukrainian General Staff and printed in Poland: *To Arms! The Organ of the Alliance of Struggle for an Independent Ukraine*. It included a detailed indictment of the Soviet system. Its program of independence for all lands under Soviet rule (without mention of Ukrainian lands under Polish rule) revealed its likely Polish sponsorship. All Ukrainians in Soviet Ukraine were told to prepare for an armed uprising for national independence.⁴¹ In November 1927, Chebotariv wrote of the successful completion of “a colossal organizational labor.”⁴² Beginning in spring 1928, Ukrainian agents from Poland began to smuggle thousands of anti-Soviet posters and pamphlets into Soviet Ukraine, calling on peasants to resist Soviet policies.⁴³ This initiative, with which Chebotariv was probably involved, was not something that he controlled. The Polish general staff must have approved such an ambitious undertaking. Chebotariv directed the Second Section, which recruited the border crossers. Yet the actual propaganda was designed by the Third Section. As initiatives organized in Poland began to take shape, Chebotariv’s relative importance as an officer working in Ukraine perhaps declined.

In 1928 something had gone wrong in the internal politics of Outpost Hetman. Chebotariv wore three hats in these years: he was a leader of an illegal organization in Soviet Ukraine, the head of counterintelligence for a Ukrainian army based in Poland, and an officer of Polish intelligence. As a revolutionary in Soviet Ukraine he experienced (or at least reported) success, and as an employee of the Polish state he was rewarded. The problematic connection was with the leadership of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, in particular with its leader Andrii Livyts’kyi. Chebotariv expressed the belief that Soviet Ukrainians longed for the restoration of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, but that its present exile leadership, after the assassination of Petliura, was unsuited to the great task of national revolution. Perhaps Chebotariv preferred to run a Polish conspiracy in Soviet Ukraine than to take orders from Ukrainian émigrés. He maintained that his Soviet Ukrainian contacts wished to be free of any formal association with the Ukrainian People’s Republic government in Poland, and in

particular with its head, Andrii Livyts'kyi. Whatever his motives, he could claim, reasonably enough, that obvious connections with foreign governments undermined the legitimacy of the national movement.

Chebotariv and Livyts'kyi were engaged in a competition for power, and for the legacy of Petliura. Livyts'kyi had been chosen to lead the Ukrainian People's Republic after Petliura's assassination, but Chebotariv was in possession of Petliura's personal archive (or so it was generally believed). Time after time, Chebotariv threatened his political rivals with exposure of past misdeeds, until the Petliura archive gained a legendary status among Ukrainian émigrés. Livyts'kyi was personally responsible for the legal continuity of the Ukrainian People's Republic, while Chebotariv controlled much of its documentation. Livyts'kyi, who was personally hesitant about operations in Soviet Ukraine, called for Chebotariv's resignation. Livyts'kyi said that Chebotariv was a Soviet agent; his real fear may have been that Chebotariv valued his Polish paymasters more than his fellow countrymen, and placed Polish above Ukrainian interests. This, of course, was not an accusation that would persuade the Polish paymasters. Chebotariv, in his turn, said that the Soviets had a mole close to Livyts'kyi.⁴⁴ Livyts'kyi won the contest for Petliura's legacy by appealing to Piłsudski, Petliura's onetime ally. Chebotariv was recalled from Soviet Ukraine in late 1928, and was asked, in mysterious circumstances, to leave Poland in spring 1929. At that moment, the Soviet secret police began to apprehend members of what they described as a Polish plot among intellectuals in Soviet Ukraine.

THE GPU

Vsevolod Balyts'kyi, the head of the GPU, the Soviet secret police, in Ukraine was an old hand in Polish-Ukrainian relations. Born in 1892, the same year as Józewski, he was of the same revolutionary generation. He also dabbled in art during the revolution: while Józewski designed rather good stage sets, Balyts'kyi wrote rather bad poetry about rivers of blood. Balyts'kyi too spent the Polish-Bolshevik War in Ukraine, and he too was responsible for political intelligence. Balyts'kyi directed the Cheka in Ukraine during the Polish-Bolshevik War, overmastering the Polish and Ukrainian intelligence organizations of Józewski and Chebotariv in 1919. Balyts'kyi was one of the Chekists responsible for the shallow graves that Józewski found upon his return to Kyiv in May 1920. The GPU chief was probably opposed to ukrainization from the start, and understood its political risks. As the party subsidized Ukrainian culture in

Soviet Ukraine, Balyts'kyi's officers followed every important member of the intelligentsia.⁴⁵ A GPU circular of September 1926 reads like a mirror image of Chebotariv's reports on Ukrainian culture and politics: both saw a cultural renaissance and connected it to support for state independence. In September 1927, a month before Chebotariv distributed the first issue of his revolutionary newspaper, Balyts'kyi presented ukrainization as an opportunity for Ukrainian nationalists to pursue independence by gaining recruits in the mass population. Balyts'kyi had no doubt that the "cultural struggle" was a tactic, part of a larger strategy of separatism, which he called the ideology of the Ukrainian counterrevolution.⁴⁶

Balyts'kyi paid special attention to Serhii Iefremov, the historian of literature who had agreed to cooperate with Józewski and Petliura in Kyiv in May 1920. In 1928, Balyts'kyi told Ukrainian party leaders that anti-Soviet elements had taken heart from Piłsudski's rise to power in Poland, and his officers began to persecute Iefremov for contacts with Ukrainian publications there. The Ukrainian politburo condemned Iefremov, who was indeed a critic of Soviet rule, for "counterrevolutionary activities."⁴⁷ In June 1929, Balyts'kyi told the Central Committee of the Ukrainian section of the Bolshevik Party that he had discovered a "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine."⁴⁸ This name was faintly similar to that of the Polish-sponsored organization that had actually existed until late 1928, the Alliance of Struggle for an Independent Ukraine. It was nearly identical to the name of a group supported by Austria and Germany during the First World War.⁴⁹ Iefremov was treated as the ringleader. An arrested student told the GPU where to find Iefremov's diaries. The diaries revealed Iefremov's "incorrect" evaluation of Petliura's assassination. The correct position in Soviet Ukraine was that Petliura had ordered pogroms and deserved to die. Iefremov had described the attitude of the Soviet press as "a cannibal dance on the grave of the murdered enemy."⁵⁰

In 1929, Petliura's legacy was a theme of the propaganda contest between Poland and the Soviet Union. Ukrainian officers in Poland published and distributed a broadside commemorating the third anniversary of Petliura's assassination. It presented a position radically opposed to the official Soviet presentation of these events: "The death of Symon Petliura only further united and strengthened us for the struggle to liberate our Fatherland!" It continued: "The time of terrible judgment is coming for our enemies! Let us prepare for it! Together with the Ukrainian People's Republic and its army, currently abroad, we will strike together against the Red bloodsuckers!"⁵¹ "Abroad" meant, of course, in Poland, where the Ukrainian army had indeed been reestablished.

This poster was printed in a run of thousands or perhaps tens of thousands, and distributed in Soviet Ukraine by Ukrainians in the employ of Polish intelligence.⁵² The GPU arrested old allies of Petliura that summer, and elicited confessions in which Petliura (by now long dead) played the central part.


In September 1929, Iefremov produced a written confession. "I acknowledge," he wrote, "the existence of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, a counterrevolutionary organization, and my membership in that organization, which was active among the Ukrainian intelligentsia from 1926. The main task of the organization was to struggle against Soviet power to create an independent Ukraine. The organization was founded in 1926 after the death of Petliura, when the hope appeared among some circles of Ukrainian intellectuals that his death would resonate among the broader masses and perhaps call forth an uprising."⁵³ The ultimate aim of the organization, confessed Iefremov, was to create a democratic Ukrainian People's Republic. Iefremov's characterization of the organization agrees in broad outline with the secret orders of Poland's Second Department, and with Chebotariv's descriptions of his own activity in Kharkiv. This might or might not have been a coincidence. The Ukrainian GPU either had no contemporary Polish documentation, or did not wish to reveal what it had. It did seem to be in possession of the archive of the Ukrainian People's Republic from earlier years.⁵⁴ If this is the case, the GPU might have known that Iefremov was Józewski's contact in Kyïv in 1920. Balyts'kyi treated the Union in the context of the Petliura-Piłsudski alliance, telling the party that the Union aimed to establish a Ukrainian People's Republic with Polish help.⁵⁵ Warsaw's own actions added some resonance to this confession that same month. In September 1929, Polish officials of the highest rank, including Hołówko and Józewski, attended a special memorial service for Petliura in Warsaw.⁵⁶

In autumn 1929, the Ukrainian state police arranged "spontaneous" protests against Iefremov. Ukrainian party leaders explained that he had been sent by "Polish fascism," and Iefremov admitted to contacts with the Polish consulate in Kharkiv. He was burned in effigy.⁵⁷ In December 1929, Iefremov was forced to write and sign a formal confession of his guilt, "The Sum of My Counterrevolutionary Activity." The confession includes a plausible account of Iefremov's reaction to the murder of Petliura. Having considered Schwartzbard's defense at his Paris trial, Iefremov wrote an anguished analysis, consistent with his other writings:

Revenge for the pogroms, even though I knew that it wasn't Petliura who was guilty, but the general disorganization and anarchy of his armies, which were steadily falling

**В третю річницю смерті Великого Вождя Українського Народу
СИМОНА ПЕТЛЮРИ**

З рук до рук!



З хати до хати!

Три роки вже минуло, як на вулиці в Парижі убито ГОЛОВНОГО ОТАМАНА СИМОНА ПЕТЛЮРУ. Большевицькі кати з Москви найняли жидів чечиста Шуліма Шварцбарда, щоб убити того, хто шлю своє життя на боротьбу за визволення українського народу з під московського ярма та з під панської кайдани. СИМОН ПЕТЛЮРА хотів, щоб народ український сам створив свою НЕЗАЛЕЖНУ ДЕРЖАВУ — УКРАЇНСЬКУ НАРОДНУ РЕСПУБЛІКУ та що-б в ній Державні були встановлені такі закони, які боронили-б права селянства, робітництва та всього пращаного люду нашого. За це боровся він з Москвою і з панщиною, а його боровся наш народ, за це боровся він з большевицькою червоною Москвою, що наслала на нашу землю під вигнанню жидів та москалів свої червоні армії.

Большевицькі грабінники сдурили наш народ — вони обіцяли йому, що запровадять земний рай на Україні. А що-ж бачимо тепер? Зберіють все, що бачить їх людське око — хлібність, останню сорочку, закутують віддавати останній кілок шпала, налосом обложили все, без чого не можна обійтись в господарстві. Але жистина нашого народу, обдурена червоными катями, не піддержала боротьби української армії за визволення. Пятьівщини і не ослабило збройний союз нашої армії проти хабарної большевицької Москви.

Україна Української Народної Республіки і Військо її змушені були покинути діляні землі та покатись на чужину. Минуло чимало вже літ з того часу і народ наш побачив, як його осудили і які свої кайдани надітали на його теперішні червоні хазяїни на Україні. Не рай приніс з Московії червоноварішниця, а торгун і розбійник, не доброту запровадила большевицька влада, а що-річний голод, пошесть та жорбацька життя! Де її жиди по селах, які запровадили Української Народної Республіки? Замість їх — концлагі, де учить тільки розбрату, насуудній пачі, де тільки нічкють новоду диточу душу! А де влада українського трудящого народу — Центральна Рада та Трудовий Конгрес? Замість неї Українську вправляє по нелегалі з Москви — червоні, що скаржались з москалів, жидів та уїмних чужинців — зайців!

Наш народ наш зрозумів уже. На своїй шкурі переконався, що то за большевицька влада. Воротилась до большевицьких грабінників, росте з кожним днем серед нашого народу. Чекають всі на слушний час, щоб підняти проти ворога. Почували це й ворог наш. Бачить він, що земля під ним трясеться і тому в безліччю своїх актів післав як хунтсуба Шварцбарда убити СИМОНА ПЕТЛЮРУ. Каті московські думали, що як убити СИМОНА ПЕТЛЮРУ, то посіють в народі наші розбрати та зневіру, що вони не стане уповноваженого українського Вождя, то легше буде приборкати цілу Україну.

Але жиди не знали, що народ наш зрозумів ворога!

Смерть СИМОНА ПЕТЛЮРИ ще більше зміцнила і зміцнила нас для боротьби за визволення нашої Батьківщини! Так, як простий козак і ГОЛОВНИЙ ОТАМАН відкасово вклав своє життя за долю свого народу, так вони пачувати червоний ворог не буде! І смерть СИМОНА ПЕТЛЮРИ була останньою жертвою українського народу в боротьбі за його визволення, за його Незалежну Українську Народну Республіку!

Чим страшного духу над ворогом вже не далеко! Готуються до нього! Спільними силами з Українським Української Народної Республіки та з її Армією, що перебувають на чужині ми здаримося разом на червоних кровопивців!

Захистіть ідеалі заповіту Великого Народного Вождя СИМОНА ПЕТЛЮРИ — за Візну України!

Візьміть пам'ять мученику і страднику СИМОНУ ПЕТЛЮРИ, що життя своє поклав за народ! Візьміть пам'ять всім розбратливим і замученим червоными катями, всім, хто життя своє поклав за Батьківщину!

Український Революційний Комітет.

Figure 8. “On the Third Anniversary of the Death of the Great Leader of the Ukrainian Nation, Symon Petliura,” Ukrainian People’s Republic propaganda, 1929. Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe, Rembertów.

apart, and which were partially recruited from uncertain elements—so in any case I say, revenge for the pogroms would have been a firm argument, had it been advanced just after the pogroms. But to seethe with the desire for revenge for six years, to nurse it in one's breast unceasingly in entirely different conditions, and to attack an unarmed enemy, after he had ceased to be harmful even from the murderer's point of view—this seemed to me unbelievable and even psychologically impossible. Thus I was inclined to think that Schwartzbard was only an instrument in the hands of others, who at an opportune time directed him to carry out a deed planned long before. But in whose hands? Of course, someone for whom this action was convenient, or necessary. So a logical path led to the communists. . . .⁵⁸

The communists themselves wished to turn such reactions to Petliura's assassination to their advantage. Balyts'kyi knew that Ukrainian patriots believed that the assassination of Petliura was a Soviet operation. He wanted to turn this conviction to Soviet advantage, by exposing Ukrainian patriots to further charges of anti-Semitism. Since Ukrainian patriotism was associated with Petliura, and Petliura with the massive pogroms of 1919–1920, this connection was easy to draw. Ukrainian activists in Poland understood their position. In response to this danger, the Ukrainian People's Republic's propaganda in Soviet Ukraine was designed to work "against Jewish pogroms and anti-Semitism, and in general against the identification of Jewish interests with the Bolshevik idea and the interests of Bolshevik authorities."⁵⁹ Most, but not all, of its propaganda kept to this line. The Petliura poster of May 1929 identified Schwartzbard as a Jew, and claimed that "Jews and Russians" led the Red Army that conquered Ukraine in 1920. It is true that about thirty percent of the Bolshevik Central Committee members were Jewish in 1917, and that Trotsky, a Jew, was the Bolshevik commissar for war in 1920.⁶⁰ Yet such a characterization could only strengthen the popular identification of Jews with communism. Other posters signed by the Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee apparently referred to the Soviet commissar Maxim Litvinov as "Finkelstein."⁶¹ Litvinov was indeed Jewish; his brother was a rabbi. Yet such unmasking could only strengthen an association of Jews with communism. Although the Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee was the name used by the Second Section for its propaganda in Soviet Ukraine, the Finkelstein posters were probably produced in Soviet Ukraine rather than in Warsaw. They might have been the work of Ukrainian agents sent across the border, who generated their own propaganda after distributing what they had brought. They might have been an initiative of Chebotariv. They might have been the work of someone else entirely, who simply

copied the Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee signature. Other posters supporting a Petliurite revolution in Soviet Ukraine in 1928 were openly anti-Semitic; these almost certainly had nothing in common with the actual Ukrainian People's Republic. But they suggest the inherent difficulties of reviving Petliura's legacy in Soviet conditions. Poland's alliance with Petliurites was a compromise with an organization that included some anti-Semites, and some people who believed that exploiting the Jewish question was an appropriate way to undo Soviet power in Ukraine. For the Polish Prometheans, who were neither anti-Semitic nor inclined to associate Jews with communism, this compromise was justified by the larger project of destroying the Soviet Union.

By appealing to the pogroms and raising the Jewish question, Soviet authorities exploited an inherent weakness of the Promethean movement in Ukraine and beyond. Prometheans conceived of liberation as national liberation, and national liberation as the establishment of nation-states controlling bounded territories. When put generally, this account of liberation was widely accepted in the 1920s and 1930. It could even be seen as liberal internationalism: just as every individual had rights, so did every nation; just as individuals could be repressed, so could nations; just as individuals could be made free, so could and should nations. Prometheans could argue, as they did with some success, that their nations would be better served by self-rule than by communism. Moscow answered that the nations of the Soviet Union enjoyed complete freedom of cultural development, and that Soviet republics were in fact freer political entities than sham bourgeois republics dominated by international capitalism. In the Jewish case, however, the Promethean account of national liberation had little force. East European Jews had gained little from the destruction of empires and the creation of nation-states after the First World War. In Ukraine, Jews had been killed by the tens of thousands during a war for Ukrainian national liberation. Whatever ill might be said of the Soviet Union, in the late 1920s it offered its Jewish citizens education, integration, and social advancement. Moreover, what the Prometheans had to offer other nations they could not offer to the Jews. The destruction of the Soviet Union might suffice to create a Ukrainian state, but not a Jewish state. There was no territory in Europe that could plausibly serve as a Jewish homeland. Prometheans could promise tolerant constitutions for future Jewish minorities, but Jews had reason to doubt that these promises would be fulfilled. Since the Jewish question was problematic for the Prometheans, it made sense for Soviet authorities to shift the discussion of Petliura from the Ukrainian question to the Jewish question.

In this way Jews of the Soviet Union could be reassured that Soviet rule was better than the alternatives, and international audiences could be persuaded that enemies of Soviet rule were retrograde.⁶²

THEATER

The Ukrainian question could be treated, with much more delicacy, in the appropriate forum: a show trial. The trial of Iefremov and the “Union for the Liberation of Ukraine” was held from 9 March to 19 April 1930 in the Kharkiv opera house, and stage-managed by Balyts’kyi and his secret police. Secret policemen, old hands at show trials by 1930, could be seen scurrying here and there during the proceedings, making the last-minute adjustments so necessary to any theatrical presentation.⁶³ The opera house was full of invited guests, who observed the trial as a spectacle. For six weeks, Iefremov and forty-four other defendants themselves lived in a completely artificial world, disconnected from their previous life and the life in prison that awaited them. They were housed in a special section of the Kharkiv prison, in clean two-room apartments. There were clean sheets on the beds, rugs on the floor, books on the shelves, pencil and paper on the desk, flowers in the vase, and, as Stalin personally ordered, lemon with the tea. They had five meals a day, including second breakfast and tea. And then they were taken to the opera house, said their parts, were convicted, and were sent to prison.⁶⁴

The theatrical setting made a point. In Ukraine as throughout eastern Europe, intellectuals, especially humanist intellectuals, enjoyed special respect. After the First World War, intellectuals did indeed come to power, in states that survived such as the Soviet Union and Poland, and in states that did not, such as the Ukrainian People’s Republic. Thirty-one of the forty-five defendants had played a role in the briefly independent Ukrainian state; one had been prime minister, two others had been ministers, and six (including Iefremov) had been members of its Supreme Council. Iefremov had also taken part in the brief revival of the Ukrainian People’s Republic brought by the March on Kyiv in May 1920. After 1923, Soviet policy had enlisted such people in a broad policy of national concessions, designed to soften the imposition of communist rule by supporting Ukrainian culture, and to undermine Polish rule in areas of Ukrainian settlement by presenting an image of a tolerant Soviet Ukraine. Leading lights of Ukrainian culture returned from emigration, or (like Iefremov) came out of hiding. The premise of the Soviet policy of ukrainization was that intellectuals could separate national culture from national politics, and that official

endorsement of Ukrainian culture need not imply any support for a Ukrainian state.

The show trial in the opera house proclaimed that many Ukrainian intellectuals had slipped the leash, and hinted that Ukrainian culture was politically dangerous. As such, it was a victory of the security organs, suspicious of individuals associated with Ukrainian high culture and officials of previous Ukrainian governments. As he pressed these points, Balyts'kyi showed little care for particular facts about particular cases. The actual defendants may or may not have been guilty, even in the light of Soviet law. Defendants and their friends and families later gave various accounts of the existence of Ukrainian patriotic organizations, but none seems to have revealed details that would confirm involvement in Chebotariv's Polish operation or any other activity of the Second Department. From Balyts'kyi's point of view, the crucial matter was the preemptive struggle against potentially disloyal Ukrainians and suspicious Polish ambitions. In the trial, Petliura was a central theme, even though he had been murdered four years earlier, and had emigrated from Poland to Paris three years before that. The defendants may or may not have taken part in a plot "to overthrow Soviet power in Ukraine by the organization of an armed uprising and to establish a capitalist bourgeois order in the form of the Ukrainian People's Republic," as the indictment read.⁶⁵

In all likelihood, they did not. There was, however, such a plot. There was probably no Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, but there was (according to Chebotariv) an Alliance of Struggle for an Independent Ukraine. The Alliance (or at least Chebotariv) was indeed connected both to the army of the Ukrainian People's Republic and to Polish intelligence.⁶⁶ Did the Alliance have something to do with the Union show trial? Writing for his own government in 1941, and then for public consumption in 1950, the director of eastern affairs for Polish intelligence claimed to have been in touch with Iefremov and his organization.⁶⁷ Ukrainian agents in the employ of the Polish state also took credit for the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine. Ukrainian agents sent from Poland distributed a broadside that claimed the Union was part of a larger struggle for a Ukrainian People's Republic, and promised aid from abroad to Ukrainians in a final struggle against Soviet rule.⁶⁸ It used the wrong word for "union"—"soiuz" rather than "spilka"—an error that suggests that Poland was not in fact behind the Union, if it existed at all. Whether or not the Union existed, the show trial was assimilated within Polish-sponsored propaganda. Prometheans did wish to use the policy of ukrainization to organize Ukrainian patriots, with the final end of destroying the Soviet Union.

In June 1930, just after the show trial, Ukrainian agents sent from Poland distributed another broadside, this one proclaiming that the Ukrainian flag would soon fly in Kyiv. Another pamphlet of 1930 called upon the Ukrainian intelligentsia, so recently persecuted, to prepare for the “historic settling of accounts between Ukrainian democracy and Muscovite autocracy.”⁶⁹ Despite the bravado, Polish networks in Soviet Ukraine were unraveling. Chebotariv had departed in late 1928. Whether or not Balyts’kyi and his GPU knew of Chebotariv’s work, the arrests and show trial hamstrung ongoing Polish operations. The quarterly report of the Ukrainian intelligence apparatus in Poland noted, just after the show trial, that “the student network in Kyiv has perished.”⁷⁰ Ukrainian officers later summarized for Polish intelligence: “Arrests in 1929 reduced considerably the number of informers: informers were arrested in Uman’, Kyiv, Dnipropetrovs’k, Zinov’ievs’k and Shepetivka. The Union for the Liberation of Ukraine trial, the consequences of these arrests, and the heightened attention of GPU agents forced a change in methods of action.”⁷¹ Warsaw’s techniques did alter. Attention was redirected to border crossers and diplomatic espionage rather than covert permanent Ukrainian networks such as Outpost Hetman. It vanishes from the record with Chebotariv’s departure.

EXPLANATIONS

What exactly happened? Possibly, real Polish networks coincidentally lost agents as a result of Balyts’kyi’s unrelated fabrication. This hypothesis would adequately account for some features of the Union affair, and is the simplest answer that fits the evidence. Perhaps real Polish networks were known to the GPU and purposefully eliminated as part of a larger action, which was itself designed to disguise just how much the Soviets knew about Polish actions. Like the first hypothesis, this supposition fails to harmonize some of the basic facts of the affair, and leaves the key questions unanswered: Did the Union exist; and, if so, was it identical with the Alliance? A third hypothesis is possible: betrayal and provocation by Chebotariv or another Ukrainian-Polish officer. This cannot be demonstrated by the available primary sources, but more adequately reconciles some known facts, and fits more easily into the overall contexts of Soviet practices, Soviet society, and intelligence operations.

Andrii Livyts’kyi apparently told Piłsudski in 1928 that Chebotariv was working for the Soviets. If Livyts’kyi’s accusation were true, it would explain certain puzzling aspects of the affair. If Chebotariv (or someone else) was an agent of the Soviets, then the Alliance could be understood as a provocation.

Such a provocation would have spread optimistic information about political opposition in Soviet Ukraine. One might suppose that enthusiastic claims about the existence of Petliurite political organizations would not serve Soviet interests. Yet this was the tactic employed in the Trust operation: to overstate domestic resistance to Soviet rule, thus persuading European governments that there was no need to intervene in Soviet affairs. Political disinformation *en minus*, designed to encourage complacency, was a Soviet practice, then as later. Such a provocation would also have generated a list of Ukrainian intellectuals who were willing to join an illegal political organization. This would have been valuable information for a suspicious security service. Such people could then be show-tried, arrested, or blackmailed. This too was a standard Soviet practice.

The ambiguous attitude of Polish intelligence officers to the Union also makes more sense if one assumes that the Alliance was controlled by the Soviets. If the Alliance was funded by Poland but run by a Soviet agent, this would explain why extant Polish documents mention "the Alliance" before the show trial (but not afterwards), and "the Union" after the show trial (but not before). If the Alliance was a real organization which Polish officers came to believe was penetrated by the Soviets, they would have had little reason to boast of it after 1928, as indeed they did not. If the Union was a fabrication, they could not have known of its existence before the affair began in 1929, and so could not have mentioned it, which indeed they did not. But since the Union was supposed to have been important, they might have boasted about it in retrospect, as they did. Such a hypothesis would also explain why Polish-Ukrainian propaganda about the show trial misnamed the group.⁷² If the Alliance was indeed funded by Poland but controlled by the Soviets, that would also explain why Warsaw seems to have lost informants in its wake. The provocation thesis would also explain a certain rhetorical ambiguity on the Soviet side. If Balyts'kyi had truly cracked a Polish operation in 1929, as interrogations and confessions seemed to show, he might have just said so, and perhaps provided some more detail. If he was controlling Chebotariv and the Alliance for years, he would have initiated arrests in 1929 for different reasons: his provocation had run its course. In that situation, he might not have wished to betray his operation to his political rivals in Ukraine, and would not have wished to reveal to Warsaw the extent of his penetration of Polish operations. The standard action in such a case is to embarrass the enemy without revealing one's cards.

The provocation thesis would also explain certain features of the affair that seem to contradict Soviet realities. One is the durability of Chebotariv himself. The Ukrainian People's Republic military leadership in Poland was riddled

with Soviet agents in 1921, at the time of the Winter March. Poland had a very poor intelligence position in Soviet Ukraine in the early 1920s, after the destruction of the Polish Military Organization. Yet Chebotariv was able to cross the Soviet-Polish frontier as a Polish-Ukrainian agent several times in the 1920s, apparently unimpeded by the Soviets. Soviet control of the western border was far from perfect.⁷³ Perhaps his own contacts and talents were sufficient; on the other hand, perhaps he enjoyed protection on the Soviet side. Similarly, the provocation thesis would explain how an organization such as the Alliance could exist in Soviet Ukraine for five years, as Chebotariv claimed. Secret political organization was difficult (some would say impossible) in Soviet Ukraine. A group controlled by the GPU, however, would last as long as Balyts'kyi wished. The timing of the arrests would fit the provocation hypothesis: the Soviets rolled up their operation after they lost their central asset, when Chebotariv left Soviet Ukraine. During the interrogations and the trial, the Soviets seem to have used the archives of the Ukrainian People's Republic of the early 1920s, including its diplomatic outpost in Warsaw. They might have gained these materials from many sources. The person most strongly associated with those archives, however, was Chebotariv. Poland's use of Ukrainian agents had the inherent weakness that such people might have been previously recruited by the Soviet services. Sending Ukrainians across the Soviet border also opened the possibility that these agents could be arrested and turned.⁷⁴ Provocation must be regarded as a possibility.

It is perhaps best to leave open all three hypotheses: "Polish plot and contemporary but unrelated Soviet repression," which is solidly supported by available evidence; "Polish plot and related Soviet repression," which seems plausible but remains undemonstrated; and "Polish plot controlled by the Soviets," which has the greatest evidentiary problems, but answers some basic questions.⁷⁵ For what it is worth, Poland's intelligence officers seemed undecided as well. All they knew for certain was that, in 1930, Poland had lost a battle in the secret war. Warsaw's political aim, to use intelligence instruments to exploit Soviet ukrainization policy, was frustrated. The leading lights of Ukrainian culture in Soviet Ukraine, and the advocates of further ukrainization within the Ukrainian section of the Bolshevik Party, now fell from grace. Iefremov's imprisonment did remove one hope of Piłsudski and his men of trust.⁷⁶ The show trial also brought an undesirable end to the Shums'kyi Affair. Oleksandr Shums'kyi, seen in Warsaw as a national communist with a bright future, renounced his previous views nine days after the conclusion of the show trial. Mykola Khvyľovyĭ, the representative of national communism in literature,

had resigned from official responsibilities in 1928. At the time of the show trial, he tried to regain favor by denouncing fellow Ukrainian writers.⁷⁷

Whatever the internal truths of the affair, its external political logic favored the career of Balyts'kyi. His interpretation of Ukrainian culture, as a link to a Polish military threat, was accepted in 1930 for the first time. He thus won an important political battle within the Ukrainian party and defined a position that would serve him in the future. He had also begun an important relationship with the central figure of the Bolshevik Party in Moscow. During the Shums'kyi Affair and the show trial, Balyts'kyi was in contact with Stalin. The latter took a personal interest in the Union show trial, asking Ukrainian prosecutors not to pass over the "medical focus"—plots of doctors to kill their patients were already a preoccupation of his, although this time the doctors were supposed to be Ukrainian rather than Jewish nationalists. Stalin apparently told Balyts'kyi that the Soviet Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was a tool of Piłsudski's counterrevolution in Ukraine.⁷⁸ Balyts'kyi was summoned to Moscow soon thereafter, and met with Stalin some twenty times in 1931 and 1932.⁷⁹

Stalin's interventions in Soviet Ukrainian affairs reveal a style of political imagination that was gaining ground in the Soviet Union. Yet in 1930 Stalin's interpretations still had some traction in the facts. There was not a Union for the Liberation of Ukraine as it was presented in the show trial, but there was indeed a Polish policy to project influence by supporting Ukrainian patriotism in Soviet Ukraine. As Stalin consolidated his own power in Moscow, he had reason to attend to Polish designs on Ukraine. After all, Polish operations in Soviet Ukraine were only one aspect of the problem. In the years after Piłsudski's coup, Moscow had seen its network of cooperating communist parties collapse in the Shums'kyi Affair, and then lost its initiative on the Ukrainian question to Warsaw. Then, the Union show trial showed Soviet nationality policy in a negative light. Soviet policy shuddered between affirmative action and national repression. This was an opportunity for the Prometheans. They had other theaters of actions besides Soviet Ukraine, not least Poland itself.

Chapter 3 Theaters of Politics

The Polish playwright Zofia Nałkowska was leery of her country's eastern backwaters, but found Henryk Józewski's Volhynia to be a delightful surprise. The region's governor, she discovered, "was a man of letters, a painter, the author of a study of Hamlet and of lovely plans for the play's production."¹ Józewski took theater very seriously indeed: scenography had been his first career, before espionage and politics. He was particularly proud of his sketches for *Hamlet*, which he showed to Nałkowska. His Polish Theater performed for a week each month in Łuck, the regional capital, and spent the remainder touring eastern Poland. Its repertoire included not only Shakespeare, but also Molière and George Bernard Shaw. It sold about thirty-one thousand tickets in 1932, the year of Nałkowska's visit. Some of the actors were Russian political émigrés who had studied under Konstantin Stanislavsky.² This was the third act in Józewski's encounter with Stanislavsky. As a Kyiv scenographer in 1917–1919, Józewski had worked under Stanisława Wysocka, a disciple of Stanislavsky. Józewski's 1924 study of *Hamlet* was probably influenced by the staging of *Hamlet* realized by Gordon Craig in Moscow at Stanislavsky's invitation.³

Nałkowska fantasized about Józewski. In Józewski's "well-ordered" house in Łuck, she subjected herself to Freudian self-analysis, concluding that the countryside and her host had effected in her a moment a sublimation, a revelatory "internal rapture" that would restore her powers of creation.⁴ This interruption of Nałkowska's melancholy and lethargy, this moment of restorative confidence, were characteristic of the mood and the place. Volhynia was one of the most economically backward and politically problematic provinces of Poland, governed by one of Poland's most optimistic politicians. The Polish political elite accepted the need to bring light to Volhynian darkness, mature political consciousness to unlettered masses. In the 1920s, under the governments dominated by the National Democrats, modernization was identified with polonization. Modernity, Polish nationalists believed, would assimilate the Ukrainian-speaking masses into a Polish nation. Józewski, who became governor in 1928, had a broader understanding of the modern. In 1932, when Nałkowska graced his home, he was at the height of his power.

MODERNITIES

When, in 1921, Poland incorporated the western portion of the Russian imperial province of Volhynia, the region had been devastated by six consecutive years of war: the First World War, the Russian Civil War, and the Polish-Bolshevik War. In the triangle defined by the three important Volhynian towns of Równe, Łuck, and Dubno, about ten to eighteen buildings per square kilometer had been destroyed. Along the course of Volhynia's rivers, the Horyń and the Stryk, sixty percent of all structures had been ruined.⁵ The region had boasted few signs of modernity in any case. In 1921, no Volhynian town had a regulated street network, and indeed few streets were worthy of the name. Only the town of Ostróg had a sewage system, and only Ostróg, Łuck, and Równe had electricity (boasting one generator each). When Polish rule was installed, illiteracy rates were as follows: 31% among Roman Catholics in cities, 60.5% among Roman Catholics in the country; 55.6% among Orthodox in cities, 84% among Orthodox in the country; 47.3% among Jews in cities, and 59.0% among Jews in the country.⁶ In the first decade of Polish rule, Polish authorities built 114 elementary schools and a high school, as well as three hospitals and ten public buildings. All important towns were electrified, and telephone service was introduced. Communications slowly improved. Bus stations began to function in Równe in 1937 and in Łuck in 1939. Trade was relocated from unregulated bazaars on roadsides and town squares to indoor markets and halls.




Figure 9. Henryk Józewski, *Hamlet: Reception Hall in the Castle*, 1924. Warsaw University Library.

The proportion of children in school increased from perhaps fifteen percent to more than seventy percent.⁷

This modernization had limits. When Józewski arrived in Łuck, more than half of the province was covered by forests and swamps.⁸ The Ukrainians and Jews of Volhynia's peasant plots and shtetlach could only reach the cities when the roads were good. Ukrainians were about seventy percent of the population, Jews about ten percent, and a majority in the towns. Poles were prominent in some larger towns, but in no Volhynian county were they ever a majority of the urban population.⁹ The lives of most Volhynians were controlled more by the weather than by the state. Peasants usually did not understand what good their taxes did them, and had a limited notion of the value of state institutions. The state did meliorate and redistribute a million hectares of land, and redistributed about 400,000 more hectares from the richer to the poorer. Ukrainian peasants benefited, but Poles benefited more.¹⁰ The state could present Volhynian land reform as a statistical success, but Ukrainian peasants were more likely to compare their own lot to that of Poles. As a result of the Great Depression and the

collapse of agricultural prices, many Ukrainian peasants were unable to pay the debts they had taken out during the land reform, and were reduced to subsistence farming. On the whole, the Volhynian countryside fared well during the 1920s, and survived the depression of the 1930s by falling back in on itself, the farmers living from their own stores, the traders making their way from locality to locality. Volhynia sent foodstuffs and Arabian horses to the rest of Poland, but in general remained isolated.

Two Polish intelligence officers meeting in the Bristol Hotel in Równe before a mission to the Soviet Union greeted each other with the passwords: "I had trouble finding you" and "After all, Równe is a little Paris."¹¹ Although this was meant as a joke, there was no denying that Volhynia's main towns were becoming cities, that Volhynia's countryside was interested by the mass politics of socialism, communism, and Zionism, that Polish state power had put down roots. Józewski intended to continue this modernization of Volhynia, by correcting what he saw as its basic flaws. He saw that Polish colonists had taken land in the countryside, but had not integrated with the Ukrainian society around them. He observed that Polish bureaucrats settled in new suburbs around the city centers, but failed to embrace city life. He was under no illusions that modernization led by the Polish state would create a province that was ethnically Polish. Indeed, he desired no such outcome. He took for granted that modernity must be multinational.

His was a minority view, but he was now in control. The National Democrats were frustrated by the failure of their vision of modernization in the east in the 1920s, and had reacted by expressing a more categorical opposition to Ukrainians and Jews. In Józewski's view, National Democratic ideology had descended to "a dark instinct of zoological hatred for everything that is not nationally Polish."¹² He categorized National Democracy as a psychological disorder. Fully aware of the dominance of "Polish chauvinism" and "anti-Semitism" (his terms) in Polish society, Józewski wished to keep them from Polish politics.¹³ Rather than blaming the Jews for Poland's failings, Józewski meant to gain the Ukrainians for the Polish cause. Jews dominated commerce in Volhynia as nowhere in central Poland, but Józewski never drew attention to this fact, which he seems never to have regarded as a problem. His concerns were with the political loyalties of citizens, not the ostensible ethnic affiliations of members of nations. Even as Polish nationalism took a turn from the confidence of the 1920s to the fear of the 1930s, shifting from the ambitions of state building to worries of powerful neighbors and internal enemies, Józewski remained ever the optimist. His view of the modern state admitted two traditions

rejected by the modern nationalists: the European Enlightenment and the republicanism of the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1569–1795). Whereas the National Democrats regarded the Commonwealth's toleration as the cause of its ruination, Józewski regarded the noble republic as a model for a modern republic. The growing European fascination with blood did not touch him. He believed that a fixation on nationality in the narrow organic sense would doom the Polish state, and had already failed in Volhynia by 1928. How was one to govern a million and a half Ukrainians and two hundred thousand Jews in this spirit, especially when native Poles were uninterested in politics and Polish colonists not useful in governance, when indeed the percentage of Poles in the region was in decline?¹⁴

Yet Józewski had a vision broader than prudence. He believed that if the Polish state would encourage Ukrainian culture, the emerging Ukrainian nation would be loyal to Poland. Nationality was a matter of politics, of mature choices as well as family origins, and individuals could be trusted to make good decisions if they were respected by the authorities.¹⁵ Polishness itself was an activity rather than a state of being, and Polishness could only prosper at the margin, on the frontier, where it could attract others and learn from them. The very "essence" of Polishness was "the emergence of Poland in non-Polish environments."¹⁶ The political task was "state assimilation," to be understood "not as denationalization, but as a creative process of mutual interpenetration."¹⁷ National assimilation could be expected in both directions, Polish to Ukrainian as well as Ukrainian to Polish, but this was a matter of secondary importance. Józewski knew that some of the great heroes and villains of Polish history were of Ukrainian origin.

As governor of Volhynia, Józewski was in a position to realize such a policy. He was one of Piłsudski's men of trust, and had been entrusted with a special assignment in the east. So long as Piłsudski lived, he had the best patronage possible and wide latitude to set local policy. The association between the two men was so strong that Jews in Luboml spread the rumor that Józewski was Piłsudski's illegitimate son.¹⁸ Although Poland was constitutionally a centralized state, in practice the regional governors enjoyed a great deal of discretion. Józewski's executive power was limited by poor communications and by ethnic Polish bureaucrats who often opposed his policies. The rival center of power was the Lublin field command of the Polish army. Yet so long as Piłsudski lived, the army did not challenge Józewski's authority. From June 1928, then, the local state apparatus was in Józewski's hands. Perhaps state power had been abused under the National Democrats. He would correct their vision of mod-

ernization. Perhaps there were too few educated Poles in Volhynia to make the vision of the Polish state attractive. Józewski knew that there was at least one such Pole, namely himself.

Józewski governed Volhynia from 1928 until 1938, a continuity that was exceptional in the careers of Polish regional governors, and which distinguished his tenure from that of his predecessors. The first governor, Jan Krzakowski, earned the ire of the locals by making soldiers salute him on the street (and by breaking up card games). Krzakowski tried, without success, to extend the legal framework of Jewish communal autonomy in Poland to Poland's east in 1921. Mieczysław Mickiewicz oversaw the parliamentary elections of 1922, which revealed that Ukrainians would vote for Ukrainians, and were thus a fiasco for the National Democrats. Stanisław Srokowski, an outspoken critic of military colonization, served in 1923 and 1924. He was replaced by General Bolesław Kaje-tan Olszewski. General Olszewski tried to govern Volhynia with military men, alienating the civilian population. Without a positive strategy to appeal to the local population, these governors were helpless to reduce communism's appeal. Lacking the resources and the personnel to establish a functioning civilian administration, they resorted to hiring former agents of the Imperial Russian secret police. In 1925, Aleksander Dębski oversaw the polonization of Ukrainian schools. Immediately after Piłsudski's coup of May 1926, Volhynia was governed by Władysław Mech, an old socialist and ally of Piłsudski, monstrously fat and enormously capable. He set the stage for Józewski's tenure, using the term "Ukrainian" to describe Volhynia's majority population, and appealing to Ukrainians to support the Polish state in exchange for local policies of national toleration. Mech also oversaw the legal establishment of Jewish communal autonomy in Volhynia in 1927.¹⁹

NEOTRADITIONALISM

Józewski believed that the institutions of the ancient Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth could be reproduced in the twentieth century, allowing Jews communal autonomy and thereby securing their loyalty to the state. He could be forgiven for observing signs of continuity: in Volhynia, unlike in central Poland, Jews almost never married Christians, and almost always declared Yiddish and Hebrew as their mother tongues.²⁰ The local Jewish communes (*kehillot*), in place when Józewski arrived, funded themselves. The contributions of local Jews were supplemented by donations from Jewish emigrants in the United States.²¹ Services provided by the communes supplemented those of

the state, most visibly in education. In the 1938–1939 school year, there were seven functioning private Jewish high schools in Volhynia. By comparison, there was one Ukrainian high school, and it was public. Every town in Volhynia had a Jewish library, and the larger towns had Yiddish weeklies.²² In permitting this flowering of Jewish civil society, Józewski was implementing a general policy. In the Piłsudski era, it was believed that a neotraditional approach to the Jewish question would keep Jews close to the political center, focused on culture and religion, and away from political extremes.²³

Józewski was one of the organizers of Józef Piłsudski's nonparty electoral bloc, designed to allow Piłsudski to dominate the parliament. The bloc appealed to those who believed that any great change in Poland would be for the worse. It was meant to be a safe form of political expression for the apolitical, to provide a ritualized opportunity to support the existing state of affairs without taking a defined political stand. It provided national and religious minorities with a center position, between Polish nationalism and left-wing radicalism. Throughout Poland, the bloc was most popular among Jews, who saw in Piłsudski a guarantor of stability, a friend of the Jewish people, or at least preferable to the anti-Semitic National Democrats.²⁴ In Volhynia, membership in the bloc was mostly Jewish, and two Jews were elected to parliament from its ranks in 1928.²⁵ The rabbis of the main Volhynian congregations urged their followers to vote for Piłsudski.²⁶ The bloc thereby allowed Jews some representation in national politics, although it was an instrument to support a nondemocratic form of government. In Volhynia, Jews probably cared less about democracy and more about stability. After all, it was a nondemocratically elected parliament dominated by the bloc that removed, in 1931, all restrictions flowing from language, nationality, or religion on the individual rights of Polish citizens.²⁷

The axis of the Polish state and traditional Jewry excluded Jews in political parties on the secular right and the secular left. On the right were the Zionists; Revisionist Zionists were popular in Volhynia at the end of the 1930s. The Zionist revolution was to take place in Palestine rather than Poland. Because Zionists wished to leave Poland rather than harm it, they could introduce all public gatherings with declarations of loyalty to Poland. Zionists could even treat Józewski's Volhynia as a staging area for emigration, where Jews could learn new trades and be trained in the use of firearms (by the Polish army) before they departed.²⁸ The Bund, an internationalist socialist party that functioned in Yiddish, was popular in Volhynian towns such as Kowel. The Bund maintained that only a complete transformation of the existing order could better the social standing of Jews and redress ubiquitous anti-Semitism. Al-

though in principle the Bund stood for international revolution, it was no ally of the Soviet Union, where it had been dissolved by the Bolsheviks. In the here and now, Bundists represented the interests of the Jewish working class, an agenda that allowed them to declare their loyalty to the Polish state. Jews were prominent in the Communist Party of West Ukraine, although of course it was not a Jewish party. In the countryside, communism drew its support from Ukrainians, in the cities from Jews.²⁹ In Łuck in 1933, for example, every member of the Party was Jewish.³⁰ The party used the national and land questions to attract the Ukrainian peasant towards revolution. One tactic that Polish authorities might have employed would have been to stress the association between Jews and communism in order to drive Ukrainians away from the Party. Józewski did not connect Jews and communism. Instead, he endorsed Ukrainian culture in Volhynia, aiming to take the national question away from the communists by demonstrating that the state was better for Ukrainians than the Party.

EXPERIMENT

Where Józewski essentially followed the etatist line of the Piłsudski era on the Jewish question, his policy towards Ukrainians was rather innovative. While he imagined that Jewish communities could be preserved in traditional forms, he acknowledged that a modern Ukrainian nation was arriving. Józewski endorsed the Ukrainian public culture he expected would emerge as state-led modernization proceeded. He hung portraits of Petliura alongside portraits of Piłsudski in public buildings, celebrated Ukrainian national holidays, and sang Ukrainian national songs. He spoke Ukrainian on his hunting trips and official visits, and answered letters from citizens and local officials that were written in Ukrainian.³¹ The state subsidized local Ukrainian reading societies, which by 1937 had some five thousand local chapters. The state also provided the capital for a Ukrainian cooperative network. The state-sponsored Ukrainian Theater presented national classics and national themes, and was on the road every week of the year. Józewski and his collaborators worked to ukrainize the Orthodox Church, to incline Orthodox priests to use the local Ukrainian language rather than Russian in sermons, record keeping, and informal communication with believers. He godfathered a Ukrainian political party, the Volhynian Ukrainian Alliance, and saw to it that loyal anticommunist Ukrainians were elected from its ranks to parliament. He founded an educational society for the Orthodox, which eventually expanded to 870 chapters.³²

In education, the most difficult question was the language of instruction. The National Democrats had proposed that parents be allowed to choose the language of their children's schools, but then ignored the results of plebiscites and pushed for the polonization of schools. They believed that Polish culture was attractive in itself, and thus that such coercion could serve the national assimilation of the next generation of Ukrainians. Piłsudski's camp generally believed that the Polish language should be present in schools, but that Ukrainian was also necessary to satisfy parents and build a positive image of Polish rule. They did not change the legislation that they inherited from the National Democrats, but rather implemented it in this spirit. In 1926, for example, Józewski recommended that nominally bilingual schools in Volhynia actually use both languages.³³ As governor, Józewski presided over a policy in which Polish was clearly favored, but not to the exclusion of Ukrainian. He built a Ukrainian high school and a Polish-Ukrainian technical school. Most Volhynian children, regardless of nationality, had some Ukrainian language in their schools. In 1933, there were 546 Polish schools with Ukrainian as a subject, and 530 bilingual schools. By 1936, more than two-thirds of Volhynian elementary schools had some Ukrainian component: either Ukrainian was taught as a mandatory subject in Polish schools (775 schools, 73,600 students), or certain subjects were taught in Ukrainian in bilingual schools (528 schools, 107,100 students). The inclusion of a Ukrainian component in Polish schools replaced rather than complemented actual Ukrainian schools, of which there were extremely few. Major public policies such as education could be reformed by regional governors only to a limited extent. The public schools in Volhynia taught Ukrainian, but most of the teachers were Poles, and indeed the percentage of Polish teachers increased under Józewski. This was beyond his control: Polish seminaries ceased to prepare teachers for Ukrainian schools in 1932.³⁴ Volhynia was also home to Polish schools with Czech as a subject, Polish schools with German as a subject, Polish schools with Hebrew as a subject, Polish-Czech bilingual schools, Czech schools, Czech schools with Polish as a subject, Yiddish schools, Hebrew schools, Polish-Hebrew bilingual schools, a Yiddish-Hebrew bilingual school, German schools, a German-Polish bilingual school, and a Russian school.³⁵

Józewski wished to go "arm in arm with the Ukrainian renaissance of consciousness," a metaphor which suggests both support and control, sympathy and mastery.³⁶ Józewski sought not only to catalyze but to channel what he saw as the inevitable Ukrainian national revival. In politics, his reforms made Volhynian political life more representative, while falling well short of democracy.

When Józewski arrived in Volhynia, the province's Ukrainian peasants were represented in the Polish parliament by Janusz Radziwiłł, a Polish magnate, and Wacław Wiślicki, director of the Central Committee of Polish Traders, who was Jewish. This was a result of electoral fraud in 1928.³⁵ In the 1930 elections, also fraudulent, Józewski supported Ukrainians. Radziwiłł and Wiślicki were elected again, but this time Ukrainians were represented by members of the Volhynian Ukrainian Alliance. Yet these new deputies were not local Volhynian Ukrainians, but rather Petliurites, comrades of Józewski. Józewski's client Stepan Skrypnyk, for example, was Petliura's nephew and former adjutant. Józewski meant to support a Ukrainian national identity that would be friendly to Polish statehood in its existing borders, and his Petliurite friends provided such a model.³⁸

Ukrainian civil society was also to be managed. As Józewski introduced his own reading societies, he suspended the activity of the Ukrainian educational society Prosvita in August 1932.³⁹ Some Prosvita activists were indeed radical nationalists, and some were almost certainly communists as well.⁴⁰ Before his own network of official cooperatives could spread, Józewski closed native Ukrainian cooperatives on various legal pretexts: only five for political crime, but sixty-nine for building violations, thirty for violating commercial regulations, and twenty-four for failing to meet sanitary standards (as of October 1931).⁴¹ He claimed, as did many Polish observers, that Volhynian cooperative unions sheltered communist agitators.⁴² His administration regarded 128 of 295 cooperatives as under the control of a communist front organization.⁴³ The Communist Party of West Ukraine did indeed plan, in 1931, to gain control of the Prosvita educational society and the cooperative movement in Volhynia.⁴⁴ Yet the Ukrainian cooperative movement actually functioned in Poland as a competitive provider of foodstuffs, and did actually employ otherwise dissatisfied Ukrainian intellectuals. The closure of Ukrainian educational and economic organizations in 1931 and 1932 had to be seen by Ukrainian intellectuals and peasants alike as a blow to their interests.

The president of Poland, Ignacy Mościcki, visited Volhynia in 1929 to endorse Józewski and his program. The population showed itself to be respectful of Mościcki's authority, if perhaps in a way that revealed more about medieval religiosity than the success of modern reform. As Polish military intelligence noted with some surprise, "the less enlightened elements treated the head of state as a Polish tsar. This was evident not only in the parades that greeted him, but also in the form of the requests and petitions submitted to him. While the president was in Łuck, delegations representing villages submitted petitions



Figure 10. Ignacy Mościcki and Henryk Józewski, Volhynia, June 1929. Archiwum Dokumentacji Mechanicznej, Warsaw.

while kneeling, their hands in the air, the written request balanced on their heads.”⁴⁵ The following year, in 1930, Orthodox priests in Volhynia demonstrated unambiguous loyalty to Poland for the first time. In the parliamentary elections, priests led the faithful to the ballot box behind church banners and portraits of Piłsudski. The army, though suspicious of experiments, admitted that reform’s initial results were encouraging. After some considerable fraud, Piłsudski’s bloc carried 79% of the parliamentary vote in Volhynia in 1930. Józewski’s combination of political repression, national concessions, and local custom had kept revolutionary forces at bay.⁴⁶

COMMUNISM

That was Józewski’s mission. Piłsudski sent Józewski to Volhynia in 1928 to defeat the Communist Party of West Ukraine in its bastion. Józewski had spent two years in Volhynia as a military colonist, and he understood the social and

national appeal of communism to the impoverished Ukrainian population. Ukrainians were a minority in Poland (about fifteen percent) but a majority in Volhynia (about seventy percent), and could easily be persuaded that their fate was connected to states other than Poland. Józewski's policy of national concessions was meant to remove the appeal of the Communist Party of West Ukraine. The communists had a clear national program: the annexation of southeastern Poland by the Soviet Union as a remedy to national and economic woes. By treating Ukrainians as a fully fledged nation, Józewski intended to gain their loyalty to the Polish state. This ostentatious elevation in status was itself a major change from previous Polish policy. Yet the Volhynia Experiment was designed not only to expand the middle ground of Polish-Ukrainian compromise, but also to remove the political extremes. Ukrainians who rejected this idea of the polity were to be removed from political life. The Communist Party of West Ukraine, which called Poland a fascist state and insisted on its renewed partition, was to be destroyed. Like Piłsudski in Poland as a whole, Józewski in Volhynia planned to reduce communism's social appeal, while banning communist organizations and imprisoning communists.⁴⁷

The timing of his appointment was fortuitous. Piłsudski's declarations of national toleration had sown disorder in the communist ranks. As communist parties quarreled in the wake of the Shums'kyi Affair, the Polish police picked up the pieces. The Communist Party of West Ukraine had lost a good deal of credibility when it was dissolved by Moscow. Its new leadership told party members on 1 May 1928 that the purge of national deviationists meant that the "rot" had been cut from the party by a "proletarian knife," but many communists disagreed.⁴⁸ To them it appeared that Stalin had interfered in their internal affairs, and in Poland they were free to say so. Party members complained that the new party leadership, handpicked by the Soviets, was predominantly Jewish.⁴⁹ The new leaders faced a whirl of internal dissent, and probably denounced rivals to the police. The favor was likely returned. After Polish authorities captured much of the party leadership in Lwów in October 1928, the police made new lists of members and began systematic arrests in Volhynia.⁵⁰ In 1929, the party showed little ability to agitate, and in 1930 its leaders were so afraid of police penetration that they dissolved local organizations themselves.⁵¹ The April 1930 meeting of the party Central Committee was dedicated to the elimination of the national deviation, a deviation that so recently had been a strategy.⁵² The split in the party leadership confused existing party members. The constant arrests of activists deterred prospective ones. New con-

fusion over the patriotism of the party dimmed its former appeal.⁵³ Meanwhile, in Soviet Ukraine in spring 1930, most farmers lost their land to newly created collective farms. Thousands of Ukrainians fled across the Polish border, bringing personal and therefore credible accounts of collectivization. Communism lost influence in the Volhynian regions directly abutting the Soviet Union. In the towns where collectivization refugees were resettled, communist agitators no longer bothered to campaign.⁵⁴

Kowel county, far from the Soviet border, was the center of the communist movement in Volhynia. Communism there had authentic mass support: in the 1928 elections, more than half the votes cast in the county (29,165 of 55,001) were invalidated, almost certainly because they were cast for legal and illegal revolutionary parties. In 1931 and 1932 Kowel was pacified repeatedly with the help of soldiers and two airplanes. In 1932 Józewski had all shotguns confiscated from the Kowel civilian population, and transferred them to his police. Łuck, the provincial capital, was the other center of support for revolutionary parties. In 1928, 29,462 of 75,487 votes in Łuck county had been cast for revolutionary (but legal) Ukrainian and Jewish parties, and another 5,442 votes had been annulled.⁵⁵ Many of those votes were cast for the illegal communist party. Józewski personally supervised the arrests after a successful strike near Łuck in spring 1932.⁵⁶ By the end of that summer, the local leadership of the Communist Party of West Ukraine felt that it was losing the battle.⁵⁷ When Józewski rounded up the party leadership in Łuck in 1933, he could congratulate himself on an apparently complete victory.⁵⁸ The Łuck communists who remained at large believed that their party had fallen into “stagnation.”⁵⁹

Of course, communism in Volhynia was supported by the Soviet Union, sometimes by direct military means. When a new wave of partisan actions began in 1932, Józewski convened a secret war council with civilian authorities of the provinces of Volhynia and Polesie as well as the field commanders of the Polish army. He believed that the partisan actions in his province were coordinated by the Soviet secret police, the GPU, and were part of a campaign meant to spread revolt throughout Poland’s Ukrainian and Belarusian territories.⁶⁰ Of special concern was the marshy territory in northern Volhynia and southern Polesie, ideal for partisan operations. When Józewski heard reports that the popular Soviet partisan Piven’ had been seen in northern Volhynia, he took matters into his own hands. He ordered his policemen to dress like peasants and arm themselves in the local weapon of choice, the double-barreled shotgun. He knew the marshy terrain from his hunting expeditions, and trusted the

peasants enough to ask for help. One of them warned Józewski that no one would ever betray Piven' to the Poles. When asked why, the peasant said in tones of awe: "Oh sir, what a man, no one will turn him in, what a man. Everything he wears is leather, his cap is leather, his jacket is leather, and, if you'll forgive me, his underwear is leather too."⁶¹ Józewski, apparently uncowed by this description, drove the partisans from Volhynia.

Finding agitation risky and unpopular, communists went underground and plotted a new strategy. They decided to throw their energies behind their legal front organization. The Peasant-Worker Union (Sel-Rob) had been created by the unification of Ukrainian populist and socialist parties. Its program was one of vaguely defined Ukrainian patriotism and specific demands for the redistribution of land to Ukrainian peasants without compensation to landowners. Its core constituency was the Volhynian peasantry, and it quickly became the region's most popular party. As the Great Depression hit Poland and agricultural prices collapsed, its protest program gained more supporters.⁶² One of its factions performed very well in the 1928 elections in Volhynia, and would have performed still better had Polish electoral officials not removed about half of the ballots cast for far left parties in Volhynia.⁶³ In a May 1930 supplementary parliamentary election, the Peasant-Worker Union dominated at least one of the three Volhynian electoral districts. Four of its members were elected to parliament. Three of the four were members of the Communist Party of West Ukraine. Two of the four were in prison.⁶⁴

Most supporters of the Peasant-Worker Alliance had no idea that their party was a front organization of the Communist Party of West Ukraine.⁶⁵ Józewski knew, and had Piłsudski's support for broad actions against cryptocommunism. Piłsudski had already gone much further against less radical opposition, imprisoning parliamentary deputies from the Center-Left and Left in March 1930. The Center-Left Alliance dared to call Piłsudski a dictator in its declaration of April 1930, and claimed (with justice) that his electoral bloc could never win fair elections. On 1 June 1930, Piłsudski personally dispatched the Center-Left Alliance organizers to the fortress at Brześć.⁶⁶ Piłsudski became prime minister that August, and prepared new elections for November in an environment of coercion. Against this authoritarian backdrop, Józewski's actions against cryptocommunism in Volhynia were relatively mild. Individual arrests and imprisonments were common from 1928. The Peasant-Worker Alliance and its publications were banned in Volhynia and throughout Poland in September 1932.⁶⁷ Józewski's Volhynian Ukrainian Alliance was the only

Ukrainian party allowed to function in Volhynia, and its press organs were the only legal Ukrainian periodicals. There was Ukrainian national life in Volhynia, closely tended.

NATIONALISM

The Volhynia Experiment dampened potential conflicts between Jews and Ukrainians. Even as violence against Jews increased in central Poland in the late 1930s, there were few recorded anti-Semitic outbursts in Józewski's Volhynia.⁶⁸ The absence of conflict was the more remarkable, given the pasts of the Ukrainians Józewski employed. The Volhynia Experiment employed Petliurites, veterans of the Ukrainian army that had carried out most of the pogroms in 1919. The pogroms in Volhynia had been particularly savage. In 1919 Ukrainian soldiers had treated communism as a Jewish movement, and some officers presented this as justification for the pogroms.⁶⁹ In Józewski's Volhynia, this association was not permitted. Józewski was an anticommunist, not an anti-Semite. The Petliurites of the Volhynian Ukrainian Union advocated democracy, the separation of church and state, and equal rights for all citizens of a future independent Ukraine.⁷⁰ The communists, Józewski's enemies, could not afford to treat Ukrainian politicians as anti-Semites. The Communist Party of West Ukraine was an alliance of Jews and Ukrainians, and had to endorse Ukrainian national aspirations. The party could refer (rather aptly) to the Volhynia Experiment as a "Petliurite occupation," but it could go no further than that.⁷¹ Looking beyond the official party of power and its revolutionary opponent, many Ukrainians and Jews might have appreciated a local order that was relatively tolerant. In these direct and indirect ways, Józewski's policies appear to have limited strife between Jews and Ukrainians.

By the end of 1932, it seemed, Józewski had created a form of public life in a difficult borderland province that was favorable to the interests of the Polish state. His Volhynia Experiment was meant to serve as a model for a general policy towards Poland's Ukrainian and Belarusian minorities, together about twenty percent of Poland's population. Józewski was to set a standard that Tadeusz Hołówko, director of the Promethean project, would seek to apply throughout Poland's east, and would exploit in international propaganda. Józewski and Hołówko were two of Piłsudski's men of trust on the eastern question, their common adventure and life's work, and the first two years of the Volhynia Experiment seemed to hold promise. The two men, who had known each other since high school in the Russian Empire, attended a requiem mass

for Symon Petliura together in September 1929. After Józewski had summoned the eastern regional governors to Łuck in December 1929, to explain the Volhynia Experiment, he wrote to Hołówko with barely concealed excitement that all of his colleagues seemed willing to follow his example.⁷² Yet Józewski's successes in Volhynia could not be replicated, and Hołówko's hopes for a general policy of toleration were disappointed.

Józewski's particular formula, state endorsement of Ukrainian national identity to weaken support for Ukrainian communism, proved applicable only to Volhynia. To the north, the national minority was Belarusian, and Polish authorities never acknowledged the legitimacy of Belarusian national aspirations. Communism was even more popular in Poland's Belarusian lands than in Volhynia, and Warsaw moved quickly to repress the main communist front organization in 1928. Even as Józewski began his attempt to find a political solution in Volhynia, in Belarusian lands Warsaw had already chosen coercion. South of Volhynia, in Poland's three east Galician provinces, Ukrainian communism was weaker and Ukrainian nationalism was stronger than in Volhynia. Unlike Volhynia, previously part of the Russian Empire, Galicia had been part of Austria before 1914. Austria's relatively open politics had permitted a Polish-Ukrainian national rivalry to mature before the First World War. In 1918, Galician Ukrainians had established a West Ukrainian People's Republic. Poland had incorporated east Galicia only after defeating its armies. Galician Ukrainian veterans of the war against Poland founded a Ukrainian Military Organization, later transformed into an Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). Poland's regional governors in the east Galician provinces of Lwów, Stanisławów, and Tarnopol had to confront not only legal and vibrant Ukrainian political parties, but also this illegal terrorist movement. Like the Volhynian communists, the Galician nationalists regarded Polish rule in the east as illegitimate, and spoke of a united Ukrainian state. Unlike the communists, they quickly found an effective answer to Piłsudski's declared policy of toleration.⁷³

The nationalist response was terrorism. When the communists feared that they were losing Ukrainian public opinion to Piłsudski, they purged their own ranks of national deviationists, to move away from any suspicion of accommodation with Warsaw. When the nationalists feared the same thing, they made the center position untenable by forcing a choice between Polish power and Ukrainian identity. Knowing that Piłsudski's policies appealed to centrist Ukrainian parties, the OUN undertook a policy apparently designed to radicalize Ukrainian public opinion.⁷⁴ In July 1930, Ukrainian nationalists began sabotage actions in Galicia, destroying Polish properties and homes through-

out the region in hundreds of terrorist actions. In September, Piłsudski ordered the pacification of Galicia, sending a thousand policemen to search 450 villages for nationalist agitators. They found weapons (1,287 rifles, 566 revolvers, 31 grenades) and explosive materials (99.8 kilograms), but Galician Ukrainians interpreted intrusive searches in political terms.⁷⁵ For many, the pacifications were a defining experience of Polish state power. By provoking the pacifications, the OUN succeeded in crippling Piłsudski's minority policy in Galicia. By publicizing the pacifications abroad, Ukrainian nationalists reduced the room for maneuver of Polish politicians who favored concessions. The debate over pacifications led the Polish government to reveal documents demonstrating that Germany had financially supported Ukrainian political parties in Poland.

Insofar as Ukrainian nationalist terrorism was effective, then, it was only within Poland, and only as a method of preventing improved relations between Ukrainians and the state. One particular act of terror eliminated the possibility of Ukrainian-Polish rapprochement in Galicia. On 29 August 1931, Tadeusz Hołówko was shot six times from close range in his sanatorium bed. The Ukrainian nationalists who were tried for the crime claimed that they had heard by chance that Hołówko was in the neighborhood, believed he was an oppressor of Ukrainians, and so decided on the spur of the moment to go and kill him. This simple-minded tale was either partially or entirely false. With the possible exception of Józewski, Hołówko was the leading Polish advocate of rapprochement with Ukrainians. If Ukrainian nationalists were indeed the initiators of the murder, their motive would have been to remove a problematic figure whose policies softened Ukrainian opposition to Polish rule. There is, however, good reason to doubt that the leaders of the OUN meant to kill Hołówko. The émigré leadership was surprised by the news of his death, even surmising that the action was inspired by the Soviets.⁷⁶ The timing of the murder was extremely unpropitious: just before the League of Nations conference that considered Ukrainian complaints about Poland's pacifications in Galicia. Ukrainian nationalists had devoted time and treasure to an international campaign portraying themselves as innocent victims of Polish aggression. Killing a reconciliator who was well known in Europe just before their resolution was considered made no sense at all. Germany, which covertly supported the OUN, also had little interest in such an act. The goal of German diplomacy was to present Poland as an irresponsible state that overreacted to domestic instability by violating human rights. The assassination of a responsible official seemed rather to support Polish claims that the pacifications had been justified. An investigation

by the Second Department concluded that the most likely perpetrators were the Soviets.⁷⁷ Well-informed observers spoke of Soviet agents within the OUN. The Prometheans took for granted that the assassination of their leader Hołówko was meant to weaken their undertaking.⁷⁸

Whatever the truth may be, Ukrainian communists in Poland danced on Hołówko's grave. The Communist Party of West Ukraine treated nationalist terror as a justified response to Polish imperialism.⁷⁹ For communists, Hołówko "represented a Great Power program of Polish imperialism, based on preparations for a war of conquest against the Soviet Union." His murder exemplified the "true struggle with the fascist occupier" and signified a "protest against the oppression of Ukrainian workers and peasants by Polish fascism."⁸⁰ The murder of Hołówko did indeed remove one of the greatest foes of Soviet power. Hołówko, along with Józewski, represented the idea that Poland could survive and thrive only by gaining the support of Ukrainians at home and abroad. Like Józewski, he stood for an alliance between Warsaw and Kyïv, and understood domestic policy as serving the more important strategic goal of creating an independent Ukraine.

PROMETHEANISM

Like Piłsudski and the other Prometheans, Józewski understood Soviet policies of ukrainization.⁸¹ From Łuck, he reproduced some of the Soviet experiment in affirmative action. Whereas the Soviets had invited Ukrainians from Lwów to take up cultural work in the Soviet Ukrainian capital of Kharkiv, Józewski had his Petliurite friends from Kyïv take up cultural work in his provincial capital of Łuck. The Soviet Union had initially permitted a Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church; Józewski supported the movement to create a Polish Orthodox Autocephalous Church with Ukrainian as the language of liturgy.⁸² Just as Moscow had endeavored to compensate Soviet Ukrainians for the lack of independence by subsidizing national culture, so Józewski treated Ukrainian culture as equal to Polish. Józewski loved the Ukrainian language, which he associated with childhood vacations, youthful feats of arms, and common Ukrainian-Polish history. Józewski expressed the view that Polish and Ukrainian were deeply connected, while Russian was an artificial implant in Ukraine. Ukraine could become the "second fatherland" of Poles.⁸³

In government, Józewski spoke openly of the March on Kyïv, the Piłsudski-Petliura alliance, and the future Ukrainian state to be created from Soviet Ukraine. He thought that "the Piłsudski-Petliura conception is the most pow-

erful construction, with the widest horizons and the brightest prospects, the only construction that will allow the Polish-Ukrainian question to be resolved along the lines of *raison d'état*.”⁸⁴ His own decisions were made in the spirit of “the Polish-Ukrainian legend of Petliura, in consultation with the ataman’s men in Volhynia.”⁸⁵ Moreover, he added, “the legend of Petliura was attached to my person, the legend of the Polish-Ukrainian alliance for the independence of Ukraine.” As Józewski let no one forget, his friendships with the Petliurites were forged in the “the brotherhood of armed struggle against Moscow.”⁸⁶ These Ukrainian People’s Republic army veterans were brought to Volhynia to implement an ostensibly civilian policy of cultural toleration. Cultural toleration was needed to make Poland a power in the east, since it would allow the recruitment of the Ukrainian masses to the Polish side in a future Polish-Soviet war. Józewski took the long view, and always regarded the Volhynia Experiment as foreign policy.⁸⁷ As Józewski put it, in Poland’s eastern districts “Poland’s fate as a power will be determined, here history will give its verdict on Poland’s identity in Europe, on Poland’s role in the future order in our nearest East”—by which he meant in a future eastern Europe without the Soviet Union.⁸⁸ If his policies succeeded, Józewski believed, Volhynia would become



Figure 11. Poland, Volhynia, and the Soviet Union.

a base of Polish espionage in times of peace, and the natural point of counterattack in the event of war. A war could be won or lost on the national question, and Józewski expected his policies to gain Ukrainian allies for Poland on both sides of the border.⁸⁹ Since the early 1920s, the more radical Polish federalists saw Volhynia as the most promising location for a Ukrainian army.⁹⁰ After 1926, optimistic war planners of the revived Ukrainian People's Republic army believed that national concessions in Volhynia would lead Volhynian Ukrainians to volunteer for duty.⁹¹ Within Volhynia itself, Ukrainian officers of the Second Section created about five intelligence outposts.⁹² While some of Józewski's Petliurite colleagues installed themselves in Volhynia, another ran the Hetman outpost in Soviet Ukraine, and dozens more ran espionage missions on the Soviet side of the border. Józewski also hosted British consular and military officers at his home.⁹³

EXPOSÉ

Józewski left little room for doubt about his intentions. A few weeks after he arrived in Volhynia, on 2 September 1928, he presented his aims in a political speech that he called his "exposé." He identified himself as a member of the Ukrainian People's Republic government of 1920, called the Piłsudski-Petliura alliance the template for his policy as provincial governor, and entertained the possibility of Ukrainian independence in the territory of Soviet Ukraine. The Soviet press criticized and mocked Józewski's past and policy unremittingly for the next month. A thoughtful essay in *Pravda* of 14 September claimed that what was on Józewski's tongue was on Piłsudski's mind, and that the exposé was one more reason to expect war from Poland.⁹⁴ The following day *Izvestiia* published an accurate biography of Józewski, and claimed that Ukrainian political immigrants would be used in Volhynia as shock troops for interventions in the Soviet Union and as ministers in a Ukrainian shadow state.⁹⁵ Józewski's goal, Soviet newspapers maintained, was to separate Ukraine from the Soviet Union. The point was made on 15 September 1928 in an editorial cartoon dominating *Izvestiia's* front page: Józewski as jack-in-the-box springs out, wearing a Polish officer's cap over a Ukrainian helmet, bristling with mad rage and unshaven cheeks, proclaiming through a thick if imaginary mustache that "Ukraine must belong to Poland." Polish aggression in Soviet Ukraine is portrayed, in the cartoon, as the true content of the peace initiatives of Poland's foreign minister, August Zaleski.⁹⁶ Articles in the Soviet press presented Józewski's exposé as a sign that Poles and their Petliurite Ukrainian allies were moving from imperial-




Figure 12. "The Peace Proposal of Mr. Zaleski," *Izvestiia*, 16 September 1928, 1. Józewski springs from the box saying "Ukraine should belong to Poland!"

ist thoughts to imperialist actions.⁹⁷ Kliment Voroshilov, the Soviet commissar for war, protested Józewski's exposé and the presence and activity of old Petliurites in Volhynia. Maxim Litvinov, the commissar for foreign affairs, formally protested the exposé. Józewski had scarcely moved into his office, and he was already the center of an international scandal.⁹⁸

Józewski later claimed that the nationalist Polish press had brought his address to the attention of the Soviets. This might well have been the case, as there was indeed a delay between the speech and the protests. Yet Józewski clearly wished for attention. He published the oration in his own official newspaper. Any interested party could read that "a Ukrainian building co-existence on Volhynian terrains is in no discord with the thought of Independent Ukraine on the lands neighboring us." This was an obvious reference to the separation of Soviet Ukraine from the Soviet Union. Such a Ukrainian, Józewski continued, "forms the most favorable possible conjuncture for the construction of a future Ukraine. The late Ataman Petliura, who will long remain the great luminary of the idea of Ukrainian independence, understood this well." Perhaps not every reader would have followed every thought, for the new governor exposed rather personal attitudes about Ukraine. These passages of the exposé are too consistent with private writings to be insincere, and one suspects that this very openness struck its nationalist and Soviet readers as unnerving. "There exists," said Józewski, "an underground current, a deep current, which unites in itself the tendencies of development of both nations—Polish and Ukrainian. There exists a subconscious community, unfailing in its line of development."⁹⁹ This was the the deep confidence that Zofia Nałkowska had found so fertile.

Yet Soviet leaders might have noted that the currents in question flowed at levels other than the subconscious. That summer, Soviet border guards noticed bottles with corks in the top and a single pebble in the bottom, bobbing their jolly way into Soviet Ukraine, drawn by the currents of rivers. Each contained five or six posters or pamphlets, with titles such as: "Peasants, Don't Give Your Grain to the Bolsheviks"; "Moscow's Prison of Nations"; and "Father Taras Shevchenko summons you, peasants and laborers, to battle for an independent Ukraine." This last poster proclaimed the national revolution. The director of Soviet security organs at the border sent an alarmed telegram to Moscow on 31 August 1928. This "significant transport of counterrevolutionary proclamations," he correctly presumed, was the work of Petliurite agents residing in Poland.¹⁰⁰ Józewski's exposé, which came two days after the telegram, was part of an opening salvo in a propaganda war, a signal of a change of course, a direct challenge to the Soviet system.

It was perhaps an “inspiration,” in the Polish counterintelligence sense of the term, an intellectual provocation designed to frighten the enemy and cause him to panic and overreact. Such inspirations were a standard part of the general repertoire of Piłsudski-era eastern policy. This one certainly suited Józewski’s flair for the dramatic, and earned him the most desired accolade of the anti-communist: the front-page caricature in *Izvestiia*, as well as the ranking as one of the world’s leading fascists.¹⁰¹ Yet inspiration also seemed an especially appropriate weapon in the struggle for Ukraine. So much of the Soviet-Polish contest, after all, hinged on unverifiable perceptions: whether Ukrainians believed that policies on the other side of the border were tolerant or repressive, whether communists believed that they or Warsaw controlled the Ukrainian question, whether Stalin or Piłsudski believed that Ukraine inclined east or west. Because Ukrainians had no representative institutions of their own, it was impossible to say. Neither communist parties nor Józewski’s personal rule allowed much room for the free play of Ukrainian political interests or political ideas. The communists and Józewski, although mortal enemies, in practice shared one principle: they governed in the name of Ukraine, using selected Ukrainians, but without the legitimating support of the mass of the Ukrainian population. Whether played as show trial in the Kharkiv Opera or folk comedy in Volhynia’s reading circles, Ukrainian political life in these years was reduced to culture, where loyalties could not be measured and fears of disloyalty mounted, where general appearances counted for much and particular actions for little, where the important lines were written by someone else, where the motives of those who designed the scenes were ambiguous and obscure, and where the spectators decided how the story would end.

Chapter 4 Spies of Winter

After returning to power by military coup in 1926, Józef Piłsudski renewed the Polish military alliance with the Ukrainian People's Republic, and recruited several of the Polish supporters of the Winter March to positions of responsibility. One was Henryk Józewski. A second was Tadeusz Schätzel, a man who had enjoyed "general moral authority" in the Polish Military Organization in Ukraine.¹ Schätzel was apparently the mastermind (if that is the word) of the Winter March. He directed the Second Department from 1926 to 1928, where he helped coordinate the re-creation of the Ukrainian army. He then served as Tadeusz Hołówko's lieutenant in Promethean work in France and Turkey. After Hołówko's assassination, Schätzel was entrusted with general Promethean policy as director of the Eastern Section of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.² A third supporter of the Winter March who resurfaced after 1926 was Jerzy Niezbrzycki. Niezbrzycki had commanded one of the most active units of the Polish Military Organization in Ukraine (in Vinnytsia), and organized diversions against the Red Army during the Polish-Bolshevik War. From 1927 he was Warsaw's most important intelligence officer in Soviet Ukraine; from 1932 he supervised intelligence work throughout the USSR.

Thus three Polish veterans of Ukrainian covert operations in 1919–1921 came to occupy key positions in the Polish state after 1926. Supporters of the Winter March had regrouped, now behind their desks rather than behind enemy lines, but with similar aspirations, greater experience and, perhaps, maturity. When Piłsudski returned to power, Józewski was thirty-three years old, Schätzel was thirty-five, and Niezbrzycki only twenty-five. Still young men, they were confident that time was on their side. None believed that the Soviet system was viable, and all saw a promising avenue for action against Soviet power. It appeared that the basic political questions of land hunger and national identity, used so well by Lenin, were turning against the regime he had founded. The three men understood that Soviet policies of the early 1920s had allowed peasants to work their own land, and watched from 1928 as collectivization proceeded in Soviet Ukraine. They had watched, in the early 1920s, as the Ukrainian national question was used against them. Now, with Piłsudski announcing domestic reform, they believed that it might work in their favor. At the orders of Schätzel, Niezbrzycki went back to Kyiv under diplomatic cover to investigate. On 1 September 1928, the day before Józewski announced his Volhynia Experiment, Niezbrzycki established Polish intelligence outpost O-2 in Kyiv.³

THE KYIV SPIES

The Polish spymaster Jerzy Antoni Niezbrzycki, alias Ryszard Wraga or R. Wraga in four decades of pseudonymous publication in Polish and Russian journals, officially Richard Wraga in later American exile, was born Jerzy Ryszard Antonowicz in 1901. He attended a Russian imperial high school in Vinnytsia, in Ukraine. A decade younger than Józewski, he was in high school during the Bolshevik Revolution. Like Józewski, Niezbrzycki knew Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian, and was raised to have a particular affection for Ukraine and a general distrust of Russia. He was an orphan brought up by an uncle, maiden aunts, and Ukrainian servants. In touchingly unmediated English, he later recalled the hair of the Ukrainian servant girls as “my first perfect grammar of beauty.”⁴ One of the maiden aunts took him to see Cracow, and pointed out Piłsudski in a café. Generally speaking, the young Niezbrzycki had the same political referents as Józewski: the Polish mission in the east, the desire for unity with Ukraine, the problem of Russia, the image of Piłsudski.

As a boy in Vinnytsia, Niezbrzycki longed for travel and excitement, perhaps as a way out from under the maiden aunts, or out of the hair of the Ukrainian

servant girls. He once traded his clothes for those of a poor boy and auditioned for the circus. He was away from home for a week before he was found by the police and sent back to his uncle. Expecting punishment, the boy was surprised to find his uncle pleased with his exploits. He joined the Boy Scouts, and read Baden-Powell's account of his espionage work. "There I discovered," Niezbrzycki recalled, "that spying may be treated as a sport, as a thrilling adventure, part of a pure manly struggle with the enemy."⁵ Polish scouts, like older Polish university students, joined the struggle for Polish independence during the First World War. Like other scouts, Niezbrzycki made contact with the Polish Military Organization, where he was told to join the Red Army to gain military training. This he did, and then deserted. At age eighteen, in 1919, Niezbrzycki ran the Vinnytsia outpost of the Third Command of the Polish Military Organization.⁶ He reported to Józewski; as their mutual friend Jerzy Giedroyc recalled, he was "the pupil of Józewski and Stempowski senior" at this time.⁷ Indeed, one of Niezbrzycki's comrades in diversionary missions was Paweł Stempowski, son of Stanisław and brother of Jerzy.⁸

During the March on Kyiv of May 1920, Niezbrzycki served as an officer in a Ukrainian unit. After the Treaty of Riga, he appeared in Warsaw, still wearing his Ukrainian officer's uniform. Józewski and Stempowski agreed that Piłsudski would enjoy seeing the beautiful Cossack outfit. So they took the young man to meet the Polish head of state for essentially aesthetic reasons. Piłsudski told Niezbrzycki to "mothball that thing and get to work."⁹ Piłsudski knew of Niezbrzycki's accomplishments in the east; that was the way he spoke to people he liked; and so began Niezbrzycki's career in Warsaw. Niezbrzycki remained closely involved in Ukrainian operations. In November 1921, he joined the Second Department of the Polish general staff, where many other veterans of the Polish Military Organization were also employed.¹⁰ When the officers of the Second Department had the bright idea that the city of Warsaw should give them passe-partouts so that they could spy in theatres and cinemas without paying admission, Niezbrzycki personally collected a passe-partout for the circus.¹¹

After missions in Bessarabia and Istanbul, Niezbrzycki was dispatched to Soviet Ukraine in the late 1920s, probably in late 1927. One of his contacts was a psychoanalyst, others were writers, actors, dancers, and singers. Niezbrzycki was arrested in the apartment of one of his Kyiv contacts, breaking one of the basic rules of espionage. Niezbrzycki was at least dressed for the occasion, in his dinner jacket. As a Polish diplomat, he enjoyed diplomatic immunity, and could not be legally prosecuted. At this time, the Soviets still more or less ob-

served this rule. Niezbrzycki was expelled from the Soviet Union on New Year's Eve, 1930, leaving behind him a formidable record. He had traveled prodigiously and accumulated contacts all over the country. He had good ties with Ukrainians, Russians, and Poles throughout Soviet Ukraine, as well as working relationships with German army officers. He filed reports on German-Soviet military cooperation. His Outpost O-2 was a most fruitful source of intelligence. The late 1920s were the golden age of Polish intelligence and counterintelligence in Soviet Ukraine.¹² This, however, is a relative distinction. A KGB instruction manual later claimed that ninety percent of Poland's Kharkiv contacts at this time were under the control of Soviet organs.¹³

Niezbrzycki landed on his feet in Warsaw, and soon landed the job of his life: coordinator of all Polish intelligence operations in the east, throughout the territory and along the periphery of the Soviet Union. In June 1932 he was named director of the Eastern Section of the Intelligence Bureau of the Second Department, where he would serve until 1939. Niezbrzycki brought a new sense of discipline and order to the Eastern Section. He forced all of his officers to write in code, and devised a master cipher that allowed him to name all of his outposts and agents, and all other relevant figures and institutions, without the possibility that one outpost could reveal the codes used by the others. On his watch, nearly the entirety of the Polish diplomatic missions in Kharkiv and Kyiv were used for intelligence work, right down to (in fact especially) the mechanics and drivers. He gave the outposts and the agents new codenames, and saw to it that they had the equipment they needed: the Soviet maps, the Polish guidebooks, the Leica cameras from Germany, the Ford automobiles from the United States, the Browning handguns from Belgium.¹⁴

Niezbrzycki's immediate superior was Stefan Mayer, director of the Intelligence Bureau of the Second Department. Mayer was also a native of Ukrainian lands and a veteran of the Polish-Bolshevik War. His previous assignments included "inspiration" work in Brześć and Wilno. The two men were on good terms.¹⁵ Niezbrzycki also knew his agents in the field in Soviet Ukraine. Piotr Kurnicki, for example, was another veteran of the Polish Military Organization, sent to Ukraine by Tadeusz Schätzel to pursue the Promethean project.¹⁶ Niezbrzycki and Kurnicki communicated like old comrades, writing to each other as "My Dear!" and occasionally falling into Russian. (For these men, Russian was the language of school and university, of youthful conspiracy, and indeed of much of their official work. They were products of the Russian Empire. Piłsudski, their patron, made a point of speaking Russian rather than French to Soviet diplomats.)¹⁷ Yet Outpost Ku was a disappointment, at least at first.

Like most new agents, Kurnicki took time to get used to the terrain. In the beginning, he needed to use the good offices of the Eastern Section to resolve outstanding financial questions in Warsaw, and complained that personal problems prevented his reporting on events of obvious significance. He talked too much, and to people whom the Second Department regarded as provocateurs. There is a certain charm in his old typewriter, in his inability to use it properly, and in his descriptions of the Ukrainian countryside: but it took Kurnicki a year to report anything interesting.¹⁸

Niezbzycki was also frustrated with the initial work of Zdzisław Miłoszewski, Outpost M-13, who seemed to care too much about the feelings of others. In a characteristic moment of annoyance, Niezbzycki wrote to him that the Fatherland would soon collapse if its agents showed such exaggerated delicacy. The metaphor he used turned out to be appropriate: "This is not a ladies' dress shop, where you can have fits of conscience because you sold someone a bra that was too tight." He recommended bromide and boxing.¹⁹ Soon enough, Miłoszewski met a twenty-eight-year-old Ukrainian woman, who presented herself as a serial wife of Ukrainian dignitaries. Under Niezbzycki's coaxing and coaching, he cultivated the woman, whom they called Candida. Niezbzycki counseled sleeping with her early and often, since this is the ordinary behavior of men, and thus would deflect suspicion of ulterior motives. Candida revealed that the GPU was coming for the writer Mykola Khvył'ovyi when he committed suicide, which was true, and which the Poles may not have known. She correctly reported that Ukrainians purged from the party leadership in 1933 were replaced by Stalin's men from Moscow.²⁰ Niezbzycki played the delicate role of long-distance national security pimp as if born to it, judging that Candida had not yet earned a fur coat one month, sending her the *American Annual of Photography* the next.²¹

Niezbzycki was most at ease with Józefina Pisarczykówna, Outpost X-22, with whom he fell into a friendly intimacy. The two of them knew each other from work in the Polish Military Organization in Ukraine, and Niezbzycki liked and respected Pisarczykówna: "what's there to say, really: you're the finest woman that I know."²² Pisarczykówna cultivated male Soviet officials, promising them long trips à deux in exchange for unpublished documents on Poles in Soviet Ukraine. Fulfilling a general assignment to collect Soviet publications touching on the national question, she traded fashionable Polish clothing to women for books from their husbands' libraries.²³ Considering the comparative advantage of the Soviet Union in producing thick books that no one really wanted and of Poland in producing lovely dresses and reliable stockings, the ex-

change was as economically rational as could be. Niezbrzycki's reaction to the plan was characteristic: "What am I going to teach you, you incorrigible seductress."²⁴

THE LWÓW COMMAND

The difference in quality of women's clothing was a famous indicator of the difference in the two economies and societies. When the Soviet Union invaded Poland in 1939, Red Army soldiers could mistake bras for earmuffs; officers' wives wore nightgowns outside, mistaking them for evening dresses.²⁵ During the interwar period, these material differences provided both opportunities and risks for Polish spies. In 1928, for example, the Lwów command of the Counterintelligence Bureau of the Second Department sent an agent across the Polish-Soviet border with a piece of material suitable for dressmaking, on the logic that he could claim to be a smuggler if caught. This was too clever by half. The agent was not caught crossing the border, but then could not resist the temptation to sell the material for profit. As a result of the illegal market transaction he and his family were arrested.²⁶ This was one of many tales of woe of the Lwów command, beginning with the fiasco of the Winter March in 1921. Yet Lwów was a centerpiece of Piłsudski's intelligence reform after 1926, and as the 1930s began some progress could be seen. The return of Lwów to the mainstream of Poland's eastern policy was part of the regrouping of the individuals and institutions who had planned the Winter March.²⁷

The Second Department of the Polish General Staff		
<i>Bureaux</i>		
Intelligence Bureau (2A)	Counterintelligence Bureau (2B)	Research Bureau (4)
<i>Sections</i>		
Eastern and Western Sections	Ten Army Field Commands (e.g., Lwów)	Russia, Germany
<i>Subsections</i>		
Soviet and European Outposts	Counterintelligence, Counterrevolution	

The Polish intelligence outposts (O-2, Ku, M-13, X-22, Kh, and others) in Soviet Ukraine were stationary assets, men and women who lived in Kharkiv or Kyïv and were attached to Polish diplomatic missions. They were subordinate to the Intelligence Bureau (2A) of the Second Department. The Counterintelligence Bureau (2B) of the Second Department ran its operations through in-

formation sections in each of the ten army field commands in Poland. While the Warsaw field command's information section was responsible for recruiting and training counterintelligence agents, the eastern field commands, such as Lwów, were responsible for coordinating and executing missions on Soviet territory. The agents sent by the information section of the Lwów field command crossed the border illegally, with discrete intelligence, counterintelligence, propaganda, or sabotage missions to complete. Whereas officers working for the outposts enjoyed diplomatic immunity, the border crossers were performing an action that was not only illegal but dangerous in the extreme. Some initial missions were crowned with success. In spring 1929, Ukrainian counterintelligence officers in Polish employ were proposing to exploit ukrainization by penetrating Soviet institutions.²⁸ In spring 1930, Agent 1309 sent back the requested material, and Agent 1316 had recruited a Soviet functionary in Dnipropetrovsk. Agent 1353 had been in and out of the Russian Republic of the Soviet Union twice, and returned with a prospective agent. In 1930, a promising wave of new Ukrainian recruits filled the ranks as Ukrainians fled collectivization in the Soviet Union, and a female agent was carrying out an "inspiration" in the Kyiv GPU.²⁹

By 1932, the work of the Lwów command brought measurable results. In March it could boast sixty-one active agents, and missions in the GPU in Proskuriv, Iampol, Shepetivka, and Kam'ianets' Podil's'kyi, in the Dniester fleet, and in the Kyiv and Kharkiv garrisons of the Red Army.³⁰ Agents were still captured by Soviet security organs, but most seem to have remained in the Soviet Union long enough to carry out missions.³¹ They learned a great deal about the personnel of the GPU, especially in Ukraine, and especially about its nationality experts.³² The mechanism of border crossing, the crucial start to the entire operation, had been perfected. The Second Department was now practiced in recruiting agents. The Border Defense Corps, reorganized in 1931, was now in part an intelligence organization subordinated to the Second Department. By now, its officers were experienced in finding open "windows" on the Soviet border at short notice. The Second Department officer would collect a prospective agent in Warsaw or Lwów, and take him or her to a Volhynian town. There the Border Defense Corps would make the final arrangements, choose a "window," and lead the agent to the border. In Józewski's Volhynia, the Równe section of the Border Defense Corps had its own intelligence office, and ran its own network of about fourteen agents, sending some as far as Kyiv.³³

Border crossing was a psychological as well as a logistical enterprise, as the fi-

nal stage of a 1933 transfer in Volhynia reveals. The border guard explained to the agent that Polish compass needles are painted black at the north-seeking end, so that dark means north. He gave the agent milled pepper to throw off the dogs used by the Soviet border patrol. The border guard had given the agent a gun with the safety on; the agent now disengaged the safety. The border guard gingerly took back the gun, and put the safety back on. He led the agent to a “window” near Dubno, and then gave him a white coat to match the snow. The agent disengaged the safety a second time. He stood nervously, worrying aloud that the moon was too bright, that he could be seen. Slowly, calmly, repeating a line that he had no doubt said many times before, and would say many times again, the border officer said that there was nothing to be done about it, and offered his hand. The agent gave him a handshake, and a kiss on each cheek. As the border guard wrote to his superiors, he “could not refuse the agent this pleasure.” “Return safely,” whispered the Polish officer, in Russian. “Uvidimsia,” replied the agent, “until we meet again.” Then he crossed, just north of border marker 1381, leaving behind great footprints in the snow.³⁴

The Lwów command was responsible for anti-Soviet Russian agents employed by the counterintelligence bureau of the Second Department in Warsaw. Barnaba Outpost, for example, was at first a British-Polish, and then a Polish, network of anti-Bolshevik Russian agents. British and Polish intelligence services first collected Russians in emigration in western Europe, chiefly it seems in France, and sent them to Poland for training. Barnaba seems also to have employed Belarusian agents.³⁵ The Warsaw command of the Counterintelligence Bureau of the Second Department prepared such agents for missions to the Soviet Union, and then sent them across the border, very often from Volhynia. Vladimir Skrobot was sent to Minsk once and Moscow twice, although he was apparently caught in March 1932. Over the course of 1932 and 1933, Grigor Husan was sent twice to Minsk and twice to Samara. At least eight Barnaba missions involved border crossings in Volhynia, and at least one of these missions ended with the arrest of the agent by the GPU.³⁶ The liaison between Polish and British intelligence appears to have been Niezbrzycki, who wrote of informal cooperation in 1932 and a formal relationship between the Second Department and the Secret Intelligence Service the following year.³⁷

By 1931, many new Polish agents were Ukrainians: patriots of the generation of 1920, or younger refugees from Soviet Ukraine. Some of them worked with the Lwów command, and were noted as “Ukrainian material” or “kulak—reliable.” More Ukrainians took part in a new network organized by the Second Section of the Ukrainian People’s Republic army, in collaboration with the Sec-

ond Department. These were sometimes men and women associated with Józewski's Volhynia Experiment, and sent from Józewski's Volhynia across the Soviet border. In the understanding of the Ukrainian General Staff, these agents were to prepare Ukraine for another armed intervention, this one better planned and executed than the Winter March of 1921, and timed to exploit the collapse of Soviet nationality policy and the opposition to new Soviet policies that collectivized agricultural land.³⁸ It took no great powers of observation to see that Ukrainian peasants resisted collectivization on a massive scale. Indeed, Ukrainian peasants fled to Poland themselves to tell the Polish intelligence services what they had experienced.

COLLECTIVIZATION

History records few examples of peasants willingly surrendering land without compensation, which is the essence of collectivization. Ukrainian peasants had little tradition of collective land ownership. Left to their own devices, almost all peasants in right-bank Ukraine—Kyiv and westward—farmed individual plots.³⁹ Private property had existed for centuries in Ukraine, as an aspiration if not as a reality. Ukrainian peasants saw every crisis of the late Russian Empire as the shining moment when they would finally get their land, treating the 1905 Revolution as an opportunity to settle scores with landlords and stake claims to property. They finally got a solid legal claim to their land with the Stolypin reforms of 1907.⁴⁰ Peasants in Ukraine tended to support the October Revolution of 1917 insofar as it meant the expulsion of remaining landlords (often Poles), and the expropriation of their property. Many of these Polish landlords did indeed flee west during the revolution and the civil war that followed. Under Lenin's New Economic Policy of the early 1920s, Ukrainian peasants were allowed to farm land and sell produce as if they were small farmers. In sum, the modern history of the Ukrainian peasantry is one of rebellion to gain land; so it is hardly surprising that Ukrainian peasants would rebel when the land they had finally gained was taken away.

As collectivization loomed, Ukrainian agents sent from Poland were prepared to exploit this sentiment. In 1929 and 1930, the Second Section printed and distributed, with Polish support, tens of thousands of pamphlets and broadsides for distribution in Soviet Ukraine. A 1929 brochure warned of the "Hunger Tsar." Another pamphlet published that year explained collectivization in terms of "What Muscovite Soviet Power Gives, and What It Takes Away." A proclamation entitled "Peasants! Don't Give Your Bread to the Bol-


sheviks" was printed three times, in 1928, 1929, and 1930.⁴¹ Its interpretation of collectivization: "The specter of hunger again looms above Ukraine! Once again, by the grace of Bolshevik power, our nation will expire by starvation!" It predicted that Moscow would sell Ukrainian foodstuffs for hard currency, which it would use to support communist parties abroad.⁴² New broadsides published in 1930 took the same tone. One called upon peasants to abandon the collective farms while they still could, and to take up arms "in the final battle for Land and Freedom." It, too, explained that food grown on collectives would be taken to the cities and sold abroad.⁴³ Another maintained that starvation would make Ukraine easier for Stalin to rule, and that national independence was the only protection from such policies as collectivization.⁴⁴ The propaganda endeavored, in other words, to provide an overarching political interpretation and program that would speak to the experience of individual Ukrainian peasants.

Such agitation was perhaps inappropriate in 1928 and 1929, when a famine of natural origins brought hunger to peasants who still generally worked their own land. Soviet Ukrainian authorities worked to relieve this famine, while treating it as an argument for collectivization.⁴⁵ As collectivization in Ukraine accelerated in early 1930, Polish-sponsored agitation spoke to the condition of peasants who faced a sudden and radical change in their way of life. Collectivization meant the rapid seizure of farmland, and the creation of collective farms for which everyone had to work. Although collectivization officially began in 1928, as of 1 January 1930 only 16% of farmland in Ukraine had been collectivized. By 11 March 1930, this figure reached 64%. Nearly half the farmland was seized in ten weeks. Resistance was immediate and massive. The GPU reported that Ukraine was the most rebellious Soviet republic. Nearly one million people in Ukraine were reported as having protested collectivization, the vast majority during March 1930. Party agitators were murdered, and party members refused to enter villages. The regions bordering Poland, where propaganda was distributed and whence flight abroad was possible, were especially rebellious. The GPU reported that hundreds of border villages had simply ceased to exist, their inhabitants having fled.⁴⁶

Collectivization ran counter to centuries of accumulated human experience of growing one's own food. Most peasants associated collectivization with the end of life as they knew it, with hunger in the years to come, and they were certainly right. The obvious parallel was with their historical condition of serfdom, still a living memory of the Ukrainian peasantry. Peasants spoke of a return to serfdom, a notion exploited in Polish propaganda, which called collec-

З рук до рук! З хати до хати!

Селяне, не давайте хліба большевикам!



Примара голоду знов наступає на Україну!

Знов наш народ з ласки большевицької влади буде кинутий на голодну смерть!

Во всіх вісцях України надходять тривожні звістки про нещоріч, а в багатьох місцях нещоріч буде ровній. На Московщині положення ще гірше — там уже тепер набуваються голодні бунти селян та робітників, наз московські агінсари лушуть розстріляні. Наді всі большевицькі на український хліб, який вони будуть грабувати з українського населення та вивозити на Московщину. Знов, як шість років тому назад, заберуть останнє, а народ наш залишать умирати голодною смертю. Червоні кати московські не зупиняться перед тим, щоб знов ниморити голодом мільйони нашого населення, як було минулого разу, коли під голоду вимерло близь восьми мільйонів української людності. А мільйони голодуючих москалів, яких послатиме большевицька влада на Україну за хлібом? Червоні хитрими посягнуть на українські землі, щоб видерти останній кусень хліба у нас, а їм самим померти з голоду. Що ж робить московські кати, що б не допустити до голоду? Чи справді вони щиро дбають про те, що б врятувати населення від голодної смерті? Ні! Не вряте їм! Не вряте їхнім завданням і загрозам!

Не давайте їм хліба!

Вони вивозять хліб наш за кордон, продають чужинцям, а гроші видають чужою валютою комуністичним партіям, щоб викликати большевицьку революцію в чужих державах. Награбовані з нашого населення гроші вони видають на комуністичну пропаганду в Англії, Франції, Німеччині, Польщі, Австрії, Румунії та в інших державах. Нема такої держави, де б вони не спалили народніми грошима. А скільки їм народних грошей на революцію в Китаї? А чи вони потрібні нам? Сотні тисяч большевицьких агентів, чекистів утримуються за кордоном для агітації за такий комуністичний рай, який вони завели на Україні. Як би ці гроші повернути на закупку хліба для голодного населення, то про який голод не треба було б і думати.

Але вони цього не зроблять.

Бо їм не ходить про те, щоб населення не вимерло з голоду, а про те, що б на цілому світі завести комуналізм та що б влада комуністична панувала всюди.

Але чи станеться так, як хотить большевикам?

Ні! Чужі держави уже завели у себе два після війни, дбають про мирне та спокійне життя для своїх народів та про добробут народний. Вони ще до пори — до часу терять комуналізм у нас, але це не довго буде тримати. Читали в пресі большевицькій, що чужоземні сили вже сьогодні готуються до жорсткої розправи з большевицько-комуністичною Москвою. Коли ж сили не зробимо розправи з червоними катями, то на нашу землю, чого доброго, вступить зброя сил чужих держав, що б знищити їх.

Селяне! Досить з нас вже і интервенції чужоземної сили московської. Хай не ступить більше на нашу поляну кров'ю землю носа якого чужинця. Рятуйтеся самі! Самі організуйтеся, щоб власними силами силою незалежної панувати снажені московських катів, та відновити Українську Народну Республіку.

Ні одного зерна хліба червоним грабінниками! Ні одного карбованця незалежним окупантам!

Рятуйтеся від голоду, готуйтеся до розправи з правлячою московською комунією!

Український Революційний Комітет.

Грудень 1929.

Figure 13. "Peasants, Don't Give Bread to the Bolsheviks!" Ukrainian People's Republic propaganda, May 1929. Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe, Rembertów.

tivization “Soviet serfdom.” Peasants called the Soviet agitators Antichrists, clearly an idea of their own. When peasants rebelled, they opened the doors to churches recently closed by the Bolsheviks. Flight often took the form of church processions: perhaps a spontaneous appropriation of ritual, certainly a collective tactic of escape.⁴⁷ On 22 March 1930 the entire village of Sulomna took the banners from the church, and marched solemnly west towards the Polish border. They were stopped by Soviet border guards.⁴⁸ The entire village of Pechyvoda decided to walk to Poland on 28 March: two thousand men, women, and children following an elderly lady with a black handkerchief tied to a stick. They might have overwhelmed the border guards by their sheer numbers, but allowed themselves to be distracted by a debate about serfdom instead. Rather than fleeing across the border, they called the collective farm manager a lord, and waited for him to be turned over to them.⁴⁹ On 2 April the villagers of Nemezhynsi took two crosses from the church and began the walk west, telling the communists who tried to stop them that they were on their way to a church fair. Members of the local Komsomol, the communist student organization, arrived on horseback and halted the procession. Later the regional militia arrived to seize the cattle and horses, and were held back by women who encircled the livestock. When the militia beat the women, their menfolk ran from their houses with their sickles and hoes. The militia returned two weeks later in greater numbers, and this time beat resisters to death.⁵⁰

Many thousands of individuals did cross into Poland, where they were apprehended by the Polish border police and required to explain the circumstances themselves before receiving permission to stay. The stories are usually the same, whether the name was Ukrainian, Polish, or Jewish, the signature in Cyrillic or Latin characters, or simply a thumbprint from an officer’s inkwell. Everyone reported that all or almost all peasants opposed collectivization.⁵¹ Many of those who fled had feared, with good reason, that they would be sent to Siberia for resisting. Soldiers who deserted the Red Army spoke of letters from their families about collectivization, and claimed that only fear prevented mass mutinies.⁵² Ukrainian soldiers had been encouraged by Polish-Ukrainian propaganda to desert the Red Army, although it is unclear if this had any effect.⁵³ Poland’s own intelligence officers reported that mass armed uprisings and the murder of communists were the order of the day in the border region. As one concluded, “the population awaits, with great longing, armed intervention from European countries.”⁵⁴ The peasants themselves, once they made it across the border, begged the Poles for war. Many peasants are armed and awaiting only a good opportunity, they said. “And if a war broke out, the mood

of the people is such that if the Polish army appeared today they would kiss the soldiers' feet, and the entire population would attack the Bolsheviks."⁵⁵

The group that had favored the Polish-Bolshevik War, the March on Kyiv, and the Winter March was back in power, and its policies had been revealed. The men in charge of Poland's eastern policy, Schätzel, Józewski, and Niezbrzycki, were the true Polish radicals, powerful state officials with secret lives in espionage, intelligence officers with a record of operations in Ukraine. In March 1930, the fingerprints of these Polish radicals were everywhere. Józewski's exposé of September 1928 had been unambiguous. The Soviets had broken a Polish diversionary network organized by the Second Department in Soviet Ukraine in 1929.⁵⁶ No later than November 1929 the GPU made its first arrest of a Ukrainian agent sent from Poland in the new intelligence and agitation campaign.⁵⁷ Although 1930 saw many intelligence successes, ever more Ukrainian agents of Poland were apprehended by the GPU. The Lwów command had to report that during March 1930 Agents 1063, 1066, and 1172 were in Soviet prison, that Agents 1270 and 1279 had been betrayed on the Soviet side and had to flee, and that Agent 1307 was apparently under arrest.⁵⁸ By March 1930, then, the GPU would have interrogated several Ukrainians and Poles who had crossed the Soviet border in the new Polish campaign. Some were apparently recruited by the Soviets and dispatched back to Poland with false information.⁵⁹ However those interrogations proceeded, the apprehension of the new agents could be understood as a signal of a new policy from the west. From a Soviet perspective, the return of winter's spies seemed to herald spring's war.

This page intentionally left blank

Part Two **A Political Descent**

This page intentionally left blank

Chapter 5 Stalin's Famine

As he rose to power in the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet Union, Iosif Stalin exploited fears of an external threat from Poland and an internal threat from the peasantry. The war scare of spring 1927, when Soviet authorities claimed that Poland would invade, provided an ironic confirmation that these fears were connected. Many peasants, Soviet intelligence organs reported in 1927, saw the war scare as reliable information and good news, believing that a Polish invasion would allow them to liberate themselves from communism and take revenge on communists. A Belarusian peasant anticipated, presumably with joy, that "after the Poles come we will hang and shoot the communists like dogs."¹ According to the Soviet state police, Ukrainians believed that a war with Poland would allow Ukraine to gain its independence.² The army of the Ukrainian People's Republic was indeed secretly revived in spring 1927 in Poland. Not surprisingly, its ideal scenario for the liberation of Ukraine from Soviet rule was indeed the combination of domestic rebellion and Polish military intervention.³

Stalin linked the Soviet peasantry to Polish militarism in 1928, as he defended his plan to collectivize farmland. Having opposed rapid col-

lectivization in the past, Stalin now changed his position, associating his political career and his own person with the policy, and the policy with the survival of the Soviet state. Whatever the true origins of previous Soviet famines, and by 1928 there had been several, Stalin presented food shortages as the consequences of willful actions by hostile classes. Only the destruction of the hostile class of prosperous peasants could remove the internal, and thus weaken the external, threat to the existence of the Soviet Union. Stalin took for granted that peasants were hostile to the communist system, and would rebel as soon as they saw the invading Polish armies. In 1928, Stalin presented to his comrades the specter of a war on two fronts: the Polish front, and the peasant front. Since the Soviet Union would lose such a war, he argued, a preventive strike was necessary to remove the peasant threat and destroy the capitalist countryside.⁴ The peasant question and the Polish question intersected in Soviet Ukraine, where peasants were resisting state requisitions. Unconsciously, perhaps, Stalin was resuscitating older Russian rhetorics of fear: Poles and food crises. The Poles had been the most mistrusted people within the Russian Empire. The Bolsheviks themselves had come to power by exploiting that Empire's inability to distribute food properly during war.⁵

When Stalin raised these two specters again, he was addressing Russia's ancient dilemma: how to modernize the country to match the West, without exposing the country to aggressive designs from the West.⁶ Collectivization was intended to advance the revolution and to protect it. The state needed the capacity to collect grain predictably, to gain hard currency on foreign markets, and to feed the workers of the Soviet Union's growing cities. The makers of a "scientific" revolution also wished to purchase political insurance against the vicissitudes of nature. Collectivization would transfer the costs of poor weather from the state to the peasants. Once the state controlled the farmland and the countryside, it could collect a grain quota regardless of the preferences or needs of those who worked the land. Poor weather would mean famine for peasants, not shortfalls for the state. To be sure, there was also the ideological argument that collective farming would facilitate the construction of socialism, and some Bolsheviks believed that collective was more efficient than private farming. As peasants in Soviet Ukraine and elsewhere resisted requisitions in 1926, 1927, and 1928, advocates of rapid collectivization in 1929 made a strong case that collectivization was also required for social control.⁷ These arguments were used in a power struggle at the heights of the Bolshevik Party, in which Stalin, with the help of allies and temporary coalitions, slowly gained a dominant position.⁸

However justified, collectivization was bound, in the short run, to intensify the peasant problem. Peasants who were resigned to landlessness might eventually be tamed, but peasants being reduced to landlessness would try to resist.

In spring 1930, as rapid collectivization proceeded, the Soviet leadership faced Stalin's peasant front in southern Russia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. The resistance in Ukraine perhaps brought back unpleasant memories of the Polish-Bolshevik War.⁹ Whether their fears were historically inflected or not, some Soviet leaders believed that they would soon face the Polish front as well.¹⁰ Resistance to collectivization was greatest in Ukraine, and in Ukraine at the Polish border. More than half of the disturbances took place at the border, where flight was a plausible goal. Soviet border guards had lost control, and rumors spread that Poland was preparing a liberating war.¹¹ Soviet authorities could blame themselves for such hopes, as they had been propagating the war scare for four years.¹² Rumors of a Polish attack were also spread by Ukrainian agents of Poland.¹³ Local party activists, who for reasons of political self-preservation could not blame collectivization for the flight of peasants, claimed that foreign consulates had organized the exodus.¹⁴ In fact, the Polish consulate in Kharkiv was surprised and overwhelmed by the spontaneous petitions from peasants who wished to flee to Poland to escape collectivization.¹⁵ Yet false claims about consulates might have sounded plausible in light of true reports about propaganda.

Sergo Ordzhonikidze, Stalin's emissary to embattled Ukraine, was convinced that Poland would attack unless the pace of collectivization was slowed. Kliment Voroshilov, Soviet commissar for military affairs, was sure that the Soviet Union was now a tempting target for Polish attack. Stalin called a temporary halt to rapid collectivization. On 17 March Voroshilov placed western units of the Red Army at full battle readiness. On 18 March he issued instructions to his officers in preparation for a Polish attack. By 25 March he had prepared the full projections of the battle theaters. After an attack by the combined forces of Poland and Romania, all of Ukraine and Belarus would be occupied, and Leningrad and western Russia would be at risk.¹⁶ Maxim Litvinov, commissar for foreign affairs, wrote Stalin that he feared that collectivization would provoke a Polish invasion. His instructions from Stalin were to seek peace with Poland. Soviet diplomats, who had been requesting a nonaggression pact since 1924, undertook a new campaign to bring Poland to the negotiating table. Stalin worried in his correspondence that Litvinov would foolishly miss the chance to sign a treaty with the USSR's western neighbor.¹⁷

WARSAW'S CHOICE

In spring 1930, Poland's Soviet enemy was accusing it of hostile intentions and admitting its own vulnerability; Poland's own intelligence services produced all manner of evidence that collectivization had indeed destabilized Soviet Ukraine; refugees streamed across the border and pleaded for a Polish attack; and Poland's own Ukrainian allies were keen to begin another march on Kyiv. The General Staff of the Ukrainian army was as ready as it would ever be for another war with the Soviet Union. In three years of work, Ukrainian officers had been trained, equipment collected, mobilization plans perfected. Mobilization times were down to ten to fourteen days.¹⁸ Yet the Polish leadership declined the Ukrainian invasion proposal of June 1930.¹⁹ Polish authorities saw no reason to attack. Even as they observed the strains of collectivization, they saw the Soviet countermeasures. They knew that the size of the border guard had been doubled, that the GPU patrolled the border, that whole divisions of the Red Army had been deployed.²⁰ They realized, perhaps, that Soviet authorities had taken advance measures to integrate border policing and collectivization.²¹ Polish observers certainly had ample reason to suspect the scale of Soviet repressions. On 30 January 1930 the Soviet politburo had ordered fifteen thousand prosperous peasants, or "kulaks," to be sent preemptively to "concentration camps" and another thirty to thirty-five thousand to be deported; instructions of 2 February specified that "kulaks were to be liquidated as a class."²² On 5 March 1930, in what was perhaps the first purely ethnic deportation in Soviet history, the politburo ordered ten to fifteen thousand families, "in the first line those of Polish nationality," to be deported from Ukrainian and Belarusian border zones.²³ In the event, something like ninety thousand people were removed in a "cleansing of counterrevolutionary elements from the border zone" between 20 February and 20 March.²⁴ This sort of state capacity had to give pause.

Polish authorities certainly recognized that social chaos was not the same thing as organized resistance. Ukrainian intelligence officers, who had every political reason to present collectivization as an opportunity for political revolution, could not make such a case. Even the most optimistic reports arriving in Warsaw, sent by Ukrainian spies in Soviet Ukraine, admitted the essential problem: "It was impossible to massively exploit the general hatred of Soviet power of both workers and peasants against the government. Hatred of the Soviet government atrophied completely under the influence of general spiritual depression—fear of exile, prison, hunger, lack of faith in one's own strength,

lack of organization, and so on. It turned out that the masses are completely incapable of organized struggle against the hated authorities, and to save their own lives joined" the collective farms.²⁵ This language may betray the bitterness of disappointed patriots, but it also clarifies the basic issue. There was no unifying ideology or organized group behind the mass resistance of March 1930. Peasants wished to preserve a way of life, and in the face of superior Soviet force had to settle for preserving life itself.

Social disorder might have sufficed as a pretext for invasion had Poland been planning a war to liberate Ukraine, as in the March on Kyiv of 1920. Ten years on, Poland had no such intentions. Poland had contingency plans for an invasion of the Soviet Union, but they were defensive in nature. A rapid invasion was meant as a plan of defense in a situation in which war was perceived to be inevitable. In such a case, the Polish general staff intended to exploit faster mobilization timetables and (Polish generals believed) superior technology to disable the Red Army before it could amass overwhelming force. Tactical victories had to be won before the Soviets achieved full mobilization, and before Soviet troops from the east could reach the west. The preemptive incursion into the Soviet Union would require support from Ukrainians, hence the continued Polish relationship with the Ukrainian People's Republic. This required the cultivation of an illusion. The Ukrainians might have imagined that Poland would initiate a war of liberation; but for the Poles, the Ukrainians were an asset to be exploited as necessary in a war the Poles had no intention of beginning. Poland also maintained the Ukrainian People's Republic as a kind of anarchy insurance. Piłsudski and his group believed that the Soviet Union was likely to collapse from its own internal contradictions, and wished to have a Ukrainian government in reserve for this contingency.²⁶ Warsaw would have been delighted if its propaganda and sabotage had contributed to the collapse of Soviet Ukraine, but had no intention of intervening short of that. Ukrainian patriots in Poland and Ukrainian peasants in Soviet Ukraine were, to this extent, pawns of Polish as well as Soviet power.

Poland was indeed changing course in its Soviet policy, but towards rapprochement rather than renewed conflict. The numerical imbalance between the Polish army and the Red Army was rapidly growing. Soviet military spending increased massively in 1931, and again in 1932. Soviet and Polish forces were still comparable as late as 1932 (the Polish army numbered 266,000, and the Red Army numbered 562,000, but deployed over a vast terrain), but the trends were clear.²⁷ As the Soviets built up their forces, the Great Depression forced severe budget cuts in Polish military spending. As the Soviets began to develop

a more modern doctrine of mechanized warfare, the Polish army remained limited by Piłsudski's antiquated image of a "war of motion."²⁸ Old allies had little to offer Warsaw. The British were drifting towards isolation. Poland's defensive alliance with France was directed against Germany, not the Soviet Union. In summer 1932, Paris and Moscow were negotiating a nonaggression pact. Even as Moscow perceived itself to be open to attack, Warsaw was willing to confirm the status quo. Warsaw accepted Moscow's offer to negotiate a nonaggression pact, proposing a draft on 23 August 1931. As collectivization proceeded, Warsaw and Moscow came to terms. The Soviet-Polish nonaggression treaty was signed on 25 July 1932. The Soviet Union continued to present Poland as a threat, but Soviet military planners in the 1930s no longer saw Poland as a power capable of attacking the Soviet Union.²⁹ The spring of 1930 was perhaps the last moment that they took this view.

FAMINE

Even as Ukrainian peasants resisted collectivization in 1930, fighting and fleeing and finally submitting, the sun shone and the rain fell. The drought conditions of the previous two years came to an end. 1930 was a beautiful year, a perfect summer for Ukraine's potatoes and wheat, and autumn's yield was marvelous. It might have helped that, during the important work of spring sowing, perhaps a third of the farmland was still in private hands. 1930 became a paradigmatic year for the collectivizers, the way things were supposed to work, the standard that other harvests should meet. The weather did not cooperate in 1931, and peasants refused to give up the little grain they had. A GPU report at the end of the year spoke of "systematic nonfulfillment of the plan," of the massive slaughter of livestock to prevent its confiscation, and of the refusal of communist authorities in many villages to collect the grain. During the winter of 1931–1932 the situation only got worse. The police reported starvation deaths and mass demonstrations. More than 125,000 people illegally fled the countryside for the cities.³⁰

Stalin and the politburo chose to interpret the problem in terms of the bad faith of Ukrainian peasants and the indiscipline of local cadres. This was where Soviet communism very often led: not to an Engelsian scientific analysis that might have emphasized poor weather and poor harvests, not to a Marxian class analysis that might have examined the collective farm as a mode of production with social consequences, but to a Leninist emphasis on will and choice. Lenin's party had rejected criticism from within according to the precepts of "demo-

cratic centralism," which meant that the dominant fraction in any debate could define any minority position as a deviation, and force any minority to submit. Stalin inherited this practice, and as general secretary had built the party from below largely from his own men and women. Lenin's party had made its revolution in 1917 to hasten the development of a backward country, on the assumption that revolution from Europe would come to the rescue. Stalin's party was in a greater hurry still, since Europe was hostile, and the Soviet Union remained stubbornly backward. Stalin had also personally committed himself to collectivization in the throes of intraparty strife. Once begun, it was too great a transformation to be reversed.

The failure of the Ukrainian collective farms to meet grain targets was blamed on people. In June 1932, the Soviet politburo decided that, in order to avoid the mistakes of the past, the party must invade every local space, every household, to meet grain targets.³¹ Stalin had already left for vacation, so that session was chaired, as was the usual practice, by his closest ally Lazar Kaganovich.³² Stalin was on the way to Sochi, accompanied by trains full of provisions.³³ Recognizing that Ukraine was ravaged by "impoverishment and famine," Stalin found another group to blame. He wrote Kaganovich that local party secretaries should be held "personally responsible."³⁴ On 20 June 1932, the GPU reported that the annual sowing in Ukraine had been carried out under "extremely tense conditions." Peasants committed suicide rather than starve to death, and cannibalism was already frequent. The peasants were too hungry to work the fields. The GPU could report that it had liquidated 119 "kulak counterrevolutionary organizations" and 35 "counterrevolutionary groups." Some 116,000 more peasants sought to flee the countryside that summer.³⁵ Peasants and local party leaders alike found the requisition targets for 1932, announced in June, to be unrealistic.³⁶ On 5 August, the GPU spoke of fractions within the Ukrainian section of the Bolshevik Party, and of national communists within Ukraine who "carry out the orders of the Second Department."³⁷ It was understood that this was the root cause of the resistance of local cadres, whose lax position encouraged the peasants to hoard grain, thereby bringing about the failure of Soviet Ukraine to meet the targets for requisitions.

Stalin now displayed his special form of political genius: interpreting the disastrous consequences of his own policies as a reason to punish his political opponents (real or imagined). For, he reasoned, if the Ukrainian peasants were rebelling, this must be the fault of the Polish Second Department; and if the Second Department had penetrated Ukraine, that must be the fault of the Ukrainian party. He expressed the view that the Ukrainian party was a carica-

ture of a communist party, thoroughly penetrated by enemies who aimed to destroy the Soviet Union. As he wrote to Kaganovich, "If we don't make an effort now to improve the situation in Ukraine, we may lose Ukraine. Keep in mind that Piłsudski is not daydreaming, and his agents in Ukraine are many times stronger" than Ukrainian party leaders believed. Stalin continued: "Keep in mind that the Ukrainian Bolshevik Party (500 *thousand* members, ha-ha) includes not a few (yes, not a few!) rotten elements, conscious and nonconscious Petliurites, as well as direct agents of Piłsudski. As soon as things get worse, these elements will not be slow to open a front inside (and outside) the Party *against* the Party. Worst of all, the Ukrainians simply *do not* see the danger."³⁸ Kaganovich agreed that the famine was to be attributed to "Piłsudski's work" and that other explanations from Ukrainian comrades were to be disregarded. In his words, "The theory that we Ukrainians are innocent victims creates solidarity and a rotten cover-up for one another not only at the middle level but also in the party leadership."³⁹

Though it is impossible to be sure, Stalin probably grasped that the Polish threat was in decline. Piłsudski was visibly ill.⁴⁰ Poland had not in fact invaded during the moment of real vulnerability of 1930, had responded to Stalin's peace initiative in 1931, and had just signed a nonaggression pact in July 1932. It seems likely that Stalin, having resolved the Polish threat to his own satisfaction by summer 1932, felt free to exploit its remnants, and indeed the chaos of collectivization, to solidify his own position. Stalin sent trusted men, Lazar Kaganovich and Vsevolod Balyts'kyi, to Ukraine to restore order. Having barely reached Kharkiv from Moscow, Balyts'kyi already knew that the famine was a result of sabotage connected with "the transfer of dozens of Petliurite emissaries and the widespread distribution of Petliurite pamphlets." He was already certain of "the existence in Ukraine of an organized counterrevolutionary insurgent underground, connected with foreign countries and the intelligence agencies of foreign states, mainly with the Polish General Staff."⁴¹ Petliurite agents from Poland had indeed run dozens of missions and distributed thousands of pamphlets since 1928. Large groups had been smuggled across the border, including a group of saboteurs. Individual agents had been apprehended. Shubrii had vanished after a border crossing of 16 June 1930, as had Tymko after 28 May 1930. Hanzha had apparently been shot after eight days on Soviet territory in August 1930. Lanovyi, who had crossed in October 1930, was believed to be in Siberian exile.⁴² Yet Stalin, Kaganovich, Balyts'kyi, and the GPU missed, or pretended to miss, what was obvious to the border crossers themselves: that all of this agitation had no political result. The combination of op-

position to collectivization and patriotic propaganda had not produced a political organization in the countryside. As the Second Section had reported in Warsaw, "The mood of the peasants is completely anti-Bolshevik and very favorable to the Ukrainian People's Republic government, which has made the GPU believe in large conspiratorial Ukrainian People's Republic organizations and expend much effort to discover these organizations. These organizations do not in fact exist."⁴³

Soviet authorities blamed failures in the countryside on recalcitrant peasants and foreign propaganda. They did so long before Poland began to spread propaganda encouraging peasants to keep their grain.⁴⁴ The reality of Polish propaganda added colorful, and perhaps even convincing, detail to a narrative that served Stalin's power politics. The Polish-Ukrainian plot was presented as a success in 1932 when in fact it had already failed. Piłsudski and Petliura were presented as powerful enemies, when the first was very ill and the second had been dead for six years. Radical measures were taken to restore order and collect foodstuffs, on the false premise that local rule in Ukraine was corrupted by foreign influences. The Ukrainian section of the Bolshevik Party was essentially suspended from its duties. New "Political Departments" composed mainly of outsiders were charged with collecting grain and controlling local cadres. Kaganovich sat in judgment on the Ukrainian politburo, forcing its members on the night of 20 December 1932 to commit themselves to new targets for grain requisitions (which, although later reduced, amounted to a death sentence for millions). On 29 December the Ukrainian politburo declared that the precondition to fulfilling the plan was the seizure of "family reserves." In Moscow, the Soviet Central Committee closed the circle on the Ukrainian peasantry. Since peasant flight was also officially part of a Polish plot to discredit the Soviet Union, peasants had to be prevented from leaving the collective farms. The peasants continued to flee, when they were strong enough. This brought down yet another decree on the "liquidation of the kulaks as such" by deporting people before they could run.⁴⁵

Balyts'kyi found what he was meant to find in Ukraine: Ukrainian nationalism and Polish conspiracy, collaborating to prevent grain collections. He knew that this was not the entire truth.⁴⁶ He saw the famine for himself. His officers wrote to him of the human catastrophe in the foreground of their work. The head of the Kharkiv GPU, for example, wrote a private note to Balyts'kyi in June 1933: "There are villages where a significant part of the adult population has left for the towns to seek money and bread, leaving the children alone to their fate. In many villages the tremendous majority of collective farm workers

and their families are starving, among them many who are sick and swollen with hunger. In many cases no help is given them since there are no reserves whatsoever. In connection with this many people die every day.” He added that “In parallel the practices of cannibalism and the eating of corpses are spreading. Not uncommon are cases of peasants making use of the bodies of children who have starved to death. There are also a series of known cases in which families kill their weakest members, usually children, and use their meat for eating.”⁴⁷ By June 1933, peasants had lost their land to collectives, had seen local party leaders replaced by outsiders, had been forbidden to leave for the cities or leave Soviet Ukraine, had been banned from buying or selling food, and had been required to surrender any food they had. They starved, by the million.

STALINISM

Warsaw, meanwhile, was concerned to consolidate its improved relations with Moscow. Piłsudski and others wished to reach Stalin directly in order to reassure him of Poland’s enduring desire for peace.⁴⁸ The nonaggression pact of July 1932 did not improve the difficult conditions in which Poland’s diplomats and spies worked in Soviet Ukraine. They found that Ukrainian communists remained very suspicious of Poland, more so than Russian communists. Ukrainian communists held Jerzy Niezbrzycki to be a ringleader of saboteurs, and thus personally responsible for the economic problems of Soviet Ukraine.⁴⁹ In general Polish intelligence officers were consistently surprised by the extent to which Ukrainian officials seemed to believe their own propaganda regarding the Polish threat. Niezbrzycki himself, however, instructed his officers in Ukraine to adapt themselves to the nonaggression pact, and to avoid contacts with Ukrainian patriotic activists, or people who presented themselves as such. Niezbrzycki specifically forbade the Promethean Piotr Kurnicki from pursuing contacts with Petliurites in Kyiv. As he wrote, “we have signed a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union, and we want to be loyal, even though they are constantly provoking and blackmailing us.”⁵⁰

Poland’s diplomats, like those of other European powers, were perfectly aware of the mass starvation of 1932 and 1933.⁵¹ Even in Kharkiv and Kyiv, privileged cities that were off limits to the starving peasantry, the famine was impossible to miss. The consul general in Kharkiv wrote of the huge increase in petitioners in February 1933: “At present everyone wants to return to Poland, everyone is finding real or imaginary claims to Polish citizenship, everyone is complaining of misery and unbearable hunger. Frequently the clients, grown

men, cry as they tell of wives and children starving to death or bursting from hunger.”⁵² Just appearing at the Polish consulate was a sign of desperation, since almost everyone who did so was arrested and never seen again.⁵³ Each of the Polish intelligence officers, independently and without orders from above, wrote a report on the hunger. These men and women, who had seen much in life, invariably used a different tone in describing the suffering they saw in 1933. Józefina Pisarczykówna wrote from Kharkiv that “the hunger embraces ever more layers of society, and one hears ever more often of cases of cannibalism. On the street one sees the dying and the dead.”⁵⁴ A new agent in Kyiv wrote, in a report widely distributed in Warsaw, of “cases of death by starvation on the streets and in the courtyards, counted not in the tens but in the hundreds daily,” and of the far worse conditions that prevailed in the countryside. “Cannibalism,” he continued, “has become a habit of sorts. Mortality has reached such heights that there are cases of entire villages that have died out completely.”⁵⁵ Writing again in October 1933, the consul concluded that “by this time at least five million people have died.”⁵⁶

Poles saw in the famine no occasion to exploit. Conditions of 1930 had been far more promising, and Warsaw had decided against intervention then. In 1930, collectivization had offered social chaos, while the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine show trial had humbled certain members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. In 1933, famine offered mass social despair, while the GPU physically eliminated leading national communists and intellectuals from Ukrainian society. Oleksandr Shums'kyi was arrested on 13 May 1933 and sent to the camps. Mykola Khvył'ovyi, the leading communist writer, was to be arrested the same day as Shums'kyi. Fearing the knock on the door, he took his own life.⁵⁷ Jerzy Niezbryzcki, in his days in Outpost O-2, had observed in Kyiv and Kharkiv a Ukrainian intellectual class friendly to Poland, and had thought that Ukrainian society would one day revolt against Moscow. These basic assumptions of the Polish Promethean project—that intellectuals could be friendly to Poland and lead societies that could rebel against Bolshevism—no longer seemed to correspond to life in Soviet Ukraine in 1933. Niezbryzcki now believed that fear of starvation had removed any trace of social resistance. His officers in Ukraine agreed.⁵⁸

Ukrainian People's Republic officers, running their own agents into Soviet Ukraine from Poland, were similarly pessimistic. Their network had collapsed under the pressure of budget cuts from Warsaw and increased border policing by Moscow. Total spending on Promethean projects fell by 31% from 1932 to 1933.⁵⁹ In June 1933 Ukrainian officers closed one of their three border points,

and in October 1933 dismissed the director of another. Their best agents fell, one after the other. Agent 102, successful on six previous missions in Soviet Ukraine, was probably apprehended by the GPU in February 1933. The GPU reported having shot and killed a Petliurite agent on 3 May 1933. This was probably Agent 8, who in fact returned to Poland on 4 May 1933 seriously wounded. Agent 7 was killed by the GPU after crossing the border on 19 September 1933. In the second half of 1933, as famine raged across Soviet Ukraine, only one agent completed any missions at all, and these were brief surveys of the border region. The border crossers' penetration of Soviet Ukraine was so poor in 1933 that simple reports of general famine were all they could muster.⁶⁰ Petliurite agents were in Soviet Ukraine during the famine, as Stalin said; but they had no direct influence on the course of events. Their importance was in the upper realms of Soviet politics. Stalin attributed great power to them, then forced his imaginary vision on the world, at the cost of millions of lives. Warsaw perhaps came to understand this possibility. After the famine, the Promethean project was revised. No longer would agents representing repressed non-Russian nationalities be sent into the Soviet Union with political missions. Propaganda work was to be separated from intelligence. Tadeusz Schätzel, head of Promethean operations, seemed chastened.⁶¹

The only group between Warsaw and Moscow who wanted war in 1933 was the Ukrainian peasantry. Far fewer peasants managed to cross the Polish border in 1933 than in 1930, but refugees' hopes for a war of liberation had only intensified with their plight. Ukrainian peasants "wished that Poland or for that matter any other state would come and liberate them from misery and oppression."⁶² Two covert public opinion surveys ordered by Warsaw found much the same thing. The Soviet-Polish nonaggression pact of July 1932 had come at the worst time for the Ukrainian peasant, since it removed the traditional hope of a liberating war from Poland just as the famine began. Piotr Kurnicki reported in December 1933 that Ukrainian peasants, in their desperation, could now only hope for a German attack.⁶³ The only Pole who seems to have considered a war of liberation was, it appears, Piłsudski himself. In September 1933 he ordered the acceleration and completion of a special study of the Red Army in Soviet Ukraine, which was submitted on 19 October. Polish agents in Ukraine were all instructed to pay special attention to nationality work that autumn. The "Old Gentleman," as Niezbrzycki called him, was to make his decision by the end of the year. That decision had fallen by 16 December, and was negative.⁶⁴ It appears that Piłsudski had to concede that the mass starvation of the Ukrainian peasantry presented no opportunity for Poland.

To be sure, Stalin did not bring about the poor harvest, nor did he plan to catch Polish agents. The famine was not limited to Ukraine, but he used it to resolve certain Ukrainian matters to his own satisfaction. It was an occasion, like many others, that he exploited for his own ends. He assimilated these facts into a political vision of the world, and forced the world to match the vision. The GPU caught about five Petliurite agents in Ukraine in 1933, and Soviet policy allowed 3.5 to 5 million Ukrainian peasants to die.⁶⁵ In 1933 Stalin no longer expressed concerns about a Polish attack.⁶⁶ His "Polish front" and his "peasant front" had been quieted by the famine. Whether his fears were genuine or manufactured, he had resolved both questions in much the way he had wanted. The famine had indeed destroyed the Polish beliefs that nationality policy was working in Warsaw's favor, and that economic development in Ukraine would produce a new generation of patriotic allies. Stalin's willingness to let millions die disoriented the Polish intelligence apparatus, leaving the modest ventures of Poland's Prometheans seeming immoral, outmoded, and quaint. The hopeful federalism of the Prometheans, the nineteenth-century presupposition that one nation could help another in the interest of all, or at least that Poland could help Ukraine in the interest of Poland, faded into the past. Henryk Józewski was one of the few Polish Prometheans who refused to alter his views.

Stalin exploited the famine in Soviet domestic politics as well. Since local cadres were scapegoated, his own people would be sent to correct the problem. One of his allies became second secretary of the Ukrainian section of the Bolshevik Party, more than a hundred trusted communists were sent to seize the heights, and 120,000 members were purged from the ranks.⁶⁷ His trusted allies Kaganovich and Balyts'kyi, sent to handle the crisis of the famine, remained in Soviet Ukraine to repair the damage the Ukrainian section of the Bolshevik Party had supposedly done by its indiscipline. Balyts'kyi was placed again at the head of the Ukrainian secret services, and became a full member of the Ukrainian politburo. Since Stalin blamed the Ukrainian party for the failure to meet grain targets, his own men had to see that all grain was collected. Stalin's men translated his abstract assumptions into political reality. If Petliurites and Polish agents were responsible for the grain shortfalls, how had they gained so much influence? They must have acted through the Ukrainian section of the Bolshevik Party. If they had penetrated the party, who was to blame? The previous leadership, and in particular the education commissar Mykola Skrypnyk. By what method had national deviationists allowed nationalists into the party? By the policy of ukrainization. The November 1933 plenum of the Ukrainian Central Committee explicated precisely this logic. Skrypnyk had lost his post in

February 1933 and committed suicide that July, so he was a convenient target. But the political analysis went beyond personalities. Since support of Ukrainian culture was linked to the armed intervention of foreign powers, anyone who had supported ukrainization was a potential traitor. Since any problems related to collectivization were the fault of Ukrainian nationalists, Ukrainian critics of the policy risked accusations of nationalism, the “right-wing deviation.” Stalin’s policy failure set a political trap.⁶⁸

Ukrainian peasants had to join in the collectivization process, and had to starve to prove its success. Ukraine had to become a model republic and a communist fortress, because this was what Moscow required as protection from enemies external and internal.⁶⁹ The new logic of necessity set different tasks than the old logic of attraction. In the 1920s, Soviet Ukraine was presented in heroic terms, as the culmination of Ukrainian national history. The Shums’kyi Affair of 1927–1928 and the Union to Liberate Ukraine show trial of 1930 were setbacks, but they could be assimilated to a narrative of overall national progress. The famine, however, could not. To deny the famine was a lie of an entirely different order. It meant suppressing the lived experiences of practically everyone in Soviet Ukraine. Balyts’kyi was the local guardian of Stalin’s big lie. He acted as if Stalin’s analyses of the famine were true, and then reaped the political rewards as others were trapped by their logic. At the January 1934 congress of the Bolshevik Party, where Stalin asserted his personal supremacy and rewrote the Soviet past, Balyts’kyi played a special part. Nineteen thirty-three was not the year of the famine. It was the year, said Balyts’kyi, when “we dealt a decisive blow to the Ukrainian counterrevolution.”⁷⁰ Balyts’kyi placed the death of millions of people inside a Soviet Ukrainian narrative about the defeat of nationalist counter-revolution.

At that same congress, Kaganovich went further, subordinating the experience of collectivization to the success of the revolution as a whole. While Stalin himself boasted only of the “complete victory of Leninism,” Kaganovich placed Stalin’s achievement above Lenin’s, as the new axis of world history. Stalin, the Man of Steel, called Kaganovich “Iron Lazar.” The “congress of victors” was also Iron Lazar’s moment, when Kaganovich was seen as Stalin’s second in command and successor, and he left no doubt where his loyalties lay. Stalin, he said, had achieved “the greatest revolution which human history has ever known, a revolution which smashed the old economic structure and created a new collective-farm system on the basis of the socialist industrialization of the country.”⁷¹ In Poland, West Ukrainian communists were less subtle than Balyts’kyi, Kaganovich, and Stalin, mentioning the rumor that “ten million Ukrainians

died of hunger" before denying it, admitting that prosperous peasants were "being liquidated as a class" on the assumption that reasonable people would understand the rationale.⁷²

Yet Stalin was a man, not a mode. As the famine was raging, in November 1932, Stalin's wife killed herself. Stalin could not speak at her funeral, and asked Kaganovich to deliver the funeral oration in his stead. "Stalin asked, and I did it," Kaganovich recalled. Many of Stalin's friends and associates, including Kaganovich, believed that the man was changed.⁷³ His views on the particular subject of the famine certainly became more radical. While still attentive to individuals and still tending towards abstraction, his reasoning now liberated itself from the burden of contact with empirical reality. In January 1933, he produced a new kind of interpretation of the failure of collectivization, pregnant with terrible promise. Faced with the reality that collective farms failed even after everyone who resisted was subdued or deported, he shifted to a metaphysical definition of the enemy. The enemy was "quiet," "sweet," even "holy." The enemy said he was in favor of the system, gave no sign of opposition, and exploited imperceptible methods of resistance. The party must learn to "tear the mask from the enemy" and show "his true, counterrevolutionary face."⁷⁴ Opposition was an inner state, those who did nothing were guilty, only security organs could ascertain the truth. Acting on the principle that empirical data were misleading, security organs would find the truth they were ordered to find. Stalin's own speech to the "congress of victors" asserted that "the nationalist deviations have been smashed and scattered," and that "the policy of eliminating the kulaks has triumphed."⁷⁵

Its results, he added, are "obvious to everyone." The results he had in mind were likely not the death by starvation of millions of Soviet citizens, but rather the triumph of his own version of communism, and indeed of himself and his clique in the Soviet politburo.⁷⁶ Not only could a backward country be rapidly modernized, but obvious lies could be transformed into unimpeachable truths, in the service of the consolidation of power. "What arguments," asked Stalin, "can be advanced against this fact?"⁷⁷ What arguments indeed? The Marxist idea of praxis, which associates truth with participation in the historical process, made it difficult for communists to disassociate facts from values. To do so was to yield to bourgeois mental habits, and ipso facto remove oneself from the making of history. Yet without this distinction, without some notion of morality independent of what actually happened, it became very difficult to criticize any policy undertaking. The Marxist idea of telos, that history must take a revolutionary course to a revolutionary end, made it difficult for communists to

distinguish what had happened from what might have happened. In practice, communists had to align themselves with policies and their outcomes, since to do otherwise would be to alienate themselves from the revolution.⁷⁸ Stalin would not have used these terms, but he was the master of their political implications, and thus of his comrades. The famine was indeed a challenge to Stalin, but he was able to assimilate it to a revolutionary account of events that served his purposes and kept him in power. No arguments could be advanced against what Stalin chose to call a fact.

Such was Stalinism as it emerged in 1933, and it defeated the Poles who were sent to understand it and undermine it. The famine deprived them of contacts and plans, of political instincts and historical moorings.⁷⁹ The Polish diplomatic spies of the Kyïv and Kharkiv outposts were products of the Russian Empire. They were often former socialists; some had known Bolsheviks personally. They were patriots who followed ukrainization with interest, and understood the Ukrainian national communists. As veterans of the the Polish-Bolshevik War, they knew Stalin as an indecisive commander, a failure. In summer 1928, when Józewski announced his Volhynia Experiment and Niezbrycki established Outpost O-2 in Kyïv, these collective experiences still held together a framework of hope. Five years later, during the famine, they no longer seemed the appropriate referents. Many Poles had understood the Russian Empire, Russian Bolshevism, and even Leninism. Very few of them, perhaps none of them, understood Stalinism.⁸⁰ Stalin, for his part, was creating his own mode of understanding the world outside, which involved classification and destruction of the enemy within. If Stalin had ever really feared the Poland of the Prometheans, he had found an answer to those fears. All of these Promethean adversaries, except perhaps Józewski, themselves began to fear. Stalin presided over the death of millions, and greeted human catastrophe as political success. In this new world, the past was no guide. Facts were not traces of the bygone, but products of an eternal interrogation of the present. Poland would be helpless, even when the victims were Poles.

Chapter 6 The Polish Terror

The secret police chief Vsevolod Balyts'kyi, dispatched by Stalin to deal with the famine in Soviet Ukraine, conjured up an organization responsible for the disaster that accommodated Stalin's expressed anxieties about collectivization. Balyts'kyi voiced agreement with Stalin that the ultimate problems were rotten Ukrainian cadres and peasants corrupted by foreign propaganda. All of the clandestine work, Balyts'kyi maintained, was organized in Warsaw and implemented by a secret paramilitary organization. Poland's agents in Ukraine, he claimed to have discovered, served a "Polish Military Organization," an espionage and diversion network that was preparing the ground for a Polish invasion of Soviet Ukraine. This was untrue. Balyts'kyi knew what could be known about the real Polish Military Organization, having interrogated its officers during the Polish-Bolshevik War, and having recruited some of them to work for Soviet intelligence. The Polish Military Organization, Piłsudski's paramilitary, had existed in the east until 1921. More than a decade later, as the famine revived associations with the Polish-Bolshevik War, Balyts'kyi resuscitated its memory. In so doing, he added historical detail and local color to Stalin's general outline of a Polish plot.

In August 1933, the Ukrainian GPU accused a Soviet official of Polish origin, Bolesław Skarbek, of espionage for Poland. Skarbek was a member of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian section of the Bolshevik Party. He was responsible for collectivization in the Polish autonomous region of Marchlevsk, in western Soviet Ukraine, near the Polish border. He was accused of delaying collectivization as part of his master plan to tear Marchlevsk from the Soviet Union and present it to Piłsudski as a gift. Skarbek was, Balyts'kyi claimed, the commander of the Polish Military Organization, which was supposed to be especially active in Marchlevsk.¹ All of this was false. Collectivization had indeed been slow in Marchlevsk, but not because Skarbek was a Polish agent. Marchlevsk had been spared the horrors of rapid collectivization because it was designed as a propaganda exhibition, a kind of Potemkin Village of Soviet nationality policy, in which Soviet Poles supposedly enjoyed national rights and economic prosperity. It was designed to create a model communist Polish community that would attract Poles in Poland. Thousands of Poles fled collectivization from Soviet Ukraine to Poland in 1930. This was humiliating enough. Soviet authorities apparently wished to avoid the fiasco of Poles fleeing their own autonomous region. Even as neighboring areas starved during the Great Famine of 1932–1933, Marchlevsk was given additional supplies and spared heavy requisitions.²

Skarbek had simply followed orders, but this was no defense. Balyts'kyi and his allies were winning the argument about nationality policy in Ukraine. They presented the very disasters caused by centralization as evidence that national autonomy brought political treason. Marchlevsk's failure to collectivize was presented as evidence of Polish invasion plans. Polish culture had been subsidized not only in Marchlevsk but throughout Ukraine. All Polish cultural institutions in Soviet Ukraine, Balyts'kyi and his allies maintained, hid the potential for revolt. Thus the director of the Polish Theater, the Polish citizen Witold Wandurski, was arrested in August 1933. Wandurski, along with several other Polish communists arrested that summer, was accused of membership in the Polish Military Organization.³ Like a few other Polish communists, Wandurski had indeed been a member of the real Polish Military Organization in his youth, when it existed.⁴ Under interrogation, he concocted a narrative in which the "Polish Military Organization" directed the activities of leading Polish communists, carrying out a grand design to destroy the Soviet Union. This did not fit Wandurski's own activities, but it did correspond to the image of the "Polish Military Organization" now elaborated by Balyts'kyi. Wandurski, a poet and dramatist of some talent, was executed on 1 June 1934.⁵ Another lead-

ing Polish communist, Jerzy Czeszejko-Sochacki, was also arrested in the summer of 1933. He leapt to his death from the fifth floor of the Lubianka prison in Moscow on 4 September 1933. A note found on his body read: "I am a communist and no traitor. I am faithful to the Party to the end."⁶

PURGES, CLEANSINGS, AND TERROR

Poland signed a nonaggression pact with Germany in January 1934. Having signed a similar pact with the Soviet Union in July 1932, Warsaw intended to preserve a policy of equal distance between Moscow and Berlin.⁷ The nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union was renewed in April 1934. Knowing that Poland was overmatched by both neighbors, its leaders tried to avoid the appearance of an alliance with either, and generated defensive war plans that relied upon preventive wars at times of emergency. The Polish army's recruitment of Ukrainians between 1928 and 1932 was based on the reasoning that a quick preemptive war in the east would require Warsaw to play the Ukrainian card. In spring 1933, Poland apparently approached France with the idea of a preventive war against Germany.⁸ Soviet leaders nevertheless treated the January 1934 Polish-German accord, publicly at least, as a reorientation of Polish policy. They claimed that Warsaw and Berlin had signed a secret protocol, and planned a joint attack on the Soviet Union. Soviet intelligence, while avoiding such drastic assertions, apparently judged that the pact precluded any future Soviet-Polish arrangement against Germany.⁹ Poland was thus not an aggressor, but also no longer a potential asset. This was, it seems, a fateful conclusion for Polish citizens of the Soviet Union. If Poland was not a potential ally, repression of Poles had no cost in foreign relations.

In 1934 Soviet organs of repression reduced the scale of their activities in the Union as a whole.¹⁰ In these western borderlands, however, repression continued unabated right through the 1930s. In May 1934, the Soviet politburo ordered the secret police to find members of the Polish Military Organization and agents provocateurs within the Communist Party of Poland.¹¹ Hundreds of Polish communists in the Soviet Union were detained and tortured until they admitted their own role in the Polish Military Organization and implicated their comrades.¹² The director of the Soviet secret police wrote of the need for watchfulness, since activists from the "Polish Military Organization" were acting as "agents provocateurs" inside the Communist Party of Poland.¹³ On the Polish side of the border, the Communist Party of Poland had to demonstrate its vigilance. Party members seemed to believe that the accused were guilty;

when arrested themselves, they concluded that “enemies” must have framed them. Party cells became malignant, consuming themselves and spreading the cancer of denunciation to others. In 1934, the Polish party organ propagated the Soviet line that the “Polish Military Organization,” “a counterrevolutionary, nationalist agency of the bourgeoisie within the working class,” had penetrated communist organizations.¹⁴ It published its own list of “agents provocateurs” from the “Polish Military Organization,” supposed agents of Piłsudski, Polish or Ukrainian nationalists. A Jewish socialist newspaper noted ironically that the autumn 1934 pamphlet neglected to specify whether a certain Jewish communist was a Polish or a Ukrainian nationalist.¹⁵ In 1935, confessions elicited by torture in the Soviet Union were presented within Polish communist publications as evidence of true betrayal.¹⁶ The Soviet and Polish purges legitimated each other. In September 1935 Soviet security organs continued their prosecution of the “Polish Military Organization,” arresting more Polish communists in Kyïv, Moscow, and Minsk. The Polish autonomous region in Marchleusk was abolished the next month, after the “discovery” of the “Volhynian Center” of the Polish Military Organization.¹⁷

Soviet citizens defined as Poles were now at risk, regardless of their party affiliations, connections with Poland, or loyalty to the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union nationality was an administrative category, inscribed in personal documents. This allowed individuals to benefit from programs of affirmative action, but it also left them vulnerable to policies of collective repression. In December 1934, the politburo of the Ukrainian section of the Bolshevik Party, following instructions from Moscow, developed a secret policy for Poles and Germans residing near the Soviet-Polish border.¹⁸ In February and March 1935, 8,329 families classified as unreliable elements were forcibly removed from the border with Poland to eastern Ukraine; 2,866 of these families were Polish.¹⁹ In September 1935, the Ukrainian section of the Bolshevik Party ordered a review of the documents of party members and a purge of “nationalists and other anti-Soviet elements,” as well as a change of leadership in all local Polish village councils. Remaining Poles in the border regions were subject to particular scrutiny; some 46% of them lost their party cards, more than four times the overall rate during that year’s verification of party members.²⁰ The loss of party membership, even when based upon anodyne charges, left an individual vulnerable to future accusations of a graver nature.

Ethnic cleansings on security grounds began in Soviet Ukraine in early 1936. In January, the Soviet politburo ordered that fifteen thousand Polish and Ger-

man families be resettled from Soviet Ukraine to Kazakhstan. The Ukrainian politburo divided the general quota into regional quotas, which local party committees were responsible for fulfilling. Balyts'kyi provided the explanation: the "Polish Military Organization" had penetrated the Ukrainian section of the Bolshevik Party. Its emissaries, he proclaimed in January 1936, continued to arrive from Poland. He then issued guidelines to his officers, ordering them to treat Polish cultural institutions in Soviet Ukraine as shelters for Polish militarists.²¹ A Ukrainian party order of 28 April 1936 led to the forced resettlement of some 41,772 people defined as Poles.²² In order to reach their quotas, local authorities made a generic set of charges fit the population: smuggling, Roman Catholicism, economic prosperity, counterrevolution, contact with relatives in Poland, collaboration with Polish intelligence. By August 1936, a local commander of security organs could report that the Soviet border with Poland's Volhynian province "had been almost completely cleansed of Poles and Germans in the course of the latest resettlement." A second action of fall 1936 was meant to complete the job of resettling "the Polish-German nationalist element from border regions to Kazakhstan." All Polish and German families were to be removed from a new border zone, their houses given to Ukrainians. In the course of 1936, some seventy thousand people were forcibly resettled from border regions of Soviet Ukraine, perhaps sixty thousand of them Poles.²³

As momentum against Poles gathered in the western borderlands in late 1936, preparations began for a new set of repressions on the scale of the entire Soviet Union.²⁴ Whereas in most of the USSR the preemptive mass arrests, interrogations, and executions known as the Great Terror amounted to a considerable change in policy, for Poles these practices were rather the climax of accelerating repressions.²⁵ This accumulation of momentum explains, perhaps, why the Terror struck Poles with such special ferocity. The "Polish Military Organization" had already been "discovered," the Communist Party of Poland had already admitted its guilt, reams of files on individual Polish "enemies" had been collected, collective responsibility had already been applied, and indeed ethnic cleansing was already underway. As with the Terror generally, well-known communists were the most visible victims. The Communist International had resolved in January 1936 that the "saturation" of the Polish party "by agents of the class enemy" demanded immediate action. Polish communists duly unmasked more "enemies" within their ranks.²⁶ All leading Polish communists in the Soviet Union were arrested, and all those arrested were executed. In 1935, for example, Tomasz Dąbal had been criticized for lack of Bolshevik

diligence in his Belarusian edition of Lenin's collected works. In 1936 he was arrested, and in 1937 he was executed. This was the fate of almost every Polish communist who mattered and could be found in the Soviet Union. Those outside the Soviet Union were invited to Moscow, and put to death.²⁷ Back in Poland, party members shuddered. Like most observers, Polish communists knew more about communists executed after show trials than about the mass actions against Poles and other groups. The show trials and the disappearance of comrades were enough to destabilize a party weary from ceaseless vigilance and constant purges. As the local party leaders forbade any discussion of events in Moscow, the membership roiled, rebelled, and resigned.²⁸ In August 1938 the Communist International dissolved the Communist Party of Poland.

In 1937, Soviet authorities assimilated the threat from Polish communists, Poles in the western Soviet Union, and the "Polish Military Organization" to a general threat from Poles as such. Before he was executed, Dąbal had confessed to being the commander of the "Polish Military Organization" in the Soviet Union. In January 1937, on the basis of this confession, Nikolai Ezhov, the Soviet commissar for internal affairs, wrote to Stalin of his discovery of the "Polish Military Organization." Ezhov was an old hand on the Polish question. He hailed from the western borderlands, and had been entrusted in 1935 with an element of the purge of the Communist Party of Poland.²⁹ In March 1937, Ezhov claimed that Polish agents had been uncovered within Soviet security organs. This allowed him to purge veteran intelligence officers, Polish clients of Dzierżyński.³⁰ In so doing, he consolidated his own position. In June 1937 Ezhov told the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party that the "Polish Military Organization" had infiltrated Soviet intelligence organs and the Party itself. This allegation then became part of the standard repertoire of charges in show trials.³¹ In August 1937, Ezhov issued Order 00485 on the "Polish Military Organization." Polish intelligence was carrying out massive operations in the Soviet Union, he claimed. Soviet assets in Poland were worthless and tainted, and Soviet institutions had been fatally penetrated. The "Polish Military Organization" had to be destroyed root and branch. Soviet agents were also to pay special attention to political emigrants (Polish communists) and former members of the Polish Socialist Party.³² The Polish population in the borderlands was subjected to triage: "agents" (usually able-bodied men) were to be shot, their families and other suspicious types were to be deported, and some elderly people could remain. Just over half of the arrests in this action were made in Soviet Ukraine.³³ The Polish action was one of eleven national actions during the Great Terror. 79.4% of those arrested in the Polish operation were executed, an

extremely high percentage, even by the Soviet standards of the day. The 111,091 Soviet citizens (not all of them Poles) executed for their ostensible association with Polish intelligence in 1937 and 1938 were about 16% of the total number of Soviet citizens killed in the Terror.³⁴

POLISH ESPIONAGE

The Great Terror was rationalized by Stalin's collaborators Molotov and Kaganovich as a necessary preemptive strike against groups that would have constituted a fifth column in the event of war. The Soviet Union was indeed vulnerable: but was it vulnerable to Poland? Can the particular savagery of the Polish Terror be justified or explained by international factors? Nazi Germany did invade the Soviet Union in 1941. But Poles, rather than Germans, suffered most from the Terror. More Soviet citizens were arrested for spying for Poland in 1937 and 1938 than for any other state, more than for Germany and Japan combined.³⁵ Were any of them guilty? Was there any foundation for the "discovery" of the "Polish Military Organization" in 1933, the executions of individual Poles in 1934, the Polish party purges of 1935, the ethnic cleansings of 1936, and the mass murder of 1937–1938? Had Polish intelligence engaged Soviet society and penetrated Soviet institutions in preparation for a war of aggression in alliance with Nazi Germany? This last part of the Soviet rhetoric can be dismissed, as Poland and Nazi Germany were not allies, and there was no secret protocol to their nonaggression pact. Ironically, it was a secret protocol to the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact of 1939 that provided for a mutual attack on Poland and the dismemberment of that country.

Yet perhaps Poland had indeed penetrated Soviet society and institutions? To be sure, Poland did send intelligence officers to the Soviet Union and try to engage local informers, as did many other states.³⁶ Between 1928 and 1932, Poland had some success with cross-border missions run by Ukrainian political emigrants. It also appears that the Marchlevsk autonomous region created relatively favorable conditions for Polish espionage. Soviet organs reported in May 1928 that Poles in Marchlevsk prayed for Polish soldiers and the eastern enlargement of the Polish state.³⁷ The Polish ministry of internal affairs had an informer in one of the Marchlevsk local councils, and received good information about the region in 1929.³⁸ Marchlevsk was about one hundred kilometers from the eastern frontier of the Volhynia province governed by Józewski. The intelligence outpost of the Border Defense Corps in the Volhynian city Równe ran fourteen agents into Soviet Ukraine in 1932, one of whom carried out mis-

sions in Marchlevsk.³⁹ Marchlevsk was also relatively close to Kyiv, and thus within reach of the Polish intelligence officers based there. Piotr Kurnicki listed five informants in Marchlevsk in December 1932.⁴⁰ These or other Polish informants drew Soviet border fortifications on handkerchiefs, and then passed them on to Polish officers. Immediately after the Marchlevsk region was liquidated in 1935, a Polish consulate auto was sent from Kyiv to inspect the new situation.⁴¹ Naturally, the Polish state took an interest in Soviet citizens who were Poles by origin. Polish agents were interested in the numbers and location of the Polish population in Soviet Ukraine. In 1932 the Polish general staff tried to list every Polish citizen and Soviet citizen of Polish origin within the Ukrainian military district. In 1933, the diplomatic spy Józefina Pisarczykówna worked hard to collect unpublished Soviet materials on Polish populations.⁴²

Polish officers in Soviet Ukraine attracted a few informers who worked from idealistic motives: Soviet Poles who felt loyalty to Poland, and Soviet Ukrainians who hated communism. They maintained contact with some over a period of years, developing codenames, passwords, and other marks of recognition that could be used over time and by more than one agent. A Ukrainian informant in Human, for example, was known by a certain missing finger. A Polish informant in Talno kept one half of a three-ruble note, and would talk to whoever could produce the other half.⁴³ For the most part, however, the officers in Kyiv and Kharkiv, like intelligence operatives in almost every environment, had to offer informers something in return. This compensation might be financial, but money alone was usually insufficient to tempt people to risk their lives. In any event, the Second Department could pay informants far less than competitors such as German military intelligence. The Second Department's main currency was the prospect of a Polish visa or passport, and some informers were Polish citizens who had emigrated to the Soviet Union and then changed their minds. There were Polish men who had stayed in the Soviet Union for love, and then had decided that this was a bad bargain. There were Galician Ukrainians, Polish citizens who had emigrated from Poland to work for Soviet ukrainization in the 1920s, only to face persecution in the 1930s. And there were probably a few Polish communists who fled Poland to avoid arrest, and after 1935 wished to flee the Soviet Union to avoid execution.⁴⁴

No evidence has yet emerged to indicate that Polish spies in Ukraine went to any particular effort to recruit Polish communists. The communists did sometimes approach Polish officials. Witold Wandurski did speak at least once with the Polish military attaché in Moscow.⁴⁵ In 1934 and 1935, as mass repressions of Polish communists began, the communists came to the Polish officers, at the

Polish consulate.⁴⁶ In February 1934 an important activist of the Communist Party of Poland, Stanisław Gowronek, was allowed to return to Poland from the Soviet Union. His request for a Polish visa was granted, although any services he performed in exchange remain unknown.⁴⁷ In November 1934 a Polish communist initiated contact with the consulate by claiming that he had worked as a police informer in Poland.⁴⁸ His case then disappears from the record. The Second Department paid close attention to the arrests of Polish communists in 1935 and 1936, and asked their agents to provide them with the most detailed information possible. Their own information was not especially timely, and seems to have been drawn from the Soviet press.⁴⁹

Were important Polish communists somehow agents of Piłsudski? Not all Second Department materials have survived, and any such agent would have been kept in the greatest secrecy. The Polish police had penetrated the Communist Party of Poland at a lower level, as have police departments faced with communist parties everywhere.⁵⁰ The Second Department did succeed, from time to time, in introducing its agents into party cells inside Poland.⁵¹ The greatest single coup of the Second Department was likely the publication of a *History of the Polish Communist Party*, written by a former party member of sufficient importance to have served as deputy commander at the Polish party's military academy in the Soviet Union in 1931, and to have attended the congress of the Communist Party of Poland in Moscow in 1932. This former communist refused to work as a police agent, but did accept state employment and the task of writing a history of his former party. The Polish police faked his death in September 1933, then packed him off to work in a provincial railway office. The result, published in April 1934, was perhaps the most revelatory document published about any interwar communist party, and contained a great deal of detail about Soviet policy and Stalin himself.⁵²

Beyond this, there are only hints and shadows. In November 1933, a Polish officer in Kyiv implied in a report to his superior that the communist Jerzy Czeszejko-Sochacki, arrested that summer, was working for Polish intelligence. Yet the manner of the remark suggests that the Polish agent knew nothing of the matter, and was trying to provoke a response from his superior.⁵³ By this time, Sochacki had already committed suicide. It is perhaps worthy of note that the Second Department's information about Jan Bielewski, the representative of the Polish party in the Communist International, was much more precise.⁵⁴ Bielewski was executed later than other Polish communists, in November 1937.

Such contacts meant little in the overall activity of Polish intelligence and counterintelligence inside the Soviet Union. After the Great Famine, most Pol-

ish authorities had concluded that aggressive counterintelligence and sabotage operations inside the Soviet Union were unsound. Having signed a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union in 1932, Poland's diplomats and intelligence officers were hopeful about an improvement in political relations. It was at precisely this moment that Balyts'kyi revived the Polish threat in Soviet society by conjuring up the "Polish Military Organization" in Soviet Ukraine. To be sure, there was still some Polish presence in Soviet Ukraine at this time, but it fell far short of Balyts'kyi's characterizations. In 1933 and 1934 the Second Department was indeed recruiting Poles in border regions for possible future diversionary actions in case of war.⁵⁵ These actions had little if any connection to Balyts'kyi's and Ezhov's wild imaginings of a "Polish Military Organization." From 1934, the best results in intelligence work seem to have been gained by Polish officers of the Border Defense Corps who personally crossed the border and returned. Balyts'kyi was correct to say that Poles crossed the border in 1934 and 1935, but wrong to connect these officers to political activity in Soviet Ukraine, and wrong to claim that they represented a "Polish Military Organization."⁵⁶ The intelligence they gained was of a technical character, and could not provide the basis for a political portrait of the Soviet Union.

Political intelligence was a task of Poland's diplomatic spies, subordinate to the Intelligence Bureau (2A) of the Second Department. For Polish officers working in diplomatic outposts, working conditions in 1935 and 1936 went from extremely bad to essentially impossible. In late 1935, the most important of Poland's Kyiv spies, Władysław Michniewicz (B-18), complained that he and his colleagues needed new cars and tires to lose the Soviet GPU officers who were following them wherever they went. Ten years before, Michniewicz had been the first to suspect the Trust operation, thus beginning a period of Polish ascendance in the intelligence wars. Now he was acknowledging frustration, if not defeat.⁵⁷ On Christmas Eve 1935 the nationalities expert and Promethean operative, Piotr Kurnicki (Ku), found the consulate's windows smashed and his wife under arrest. Stanisław Nawrocki (E-15), the most industrious of them all, returned to Warsaw in May 1937.⁵⁸ The diplomats were helpless before Soviet repressions. Five thousand Polish inhabitants of the dissolved Marchleusk region applied for visas to Poland, of whom only three were allowed to go by the Soviets.⁵⁹ Poles in GPU custody were forced to write letters to the consulate renouncing their legal right to a meeting with a consular official. By late 1936, the consulate was dealing with the desperate applications of people caught in a diabolical trap: petitioners who wished to prove, somehow, that they had no contacts at all with Poland. Consular employees knew that these people were inno-

cent of espionage: but how could they certify an absence?⁶⁰ From the Soviet point of view, their very attempt to prove their innocence probably proved their guilt. Once they had contacted the Polish consulate, they had contacts (as the Soviets saw matters) with Polish intelligence. The Polish consul general knew that Soviet accusations of sabotage in 1937 were “madness.” He had the impression that when “he went for a walk in the fields or to hunt for mushrooms in the woods, people who meet me by the road who have read or heard such things, will think: here comes the Polish consul to burn down the forests or sabotage the tractors.”⁶¹ The humor conveys the bitterness of impotence.

By August 1936, Warsaw no longer expected that diplomatic immunity would protect consular employees. The Second Department issued detailed directions to its agents about how to behave during interrogations. Officers were expected not to carry anything with them out of doors aside from money and Soviet documents: no clothing labels, no objects of sentimental value, and no photographs. If arrested, officers were to make the Soviet police take them by force on a public street, so that passersby would be aware of what was happening. Once arrested, officers were to avoid concocting theatrical scenarios, to restrain themselves from trying to outwit their interrogators, and indeed to say as little as possible. Acceptable answers to questions were: I don’t know, I will say nothing, I don’t remember. Regardless of torture or blackmail, agents were to maintain dignity and silence.⁶² These instructions applied to all outposts everywhere in the Soviet Union. They were issued after the June 1936 arrest of the Polish spy Alfred Ran, who was sent from Kyiv to Moscow on a mission that turned out to be a Soviet provocation. Ran broke procedures, and was lured into a trap and arrested with incriminating materials (photos of tanks, apparently) on his person. Although Ran was eventually released in an exchange, Warsaw had to assume that damage had been done.⁶³ By 1936, Polish diplomatic espionage produced very meager results in Moscow and Leningrad as well as in Kharkiv and Kyiv.⁶⁴

Unsurprisingly, Polish diplomatic spies in Moscow and Leningrad did have a few contacts, of various nationalities, in the military and in industry. Most of them were not Polish, and they did not constitute a network. In 1937, Polish counterintelligence was indeed preoccupied with the possibility of war, although the scenario was an anticipated Soviet attack. On 19 November 1937 Warsaw ordered Agents K-10 and G-27 to prepare a covert network for use in case of war with the Soviet Union. The Second Department was perfectly aware of its own weaknesses, and now recounted them to its leading agent in Leningrad. The dilemmas shine through the cloudy bureaucratic prose: “As

you consider this topic, please take into account the following characteristics of the terrain: (a) the complete isolation of the Soviet terrain given the impossibility of our state expansion, or of the expansion of a state that would be friendly to us and whose mediation we could use in intelligence work.” “You must also take into account the incomparability of intention and activity flowing from the internal situation and political structure of the Soviet Union and Poland. This means that our counterintelligence operations find themselves in much more difficult working conditions, and have infinitely more circumscribed offensive possibilities.” The conditions of Polish intelligence, in a word, were “fatal.”⁶⁵

JUDGMENTS

Ezhov was wrong about the vast capabilities of Polish agents in 1937, wrong about the existence of the “Polish Military Organization,” and a fortiori wrong that Polish communists and Soviet Poles in general were its agents. The policy of executing more than a hundred thousand Soviet citizens for ostensible ties to Polish networks could not harm networks that did not exist. To maintain that a Polish threat justified the Terror is to say that the Soviet system could have reacted in no other way, and to take this view is to enter *nolens volens* an extreme indictment of the system: as fundamentally weak, and as inflexibly terrorist. It is best not to reduce Soviet politics to a system with simple inputs (“threats”) and outputs (“policies”), but to recognize the mediation of domestic politics: institutions and personalities alike. In the Soviet system, certain actors used concerns of “security” to bolster their own positions, and to weaken the positions of others. Like the Famine in Ukraine, the Terror of Soviet Poles was justified in terms of state security, but at a moment when the threat had already been removed. During the Terror, Stalin revived an important idea that he had introduced during the Famine: that of the invisible enemy, apparently harmless and loyal, who can only be detected by suspicion and interrogation.⁶⁶ In 1933, Ukrainians suffered most from this kind of reasoning; in 1937, it was the turn of the Poles.

The Terror did little harm to Polish intelligence. If anything, wrote the Second Department in Warsaw to a Leningrad officer in November 1937, the Terror was “a comforting phenomenon” since its “absurdity” wasted the energy of Soviet counterintelligence, and its purges killed talented Soviet officers.⁶⁷ Previous repressions had also been blunt instruments, but they had weakened Pol-

ish endeavors. The Terror was even less precise than previous purges and cleansings, while Polish operations had already virtually ceased to exist by 1936. Moreover, Niezbrzycki claimed, the Terror made it easier to recruit Soviet intelligence officers on European missions. Since they were mortally afraid to be summoned back to the Soviet Union, Polish officers could recruit them by promising not to draw attention to them, thus allowing them to stay where they were.⁶⁸ The head of the Second Department, Tadeusz Pełczyński, also believed that the great purge of the Red Army weakened its ability to make war.⁶⁹ Such was the cold comfort Warsaw could offer its harried and exhausted officers in the Soviet Union.

Only an intelligence apparatus in truly dire straits could draw comfort from the Terror. In the late 1930s, Polish intelligence was gathered by besieged diplomats and by border-crossing agents of the Border Defense Corps. In Poland's internal politics, the foreign ministry, which knew less about Soviet affairs, gained a position superior to the ministry of defense, which knew more. Yet the military had its own problems. The Second Department was reorganized in an unsuitable way at an unsuitable time, in 1938 and 1939. Within the Second Department, the Eastern Section chose summer 1939 to begin bureaucratic infighting with the Western Section, claiming (quite wrongly) that the latter was overestimating the German threat and spreading panic.⁷⁰ But no agency offered anything resembling political intelligence in the second half of the 1930s, as Poland's international position grew increasingly untenable. Poland meant to remain neutral in the competition between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Poland's leaders systematically underestimated the Nazi threat, and failed even to consider that these two neighbors would ally against Poland.⁷¹

In Soviet internal politics, another pattern was emerging. A group was first defeated or disempowered, and then defined as a threat, which was then used to justify unrelated policies. In this situation, ideal for political infighters, the "threat" can be managed and directed against opponents, since it is unlikely to appear in a reality not controlled by the system. In fact, Soviet intelligence organs were superior to Polish for most of the interwar period. The Soviets may have grown suspicious of their Polish assets; nevertheless, Soviet penetration of Poland was incomparably superior to Polish penetration of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union did have reliable agents inside Polish counterintelligence for most of the interwar period.⁷² The Soviets seem to have recruited at least two of Poland's diplomatic spies. A KGB manual even claimed that Soviet organs had a radio transmitter within the Polish general staff.⁷³ For a few years during

Piłsudski's rule, the combination of declaratory policies of toleration, strengthening of border defenses, and aggressive border-crossing missions created the basis for some doubts on the Soviet side. Even during this period, however, Soviet organs probably had far more impressive achievements in Poland than Polish agents had in the Soviet Union. After the signing of the Soviet-Polish nonaggression pact in 1932 and especially after the Famine of 1932–1933, the advantage of the Soviet services was pronounced. During the Terror, the policy of repression surpassed the limits of rationality, finding enemies who no longer existed and destroying state assets that were much needed. In 1941, Moscow repeated Warsaw's mistake of 1939, underestimating the imminence of the German threat. Of course, Stalin managed to turn even this debacle to his political advantage . . .

"POLISH MILITARY ORGANIZATION"

Ever since Aristotle, the critique of tyranny has included the problem of information: that tyrants know only what fearful subjects wish to tell them. It is perhaps a bias within the liberal tradition to assume that this must be a disadvantage to rulers. The information that reached Ezhov, or Stalin himself, was indeed carefully selected. Soviet tyranny was based on a particular kind of epistemological optimism: that history can be known, and the party can know it in advance. In this framework, the limited nature of information could become a strange kind of advantage. The imperfection of data was to be expected, given the difficulty of understanding history as a totality, with the seeds of the future present in implicit form in the present. Party leaders had the right, indeed the obligation, to act on the basis of extremely ambiguous symbols in such a way that the revolution would be advanced. Their hegemony was one of interpretation. Lenin and Stalin both wished to accelerate history in their backward country, and Stalin achieved political success by forcing events (nations, classes) to fit his own often ill-informed and incorrect predictions. The predictions could always be revised later. At every moment, the crucial thing was to create an interpretation that advanced a given policy goal, or, more fundamentally, that protected the position of a politburo member.

Yet the banal sequence of cause and effect could not be banished entirely, even by the most energetic of dialecticians and the cleverest of politicians. An effect of coordinated repression, for example, is the generation of files. With time, the dead hand of bureaucratic accretion weighs down upon the vital task

of policing. The Soviet secret police, known successively as the Cheka, the GPU, and the NKVD, was designed to be the hammer of the revolution, but existed as much in filing cabinets as in interrogation chambers. Even as it purged or was itself purged, actions meant to cleanse institutions created a new layer of institutional records, another ream of files. In the case of the operations against the "Polish Military Organization," the paper began to accumulate early. The Soviet investigation of the real Polish Military Organization began in Poland in 1928, as Piłsudski, Józewski, and other veterans succeeded in turning aside the communist challenge by way of electoral manipulation, national toleration, and intelligence reform, and as Józewski's past in the Polish Military Organization was trumpeted in the Polish and the Soviet press.⁷⁴ By 1929 the Soviet secret police had its own man in the politburo of the Communist Party of Poland, charged with protecting the party from police penetration.

In 1932 and 1933, the famine in Ukraine required a political explanation, the political explanation an enemy, and the enemy a name. Balyts'kyi chose the "Polish Military Organization." Polish communists were charged with espionage in 1933. Some of these were political emigrants entrusted with creating a Soviet Polish culture, others were Soviet citizens accused of sabotaging collectivization on the orders of the "Polish Military Organization." Their inevitable confessions created "evidence" that the "Polish Military Organization" existed and was preparing the ground for Polish military intervention in Soviet Ukraine. Polish communists in Poland then ostentatiously demonstrated their vigilance, in effect admitting that the "Polish Military Organization" had penetrated their ranks. They provided, in the particularly useful jargon of communist self-criticism, more "evidence" of the power of the "Polish Military Organization." The Communist Party of Poland was pressed by the Polish political police from one side, and by the Soviet secret police from the other. This crisis in the party created a further basis for charges of espionage against Polish communists in the Soviet Union in 1934 and 1935, who were forced not only to confess but to denounce their comrades as spies. In 1935, the review of party documents of Soviet Poles residing near the Polish border found, as it was designed to, that Soviet Poles were an unreliable element. The associated purges created more "records" of Polish espionage. The 1936 ethnic cleansing of Poles from border zones had revealed, at least in this administrative sense, thousands more Polish spies. Meanwhile, the Communist International continually revisited the files of its Polish members, producing another bountiful source of "evidence." By the time Ezhov began his mass executions in 1937, the "reality" of

the “Polish Military Organization” had been long established, and his interrogators made it fit every interrogation. To be Polish was to be a threat, and the NKVD resorted to searching the phone book for Polish last names. Ezhov assimilated the Polish population of the Soviet Union to an organization that no longer existed, and whose few survivors among the Soviet citizenry were far humbler than he could possibly have imagined.⁷⁵

There was a third Soviet novelty in the history of tyranny and information, aside from the dialectics of prediction and persecution: the massive and systematic generation of untruth as justification and guide for policy. The scripted confessions of the show trials of 1937 and 1938 were merely the most dramatic and public stage in a process of information generation that had begun several years earlier. When prominent Bolsheviks confessed, among other things, to having served the “Polish Military Organization,” they were also cooperating in the production of trial transcripts and newspaper accounts that created a kind of social reality. Yet the production of the false need not always replace the history of the real, it merely overwhelms it for contemporaries, and usually supplants it in the retrospective re-creation of memoirists and historians. The Polish Military Organization, like any institution, does have a history, one that can be disentangled from the history of the “Polish Military Organization” in Stalin’s tyranny of information. Indeed, it may be that the great darkness of the latter can only be seen in the weak light of the former.

A flickering candle, then, for the abyss. On 2 March 1933, a few days after Vsevolod Balyts’kyi returned to Soviet Ukraine and began his hunt for the “Polish Military Organization,” an elderly lady appeared at the Polish consulate in Kharkiv. She submitted an application to emigrate to Poland “as soon as possible.” Anna Jaworska, as she called herself, was without proper clothing, and like millions of others in Soviet Ukraine was starving to death. Though nearly delirious from hunger, she communicated one important fact to the consular officer who received her application: that she had once been an operative of the Polish Military Organization. The consular officials could not recognize the woman, and feared a Soviet provocation. Piotr Kurnicki wrote to Jerzy Niezbrzycki to inquire. Niezbrzycki, surrounded as he was by Polish Military Organization veterans in the Second Department headquarters in Warsaw, was able to confirm the woman’s identity: “she’s the one all right! A very deserving lady, a courageous and worthy woman.” Anna Jaworska was to be granted immediate permission to emigrate to Poland, and under no circumstances was to be

used for intelligence work: “this is taboo. A holy matter.” Any surviving veteran was too precious to be risked. Her old comrades in Warsaw took up a collection to aid her return.⁷⁶

They were delighted to find that a veteran of the Polish Military Organization still lived. The eastern operatives of the Second Department were survivors of the Cheka operations that had all but destroyed the Third Command of the Polish Military Organization in 1920. They had survived by fleeing Soviet power in the early 1920s, and had returned with the protection of diplomatic immunity. They had left behind humbler activists of the Polish Military Organization, such as Jaworska, whose main activity had been to give shelter to couriers. The Second Department officers assumed that all such people had been long since arrested and executed. The appearance of Jaworska was thus a happy reminder of an earlier stage in their lives. For most Second Department officers, the Polish-Bolshevik War of 1919, the March on Kyiv of 1920 and the Winter March of 1921 had been hopeful episodes, meaningful attempts to create a better Poland by restoring its best traditions. In reality, each venture eastward had ended in greater disaster than the last. The return of Piłsudski in 1926 meant the return of many of them to power. Piłsudski renewed Promethean dreams abroad and restrained communist revolt within. For the men and women of the Second Department, he represented the immodest hopes of youth, and the modest successes of maturity. Piłsudski’s death in May 1935, without a clear success or a clear successor, without an international or institutional legacy, revealed the hollowness of it all.

There was one operation associated with the long-defunct Polish Military Organization in the Soviet Union in the 1930s. On 8 June 1935 the Second Department ordered its agents to visit every battlefield where the Polish Military Organization had fought in 1918–1921, and every cemetery where its soldiers and couriers were buried. The agents were to collect a sackful of earth, label it according to site, and send it to Poland, where it would be spread on Piłsudski’s burial mound. Throughout that summer and fall, Polish agents set out from Kyiv and Kharkiv, from Moscow and Leningrad, adding to Warsaw’s long list of sites from their own memories, digging up soil, and sending it home.⁷⁷ As they drove their Ford automobiles and clicked their Leica cameras, they recalled earlier missions on foot and reports written in pencil, revisited fields where battle had been joined on horseback, all in a war which by now they had lost, for a Europe that never came to be. At the moment when Soviet security officers forced Soviet Poles to create a false record of the Polish Military Orga-

nization, its true veterans made their true confession: of Romanticism. As Poles in the Soviet Union fell victim to a new tyranny of fear, Polish officers revealed their own slavery to a tyranny of hope. Their master had been Piłsudski, but their mistress had been Pandora, and their guide the hope that remained in the box she received from Prometheus. In 1935, the Ukrainian earth well suited the mourning of the Polish Military Organization, although the death done in its name had scarcely begun.

Chapter 7 A Revolution

Prepared

Europe waned and Italy beckoned. Maria Dąbrowska, the Polish novelist, found her friends Henryk Józewski and Julia Józewska, or Rykućio and Lusia as she called them, waiting at the Vienna station. The painter and his wife, coming by train from the east, had taken the sensible route through Galicia, on old Austrian tracks, to the Austrian capital. The three of them, Maria, Julia, and Henryk, found a blessedly empty compartment for themselves, next to the sleeping car. They rode through the Alps by night, bound for Sorrento, for Mount Vesuvius and the Mediterranean. In Italy, they hiked the mountains with élan, visited a neurological museum, admired the form of a Polish chaplain on the beach, read by night. In her diary, Dąbrowska noted her reservations about Proust's *Remembrance of Things Past*. Memory seemed a poor substitute for the world outside. The present, in that autumn of 1934, still seemed to have something to offer. Yet the newspaper brought bad news, imbibed each morning with the good coffee. The Yugoslav king and the French foreign minister were assassinated during the friends' vacation. The friends preferred to dress Italy in classical garb, but Italy was now fascist, and Mussolini's Black-

shirts dominated Rome. Vienna itself, where the friends had met, had just witnessed an attempted coup by National Socialists.

When the friends met again, in Volhynia the following summer, the mood had changed. Józewski entertained Dąbrowska by taking her, in his massive black Buick, to watch Polish army maneuvers on the Polish-Soviet border. Breakfast conversation one morning was cut short, for Józewski had to attend the funeral of one of his policemen, killed by local communists. There was still time, of an afternoon, to watch the horse races, to see the Arabian stallions for which Volhynia was known to the world. But the nighttime discussions of literature had taken on a darker hue. Dostoevsky now had his turn: the Russian genius who despised the Poles, and contemplated the possibility of a moral order without God. And then Joseph Conrad, the Polish émigré, read by Poles as an exemplar of Romantic determination, of an ideal of steadfastness despite the impossible demands of the world. Each of these writers placed the burden of responsibility on individuals, knowing that it was unbearable. A few weeks earlier, the most important individual in Poland, the leader who had borne some of the burdens of Polish political life, had passed away. It was summer 1935, Józef Piłsudski was dead, Poland's enemies were arming along its borders, and Józewski was on his own in the eastern marches, suddenly vulnerable. He continued his experiment in national concessions, supported by Dąbrowska and other friends, putting a brave face on things, convinced that the alternatives were all worse.

In the months to come, Maria Dąbrowska was uneasy. The novelist dreamt long and disturbing dreams, some of them of the painter and his wife, of Henryk and Julia. In the most elaborate of her dreams, Maria believes herself to be ill, and consults Tadeusz Boy-Żeleński, the modernist novelist, associated in his day with family planning, free love, and eugenics. Although Dąbrowska was usually prim in her prose, the great figures of Poland's modernist literature of the 1930s had all taken the turn towards explicit eroticism, portraying the inner life as unhappily biological, crucial to the possibility of reason and yet overmastering by day and night. In Maria's dream, Boy is playing a doctor, and also playing doctor. Boy's diagnosis is "sexual sensations." Maria then quarrels with a German nurse about where she is to await treatment. It then emerges, as the dream continues, that Maria really is ill, with tuberculosis, and promptly infects others. Henryk and Julia appear, brightly denying any illness, and take Maria to the horse races. The seats that Julia wants, ostentatiously expensive ones, seem to be allotted to Russian mourners. At the track, rather than horses, they find a folk carnival. They look down upon the energy of Ukrainian life.



Figure 14. Memorial procession for Józef Piłsudski, Łuck, 1935. Archiwum Dokumentacji Mechanicznej, Warsaw.

Without taking their seats, they buy enormous chestnuts, and eat them. Maria asks Henryk why they do not sit, and he replies, smiling, that to stand is now the done thing.

In Maria Dąbrowska's Volhynian nightmare of January 1936, as in her rival Zofia Nałkowska's Volhynian fancies of February 1932, there is the modernist sense of a hidden reality, a psychological world deeper than the empirical one, an inner life in disaccord with the outer. Volhynia in 1932 could convey the pos-

sibility that this inner world was that of Józewski's ideals, and that the outer world could be yet shifted, by tact, wit, and will, into alignment. Nałkowska had experienced a land of psychic optimism, where sublimation was the rule, and found herself liberated to write again. By 1936, Dąbrowska could sense, although she never quite said so, that the inner life of Volhynia had escaped Józewski's control, that Ukraine had slipped free. It was a world where the body prevailed, infection spread, and the passions of a backward province ran wild. Germany and Russia were near, approaching, difficult to escape. The painter himself insisted on doing what is done, charming as ever, with plenty of time for the beautiful and the profound, but helpless before the disharmony between the invisible and the visible. His art was deception rather than mastery.¹

REVOLUTION FROM WITHIN

Jerzy Stempowski continued to visit Volhynia each year, and his view of the Volhynia Experiment was very similar to Dąbrowska's. She was his friend and his father's lover, but he arrived at his own verdicts independently, his own account of Volhynia based upon a great deal of conversation with Ukrainians and Jews. Like Dąbrowska, he never criticized Józewski, and regarded him as representing the sensible center in Polish politics. Yet he observed the fundamental weakness in Józewski's assumption that Volhynia could become the home of a Polish-Ukrainian cultural synthesis. The Polish state was represented in Volhynia by policemen, soldiers, and schoolteachers. These presented, collectively, an image of Poland as coercive and unenlightened, regardless of Józewski's personal talents or aims. They, not he, were the state. Poles lived in Volhynia like "Jonah in the belly of the whale," completely unaware of the appeal of Ukrainian and Jewish culture, and hapless in the propagation of a positive image of Poland. Polish culture as such had lost its historical appeal to eastern Slavs. The days when Polish nationality represented social advance had passed. Rather than indicating noble status, Polish culture in the east simply indicated one nationality among others. Józewski's project had assumed that at least some gifted Ukrainians would become Poles and aid in the construction of a strong Polish state. Instead, educated Poles left the region, while a Ukrainian intelligentsia formed by Józewski's schools remained. With little access to dignified work, this intelligentsia turned, discontented, to politics.²

Another gifted visitor to Volhynia, the essayist Ksawery Pruszyński, was more direct: the calm exterior of Volhynia was simply "painted."³ Józewski had failed to devise an artifice whereby the interests and feelings of the Ukrainian

population were connected with the institutional and emotional reality of the Polish state. The politics expressed by the Ukrainian intelligentsia, and the politics that appealed to Ukrainian peasants, were unlikely to be favorable to any Polish project. In fairness, the problems Józewski faced in the second half of the 1930s transcended his province. Without the charisma of Piłsudski, the entire Polish political system gasped for air. Rule by conspiracy became senseless without an acknowledged leader. The various sham parties designed to support Piłsudski lost their point of orientation. The far Right and the far Left, held at bay by Piłsudski, now grew eager for state power. Peasants, still the majority of the population, believed themselves to be unrepresented and exploited. The Great Depression hit agricultural countries hard, and their peasant farmers hardest of all. Following European trends, Poland began to increase state investment in underdeveloped regions in the late 1930s. Yet Poland was a poor country, required to devote much of its modest state revenue to defense expenditures.

A large part of the Volhynian Ukrainian population supported the Communist Party of West Ukraine. There were no real alternatives. Peasants can sometimes be persuaded to support democracy in peasant countries, for they constitute a majority. Ukrainian peasants in Volhynia belonged to a class majority, but as a national minority they were separated from Polish peasant politics on a national scale. Their own peasant party, *Sel-Rob*, had been banned as a communist front organization. Democracy itself had been compromised since 1926, and the new elections called by the center-right regime of Piłsudski's successors promised more falsification. Józewski's alternative to democracy, some local cultural toleration and the promise of national independence for Soviet Ukraine, failed to speak to the immediate interests of peasants, and by 1935 had run its course. There were no good political options, and the social interests of Volhynian Ukrainian peasants were clear enough. Indeed, with time, their real needs only became clearer, as the Polish political system became ever less able to address them. The essential class interest of the Volhynian Ukrainian peasantry, more land, was largely unsatisfied.

Józewski's rule saw a slight transfer of land from Poles to Ukrainians and a more significant transfer from the rich to the poor. Yields also increased by some 38.8% between 1925 and 1938.⁴ Overall, however, land reform fell far short of expectations, and failed to create a sense of loyalty to the state. Ethnic Polish landholding did indeed suffer a bit under Józewski's tenure, but hardly enough for this to be appreciated by the Ukrainian majority. Rather than seizing and redistributing land from great landowners, the Polish state acted as a mediator and source of credit in transactions. Peasants were thus dissatisfied

when transactions were slow, and hurt when credits were withdrawn during the Depression. Land reform as a series of transactions by free individuals was, naturally, part of a larger vision of market economics, a vision that the state had to realize against the wishes of the public. Traditionally, Volhynian Ukrainian peasants had benefited from rights of use in the commons, which in Volhynia meant the right to collect wood from forests owned by nobles. When all land was treated as private property with defined owners, such traditional rights could not be enforced. Forests were cleared, and the lumber sold abroad.⁵ Volhynian peasants lost access to what had been a common good, without profiting from its commercialization and sale.

Józewski favored more radical land reform, but any discretion he might have enjoyed in this area was nullified by larger political concerns in Warsaw. His patron Piłsudski wished to gain the support of the great Polish landholders from the National Democrats, which meant that eastern magnates such as Janusz Radziwiłł enjoyed personal protection from land reform. While communists organized regular revolts on his estates, Radziwiłł served as a parliamentary deputy from Volhynia in Warsaw.⁶ After Piłsudski's death, Józewski had to defend his policies against the charges of Polish nationalists that he was allowing Ukrainians to buy land from Poles, which was true. In the second half of the 1930s, Volhynian Ukrainians had very real economic grievances, as the Second Department regularly acknowledged.⁷ Like peasants everywhere in Poland, Volhynian farmers did not understand what good their taxes would do them. The arbitrary collection of overdue taxes brought distrust of public authority and general woe. All of this was exploited by local communists, who claimed that Poland had fallen, like the capitalist system, into a state of general crisis.

INFORMATION BORDERS

To a surprising extent, communism in Volhynia escaped the taint of Stalinism. The Volhynian Ukrainian peasant was in good company in his communist faith. Many people in less desperate material circumstances, and with far greater educational attainments, supported the Soviet Union in the 1930s. Yet the factors that explain the popularity of communism in Paris, Berlin, or New York do not apply to Polish Volhynia. One could hardly explain the local appeal of communism there by reference to the intellectual appeal of dialectics, or by the political conviction that one had to choose between Hitler and Stalin. The poor peasants of Volhynia had their own local understanding of communism. It arose from the anarchic years of 1917–1921, when no state power had yet been

established in Volhynia, and when communist agitators persuaded them to expel the “Polish lords” and seize their land for themselves. Like Józewski, then, many peasants had their own nostalgia for the Polish-Bolshevik War, but with the opposite valence. Having never experienced communism as tyranny, many Volhynian Ukrainians still imagined communism as liberation.⁸ Like Józewski and Polish authorities generally, peasants failed to understand the fundamental transformations taking place in the Soviet Union in the 1930s.

Communist agitators were prepared for criticisms of new Soviet policies. Although one activist committed suicide after having understood the gravity of the 1932–1933 Famine in Soviet Ukraine, he was a forgotten exception.⁹ Propaganda had attained a peak of clarity, and the Communist Party of West Ukraine was an efficient distributor of calculated untruth. The big lie was told on every occasion. As land was taken from peasants in Soviet Ukraine, the official line of the Communist Party of West Ukraine was that, in Poland, land should be distributed to peasants without compensation to previous owners. This spoke directly to the interests of peasants in Poland, while shrouding the policies actually pursued in the Soviet Union. As peasants in Soviet Ukraine died of starvation, communists maintained that the true famine was on the Polish side of the border. Since Volhynian families really were going hungry, this was easy to believe. A Soviet spy sent during the Famine admitted to “a bit of a shortage of bread,” and recruited agents in Volhynia. Volhynian communists staged a hunger strike in a Polish prison, to the unbridled astonishment of a refugee from Soviet Ukraine.¹⁰ As Stalin halted the Ukrainian cultural revival, communist agitators in Volhynia described a flowering of Ukrainian literature and drama. Again, as Józewski closed the organizations that embodied Ukrainian civil society, Volhynian Ukrainians could believe that the opposite must be taking place in the Soviet Union. As Stalin eliminated Ukrainian patriots, agitators in Volhynia spoke of Soviet Ukraine as an independent state. They even promised, in their more enthusiastic moments, that Volhynia itself would become a Ukrainian state. The greatest enemy of the Ukrainian nation, they always maintained, was the Polish occupier.¹¹ More and more Volhynian Ukrainians heard such claims on the radio, from Soviet broadcasts in Ukrainian. Radios supplied by the Polish state were used by Ukrainian nationalist schoolteachers to transmit Soviet propaganda.¹² Communists managed to reach Ukrainian schoolchildren, one of whom reported his belief that “Ukrainians inhabit all of Poland, and Poles are only a kind of ruling caste.”¹³ The Polish officer who recorded this statement found it characteristic.

In the beginning, Józewski had driven a wedge between local communists

and Moscow. By announcing a policy of national concessions after the 1926 coup, Piłsudski had created some of the preconditions for the split between the Communist Party of West Ukraine and its patrons, the Ukrainian section of the Bolshevik Party and the Communist Party of Poland. By exploiting dissension between Ukrainian and Polish communists, the Polish police had arrested much of the West Ukrainian party leadership. Józewski brought this two-track approach to Volhynia in 1928, promising support for Ukrainian culture while imprisoning Ukrainian communists. Yet this was an essentially political approach, and targeted party organizations rather than the social conditions that made communism attractive. The basic sources of communist popularity remained, and no one doubted that a legal communist or communist-front party might again win elections in Volhynia.¹⁴ In 1932, the Communist Party of West Ukraine showed signs of life, with a campaign designed to respond to the ban on public organizations and parties, and to speak to the radicalization of the countryside. It sent a band of insurgents from Kowel in a rampage of terror across the Ukrainian countryside, attacking Polish homesteads and the Polish police. Józewski's police force, surprised at first, replied with massive arrests, which it called "liquidations." Much of the party leadership was arrested in 1933, and the party was forced back into conspiratorial work. Yet the propaganda damage had been done. Polish military intelligence reported that the dramatic action had seized the imagination of the locals. One officer reported that "the entire Volhynian population" saw the action as "the beginning of an uprising designed to liberate Ukraine from Polish rule."¹⁵

REVOLUTION PREPARED

That report exaggerated matters, just as local police reports in the years to follow overestimated the scale of resistance to Polish rule and the importance of communist ideology as a motivation for revolt. It was easier for Polish officials to blame foreign agitation than local policy failures for the growing crisis in Volhynia. Nevertheless, the number of communist actions increased after 1932, as did support for communist revolution. In December 1933, the new leadership of the Communist Party of West Ukraine planned a strike action for 1934. The strikes in this new wave took place in January and February.¹⁶ As Polish authorities planned their spring trial of sixty-three individuals accused of taking part in the Kowel sabotage campaign of 1932, the Party in Kowel planned new actions. According to their records, some 130 villages struck, refusing to sell foodstuffs to the cities, and 400 arrests were made. Polish police

records confirm the arrests, which themselves became a cause of further agitation. On 11 April 1934, a mob attacked the police station in Silna, demanding the release of two communist prisoners. The police had to yield. On the same day, in Cuman, a crowd attacked policemen trying to make an arrest. The police fired on the crowd, then fell back. Police reserves sent from Łuck arrived on the scene and arrested fifty-nine people. Communist records describe a general pacification in Cuman.¹⁷

All of this was mere preparation for the celebration of the First of May, the international labor holiday. Communists proceeded to attack the police directly, and to provoke mass riots throughout Volhynia. The Party then began a series of strike actions, threatening those who did not participate with violence. The strikes were designed to halt the functioning of country markets, so that foodstuffs could not be supplied to the cities. This was a protest of low prices, but it also prevented the local peasant from making his meager profit. Another strike action was aimed to halt public works projects to build roads and bridges. Peasants forced to work by the roadside without pay had a grievance, but the poor state of communications in Volhynia increased transaction costs and so kept agricultural prices low. With such strikes, communists both exploited and sustained peasant grievances. This clever strategy had no appeal to Jewish traders. Jewish traders in local Communist Party committees demanded a halt.¹⁸ Polish military intelligence reported that Soviet agents had liquidated three police informers, and that conditions for its own work were extremely poor. The preponderance of Ukrainians and the popularity of communism made work “almost impossible.”¹⁹

The Party was encouraged but also disappointed, criticizing its members for not taking a sufficiently aggressive position, and for not fully exploiting the dissatisfaction of the local masses.²⁰ It appears that the strike actions were a local tactic, which the Soviets understood as a deviation. Moscow would dictate that the main threat was from “right deviationists” at one moment, and from “left deviationists” at another. Communist parties throughout the world had to follow Moscow’s line, and produce their own local deviations and deviationists. In the local idiom of the Communist Party of West Ukraine, the “left deviation” meant too much attention to sabotage and strikes, while the “right deviation” meant too much attention to the penetration of legal organizations such as co-operatives. At the Fourth (and final) Congress of the Communist Party of West Ukraine, held in Soviet Ukraine in October–November 1934, West Ukrainian communists learned that they suffered from the “left deviation.”²¹ When the party had been instructed that it suffered from the “right deviation” a few years

earlier, it had purged itself and lost much of its popularity. West Ukrainian communists apparently reacted differently this time. Of course, they duly promised to pay more attention to political rather than violent action. But the months to follow indicated that party discipline was less than ideal.

The strike actions of 1935 were more daring than those of 1934. In April 1935, communist agitators told the Volhynian population that a revolution was underway, that the army garrison in Łuck was in revolt, and that a mass march on the provincial capital would overthrow the Polish regime. There were some problems of coordination. Some peasants lost their way to the provincial capital, and asked local police for directions, innocently explaining that the purpose of their journey was to overthrow Polish rule. The action in Łuck was prevented, but in a nearby village a mob of workers on a great noble's estate killed a policeman. In the countryside, the communists began another coercive strike, forcing girls who worked in the state forests to stay home. The Polish police arrested those who threatened the girls, only to be surrounded by locals, and forced to yield. Twenty-four policemen were then sent in to make the same arrests, only to be attacked by a large group, armed with sickles and clubs and crying "beat the Poles, down with Poland." The police opened fire, wounding at least seven. Throughout Volhynia, communists began to carry out threats against those who failed to participate in strikes. One couple found two of their horses gutted, and a third hanged from a tree. More drastic means were used against police informers. At least nine were killed. The police, for their part, reported killing eighteen communists and wounding twenty more.²²

Nineteen thirty-six saw an increase in the use of lethal force, by both the police and the communists. The communists killed at least twenty-two more people suspected of being police informants. They began to assassinate local officials, Ukrainians, simply for "collaborating" with the Polish state. State employees were now at risk of having their fields burned, a terrible loss for any farmer, and all the more for poor peasants with few if any reserves. At least 150 people suffered some kind of retributive action for working rather than striking on 1 May 1936. A strike action from August to October 1936 was intended to halt the delivery of food to the towns. At least 132 people had their windows broken for not taking part. To lose windows was a serious problem in the cold Volhynian autumn, and a serious expense for a poor family; it was also the first in a series of increasingly painful warnings that proceeded to burned fields and poisoned wells, and could end in murder. The police, for their part, weakened the 1 May actions by mass preventative arrests in April. They killed at least thirty-one people in firefights and arrest actions over the course of the year.²³

The open communist threat to Polish state power in Volhynia escalated in 1937. Loyal Ukrainians became afraid to report communist activity.²⁴ Local officials began to receive anonymous threats warning them that they would be killed for “collaboration” with Polish authorities. On 14 February 1937, for example, a police officer received a warning on his door that all officials should leave Volhynia, the author of the note taking the opportunity to express the hope that one day all Poles would be slaughtered. The communists were equally merciless with their own. One Party member married a rich girl, but had to resign from the Party to get the dowry. His former comrades shot him in the chest. A body found in a field without arms and legs was thought to be an informer killed the previous year. Increasingly massive arrests and trials, combined with a general sense among communists in Poland that vigilance was required, had forced the communists to take greater care. The local Volhynian party leader, Fryda Szpringer, began a purge of some of her underground activists. The party was also concerned with anti-Semitism in its ranks. One of Szpringer’s underground activists used the pseudonym “Hitler.”²⁵

By the late 1930s, the Communist Party of West Ukraine was a fairly autonomous organization, burdened by local difficulties, but relatively free from outside influence. There had been no party congress since 1934. The Communist Party of Poland, of which in principle the Communist Party of West Ukraine was a part, was rent by internal divisions and essentially impotent from about 1933. When the Communist International dissolved the Communist Party of Poland in 1938, it theoretically dissolved the Communist Party of West Ukraine as well. But in the terrain, in Volhynia, the officially nonexistent party fought on. One informer even told Polish authorities that the dissolution of the Communist Party of Poland actually gave the Communist Party of West Ukraine greater flexibility.²⁶ A communist party that was designed to be doubly subordinated—to the Ukrainian section of Bolshevik Party and to the Communist Party of Poland—was left to its own devices. Although created from above, it had real support from below. In 1938 Szpringer took her Volhynian section of the party into deep conspiracy. Her devoted “Underground Men” became local heroes, Robin Hoods who received a warm welcome in peasant huts. Party actions by this point were restricted to warnings and verdicts. In one village, for example, two activists threw a rope around the neck of a villager, dragged him through the village to strangle him, and then stuffed his mouth with mud. He recovered and told the police. Meanwhile, the Polish police were taking some effective counteractions. In their own counterpropaganda, they exploited the fact that grain prices had finally increased, and that Volhynian peasants could sell their

wares for a real profit. They had also arrested seven Underground Men early in the year, and induced some of them to inform. In the spring, they discovered Szpringer's hiding place, and arrested her along with four of her Underground Men. By the middle of the year, they were catching the remaining Underground Men one by one. On 13 August 1938 a police patrol surrounded the house in Dubno where one of them was hiding. As the police told the story, he came out firing from his Soviet rifle, and drew forty-seven rounds in reply.²⁷

By early 1939, Volhynia was relatively calm, but there were still disturbing signals from the field. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) had made its presence known in Volhynia. The Communist Party of West Ukraine, weakened seriously by arrests, decided to cooperate rather than compete with the nationalists.²⁸ The truce surprised no one. The Party had used nationalist agitation from the very beginning. Its leaders spoke not only of national cultural rights, but also of national self-determination and even state independence. Its May Day marchers carried Ukrainian flags, sometimes to the exclusion of red banners, and chanted "Long live Ukraine, down with Poland!" Party members in Volhynia had a decided preference for the Ukrainian national anthem over the Internationale. Since the Communist Party of West Ukraine had been officially dissolved by Moscow, and the Communist Party of Poland no longer existed, local communists could make whatever alliances they wished. In the past they had made some efforts to follow the party line on questions such as cooperation with nationalists, but in the end they followed the inclination of local members. The OUN, for its part, had modeled its political education on that of the communists. It had penetrated the Communist Party of West Ukraine, and had been infiltrated in its turn by the communists. Throughout the 1930s, the OUN had used the party's demonstrations as an occasion for its own work, joining for example in May Day demonstrations. In Volhynia, both groups promised social and national revolution.²⁹ It was the communists who spoke of a "final solution" to national problems in Volhynia, meaning that the Poles would be destroyed as the political class.³⁰

EXPECTATIONS

The Communist Party of West Ukraine posed a challenge to Polish state power in Volhynia, contesting with some success the source and symbol of state authority: the monopoly of violence. This was evident not so much in the scale of the violence itself, as in the party's ability to exercise authority over non-party

members by threat of violence, and by its ability to intimidate, at times, organs of state power. When the Party was defeated, temporarily, in the first half of 1939, it was by overwhelming force. The Polish police arrested suspects and demonstrators in large numbers, and procurators organized mass trials. These were held before the Łuck district court, which traveled ceaselessly under heavy guard from county seat to county seat to visit justice upon the entire province. One official Polish reckoning gives 228 imprisonments for communist activity in Volhynia in 1933, 334 in 1934, 453 in 1935, 669 in 1936, and 989 in 1937.³¹ The number of imprisonments was in reality higher. A count drawn from incomplete provincial reports gives 282 for 1935, 895 for 1936, 1,753 in 1937, 3,043 in 1938, and 428 in 1939.³² Political trials continued through the summer of 1939. It appears that people were held in jail without trial for substantial periods. Central Polish statistics over the same period present Volhynia as the country's most revolutionary province. In 1935 Volhynia recorded 11.6% (1,026 of 8,774 acts) of recorded communist criminal activity in the entire country; in 1936 the figure increased to 25.9% (1,533 of 5,914) and in 1937 reached 39.6% (1,085 of 2,734). These figures suggest that even as the Communist Party of Poland disintegrated from within and lost its support, communism in Poland's east retained its popularity. Even as the absolute number of sentences for communist activity decreased for the country as a whole, it remained stable in Volhynia. By 1937, inhabitants of Volhynia, one-sixteenth of Poland's population, were reckoned responsible for two-fifths of communist criminal acts.³³

There were at least five thousand Volhynian communists in Polish prisons in summer 1939, and probably far more. Prisons removed communists from Volhynian society, and confirmed Polish power. Yet to be imprisoned was also a kind of individual martyrdom that legitimated resistance. (Volhynian jailhouses and interrogation cells were a cause célèbre of the Polish Left, thanks in part to Władysław Broniewski's poem, "The Police Dogs in Łuck.")³⁴ Imprisonment also trained Party members in communism, and further attached them to the Party. In Polish prisons, political prisoners were separated from common criminals, and communists maintained their Party organization and hierarchy in what they called the prison commune. The Party gave members a sense of identity, that they belonged to a special group inside prison, and that comrades awaited them expectantly on the outside. Many of them read their Marx in prison for the first time, since Polish prisons did not censor reading material. One party member recalled prison as a "well-organized school."³⁵ Polish prison was perhaps most important as a shelter. Many West Ukrainian communist

Party leaders were already behind bars when the Communist Party of Poland was dissolved, and when comrades were sentenced to death after show trials in the Soviet Union. They escaped the Great Terror both physically and emotionally, they and their ideals survived. From Polish prison, it was easier for Volhynian communists to keep faith in the Soviet Union. They could dream of the day when the Red Army would liberate their "West Ukraine," and themselves.

Chapter 8 Revindications of Souls

In the 1930s, Henryk Józewski lived in two political worlds, in Warsaw and Łuck. He defended a program of reform in the capital, while implementing it in the provinces. Returning to Volhynia during his first winter as governor, he was greeted by the gloomy spectacle of an Orthodox church occupied by its faithful to prevent its transfer to the Catholic Church. During the long nineteenth century, when Volhynia and most of Poland were under Russian rule, the Orthodox Church was a symbol of Russian power. When the Polish state was restored, Catholic believers and the Catholic Church pressed for “revindications”—that is, for the restoration of church properties and, more generally, of the status of Catholicism. In Warsaw, where there were few Orthodox believers, Orthodox churches could be converted to Catholic use with little domestic controversy. In Volhynia, where most Polish citizens were Orthodox Ukrainians, disagreements were bound to arise. Catholics had a claim of historical justice, since many Catholic churches had indeed been seized by the Russians; the Orthodox had the argument of continuity, that people accustomed to worshipping in a certain house of God should not be expelled therefrom. In

Zabrze, the parishioners had chosen to prevent the transfer by passive resistance. When Józewski arrived, they had endured the icy cold for seven days, and were licking frost from the window panes for water.¹

The entire action, as Józewski recalled it, was led by Soviet agents. Although the Soviet Union was a communist state, it could still exploit religious tension within Poland. Józewski knew that this was an ancient maneuver, and believed that the new Poland would have to integrate its own Orthodox population if it was to survive. The old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Józewski's model of Polish power, had been a multiconfessional society. As he well knew, Orthodox families with connections to Volhynia had produced some of the leading figures of the Commonwealth. Although the Commonwealth had suppressed Orthodoxy by treating its believers as members of a Uniate Church (later known as the Greek Catholic Church) created in 1596, Polish kings later endorsed the existing Orthodox hierarchy and allowed an Orthodox bishopric to be established in Volhynia, at Łuck. Yet the Commonwealth had to concede Kyïv and its Orthodox metropolitanate to Muscovy in 1686, and grant to the Moscow patriarchate the patronage over its Orthodox believers. The supposed oppression of the Orthodox within Poland was a major argument the Russian Empire advanced to justify partitioning the Commonwealth out of existence at the end of the eighteenth century. In the nineteenth century, Volhynia's mostly Uniate population was forced to convert to Russian Orthodoxy. Whereas the Uniate Church survived in Austria (as Greek Catholicism), it was liquidated in Russia.²

The Riga frontier left about three and a half million Orthodox believers in the new Poland: former Russian subjects, now Polish citizens, speakers of Belarusian and Ukrainian. The Orthodox Church in Poland was still led by Russians, holdovers of empire, bishops and priests who at first expected both Bolshevism and Polish independence to quickly collapse. These clerics took for granted that the supreme authority of the Orthodox Church within Poland was the Moscow patriarchate. The new Polish state had to domesticate this foreign organization, while convincing the Orthodox that Poland was their home.³ Unlike the Catholic Church, the Orthodox Church lacks a clear international hierarchy. Its basic organizational unit is the autocephalous ("self-headed" or autonomous) church, within a single country. In this sense, it was natural that Polish authorities would anticipate the establishment of a new Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church. While the Orthodox Church was closely connected to the state, this was traditionally an Orthodox state. Yet Poland, far from being an Orthodox state, was a constitutionally secular republic with a

majority Roman Catholic population. The patriarch of Moscow, Tikhon (Belavin), refused to countenance the possibility that he would lose some of his domains, and he had good canonical arguments at his disposal. Most Orthodox bishops in Poland agreed with Tikhon, and followed his lead. Tikhon had been elected as patriarch by a Russian Church responding to revolution, and to many bishops and priests he appeared as the best hope for the preservation of the church during a moment of great temporal change.⁴

Temporal rulers had their own ideas. The Polish government named a metropolitan friendly to its goals, Jerzy, who declared autocephaly in July 1922. As the government pressured bishops and priests to accede, an Orthodox clergyman assassinated Jerzy in February 1923. The Orthodox bishops then elected Dionysius Valedenskii, a Russian, who resisted Warsaw's plans. With Patriarch Tikhon adamant in Moscow, Warsaw took the matter to the patriarch of Constantinople. Patriarchs of Constantinople cannot command the obedience of other patriarchs, and therefore must seek occasions to demonstrate their authority. The autocephaly quarrel provided such an occasion. Precisely to demonstrate its superiority to the Moscow patriarchate, the Constantinople patriarchate disagreed with Moscow, and then allowed Warsaw to enforce its decision. Constantinople accepted Poland's gift of twelve thousand pounds sterling, and blessed the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church in November 1924. The Orthodox hierarchy in Poland grudgingly accepted its new status. By this time, it seemed clear that Soviet power would endure, and that no rescue could come from the mother church in Russia. Most Orthodox bishops and priests probably believed that the new Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church was illegitimate, as it had no sanction from Moscow. The Moscow patriarchate, however, had been dealt a serious blow. Tikhon died in 1925. Orthodox bishops in Poland had little choice but to accept the new situation, and to begin negotiations with Warsaw about the church's legal status.⁵

After 1918, the Orthodox Church in Poland existed in legal limbo, unrecognized by formal legislation, and unable to defend the properties and believers it had inherited from Russian times.⁶ Negotiations between Metropolitan Dionysius and the National Democrat Stanisław Grabski, the Polish minister of religion, reached a successful conclusion in May 1926.⁷ After Piłsudski's military coup that month, however, Dionysius denied that any agreement had been reached. Since Piłsudski's new regime promised equal rights for national and religious minorities, Dionysius might have counted on more generous treatment from Piłsudski's governments.⁸ If so, he miscalculated. Some members of

Piłsudski's camp, Józewski in particular, had more ambitious plans. Rather than simply regulate the status of the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church, they wished to transform it into an institution of Ukrainian rather than Russian culture. The creation of such an Orthodox Church, they believed, would satisfy one demand of Ukrainian nationalists in Poland, and prevent Moscow from exploiting the issue of religious intolerance within Poland.⁹ In Volhynia in 1927 and 1928, lay Ukrainians organized a protest movement against church authorities. Believers pressed for the Orthodox Church to reconstitute itself as a more democratic organization, in which the lay faithful would participate in church governance.¹⁰ Such democratization, Józewski believed, would ukrainize the church in places where Ukrainians were a majority, such as Volhynia.¹¹

As Ukrainian activists in Volhynia began to establish a parallel church structure, Metropolitan Dionysius understood the threat.¹² His Russian hierarchy was trapped between a Polish state and a Ukrainian population. Rather than accede to the demands of either, he decided himself to call a *sobor*, a general congress of the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church. He supported a rival campaign of priests and believers, who wrote to Polish authorities to complain of the influence of Ukrainian nationalists. Suspending negotiations with the Polish state over the church's statute in October 1929, Dionysius declared that the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church would constitute itself, with no interference from the Polish state, and no input from the body of believers.¹³ Warsaw could never permit this, and Józewski was called in from his new post as governor of Volhynia to resolve the crisis. He was named minister of internal affairs in December 1929, and began conversations with Dionysius. He brought about a convergence of positions by April 1930, in which the state agreed to allow a *sobor*, while the church agreed to await the legal regulation of its status before calling one.¹⁴ After eleven further meetings in May and June, with a wider delegation from both state and church, the two sides publicized this agreement. President Mościcki announced in June 1930 that the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church would soon convene a *sobor*, and masses were celebrated throughout Warsaw. Józewski returned to Łuck to govern Volhynia.

All that remained was to negotiate the statutes: one on the internal structure of the church, and another on the relation between church and state. Church and state quickly established a Mixed Commission for this purpose, with Dionysius and Józewski as chief negotiators.¹⁵ In Warsaw, Józewski was the great friend of Orthodoxy, who spoke Russian with pleasure, knew Orthodox hymns and liturgy, and wished for the Orthodox Church to prosper. Yet in the



Figure 15. Cabinet of Walery Sławek, 1930. Józewski and Piłsudski sit first and third from the left. Archiwum Dokumentacji Mechanicznej, Warsaw.

provinces Józewski was the secular reformer of Orthodoxy, the statesman who saw a ukrainized Orthodox Church as a way to defend Poland against the Russian threat, and indeed a weapon against Bolshevism.¹⁶ Józewski meant to create an Orthodox Church that would steal a march on Ukrainian nationalists, take an argument away from Bolshevik propagandists, attach the Volhynian peasantry to the Polish state, and create a magnet for Orthodox believers in the Soviet Union. This was part of the Promethean project; Józewski's collaborator in the endeavor from the Ministry of Internal Affairs was Henryk Suchenek-Suchocki, the man entrusted with Promethean affairs in that ministry.¹⁷ In 1930, there was general agreement about the project and the importance of regulating the status of the Orthodox Church.

Such revolutionary goals could hardly be mentioned in the heavy air of the metropolitan palace in Warsaw. In Volhynia, they could be brought to life. In 1930, forty-nine churches in Volhynia offered services in Ukrainian, a result of local initiatives presumably endorsed by Józewski. Volhynia was the only province in Poland where any language other than Russian and Church Slavonic was employed in Orthodox church services.¹⁸ In April 1931, Józewski's political program for the church was endorsed by the Polish government, as preparation for "the possibilities of the Orthodox Church in a future Russia," after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.¹⁹ In spring 1931, Józewski began negotiations with Dionysius, official now rather than unofficial, in the matter of the statute of the Orthodox Church in Poland. Yet he could not resist a con-

spiratorial approach. He consulted, secretly, with Bronisław Żongołłowicz, an intelligent and devoted public servant and a Roman Catholic priest, who was serving as vice minister of religion. Żongołłowicz was another eastern Pole who believed that the emergence of a Ukrainian nation was inevitable, and that the Orthodox Church must be created in a corresponding form. Józewski and Żongołłowicz seemed to have the matter well in hand, and by July the final sections of the statute were under discussion. Then, abruptly, Dionysius withdrew from the negotiations, saying that, after all, only a *sobor* could decide such matters.²⁰ By then, Józewski was already at work in Volhynia, using state power to encourage the democratization of the Orthodox Church.

VOLHYNIAN ORTHODOXY

Józewski renewed his Volhynian campaign with a deftly chosen symbol. The Mohyla Society, founded in June 1931, commemorated the most famous metropolitan of Kyiv, Petro Mohyla. During the first half of the seventeenth century, Mohyla had been a great Orthodox scholar, and a loyal subject of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. By naming the educational society after Mohyla, Józewski managed at a stroke to suggest Poland's designs on Kyiv, Ukraine's potential for enlightenment, and accord between the Polish state and the Orthodox Church.²¹ In fact, the educational society was something of a cover for a coordinating committee which plotted the ukrainization of the Orthodox Church. Józewski and his old Petliurite comrades of the Ukrainian People's Republic, for whom he arranged positions in the Volhynian administration and seats in the Warsaw parliament, were the main conspirators. One of them was his agent in Dionysius's office, engaged in stealing papers.²² Ukrainization from below brought Dionysius back to the table, but he withdrew once again in June 1933. Dionysius proclaimed that July that he would call a synod of himself and a few allies, rather than honor an agreement with the government.²³ Here the coordinating committee turned the Ukrainian Orthodox population against the elitist and Russian orientation of their metropolitan. Its first great success was to organize protests during Metropolitan Dionysius's visit to Volhynia in September 1933. As many as thirty thousand Volhynian Ukrainians rallied for the ukrainization of their church, and in particular for the reestablishment of a bishopric in Łuck, to be filled by a Ukrainian. These demands wed the modern to the traditional: after all, in Mohyla's time, there was an Orthodox bishopric in Łuck. Józewski wrote to the ministry

of religion that the establishment of such a bishopric was “of the first importance.”²⁴

Metropolitan Dionysius, under pressure from Józewski in Volhynia and the government in Warsaw, conceded in March 1934. Dionysius had been, in his own person, metropolitan of both Warsaw and Łuck. He now permitted the diocese of Volhynia, previously under his direct personal authority, to be treated as a separate archbishopric, and for a new archbishop and bishop to be installed in that province. The candidates, as Dionysius must have suspected, were approved by Józewski.²⁵ The new archbishop of Volhynia and Krzemeniec, with a seat in Krzemeniec, was Oleksii Hromads'kyi. Archbishop Oleksii had changed with the times: once a monarchist, he now favored the ukrainization of the church. His suffragan, Bishop Polikarp Sikors'kyi, was a Ukrainian nationalist. Bishop Polikarp's seat was in Łuck, the provincial capital. Oleksii and Polikarp began to ukrainize the church from within, endorsing Ukrainian as the language of internal correspondence in October 1934.²⁶ In January 1935, Archbishop Oleksii declared that Ukrainian should be used in sermons, where parishioners so wished.²⁷ This was a crucial part of Józewski's project, as he believed that the use of Ukrainian in church would help to establish the Ukrainian political identity of Volhynia's citizens, while the church itself would propagate loyalty to the state. It was also a radical change in practice: for the Orthodox Church to replace Church Slavonic with Ukrainian was the equivalent of the Roman Catholic Church replacing Latin with vernacular languages, a change that was then still four decades in the future. Józewski asserted for himself the right to fill church positions. He removed problematic priests from Volhynia, replacing them with more Ukrainian or at least more yielding candidates.²⁸ The first Ukrainian priest in a ukrainized church, in his provincial capital of Łuck, was a Petliurite, one of his old allies from the Ukrainian People's Republic. Moscow followed these changes with interest.²⁹

Józewski's achievement was substantial. Volhynia was the most Ukrainian province in Poland, as well as the center of Orthodox belief. It was the largest Orthodox diocese in Poland, with 689 parishes. To all intents and purposes, all 1.5 million Polish citizens of Orthodox faith and Ukrainian nationality lived in Volhynia. Thirty thousand of seventy thousand hectares of Orthodox Church land in Poland were in Volhynia, the property of some two hundred monasteries and six convents. Ostróg (today Ostrih), site of the publication of the first complete Bible in Church Slavonic, is a Volhynian town. The famous Pochaiv fortress monastery is in Volhynia.³⁰ By 1935, Józewski's work in Volhynia had

improved his negotiating position in Warsaw. Having largely ukrainized the most important diocese of the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church, he could present Metropolitan Dionysius with a *fait accompli*. Yet having outmaneuvered the Orthodox hierarchy, Józewski found his plan to ukrainize the Orthodox Church opposed from an unexpected quarter: the Polish government. By 1935, his model of an Orthodox Church had lost favor. Even as Józewski continued to lead Polish negotiators in 1936, 1937, and 1938, he had to contend with an alternative view: that the Orthodox Church should simply become an instrument to polonize Ukrainians.

FORETHOUGHT AND AFTERTHOUGHT

Like the Promethean project and the Volhynia Experiment, the ukrainization of the Orthodox Church was justified within a certain conception of Poland's strategic interests. When negotiations between the Polish state and the Orthodox Church began in 1930, the Polish prime minister could foresee that a ukrainized Orthodox Church would serve Polish interests in the Soviet Union, and indeed in Russia and Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union. By 1935, few Poles were so optimistic about the future of their eastern neighbor. Few still believed in Poland's eastern mission, or that Poland could be preserved by destroying the Soviet Union from within. Polish war planners no longer assigned much importance to the possibility of a Ukrainian diversion inside the Soviet Union in the case of a Soviet attack. Since the Ukrainian question was of less use abroad, there was less need to demonstrate toleration in domestic policy. Previous advocates of an adventurous Promethean policy, from both the army and the foreign ministry, now turned their attention to the Soviet (and later the Nazi) threat, and the potential national enemy within. Those who had held an optimistic long-term vision of the national question now took a pessimistic near-term view of the national problem.

When Piłsudski died in May 1935, the issue was settled, and the new view was generally accepted by the men and women of his camp. Once the optic was domestic stability rather than international security, ukrainization of the Orthodox Church made little sense. General Tadeusz Kasprzycki, named minister of war on the day of Piłsudski's death, had no interest in such national concessions. A new multiministerial Commission for National Affairs in the Eastern Lands, established no later than April 1935, proposed the alternative: the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church should become a Polish institution, in its practices as well as its state loyalty. In this variant, it would serve national rather

than state assimilation: the language of the National Democrats had returned to the summits of power. The commission recommended the creation of "Centers of Polishness" in Orthodox parishes, and portrayed the polonization of Orthodox services within the army as a precedent to be followed generally.³¹ Józewski was invited to the early meetings of this body, so knew that its goals were not his own. In December 1935, the prime minister told the government that he preferred Russian to Ukrainian priests, and that the ukrainization of the population through the Orthodox Church must be halted immediately in the interests of *raison d'état*. Józewski, who was invited to this meeting, defended his achievements in Volhynia, arguing that state assimilation was the only feasible policy in Volhynia, and that support of Ukrainian culture was the only way to create loyalty.³² He realized that the new view, followed to its conclusion, would eventually challenge the existence of the Orthodox Church itself. Now outside the mainstream, Józewski realized that he would soon be swimming directly against the current. Rather than resign his position at the head of the Polish delegation, he intensified his work in Warsaw. Over the course of 1936, he traveled about sixteen times from Łuck to the capital, and established the framework of the final law regulating relations between the Orthodox Church and the Polish state.³³

Unlike some of his Polish partners, Józewski did wish to conclude the negotiations and grant the Orthodox Church some legal standing in Poland. The representatives of the ministries of religion and internal affairs were rather dilatory, and seemed increasingly content with the idea of a Russian hierarchy. Suchenek-Sucheki, once a Promethean, had abandoned any notion of religious policy as foreign policy. Speaking to his collaborator Żongołłowicz, Józewski called another Polish negotiator "a harmful man," in Russian.³⁴ In March 1936 Józewski lost his one remaining Polish ally, as Żongołłowicz submitted his resignation in protest of the government's plan to ban ritual slaughter by Jewish butchers. Żongołłowicz showed no sign of liking Jews or Orthodox Christians, but believed that the Polish state could only be built on the basis of the toleration of flourishing religious communities. Year after year, most of the holiday cards he received were from Jews; when he resigned, it was the rabbis who came to wish him well.³⁵ Józewski's position was ever weaker in Warsaw. In 1937 the prime minister rebuked Józewski for his close contacts with the Orthodox Church, and ordered him to maintain the official government position.³⁶

The legal status of the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church was finally regulated by presidential decree in November 1938. In 1930, Józewski had an

ambitious plan to ukrainize the church, and was supported by the government; by 1938, Józewski's original plan had been abandoned, and initiative had been stripped from him. The debates about the Ukrainian or Russian character of the church were obsolete. After 116 negotiating sessions and 273 government meetings, what Józewski had to offer the Orthodox Church was legality in Poland.³⁷ By the terms of the presidential decree, the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church was neither Russian nor Ukrainian, but rather simply Polish. In the final draft, only a few passages, such as a provision about the discretionary powers of provincial governors, reveal Józewski's touch. By 1938, however, Dionysius was happy to accept even this.

The metropolitan and the painter had grappled for a decade, Dionysius arbitrarily changing his position and trying to go over Józewski's head, Józewski transforming Dionysius's church in its Volhynian heartland and then returning to Warsaw to collect the rewards at the negotiating table.³⁸ Each man claimed to be concerned only with the legal status of an existing Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church, but each had a larger vision of that institution's future. Dionysius had hoped at first to preserve the church's Russian character, whereas Józewski had aimed to create a new Ukrainian body. Failure in these more ambitious goals had brought the two men closer. A new Polish nationalism that attacked traditional institutions was an enemy to them both. Dionysius's thanks to Józewski were exceptionally warm, and perhaps even sincere. "I am fully aware," wrote the metropolitan in November 1938, "of how much time, energy, and work you have devoted to this task, the fulfillment of which will always be associated with your name." It was a "work for the ages."³⁹ By the time Józewski read these messages, he had been forced to resign from his position as governor of Volhynia, and the Orthodox Church was under direct attack from the Polish state.

NATIONAL UNITY

In Volhynia, Józewski lost the trust of the army. While he continued to imagine a second Polish-Bolshevik War and another eastward march, Polish generals were convinced that any war with Moscow would be fought on Polish territory. Even after Piłsudski's death, Józewski believed that Kyïv could be retaken. In September 1935, he told an interviewer that "from the window of my office I see Kyïv."⁴⁰ By then, actual war planning concentrated on defense.⁴¹ When the Volhynia Experiment began, in 1928, the Polish general staff had believed that its mobilization schedules were substantially faster than the Red Army's. By

1935, Polish war planners were concerned that a Soviet attack would find Polish armies unprepared. By the mid-1930s, the army believed that all state offices in Volhynia had to be held by ethnic Poles to ensure quick mobilization and prevent wartime sabotage.⁴²

The Lublin field command of the Polish army, along with Józewski's administration and the Border Defense Corps, was a major instance of Polish state power in Volhynia. At first, the army seemed to approve of the Volhynia Experiment. The Lublin field command followed the policy with interest, noting in the early years that Józewski had pacified the region, persuaded Ukrainian peasants to vote for Piłsudski, and ukrainized some Orthodox churches. The key issue, as the army saw matters, was Ukrainian nationalism. Józewski had argued that the Galician Ukrainian nationalism of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) could be kept from Volhynia. He envisioned the provincial boundary between Galicia and Volhynia as a political barrier, claiming that virulent nationalism could be quarantined in the south, while a healthy pro-Polish Ukrainian identity was nurtured in the north. In 1930, as the OUN terrorized the Galician countryside, and as Volhynia remained comparatively peaceful, Józewski's reasoning seemed sound. His church policy, designed to take an argument away from Galician Ukrainian nationalists and create Volhynian Ukrainians loyal to the Polish state, seemed plausible. The legal Ukrainian movement organized by Józewski had seemed, at first, to be a credible political organization.⁴³

As the 1930s passed, however, the field command grew convinced that control over Ukrainian nationalism had been lost. In 1933, as Poland's international position began a steep decline with the rise of Hitler in Germany and the consolidation of Stalin's power in the USSR, alarming reports of internal strife were filed from Józewski's Volhynia. The OUN, now cooperating with Nazi Germany in intelligence work, established a presence in Volhynia. Józewski himself reported that the OUN was intensifying its activities, exploiting his own reformed schools and churches. Graduates of the Ukrainian high school in Volhynia helped the OUN overcome its image as a Galician organization.⁴⁴ The following year Józewski's administration reported another increase in nationalist activity, counting fifty Ukrainian nationalist activists who had arrived from Galicia.⁴⁵ As mass arrests of Ukrainian nationalists weakened the organization in Galicia in 1934, it gained momentum in Volhynia. In late 1934, the OUN planned to assassinate Józewski himself.⁴⁶ By 1935 the head of local intelligence for the Border Defense Corps reported that the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists had 790 members in Volhynia.⁴⁷ (Józewski's own administration

counted 639 that year, and 720 the next).⁴⁸ In 1935, 92 people were tried in Volhynia for illegal political activity connected with the OUN; that figure increased to 136 in 1936, and then 167 in 1937.⁴⁹ The procurator of the appeals court at Lublin filed a gloomy report on the nationalism of the Volhynian defendants who came before him in 1936: "the Volhynian peasant, supposedly a 'loyal citizen attached to his fatherland,' in a calm and dispassionate, indeed rather friendly conversation with Polish officers and an appeals court judge, dares to anticipate the inevitable expulsion of the 'Polaks.'" In the trials, he continued wearily, the constant refrain is "slaughter all the Poles."⁵⁰

By 1937, the Lublin field command had drawn its own conclusions from these findings. The ukrainization of the Orthodox Church in Volhynia, its leading analysts began to argue, had done nothing to channel nationalism or secure loyalty. Rather than preventing the penetration of Galician Ukrainian nationalism, the policy had facilitated it. Archbishop Oleksii, they believed, had fallen under the influence of the OUN. Bishop Polikarp was hostile to Polish statehood. He was accused of calling the eagle, the Polish symbol of state, a "rooster."⁵¹ The younger generation of Orthodox priests were nationalists who opposed Polish rule. Volhynia had been more stable, military analysts suggested, before the church was reformed. Reform had not only opened the way for an undesirable modern ideology, nationalism; it had also sapped the traditional capacity of the church to persuade the peasant to be content with his lot on this earth. Oleksii had made poor choices of priests, many of whom were not revered. The use of the Ukrainian language rather than Church Slavonic stripped the liturgy of its mystery, and thus dissolved the aura of authority of the church. In any event, went a final line of criticism, the local Orthodox Church was so poorly run that it could scarcely implement any sort of coherent policy. In 1935 alone, more than half of the parishes in Volhynia changed priests.⁵²

At the top, military analysts concluded, the Orthodox Church in Volhynia was not an instrument of Polish rule, but rather a satellite of Galician Ukrainian nationalism. At the bottom, it had lost whatever authority it might have enjoyed, leaving the younger generation of Ukrainians more vulnerable to revolutionary ideologies. Throughout, it was disorganized and unpredictable. By commission and by omission, the church fomented a hostile nationalism. This analysis was quickly extended from religious toleration to the rest of the Volhynia Experiment. The Petliurites were poor protectors of Volhynian Ukrainians, and unable in practice to compete with the more vocal, organized, and numerous Galician activists. With some justice, military analysts argued that the legal

Ukrainian institutions created by Józewski had all been penetrated by the OUN, that toleration itself was a nasty façade covering nothing but rot.

The Border Defense Corps, whose own role in Volhynia had expanded, was the first to express its criticism to Józewski. Just a few years before, the local Border Defense Corps had cooperated with Józewski in an ambitious policy of counterintelligence in Soviet Ukraine. Its officers had located the open “windows” in Soviet border defenses, and dispatched Ukrainian border crossers to Soviet Ukraine. By 1935, the Corps was convinced that Józewski had allowed Volhynia to be penetrated by organizations hostile to Polish statehood. In July 1936, in a direct confrontation with Józewski, its director of intelligence recited a series of depressing facts. He made a persuasive case, based on direct observation, that the Volhynia Experiment sheltered local corruption and massive treachery. The churches, the schools, the cooperatives, and the theaters all protected Ukrainian nationalists and communists, who transmitted an increasingly aggressive message. Rather than enlightenment, the Ukrainian reading societies promoted drunkenness and nationalism.⁵³ In September 1937, the commander of the Polish army’s Lublin district, General Mieczysław Smorawiński, also confronted Józewski. To his way of seeing things, the great failure of the Volhynia Experiment was the relative decrease in the ethnic Polish population in Volhynia. The total population of Poles and Ukrainians alike was increasing, but Ukrainian families were having more children. Like his superiors in Warsaw, Smorawiński now saw demographics as a security problem, and national homogeneity as a security policy.⁵⁴

In neither debate did Józewski dispute the facts. His own office had produced the most comprehensive report of Ukrainian nationalist activity in Volhynia.⁵⁵ His disagreements concerned interpretation. Józewski tried to convey the sense that apparent failures were temporary and reparable, and that the overall policy of national concessions was still required on geopolitical grounds. Unfortunately for him, the Polish military had adopted an opposing strategy. Józewski’s Prometheanism earned him only derision in 1937. The Ukrainian Second Section, which dispatched agents on Soviet missions, had been dissolved on 1 January 1936. The Ukrainian question was no longer exploited in Soviet Ukraine to gain intelligence for Poland. If anything, the reverse was true: Moscow was using Ukrainians in Volhynia in its own intelligence work. In March 1937, the local commander of Polish military intelligence had reported to Warsaw that “Volhynia is gangrenolated with intelligence operations.”⁵⁶ More broadly, the Volhynia Experiment no longer seemed to secure Poland’s eastern flank in the event of war with the Soviet Union. Polish generals were in-

formed, instead, that important elements of Volhynia's towns would side with the Soviet Union were the Red Army to invade.⁵⁷ Józewski's orations, then, received little response. The stenographer of the Lublin field command allowed himself to note his own impression that Józewski's geopolitical arguments were conceited. The stenographer of the Border Defense Corps made his attitude known by recording only the length, not the contents, of Józewski's remarks.⁵⁸

This was not impudence. The man playing the role of stenographer in Józewski's meeting with the Border Defense Corps was, in fact, a powerful intelligence officer on the rise who was masterminding the destruction of the Volhynia Experiment. Major Tadeusz Skinder was, in some sense, Józewski's *doppelgänger*. Both were men of the east and veterans of the Polish Military Organization.⁵⁹ Whereas Józewski had avoided a career in intelligence organizations in favor of a policy position with covert intelligence and propaganda dimensions, Skinder had charted a careful course in the Polish military. Skinder had been head of intelligence of the Border Defense Corps since 1932, and was an elite officer of the Second Department, marked by his superiors for great responsibilities. As the Border Control Corps became the most successful Polish intelligence organ in the Soviet Union, Skinder's reputation had risen further. This, then, was a contest for power between civilian and military authorities in a border region of great importance for national security. As governor, Józewski was generally responsible for the security of the province; as head of intelligence for the Border Defense Corps, Skinder commanded forces crucial to that security.⁶⁰

Both men were conspirators, but disagreed about the nature of the desired conspiracy. For Józewski, secrecy meant that political goals were to be hidden behind political work, and high ideals such as Prometheanism were to motivate cooperation with non-Polish allies. Skinder's Border Defense Corps took for granted that only Poles could be trusted, and treated secrecy as a technical matter of the organs of the Polish state. Józewski and Skinder agreed that the Soviet threat was more important than the German; Skinder, however, at least had to take Nazi Germany into account. Unlike Józewski, he would have known that the Germans had considered using Volhynia as a base for anti-Soviet provocations, sending their own agents into the Soviet Union posing as Polish agents. The goal was to worsen Polish-Soviet relations by creating the appearance of Polish support of Ukrainian nationalism in Soviet Ukraine. In 1937, Germany turned its attention to Volhynia.⁶¹ Increasingly isolated, Józewski would not have had access to such intelligence. Unaware of German plans to exploit proj-

ects that he still regarded as secret, Józewski was vulnerable to Skinder's greater knowledge and superior position.

NATIONAL UNITY

By 1937, all Józewski had to offer was a strategic vision, which might or might not persuade. He had few friends left in Warsaw. He was now outside the institutions of the regime, rather than inside. He had been, for example, one of the organizers of Piłsudski's nonparty electoral bloc. In 1928, Józewski had delivered his "exposé" on his Volhynia Experiment to parliamentarians of that bloc. Nine years later, in September 1937, the military (without Józewski) presented its alternative Volhynia policy to the Camp of National Unity, the new parliamentary and social organization that supported the post-Piłsudski regime. The bloc had been etatist; the Camp was overtly nationalist. Whereas the bloc had recruited Jews and other national minorities, the Camp explicitly rejected their membership. The moment of Józewski's influence had passed. While Piłsudski lived, Józewski was one of his men of trust, making public policy in private apartments, then presenting it to state officials. Now Józewski was the cuckolded state official, behind whose back the military and the Camp of National Unity plotted: on this occasion in the private apartment of the commander of the garrison at Równe.⁶²

Józewski was left behind as the center of Polish politics moved to the right. The Camp of National Unity was mainly led by old allies of Piłsudski, such as Edward Śmigły-Rydz, who became marshal of Poland after Piłsudski's death. Józewski had reported to Śmigły in 1919 in the days of the Polish Military Organization, and Śmigły had decorated Józewski as a Polish Military Organization veteran in 1921. The two had remained on good terms until Piłsudski's death.⁶³ From 1935, Śmigły was among those who kept power in the hands of the Piłsudski camp by further compromising Polish electoral practices, revising the constitution, and co-opting the program of the National Democrats. He founded the Camp National Unity in 1937; that September, a local branch of the Camp met in Volhynia to announce its total opposition to Józewski's Volhynia Experiment. "Poles," it declared, "have contributed their blood and their culture to the east, and therefore deserve to be seen and treated as the masters of these lands." This was just the sort of logic and rhetoric Józewski had always opposed.⁶⁴

In November 1937, Józewski took his last stand as governor of Volhynia. He

called a congress of the Volhynian Ukrainian Alliance, inviting allies from Warsaw as well as his local administration. He tried to defend his position by appealing to the Ukrainian population of the region. The hall in Równe was decorated with portraits of Petliura and Piłsudski, and the sky-blue and yellow Ukrainian flag was hung next to the Polish red and white. The meeting began with the Polish and Ukrainian national anthems, sung by seven hundred voices. Józewski, inaugurating the formal proceedings, was greeted by Ukrainian cries of "Glory!" Leaders of his Volhynian Ukrainian Union then spoke, explaining that their program was still the best approach to the Ukrainian question in Poland, since only toleration would protect Volhynia from political extremism. With this impressive if staged endorsement, Józewski tried to influence the ruling camp in Warsaw. He was greeted by a mocking article in a right-wing newspaper, which treated him as a Ukrainian nationalist. The fact that he stood to attention to a recital of the "Testament" of the Ukrainian national poet Taras Shevchenko was presented as proof of unreliability, if not treason.⁶⁵

The strategic justifications for toleration in Volhynia had always been lost on the nationalist portion of the Polish reading public. As an elitist project, the Volhynia Experiment required the covert support of cohesive and powerful allies in the government. Now Józewski found that his allies had deserted him. Piłsudski was dead, and his successor Śmigły hostile. Józewski took his case to the Polish president, Ignacy Mościcki. The president, whose visit to Volhynia in 1929 had been a triumph for Józewski's policy, and whose announcement of the forthcoming *sobor* in 1930 had been the moment of great hope for church reformers, now told Józewski that the Volhynia Experiment was no longer in favor. In December 1937, the Border Defense Corps inaugurated its own Volhynia policy, converting Ukrainian Orthodox believers to Roman Catholicism in sensitive border regions. Józewski's complaints in Warsaw in January and February 1938 brought no response. In April 1938, Józewski was informed by telephone that his services were no longer required in Volhynia. He left Łuck to take a position in central Poland as governor of the Łódź region.⁶⁶

REVINDICATIONS

The military planning for a new policy towards the Orthodox Church had begun in December 1936.⁶⁷ The Lublin field command, supported by the Military Academic Institute in Warsaw, defined a project of the "revindication" of "souls" for the Polish nation.⁶⁸ Although the idea was to encourage Ukrainians

to convert from Orthodoxy to Roman Catholicism, the Catholic Church was neither the initiator nor the intended beneficiary of this policy. Military officers saw Catholicism as a means to an end. If Volhynian Ukrainians converted to Catholicism, they would begin to see themselves as Poles.⁶⁹ If they saw themselves as Poles, they would become more reliable protectors of the Polish state in its sensitive borderlands. This new revindication presupposed that Russian imperial rule had warped the development of Polish families and Polish souls. Many Volhynian communities, the field command correctly believed, had once considered themselves part of the Polish petty nobility. If such people could regain consciousness of their true nationality, reasoned the army, they could be rescued for the Polish state.⁷⁰

The Polish army financed an organization of petty nobles, which by October 1938 numbered some eight thousand members.⁷¹ Its members were to petition their local priests for conversion to Roman Catholicism. Some people, perhaps, converted to Catholicism because they accepted the new account of their origins. Others reacted to more direct incentives. Along the Soviet border, hundreds of people were converted by force or threats of force, or told that they would be expelled from border regions if they remained Orthodox.⁷² Though far less radical than Soviet policy, which involved the ethnic cleansing of some sixty thousand Poles from border regions of Soviet Ukraine in 1936, this threat was new to Polish policy. Throughout Volhynia, Ukrainians were told that Poles, including recent converts, would be favored in ongoing land reforms. One report noted that twenty-five Ukrainians had converted when they learned that they were petty nobles, and another ninety-nine did so in anticipation of land redistribution.⁷³ At this time, Ukrainians who worked for the Polish rail system were losing their jobs. Those who converted could reapply. Children of parents who converted were given clothing, and allowed to attend new day camps. Adults were aided in their studies, and offered vacations in central Poland. In some cases, Orthodox believers who were awaiting a new church agreed to convert if one were built for them. Orthodox priests agreed to polonize their services, presumably for fear of losing the right to preach entirely.⁷⁴ By the end of 1938, most or all of them preached in Polish.⁷⁵

By the end of 1938, the military had revindicated about 6,225 souls.⁷⁶ This was only 0.4% of the total Volhynian Orthodox population of 1,455,882 recorded by the military in 1937, and only 6.2% of the 100,000 petty nobles generally believed to inhabit Volhynia: surely less than the revindicators had expected. The project could not be undertaken simply by threatening and cajoling the population; it required the cooperation of other institutions, espe-

cially the Catholic Church. The attitude of the church was complex. It aspired, of course, to convert all Orthodox believers, but its highest authorities had their own understanding as to how conversions should proceed. An 1894 papal encyclical stressed that converts from Orthodoxy should preserve their eastern ritual practices even as they accepted the unity of the church and the authority of the pope. Orthodox believers should be encouraged to accept the universality of the Catholic Church, but should not be instructed to follow the “Latin” or Roman Catholic style of worship. After Polish independence, the Vatican exploited Polish territory as a base for the conversion of the Orthodox in the east. The Jesuit Order was to convert Volhynian Ukrainians to Roman Catholicism, in the guise of a Neo-Union between eastern and western Christianity that would respect traditional liturgy and practices.⁷⁷ This would prepare the way for the future conversion of Ukraine and Russia to Catholicism in an eastern rite. The preferred method was reasoned dialogue, in the anticipation of a political crisis that would destroy the Soviet Union and allow for mass conversions. The Vatican did not believe that eastern-rite believers had to be polonized to join the True Church.⁷⁸ By the late 1930s, however, many if not most Polish bishops had drawn the opposite conclusion, and welcomed state support in creating a Catholic Poland. This did not mean, however, that they endorsed forced conversions.⁷⁹

Within Poland, attitudes varied from bishop to bishop and place to place. The center of the 1938–1939 revindication campaign was west of Volhynia, in the Chełm region, which like Volhynia fell under the purview of the Lublin field command of the Polish army. There the army destroyed some ninety-one churches which had at one time been used by Orthodox believers. In Chełm, where the population was more evenly mixed between Ukrainians and Poles and the contest for souls had a long history, some Roman Catholic priests supported these actions.⁸⁰ In Volhynia, where Orthodox believers were the clear majority, radical views were less in evidence. Polish officers had to ask local Roman Catholic priests for their support. Priests did perform conversion ceremonies, but often without much enthusiasm.⁸¹ Soldiers, meanwhile, were not civil servants, and were often far from civil. Although revindication was meant to create more ethnic Poles, Polish soldiers often refused to accept that converts really were Polish. The commander of the Lublin garrison had to issue a warning in August 1939: “Certain officers and military functionaries, when they come into contact with the Volhynian population, exploit the latter’s passivity and lack of self-awareness, and permit themselves to treat this population in a way most deserving of punishment. Such officers carry out their own national-

ity policy to some groups of citizens, regarding them as an unfriendly and alien element."⁸² Meanwhile, the military hesitated in 1939 about just whom to convert. In practice officers had to decide on the basis of surnames and personal declarations, which led to palpably absurd situations. Here science seemed to offer a solution. The army dispatched teams of researchers to Volhynia to carry out "anthropogeographic" and "ethnosociological" research.⁸³

Revindications were part of a larger plan, with the immediate goal of polonizing the mixed terrains of the Chełm region just west, and the long-term goal of polonizing Volhynia's Ukrainian majority by 1944.⁸⁴ Plans had been made for a new round of colonization by military personnel and Polish military veterans in border zones, and by Polish civilians throughout. Taken together, the anticipated four military and four civilian colonial zones covered much of Volhynia. Military officers also drew up plans for hundreds of new Roman Catholic churches, presumably for further converts as well as colonists. Colonization, like conversion, was planned in the spirit of modern nationalism. Like the National Democrats in the 1920s, the Polish military in the late 1930s associated Polishness with modernity. By the late 1930s, however, the army realized that state intervention was necessary to support both. They were under no illusion that Polish culture could win an unsubsidized competition with Ukrainian culture. The polonization of Volhynia was to be accompanied, in the five-year plan, with massive state investment designed to improve local infrastructure and agriculture, and foster growth across the region.⁸⁵ This was an example of a general turn in Europe towards state intervention in the economy, which sometimes involved (in South Tyrol as in Volhynia) the attempt to change the national composition of a borderland.⁸⁶ The foreign ministry had similar intentions. It had endorsed a private organization called the "Association for the Development of the Eastern Lands" in 1933. Since 1934, the foreign ministry had sponsored studies by a new research commission on the east. The commission aimed to divide the Ukrainian and Belarusian nations into ethnic subgroups whose differences could be accentuated by state intervention, and to identify Poles in the east who would best profit from state subsidies. Like the army, the foreign ministry treated polonization as part of a larger project of state-led modernization. Through 1936, the foreign ministry had ignored Volhynia. After Józewski's removal, there was no barrier to coordinated work between the ministries of defense and foreign affairs.⁸⁷

The defense and foreign ministries had once been Józewski's allies in the Promethean project of undermining Soviet power by exploiting the national question. By the late 1930s these institutions endorsed an entirely different

course of action in Volhynia. Rather than support Ukrainian culture as part of an offensive policy against the Soviet Union, they opposed Ukrainian culture as defensive preparation for an attack from Germany or the Soviet Union. Rather than see the Orthodox Church as an ancient institution that could be modified to serve Polish state interests, they saw it as a fragile entity that could be turned to practically any use. In Volhynia, Józewski's successor, Aleksander Hauke-Nowak, shared in this new consensus. Hauke-Nowak was a veteran of Piłsudski's Legions and an operative of the Second Department, and spoke respectfully of the old Piłsudski-Petliura alliance. He had worked as a specialist in anticommunist measures in the security department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the early 1930s, and at that time his concerns were quite similar to Józewski's. Yet, he noted in February 1939, Józewski's "program had arisen during the period of demo-liberalism, after which has followed a transvaluation of concepts across the world, a transvaluation that continues."⁸⁸ The time for national concessions, and presumably democracy and liberalism, had passed. Hauke denied that Volhynia could ever serve as a staging point for an independence movement in Soviet Ukraine, and presented the Orthodox Church as an instrument to polonize future generations of Ukrainians. For the time being, Polish officials should cease to use the words "Ukraine" and "Ukrainian." This returned the rhetorical practice of the Polish administration to 1925, on the palpably false assumption that Volhynian Ukrainians had not yet developed an understanding of their own national identity. Hauke based his own local rule on the Camp of National Unity, and upon the local Polish minority. He eliminated all state support of Ukrainian institutions.⁸⁹

The reversal of the Volhynia Experiment had unsurprising consequences. After the first revindications, Archbishop Oleksii traveled to the eastern border and urged Ukrainians to remain true to the faith of their fathers.⁹⁰ Local Orthodox priests also reacted with outrage to revindication, one preaching that "the black cloud of persecution looms above the Orthodox Church." Although revindications touched a minority of parishes in Volhynia, no Orthodox priest could imagine that Polish policy was friendly or even neutral. The Orthodox Church was granted a distinction it never sought, the aureole of resistance and martyrdom. Józewski's friend Jerzy Stempowski, who watched the revindications of 1938 and 1939, described a subsequent "renaissance of Orthodoxy."⁹¹ Secular Ukrainian patriots recognized an opportunity to transform religious martyrdom into national rebirth. The OUN saw revindication as an opportunity for the further penetration of Volhynia. As Polish intelligence reported, nationalist activists made their way to villages affected by revindication, and

offered the villagers an alternative: organized terrorist opposition to Polish rule. The message fell on fertile soil. As the Lublin command felt obliged to record in an October 1938 report to Warsaw on the popular mood in Volhynia, a typical comment from a young Ukrainian man was that “we shall decorate pillars with you, and trees with your wives.”⁹²

Yet the revolutionary ferment of Volhynia in the late 1930s most served Volhynia’s native radical party: the Communist Party of West Ukraine. Warsaw’s new modernization projects, quite radical in some ways, could be portrayed as insufficiently radical to save the peasants and working class. The project of state-led modernization advanced by Piłsudski’s successors, communists argued, was a pale shadow of what they had proposed all along. In the east, they could claim that Warsaw’s science of society was elitist and nationalist, and thus far less attractive and appropriate than the communist version on offer to Ukrainians in Volhynia. No amount of conversion or colonization would change the basic fact that Volhynia was massively Ukrainian by population, so Poland’s new policy could only favor a minority. Ukrainian communists could promise both land and national culture to Volhynia’s majority. Polish policy of the late 1930s identified Polishness with noble status and Roman Catholic religion: petty nobles were to become Roman Catholics, and thus Poles. This was grist for the mill of communist propaganda, which portrayed Poles as a noble and Catholic nation that exploited the Orthodox Ukrainian peasantry.

Nothing prevented the communists from presenting themselves as defenders of the Ukrainian character of the Orthodox Church, and atheists led some of the protests against revindication. An October 1938 letter from the Communist Party of West Ukraine protesting the closing of Orthodox churches presented communists as “the last defenders of the national masses.”⁹³ When Józewski had arrived in Volhynia ten years before, revindication of church properties had provided an occasion for Bolshevik agitators, such as those he found in that freezing church in Zabrze. After his departure, the army’s attempt to revindicate souls left Ukrainian society vulnerable again to communist agitation. Ten years of labor to moderate modernity and normalize nationalism, to build a Ukrainian society loyal to a strong Polish state, were quickly undone. In 1939, the Camp of National Unity promised a “Polish revolution” in Volhynia. Ukrainian communists and nationalists prepared revolutions of their own. The final act of Polish policy was the revindication of the last Orthodox church in Luck.⁹⁴ This was August 1939.

This page intentionally left blank

Part Three **The Local**
World War

This page intentionally left blank

Chapter 9 Glass Houses

In 1939, Józewski was no longer governor of Volhynia, and was finding his way as governor of the Łódź province in central Poland. In the bustling industrial city, Józewski confronted new challenges of government. Józewski busied himself for the first time with a real proletariat, inspecting local factories, and initiating a plan to guarantee worker vacations.¹ Perhaps 37% of Łódź's population were Jews. Two districts of the center were inhabited mostly by Jews, and most of the city's Jews lived in these districts.² Some of the great industrial families were Jewish. The Poznański family had built four urban palaces; Józewski would have known this, as his office rented one of them.³ Julian Tuwim, the most beloved Polish poet of the twentieth century, was raised in an assimilated Jewish family in Łódź. Tuwim was the most famous of a group of modernist poets known as the Skamandrites, with whom Józewski was friendly from his years in Warsaw. These friendships had arisen in a cosmopolitan milieu in which questions of race were beside the point. In the Łódź of the late 1930s, however, racial thinking was unavoidable. Poles and Jews lived alongside Germans, and after 1933 had to contemplate Nazi Germany.

Nazi racial ideas found resonance among local Germans.⁴ It was in Łódź that Józewski began to regard Germany as a threat. In summer 1939 he inspired the publication of the journal *Voice of Truth*, designed to counter Nazi propaganda.⁵

Yet there was no policy toward Łódź Jews comparable to the Volhynia Experiment. Here as elsewhere, Polish authorities had supported the traditional Jews of Agudas Israel, in the hopes of marginalizing secular Jewish parties.⁶ Yet Agudas Israel was undercut by Polish laws that were anti-Semitic in intent: the restrictions on ritual slaughter introduced in 1936, and a 1938 law requiring lawyers to be registered by the state. Jewish voters in Łódź had moved to the left, as city elections of 1936 and 1938 demonstrated. More than half of the Jewish councillors elected were revolutionaries.⁷ As Jewish politics moved to the left, Polish leaders looked to the Jewish Right. The Polish government looked upon the Revisionist Zionist project with sympathy.⁸ Józewski did not regard the prospect of a population transfer to Palestine with relish. His sympathy for Zionism seems rather to have arisen from sympathy for national causes, and from a personal foreboding of disaster. Józewski regarded Vladimir Jabotinsky, the Revisionist Zionist leader, as a Jewish counterpart to Piłsudski and Petliura.⁹ Both Jabotinsky and Piłsudski had worked with Petliura, and had been among his most prominent mourners.¹⁰ For Józewski, Jabotinsky was “an apostle of the Jewish world, calling out for rescue.”¹¹

SUMMER 1939

That summer, Józewski and his friends gathered as usual for a few weeks of vacation, this time not in Italy or in Volhynia, but in his new modern palace. Although he had been governor of the Łódź region for but fifteen months, Józewski had contrived to design and build a spectacular summer house in the Silesian village of Jaworze. The interior walls were plastered in a shade of pink Józewski had admired in Italy, and the exterior was adorned by a Gothic tower, complete with a folk representation of a knight on horseback. The greatest peculiarity of the house, as Maria Dąbrowska recalled it, was that one side was entirely of glass. The glass house, a universal reference, had a particular meaning in the Polish culture of the day. Józewski's painterly summer house was, among other things, a literary reference Dąbrowska could not have failed to understand.

In Stefan Żeromski's fine novel of the birth of Polish independence, *The Spring to Come*, the protagonist's father imagines, from deep within the Russian



Figure 16. Józefowski's villa in Jaworze, 1939. Zbigniew Chomicz.

Empire, that the new Poland will be adorned by glass houses. His wife is killed by revolutionaries, and he and his son journey from the Caucasus to Poland by train. The father perishes before they reach the border. The son, Cezary Baryka, is disappointed by the Poland he finds after 1918, and sympathizes with revolutionaries who wish to begin anew. Baryka was a potent symbol in interwar Poland, of the young Polish hero torn between the patient creation of a Polish state and the impatient hope for revolution. He was especially crucial for men such as Józefowski, whose generation was increasingly divided between those who had succumbed to the siren song of the Left that all could be begun again; and those who had yielded to the comforting chorus of the nationalist Right, that all was not yet lost. Two decades of independence had not resolved Poland's problems. As the literary Baryka found when he reached Poland, there were no glass houses. So Józefowski chose to live in one, in Poland's last summer.

Franco was triumphant in Spain. Hitler had absorbed Austria and dismembered Czechoslovakia. Germany, Italy, and Japan had formed their Axis. Germany had renounced its nonaggression pact with Poland. The painter and the novelist tried to make grass grow on the roof, so that they could sunbathe. "The

prospect of war is so near: this could be life's last country holiday!" wrote Dąbrowska in her diary.¹² War came six weeks later. On 1 September 1939, the German army breached Poland's western frontier in a massive and rapid assault. Józewski was ordered east to familiar Łuck. He left at the last moment. Like hundreds of thousands of others, he fled east before the Germans. In Łuck, he declined to be evacuated across the border into Romania along with the Polish government. He meant to stay in Poland, come what may, and had another plan. He would organize the peasants of Volhynia into partisan units and fight the Germans. He quickly gained the official endorsement of departing government officials. The director of state forests attached ministerial seals to a letter of support written on his wife's handkerchief. Józewski made his way north to Pińsk, where he won the support of the commander of the local fleet. He found a friendly engineer to draw the maps. He fell to sleep, exhausted, on a pile of hay, in the early morning hours of 17 September, 1939.

Józewski awoke to learn that the Red Army had crossed Poland's eastern border. It was treachery that few had expected. Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union had recently signed a surprising nonaggression pact, but few imagined that their cooperation would proceed as far as a joint invasion of Poland. Poland's intelligence services, which had been rendered all but useless on Soviet terrain by the late 1930s, had given no warning. The German attack sixteen days earlier had nullified almost all Polish preparations for a Soviet attack. Troops had been diverted west. The Border Defense Corps was not meant to face the Red Army alone, even at full strength, and many of its men had been sent to the west. Even the civilians trained for diversionary operations against the Red Army had been transferred west. Poland was losing the war with Germany, and now had been attacked by its other great neighbor. As Józewski instantly grasped, it was one thing to rally Volhynian peasants against Nazis, another to arm them as the Soviets arrived: "Everything was finished. There could be no further talk of partisan operations." He climbed into his enormous black Buick and headed back west. The local peasants were already looking differently at him, a Polish gentleman in a big car. He ran out of gas, and filled his tank with alcohol. Making haste, fearing for his life, he still noted his impressions of the scene: "my route took me through the boundless Polesian marshes, forests, swamps, mud, through a Polish jungle resonating with the approach of the German and Soviet fronts. I encountered the strangest of personages: little groups of intellectuals perorating on politics in the woods, smaller and larger army units that had lost their way; I even met a column of criminals, marching

along in a relaxed way, having been released from one of the provincial prisons.”¹³

REVOLUTION

Lavrentii Beriia, the Soviet commissar for internal affairs, had ordered on 15 September 1939 that all political prisoners be released from Polish prisons. The moment awaited by the communist political prisoners in Volhynia, their liberation by Soviet forces, had arrived. Their personal triumph served a propaganda campaign that presented the Soviet invasion of Poland as national justice for Ukrainians. A Ukrainian general led the Soviet troops who pressed into Volhynia and Galicia, fighting on what they called the Ukrainian Front. With Polish forces retreating in disorder before the Germans, and with much of Poland's eastern population welcoming the Soviet advance, little organized resistance was possible. By the afternoon of 18 September 1939, Soviet tanks rolled into Luck, defeating Polish resistance and taking nine thousand prisoners. As the Red Army moved into the smaller towns, it clarified its political profile. Units were to enter towns with bands playing the Internationale, but to sing it in Ukrainian. Soldiers were to present themselves as liberating Ukrainians from Polish oppression. In the terrain, there were already Volhynian communists familiar with this refrain, who believed it with a sincerity alien to their allies from the east. Local communists disarmed Polish soldiers and policemen, and turned their new weapons on the Polish population.¹⁴ For the first few days of the Soviet occupation, local communists (and people bearing grudges) carried out a murderous riot of their own, killing landholders, officials, policemen, and disarmed soldiers.¹⁵ The Red Army's political officers explained that this was a result of enemy work, and not at all part of the plan. The chaos was to be halted by the rapid establishment of a civilian administration.¹⁶ In Volhynia, the civilian administration was recruited, at first, from members of the Communist Party of West Ukraine.¹⁷

The reversal of the prewar power structure was perfect. The Soviet NKVD arrested Polish officials and placed them in cells formerly occupied by communists. The NKVD released political prisoners, and placed them in offices formerly occupied by state officials. Throughout Volhynia, former prisoners, Ukrainian and Jewish communists, were placed in charge of the local councils, called soviets.¹⁸ As one of them recalled, “All of the former West Ukrainian Communist Party activists who had been in Polish prisons for communism and

who were even somewhat literate began to seize for themselves positions in the administration.”¹⁹ In autumn 1939, the NKVD used the new local councils and administration to destroy the social order established under Polish rule. Poles had been the only element trusted to hold state office; now they were expelled from positions of authority. Almost all policemen had been Polish; now almost none were. Local Ukrainians and Jews made up the new militias. Polish military colonists had been invited to Volhynia to secure the border against a Soviet intervention; now that the intervention had arrived, they lost their land. When colonists asked why they were arrested and expropriated, NKVD men responded: “We remember 1920,” the year of Poland’s March on Kyïv, “very well.”²⁰ Ukrainian peasants were sometimes eager to take land from Poles, but sometimes had to be cajoled or even forced to do so.²¹ Poles had been the political class; now they were subjected to ritual political humiliation. They had to attend mass meetings that denounced Polish rule, watch as the public space was filled with Soviet propaganda, and then vote on 22 October 1939 for the communist slate of candidates and the annexation of Volhynia by Soviet Ukraine.²² Local communists formed the electoral councils that helped to organize the fixed elections and the fraudulent referendum that joined Poland’s former Volhynian and Galician districts to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.²³

In a few weeks, a world had been turned upside down. People were forced to endorse the end of an order and an age. As one Pole recalled, “My grandfather was murdered in the [1863] uprising against Tsarist Russia. My father was devoted, heart and soul, to our fatherland, to Poland. I fought for independence in 1918–1920 and [now I have] voted for the tearing away of part of Poland and its connection to Russia. Whoever reads this declaration, please believe me when I say that if burning iron were placed against my body I would suffer less than I did then.”²⁴ During the electoral campaign, a few Poles in Łuck put up anti-Soviet election posters of their own, and two Poles went looking for Józewski in the German occupation zone, to persuade him to return to Volhynia and lead the resistance.²⁵ It was too late. The veteran anticommunist was too canny to have remained, and surely would not have returned to a Volhynia that was becoming Soviet. The new assembly endorsed the annexation of Volhynia and Galicia by the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, which is to say by the Soviet Union. The new political order, staffed from early 1940 mainly by cadres from the east, continued the revolution.

Polish citizens were physically removed from Volhynia, deported to Kazakhstan and Siberia. A first deportation action (initiated 10 February 1940) targeted colonists and foresters; a second (13 April 1940) government officials and

prisoners of war; and a third (29 June 1940) refugees from other parts of occupied Poland, most of them Jews; and a fourth (20 May 1941) all members of any of the above groups, as well as Ukrainian nationalists. About 40,000 people, most of them Poles, were forced from their homes in Volhynia and sent east in these four actions.²⁶ All in all, some 292,513 Polish citizens were deported in four waves from the former eastern districts of Poland, and tens of thousands more were transported as criminals or in border-cleansing actions.²⁷ Poland's former east, now the Soviet far west, became the center of gravity of Soviet repression.²⁸ The NKVD made more arrests in the former eastern Poland than in the rest of the Soviet Union in 1939–1941. In Volhynia, the deportees represented about an eighth of the total Polish population. If the number of local Poles imprisoned or executed is added, the number rises to perhaps 45,000, the proportion to about one in seven.²⁹ In addition, in March 1940, Stalin signed the death warrant of 21,857 captured Polish officers, who were executed in April and May 1940 at three sites, most famously at Katyn' near Smolensk. Many of these were eastern Poles; roughly ten percent were Polish Jews. One murdered officer was General Mieczysław Smorawiński of the Lublin field command, Józewski's opponent in Volhynian policy. Even after the selection and murder of officers, tens of thousands of Polish soldiers were held in work camps, thirty-two of which were located in Volhynia. When these camps were evacuated to the east in June 1941, perhaps ten percent of the prisoners of war perished in death marches.³⁰

These policies in the new Soviet western frontier in 1939–1941, shocking as they were to their victims, were in one sense gentler than the Soviet approach to the Polish question in 1937–1938. In occupied eastern Poland in 1939–1941, perhaps 25% of those arrested were executed (20,000–30,000), and mortality rates of deportees were about 3% during the physical transfer, and 6% during the first year in exile. To these deaths must be added murdered officers and prisoners of war who were worked to death. Perhaps 500,000 Polish citizens in all were arrested, deported, or otherwise repressed after the annexation of eastern Poland, of whom perhaps 400,000 survived. The absolute total of Polish deaths as a result of Soviet repression in 1937–1938 and 1939–1941 is thus comparable: about 100,000 in each case. The mortality rate of the repressed, however, had improved radically. About four in five repressed in 1937–1938 were executed; no fewer than four in five repressed in 1939–1941 survived. Against the background of Soviet policies towards Poles during the Great Terror of 1937–1938, two changes must be noted. The Great Terror, of which the Polish action had been the single most frightful episode, had ended by 1939; and by 1939 Poland,

too, had passed. After Stalin collaborated with Hitler to destroy the Polish state, Poles themselves could hardly be seen as the same kind of threat to the Soviet Union. The previous scenario of a Polish-German secret alliance made even less sense after Poland had been destroyed as a state, and while the Soviet Union was in effect allied with Nazi Germany. Even the Stalinist imagination had limits. In 1939–1941, Poles could be seen as the least reliable element in the new Soviet western borderlands, but they could no longer be presented as agents of a hostile sovereign state. When interrogated, Polish officers were still asked if they belonged to the “Polish Military Organization,” but the exaggerated contortions of the Terror had come to an end. Most Polish elites were deported or shot, and that was generally enough.

Attempts to create a Polish underground polity and army in eastern Poland were discovered by the Soviets. (Polish soldiers who went east to the prewar Soviet Union were perhaps safer than those who remained at home.)³¹ Conspiracies that worked against the Gestapo typically failed against the NKVD. Polish underground emissaries sent from the German to the Soviet occupation zone were arrested. Of sixty-eight sent from the German to the Soviet zones, only sixteen returned having completed their mission. The Polish underground in Volhynia was broken by NKVD arrests during the first three months of 1940. The designers of prewar intelligence policies in the east, Jerzy Niezbrzycki for example, soon found themselves refugees in the West. (Ironically, successful Polish intelligence operations in the east were now run by veterans of the Western Section of the Intelligence Bureau of the Second Department—in cooperation with the Japanese.)³²

Poles were a minority in the east, their elites had been deported or killed, their soldiers were held in camps. Yet the NKVD, as later events would prove, was more successful than the Gestapo against Polish conspiracy not only in the east but in every part of Poland. Part of the difference was a kind of institutionalized humility. The Soviet state police was founded by professional conspirators, people who knew that the police could be fooled; the Gestapo was directed by believers in German racial superiority, and operated in an environment where racial difference was constantly stressed. In addition, the NKVD's operations were different. The Soviets preferred patient penetration and mass arrests of opponents; the Germans swift reaction and mass executions of civilians. While the Germans made lists of people to be executed in case of subversive actions, the Soviets made lists of informers. As German reprisals grew more massive, some Poles began to reason that life underground made as much sense as life in the open, since one could be executed for someone else's actions in any

event. In the Soviet zone, informants believed that, by their actions, they might avoid arrest and deportations themselves.³³

The revolution, spearheaded by the NKVD, aimed to destroy the previous ruling class in order to preserve the security of the Soviet state. The transformation of Volhynian society was also presented as a national liberation for Ukrainians, but in fact it provided only the barest semblance of representation for the Ukrainian majority in Volhynia. As Soviet cadres from the east assumed control over local policy after December 1939, Volhynian Ukrainians, including devoted communists, had reason to reflect. The expropriation of Poles had been a popular policy, but it was accompanied by requisitions from all farmers, and followed in 1940 by the beginnings of a new policy of collectivization. The sequence of Soviet agricultural policies of the 1920s and 1930s—first the distribution of land to gain popularity, then collectivization to gain power—was followed, at an accelerated tempo. Collectivization began in Volhynia in earnest in March 1940, and ten to twenty percent of Volhynian farmland was collectivized by spring 1941.³⁴ The deportations of the Polish colonists had appealed to some: one local council had moved that all colonists be murdered on the spot. Some Ukrainians came to steal when Poles were deported, but others came to say farewell.³⁵ Yet deportation as a policy lost its appeal over time, as more Ukrainians were sent east for nationalism, especially in the fourth wave of deportations in spring 1941. Some had believed that the annexation of Volhynia by Soviet Ukraine would mean national independence, but they were usually disabused of that illusion. The Soviet Union offered a unit, Soviet Ukraine, with boundaries that now embraced almost all Ukrainians. It did not offer sovereignty to Ukrainians as a group, or representation to Ukrainians as individuals. With time, this was understood.

Volhynian communists, with their own revolutionary traditions, were sometimes disappointed with the reality of Soviet rule. Having spent the 1930s protesting Polish electoral abuses, which were especially flagrant in Volhynia, local communists were disappointed by the ritual character of Soviet voting practices. They believed, with some justice, that they could win free elections; but of course free elections were unthinkable in the Soviet Union. Volhynian communists were also disturbed by the appearance and the comportment of cadres from the east. Members of a traditional society, Volhynian Ukrainians could be shocked by drunkenness and rape. Educated themselves in decent schools, and often well read from time spent in Polish prisons, they were stunned that Soviet commissars had no understanding of Marx. Many native communists saw that the revolution had not resolved the two great questions

exploited by Leninist propaganda: land hunger and national self-determination.³⁶ This disappointment favored the communists' old rival and sometime ally, Ukrainian nationalism. In Volhynia, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists had always proposed a program of national and social liberation similar to that of the communists. Its revolutionary program, unlike the communists', was untainted by association with Soviet rule. The OUN secured its foothold in Volhynia under Soviet occupation. It had replaced the Polish underground as the main object of interest of the NKVD by the middle of 1940, and carried out acts of terror against local soviets, almost certainly with German backing, in spring 1941.³⁷

HOLOCAUST

When Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union invaded and divided Poland in September 1939, Poland's Jews had been divided, it appeared, into two communities of fate. The Jews of Łódź along with those of Warsaw and Cracow fell under German occupation; the Jews of Volhynia along with those of Galicia and Belarus under Soviet occupation. About 200,000 Jews, including tens of thousands of Jews from Łódź, fled east from the Germans in September 1939. Jews who remained behind were closed in ghettos; the Łódź ghetto was established on 10 December 1939. Jews who fled east joined a native Jewish population of about 1.2 million in the Soviet zone of occupation, in lands that had been eastern Poland.³⁸ Many Łódź Jews, such as Joel Cygielman, made their way to Volhynia. Cygielman had his own car, and drove from Łódź to the village of Dąbrowica. There he allowed some local Jews to persuade him to drive to Sarny to greet the Red Army. The Red Army was a pathetic sight, and the car's engines frightened away columns of soldiers. Upon reaching Sarny, Cygielman was hailed by a Red Army officer with a grenade in hand, who stole his car.³⁹ This, in a few hours, presaged the tone of the twenty-two months of Soviet occupation: it brought hope to some, material loss to most, and disappointment to almost everyone. It saved Jews from the Germans: for a time.

On 22 June 1941, the German army began another eastward march. Hitler had betrayed his Soviet ally, and ordered Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union. Volhynia was now the front line of a new war. The Luftwaffe bombed Łuck on the first day of hostilities. Special task forces, the *Einsatzgruppen*, followed the German army east, under orders to shoot communists and Jews.⁴⁰ In Volhynia, *Einsatzgruppe C* tried to induce the local population to kill Jews and communists in "self-cleansing" pogroms. The Germans presented themselves as liberators from Soviet tyranny, and told Ukrainians and Poles

that the Jews had been the cause of their woe under the Soviet occupation. German propaganda exploited the murder of political prisoners by the NKVD, presenting it as a crime of Jews upon Ukrainians. The NKVD, of course, had been composed of personnel from the east, not of locals. Communism in Volhynia had always been a joint project of Ukrainians and Jews. Whether the Germans understood this or not, their propaganda implicitly exonerated Ukrainians from participation in the Soviet occupation. It seems entirely possible that one Ukrainian motivation for murdering Jews in Volhynia was to prove that one had had nothing to do with the Soviet occupation. After all, Ukrainian collaborators in Soviet organs must have been more numerous than Jews.

This German “self-cleansing” experiment led to pogroms in a broad arc of territory from the Baltic to Bukovina.⁴¹ In Volhynia, the most deadly pogrom was apparently in Krzemieniec, where the NKVD had murdered 100–150 prisoners before departing in haste, and where the disinterred bodies revealed signs of torture. Here the local population killed about 130 Jews. In Łuck the NKVD machine-gunned its prisoners after a revolt, leaving behind 2,800 corpses. *Sonderkommando 4a* reported that it had organized the murder of 2,000 Jews as retribution.⁴² These actions ranged across a spectrum in which, at one extreme, the local population killed Jews with (and sometimes without) the help of the Germans and, at the other, the Germans killed Volhynian Jews hoping to gain the support of the local population. In summer 1941, however, the vast majority of the murder was committed by the Germans themselves. In June and July 1941, the German police and the SS killed about 12,000 Volhynian Jews, mostly but by no means entirely young men.⁴³ Local participation in the mass murder was, however, an important step downward in the decline of local social ethics. Under Soviet occupation, Polish elites, and in some measure Poles as such, had been treated as an underclass, subject to repression and execution. Non-Poles took some part in these repressions, and profited from deportations by receiving land. This was a blow to traditional social solidarity, which, despite the decline of the late 1930s, still existed in 1939. In 1941, the Germans treated Jews as completely outside the sphere of law and social concern. Some locals took part in murders, others profited by taking property. It would be too much to say that trust between Volhynia’s national communities had completely disappeared by summer 1941. Nevertheless, Jews generally believed, after the pogroms, that they were isolated.

In autumn 1941, the Germans killed 20,000 more Volhynian Jews, about 15,000 of them in Równe, which became the administrative center of the occupation zone known as the Reichskommissariat Ukraine.⁴⁴ These death tolls, high as they were, remained lower in Volhynia than in Ukrainian lands further

east. The front had passed through Volhynia very quickly, before the killing of Jews had become (in September 1941) a policy of total annihilation. Thereafter Jewish communities were simply eliminated: Berdychiv on 12 September, Vinnytsia on 19 September, Kyiv on 29–30 September, Dnipropetrovsk on 13 October. In Volhynia, some semblance of Jewish life remained, and some shadow of Jewish social order could return.⁴⁵ The Reichskommissariat appointed Ukrainians to the local administration, and revived the Jewish commune as a means of controlling surviving Jews and extracting their wealth and labor.⁴⁶ German policemen and their ever more numerous Ukrainian auxiliaries established ghettos. In Volhynia, perhaps 12,000 local Ukrainians collaborated with the German police.

In towns, the construction of ghettos meant expulsions from homes and the erection of barriers; in villages Jews were banned from leaving their place of residence.⁴⁷ During the first half of 1942, epidemics raged through the overcrowded Volhynian ghettos. Jews began to starve to death; people who tried to bring food from the outside were killed by the Germans.⁴⁸ Jews were also worked to death. All Jews between the ages of fourteen and sixty were subject to slave labor; any Jew found beyond the ghetto not engaged in slave labor was to be shot. The Jewish police collected money, organized forced labor, and prevented escape. The Ukrainian and German police guarded the ghetto. Even in these circumstances, communes continued to care for their members, trying to move clinics into the ghettos, and appealing to the Germans to restrain their demands for labor. As late as May 1942, after two-thirds of Równe's Jews had been killed, its communal authorities still tried to negotiate with local authorities so that survivors could preserve some means of subsistence.⁴⁹

By that time a second sweep of mass murder had begun. Its initial purpose was to kill all Jews deemed unfit for labor: it quickly became a policy of annihilation. Between April and July 1942 another 30,000 or so Volhynian Jews were shot in death pits by German security police, with the help of Ukrainian policemen. In late August 1942, the local German administration learned that all remaining Jews were to be killed.⁵⁰ In the next three months, about 150,000 more Jews were murdered in Volhynia.⁵¹ Entire Jewish communities were shot in death pits near their homes.⁵² From Łuck the Jews were driven about seven kilometers to the woods of Górki Polanki, where pits had already been dug. They were forced to strip and lie face down in the pits. There they were shot to death, or buried alive if they survived the first salvo. So perished about 17,000 Jews.⁵³ The last Jews of Równe were murdered in the same way, in woods near Kostopol.⁵⁴ By the end of the year, the Jewish population of Volhynia had been

almost completely exterminated.⁵⁵ As elsewhere on the Eastern Front, the Holocaust in Ukraine was a public affair. Jews had few illusions about what would happen to them. Everyone in Volhynia watched.

KULTURTRÄGER

Whereas the rhetoric of Soviet occupation had been one of the equality of nations, the Germans presented themselves as racial masters. Unlike Soviet Ukraine, the Reichskommissariat Ukraine was not even a facsimile of an independent state. It was an occupation zone. It excluded Galicia, a territory that any Ukrainian nationalist would have regarded as essential. Galician Ukrainian nationalists had been sent by German authorities to establish local councils and police forces during the first days of the invasion.⁵⁶ Yet when leading Ukrainian nationalists announced the creation of a Ukrainian state to fight the Bolsheviks as a German ally, the Germans arrested them. Ukrainians were treated with lesser savagery than Jews, Russians, and Poles; the army usually killed non-Ukrainians in reprisals.⁵⁷ Yet the civilian authority, the Reichskommissariat, was a machine of exploitation. It had no representative bodies for national groups, and no channels of communication with the population. It preserved some of the most hated aspects of Soviet rule. The Germans took nationalized property in towns for their own use. Collective farms were preserved. Soviet laws on taxation were kept on the books, and those who failed to pay taxes were treated as saboteurs, which meant that they were subject to execution.⁵⁸ Soviet-era judges were retained.⁵⁹ The Germans collected radios (as had the Soviets), and even tried to requisition bicycles and typewriters.⁶⁰ Like the Soviets, the Germans registered the entire population as best they could, taking careful note of nationality.⁶¹ Whereas the Soviets had introduced massive repressions, they at least treated West Ukraine as part of their country, and its population as Soviet citizens. The German occupation authority regarded the Ukrainian population as a natural resource to be exploited. As a Jew who fled Ukrainian policemen recalled, “the Ukrainians were also persecuted by the Germans.”⁶²

The Germans described their occupation as exemplary of the high standards of Europe. In Ukrainian, as in German, the word “culture” connotes exemplary behavior as well as attainment; in Ukraine, the constant German claim to represent culture was in surreal contrast to German practices. The Poles (until 1938) and the Soviets, whatever their political motives, had declaratively supported Ukrainian culture. The Germans expected Ukrainians to work the land,

and eliminated education beyond the fourth grade. On his hunting trips, Józewski had spoken Ukrainian with the local population near his provincial capital of Łuck; Erich Koch, the Reichskommissar, deported thousands of Ukrainians so that he could create a private game reserve near his administrative center at Równe. In Równe, the Germans entertained themselves with music, as they implemented policies of the basest nature before the eyes of the local population. As the German army prepared for its "Culture Week" in spring 1942, Soviet prisoners of war were starving to death in the tens of thousands in a nearby camp. Four weeks after Culture Week, which included recitals of Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, Wagner, and Liszt, the SS and the police liquidated the ghetto in Równe, killing the Jews in plain sight not far from the city. After the German army's stunning defeat at Stalingrad in February 1943, the entertainment took on a lighter tone: an evening affair of April 1943 included accordionists and a clown, and the Harvest Festival of October 1943 featured the girls' choir of the local Hitler Youth. By then, Ukrainians were rebelling in the countryside. The German chief of antipartisan operations, Erich von dem Bach, tried to call them to reason in the name of "the great and ancient culture of Europe."⁶³ The leader of the Ukrainian nationalist rebellion, Roman Shukhevych, had served under Bach until late 1942.⁶⁴ Presumably Shukhevych had already learned his lesson about European culture, as he and his men helped the Germans to murder Jews, communists, and others defined as enemies.

By their actions, the Germans taught Ukrainians that culture was nothing more than the power to give orders, a power Germans derived in Ukraine from their victory over the Soviets. As time passed, Ukrainians in Volhynia had reason to ask themselves if the German claim that "Soviet power has perished and can never return" was true, if Germans would be the masters of violence for much longer.⁶⁵ Reichskommissar Koch had called upon the Ukrainian population to make great sacrifices in the name of gratitude for liberation from the Soviets, claiming that "a new era of peace and prosperity" would follow the German victory. A few Ukrainians must have shaken their heads when the Ukrainian mayor of Równe came begging for winter clothing for the German army in December 1941.⁶⁶ By September 1942, the Równe county commissar's claim that "the invincible Wehrmacht has driven the Bolshevik enemy from this land" was far less persuasive than it might have been a year before.⁶⁷ By then, Soviet partisans had already been spotted in Volhynia. Meanwhile, German requisitions increased. From August 1942, foodstuffs from the Reichskommissariat Ukraine were directed westward, to mitigate an anticipated food

crisis in Germany.⁶⁸ Labor service then became obligatory, at first for young men, and eventually for all men.⁶⁹ Ukrainian policemen were expected to collect the grain and the laborers, tasks they found increasingly distasteful. Like the general population, these twelve thousand or so Ukrainian policemen had good reason to ask themselves how they might prepare for a future without the Germans.

UKRAINIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

Even after the revindications of 1938–1939 and even after three years of occupation by two totalitarian regimes, Volhynia still bore some traces of Polish rule and the Volhynia Experiment. Józewski's initial plans to raise partisan brigades in Polesie had at least one echo. Taras Borovets' was too young to have taken part in the Polish-Bolshevik War, but as a Ukrainian who came of age under Józewski's rule, he learned of the Petliurite legend and made it his own. He hailed from northeastern Volhynia, just a few miles from the Soviet border, and heard of the horrors of collectivization. Although he had his troubles with the law in Poland, Borovets' also took part (knowingly or unknowingly) in Polish contingency plans for a preventive war with the Soviet Union. He took orders from General Volodymyr Sal's'kyi, minister of defense of the Ukrainian People's Republic. General Sal's'kyi, himself a native of Volhynia, had interpreted the Volhynia Experiment as a way to draw Volhynian recruits to his army for a future war with the Soviet Union.⁷⁰ Borovets' was one of those recruits. In Volhynia his contacts were Ukrainian intelligence officers employed by Poland and sheltered by Józewski's Volhynia Experiment. Borovets' founded a political group associated with the Ukrainian People's Republic, and prepared his followers for an insurrection. His group released Ukrainian People's Republic propaganda funded by Poland into Soviet Ukraine—by way of bottles and balloons. They also collected evidence of the famine on the Soviet side of the border. In 1939 in Warsaw, after the joint Nazi-Soviet invasion of Poland, he made contact with Ukrainian People's Republic military men, contract officers in the Polish army.

The premise of Polish cooperation with the Ukrainian People's Republic was that Ukrainians would aid Poles in a future war with the Soviet Union. The Nazi-Soviet invasion of 1939 all but removed the Polish army from this equation. Although some of Poland's Promethean allies were attracted by German power, others remained loyal despite Poland's defeat.⁷¹ The Ukrainian People's Republic dispatched Borovets' to Volhynia in summer 1941, just after the Ger-

man invasion of the Soviet Union, to organize a partisan force that would fight for Ukrainian independence. It is unclear whether those who organized this expedition were collaborating with the Germans, although this is certainly possible.⁷² The Ukrainian People's Republic continued to treat the Soviet Union, rather than Germany, as the major enemy of Ukrainian independence. Borovets' did create a partisan organization, and managed to make the Germans respect his local authority in a small area of the Polesian swamps. He established his group with German acquiescence in autumn 1941, before the Germans set up a civilian administration in his remote district, on the understanding that he would fight Soviet partisans. He seems to have done so, and evidently his group handed over captured partisans and (more than likely) Jews to the Germans.⁷³ By November he had established his own autonomy and taken his group underground. His operations were now illegal, from the German perspective. Henceforth the Germans would try to bring Borovets' within their command structure, without success. He made his headquarters in Olevs'k, the town where the army of the Ukrainian People's Republic had made its tragic last stand in the Winter March of November 1921.⁷⁴

The Soviets returned to the area. By August 1942, Borovets' was forced to share northeastern Volhynia with Soviet partisans making raids behind German lines, and he arranged a truce with them that September.⁷⁵ Soviet partisans began to draw native Volhynians into their ranks, including a few Jewish survivors and hundreds of local Ukrainians.⁷⁶ Their success disquieted Borovets' and alarmed the local leaders of another Ukrainian group, the OUN. The nationalist Right had been less important than the far Left (the communists) and the Center (the Petliurites) in prewar Volhynia, but Ukrainian nationalists saw the world war as their great chance. Having provided men for special units of the German army and having helped establish the German administration in Ukraine, Ukrainian nationalist leaders hoped to gain something in return, at the very least training and weapons. The OUN was divided into two fractions, led by Andrii Mel'nyk and Stepan Bandera, who disagreed about the calculations of collaboration. In practice, local leaders of each of the two fractions were usually required to make rapid judgments in response to local circumstances. In Volhynia in late 1942, Ukrainian nationalists saw that the communists and the Petliurites were each represented by a partisan force. They also observed as the Polish underground, rather weak during the Soviet occupation, returned to Volhynia.⁷⁷ All of this militated for haste. The nationalists had wanted Ukrainian policemen to remain in the German service until the last possible moment, and then fight for Ukrainian independence.⁷⁸ As the

German army was bogged down near Stalingrad, nationalists feared mass defections of the Ukrainian policemen to the Soviet partisans. At a critical moment in early 1943, a Soviet provocation led the Germans to retaliate against some of the Ukrainians in their police force.⁷⁹ Feeling the pressure of the moment, and seeing their opportunity, nationalists established in March 1943 a third Ukrainian partisan force in Volhynia, drawn from the ranks of policemen withdrawing from German service. Ukrainians who refused to leave the police and join the nationalist partisans were threatened with death via “revolutionary tribunals.”⁸⁰ One nationalist reckoned that half of the partisans who joined in these first few weeks were coerced.⁸¹

Negotiations in April and May 1943 between the Ukrainian People's Republic partisans of Taras Borovets' and the OUN partisans of Stepan Bandera (led in Volhynia at the time by Mykola Lebed') brought agreement in principle to merge, but disagreement on two fundamental points. Borovets' continued to treat the Ukrainian People's Republic as the state entity to which all Ukrainians should be loyal, regardless of particular party loyalties. He saw the OUN as one party among others. The Ukrainian nationalists believed that the OUN was a kind of proto-state commanding the obedience of all Ukrainians, and did not recognize the Ukrainian People's Republic as the legal continuation of an earlier Ukrainian state. Each organization tried to define itself as transcending politics, and the other as a mere political organization. Second, Borovets' seems to have opposed the ethnic cleansing of Poles from Volhynia, which his interlocutors apparently advanced as a joint project.⁸² In conditions of war, the more radical position prevailed. The nationalists kept the name of Borovets' partisan force, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). They forced or persuaded many of his men to serve in their ranks. In August 1943, they arrested Borovets' staff officers and his (Czech) wife, whom they tortured and killed. By September some of his forces had been dispersed, and the rest absorbed by the new nationalist Ukrainian Insurgent Army.⁸³

VOLHYNIAN REVOLUTION

The Ukrainian People's Republic in exile stood for legal state continuity and political compromise with Warsaw, and Volhynia under Józewski had been its stronghold. In 1943, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army brought Volhynia the completely different politics of nationalist revolution. It was a revolution of rising national expectations, and of mounting material misery. Volhynian Ukrainians had been teased by promises of independence since Józewski had become the

regional governor in 1928, and had watched as outsiders—Poles, Soviets, Germans—failed to deliver on their promises. Most Volhynian Ukrainian peasants lived in destitution under Poland, some lost their land under the Soviets, and many were driven to desperation by the Germans. Increased requisitions and manhunts deprived families of the means of subsistence. The extermination of the Jewish population ended the contact of Ukrainian farmers with legal and black markets.⁸⁴

Independence and land had been the political slogans of radicals in Volhynia for a generation. The Ukrainian Insurgent Army now made the point that social and national liberation could only be achieved by Ukrainian efforts. Having experienced both Soviet and Nazi rule, Volhynian Ukrainians would understand the comparisons made by the UPA between the Gestapo and the NKVD. The summons to “join us if you do not want to die in the dungeons of the German Gestapo or the Soviet NKVD” resonated. The extermination of the Jews was presented as a fate that could be avoided: “The Germans use every method to beat us down, and then later do to us what they did to the Jews. We are not Jews and will not die a Jewish death.”⁸⁵ As Ukrainian farmers began to worry about hunger in summer 1943, nationalists told them of the history of mass starvation in the Soviet Union. This information, which most Volhynian Ukrainians had not believed at the time, was more credible after the experience of Soviet rule. In the short term, the UPA offered relief. It promised hope to young people who might otherwise have accepted their fate as forced laborers. It prevented the Germans from carrying out requisitions in some parts of Volhynia, and promised Ukrainian peasants Polish land.⁸⁶ The UPA also recruited by force, treating young men who failed to join as suspicious elements. Its security service provided the means of intimidation.⁸⁷

Even amidst the extreme nationalism, there was an unmistakable left-wing flavor to the UPA. Ukrainian nationalist leaders greeted followers as “Friends and revolutionaries!”⁸⁸ They opposed imperialism, as would any good Leninist—but treated the Soviets, as well as the Germans, as imperialists. Ukrainians were reminded that “Muscovite as well as German imperialism is a furious enemy of the Ukrainian nation.”⁸⁹ The slogan “Death to Hitlerism and Hitler!” was followed immediately by “Death to Stalinism and Stalin!”⁹⁰ Just like Lenin and his Soviet heirs, the Ukrainian nationalists pronounced that imperialism was full of contradictions. The inclusion of the Soviet Union among the imperialists, naturally, changed the conclusion of such an analysis. As nationalist propagandists saw matters, German and Soviet imperialists were locked in “a fatal embrace,” and both in effect would lose the world war.⁹¹ Just as Lenin

might have maintained, the UPA argued that war between Germany and Russia created the tactical opportunity for revolution. The revolution was national, but its promises and rhetoric were remarkably similar to Lenin's. Nationalists promised to give land to the Ukrainian peasant, to "resolve the social question," and to create a "state of Ukrainian workers, peasants, and laboring intellectuals."⁹² Their Polish program could have been copied directly from the actions of Bolsheviks in Volhynia in 1917, from interwar Soviet propaganda, or from the agitation of the Communist Party of West Ukraine: "beat the Polish lords!"⁹³ Ukrainian nationalists inhabited a social and political world that had been penetrated by communism. The Ukrainian nationalists' mode of expression was sufficiently similar to that of the Soviets that the Germans and local Orthodox bishops could treat them as Bolsheviks in public pronouncements, or at least as a Bolshevik provocation.⁹⁴ Soviet partisans quickly realized that they had fallen into a propaganda war with a worthy adversary.⁹⁵ The nationalists were competing with the Soviet partisans for the hearts and minds of young people who were willing to fight, as well as for the support of the Volhynian population.

The UPA took for granted that Poland would never voluntarily concede Volhynia. Indeed, the Polish government in exile was planning an "armed occupation" of Volhynia right after the cessation of hostilities.⁹⁶ Ukrainian nationalists, like Józewski, remembered the outcome of the First World War: but whereas Józewski chose to emphasize the Piłsudski-Petliura alliance of 1920, these Ukrainian nationalists recalled that the price of that alliance was Petliura's concession of Galicia and Volhynia to Poland. Whereas Józewski dreamed of renewing an alliance against communism, the nationalists wanted to make sure that Poland could never again incorporate these lands. To the nationalists' way of thinking, the Polish population in Volhynia was a security threat. One wartime statement of goals indicated the desirability of removing "Poles in the western Ukrainian regions, who have not abandoned their dreams of rebuilding a greater Poland at the expense of Ukrainian lands."⁹⁷ The commanders of the UPA assumed that "the nationally foreign element," the Poles and Jews as well as the less numerous Czechs, Germans, and Gypsies, would prefer Soviet rule to a Ukrainian national state, and were therefore objective enemies.⁹⁸ The models were at hand. People who joined the UPA had watched the Soviets send Poles to Kazakhstan and Siberia. Many hundreds of nationalists, working as German policemen, had helped the Germans murder the Jews.

Ukrainian nationalist commanders in Volhynia agreed that Ukrainian interests required the removal of the Poles, and apparently decided to ethnically

cleanse Poles from Volhynia in early 1943.⁹⁹ Actions against the civilian population killed about seven thousand in a first attack in the spring, and perhaps forty thousand by December 1943.¹⁰⁰ In July Ukrainian partisans promised “shameful death” to all Poles who did not flee.¹⁰¹ Polish partisans in Volhynia had to fight Ukrainian nationalists to defend the Polish population. Some of them perpetrated atrocities against Ukrainian villages.¹⁰² Polish civilians, desperate to survive, joined the German police (about twelve hundred) and the Soviet partisans (about six thousand).¹⁰³ Poles in German and Soviet service then pacified Ukrainian villages. Ukrainian nationalists then claimed that Poles were not only imperialists themselves, but also collaborated with two other imperialisms.¹⁰⁴ In the ethnic war that followed, Poles were hopelessly outnumbered, and bound to lose.¹⁰⁵ By the end of the year, Ukrainian nationalist commanders could report that “the Polish problem is basically solved.”¹⁰⁶

Over the course of 1943, the Ukrainian nationalist campaign against Poles drastically worsened the position of Volhynia’s few surviving Jews. Volhynian Jews had survived the mass murder of 1941 and 1942 in three ways: by being deported east to the depths of the Soviet Union, by joining the Soviet partisans, or by taking shelter with Polish or Ukrainian families. This last group was now extremely vulnerable. Polish colonies, which sheltered many Jewish survivors, were a main target of attacks.¹⁰⁷ As the UPA brought much of the countryside under its control, Jews who were staying with Poles were killed along with their rescuers, sometimes as Poles and sometimes as Jews.¹⁰⁸ Jews sometimes joined Poles in their flight to the towns, which were still under German control. There Jews fought with Poles in Polish self-defense units, supported sometimes by the German authorities, sometimes by the Soviet partisans, and sometimes by the Polish Home Army.¹⁰⁹ Some Jews remained in the countryside to work the fields of Polish rescuers who had fled to the towns. Some of these Jews were discovered by the UPA and killed as Jews. In at least one case, Jews who had shelter in 1943 rescued Poles from Ukrainians.¹¹⁰ In another case, Jews who had taken shelter with Poles watched as their hosts were murdered by Ukrainians on western-rite Christmas Day.¹¹¹ Meanwhile, the Red Army returned to Volhynia in 1944. The Soviet Union once again annexed Volhynia and Galicia. Rather than deporting elite Poles to the east, as in 1940–1941, the NKVD in 1944–1946 now deported all Poles (and Jewish survivors) to the west, to Poland.¹¹² This was an ethnic action: Poles and Jews were to leave Volhynia, and Ukrainians were to stay, regardless of prewar or wartime citizenship. Thus the Soviets completed the work that the Ukrainian nationalists had begun.

STONES THROWN

The UPA fought against the renewed Soviet occupation until the early 1950s.¹¹³ As Józewski had wished, although in circumstances he could hardly have anticipated, tens of thousands of Volhynian Ukrainians became determined foes of Soviet power. Józewski had left behind a Volhynia in which Ukrainian nationalism could indeed flourish, but not a Volhynia in which Ukrainian nationalism would be pro-Polish. He had tried to create a Ukrainian patriotism that could accept loyalty to Poland, and avoid the forced choices of ideological mass politics. Józewski had hoped that Volhynia might avoid the European path of ethnic homogenization, and exemplify instead a tolerant centrist alternative to both nationalist and communist extremes. He was able to restrain the extremes for a few years in the late 1920s and early 1930s, but no longer. By the late 1930s, a revolution in his Volhynia had become conceivable; even many local Poles thought it was only a matter of time. Józewski seemed to be fully aware of the actual state of affairs in his province, but could not imagine desirable alternatives to his previous policies. He believed that the proposals he heard from radicals in Volhynia and rivals in Warsaw were all far worse than the shuddering status quo. Perhaps he was right. He was wrong, in the late 1930s, to believe that his policies could ultimately be justified by secret planning for a Polish-Ukrainian alliance during the next war. This was his glass house.

Volhynian Ukrainians also suffered from the biases inherent in their perspectives. It was far easier for them to see through Józewski's glass house than it was for them to view themselves from the perspective of Warsaw, Moscow, or Berlin. The larger realities of Polish and European politics left only three viable contemporary alternatives to the Volhynia Experiment: Polish nationalism, Soviet rule, or German occupation. All of the alternatives were then tried in practice after the Experiment's end. Polish nationalists had implemented enough of their program in 1938 and 1939 to convince doubting Ukrainians that foreign occupation must be superior to Polish rule. After 1939, Volhynian communists and nationalists each tried to exploit a foreign occupation, the communists the Soviet and the nationalists the Nazi, only to be disappointed. Naturally, none of them remembered Józewski's Volhynia Experiment, against which they had struggled, with any nostalgia. Memories of the lesser evil are rarely warm.

Józewski threw some stones. Galician Ukrainian nationalists rightly saw him as a great foe of their cause. Volhynian Ukrainian communists knew that he was their main enemy. Political rivals in Poland saw him as an idealist dreamer, out

of touch with Polish society. These were not descriptions that Józewski would have much disputed. He wished to weaken nationalism and communism, and had no interest in public opinion. His rule in Volhynia was certainly authoritarian, although it scarcely bears comparison to what followed. His project took place within Polish and European contexts that were inimical to its ethical, political, and strategic goals. After Józewski's departure in 1938, Polish and European politics rushed into Volhynia as into a vacuum. The European competition between the far Right and the far Left came to Volhynia with a vengeance. Warsaw's revindication of souls prepared the way for communist and national revolutions, each of which had, for a time, some popular support. Under Soviet and Nazi occupation, Volhynia became one of the starkest examples of European terror and genocide. There was no middle way, only the mainstream of European history. Józewski had held back its tide for a brief moment in the late 1920s and early 1930s, but the deluge, when it came, could hardly have been worse. The Ukrainian population suffered enormously under Soviet and especially Nazi occupation. The Polish presence in Volhynia was brought to an end by ethnic cleansing. The Jews were eliminated as a society, in Volhynia, Poland, and Europe, in a hitherto unthinkable Holocaust.

Chapter 10 Nazi Occupation

“It’s terrible,” the painter had said to the novelist in August 1939, “but this war will be my salvation.” Maria Dąbrowska understood her friend Henryk Józewski. His wife Julia had died of cancer that May, carried away in a bed of lilacs as friends and family sang the Ukrainian songs she loved, and old comrades from the Polish Military Organization held high their banners. “There was something in her,” Dąbrowska confided to her diary, “of a drowned Ophelia from old paintings.” In the summer of 1939 Józewski had comported himself, for the first time in his life, like the Hamlet of stereotype: troubling friends with long silences, surprising colleagues with moments of indecision. Józewski thought it improper to speak of his grief at Julia’s death, just as during her life he had believed it superfluous to characterize his love. Julia had been his comrade in arms in Kyïv, one of the women couriers of his command of the Polish Military Organization. In the 1920s and 1930s, as Józewski exercised power in independent Poland, Julia remained his companion in aesthetics and politics. She, too, was a painter, having studied in Munich; and she took part in the Volhynia Experiment, organizing its women’s groups, its markets, and some of its theater.¹



Figure 17. Julia Józewska, *Landscape with Church*, 1930s. Zbigniew Chomicz.

After Julia's death, Józewski seized the Second World War like a man desperate to return to an underground that for him was a kind of second home, to re-assume the habits of conspiracy that had long been a kind of second nature. He would spend his war in hiding, changing his identity and place of residence regularly, but keeping in contact with friends and comrades. His first thought after the German invasion was to organize partisans against the Germans, in the lands of eastern Poland where he and Julia had spent the best years of their lives. After the Soviet invasion, despite the general mood of hopelessness, he decided to remain and fight. While the rest of the Polish government fled, he made his way back to Warsaw, first in his black automobile, then in a hay wagon, and finally on foot. For many Poles in the 1930s, Józewski represented the heights and the haughtiness of power. His choice to remain when he might easily have escaped, and his humble appearance when he reached Warsaw, earned him new friends among those who had opposed the Piłsudski regime and its successors.²

SERVANTS OF VICTORY

In Warsaw in early October 1939, as German tanks approached, conspiracy beckoned. The Polish state was destroyed, the government dispersed, but secret organizations remained. One of these was Freemasonry. As during the American Revolution and the French, so during the invasion of Poland the habits of sociability and trust among masons allowed for quick and quiet organization. On 21 September, General Michał Tokarzewski-Karaszewicz had arrived in Warsaw to coordinate the Polish resistance to follow the formal surrender. Tokarzewski embodied the particularities of Polish masonry: elitist, left-liberal, and tolerant, affiliated with international organizations but patriotic in the old manner, celebrating the variety of nationality and confession that Poland had inherited from the old Commonwealth. In interwar Poland, as elsewhere, masonry had allowed for the creation of social connections among members of different groups, across classes as in France or Britain, but here across nations, religions, and genders, too. Polish lodges welcomed Jews, Ukrainians, and women. Janusz Korczak, for example, the Jewish doctor and educator, belonged to the “*Le droit humain*” lodge, along with General Tokarzewski. Polish masonry, quite influential in its way, was more a milieu than a mass organization: no more than a few hundred citizens were masons. They had been closely associated with the Piłsudski camp at the beginning; perhaps five of eleven of Piłsudski’s first ministers belonged to a masonic lodge.³ By the late 1930s, Piłsudski’s heirs had turned against masonry. In late 1938, as Poland’s government moved to the right, and as organizations and groups associated with minorities and the Left were suppressed, Polish masonry was dissolved. This had few consequences for the masons themselves, although Maria Dąbrowska and Stanisław Stempowski endured a police search of their home.

General Tokarzewski was no ordinary mason, even by the specific standards of Warsaw. He belonged to at least three different lodges: one admitted only those masons who had attained the thirty-third or highest degree of masonic status, the other two admitted women. “*Le droit humain*,” with which he was strongly associated, was a French lodge founded on the doctrine of the equality of the sexes. Its first Polish daughter lodge was founded in 1923, and a Polish federation of lodges had been established by 1934. Its international representatives spoke, that year, of “liberty and toleration” as the Polish virtues that the lodge would serve.⁴ In Poland itself, “*Le droit humain*” was also associated with theosophy, the esoteric search for divine truth by a synthesis of the Christian and the Buddhist traditions. The theosophists believed that the God described

by Christian scripture existed within each individual, and that contact with the divine was achieved by contemplation which distanced the mind from the accidental facts of everyday experience. Tokarzewski was Poland's most famous theosophist; it was he, in full general's regalia, who greeted mystics when they traveled to Warsaw in the 1920s. To his wartime conspiracy he gave an esoteric name very similar to that of one of his theosophic groups: Servants of the Victory of Poland. He gathered, on 25 September 1939, seven trusted friends in the basement of a bank. At least three of them were fellow masons, two were fellow theosophists. One of the latter was Janina Karasiówna, who would be entrusted with communications for the major organizations of Polish resistance for the rest of the Second World War. Such was the beginning of organized Polish resistance to German occupation.⁵

Józewski, meanwhile, made his way from Volhynia to Warsaw. Was he, like Tokarzewski, a mason and a theosophist? It is impossible to say with certainty. One student of interwar Polish masonry concludes, despite the absence of documentary evidence, that Józewski was a mason.⁶ In the 1930s, right-wing Catholic politicians routinely presented Józewski's policies as a masonic plot. Władysław Korsak, Józewski's companion in student conspiracy, artistic fraternity, and then public service, was a mason. So was Tadeusz Hołówko, the leading Polish Promethean, and his successor, Tadeusz Schätzel. Józewski's predecessor as Volhynian governor, Władysław Mech, was a mason. Józewski's dear friend Stanisław Stempowski was a member of Polish and Ukrainian lodges and a mason of the thirty-third degree.⁷ Józewski was certainly no stranger to esoterica. He owned a copy of a 1921 edition of the *Book of Tao*, the central text of the theosophists.⁸

By the time Józewski arrived in Warsaw, on 2 October, Tokarzewski had received official authorization from his superiors to organize the underground, and had worked for two weeks to do so. Upon meeting in Warsaw in early October 1939, the two men embraced, and Tokarzewski made Józewski commander of the Warsaw district of the Servants of the Victory of Poland.⁹ Józewski and Tokarzewski were both veterans of the Polish struggle for independence, both men with eclectic interests and Ukrainian connections, both were old socialists, and convinced patriots whose model was the Commonwealth. Józewski had been one of Tokarzewski's supporters in the late 1930s, when Tokarzewski was charged with the Lwów command of the Polish army. Józewski's main recommendation now, as Tokarzewski saw it, was his willingness to begin underground activity. Józewski took the nom de guerre "Olgierd" and set to work. He helped to recruit political parties into the structure of the new orga-

nization.¹⁰ He helped found the *Information Bulletin*, which lasted for the rest of the war, and became an important source of information about occupied Poland.¹¹ Servants of the Victory of Poland was a conspiracy organized on masonic lines, divided into groups of five, each group having contact with only one superior. Józewski was more secretive than most. He remained in conspiracy as Olgierd, insofar as possible, even within his own organization. General Tokarzewski, a womanizer who believed that sex was a form of tantric fulfillment, tried to introduce Józewski to the new generation of female couriers. They all wanted to meet Olgierd, said Tokarzewski. Józewski showed little interest. He was cheered, however, to see among the young women an older courier whom he knew from the March on Kyiv of 1920, Tokarzewski's trusted messenger Felicja Wolff.¹² Wolff shared none of Tokarzewski's esoteric or erotic interests, but admired the man as a patriot. She was a principled woman, who believed that one should live "without compromises and concessions, when we are convinced of the justness of our cause." For her, this was the "beauty" of life, and life was to be lived "beautifully": not comfortably, or happily.¹³

The Servants of the Victory of Poland was superseded by the end of 1939 by another organization, commanded from abroad. The government of Poland had been established in emigration in France, and General Władysław Sikorski, the new prime minister, sought to bring Polish resistance under his control. Sikorski was a man of a different stamp than Józewski. The two men disagreed, throughout their careers, on the character of the threat from the Soviet Union. Sikorski had distanced himself from Piłsudski's policies and bided his time, one political general waiting for another's epoch to pass. The Second World War brought Sikorski to power, at the head of a coalition that wished to efface Piłsudski's legacy, or at least remove his associates from positions of power. Tokarzewski loyally subordinated his organization to Sikorski's new Union of Armed Struggle. Tokarzewski was dispatched to the Soviet zone in early 1940, to subordinate Polish underground groups there to the Union. One of his final reports emphasized the importance of a reconciliation with Ukrainians.¹⁴ He was arrested crossing the border on the night of 6 March 1940, but was not recognized by his NKVD interrogators. Successfully posing as a medical doctor seeking his family, he was found guilty only of the illegal border crossing. This meant five years of hard labor in a camp near Archangel. In January 1941 he was identified and sent to Moscow for a new round of interrogation.¹⁵ His courier Felicja Wolff was arrested by the NKVD on 22 January 1941 (although not before having crossed the German-Soviet border at least twice), and sentenced to the Gulag.¹⁶

HOME ARMY

Elites of the Piłsudski era were not welcome in the Warsaw Command of the Union of Armed Struggle, and Józewski resigned in early 1940.¹⁷ Józewski's connections to the Union, and its successor the Home Army, were close though informal. He agreed to continue political intelligence work ("special assignments") for General Stefan Rowecki, now commander of the Warsaw region. From June 1940 Józewski edited an illegal biweekly, *Poland Fights*, subsidized and distributed by the Union of Armed Struggle and then the Home Army. In April 1942 he added another journal, *The Republic's Eastern Lands*. In these two publications, Józewski presented himself as a defender of Poland's 1939 boundaries, but also as a democrat and an advocate of land reform. The two publications served as the center of gravity of Józewski's political group, which began with his closest friends, and extended to colleagues from the prewar administration: overlapping categories that comprised inner and outer circles. Maria Dąbrowska wrote for, and Stanisław Stempowski helped edit, both journals. Two younger friends from Volhynia, the brother and sister Janusz and Maria Si-payłło, distributed the newspapers. Idalia Korsak and Michalina Krzyżanowska, women of Józewski's own generation, and friends of his and of his sister Helena, helped as they could. Their artistic connections with Józewski were close. Krzyżanowska's husband had lent their Warsaw studio to Józewski in 1925 and 1926. Korsak spent the war in Warsaw and in the nearby artists' colony at Podkowa Leśna; Krzyżanowska in Warsaw and Auschwitz. Such intimates were the core of "Olgierd's Group," a collection of friends, colleagues, and—in Józewski's favorite term—"comrades." In the next circle were old clients from eastern Poland, former mayors and local officials—Zygmunt Kubicki, Wacław Drojanowski, and others—who also helped distribute the journals. In another group were fellow veterans of the Polish Military Organization. Adolf Abram bridged these last two groups: he was a veteran of the Polish Military Organization in the east and a former president of the military colonists' organization. Finally, there were new acquaintances, such as Anna Babulska and Irena Repp, who were friends of friends encountered during the war.¹⁸

From these circles, Józewski sought to unify a post-Piłsudski Left in preparation for war's end. He maintained that Piłsudski's followers had to abandon their search for a leader, and take part in normal political parties. He went so far as to imply that the Camp of National Unity of the late 1930s was infected by totalitarianism.¹⁹ Józewski maintained a special status in Polish conspiracy, pursuing the general goal of national liberation along with the personal hope of

political resurrection. Józewski was allowed to be of the Polish Underground State but not in it, to use its resources without taking any formal responsibility, thanks to his personal connections and conspiratorial usefulness. The most important personal alliance, after Tokarzewski's arrest, was with Tadeusz Pełczyński, chief of staff of the Home Army's commanders. Józewski, as governor of Volhynia, and Pełczyński, as director of the Second Department, had been among the last of the Prometheans in the 1930s, among the few Poles who continued to believe, after famine and terror, that the national question could be used against the Soviet Union. Although Poland abandoned Promethean operations within the Soviet Union in about 1934, Pełczyński kept Promethean operatives in reserve for future contingencies until war came in 1939. The two men had thus already shared an idea and a mission that required intense commitment and trust. Pełczyński became Józewski's regular contact in 1940, and remained so for years to come.²⁰

One of Józewski's early collaborators joined an elite squad of female saboteurs organized by Pełczyński.²¹ The two men gathered political intelligence within Poland, to be shared with Poland's allies, Britain and France. For the first two years of the war, it was a labor without much immediate effect. France and Britain had indeed declared war upon Nazi Germany in September 1939, but could do little to help. During the Phony War, between October 1939 and June 1940, France and Britain prepared their own defenses, while Nazi Germany occupied the western half of Poland, and the Soviet Union occupied Poland's eastern territories. In June 1940, Hitler attacked France, his armies reaching Paris almost as quickly as they had Warsaw. This left Poland with only one ally, Great Britain; the exiled Polish government left Paris for London. In summer 1940, Britain too was besieged, protected by the English Channel from immediate invasion, but attacked from the air. Polish pilots accounted for a tenth of the missions flown in the Battle of Britain. October brought victory in the air battle, and Britain's "finest hour."

Hitler turned his attention east, to the Soviet Union. The surprise attack of June 1941 changed the complexion of the war. Until summer 1941, Poland suffered two occupations, and Poles had little reason to believe that either would soon be lifted. Hitler's attack brought all of Poland under German occupation, and put Moscow and Warsaw on the same side of the conflict. The transition from enmity to alliance was perforce difficult. To be sure, the Soviet-Polish accord of 30 July 1941 annulled the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, and reestablished formal diplomatic relations. Moscow agreed to allow Poles within the Soviet Union to form an army, later known as the Anders Army after its commanding

officer, General Władysław Anders, to fight on the Western Front against Nazi Germany. The project was feasible only because Moscow had deported hundreds of thousands of Polish citizens from its zone of occupation in 1940 and 1941. Some seventy thousand of these were evacuated by way of Iran and Palestine in spring 1942. Among them was Felicja Wolff. She was freed from the Gulag after the Soviet-Polish accord, and joined the Anders Army. Reunited with General Tokarzewski, she worked as a nurse (and a courier). She took part in the Fourth Battle of Monte Cassino, where in May 1944 Polish troops of the Anders Army defeated the Germans in a daring uphill charge. Wolff would find her way back to Warsaw, where she and Józewski would meet again.²²

1943

Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union coincided with the Final Solution, the plan to murder all Jews in Europe. *Einsatzgruppen* began the mass murder of Jews as they followed the German army through what had been eastern Poland, and then into the Soviet Union. In Warsaw as in the western half of occupied Poland, the Jews were crowded into ghettos. At first, Warsaw Jews had little or no sense that ghettoization was the first stage of a general plan of complete extermination. By late 1942, however, after most of Europe's largest urban Jewish population had been murdered at Treblinka, some Warsaw Jews began to plan resistance. A few made contact with the Home Army. One point of contact was the Home Army's Bureau of Information and Propaganda, where Józewski's friends Aleksander Kamiński and Wanda Pełczyńska now worked. Although the Home Army shared some of its small cache of arms, tried to breach the walls of the ghetto, and in a few cases had soldiers fighting inside the ghetto, Jews and Poles knew that such gestures were symbolic.²³ No one expected the uprising to succeed. The Jewish Fighting Organization expected to die, and the Home Army knew that the time was not ripe for a general uprising. On 19 April 1943, as the Germans began to clear the ghetto for the final transports to Treblinka, Warsaw Jews mounted the most serious armed resistance to the Holocaust in Europe. They held out against superior German firepower for nearly a month. The Home Army's *Information Bulletin* (in its 29 April 1943 edition) wrote that the victory of Warsaw Jews was to have died with dignity.²⁴ The idiom of dignity might have been taken from the Jewish Fighting Organization's appeal to the Polish population. Of Poland's three million Jews, perhaps ninety percent were dead by summer 1943. The Polish government, in its London exile, ap-

pealed to its allies to take action to stop the extermination of Jews, and organized the only state-sponsored rescue effort, code-named *Żegota*.²⁵

The largest minority of interwar Poland had been the Ukrainians, and Józewski remained associated with Ukrainian policy. Józewski still believed that this historical connection between Poles and Ukrainians could find some future political realization. In his publications, he continued to offer Ukrainians the prospect of an independent state, after war had destroyed the Soviet Union. On the crucial question of postwar borders, however, he had nothing new to propose. Whatever Józewski may privately have thought, the Polish government could not contemplate wartime concessions on boundaries. Any such gesture would have been understood as a concession not to a nonexistent Ukraine but to the Soviet Union. Józewski arranged discussions between Polish and Ukrainian partisans. He served as an intermediary in an abortive attempt to bring a Ukrainian politician into the Polish National Council. Finally, he worked to organize a unit of the Polish Home Army in Volhynia that would fight, he hoped, side by side with Ukrainians against the Red Army at some future point.²⁶ The experience of German and Soviet occupation, Józewski seemed to believe, had brought Poles and Ukrainians in Volhynia closer together. This was by no means the opinion of the Polish government, and was certainly an error.²⁷ In fact, the occupations had brought about a Ukrainian revolution in Volhynia, whose first victims were Poles. In April 1943, even as Józewski called for military and political cooperation, he heard the first reports of Ukrainian partisans murdering Polish civilians in Volhynia. Although Józewski himself never lost hope for Ukrainian-Polish cooperation, as a viable political option it was removed for the duration of the war by ethnic cleansing.²⁸ Neither Poles in Volhynia nor Poles in London could conceive of such an alliance in 1943. They would have had no partners in any case. Borovets' had been eclipsed by the nationalists. The Petliurites had faded away, arrested by the Soviets, collaborating with the Germans, joining with Ukrainian nationalists, or organizing resistance to the Poles. One of the outstanding Ukrainian intelligence officers of the interwar years was killed by the Home Army.²⁹

By 1943, it was already clear that a future Poland, whatever shape its borders and polity might take after the war, would be a radically different country than it had been in the past: without its historic Jewish population, and in all likelihood without a place for Ukrainians. By this time, a few self-proclaimed architects of a new Poland had begun to emerge, with powerful backers. Polish communists were emerging from the shadows. Stalin, who had dissolved the

Communist Party of Poland in 1938, created a Polish Workers' Party in February 1942. After the Soviet victory at Stalingrad of February 1943, Polish communists who had spent the war in the Soviet Union prepared their grand return. In spring 1943, Józewski was warned by the Home Army that local communists planned to assassinate him. Political murder of Poles by Poles was far from rare at the time, but usually the perpetrators were extreme nationalists. Józewski checked the report with Pełczyński, who was dubious, but eventually confirmed its veracity. Józewski went into hiding in the countryside, bringing his friend Janusz Sipayłło with him. One night in early July 1943 they were playing bridge with the locals in a forest cabin. A head appeared at the window, followed by two hands, each holding a pistol. The nervous attacker emptied two clips without hitting a thing. He then lobbed a grenade through the window, and disappeared into the forest.³⁰

All survived, but Józewski and Sipayłło were wounded. Local friends called for an ambulance. After a bit of reflection, Józewski asked to be taken to a private German hospital on Chmielna Street in downtown Warsaw. Józewski reasoned that his documents would not be checked if he could afford to pay for his hospital care, which turned out to be correct. In September 1943, after two operations and with his leg in a cast, he had to find new quarters in Warsaw. He was taken in by his friend Dr. Idalia Korsak, who lived on Śliska Street. There is no conspiratorial activity in this building, she assured him. You will be perfectly safe. Knowing there was no better alternative, she gently lied to her old friend. In another apartment in the same building, a Home Army soldier was recovering from wounds. Józewski's own illegal newspaper was stocked in and distributed from a lower floor. Józewski managed to recommence its publication from his bedside, his leg still in a cast. He was visited by other friends and comrades, including Dąbrowska. Korsak's apartment, full of wounded soldiers and members of the Polish (and Polish-Jewish) underground, was likely the model for a similar home described in one of Dąbrowska's postwar stories.³¹

In spring 1944, the Home Army was again urging Józewski to leave Warsaw. The Gestapo was on his trail.³² Dr. Korsak again found a solution. She arranged an ambulance, and had Józewski driven, still wearing his cast, to a summer cottage in Podkowa Leśna. This was not without risks. Korsak was spending her summers in Podkowa, with her friends, the Niemyski family. The family was prosperous, socialist, and connected to Stempowski and Dąbrowska as well as to Korsak.³³ The group exemplified a Warsaw milieu of tolerant left liberals, Polish patriots with cosmopolitan instincts, a class of people who played a disproportionate role in the culture and society of interwar Poland, and are now



Figure 18. Podkowa Leśna, 1943. Stanisław Stempowski, Janina Niemyska, Lucjan Niemyski, Marceli Handelsman, Maria Dąbrowska, Idalia Korsak. Museum of Literature, Warsaw.

generally forgotten. The five Niemyskis—Lucjan, his wife Barbara, and his younger sisters Janina, Wanda, and Barbara—were practicing their own kind of conspiracy: they spent the war sheltering Jews. In Podkowa, Józewski thus found himself among other men, women, and children in hiding. Like the Jewish families, he was fleeing the Gestapo, using false German documents and a false name. Like his new Jewish neighbors, he faced death if caught. Unlike them, he would have been killed for what he had done, not for who he was. For the time being, still in his cast, he kept quiet, enjoyed the forest views, and painted.³⁴

WIN

In Podkowa, everyone awaited the Red Army. In January 1944, it reached the prewar Soviet-Polish border. That spring, in what had been eastern Poland, the Home Army initiated Operation Tempest. Its military goal was to aid the Red Army in the liberation of Poland, its political goal to show the world the importance of Polish arms. These goals were mutually contradictory. In order for the Home Army to cooperate with the Red Army, its officers and soldiers had to reveal themselves. Sooner or later, before the engagement with the Germans

or afterwards, the Polish officers would be screened by the NKVD and disarmed. The Home Army did take part in the liberation of Wilno and Lwów, but received no credit for doing so, and its fighting men and women were disarmed by the Soviets once they had defeated the Germans. As the Red Army moved west towards Warsaw, Operation Tempest reached its climax. The Polish government in London had authorized the Home Army command to initiate, at its discretion, an uprising against German troops in Warsaw. The Home Army began its battle for the Polish capital on 1 August 1944. Stalin ordered the approaching Red Army to halt. For eight weeks, the Home Army fought the Germans alone, with no help from the Red Army and very little from Britain or the United States. The Germans received the surrender of the Home Army soldiers, but treated the population and city of Warsaw as beyond the laws of war. The civilian population was murdered en masse during and after the Uprising. After the surrender, the entire city was put to the torch.

Józewski, on his feet by October 1944, made his way from Podkowa to the nearby hamlet of Milanówek, where he heard about the downfall of the Warsaw Uprising, and joined the debate about what to do next. Surviving Polish officers and underground political activists flooded this Warsaw suburb. In the emerging constellation of political parties, Józewski's collection of friends and comrades, "Olgierd's Group," was treated as a legitimate entity, even though it had no prewar history and no popular support. It was one of the constituent groups of the Democratic Unification Party, which was a full participant in the Council of National Unity, the quasi-parliament associated with the government in London that was now convening in Milanówek. Józewski concentrated on resistance rather than politics. As he knew, there had been another Home Army plan besides Tempest. The operation was called "Independence," "Niepodległość" in Polish. It was known as "NIE," which in Polish means simply "No." Initiated in spring 1944, it was designed to preserve some Home Army structures in case of Soviet occupation. Unfortunately for the Polish general staff, Operations Tempest and Independence were incompatible. The Home Army had to reveal itself to fight alongside the Red Army in Operation Tempest, which meant that most of its cadres were identified (and sometimes deported or executed) and therefore useless in Operation Independence.³⁵

General Leopold Okulicki, the organizer of Independence, had been the officer on duty in Warsaw who received the first reports of the German invasion in September 1939. He had served in the underground Union of Armed Struggle, until arrested by the Soviets after crossing into the Soviet zone. In January 1941 he was imprisoned in Moscow. After the German army invaded the Soviet

Union, he was freed and became Anders's chief of staff. He was then trained by the British for a covert mission in German-occupied Poland and dropped by parachute in May 1944.³⁶ After the defeat of the Warsaw Uprising, he left the destroyed city with its civilian population. He was placed in command of the remnants of the Home Army, and ordered to find the cadres for Independence. On 19 January 1945, Okulicki released Home Army soldiers from their oaths, preparatory to the establishment of another, smaller, and more conspiratorial army.³⁷ In Milanówek, he invited Józewski to discuss its design.³⁸ Milanówek, however, was a poor place for conspiracy. Soviet officers, arriving in January 1945, laughed to find in Milanówek a "little London," a miniature of Polish political life, where groups that had remained underground under the German occupation now began to emerge into the light. Polish political parties awaited the Soviets in the mistaken hope that some compromise could be found. In March 1945, the Soviets invited Okulicki, as well as several civilian politicians, to begin negotiations about the future political order in Poland. Okulicki feared a trap, but attended anyway after the invited civilian politicians questioned his courage. They were all seized by the NKVD in Milanówek, flown to Moscow, interrogated, and show-tried. Okulicki died in a Moscow prison.³⁹

The June 1945 show trial in Moscow of Okulicki and other kidnapped Polish citizens, the "Trial of Sixteen," sent an international political message. The Americans and British were made to understand Stalin's methods in Poland. The Polish government in exile in London was confronted by an impossible choice. Even as some Polish politicians were tried according to Soviet law and sentenced by Soviet judges, others journeyed from London to Moscow in the hope of reaching an agreement about the political order and the eastern border. Stanisław Mikołajczyk, the Polish prime minister, came to Moscow as a petitioner. He could do nothing as his colleagues, after excruciating interrogation, were publicly humiliated in the show trial.⁴⁰ The British and the Americans, as Mikołajczyk learned from Stalin, had already conceded Poland's eastern lands to the Soviet Union at the summit at Teheran. Mikołajczyk did not fully understand that further agreements among the wartime allies would leave Poland itself under the Soviet sphere of influence. Lacking the support of the British and the Americans, Mikołajczyk could only accept what Stalin would offer, settling for a minor role in a Temporary Government of National Unity. This, Stalin's proto-government for Poland, was recognized as legitimate by the British and the Americans in July 1945. In a letter to the Polish government in London, Józewski complained that Mikołajczyk's mission was pointless and divisive.⁴¹

Yet the view from Milanówek was not entirely one of despair. Jewish survivors in nearby Podkowa emerged from hiding. In Milanówek itself, Józewski had spent the last weeks of the war in hiding with a Jewish woman in an apartment secured by his friend Janusz Sipayłło.⁴² When the Soviets arrived, she was liberated, like the eleven thousand or so Jewish survivors in Warsaw.⁴³ Józewski remained underground. For him, the arrival of the Red Army after the departure of the German army was almost indescribably painful. "The Germans left. Soviet Russia appeared. It was as if Lazarus, raised from the grave, was ordered to return."⁴⁴ Yet he did not see the new situation as hopeless. He initiated co-operation with the new Polish commander, General Jan Rzepecki, who had just returned from a German prisoner of war camp. Rzepecki's plan was political. He cancelled Operation Independence, reasoning correctly that it was compromised by the arrest of Okulicki and the show trial. Still representing the Polish government in London, he dispatched Józewski to improve relations with the UPA, still operating in Poland.⁴⁵ After Stalin's Temporary Government of National Unity was recognized by the Allies, Rzepecki took the initiative. His new civilian organization, Freedom and Independence, or WIN in its Polish acronym, was to replace the Home Army.

In the second half of 1945, WIN faced dilemmas of all kinds. Unlike the Home Army, it was not connected to a recognized Polish government abroad, and could not expect much help from international allies. It was the successor to a military organization and was commanded by a general, but its quotidian message was that Poles should not fight the new Soviet occupation by force of arms. Most soldiers of the dissolved Home Army probably wished to fight on, and many saw Rzepecki's appeals as the counsel of cowardice. Rzepecki was also a liberal democrat associated with the Home Army's former propaganda office, founded by Józewski: nationalist partisans in the field treated the office as a "Judeo-Masonic" enterprise. There was no anti-Semitism in the WIN leadership, but most armed units still in the field probably associated Jews with communism. As many fighters rightly suspected, WIN's political message flowed from a very faint hope. Mikołajczyk's legal Polish Peasant Party, Rzepecki believed, could win the elections that Stalin had conceded would be held in Poland. Mikołajczyk's position in the new government was weak, but so long as free elections were to be held, Rzepecki could imagine victory.⁴⁶ Yet WIN, as an underground organization, could have no direct contact with Mikołajczyk and his Peasant Party. Rzepecki wished for a personal meeting, but Mikołajczyk refused.

Józewski's new press organ, *Independent Poland*, reflected these tensions. Just

as his previous newspapers had been financed by the Home Army, *Independent Poland* was subsidized by WIN.⁴⁷ From the first issue of March 1945, Józewski took the line that Poles must preserve their moral energies, and not yield to the temptation to accept the existing state of affairs, which he characterized as “Soviet terror.”⁴⁸ Poles should expect a “democratic revolution” with justice for all. Józewski had always been on the left wing of the Piłsudski camp, more democratic by inclination than the group that had seized power after Piłsudski’s death. As governor of Volhynia, he had sacrificed democracy to anticommunism, for communism had been very popular in the region. In postwar Poland as a whole, however, communism was unpopular, and democracy could now both be endorsed in principle and seen as a means to defeat the communists. Józewski certainly expected a struggle, and cited Theodore Roosevelt to the effect that justice should be valued more than peace.⁴⁹ On the broader question of the desired character of Polish society, *Independent Poland* followed the line that appeared in other WIN propaganda: the eastern borders might still be held and new lands gained from Germany in the west; democracy was the only acceptable political system; private property should be preserved but considerable redistribution would take place.⁵⁰ Rzepecki and Józewski were men of the Left, but such views were generally held among politicians who hoped to gain support in postwar Poland. The defeat of 1939 had discredited dictatorship as a means of governing Poland, and the obvious need to bring peasants and workers into the political order required radical social reform. To be sure, the shift leftward was also meant to cover the ground coveted by the communists, who had their own plans for a new Poland.

One reason for hope in Milanówek was the weakness of Polish communists. In 1945, politicians and officers could tell themselves that Stalin had no choice but to involve native political organizations, even if his only wish was to govern the country. The Home Army and the Polish Underground State had survived the war, and even after the defeat of the Polish Uprising and the abandonment of Poland by its former allies, officers and officials found it difficult to believe that they would be of no importance in the final political settlement. Yet so it was. The NKVD made short work of both military and civilian organizations in the early months of 1945.⁵¹ Even as the revived and renamed communist party began its rise to hegemony in Polish politics, new Polish security organs began to supplement the NKVD. The Office (then Ministry) of Public Security, controlled by the communists, began to apply emergency legislation. On 5 November 1945, General Rzepecki was arrested by Polish security organs. Jacek Różański, director of the Investigations Department of the security apparatus,

chose the right psychological approach: he spoke to Rzepecki as one Pole to another, one Polish officer to another. He appealed to Rzepecki's responsibility for his men. Rzepecki allowed himself to be persuaded that emergence from the underground conspiracy was in the interest of the men under his command, and revealed them to the police. He chose self-criticism and was released, only to be arrested again.⁵²

Józewski knew that deconspiracy would mean arrest, torture, and death. He fled Milanówek when Rzepecki was arrested in November 1945, but recommenced his cooperation with WIN as the organization regrouped under new leadership. He made his way to Skierniewice, where he stayed with Irena and Mieczysław Repp. Irena Repp had worked for one of Janusz Korczak's Jewish boarding schools before the war, and had come to know some of Józewski's friends during the Warsaw Uprising. She now worked in an orphanage.⁵³ From her home, Józewski continued the publication and distribution of *Independent Poland*. The Christmas number contrasted the experience of Polish soldiers in communist torture chambers with that of British and American soldiers happily returned to their homes.⁵⁴ Maria Sipayłło distributed the journal, and renewed Józewski's connections with WIN. Her contact with WIN's Warsaw organization was Helena Sosnowska, who directed its intelligence section. Sosnowska helped distribute *Independent Poland*, and sent WIN's intelligence reports to Józewski by way of Sipayłło.⁵⁵ When WIN and a coordinating council of underground organizations wrote an appeal to the United Nations, she secured Józewski's signature. Sosnowska was the link between the new coordinating council and its component organizations, one of which was Józewski's new political party.⁵⁶ "Olgierd's Group" had now become the Polish Democratic Party, accepted as a partner in the Polish underground opposition.⁵⁷ *Independent Poland* presented itself as the party organ.⁵⁸

Even as Józewski took part in Poland's underground political life, he sensed some of its basic problems. He argued in his newspaper that the Soviet occupation of Poland was comparable to the German in its danger to Poles, and that it was perhaps the more dangerous in its superior propaganda.⁵⁹ Yet he also realized that the potential for Polish resistance, after the Nazi occupation, was incomparably less. Even as he stressed the need for moral preparation and clear-sightedness, he addressed these practical issues in his communications with other Polish organizations. He believed that the Polish underground needed some central organization with a liaison to London. In May 1946, he asked the Polish government in exile, which was no longer officially recognized by its former allies, to create such an organization. He proposed that Tokarzewski be ap-

pointed as liaison.⁶⁰ Such messages, sent by courier, took weeks or even months to deliver; before he had any response, he had to face yet another crisis. In October 1946 Polish security forces began the next wave of WIN arrests, also apprehending the civilian organizers of the alliance's coordinating council.⁶¹ In the weeks to follow Józewski's important contacts were arrested: the Warsaw WIN commander, Wincenty Kwieciński; the director of propaganda, Ryszard Goldman; the courier Helena Sosnowska.

Maria Sipayłło, Józewski's personal courier, was also targeted for arrest.⁶² She fled Warsaw in November, taking shelter with the Jewish woman who had been hidden by her brother Janusz during the war.⁶³ For a second time, Józewski had to assume that the arrest of the WIN leadership would reveal his location. His own network was reduced from about fifteen people to about six.⁶⁴ He left Skierniewice for his old wartime haunt, Podkowa. Although he kept a printing press, without Sosnowska and WIN he lacked a distribution network. The last issues of *Independent Poland*, in summer and fall 1946, reflected the winnowing of political options. The 1 August 1946 issue, devoted to the second anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising, called Poland "a sacrificial offering against tyranny." It discussed the attempt of the communist regime to portray the massive anti-Nazi Uprising as a misguided adventure.⁶⁵ On 22 August, Józewski declared that "the moral presence of the individual should be the catchword of our times."⁶⁶ The October 1946 number of *Independent Poland*, the last as it happened, called for Poles to preserve their culture during the long period of occupation to come, to enter into official institutions but to sustain "an unofficial Poland."⁶⁷

By late 1946 the official Poland had taken a clear shape, and that shape was communist. WIN had supported Stanisław Mikołajczyk, in the hope that he could somehow rescue Poland from communism. This hope depended upon democracy, since Mikołajczyk's Polish Peasant Party was rightly believed to be far more popular than the communists. The communists, however, already controlled the ministries that mattered most in this period of rapid change, and falsified the results of the constitutional referendum of June 1946, and of the parliamentary elections of January 1947. The WIN arrests of late 1946 and early 1947 were part of a larger campaign of intimidation, designed to induce Poles to vote for the communists and their allies. Even in conditions of general terror, the communists quite clearly lost both contests; yet they faked the returns and claimed an unambiguous victory. The elections of January 1947 broke the morale of opposition groups, legal and illegal alike. They demonstrated not only the naked force that the communists could deploy, but also the calculation

and cynicism they could exhibit. Most remaining patriotic partisans now accepted an amnesty. Mikołajczyk fled the country. Communist power, by 1947, seemed secure.

COMMUNISM

From the beginning, communists had controlled the most politically sensitive of the ministries of Poland's postwar government, including the portfolios of national defense and public security. From this position, and aided by numerous Soviet advisors (and for a time by the NKVD), the communists were able to suppress majority opinion and create a sense of historical inevitability about their rise to power. They could not quite monopolize the use of force, but they could create the sense that continued armed resistance was senseless. Communists could not legitimate their rule by honest elections, but they could exploit their simulacra to demoralize opponents at home and confuse enemies abroad. The votes of 1946 and 1947 had been tests of power disguised as tests of popular will, and for the communists they had been a magnificent success. The military and security resources devoted to that campaign could now be used to strengthen the state in a way that would buttress the emerging communist order. One of the most fundamental concerns was the new state border.

As Stalin had desired, Poland lost its eastern lands to the Soviet Union, and was compensated in the west at the expense of Germany. After the Jewish Holocaust, population exchanges with the Soviet Union, and the expulsion of the Germans, the Polish state was quite homogeneous. The one remaining area of settlement by a non-Polish group was the southeast, inhabited by Ukrainians and speakers of Ukrainian who identified themselves as Lemkos. In spring 1947, Polish army and internal security forces began forcibly to resettle some 140,000 men, women, and children from the southeast to the north and west. Polish citizens identified as Ukrainians were resettled in small groups on the far side of the country, at a safe distance from the border. Several thousand were held at a concentration camp in Jaworzno built by the Germans. Poland's new rulers had elected to "resolve the Ukrainian problem once and for all" by ethnic cleansing.⁶⁸ The communists turned this military operation to political advantage, recalling that Ukrainian nationalists had ethnically cleansed Poles during the war. By this time, the UPA and WIN had reached a truce, and in some instances attacked communist forces together. This minor success of the Polish underground had no bearing on Polish public opinion, which believed the regime's claims that it was preserving national security. By summer 1947 the

Polish underground had lost its major points of contact with the public. As communists and their enemies understood, any further successes of the underground would require support from the West. In this respect, communists had some reason for concern.

Winston Churchill had warned Americans of a descending “iron curtain” in March 1946, and in March 1947 President Harry S Truman declared his intention to prevent any further spread of communism. Józewski devoted a long and approving article to Churchill’s address.⁶⁹ As the Cold War began, the Polish communist regime, like its neighbors in the emerging Soviet sphere of influence, turned its border into a security zone.⁷⁰ As world war shifted to Cold War, Józewski made the same decision he had in 1939: to remain in the country and trust his luck. By this time, many of those who had remained to fight the Germans had made their way to London. General Tokarzewski and General Pełczyński, Józewski’s contacts in the anti-Nazi underground, were in England. Józewski was steadfast in his hope, now the hope that a Third World War would liberate Poland from the Soviet sphere of influence. “The world wants no war, the world is preparing for war,” was his interpretation of Churchill’s speech.⁷¹ Unlike most other Poles before and since, he did not treat the Yalta accords between Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union as a betrayal. These accords, reached without the presence or consent of Poles, left Poland in the Soviet sphere of interest. Perhaps he recalled the Treaty of Riga, which ended the Polish-Bolshevik War in 1921, and left most of Ukraine under Bolshevik control. Józewski had worked to persuade Ukrainians in Poland and in the Soviet Union to believe that, some day, war would come and everything could change again. Perhaps the world of Yalta could be resisted, just as the world of Riga had been. As far as Józewski was concerned, both were unjust, Poland was not innocent, and Poland’s duty to Ukraine and itself was the destruction of the Soviet Union. That is how he saw the world, regardless of radically changing circumstances.

Józewski believed that the Soviet empire would collapse, and that those who had stayed behind would be the nucleus of the first postcommunist governments. So Józewski remained, though he lost position after position. Until about 1934, he had been one of the leaders of a Promethean policy designed to destroy the Soviet Union. Until 1938, he had held power in Poland’s east, working to prevent a communist revolution. During the war, he had been forced underground by the Nazis and the Soviets. After the war, he remained underground to resist the communist regime in Poland. It is one thing to conspire on behalf of one’s country to weaken a neighbor, and quite another to hide from

the government that the neighbor, triumphant, has installed in one's country. Yet his conspiracy continued, a constant form of activity against a changing backdrop. The power of world communism seemed steadily to grow, the influence of Józewski and like-minded Europeans steadily to wane. Still, he remained in Poland to challenge the new organs of communist power, relying as ever on the help of friends who made choices like his own. Most of them, as it happened, were women.

Chapter 11 Conspiring

Women

On 27 July 1947, border guards serving Poland's new communist regime arrested a woman and found an encrypted message on her person. They turned her over to the nearest outpost of the Ministry of Public Security, at Jelenia Góra. The functionaries of Public Security identified the woman as Imgard Pyke, but could ascertain neither the ultimate intended recipient of the message, nor any method of decryption. The courier herself did not know that the message was meant for Henryk Józewski, that he was the ninth link in a chain of secret communication from the British occupation zone of Germany to a forest hideout near Warsaw. All she knew was the name of her own contact. Public Security had a protocol to follow. Where there was a courier and a contact, there was a network, and a network offered an opportunity to security officers capable of determined and intelligent subterfuge. Agents of Public Security would place themselves within the network, and creatively and mendaciously follow its connections as far as they could. This meant impersonating a member of the network, and persuading others to yield their secrets. Public Security replaced Pyke with a female functionary, Ela Gradomska. Gradomska

found Pyke's contact, Władysława Bulik. Bulik was the first to be deceived by the agent her victims later called "the Blonde."¹

Public Security's probe had begun. On 28 August 1947, Władysława Bulik revealed to Agent Gradowska that her contact was Jadwiga Zajm. Bulik said that Zajm could be found in the town of Mińsk Mazowiecki, and that Ryszard Celkowski, a local barber, would know the address. At the barber shop in Mińsk Mazowiecki "the Blonde" had a piece of good luck. Celkowski, who was probably meant to screen such attempts, was momentarily absent. Agent Gradowska quite cleverly extracted a note from another barber to Celkowski's daughter, instructing the girl to show her where Zajm resided. On 31 August Agent Gradowska introduced herself to Zajm as the courier from abroad, and again learned the identity of the next contact. "The Blonde" claimed that the message was urgent and was to be transmitted immediately and directly to its final addressee. Each time, the contact did not know the true identity of that person, and had to make contact with her own next link to ask for guidance. This time, Jadwiga Zajm did not physically produce her contact, but rather wrote her a letter. She did let slip a name: Aniela Maciejewska. Fearing delay, Public Security arrested Maciejewska on 15 September. They had reached the fifth link of the chain.

Intended Route of Encoded Letters

- (1) Czesław Zajm and Wanda Maciejewska (Meppen)
- (2) Imgard Pyke (courier)
- (3) Władysława Bulik
- (4) Jadwiga Zajm
- (5) Aniela Maciejewska
- (6) Anna Babulska
- (7) Irena Repp
- (8) Michalina Krzyżanowska
- (9) Henryk Józewski

Delivery by "the Blonde"

- (Boldface indicates Public Security interference with the chain)
- Czesław Zajm and Wanda Maciejewska
 - Imgard Pyke (**arrested at the border**)
 - Ela Gradowska (Public Security officer replaces Pyke)**
 - Władysława Bulik (**sends Gradowska to Celkowski**)
 - Ryszard Celkowski (**sends Gradowska to Zajm**)
 - Jadwiga Zajm (**summons Aniela Maciejewska**)
 - Aniela Maciejewska (**arrested**)

It was time for interrogation.² On 15 September 1947, Public Security commenced Operation "Traitor," shifting, for the moment, from impersonation to intimidation. Aniela Maciejewska's questioning revealed a spotless past. She had been arrested by the Germans during the war, and spent time in the camp at Ravensbrück. Imprisonment in German camps was one of the few reliable (although far from fail-safe) defenses against charges of wartime collaboration. Maciejewska was now working for the Red Cross. She denied, probably truthfully, that she knew the contents of the encrypted message, and could not say whether it constituted antistate propaganda. All that she revealed under arrest was the name of her own contact: Anna Babulska.³ Having identified the sixth link in the chain, Public Security returned to deception. Agent Gradowska, "the Blonde," was dispatched to find Babulska in Warsaw. Now that Public Security had made an arrest, it had to account in its deceptions for the alterations in conspiratorial reality that it had created. A good agent had to simulate, and dissimulate. "The Blonde" told Babulska that she had an important message from Maciejewska, who had gone to Łódź to investigate a possible arrest.

On 21 September 1947, Anna Babulska appeared late for her appointment with Gradowska at the Pomianowski Pastry Shop in Warsaw. Babulska faced a distressing situation. She heard a story which, if true, meant that Maciejewska had been targeted and the network was in danger; and which, if false, meant that Maciejewska was already under arrest, and that the danger was greater still. Gradowska showed her a letter from Maciejewska, which could be taken as evidence of either scenario: Maciejewska might have written it under arrest (as was the case), or while fleeing arrest (as the letter maintained). Babulska seemed to emanate both trust and distrust. "What would you say," began Babulska to Gradowska, "if two gentlemen came up to you and said that you are under arrest!" The agent went pale. Then Babulska raised the possibility, as if thinking aloud, that "Maciejewska is under arrest and was forced to write that letter." Babulska then changed tack, seeming (pretending?) to believe that Gradowska was indeed part of the underground, complaining only that it made no sense that someone whom she did not know had been chosen to send her a message. "The Blonde" tried sympathy, saying that she too never quite understood what those "on top" were doing. Gradowska persuaded Babulska that they should try to find one of Babulska's contacts. The two women walked arm in arm through Warsaw, stopping to look into restaurants and shop windows. Babulska spoke admiringly of the reconstruction of Warsaw, and longingly of the ny-lons she saw but could not afford; the agent believed she was asking for clothing in exchange for cooperation. Babulska spotted a male Public Security agent

who was tailing the two women, but attributed her correct identification to nerves. It was a fraught afternoon.⁴

Not having found Babulska's contact, the two women made an appointment for the following day, 22 September 1947. They met on Grójecka Street, and took a walk together while waiting for the tram. Babulska seemed more collected and curious. She asked the agent how long she had known Maciejewska, how often she was in Poland, and the like. "The Blonde" had to dissimulate plausibly without inventing details that would contradict what Babulska might know about the network. Babulska then told Gradowska that she would take her to see an important person, to whom everything must be explained. They took tram 25 to Poznańska Street, and walked to the Swiss Pastry Shop. Awaiting them was Irena Repp, who without introducing herself gave the agent a thorough questioning. All Repp said about herself was that she was the cousin of the final recipient of the coded message, which was not true. She was, however, much closer to Józewski than Babulska: although both women had distributed his newspapers, Repp had hidden him from November 1945 through March 1946, and probably knew his present whereabouts. As Babulska nervously watched the street, Repp put the agent through her paces.

"The Blonde" was ready. She produced a second letter from Maciejewska, who was still in jail. Interrogators had wrenched from her a story of a missing fifty dollars, and Gradowska now claimed that she had to see the final addressee of the original encrypted message in this matter of the funds. This was a well-chosen gambit, designed to provoke anxiety. To possess dollars was a crime against the state, and to lose them was a failure of conspiracy. Repp stayed calm. She asked "the Blonde" if she knew this person herself, and the agent had to admit that she did not.⁵ Repp was the seventh link in the chain. She had revealed nothing except her appearance. Naturally, she was followed and identified, almost certainly by the undercover male agents who followed the women to the pastry shop. Repp and Babulska were soon arrested.⁶

Operation "Traitor"

Aniela Maciejewska writes "The Professor" from Prison

Ela Gradowska takes the false letter to Anna Babulska

Babulska summons Irena Repp to question Gradowska

Babulska arrested 24 September, reveals another contact

Irena Repp arrested 25 September, reveals nothing

Operation "Boarding School" initiated that day

With four women now in custody, Public Security initiated Operation "Boarding School" on 25 September 1947. The cryptonym "Boarding School" might have referred to Irena Repp; before 1939 she had directed one of the boarding schools of Janusz Korczak.⁷ The cryptonym may also have been a joking reference to the pseudonym of the addressee of the encrypted message, whom the women called "the Professor." In Poland, teachers at boarding schools might be so addressed. At any event, Public Security now knew that the main target was "the Professor," the leader of "an illegal political intelligence group." To reach him, Public Security had to exploit at least one of the women in custody. Pyke and Maciejewska did not have any close contacts. Repp did, but refused to talk, or rather would talk at length, but only about her work with children. Babulska had fairly close contacts and betrayed some willingness to cooperate. Babulska was told that she could improve her own situation if she helped to bring "the Professor" to justice. To reach "the Professor," Public Security began the "moral preparation" of Babulska to collaborate in a provocation.⁸ Babulska had another contact besides Repp: Michalina Krzyżanowska. Agent Gradowska and Babulska traveled together to pay a visit to Krzyżanowska, who knew where to find "the Professor." The relationship between the two women had changed. Babulska now knew that "the Blonde" was a functionary of Public Security.⁹

Their target was vulnerable. Michalina Krzyżanowska was not a young woman. She had spent some of the war in Auschwitz. Until early 1947, she had lived in a camp for people who had survived German concentration camps.¹⁰ That spring, she had just established herself anew in her studio on Koszykowa Street. Krzyżanowska and Idalia Korsak decided to spend the summer of 1947 in Silesia painting fresh landscapes. Soon after the pair of ladies arrived, Krzyżanowska was attacked and robbed, and spent what was to be her vacation in recovery in the hospital in Cieplice. It was from her hospital bed that she now greeted Anna Babulska and "the Blonde." Babulska introduced her companion as a courier with an urgent message for "the Professor" about Irena Repp's recent arrest. As ever, Public Security matched its narrative provocation with the facts on the ground that it had created. Repp was indeed under arrest: mention of this fact provided credibility for the messenger, justified haste, and created anxiety. Krzyżanowska, weak as she was, must have had her doubts. She did write a card for the pair of women, but it was addressed not to "the Professor" but to a villa in Podkowa inhabited by Helena Świąćka.¹¹ Helena Świąćka was in fact Helena Józewska, Józewski's sister. Since brother and sister were both residing in Podkowa, the message did lead Public Security much closer to

Józewski. Yet Helena Józewska was an intelligent, experienced conspirator, and fanatically devoted to her brother.¹² In all likelihood Krzyżanowska felt that she was in no position to refuse to send the message, and trusted Józewska to forestall any potential danger. It was the afternoon of 27 September 1947. Exactly two months after the first courier had been apprehended, the officers of Public Security believed they had found their way to her message's intended recipient. Soon, it seemed, they would lay hands on "the Professor."

A TRAP LAID

Agent Gradomska returned to the local Public Security office in Jelenia Góra with the card and its Podkowa address. Her superiors decided to arrest "the Professor" at once. Public Security sent a group of forty men, commanded by two lieutenant colonels and accompanied by Agent Gradomska. "The Blonde" was expected to continue her impersonation of an underground courier, to take "the Professor" by stealth rather than storm if possible. It was late at night when the Public Security detachment arrived in Podkowa. Agent Gradomska knocked on the door. In the previous two months, "the Blonde" had navigated her way from the beginning of the chain almost to its end, and now faced but one more woman. She introduced herself to Helena as a courier with an urgent message for "the Professor." For the first time, she found herself refused. The two lieutenant colonels then tried their luck, claiming to be underground men with a message for "the Professor." Helena listened to their long protestations of innocence of any connection with Public Security. She seems not to have believed them. Their very gender was suspicious. All of Józewski's couriers were female, as were all eight of the intermediaries between him and the source of this particular message. His sister Helena acted, however, as if she believed the men, and told the two officers that "the Professor" would meet them at one of the local villas. Helena led the two officers to that villa, then continued alone into the dark forest. The two officers, playing their roles, chose to wait. She tapped on her brother's window and explained the situation. "That's not the underground, that's Public Security," was all he said. Józewski took his photo of Julia from his bedside table, gathered his documents, and ran outside to hide in the underbrush. Then he waited. Shortly, two trucks unloaded the forty Public Security men. They identified his villa, and seized his printing press. Józewski made his way on foot to Milanówek. It was a good night for walking, he knew the woods, and (even at the age of fifty-five) he always liked his chances in a

hunt. From Milanówek he took a bus to Warsaw. The original message remained encrypted and undelivered. Its origins in the British zone of occupied Germany remained mysterious. Józewski was still free.¹³

The security men arrested Helena Józewska, who joined the other women as prisoners taken in Operations "Traitor" and "Boarding School." Józewski's sister pursued an interesting strategy during her months of interrogation. She continued to use her wartime pseudonym, Święcka—their mother's maiden name. Helena readily admitted that she knew "the Professor"—since, she maintained, he was her lover. She characterized their relationship, as if hopefully, as that of a couple engaged to be married: "he kept promising to marry me." Helena granted that she knew "the Professor's" name and life history—and claimed that his name was Jacek Florkowski, and that he had been an official in Wilno before the war. She denied knowing his wartime address in Warsaw. Asked how this could be, she explained. Although she had invited herself to his apartment many times, he was ever the gentleman and insisted on meeting in cafés. She was happy to give the addresses of the cafés, and then to lead Public Security officers on romantic if pointless tours of Warsaw. Questions about "the Professor's" political activity she turned aside. She knew, she said, that he was involved in political work, and respected his wishes not to speak about it. Annoyed officers asked sarcastically if she took any interest in his life at all. She responded sweetly, claiming that she did her very best to look after him, and that this was the most important kind of interest. Asked what they talked about if they avoided politics, she said that they dreamed of their future life together.¹⁴

Helena Józewska seemed to inspire respect among her interrogators, or at least to arouse discomfort. She was a striking middle-aged woman of some education and attainment, at a time when Public Security was flooded with rough young men keen for social advancement. She calmly smoked the cigarettes her interrogators gave her, and spoke openly to them of passion and desire. The interrogators forgot themselves and (according to their own interrogation protocols) used the polite form of address—the equivalent of "madam"—when questioning her.¹⁵ That is indeed how young men address older women in Poland: but it was not how officers of Public Security were supposed to interrogate prisoners in 1947. During her interrogation, Public Security identified "the Professor" as Henryk Józewski, on the basis of information from other prisoners under arrest on other charges. On 17 December 1947 the interrogators began their questioning by asking Helena how long she had known Henryk

Józewski. She denied that she knew him personally, but did seem to remember, she said, reading something about his work as governor of Volhynia in the interwar press.¹⁶

On 10 April 1948 the procurator closed the case: the subject knew nothing about politics, he found, and was connected to Józewski only by personal intimacy. The investigators had accepted Helena's tale that she was Józewski's girlfriend, and ignorant of his political work. The devoted sister played the distracted lover to the end. The finding of innocence was a serious conclusion, as Helena had been arrested on the charge of espionage.¹⁷ Just then, Public Security must have received a tip: from the outside, from one of the other women under interrogation, or from someone interrogated in another case. On 20 April 1948, ten days after "Helena Święcka" had been found innocent, Helena Józewska was interrogated under her own name. She briefly explained that she had used her mother's maiden name to distance herself from her brother. The following day she was required to sign a statement obliging her not to reveal what she had seen while under arrest. Then she was released. It may be that the officers involved in her first interrogation preferred to let her go than to admit their embarrassing mistake and their waste of six months. Public Security did follow Helena, in the hopes of revealing Józewski. They traced her to the studio on Koszykowa Street which she had shared with Michalina Krzyżanowska.¹⁸ By September 1948, when Public Security decided to arrest Helena Józewska again, she had disappeared.¹⁹

Public Security learned little from the other three women held in custody. Officers expected the most from Anna Babulska, whom they had already induced to collaborate in the manhunt. They believed that she was "morally separated from the group we are working on, thanks to her testimony, to her execution of our tasks, and our suggestions."²⁰ Babulska had also expressed a desire to rehabilitate herself, which officers believed they could exploit. On 22 October 1947 Anna Babulska obliged herself to cooperate with "the Organs of Public Security." According to the pledge she signed, noncompliance would bring about her prosecution for previous political crimes as well as for the revelation of state secrets. Public Security now understood that Michalina Krzyżanowska and Idalia Korsak were direct links to Józewski, and planned to use Babulska to exploit the two women. Babulska, grandly christened "Agent Truth," was sent to her task. There were three problems with this approach. First, Krzyżanowska and Korsak had disappeared after the failed attempt to arrest Józewski. Second, it seems extremely unlikely that they would have cooperated with Babulska, since she had already brought an agent of Public Security

to Krzyżanowska's hospital bed. Third, Babulska, once released, showed no real inclination to collaborate further. After a few desultory meetings with Agent Gradowska, and some requests for clothing, she disappeared in November 1947. She was apprehended again, but eventually released without charges in July 1948.²¹

Aniela Maciejewska was also recruited, with no success. In poor health, she endured three months of interrogations, and was released in February 1948. She had to report regularly to her minder for a few months, but what she reported was that she had told friends of her arrest. This is behavior proper to a conspirator, not to an informer. Maciejewska was of little if any use as an informer, and was released from supervision in July 1948.²² Irena Repp had proven steadfast and loyal to Józewski from the beginning. Unlike the other women, Repp was married, and Public Security tried to exploit this relationship. The husband was told that if he provided information about his wife's contacts, her release would be expedited. Mieczysław Repp was given an agent's cryptonym, "Olga," but never in fact provided any information. He was instructed to report on her and her contacts, but seems not to have done anything of the sort. Officers of Public Security called him a "coward" for failing to betray his wife. Irena Repp was released on 9 April 1948.²³ By summer 1948, Public Security had released everyone implicated in Operations "Traitor" and "Boarding School" (except for the courier, who vanishes from the record), and was no closer to finding Józewski than they had been a year before.

THE PLANNING BUREAU

After his flight from arrest in September 1947, Józewski took refuge in Warsaw. The city, almost totally destroyed by the Germans after the Warsaw Uprising, was being rebuilt. Housing was still in extremely short supply. Communist social policy had a sort of answer to this problem: people were expected to live with total strangers. Many of Józewski's wartime contacts would have sheltered him, but they could not trust their fellow tenants in crowded communal apartments not to report a new arrival to the police. Once again, women provided the solution. While taking shelter in Podkowa with the Niemyski family during the war, Józewski had come to know two cousins of his hosts: Janina Parys and Wanda Sokołowska. The two women now shared a small apartment on Pilecka Street in Warsaw, one room divided by a curtain. They allowed Józewski to stay, although all three of them found the situation highly uncomfortable. To prevent neighbors from hearing a man's heavy footsteps, Józewski had to wear soft

slippers. When guests arrived, Józewski had to hide behind the curtain and breathe as quietly as he could. He smoked his cigarettes in the bathroom, exhaling the smoke through a hole in the ceiling.²⁴

Meanwhile, Józewski's confederates from the anticommunist underground were apprehended, arrested, and tried before military tribunals. Józewski's contacts in WIN and the underground political parties were tried as spies before the Warsaw Military Court in December 1947. The presiding judge passed, in his words, "judgment on a dying world."²⁵ The new WIN leadership was also arrested while Józewski hid in Warsaw. Its last commander was interrogated and tortured for three years, then executed.²⁶ In the meantime, Public Security was able to exploit WIN's record of achievement for its own purposes. In April 1948, a courier arrived from London to investigate the state of WIN. He was met by a man he trusted, who informed him that WIN had been re-created. The courier brought back the good news to London. The new WIN, however, was a provocation, an "inspiration" in the Polish intelligence jargon. It was led by Public Security functionaries, former WIN members who had been captured and turned, and a few true WIN officers who were unaware of the actual situation. This false WIN was enlisted by British and U.S. intelligence. The United States channeled at least \$1.1 million to this WIN, thereby helping to finance the communist regime. In return, Public Security provided the Americans with falsified documents. This organized disinformation campaign was reminiscent of the Bolsheviks' Trust inspiration of the 1920s.²⁷ James Angleton of the CIA apparently noticed the resemblance.²⁸ Jerzy Niezbrzycki, the pre-war director of the Eastern Section of the Second Department, now writing in America as Richard Wraga, warned to no avail about "more Trusts."²⁹ He was apparently correct that the Trust was taught at the KGB academy as a model operation.³⁰ His warning, the conclusion of an article written in English, was rejected as irrelevant to contemporary affairs by several American publications.³¹ The innocent London courier continued his missions to Poland. It was from him that Public Security learned that Józewski was still in Poland, sending reports to London. Józewski had spread the rumor that he had fled to the West; Western intelligence agencies unwittingly betrayed his whereabouts.³²

Contact with the West was increasingly difficult, and reliable couriers were hard to come by. It appears that Józewski's most trusted contacts, at that difficult moment, were his fellow conspirators of the Nazi occupation. In late 1945, General Tokarzewski had attempted to restore contact with Józewski from Italy, while Józewski tried to reach Tokarzewski by way of Tadeusz Pełczyński's wife Wanda Pełczyńska.³³ Pełczyńska was another of the couriers that popu-

lated Józewski's female acquaintance. She had served as a courier for the Legions and the Polish Military Organization. During the interwar period she was one of Poland's leading social activists and feminist writers. Along with Dąbrowska, she published memoirs of women who fought for Polish independence. As editor of the magazine *Modern Woman*, she published, for example, Dąbrowska and Zofia Nałkowska. In the late 1930s, Pełczyńska was a parliamentary deputy. In parliament she was an advocate of the rights of Poland's Ukrainian minority.³⁴ In 1940 she joined the Union of Armed Struggle in Wilno and was imprisoned by the Soviets. She was released after Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, and made her way to Warsaw. There she worked in the Home Army's Bureau of Information and Propaganda. It was she who distributed funds from the Home Army to Józewski as subsidies for his publications, such as *Poland Fights*. She had found him in his hospital bed in 1943 to deliver funds.³⁵ In autumn 1945 she found him again. She had joined her husband Tadeusz Pełczyński in London, after his release from the German prisoner of war camp where he had been sent after the Warsaw Uprising. Together with Tokarzewski, it appears, the Pełczyńskis sought to renew contact with Józewski at war's end.

It was Tokarzewski's courier Felicja Wolff (alias Elżbieta, Ela, Anna Neuman, Auntie, Maria Federowicz, Halina Nowak, Gertruda Cieślík, Ksawery Gieda, Magda, Zofia, Stefania, Zawadzka, Hermanegilde, Cieciewicz, Mery, and Tekla) who found Józewski.³⁶ She was sent by Tokarzewski, but was acting on behalf of certain Polish authorities. In Italy, the Anders Army had an intelligence arm known, rather innocently, as the Planning Bureau. After the evacuation of Polish soldiers from Italy to Britain, the Planning Bureau continued gathering intelligence within Poland.³⁷ The operation in Britain was led by Colonel Franciszek Demel. The Planning Bureau secured a few tens of thousands of dollars each year, which was enough to support a network in western and central Europe.³⁸ In the United Kingdom, Wolff was among the thirty-five or so Poles who worked for the Bureau.³⁹ She was one of the very few couriers (at some points, perhaps, the only one) who could be relied upon to cross the Polish border and return safely. In autumn 1946 Wolff brought Józewski two thousand dollars in cash, letters from Pełczyński and Tokarzewski, and a message from the Planning Bureau. He gave Wolff a political report. Wolff remained in Poland until April 1947, and probably met with Józewski on several more occasions.⁴⁰ She made the return trip safely, reporting in London in May 1947. She portrayed Józewski as the Planning Bureau's most important asset inside Poland. Speaking of the Planning Bureau's ambition to support a newspaper, she

characterized Józewski (whom she called “the Lawyer”) as “the most modest and the most responsible of all of the people at our disposal, and perhaps the only one to whom such important work as the press can be entrusted.” Her only worry was that, in the absence of contact with the international press, he would “drift into purely philosophical reflections and cease to be relevant to the moment.”⁴¹ She noted that he was careful with money, and lived humbly himself. He tried to support the families of those who had been arrested in connection with his illegal work. “Characteristic of him,” reported Wolff, “is the ambition that the people from whom he has demanded collaboration should feel that he is caring for them in times of misfortune.”⁴²

Wolff was dispatched back to Poland in early October 1947, mainly to work again with Józewski.⁴³ She sought him in Podkowa, but he had just fled from arrest as a result of Operation “Boarding School.” Wolff found his former landlady, who recounted the events. The landlady had enjoyed Józewski’s trust, because she was the sister of a longtime close associate of Piłsudski, Witold Jodko. Jodko had been Polish ambassador to Turkey, and a participant in the Promethean project.⁴⁴ Like Wolff, she knew Józewski’s identity, so the two women could speak openly. In late 1947 Józewski was wearing his soft slippers and hiding behind his curtain in Warsaw. It appears that Wolff located him there, and escorted him to a better hiding place in Gliwice. It was probably there that she carried out her main orders from the Planning Bureau: to give Józewski two thousand dollars and a radio. She may also have given him some penicillin and a hundred dollars from Tokarzewski. She was also to make arrangements for his flight from Poland. He apparently refused to countenance leaving the country. He gave her a letter for Pełczyński. She stayed in the country until December.⁴⁵

Wolff and Józewski were becoming regular companions. She was the conduit of his remaining political activity. Political work within Poland was by now nearly impossible—one of the messages he conveyed to London. The most he could do was to keep London informed about the changes he observed or learned about from his ever narrowing circle of informants. Wolff was more than a courier, however: she had become something of a guardian angel. Not only did she move Józewski to Gliwice and deliver to him the necessary supplies and funds from London, she also arranged for him to receive a new set of false identification papers. While in Poland, she saw Józewski regularly. Upon an agreed signal, they would meet at ten o’clock in the morning the following Sunday at the Church of Our Savior in Warsaw.⁴⁶ Wolff was also in contact



Figure 19. Felicja Wolff. Daniel Bargiełowski.

with Wanda Sokołowska in Warsaw, whom she also met at the same church on Sundays. When Józewski moved to Wrocław in spring 1948, Wolff located him there without difficulty. She arrived in March, again with the major purpose of communicating with Józewski. This time, she had been sent to escort him abroad. Again he refused, and gave her a report for Tokarzewski in London. She crossed the border on 1 May with some smugglers to the Soviet zone of Germany, then made her way to the French sector of Berlin, and thence to the West.⁴⁷

"INTERNATIONALISM" AND INTERMARIUM

Wrocław had been the German city of Breslau until 1945, and was the most beautiful and important Silesian city grafted to Poland by the postwar settlements. Józewski lived there in deep secrecy, not contacting his friends Stanisław Stempowski and Maria Dąbrowska, who happened to be in Wrocław at the time. Wrocław featured the social chaos characteristic of all of the formerly German "recovered territories." As the city's prewar and wartime population had been almost completely replaced by newcomers, no one could be quite sure who lived where. The city's native Jewish population had been exterminated, and its native German population had been expelled. At the end of 1945, Germans outnumbered Poles in the city by five to one. Just sixteen months later, Poles outnumbered Germans by more than twenty to one.⁴⁸ In all this motion it was easy for many conspirators to hide. Yet Wrocław was repopulated after the war by Poles from the east, people who had escaped Ukrainian ethnic cleansing or were deported by the Soviets from Galicia and Volhynia. It was this, and Józewski's longing for art, that forced him to leave the city: he attended an exhibition celebrating Poland's annexation of the "recovered territories," and there he was recognized by an eastern Pole who remembered the former governor of Volhynia.⁴⁹ He fled at once. To be recognized risked being reported, and arrest at this moment would have meant certain execution.⁵⁰

In February 1949, as Józewski fled Wrocław, Poland was in the throes of high Stalinism. Jakub Berman, the politburo member responsible for internal affairs, subjected the Ministry of Public Security to review. He criticized the apparatus for its failure to understand the dialectic of history. As Stalin had explained in the 1930s, Berman recalled, the class struggle actually intensifies as communism is constructed. Public Security, following this logic, must increase, not decrease, its ability to suppress the class enemy. The absence of empirical evidence of opposition activity was of no consequence. Indeed, the absence of evidence was itself a reason for suspicion, and a justification for heightened vigilance. Whether or not resistance could actually be found, history guaranteed its existence, so enemies must be sought out and preemptively suppressed. The logic of Stalinism began to be applied in Poland. The thesis of the intensification of the class struggle therefore included, as in the Soviet model of the 1930s, a corollary about the appearance of the internal enemy. Leading communists were arrested as "right-wing national deviationists." Pub-

lic Security also arrested officers of the Home Army and WIN who had already accepted an earlier amnesty, or had already served their sentences in prison.⁵¹

Internationalism, as reinterpreted by Moscow after the Second World War, meant the division of the world into “two camps.” In some sense, this was an extension of Stalin’s view that socialism was to be built in one country, despite the hostility of the rest of the world. As the Soviet Union created and consolidated its bloc in eastern Europe, and after the communist revolution in China, Stalinists could no longer speak of “one country,” but they could speak of “one camp”: the Soviet Union and its communist allies. Just as contacts with then-“bourgeois” Poland had been inherently suspicious in the 1930s, so now contacts with noncommunist Europe or North America were treated as contaminating. Poland’s Stalinists also had an idea of Józewski’s importance abroad. Reports from 1949 to 1951 treated Józewski as a major source of information for Poles in London, as well as for “Anglo-Saxon intelligence”: MI6 and the CIA.⁵² Polish intelligence knew that one of Józewski’s contacts was Pełczyński.⁵³ Józewski was reputedly known in the West as an expert on Ukrainian and Russian affairs. Other reports associated Józewski with a general initiative from the West to end Polish-Ukrainian conflict, so that Polish and Ukrainian opposition movements could work together against communism. Another report spoke of an imperialist plot known as the “Five Generals,” with Józewski being one of the five.⁵⁴ Józewski was also portrayed as an agent of “Intermarium.”⁵⁵ This was a term for the land between the Baltic and Black Seas—an old geographical preoccupation of Polish and Roman Catholic intellectuals. After the Second World War, the *Intermarium Bulletin* was the very modest publication of a club of exiled East European federalists. The *Bulletin* described both Nazi and Soviet ideologies as totalitarian, and presented the idea of a Central European Federation as a counterweight to both Germany and Russia.⁵⁶ The most direct connection between Józewski and this new Intermarium project was personal. His friend Juliusz Poniatowski was the vice president of the Central European Federal Club, which published the *Intermarium Bulletin*.⁵⁷ Józewski asked the Planning Bureau about the progress of Poniatowski’s Intermarium initiative, and the Planning Bureau was clearly connected to Intermarium in some way.⁵⁸

Intermarium might have offered an escape from communist Poland to Italy. Józewski refused all such offers, while spreading the cover story that he had left the country in 1947. Józewski said that he remained in Poland because he believed in a coming Third World War, and that those Poles who had endured communism would be best placed to lead the government of a postcommunist

Poland. There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of these views, which correspond to the combination of crusading optimism and ruthless tactical sense that characterized Józewski's entire adult life. He had indeed tried during the Second World War to create a political as well as a conspiratorial organization. By the end of the war, he was perhaps the only major Polish politician associated with Piłsudski to have rehabilitated himself by his wartime actions in the eyes of previous opponents of the Piłsudski regime. Whatever chances his tiny organizations would have had in democratic elections, Józewski certainly continued to believe that communism could not last.

He might have had another, unspoken, reason to remain in Poland rather than make the risky and perhaps irreversible decision to emigrate. Józewski was himself a man of the borderlands, and had made several risky border crossings in his youth. As governor of Volhynia, he had overseen the systematic breaching of the Soviet frontier by agents of Poland. Many of them were Ukrainians, with a political agenda of their own. Many others were Russians, who sometimes did not even know that the Polish state stood behind the front organizations that organized their journeys. Józewski understood, then, that border crossings were a moment of special vulnerability, physical but also intellectual and moral. Had he been smuggled out after the Second World War, he would no longer be quite the free agent he had been. In the best case, he would owe a debt, without knowing all of the creditors. Although he and Wolff were rather close, it is unclear that he knew just where all of his dollars came from (he knew that some came from Tokarzewski personally), or had even heard the name "Planning Bureau." In the worst case, a border crossing could fail, or even turn out to be a provocation. Since Kim Philby, a Soviet agent, was the British field operative for eastern Europe, this concern would have been justified. Given Józewski's own ideas of his importance, he might have considered it safest to remain where he was. In an odd sense, it was in Poland that Józewski remained free.

THE THIRD DEPARTMENT

So long as Józewski remained in Poland, Public Security had every reason to find him. In late 1948, his case was transferred from Department I, charged with counterintelligence, to Department III, charged with defeating political opposition. Department III immediately complained of the lack of information on the people they were supposed to find: Józewski himself, but also Michalina Krzyżanowska, Idalia Korsak, and Maria Sipayłło.⁵⁹ They com-

plained of the lack of agents; informers were their major means of locating people in hiding. Department III insisted on learning the identities of the three supposed "agents" that Department I had ostensibly "recruited" in 1947: Anna Babulska, "Agent Truth"; Mieczysław Repp, "Agent Olga"; and the barber Ryszard Celkowski, who was noted in the records as "Agent 1001." None of these people had provided any useful information after September 1947, and none of them was helpful now.⁶⁰ The simple fact that a name was recorded in secret police files as that of an "agent" did not mean that the person in question collaborated. The old "agents" having failed them, the officers of Department III tried to recruit new ones. They could find very few people in the country who might actually have known Józewski well enough to ascertain his location. Józewski had, after all, been underground for more than nine years, since 1939. Department III planned to recruit Zygmunt Beczkowicz, who was spreading the cover story that Józewski was abroad. This led to nothing.⁶¹ They then tried to arrest Wacław Szuyski, a comrade of Józewski during the German occupation. Szuyski somehow learned of the trap laid at his business office, and escaped the day before the Public Security men arrived. He managed to run his company for the next several months from a place of hiding. His employees refused to cooperate with the authorities. Szuyski was not apprehended.⁶²

A single betrayal can destroy a conspiracy. Yet Department III of Public Security lacked that one informer. In all of Poland, throughout 1949 and 1950, they could find no one willing and able to aid them in finding Józewski. They resorted to simpler measures. They checked the address of Helena Święcka and Michalina Krzyżanowska in Warsaw, the studio at 24 Koszykowa Street. As they might have known had they read the records of Department I, the women had fled.⁶³ They staked out the house of a woman named Sabrina Krzyżanowska, who was perhaps (but perhaps not) a relative of Michalina. The Public Security agent who watched the house was to report on who entered. His report said that another Public Security agent had entered the house—to warn Sabrina that she was under surveillance.⁶⁴ Public Security put out a general search bulletin to members of the communist party. This brought reports that were worse than useless. One party member summoned Public Security, claiming that he had seen someone who looked very much like Józewski. As it turned out, the person in question wore no beard nor mustache, as Józewski did at the time; did not walk with a limp, as Józewski did after the attack of 1943; and was by trade a coal miner, not a painter.⁶⁵ The central office of Department III in Warsaw complained, with some justice, that its regional offices were useless. One lieutenant colonel wrote of the "great chaos" that destroyed

investigations, since local “functionaries do not know which matters are theirs, nor how to work on them.”⁶⁶ But at the end of 1950, even Warsaw officers had to admit that the entire investigation had brought “very weak results.”⁶⁷ In fact, it had brought none. In this case, at least, Public Security was unable to find any purchase in Polish society.

In the conditions of Stalinist Poland, to hide any one person sought by the authorities required a conspiracy. Six people at least were at large, “the Professor” and five conspiring women. Józewski was in hiding, but then so was Felicja Wolff (when she was in Poland), and so were Helena Józewska, Michalina Krzyżanowska, Idalia Korsak, and Maria Sipayłło. To hide for years from Public Security, they needed help. The most important source of aid was Irena Wojnicz, an optometrist by profession, and a friend of Józewski from prewar years in Łuck.⁶⁸ Irena Wojnicz took vows as a nun in communist Poland. Sister Irena seems to have hidden Michalina Krzyżanowska, Idalia Korsak, and Helena Józewska in the Ursuline convent in Ożarów for over a year. Helena remained with Wojnicz thereafter, while Krzyżanowski and Korsak made for Zakopane: the most famous artists’ colony in Poland, associated with the literary modernism of some of its early admirers and the natural beauty of the Tatra Mountains. Poets and painters found much to idealize in the mountainous landscape and the mountain people of the region. Krzyżanowska and Korsak lived on false papers and painted, and for good measure distributed Józewski’s publications to the local people.⁶⁹ At moments of special risk, Sister Irena also took in Felicja Wolff. Sister Irena served as a courier among all of the other women, and made sure that Józewski had news of his sister and friends. Meanwhile, Wanda Sokołowska and Janina Parys, in Warsaw, continued to serve as intermediaries between couriers from London and Józewski. Perhaps more remarkable still, Maria Sipayłło continued to work for Józewski. She had barely escaped arrest when WIN was liquidated, and now ran great risks. Her brother Janusz Sipayłło, living in the open, collected information which Maria then conveyed to Józewski. Janusz and his lover collected the gossip of diplomatic wives and the braggadocio of Public Security commanders, and sent their news on to Józewski, who then used it in his reports to London.⁷⁰ This was more than a conspiracy of safety. It was an international political network, modest in scale, operating in the demanding conditions of high Stalinism.

Felicja Wolff appeared in Poland once again in autumn 1949. This journey had been more dangerous than preceding ones. She traveled by way of Munich and through Czechoslovakia, which was by this time, like Poland, a communist country and part of the Soviet zone of influence. Her guide in Czechoslovakia

was careless, and both were arrested by Czechoslovak security organs. Wolff discarded her dollars and ate her instructions, and admitted to nothing under interrogation. In July 1949 the Czechoslovak organs passed her to Polish Public Security, who interrogated her until October. She admitted nothing and was released. Believing that she should complete her mission, she contacted the theosophist Jadwiga Piekarska, who helped her pass money to Józewski.⁷¹ By this time, Józewski was staying in Ostrówek with Jan Chomicz, his cousin and onetime personal secretary. Józewski had prepared a political report for Tokarzewski, which he gave to Wolff, probably by way of Piekarska. In this report he called the Roman Catholic Church the only national institution uncorrupted by communism. Józewski was not a conventional believer and was not observant, and this was a new political judgment. It was perhaps partly grounded in Sister Irena's successful efforts to shelter his sister and friends in a convent.⁷² It may also have flowed from his connection to Wolff, a devout Catholic.

A SECRET LIFE IN TODAY'S CONDITIONS

It may also have been a case of welcoming any port in a storm. Józewski had worries. By now he had lived underground for more than a decade. It was difficult to maintain emotional ties to the world before the war, while preserving his entirely falsified identity in Stalinist Poland. Seeming annoyances became moments of crisis. His pocket was picked in Lublin, for example, and he lost his documents and his photographs of Julia.⁷³ While Józewski took the risk of seeking out an old friend to get another picture of his wife, Wolff arranged for another set of forged documents. Józewski was also worried by the disappearance of one copy of a report he had written for London. Maria Sipayłło had typed two copies for him, which he had hidden in the bathroom in Ostrówek. One day he noticed that one of the copies was missing. Although it had probably been taken by some children, Józewski nevertheless burned the other copy and sought a new hiding place.⁷⁴ The Chomicz family agreed to allow him to live on another property, in Jaszczów, near Lublin. The arrangements were carefully made. The family in Jaszczów placed an advertisement in the local paper for a gardener.⁷⁵ Józewski appeared and applied for the "job," and was "hired" in spring 1951. Wolff escorted him from Ostrówek to Lublin. Then she tried to leave the country.⁷⁶ She was arrested by Polish border guards on the night of 6 June 1951. Like Imgard Pyke four years earlier, she was taken to the Public Security office at Jelenia Góra for questioning.⁷⁷

At some point in summer 1951, the theosophist Janina Piekarska was also ar-

rested. Under arrest, Piekarska told what she knew, apparently because she was constitutionally unable to lie. Piekarska apparently admitted her connection to “the Professor,” but she did not know Józewski’s identity or location. She did name her own contact: Wanda Sokołowska in Warsaw. Wanda Sokołowska was arrested on 2 November 1951, and revealed that she had sent messages to Henryk Józewski.⁷⁸ Public Security had hoped to trace Piekarska to someone important. It seemed that they had succeeded. Yet Sokołowska did not know Józewski’s whereabouts. Wolff probably did, but it appears that she said nothing, neither at this moment nor in her years of prison to come.⁷⁹ This is remarkable. The women arrested in 1947 and held in 1948 in Operations “Traitor” and “Boarding School” were apparently not physically tortured, although they were subject to psychological pressure. Between 1949 and 1953, however, during the period of high Stalinism in Poland, the torture of political prisoners was routine. This abuse included beatings, long spells of standing on one leg, and hoodings. During interrogation sessions in Stalinist Poland, prisoners were also subjected to the following tortures, among others:

- (1) “The jazz game.” An interrogator rhythmically beats the prisoner’s fingertips with his club, and rhythmically crushes her feet with his boots. The prisoner loses her fingernails and toenails.
- (2) “Sitting on the rod.” A stool is reversed, so that its legs point towards the ceiling. The prisoner is ordered to sit on one of the legs, and raise her arms and legs. The leg of the stool penetrates the rectum and large intestine.
- (3) “Burning.” Two men hold the prisoner’s arms. A third burns each of her fingertips, then the edges of her mouth and eyes, with a lit cigarette. The cigarette is extinguished on the prisoner’s forehead.
- (4) “The Little Windmill.” The prisoner is dragged through the room by her hair.

Other tortures were administered in the cell. They included:

- (1) “The Shower.” The prisoner stands on a concrete block for an entire night. From time to time, she is doused by cold water from the toilets.
- (2) “Water Deprivation.” When a thirsty prisoner asks for water, she is forced to eat salty fish.
- (3) “Whispers in the Cell.” The prisoner hears whispers at night about bodily functions, such as perspiration. She begins to lose her ability to distinguish between real and imagined whispers, and loses control of bodily functions.⁸⁰

By arresting Wolff, Public Security had removed Józewski's link to London, but they were no closer to catching the man himself. As a captain had to admit on 9 November 1951, "thus far, investigation materials have revealed nothing about the activity of Józewski's group, its tasks and direction."⁸¹ In this moment of Stalinist paranoia, the very difficulty of the manhunt seemed to escalate suspicions. Officers began to suspect that Józewski's reports to London drew on contacts inside the Soviet Union. In May 1952, Public Security turned to a historical investigation. Perhaps wishing to check on the possibility of Soviet contacts, or believing that someone among Józewski's interwar friends must know his whereabouts, they commissioned a study on the leading personalities of interwar Volhynia.⁸² Volhynia had been incorporated by Soviet Ukraine, and Volhynian Poles on both sides of the border became suspects. This guess was not wrong. At the time the study was commissioned, Józewski was in fact hiding with the family of his former secretary in Łuck. By chance or by design, the former Volhynian official who authored the study, the commissioner of Łuck county under Józewski, omitted to mention this particular individual, whom he knew quite well.

Public Security did not follow every lead. The most famous visitor to interwar Volhynia, the novelist Maria Dąbrowska, was a public personality in Warsaw. Public Security knew that Dąbrowska had been Józewski's close collaborator during the German occupation, and correctly believed that she had written "ideological articles" for *Independent Poland*. From Public Security's point of view, this was a heavy political crime. Her name figured in Operations "Traitor" and "Boarding School" from 1947 through 1953. Dąbrowska was also in touch with emigrants who wrote about Poland, such as Jerzy Stempowski, who was beginning a second career as an essayist and translator for the Paris monthly *Kultura*.⁸³ Despite all of these grounds for arrest, Public Security treated the novelist rather differently than Józewski's other female co-conspirators.⁸⁴ Precisely because she was a popular and admired writer, the regime sought to exploit her name and talent to legitimate the new order. Terror and culture were intimately connected in Stalinist Poland. Jakub Berman was the politburo member responsible for both. Jacek Różański, the head of the investigative department of Public Security, was the brother of Jerzy Borejsza, the commissar for culture. Dąbrowska might have been investigated by Różański's men, but instead she was recruited by the cultural apparatus that Borejsza created.

Had Maria Dąbrowska been followed by Różański's agents rather than recruited by Borejsza's, Józewski would probably have been arrested in May 1952. Józewski, having heard of the death of his dear friend and Dąbrowska's life part-

ner Stanisław Stempowski, left his place of hiding for a moment and summoned Dąbrowska to him. She took the train to a provincial station, then followed a path through the woods to the house where Józewski was spending the Easter holidays. "He looks extremely lovely," she confided to her diary,⁸⁵ "he's not wearing a beard as he did during the occupation, but a trimmed gray mustache: a magnificent Polish senator's face, it has been a long time since I have seen him looking so beautiful." The novelist was "simply stunned by the strength of this man's soul and constitution, that he can bear to live a secret life in today's conditions . . ."

Chapter 12 Communist

Prison

In September 1952, after what she called “internal” consultation with her life partner Stanisław Stempowski, who was dead, and her friend Henryk Józewski, who was in hiding, Maria Dąbrowska yielded to the pressure of her country’s communist rulers, and published some of her literary work in an official periodical. Józewski wrote Dąbrowska to call her action “treason.”¹ She had been quite wrong about how her old friend would judge her decision. Alone now in the world, without Stempowski, she had secured a place in the new order for herself, at the cost of a break with her friend. Józewski, too, was ever more alone. His last important political work was his reporting for London, but he had not seen Felicja Wolff since spring 1951. Without an audience, he could write only for himself. He did: a political manifesto about a future united Europe, after the American defeat of the Soviet Union. As his connections to the outside world weakened, his hopes became more general and geopolitical. He placed great stock in the election of a political general, Dwight Eisenhower, to the office of president of the United States in November 1952.² Just as the painter ceased to write for an audience, the novelist began again. Józewski’s dearest

friend living a public life, Dąbrowska, made a compromise with the communists that he could not countenance. His seemingly inexhaustible prewar connections were wearing thin.

His place of hiding was with his relatives, the Chomiczes. He had stayed with his aunt and uncle Chomicz, his mother's sister Ewa and her husband Leonard, after his return from Saratov exile to Kyiv in 1917.³ Now he stayed in a house in Jaszczów owned by Leonard's brother, Jan Chomicz. It is perhaps a sign of the importance and durability of family connections in Poland that he could place his trust in his deceased mother's sister's husband's brother. Yet there was also a more direct connection. The Jan Chomicz who owned the house in Jaszczów was the uncle of another Jan Chomicz, Józewski's first cousin and former personal secretary. This Jan Chomicz probably arranged the stay in Jaszczów with his uncle. Yet Józewski's hosts in Jaszczów were perhaps not the Chomicz family's most reliable members. Jan Chomicz, the uncle, had a lover, Helena Audziejczuk, who was a former employee of Public Security. She had worked on the expulsion of the German population from postwar Poland, as well as in the communist League of Women. Helena Audziejczuk's son, Kazimierz Audziejczuk, was a cadet at the Public Security academy at Legionowo. Kazimierz's wife, Tamara Audziejczuk, was a Public Security functionary, who worked at the prison in Lublin Castle. Kazimierz and Tamara often visited the house in Jaszczów.

Józewski was thus surrounded by people associated with the apparatus that was hunting him. His first cousin and former secretary Jan Chomicz was also living, in Warsaw, in the same house as someone he believed to be connected with Public Security.⁴ Although extreme, this situation was not entirely unrepresentative. Poland had become a police state. Some 200,000 people were employed in the various security services, and another 125,000 served in citizens' militia reserves.⁵ About 85,000 citizens were registered as agents or informers. Public Security already had files on some five million people.⁶ Quantity does not mean quality, though, and not everyone who sought employment in the security services was a devoted communist. Helena fell under the influence of Chomicz and Józewski, both anticommunists. She and the other Audziejczuks knew Józewski as Przemysław Pawłowicz, the gardener. (Przemysław was the name of Józewski's elder brother, and the pseudonym Józewski had used in the Polish Military Organization after his brother was killed in action as a Russian soldier.) Józewski really did work as the gardener, and even won awards for the nuts he cultivated.⁷ For a gardener, however, he was rather inquisitive. He learned from Tamara of the brutal interrogation practices at the Lublin prison.

Kazimierz told him that the cadets feared for their lives, as they would be attacked by anticommunist partisans while on training missions.⁸

In the end, it was apparently Tamara who turned in the gardener: in fact her husband's mother's lover's brother's wife's son, Henryk Józewski, former operative of the Polish Military Organization, former vice minister of internal affairs in the government of Ukraine, former minister of internal affairs in the government of Poland, former governor of Volhynia, one of the last important members of the Polish underground still at large in Stalinist Poland. It is unclear just why she would have done so.⁹ She may have learned of his attempts to persuade her mother-in-law to rejoin the communist party and give him news from the inside. She may have realized that his curiosity about communist prisons was more than incidental. The prison at Lublin Castle had been attacked twice by the underground to liberate political prisoners, so its functionaries were doubtless instructed to report those who showed such an interest.¹⁰ Or she may simply have decided that he was a bad influence, or suspicious in some way. The arrest may also have been a result of a family squabble of some sort. At first Public Security had no idea whom they had apprehended.¹¹ The officers of Public Security, the "beating heart" of the communist party, could be forgiven some momentary palpitations. Józewski was arrested in Jaszców on 3 March 1953; two days later, on 5 March, Stalin died in Moscow.¹²

INTERROGATION

Józewski had remained unidentified until Stalin's death. He knew that this was a victory, but he had no reason to believe that it was an escape. Józewski was sure that any communist government that apprehended him would kill him. Communism, not Stalinism, was the ultimate enemy. He had known communism before Stalin's rise to power. Józewski's own trial by fire had been in 1919 and 1920, during the days of Lenin and Trotsky. The friends of his youth had been executed then, at a time when few had even heard the name Stalin. His Polish communist interrogators of 1953 gave him no reason to believe anything else. Once he was identified, the routine began. He was interrogated in the Mokotów Prison in Warsaw six days a week, for twelve hours a day, by two men—usually by Jan Dyduch, but occasionally by Sławomir Starzewski. The former handled the daily work, while the latter was responsible for political matters his colleague did not understand. Dyduch would fantasize aloud about how Józewski would look at the end of a hangman's rope. He promised that Józewski would be sent to Moscow once Poland's Public Security was finished



Figure 20. Communist Poland.

with him. Moscow, he said, would finish the job. Jacek Róžański, the director of the investigative section of Public Security, would visit the interrogation chamber from time to time. His grinning face reminded Józewski of a drug addict.¹³

Józewski experienced several shocks. The first was his arrest, at a time when his activity was reduced to practically nothing, and at a moment when anti-communists throughout the world had reason for happiness. The second was that Public Security already knew so much. From years of interrogations of other prisoners and provocations of Western intelligence agencies, Public Security had accumulated a vast file on Józewski.¹⁴ The third shock was that Felicja Wolff was also in custody. He seemed to believe that she was too good ever to be caught. In fact, her trial had begun on 17 February 1953. The day after his interrogator showed him her photograph, 26 March 1953, Józewski sat silently in his cell and smoked cigarettes.¹⁵ Yet some surprises were pleasant. He was never tortured. He was allowed to eat, sleep, smoke, and exercise on a regular sched-

ule. He was given no declaration of cooperation to sign. This was his great fear: that he would have to compromise on a matter of principle. He also feared that any such declaration would spoil his chances for American support in post-communist Poland.¹⁶ It is not entirely clear why Józewski was treated so well. He himself believed that he had protectors in the state apparatus, and perhaps abroad as well. This is possible.

Józewski could not have known that he would not be tortured, but he did collect himself and his self-confidence. He reminded himself that he was familiar with interrogation techniques, even if he had never before experienced the prisoner's perspective. He congratulated himself on his previous successes: after all, he had been battling totalitarians all his life, and had eluded the Gestapo and Public Security for more than thirteen years. He must have quickly realized the significance of Stalin's death. He concentrated his mind on re-creating the prison and especially the interrogation chamber as a theater. He imagined the interrogators and the guards as insects, unworthy of normal human attention and concern. He worked to achieve the kind of intellectual distance from his own experiences that would allow him to perform with some dignity and grace. "The play made no sense, but I could hardly fail to play my part. But sometimes," he later recalled, "I felt like a prima donna in the provinces."¹⁷ In the early days, Józewski provoked, letting it be known that he hoped Różański would soon be assassinated, and mentioning high officials of the communist regime whom he knew from the underground. After six weeks of interrogation, there was an intermission.¹⁸ Józewski was left in peace by his interrogators from 22 April to 10 July 1953.

Yet the interrogators enjoyed the advantages inherent in their position. They had already apprehended almost every member of Józewski's circle, and thus had ample material to incriminate him. They enjoyed the basic advantage of knowing in advance what they would ask. Prisoners might prepare a general strategy, or versions of particular events, but it is extremely difficult to anticipate every eventuality. Furthermore, interrogators did not need to ask especially intelligent questions. It is far harder to conspire than to deconspire. Simple questions such as "what was this group?" "what connected you to that individual?" "whom did you see while you were there?" were enough to sketch the shape of organizations. Polish security officers also used the Soviet "biographical method," simply asking prisoners to tell their life stories over and over, seeking novelties and inconsistencies. It is quite difficult to tell exactly the same story each time without notes, especially if elements of the story are false. Each day of interrogation ended with a signed protocol. Interrogators could




Figure 21. Henryk Józewski, 1950s. Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Warsaw.

therefore check what prisoners said each day against a growing record. Functionaries had such protocols from multiple prisoners. Since prisoners were separated one from another, they could not coordinate their stories. The multiplicity of sources of information gave interrogators the possibility to detect falsehoods and omissions. The written word was on their side.

Józewski understood all of this, and performed fairly well. He did fall prey, at

least to some extent, to a standard ruse. His cell mate, who claimed to be an American spy sent from Munich, was a Public Security informer. Every few days he filed reports on what Józewski said during the four waking hours when he was not being interrogated. Józewski did talk to his cell mate, but did not take him especially seriously. Józewski spent most of his time reading philosophy books and mentally preparing his memoirs. He would tell his cell mate that he was bored with their conversation, and return to his reading. After a time, the cell mate began to realize that his own reports to Public Security contradicted one another. Although Józewski did not suspect his cell mate of anything in particular, he did have some conspiratorial habits that he applied generally. He never told the same story the same way twice. He gave one story in at least four different versions. The cell mate could not keep them straight, let alone judge among them. By August, the cell mate was begging to leave. He could no longer stand that Józewski did not make his bed in the morning, and left garbage lying around the cell. He was annoyed that Józewski did not eat all of his food, only what he liked. On 13 August 1953 he complained to his minders: "In Cell 28 there were always rules, which I was taught. He doesn't want to adapt himself to the rules, he says that what I say doesn't go, and only makes life difficult."¹⁹ This is the last extant informer report.

In September 1953 Józewski got a nasty surprise. All previous interrogations had concerned his activities during and after the Second World War. Now his interrogators began to ask him about his policies as Volhynian governor in the 1920s and 1930s. During the summer hiatus, functionaries had raided the archives of the interwar Ministry of Internal Affairs, and found reports on the prosecution of political criminals in Volhynia. Józewski could hardly deny the charge of fighting communism there, which was common knowledge, and also a source of personal pride. Even had he wished to deny it, the files accumulated by Public Security were massive and unambiguous. The interwar Polish police had kept careful records of the number of communists they had arrested in Volhynia. This part of his record established, his interrogators returned him to his youth, to the Polish-Bolshevik War of 1919–1920, and his activity in the Polish Military Organization. They took this line of questioning to its logical conclusion, asking Józewski about his political activities as a university and high school student in Kyïv. Although the interrogators had now reached a period before the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, they still sought suspicious organizations. No student reading circle went unexamined.²⁰

Józewski was interrogated for more than a year. By the end, he had admitted to a great deal, and confirmed the activities of a good number of people. He

worked hard, however, to admit only what he could not deny, and was repeatedly forced to retract earlier versions of stories as the interrogators accumulated evidence from other prisoners. All of his women friends in hiding were under arrest by autumn 1953, and it was impossible for them to coordinate their stories. Józewski had, falsely, denied that he knew the whereabouts of Idalia Korsak and Michalina Krzyżanowska. It took Public Security months to find them, in “Operation Convent.” He never mentioned Maria Dąbrowska, although she had been a close collaborator during and perhaps after the war. He falsely claimed to have been the only author of articles for *Poland Fights* and *Independent Poland*, thereby, he thought, freeing Dąbrowska, Stempowski, and others from suspicion. He managed to minimize the scale of Wolff’s activities. He invented three other female couriers to replace her in his account of events, and kept them alive in his stories for an entire year. He decreased the amount of money that she had delivered to him. Most importantly, none of his testimony revealed anything about organizations. Public Security was unable to grasp the overall character of his network in Poland, and learned nothing new about contacts between the underground and London.

JUDGMENT

While Public Security could prove that Józewski’s interwar policies had been anticommunist, they had no conception of the extent to which they were also anti-Soviet. The Promethean purposes of the Volhynia Experiment escaped notice entirely. Józewski laughed at attempts to portray him as a high-ranking officer of the Second Department, pointing out that the military had opposed his policies in the late 1930s. This was true, but obscured earlier cooperation between Józewski and the Second Department in the larger project of using the national question against the Soviet Union. Józewski was treated as a spy, but Poland’s actual interwar labors to destroy the Soviet Union, some of them indeed in cooperation with British intelligence, went unnoticed. Although nothing can be said without access to British and American archives, it seems unlikely that Józewski was an agent of a foreign intelligence service in the 1940s.²¹ Throughout his life he avoided subordinating himself to institutions of state power. He worked for the informal Polish Military Organization in 1919–1920, but refused to be drawn into the Second Department. He worked for the free-standing Servants of The Victory of Poland in 1939, but not officially for the Polish government in exile. He cooperated with Polish institutions, but was quite poor at taking orders. He was ever the man of trust, never the rule-bound

functionary. The exception that proves the rule was his tenure as governor of Volhynia, when his only true superior was Józef Piłsudski. After the war he was funded by the Planning Bureau, although he and Wolff seem to have treated his work as a matter of personal correspondence with Tokarzewski and Pełczyński. He was not, however, taking orders from the Bureau, let alone from the British or the Americans. He was a free agent, and the Planning Bureau was glad to have him.

Interrogators did know more than enough to send Józewski's case to a military tribunal for prosecution. Poland, like other communist states, preserved a curious legalism, while eliminating basic elements of the rule of law. Civilians could be tried by military tribunals upon a simple motion by executive authorities. An important decree on Nazi war crimes was applied well after the war, and indeed to people who had fought against the Germans. The army's criminal code included the very broad category of criminal attempts to change the structure of the state. Laws were applied retroactively, even to the period before the war. In particular, it was a crime in communist Poland to have acted, before 1939, so as to have weakened the defense of the previous Polish state against the Nazi attack. This law was not only retrospective, it also invited extremely general application. Anything besides communist party activism was construed as weakening the Polish state. Józewski was accused of breaking these three laws, as well as receiving money from abroad and carrying false personal documents. In particular, he was accused of trying to change the state structure by publishing newspapers after 1945, of sending intelligence reports abroad after 1945, of weakening the war effort against Germany by publishing newspapers that were not explicitly pro-Soviet during the war, and of weakening the Polish state before 1939 by suppressing communist organizations in Volhynia.²² Although Dyduch, the main interrogator, had wished to prosecute Józewski for "crimes" predating the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, his superior Starzewski contented himself with "crimes" that began when Józewski was named governor of Volhynia in 1928.²³

Józewski was tried by the Warsaw Regional Military Tribunal from 14 to 24 September 1954. Michalina Krzyżanowska and Idalia Korsak were used as witnesses against him, just as later he would be forced to testify against Wanda Sokołowska and Janina Parys. After a year and a half in prison, he was delighted to see Krzyżanowska and Korsak, and broke free of his guard for a moment to kiss their hands. He sat back and admired the testimony of other witnesses, prewar Second Department officers, who generally spoke at length and revealed little. For his part, Józewski refused to acknowledge that he was on trial.

He declined to treat the judges as judges, addressing them according to their military rank as “captain” or “major.” He pursued a defense strategy consistent with this overall conception. He instructed his lawyer not to say a word in his defense. Józewski only liked theater when he could design the scenes. He was also following some advice Piłsudski had given him a quarter-century before: “Don’t defend yourself. Then you will always lose. Follow my example.” It was very much in character for Józewski to apply Piłsudski’s advice in this way, to make an inside joke intended to expose the joke outside. He even declined his right to make a final statement. He waited silently for the sentence to be pronounced. He expected death. He got life in prison instead. The guard who led him back to his cell grumbled about the leniency of the sentence. Józewski replied, in all sincerity: “Sir, it’s just like someone has given me a gold watch.”²⁴

Józewski had achieved more than he realized by remaining at large until spring 1953. The worst years to be sentenced by a Regional Military Tribunal were 1946, 1947, and 1948, when death sentences were common.²⁵ The worst years to be interrogated in Mokotów Prison in Warsaw were 1949, 1950, 1951, and 1952, when torture was routine. His own interrogation began after the death of Stalin. Józewski began his sentence at Mokotów, where he had been interrogated, and then was transferred to Rawicz and Wronki—prisons which had held Poles under the Nazi occupation, and now held Polish political prisoners. Józewski made friends with criminals as well as other political prisoners. He admired a tattoo of Stalin on one man’s buttocks, and the steadfastness of female political prisoners. He believed that prison served a moral and an aesthetic function, testing human beings within and enchanting the world outside its walls. He told some of his new friends that prison was where he belonged so long as Poland was communist. He conveyed a credible impression to fellow political prisoners that he was enjoying the experience. This attitude would have been harder to maintain, of course, had he been imprisoned a few years earlier, or in the Soviet Union. He was allowed to receive packages from the outside, and Dąbrowska gave money to his sister Helena.²⁶ As it was, conditions were difficult enough. In Rawicz and Wronki rations were poor, exercise was limited, and rotations from cell to cell made personal contacts impossible to maintain. Józewski’s body suffered, even if he maintained his good spirits. His leg still hurt from the grenade attack of 1943. A heart problem, which had first appeared in 1932, required frequent stays in prison hospitals.

Nevertheless, when the opportunity came to leave prison, Józewski declined. After Stalin’s death in March 1953, communist Poland had begun a process of de-Stalinization. Józef Światło, director of the secret Tenth Department of

Public Security, fled to the West in December 1953 and began work for Radio Free Europe in September 1954.²⁷ Jacek Róžański, the dreaded chief investigator of Public Security, was fired a year to the day after Stalin died, and then subjected to interrogation in autumn 1954. He was imprisoned in 1955.²⁸ Polish President Bolesław Bierut died in Moscow in March 1956, shortly after Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" condemned certain aspects of Stalinism. Bierut's longtime ally Jakub Berman, responsible for culture and security in the Polish politburo, fell from power in May 1956. Old rivalries among Polish communists resurfaced. Power in Poland was changing hands, if only from one group of communists to another. By spring 1956, the politburo wished to free the political prisoners of the Stalinist period.

Józewski again refused to defend himself, to the point that he declined to file the paperwork necessary to begin proceedings for his release. He also forbade his lawyer and friends from intervening on his behalf.²⁹ Dąbrowska and others did so nevertheless. The primate of Poland, Stefan Wyszyński, also asked for Józewski's release.³⁰ The regime itself was changing, as even Józewski would later recognize. The national communist Władysław Gomułka came to power on 19 October 1956, without the explicit support of Moscow, but with some popular support. A military tribunal made the motions for release on medical grounds on Józewski's behalf two weeks later, on 3 November.³¹ He finally left prison, one of the last of the old political prisoners, on 6 November 1956. Józewski had said that he believed that prison was where he belonged so long as communism remained, and later wrote that any formal request would have acknowledged the legitimacy of a system he denied. His female friends remembered another motivation: that he refused to leave prison until he was convinced that Felicja Wolff would be released as well.³² Wolff had been sentenced to death, and had refused to submit the motion necessary for a presidential pardon. Her lawyer submitted the paperwork for her, and her sentence was reduced to life in prison. She refused to sign an acknowledgement of the pardon, on the grounds that she had no idea who Felicja Wolff might be. She was finally released from prison, after five years, eight months, and six days of detention, on 22 February 1957.³³

"It's terrible," the painter had said to the novelist in August 1939, "but this war will be my salvation."³⁴ Józewski had meant to tell Dąbrowska that war would bring an end to the numbness and disorientation he had felt since his wife's death. Józewski threw himself back into conspiratorial work determined to return direction to his life and sense to his surroundings. He had raised par-

tisans in Volhynia, joined masons in Warsaw, hidden with Jews, published newspapers against Nazis and communists, organized a new political party, supported WIN, signed petitions to the United Nations, maintained contact with London, collected political intelligence, survived an attempt on his life, changed his public identity at least twice and his place of residence at least thirty times. None of this would have been possible without a long list of female co-conspirators: Maria Dąbrowska, Wanda Pełczyńska, Maria Sipayło, Michalina Krzyżanowska, Idalia Korsak, Irena Repp, Anna Babulska, Aniela Maciejewska, Wanda Sokołowska, Janina Parys, Janina Piekarska, Helena Sosnowska, Irena Wojnicz, Helena Józewska, Wanda Gertz, and Felicja Wolff.³⁵ Several of these women, like Julia, were Poles associated with Ukraine, intellectuals and artists, and couriers who risked their lives for Polish independence during at least one world war. Several of them had known Julia. Michalina Krzyżanowska, for example, had been a close friend to both Henryk and Julia for decades. Józewski recalled her serene gaze at Julia's funeral.³⁶

War had saved Józewski in its terrible way, in the way he had anticipated: by providing the enemies against whom to conspire. War had also saved him in another way, perhaps unforeseen: by revealing the women with whom to conspire, by reminding him of old friends and recommending him to new ones. Now the war was over, and the painter and all of the conspiring women were free. Józewski's war had begun on 1 September 1939, with the invasion of Poland by Nazi Germany, and ended on 6 November 1956, with his release from communist prison. He had drawn it out for seventeen years, two months, and five days.

Epilogue: Representations

The First World War destroyed an imperial order in eastern Europe, granting revolutionaries their chance to make the world anew. The Russian Revolution found its western limits at Poland's border, as Warsaw defeated Moscow in the Polish-Bolshevik War of 1919–1920. Some of the Poles who fought this war were revolutionaries of a sort themselves, believing that the Soviet Union should be destroyed in the name of self-determination for its component nations. After 1926, Poland and the Soviet Union fought a cold war in miniature, complete with opposing ideologies, war scares, battles for hearts and minds, and intelligence adventures on both sides. The key theater of this contest was Ukraine, divided between Poland and the Soviet Union, believed by each side to be a weakness of the other. Poland enjoyed certain successes in the 1920s, but was overmatched by its great eastern neighbor in the 1930s. In September 1939, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany jointly invaded Poland and divided it between them. Poland was then occupied entirely by Nazi Germany after 1941, then occupied entirely by the Soviet Union from 1944. Although Polish soldiers continued to fight on the Allied side throughout the war,

Poland was unrepresented at the Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam summits that decided the postwar order. Poland's eastern territories were granted to the Soviet Union. Poland itself was treated as part of the Soviet sphere of influence.

After the Second World War, Washington gave signs of tiring of a Yalta order that left most of Europe communist, just as Warsaw had tired of a Riga order that left most of Ukraine Soviet. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Washington and London organized the same kinds of operations that Warsaw had arranged in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Just as the Poles had recruited Ukrainian agents from internment camps after the Polish-Bolshevik War, so the Americans and British recruited Ukrainian agents from displaced persons camps after the Second World War. The Poles had run dozens of Ukrainians agents across the Soviet border. The Americans and British, as far as can be ascertained, were less successful with the same tactic. Kim Philby, the Briton in the Soviet service, caused losses as painful as that of the Polish turncoat Ignacy Dobrzyński. The Polish communist WIN "inspiration" fooled London and Washington in the 1940s, using the very same mechanisms that the Cheka had deployed in the Trust operation of the 1920s.¹

The differences between the two confrontations, of course, were very great. Poland aspired to be a regional power and failed; the United States became a superpower. Polish Prometheans had operations against the Soviet Union based in Istanbul, Teheran, Cairo, and perhaps Tokyo, and Warsaw received limited cooperation from London and Paris. The United States could create durable military alliances that embraced these and other states. The Polish army had counted upon technological superiority to compensate for the numerical superiority of the Red Army. The United States Army in fact disposed of technological superiority. The invention of nuclear weapons made it more likely that the Cold War would be decided by a competition of economic and social systems than by direct military confrontation. Although interwar Poland had been a richer country than the Soviet Union, it had failed to convey an image of prosperity, especially during the Great Depression. Józewski's Volhynia Experiment failed to convince the Soviets that life was significantly better in the west, mainly because it failed to create such a conviction among Volhynians themselves. The project of European reconstruction initiated by the Marshall Plan did indeed create a showplace of capitalism, incomparably more attractive than interwar Poland. The postwar recovery embraced the entirety of Western Europe, which with time created the impression that one system truly was superior.²

In the meantime, some of the moral compromises were also similar. Polish

Prometheanism involved an alliance with leaders of the Ukrainian People's Republic, some of whom were associated with pogroms of Jews. American and British anticommunist policies engaged veterans of a Waffen-SS Division composed of Ukrainians. The Ukrainian general Pavlo Shandruk played a central role in each of these projects. Shandruk was chief of staff of the Ukrainian army on Polish soil in the 1920s and 1930s, and a contract officer in the Polish army. He fought the Germans in 1939. He then joined the Rolland Battalion, a unit composed of Ukrainians that fought with the German army during the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. He left German service in late 1941. In 1944, he was chosen by Ukrainian organizations to assume command, under German sponsorship, of a small armed force that was to be called the Ukrainian Army. Its first division was composed largely of veterans of the Waffen-SS Division "Galizien." Shandruk intended to create a basis for negotiations with the Allies after the Allied victory, and rescue Ukrainians from repatriation to the Soviet Union. His efforts were crowned with success. With the help of the Vatican and British intelligence, thousands of these veterans were dispatched to the United Kingdom. Shandruk emigrated to the United States in 1949.³

A second Ukrainian who made the transition from Prometheanism through German collaboration to the West was Stepan Skrypnyk. Skrypnyk was one of Józewski's lieutenants in the Volhynia Experiment, active in the ukrainization of the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church. Józewski named him vice mayor of Równe, and had him elected to the Polish parliament. After Józewski was forced to depart Volhynia in 1938, Skrypnyk said openly that only foreign intervention, by which he meant German invasion, could bring about a Ukrainian state.⁴ When the Germans arrived in 1939, he offered his services as an Orthodox activist. When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, he advised the German army about personnel for the civilian administration. The Germans permitted him to establish a journal, and named him the director of their Ukrainian Council of Trust in Volhynia. In 1942, he took orders as an Orthodox priest, and was hastily ordained a bishop. Skrypnyk pledged loyalty to Hitler, while trying to unite the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. When the Red Army returned, Skrypnyk fled west. The Polish government in exile tried to protect him. He was received as a Polish citizen in a displaced persons camp, until the Americans expelled him for troublemaking. He emigrated to Canada, began a second life as a bishop in exile, and was named metropolitan of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in emigration. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was revived in the Soviet Union in 1990, and Skrypnyk returned to serve as its metropolitan.⁵

AFTER HOPE

Other non-Polish Prometheans had apparently remained loyal to Poland, and Poland could offer networks in Ankara and Teheran to the British in 1939 and 1940.⁶ Yet the destruction of the Polish state meant that Polish Prometheans had little to offer such associates besides contacts with great powers. Interwar Polish cooperation with Petliurites had some wartime echoes, but in general Polish Prometheans had to fight their own war by themselves. Most of them fought with the Home Army in Poland or in the Anders Army in Italy. Far more than their British and American allies in the war against Nazi Germany, the Poles considered the Soviet Union a future enemy during the war itself. When the Cold War began, a few Prometheans were supported by the United States, in a modest capacity.⁷ Leading Ukrainian and Polish Prometheans tried to revive the movement.⁸ In the postwar years, it was no longer a euphemism for a covert strategy, but an open association of individuals concerned to promote historical knowledge of Russia's western and southern neighbors. A political design shone, if very faintly by now, through this attention to culture.

The Promethean idea was most deftly adapted to the postwar world in Maisons-Laffitte, a suburb of Paris best known for its horse races, where Jerzy Giedroyc published the monthly *Kultura*. Giedroyc, a bureaucrat and journalist in interwar Poland, was a central if discreet figure of the Prometheanism of the early 1930s. He saw in Józewski a friend and a model, although he found Józewski's temperament to be too artistic for the difficult work at hand. He worked for a time in the same ministry as Stanisław Stempowski, and spent as much time with the older man as he could. He was on very friendly terms with Jerzy Niezbrzycki, who wrote for Giedroyc's journals.⁹ After the Second World War, Giedroyc managed to reunite this group in the pages of *Kultura*. He published, for example, the portions of Stanisław Stempowski's memoirs that could not appear in communist Poland, Niezbrzycki's account of his spying adventures in prewar Soviet Ukraine, the memoirs of the editor of Józewski's Volhynian newspaper, and finally three long excerpts from Józewski's memoirs.¹⁰ Jerzy Stempowski made his career as a literary critic in the pages of *Kultura*, and owed his postwar reputation to Giedroyc's support. Thus Józewski himself, Józewski's "father" in the Ukrainian question (Stanisław Stempowski), his "brother" in Volhynian art (Jerzy Stempowski), his "pupil" in Ukrainian espionage (Niezbrzycki), and for good measure his house poet (Józef Łobodowski) were all represented.

Giedroyc's interwar journals bore ambitious titles: *The Rebellion of the Young*,

Poland the Great Power. These promised more than they delivered. With *Kultura* it was rather the opposite: it offered not only culture but politics, not only politics but international relations, not only international relations but grand strategy. Giedroyc sought to make a future geopolitical virtue from the vices of Poland's postwar position. From the beginning, while the overwhelming majority of Poles felt the loss of Poland's eastern territories to the Soviet Union as a fresh wound, Giedroyc advanced the view that the new eastern border should be treated as binding. Even though this meant resignation to the loss of nearly half of Poland's previous territory, Giedroyc saw the advantages of conceding Vilnius, western Belarus, Galicia, and Volhynia. In his understanding, this was not a concession to Soviet Lithuania, Soviet Belarus, and Soviet Ukraine, but rather a gesture to the Lithuanian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian nations. Beginning in 1973, *Kultura* proposed an eastern program: that all Polish, Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Lithuanian patriots should treat the postwar borders as binding upon future independent states. This line, articulated by Giedroyc's collaborator Juliusz Mieroszewski, assumed that the Soviet Union would one day disintegrate along national lines.¹¹ Interwar Polish policy had unintentionally (in most of eastern Poland) and intentionally (in Volhynia) strengthened the national identity of national minorities. These territories were indeed among the most problematic for the postwar Soviet Union. In all probability, the *Kultura* eastern program also presumed that the Soviet Union was more likely to dissolve if Lithuanians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians could see Moscow as their only enemy.¹² By the 1970s, *Kultura* was the most important periodical appearing in Polish, widely read by intellectuals of Poland's eastern neighbors as well.

The underlying logic of the *Kultura* eastern program was the same as that of interwar Polish Prometheism: the crucial matter was not historical strife in the eastern borderlands dividing Poland and its neighbors (for example Volhynia), but rather future relations between Poland and future independent states in the east (especially Ukraine). In the interwar period, this meant that Prometheans favored tolerant policies in the borderlands, as an instrument to future strategic understanding. In the postwar period, it meant that *Kultura* could concede the eastern borderlands, to the same end. Prometheism offered hope; *Kultura* answered hopelessness—Stempowski's best writings were his "Essays for Cassandra." Perhaps the absence of hope was a boon to strategic thinking. Perhaps it was more appealing for Poles to present themselves as equal partners of their eastern neighbors in a common project than as a Promethean power. Still, like the original gamble on Kyïv in 1920 and the in-

terwar Promethean policy, the postwar eastern program required that national sentiments be treated as less important than *raison d'état*. The ethnic cleansings of Poles from Volhynia, for example, must not be allowed to interfere with the prospect of a future Polish-Ukrainian alliance.¹³ Józewski never believed that this ethnic war denied the sense of his undertaking. Like his allies in *Kultura*, he took the long view.

AFTER PRISON

Józewski agreed that the Soviet Union would collapse, and meant to stay at large in communist Poland until it did. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, he was one of the few Prometheans to return to the traditional labor of intelligence work against a communist regime. His capture and imprisonment removed him from this or any other kind of political work. His choice to remain in Poland meant that he participated very directly in the Cold War in its early phase, but only marginally thereafter.¹⁴ When he was released from prison in November 1956, he was a sixty-four-year-old man with a blown cover, a game leg, a weak heart, and the certainty that he would be followed by Public Security for the rest of his life. Carrying a single suitcase tied with string, he descended upon his old studio on Koszykowa Street in Warsaw. In a city where more than ninety percent of buildings had been destroyed by the war, Koszykowa 24 remained intact. The apartment belonged to Michalina Krzyżanowska, who had been imprisoned for helping Józewski. After their release she welcomed him and his sister Helena. The two women slept in the bedroom, he in the room they treated as a workshop.¹⁵ Józewski seemed content with these arrangements. He required only two luxuries: English tea and Yardley's cologne, which Tadeusz Pełczyński sent him from London.¹⁶

In the years to come, Józewski exemplified in some modest way the antipolitical ideas he had elucidated in 1946 in his underground newspaper *Independent Poland*: the moral presence of the individual, the collective effort to create an "unofficial Poland."¹⁷ He maintained certain standards, never complaining about his fate, always expressing satisfaction with a life he regarded as full. As Dąbrowska recalled his mood after a walk together in the pouring rain in 1958: "Very special in Henryk: an ecstatic approval of his own life and his own fate. Perhaps only Samuel Pepys was so much in love with his own fate. And at the same time a great sensitivity to other fates, an excellent vision of people, events, things."¹⁸ Józewski continued to see old friends: the women couriers from his days in the Polish Military Organization, his colleagues from interwar Łuck,

Warsaw, and Łódź, fellow conspirators from the German occupation, fellow prisoners from Mokotów, Rawicz, and Wronki—and not only political prisoners but some common criminals as well. Some visitors, of course, crossed these categories. Jan Chomicz, his first cousin and personal secretary, had been imprisoned for helping Józewski. The two men remained close. Chomicz, who had guarded Józewski's secrets in interwar Poland and sheltered the man himself during the war, arranged to have Józewski's memoirs smuggled to the West.¹⁹ Józewski also welcomed some of the literary luminaries of his own generation: Maria Dąbrowska, of course, but also the essayist Antoni Słonimski and the art historian Stanisław Lorentz.²⁰ In the 1970s, Józewski came to know some younger people, a few of them associated with the Committee for the Defense of Workers. This was an instance of the new civil society then emerging in Poland, people organizing as if they were free.²¹ Perhaps he recognized the similarity to the ideas he had expressed in *Independent Poland*.

Józewski regarded the communism that was actually around him as a transitory and superficial reality that would one day be overthrown by a deeper and more permanent order. His memoirs, his single important written work, seek to express this conviction. They were drafted by 1958 and continually redrafted thereafter, and bore the titles "The Composition of Existence" and then "A Tale of Existence." Józewski did not believe he could write memoirs without justifying the task in philosophical terms. He began therefore with his definition of existence, which he seeks through the notion of the "I AM." This is a definable essence that shines through individuals when they face certain conjunctures. It is revealed by events, even if it cannot bring them about. The memoirs contend that not only individuals, but also Poland and Ukraine have an "I AM," the similarity of which explains their essential harmony.²² This belief echoed pre-war rhetoric of "underground currents" and "subconscious communities."²³ Dąbrowska read the memoirs as existentialist. As she wrote in her diary, "Henryk doesn't know the new philosophers, he hasn't read Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Heidegger or Sartre, which gives him a certain freshness of formulation."²⁴ She was right that the text seems existentialist while lacking the expected references. Józewski's own reading was both more traditional and more exotic. The assertion of individual existence in and despite an external world thick with confusion and duplicity recalls Descartes. A more certain source of inspiration is theosophy. The endlessly repeated "I AM" of the text is more a mantra than a premise, a disciplined effort to define a deeper (and concealed) self apart from the accidents of superficial reality. Józewski often returned to images of the sea as he attempted to express this notion.²⁵ The motif perhaps arose from his eso-

teric interests. An underlined passage in his copy of the *Book of Tao*, in English translation from Jan Lemański's free Polish rendering, reads:

Thus the seawater touches all lands:
 Remaining itself as it washes all sands.
 And though it be claimed as it rolls to and fro,
 None will it serve without wishing it so.
 Live by this example. Be like the water of the sea:
 An element that shares its waves and its power
 With anyone at any hour
 But ever and always is free.²⁶

STILL LIFE

In February 1958, the Polish painter made a concession to reality, applying for admission to the official Union of Artists. Underground and in prison when socialist realism was mandatory in Poland, he was able to paint as he liked after 1958. In May 1959, he and Michalina Krzyżanowska rented rooms in the




Figure 22. Henryk Jozewski, *The Sea*, 1960s.




Figure 23. Henryk Józewski, *Hamlet: To Be or Not to Be*, 1924. Warsaw University Library.

countryside, to paint the Vistula River.²⁷ From 1958 onwards he took regular part in exhibitions at the Zachęta Gallery in Warsaw. Józewski had individual exhibitions in 1960, 1964, and 1969.²⁸ Dąbrowska treated the first of these, on 11 April 1960, as his debut as an artist: “One’s first vernissage at the age of sixty-eight! A powerful fact!”²⁹ His first vernissage had actually been in Kyïv on 15 October 1917. The more powerful fact is that his style and his subjects had remained largely unchanged over the intervening half century. When compared to the larger trends of art history, his modernism was radical in his youth and dated in his maturity; when treated as part of his biography, it defines a remarkable constant. His essential notion, first expressed in his 1924 *Hamlet*, that art is a way of revealing formal problems of perception and action, remained unchanged. He continued to paint flowers, landscapes, and still lifes. Horses and chariots continued to find their improbable way into still lifes. Perhaps a hint of personal experience slipped through his new preoccupation with windows. A window, in the technical jargon of Polish espionage, was a time and place when a hostile state border could be crossed. The eastern border of Józewski’s Volhynia had been the source of many windows for Poland’s border-




Figure 24. Henryk Józewski, *Space in a Window*, 1960. Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw.

crossing spies. In postwar Poland Józewski had chosen not to exploit any of the windows arranged by the Planning Bureau. One of the best paintings of his postwar period, “Space in a Window,” reveals tersely the colors and shapes of a postwar Warsaw rebuilt by the communists, through a window that is firmly closed. A portrait displays Józewski, apparently by a window, which is in fact one of his paintings of a window.

If there was a change in attitude and expression, it had to do with the unavoidable shift from (in the young Józewski’s terms) action to contemplation. Later compositions seem preoccupied with precision and form, “drowned




Figure 25. Henryk Józewski, *Composition with Flower*, 1970s. Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw.

thoughts.”³⁰ This is, perhaps, most evident in his revived interest in the still life. In contemplating a still life, one can always force oneself to imagine the moment when the objects portrayed were arranged. For every such painting, there was a particular instant when things were assembled in order to be represented. Composition, in other words, is not only an act of creativity but also a historical fact. Yet: it would be misguided to reduce the still life to that moment of composition. The still life, as a form, strives for a sense of atemporality, and this striving communicates itself over time, despite time, conveying the sense that composition can elude decomposition. The historian is bound to say that Józewski’s fixed ideas, both in politics and in art, flow from experiences rather early in life, in the Russian Empire and the Russian Revolution. That these




Figure 26. Henryk Józewski, *Still Life*, 1970s. Polish Academy of Sciences. Warsaw.

ideas remained fixed, and provided the basis for consistent choices throughout a long life, is another kind of historical fact. The striving for coherence, transmitted across time, cannot be reduced to material causes at any one moment.

Until the 1950s, Józewski lived a life of action that rewards the gaze with new perspectives: upon a political Center in Poland that defied extremes of Right and Left, upon a policy of national reconciliation during a moment of national terror, upon a project to defeat communism and the compromises it inspired, upon continuities between prewar and postwar Europe, upon the nature of a life underground, upon the workings of a Stalinist security apparatus, and upon a milieu whose political aims were based less upon ideologies than upon common experiences and aesthetic ideals. From the 1950s, Józewski contemplated and composed. The written sources he created are difficult to handle, eagerly yielding images and formulae, glosses and tangents, begrudging the connections between people and the continuities of ideals. The interrogation protocols of the early 1950s record an attempt to deceive a communist intelligence apparatus, and the memoirs of the late 1950s are an attempt to mystify an anticommunist intelligence project. Józewski never wrote anything




Figure 27. Zbigniew Chomicz, Józewski in his Studio, c. 1970.

of substance about the organization in which he took the most pride, the Third Command of the Polish Military Organization. He joined in the collective taboo of its veterans. Here Józewski was especially generous with his historical silence. Because his friends and comrades of the Third Command had been buried in unmarked graves, he desired that his grave, too, be without a marker.³¹



Figure 28. Henryk Józewski, *Still Life*, 1970s. Polish Academy of Sciences.

Józewski died in April 1981 at the age of eighty-eight, in the middle of Poland's Solidarity revolution, thinking of the Polish-Bolshevik War. Just as he had stayed in power in Volhynia for longer than seemed likely, and stayed underground for longer than seemed possible, he stayed active well beyond the normal span of his generation. That spring, a new generation of Polish political activists was emerging, developing a form of anticommunism that was not nationalist. The Solidarity movement enacted, on a very large scale, the ideal of an "unofficial Poland."³² In foreign affairs, Solidarity adopted the *Kultura* eastern program, extending greetings to the "nations" of the Soviet Union, taking for granted that Volhynia and Galicia were in Ukraine.³³ Solidarity was crushed by martial law a few months after Józewski's death: but it survived, underground,




Figure 29. Zbigniew Chomicz, Henryk Józewski, c. 1970.

to emerge again in 1988 and lead Poland out of the communist camp in August 1989. During the next two years, while Poland was sovereign but the Soviet Union remained intact, Warsaw pursued a special eastern policy, treating Soviet republics as if they were already independent states.³⁴ In September 1989, a Solidarity delegation travelled to Kyïv to support the Ukrainian independence

movement. In October 1990, the Polish and Soviet Ukrainian foreign ministers signed a “state-to-state” declaration, emphasizing that they acted “as sovereign states.”³⁵ The history of the Cold War and the history of Prometheanism coalesced, as the collapse of the Soviet bloc in late 1989 was followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991. The eastern Europe defined by world war was passing. Terror receded, politics returned. In 2004, a popular revolution brought to power a new generation of democratic leaders in Ukraine. A shadow of Prometheanism stirred, as Ukraine, Poland, and Georgia treated this revolution as the beginning of an era of democracy in Eurasia as a whole. This general project now enjoyed some support from a democratic European Union, as well as from the United States.

If the twenty-first century seems to hold some promise for a free eastern Europe, this is due, in some measure, to the individuals and groups who carried with them the alternative image of the twentieth: in Józewski’s case an aesthetic that resisted any individual reconciliation to the political reality of communism and nationalism, while confirming the need for reconciliation between neighboring societies. Józewski had fled Kyiv for Warsaw in December 1919 to warn of the advance of the Red Army. In December 1991, Warsaw sent official word to Kyiv of its recognition of Ukrainian independence. Józewski lived his still life. Something of what he composed remains.

Codes and Characters

Decrypted terms in the notes are enclosed within braces: { }. Names of persons and places and other information derived from context are enclosed within brackets: [].

With the exception of Warsaw and Cracow, cities within interwar Poland are rendered in Polish, hence Łuck, Równe, and Lwów. Toponyms in Soviet Ukraine are rendered in Ukrainian, hence Kyïv and Kharkiv. Luts'k, Rivne, and L'viv, like Kyïv and Kharkiv, are today cities in independent Ukraine. Places are known by different names in different languages, as below.

English	Ukrainian	Polish	Yiddish	Russian	German
Volhynia	Volyn'	Wołyń	Volin	Volyn'	Wolynien
Galicia	Halychyna	Galicja	Galitsye	Galitsiia	Galizien
L'viv	L'viv	Lwów	Lemberik	L'vov	Lemberg
Kyïv	Kyïv	Kijów	Kiv	Kiev	Kiew
Kharkiv	Kharkiv	Charków	Kharkov	Kharkov	Kharkow
Luts'k	Luts'k	Łuck	Loytsk	Luts'k	Luzk
Rivne	Rivne	Równe	Rovne	Rovne	Rowno

Ukrainian and Russian are normally written in the Cyrillic alphabet, and Yiddish and Hebrew in the Hebrew. The Cyrillic and Hebrew alphabets are transliterated according to simplified versions of the appropriate Library of Congress system, except where other spellings are conventional. Some interwar spellings and usages reproduced in the notes are incorrect by modern standards. Authors' names are spelled as they appear in the cited work.

Polish, like French, German, and English, is written in the Latin alphabet. The Polish "ą" is pronounced a bit more nasally than the French "o" in "dont"; "c" is pronounced as "ts" in "cats"; "w" as "v" in "vase"; "ć" as the first "ch" and "cz" as the second "ch" in "church"; "ę" as "en" in French "enfant"; "ś" as "sh" in "wish"; "sz" as "sh" in "show"; "rz" and "ź" as a heavier "j" in French "Jean"; "ż" as the "g" in French "dommage"; "ń" as the first "n" in "onion"; "j" as "y" in "yes"; "ó" as "u" in "true"; "ł" as "w" in "woe." "Henryk Józewski," for example, is pronounced "Henryk Yuzevski."

Abbreviations

DOK	Dowództwo Okręgu Korpusu (Army Field Command)
GPU	Gosudarstvennoe politicheskoe upravlenie (State Political Directorate)
IP	Interrogation Protocol
IPHJ	Interrogation Protocol (of Henryk Józewski by Jan Dyduch, Mokotów Prison, Warsaw, 1953–1954)
IR	Informer's Report (by Józewski's cellmate at Mokotów Prison, Warsaw. Signed his reports "Sl."; known by Józewski as "Witwicki")
KN3	Komenda Naczelna 3 (Third Command of the Polish Military Organization)
KOP	Korpus Ochrony Pogranicza (Border Defense Corps)
KP(b)U	Komunistychna Partii (bil'shovykiv) Ukraïny (Communist Party of Ukraine (Bolsheviks), here discussed as the Ukrainian section of the Bolshevik Party)
KPP	Komunistyczna Partia Polski (Communist Party of Poland)

KPZU	Komunistychna Partiia Zakhidnoi Ukraïny (Communist Party of West Ukraine)
MBP	Ministerstwo Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego (Ministry of Public Security)
MSW	Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych (Ministry of Internal Affairs)
MSZ	Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
MWRiOP	Ministerstwo Wyznań Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego (Ministry of Religious Denominations and Public Education)
NKVD	Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs)
OUN	Orhanizatsiia Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists)
POW	Polska Organizacja Wojskowa (Polish Military Organization)
PPS	Polska Partia Socjalistyczna (Polish Socialist Party)
UMW	Ukraińska Misja Wojskowa (Ukrainian Military Mission)
UNR	Ukraïns'ka Narodna Respublika (Ukrainian People's Republic)
UWW	Urząd Województwa Wołyńskiego (Volhynian Provincial Administration)
UPA	Ukraïns'ka Povstans'ka Armiia (Ukrainian Insurgent Army)
WIN	Wolność i Niezawisłość (Freedom and Independence)

Archives

AAN	Archiwum Akt Nowych (Archive of Modern Files, Warsaw)
AMP	Archiwum Muzeum Polskiego (Archive of the Polish Museum, London)
AVPRF	Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Moscow)
AWK	Archiwum Wschodnie, Ośrodek Karta (Eastern Archive, Karta Institute, Warsaw)
BUWDR	Biblioteka Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Dział Rękopisów (Warsaw University Library, Manuscripts Department)
CAW	Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe (Central Military Archive, Rembertów, Poland)
DAR	Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Rivnens'koï Oblasti (State Archive of Rivne Oblast, Ukraine—Copies at United States Memorial Holocaust Museum, RG-31.017M, Reels 1–7)

FVA	Fortunoff Video Archive of Holocaust Testimonies, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut
GARF	Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (State Archive of the Russian Federation, Moscow)
HI	Hoover Institution Archive, Stanford University, California
IPN	Instytut Pamięci Narodowej (Institute of National Remembrance, Warsaw)
ISPAN	Instytut Sztuki Polskiej Akademii Nauk (Institute of Art of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw)
JPI	Józef Piłsudski Institute, New York
KA	Kriegsarchiv (Military Archive, Vienna)
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration, CIA Subject Files, College Park, Maryland
SPP	Studium Polski Podziemnej (Polish Underground Movement Study Trust, London)
TsDAVO	Tsentral'nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Vyshchykh Orhaniv Vlada Upravlinnia (Central State Archive of Higher Organs of Government and Administration, Kyiv)
USHMM	United States Memorial Holocaust Museum, Washington, D.C.
WSR	Wojskowy Sąd Regionalny (Regional Military Court, Polish Army; officially transferred to: Archiwum Państwowe m. st. Warszawy [State Archive of the Capital City of Warsaw]; read in: Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie, VIII Wydział Karny [Warsaw District Court, Criminal Division])
ZDB	Zbiory Daniela Bargielowskiego (Personal collections of Daniel Bargielowski, Warsaw)
ŻIH	Żydowski Instytut Historyczny (Jewish Historical Institute, Warsaw)

Notes

PROLOGUE

1. The domestic aspect of Józewski's policy is emphasized in Jan Kęsik, *Zaufany Komendanta: Biografia polityczna Jana Henryka Józewskiego 1892–1981*, Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 1995; Włodzimierz Mędrzecki, *Województwo Wołyńskie*, Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1988; Cornelia Schenke, *Nationalstaat und nationale Frage: Polen und die Ukrainer 1921–1939*, Hamburg: Dölling und Galitz Verlag, 2004.
2. In this study, Volhynia refers to the interwar Polish province of that name, the *Województwo Wołyńskie* or Volhynian Palatinate. Much of historical eastern Volhynia was incorporated by Soviet Ukraine.
3. Soviets: IR, 23 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/190; Bronisław Żongołłowicz, *Dzienniki 1930–1936*, Warsaw: Przegląd Wschodni, 2004, 381. Ukrainian nationalists: "OUN—sprawozdanie doraźne z 27.10.1934," AAN MSW 1/1252/13; "OUN—sprawozdanie doraźne Nr. 4," 6 January 1935, AAN MSW 1/1252/50; IR, 25 June 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/223. Polish nationalists: IR, 17 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/170; Henryk Józewski, "Zamiast pamiętnika," *Zeszyty Historyczne*, No. 59 (1982), 126. Communists: IR, [April 1953], IPN 0330/249, /t-1/219; T. Walczak, por., St. Ref., Wyd. VI. Dep. I., "Notatka służbowa," Warsaw, 28 April 1953, IPN 0231/44/10.
4. "Telefogram do wojewódzkiego Urzędu BP w Poznaniu," 11 October 1947, IPN 0192/520/t-1.

5. Ryszard Wraga [Jerzy Niezbrzycki], "Czwarty marszałek Polski," *Kultura*, No. 1, 1950, 119–132; "Referat Vostok 2-go oddziału Pol'skiego Genshtaba," 9 May 1950, CAW VIII/800/71/4.
6. Second department files are discussed in Leszek Gondek, *Wywiad polski w Rzeszy 1933–1939*, Gdynia: Wojskowa Drukarnia, 1982, 23–41.
7. Cezary Popławski, "Ze wspomnień osobistych," 12 December 1945, ISPAN.

INTRODUCTION

1. Henryk Józewski, "Zamiast pamiętnika," *Zeszyty Historyczne*, No. 59 (1982), 10. This published excerpt of his memoirs will be cited as "ZP (1)." The next excerpt, from No. 60 (1982), will be cited as "ZP (2)." The final part, from No. 63 (1983), will be cited as "ZP (3)." The full drafts of his memoirs are in BUWDR. A typescript is in ISPAN.
2. Student groups: IPHJ, 7 September 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/276; IPHJ, 16 September 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/283.
3. Eric Lohr, *Nationalizing the Russian Empire*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003.
4. Deportation: IPHJ, 19 September 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/288. PPS: Józewski, ZP (3), 29. On the revolution in Saratov: Donald J. Raleigh, *Experiencing Russia's Civil War: Politics, Society, and Revolutionary Culture in Saratov*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, 15–106.
5. I will use "Bolshevik" and "Bolshevik Russia" for the period before the establishment of the Soviet Union, November 1917–December 1922, and "Soviet" and "Soviet Union" thereafter.
6. Revolutionary committee: ZP (3), 29–31. The Jewish revolutionary (Bundist): ZP (3), 33–34. Refugees: IPHJ, 31 August 1953, WSR 275/54/t-1. Political agitation: IR, November 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/324. Experience of revolution: IR, 17 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/170. Saratov alien: ZP (3), 27.
7. "Raport z roboty POW i stanu umysłów w Rosji," [February 1916], CAW VIII/800/76/71; Pełński, *Wywiad polski na ZSSR*, 12; Tomasz Nałęcz, *Polska Organizacja Wojskowa*, Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1984, 235.
8. Bohdan Hud', "Panowie polscy," *Karta*, No. 41, 2004, 6.
9. See Viktor Bortnevski, "White Administration and White Terror (The Denikin Period)," *Russian Review*, 52:3, 1993, 366.
10. Artist aunt: IPHJ, 14 October 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/319; Interview, Zbigniew Chomicz, Warsaw, 18 September 2004.
11. "Odprawa N 2," 2 September 1919, CAW VIII/800/76/72.
12. Cezary Popławski, "Ze wspomnień osobistych," 12 December 1945, ISPAN.
13. Lija Skalska Miecik, "Dotknięcia muzy," in Andrzej Stawarz, ed., *Henryk Jan Józewski: Polityk, Artysta, Malarz*, Warsaw: Muzeum Niepodległości, 2002, 21–23.
14. Importance of KN 3: Andrzej Pełński, *Wywiad w wojnie polsko-bolszewickiej 1919–1920*, Warsaw: Bellona, 1999, 52. Józewski's role: *ibid.*, 93; ZP (1), 18; IPHJ, 21 September 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/291; IPHJ, 30 September 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/294; and CAW files cited below.
15. ZP (1), 34–35.

16. Couriers female: ZP (1), 28. Perfume: Peplowski, *Wywiad w wojnie polsko-bolszewickiej*, 160. Niewirowska: *ibid.*, 169. Commendations: *ibid.*, 186.
17. Marek Gałęzowski, "Henryk Jan Józewski," in *Konspiracja i opór społeczny w Polsce 1944–1956: Słownik biograficzny*, Warsaw: IPN, 2004, 186.
18. IPHJ, 14 October 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/317. Bolewski filed reports through March 1920. Peplowski, "Wywiad Komendy Naczelnej POW-III na Ukrainie (1919–1920)," *Przegląd Wschodni*, 5:2, 1998, 331.
19. Julia's presence: "Ś. P. Julia Józewska," *Życie Krzemienieckie*, May 1939, 147. Painting vacation: IPHJ, 2 October 1953, WSR 275/54/t-1; ZP (2), 113; Skalska-Miecznik, "Dotknięcia muzy," 23. Late-night conversations: ZP (1) 22.
20. Quotation from Komenda Naczelna 3, "Rozkaz," Kyiv, 15 May 1920, CAW VIII/800/76/67. Other pertinent orders: Przemysław [Henryk Józewski], "Odprawa Nr. 3," 5 May 1920, CAW VIII/800/76/72; Przemysław [Henryk Józewski], POW Komenda Naczelna III, "Do Obywatelki Ireny Baranowskiej," 25 March 1920, CAW VIII/800/76/68; Przemysław [Henryk Józewski], POW Komenda Naczelna III, "Do Ob. Hanny [Kudelskiej]," 15 March 1920, CAW VIII/800/76/65.
21. IPHJ, 2 October 1953, WSR 275/54/t-1; Józewski, ZP (2), 11.
22. Jarosław Abramow-Newerly, *Granica sokoła*, Warsaw: Twój Styl, 2001, 19.
23. ZP (2), 116, 121.
24. ZP (2), 121; IPHJ, 5 October 1953, WSR 275/54/t-1; IPHJ, no date, IPN 0330/249/t-1, 310. On Ukrainian socialist federalists: Jurij Borys, *The Sovietization of Ukraine, 1917–1923*, Edmonton: CIUS, 1980, 83–84. See also Włodzimierz Suleja, "Piłsudski a Petlura," in Zbigniew Karpus, Waldemar Rezmer, and Emilian Wiszka, eds., *Polska i Ukraina: Sojusz 1920 roku i jego następstwa*, Toruń: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika, 1997, 124–125.
25. "Rok 1920: Wyprawa na Kijów," *Karta*, No. 38, 2003, 4–33.
26. Ivan Kuras, Iurii Levenets' and Iurii Shapoval, "Serhii Iefremov i ioho shchodennyky," in Serhii Iefremov, *Shchodennyky 1923–1929*, Kyiv: Hazeta Rada, 1997, 14.
27. Andrzej Peplowski, *Kontrwywiad II Rzeczypospolitej*, Warsaw, Bellona, 2002, 105.
28. Executions: "Nabożeństwo żałobne za 5-ciu poległych oficerów POW," 26 October 1921, CAW I/303/4/1722; Sztab Generalny, Oddział II, "Lista wymiany jeńców—b. członków POW," 14 May 1922, CAW I/303/4/1724. Execution of Bolewski: Sztab Generalny, "Lista wymiany jeńców—b. członków POW," 17 May 1922, CAW I/303/4/1724; Józewski's knowledge of this: IPHJ, 14 October 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/318.
29. Orlando Figes, *Die Tragödie eines Volkes: Die Epoche der Russischen Revolution 1891 bis 1924*, Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1998, 682.
30. ZP (1), 38.
31. ZP (2), 122.
32. ZP (3), 41.
33. Piotr Mitzner, "Widmo POW," *Karta*, No. 11, 1993, 21–22.
34. Stefan Mayer, "Wykłady Pułkownika Stefana Mayera o wywiadzie polskim w okresie II RP," *Zeszyty Historyczne*, No. 142, 2002, 113–116; Peplowski, *Kontrwywiad II Rzeczypospolitej*, 18.
35. ZP (1), 47; IR, IPN 0330/240/t-1/224; Piotr Mitzner, "Instynkt podziemia," *Karta*, No. 5, 1991, 53.

36. Red Army manifestos: CAW VIII/800/57/14.
37. Richard Pipes, ed., *The Unknown Lenin*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996, 100.
38. Robert Service, *Stalin: A Biography*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005, 182–185. The Polish-Bolshevik War: Piotr Wandycz, *Soviet-Polish Relations, 1917–1921*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969; Norman Davies, *White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War, 1919–1920*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972; Andrzej Nowak, *Polska a trzy Rosje*, Cracow: Arcana, 2001.
39. The key National Democratic text is *Thoughts of a Modern Pole* by Roman Dmowski. An exposition: Brian Porter, *When Nationalism Began to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in Nineteenth-Century Poland*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
40. Dates: Oleh Shatailo, *General Iurko Tiutiunnyk*, L'viv: Svit, 2000, 58–61.
41. Mjr. Florek, Second Department in Lwów, to Second Department in Warsaw, 8 July 1921, CAW I/303/4/6870; Por. J[erzy] Kowalewski, "Pro Memoria w Sprawie Sztabu powstańczo-partyzanckiego," Warsaw, 24 August 1921, CAW I/303/4/6870. See also Iu. Tiutiunnyk, *Z poliakamy proty Vkraïny*, Kharkiv: Derzhavne Vydavnytstvo Ukraïny, 1924, 75–84; V. S. Sidak, *Natsional'ni spetssluzhby v period Ukraïns'koï revoliutsii*, Kyïv: Al'ternatyvy, 1998, 278.
42. Jerzy Kowalewski, "Zapoczątkowana akcja ukraińska . . ." 18 March 1921, CAW I/303/4/5358; Mjr. Florek, Second Department in Lwów, to Second Department in Warsaw, 9 August 1921, CAW I/303/4/6870; Por. J[erzy] Kowalewski, "Sytuacja w jakiej się znalazła Ukraina i jej rząd w r. 1921 i środki potrzebne dla odrodzenia U.L.R.," [August 1921], CAW I/303/4/6870. See also Komitet Wykonawczy Towarzystwa Straży Kresowej, Do Wydziału Wschodniego MSZ, 14 July 1921, "Komunikat Referatu Prac Zagranicznych Nr. 13, Sytuacja na Ukrainie w czerwcu," AAN MSZ 6665/29-31.
43. Ukrainian National Organization: above reports and Tsivil'ne Keruvannia Partyzans'ko-Povstanches'koho Shtabu pry Holovnoi Komandy Viis'k U.N.R., "Vidchyt pratsi za lypen' misiats' b/r.," 1 August 1921, CAW I/303/4/6870 4. UNR maps indicating locations of organizations: "Dyslokatsiia partyzans'kykh zahoniv na 22 lypnia 1921 roku," CAW I/303/4/6870. Tiutiunnyk's plea: U.N.R. Partizans'ko-Povstanches'kyi Shtab, 9 August 1921, to Lwów Ekspozytura, Second Department, 9 August 1921, CAW I/303/4/6870.
44. Bolshevik penetration: "Instrukcja," [Lwów Ekspozytura, Second Department], 8 August 1921, CAW I/303/4/6870. State of UNR army: Regulski, "Obecny Stan Armji Ukraïnskiej," 4 September 1921, CAW I/303/4/1722. General staff's position: Sztab Generalny W.P., Oddział II, Ekspozytura V, "Protokół konferencji w sprawie dalszej działalności Part. Powst. Sztabu przy Gł. D-twie wojsk U.R.L.," 24–25 September 1921, CAW I/303/4/6870.
45. Tiutiunnyk, *Z poliakamy proty Vkraïny*, 54.
46. Meeting *chez* Józewski: ZP (2), 127. Crossing the border: Romer to Sikorski, 6 November 1921; arrest ordered: Sikorski to Romer, copy of telegram, [November 1921], CAW I/303/4/5358; Lwów command closed: Telegram from Sikorski, [November 1921], all in CAW I/303/4/5358. Jan Jacek Bruski argues that Sikorski supported the operation and sent countermanding orders to preserve appearances. *Petlurowcy: Centrum Państwowe*

- Ukraińskiej Republiki Ludowej na wychodźstwie, 1919–1924*, Cracow: Arcana, 2000, 315–316.
47. Shatailo, *Heneral Iurko Tiutiunnyk*, 64–66.
 48. Sidak, *Natsional'ni spetssluzhby v period Ukraïns'koï revoliutsii*, 236, 256–258.
 49. Shatailo, *Heneral Iurko Tiutiunnyk*, 65; Bruski, *Petlurowcy*, 301.
 50. Shatailo, *Heneral Iurko Tiutiunnyk*, 74.
 51. News reports from Równe in AAN MSZ 6665; Soviet border forces' report in *Pogranichnye voiska SSSR 1918–1928: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov*, Moscow: Nauka, 1973, 482–486; see also Mykola Livyts'kyi, *D. Ts. U.N.R. v exyli mizh 1920 i 1940 rokamy*, Munich: Ukraïns'ke Informatsiine Biuro, 1984, 35; Vasyl' Kucheruk, "Ukraïns'ki viiskovi formuvannia," *Naukovi zapysky*, 5:2, 1996, 57.
 52. Mykola Chebotariv to B. Shevchenko, 15 January 1924, in V. S. Sidak, ed., *Vyzvol'ni zmahannia ochyma kontrrovidnyka*, Kyiv: Tempora, 2003, 182; Shatailo, *Heneral Iurko Tiutiunnyk*, 101–102. By 1923 he was unwelcome in Poland.
 53. Jan Pisuliński, *Nie tylko Petlura: Kwestia ukraińska w polskiej polityce zagranicznej w latach 1918–1923*, Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2004, 353.
 54. The fundamental study is Antony Polonsky, *Politics in Independent Poland 1921–1939: The Crisis of Constitutional Government*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972.
 55. The Council of Ambassadors of the Entente powers confirmed Poland's jurisdiction in eastern Galicia on 15 March 1923.
 56. Pogrom figures after Henry Abramson, *A Prayer for the Government: Ukrainians and Jews in Revolutionary Times*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997.
 57. Proportion of pogroms: *ibid*, 115, 117.
 58. Quotation from Por. Naglicki, "Raport Informacyjny Nr. 49," Tarnopol, 27 December 1923, CAW I/303/4/6952. On the otherwise positive reception: "Poiasnienie do Svodky pro Tiutiunnika," 27 January 1924, CAW I/303/4/6952.
 59. See Iwo Werscher, *Tadeusz Hołowko: Życie i działalność*, Warsaw: PWN, 1984, 220–226; also Włodzimierz Bączkowski, *O wschodnich problemach Polski*, Cracow: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2000, 137–156; Józef Lewandowski, *Imperializm słabości: Kształtowanie się koncepcji polityki wschodniej piłsudczyków 1921–1926*, Warsaw: PWN, 1967, especially 63, 106, 125; Piotr Wandycz, *Z Piłsudskim i Sikorskim: August Zaleski, Minister Spraw Zagranicznych w latach 1926–1932 i 1939–1941*, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1999, 52–54; Wojciech Materski, *Tarcza Europy: Stosunki polsko-sowieckie 1918–1939*, Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1994, 290.
 60. "Wniosek na odznaczenie orderem Virtutu Militaru w myśl Uchwały Kapituły Tymczasowej z dn. 23. I. 1920," 8 January 1922, Teczka personalna, Jerzy Kowalewski, CAW.
 61. ZP (2), 124–126; Henryk Józewski, "Opowieść o istnieniu," "Myśli o Józefie Piłsudskim," Vol. 2, Part I, p. 23, BUWDR 3189/2; Mieczysław Pruszyński, "Wojewoda Józefski o sprawie ukraińskiej," 5 September 1935, AAN UWW 299 I-1 44.
 62. The Second Department on Petliura in Warsaw: "Stan Sprawy Ukraińskiej w Chwili Obecnej," [1921], CAW I/303/4/2718 5. Józewski in the Ukrainian Central Committee: *Dokumenty i materiały do historii stosunków polsko-radzieckich*, Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, Vol. 4, 1964, 102–105; also Rudolf A. Mark: *Symon Petljura und die UNR*, Ber-

- lin, Osteuropa-Institut, 1988, 207. Soviet protests about Petliura's presence, *ibid.*, 105–108. About 40,000 Ukrainians were interned in Poland in 1921, among them 15,000 soldiers, although thousands returned to Soviet Ukraine or emigrated further; *ibid.*, 201.
63. Tiutiunnyk, *Z poliakamy proty Vkraïny*, 54.
64. Percentage: Werner Benecke, *Die Ostgebiete der Zweiten Polnischen Republik*, Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 1999, 131; numbers: Janina Stobniak-Smogorzewska, *Kresowe osadnictwo wojskowe 1920–1945*, Warsaw: Rytm, 2003, 93–116.
65. Jerzy Stempowski, *Od Berdyczowa do Rzymu*, Paris: Instytut Literacki, 1971, 8.
66. Jerzy Timoszewicz, “‘Hamlet’ Henryka Józewskiego,” *Pamiętnik Teatralny*, 40:1, 1991, 102.
67. B. Serafin [Jerzy Stempowski], *Pielgrzym*, Warsaw: Instytut Głuchoniemych i Ociemniałych, 1924. It is reprinted in Stempowski, *Od Berdyczowa do Rzymu*, quotation at 32. See also B. Hubert [Henryk Józewski], *Widzenia*, Warsaw: Jan Cotty, 1924.
68. B. Hubert [Henryk Józewski], *Hamlet: Słowo i pomysły sceniczne*, Warsaw: Jan Cotty, 1924, 1–3. Stempowski had a brother named Hubert.
69. ZP (1) 19; IPHJ, 31 August 1953, WSR 275/54/t-1.

CHAPTER 1. MATTERS OF TRUST

1. ZP (1), 48.
2. Joseph Rothschild, *Piłsudski's Coup d'Etat*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1966, 4–24.
3. *Ibid.*, 200, 208.
4. “Men of trust”: Andrzej Chojnowski, *Piłsudzczy u władzy: Dzieje Bezpartyjnego Bloku Współpracy z Rządem*, Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1986, 20–21, 34.
5. Oleg Khlevniouk, *Le cercle du Kremlin: Staline et le Bureau politique dans les années 30: Les jeux du pouvoir*, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1996, 53.
6. Józewski's posts: Chojnowski, *Piłsudzczy u władzy*, 37–38; his philosophy, 40–41; also Andrzej Ajnenkial, *Polska po przewrocie majowym*, Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna, 1980, 77.
7. Maria Dąbrowska, *Dzienniki 1914–1932*, Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1988, at 260, see also 196, 229, 239, 299.
8. Chojnowski, *Piłsudzczy u władzy*, especially 21, 34, 250. See also Waldemar Paruch, *Mysł polityczna obozu piłsudczykowskiego*, Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2005, 185–197.
9. Jerzy Stempowski, *Pan Jowialski i jego spadkobiercy: Rzecz o perspektywach śmiechu szlacheckiego*, Warsaw: Biblioteka Polska, 1931, at 78–79, 80.
10. Jerzy Timoszewski, “Jerzego Stempowskiego spotkania z teatrem,” in Jerzy Stempowski, *Pamiętnik teatralny trzeciej klasy i inne szkice*, Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1999, 5–6.
11. Employment: BUWDR 1505/4–14. Reports: BUWDR 1520 1/1/1–28; BUWDR 1520/2d/1–4; BUWDR 1522/1/1–4.
12. Andrzej Stanisław Kowalczyk, “Biografia eseisty,” in Jerzy Stempowski, *Listy do Jerzego Giedroycia*, Warsaw: LNB, 1991, 192.

13. Kpt. Edmund Charaszkiewicz, Szef Eksp. 2 Oddz. II, Do Pana Szefa Oddziału II Sztabu Głównego, 6 December 1929, CAW I/303/4/2601. Charaszkiewicz was a Promethean operative.
14. The tempting of this intelligentsia: Marci Shore, *Caviar and Ashes: A Warsaw Generation's Life and Death in Marxism, 1918–1968*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.
15. Jan Alfred Reguła, *Historia Komunistycznej Partii Polski*, Toruń: Portal, 1994, 87, 89, 94, 96, 97, 107, 127, 132; Janusz Radziejowski, *Communist Party of Western Ukraine*, Edmontonton: CIUS, 1983, 42; M. K. Dziewanowski, *The Communist Party of Poland*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959, 114–116.
16. Rothschild, *Piłsudski's Coup d'Etat*, 127, 380.
17. Ajnenkial, *Polska po przewrocie majowym*, 15.
18. Politburo session of 29 May 1926, in I. I. Kostiuszko, ed., *Materiały "Osoboi papki" Politbiuro Ts.K. RKP(b)-VKP(b) po voprosu sovetsko-pol'skikh otnoshenii 1923–1944 gg.*, Moscow: RAN, 1997, 24. Stalin and others remembered the February Revolution in Russia, and the Kerensky government that preceded their October Revolution in 1917.
19. "May Error": Dziewanowski, *Communist Party of Poland*; George D. Jackson, Jr., *Comintern and Peasant in East Europe, 1919–1930*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1966, 196; Reguła, *Historia Komunistycznej Partii Polski*, 150–157; M. I. Zil'berman, *Revoliutsiina borot'ba trudiashchyykh zakhidnoi Ukrainy (1924–1928 rr.)*, L'viv: Vydavnytstvo L'vivskoho Universytetu, 1968, 120. See also Serhii Iefremov, *Shchodennyky 1923–1929*, Kyiv: Hazeta Rada, 1997, 375.
20. Ajnenkial, *Polska po przewrocie majowym*, 23.
21. Andrzej Pełoński, *Kontrwywiad II Rzeczypospolitej*, Warsaw: Bellona, 2002, 262.
22. A resolution of the Fifth Party Conference of the KPZU of April 1924 called for the incorporation of West Ukraine by the Soviet Union. The KPP issued an analogous resolution at its Third Party Congress in February 1925. The Comintern adopted a similar line at its Fifth Congress in Moscow in June–July 1925.
23. Operations against Poland: Ekspozytura V, DOK VI, Second Department, "Organizacja band przez Tiutiunnika," Lwów, 28 November 1923, CAW I/303/4/6952. Tiutiunnyk eventually lost his usefulness. He was arrested by the Soviets in 1929 and executed in 1930.
24. Pułkownik Bajer, "Przygotowanie bolsz. do akcji dywersyjnej," to Lwów Ekspozytura, Second Department, 16 June 1924, CAW I/303/4/6952. Trains: CAW I/303/4/1760. Polish counteractions: Województwo Lwowskie, "Likwidacja ukr. tiutiunikowskiego sojuza," Do DOK Nr. VI we Lwowie, 28 April 1924, CAW I/303/4/6952.
25. Radziejowski, *Communist Party of Western Ukraine*, 46; Mykola Kuczerepa, ed., "Dokumenty a materiały," *Przegląd Wschodni*, 4:1, 1997, 161; idem, "Polityka II Rzeczypospolitej wobec Ukraińców na Wołyniu w latach 1921–1939," *ibid.*, 144.
26. The origins: V. V. Doroshenko et al., eds., *Istoriia sovetskikh organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti: Uchebnik*, Moscow: KGB, 1977, 206–207. See also Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story of Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev*, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1990, 67–78; John Dziak, *Chekisty: A History of the KGB*, Lexington: Lexington Books, 1988, 49.
27. Numbers after Richard Spence, "Russia's Operatsiia Trest: A Reappraisal," *Global Intelligence Monthly*, April 1999, offprint, 20.

28. Stefan Mayer, "Wykłady Pułkownika Stefana Mayera o wywiadzie polskim w okresie II RP," *Zeszyty Historyczne*, No. 142, 2002, 116.
29. Władysław Michniewicz, *Wielki bluff sowiecki*, Chicago: Wici, 100 on diplomatic post, 101 on codes, 142 on passports.
30. Richard Wraga [Jerzy Niezbrzycki], "The Trust Case," JPI TO 109/96–125; R. Wraga [Jerzy Niezbrzycki], "'Trest'," *Vozrozhdenie*, 7:1, 1950, 119, 132–133, and passim; Michniewicz, *Wielki bluff sowiecki*, 14 on his initial discovery, 245–246 on Piłsudski.
31. The internal study of "inspirations": Sztab Generalny, "Inspiracja i aktywność jako metody nowoczesnego wywiadu," Warsaw, 1 May 1926, CAW I/303/4/2560. Examples: CAW I/303/4/2581, CAW I/303/4/2601. See also Peplowski, *Kontruwywiad II Rzeczypospolitej*, 191, 236; Andrzej Peplowski, *Wywiad polski na ZSSR 1921–1939*, Warsaw: Gryf, 1996, 341. An introduction to disinformation: David Atlee Phillips, "Some Truth, Some Untruth, Some Half-Truth," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence*, 1:3, 1986, 109–114.
32. Eugeniusz Stańczykiewicz, "Przedmowa" to Leszek Gondek, *Wywiad polski w Rzeczypospolitej 1933–1939*, Gdynia: Wojskowa Drukarnia, 1982, 12.
33. Marek Kornat, "Ambasador Wacław Grzybowski i jego misja w Związku Radzieckim (1936–1939)," *Zeszyty Historyczne*, No. 142, 2002, 17.
34. In November 1926 Poland had little control of its border with Soviet Ukraine. Progress thereafter: Płk. Maczek, Kierownik Ekspozytury 5, Oddział II, [Report on agents sent to Soviet Ukraine], November 1926, "Ekspozytura Nr. 5, Kwartał III. Rok 1928–1929"; "Ekspozytura Nr. 5, Rosja Radziecka, Kwartał III. Rok 1928–1929"; "Ekspozytura Nr. 5, Kwartał IV. Rok 1928–1929"; "Ekspozytura Nr. 1, Rosja Radziecka, Kwartał IV. Rok 1928–1929"; all in CAW I/303/4/1803. Border zones: Terry Martin, *Affirmative Action Empire*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001, 313–314.
35. Petr Voikov, Soviet envoy in Warsaw, report of 13 July 1926, AVPRF, 122/10/34.
36. Czesław Madajczyk, ed., "Dokumenty w sprawie polityki narodowościowej władz polskich po przewrocie majowym," *Dzieje Najnowsze*, 4:3, 1972, 159.
37. Volhynian mission and regional studies: Andrzej Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki narodowościowej rządów polskich w latach 1921–1939*, Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1979, 92–93. Józefowski's policies are treated below.
38. Agencja Telegraficzna Express: Kowalewski [to Tadeusz Pełczyński], 12 February 1937, and attached files in CAW I/303/4/5565. Ukrainian radio hours: Roman Smal-Stocki, "Wielce Szanowny Panie Kapitanie!" 24 January 1930, CAW I/303/4/5389. The Instytut Badań Spraw Narodowościowych: Marjan Świechowski and Stanisław Paprocki, Sekretarz Generalny, do Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych, [copy to Tadeusz Hołówko], 10 June 1929, AAN MSZ 5314/21–25.
39. Iwo Werschler, *Tadeusz Hołówko: Życie i działalność*, Warsaw: PWN, 1984, 238.
40. CAW I/303/4/2011, CAW I/303/4/1985.
41. Diplomats had noted the opportunity to turn the tables. [Polish consulate in Kharkiv], "Raport," [September 1922], AAN MSZ 6703g/291–295; Charwat, Chargé d'Affaires, Kharkiv, 14 April 1923, CAW I/303/4/1713; "Polityka narodowościowa Rządu Radzieckiego," 2 May 1924, CAW I/303/4/1787. For Soviet documents and further evidence: AAN MSZ 6703g/604–605 and CAW I/303/4/1787. Attention to these matters was so

- intense that the language of toasts in embassies was monitored, and a few sentences uttered by Skrypnyk in Polish were the subject of comment throughout the foreign ministry. See marginal notes to Consul Skrzyński's report, 9 November 1925, AAN MSZ 6703g/582.
42. Cited after Radziejowski, *Communist Party of Western Ukraine*, 95. On the domestic success, Werschler, *Tadeusz Hołowko*, 193.
 43. Polish diplomats: Skrzyński, Polish consul in Kharkiv, to foreign ministry, 22 January 1927, AAN MSZ 6705/40–41; T. Leszner, consulate in Kharkiv, to foreign ministry, "Referat o Instytucie im. Tarasa Szewczenki w Kijowie," 4 March 1927, AAN MSZ 6705/157–158; Skrzyński to foreign ministry, 27 August 1927, AAN MSZ 6706; Skrzyński to foreign ministry, 16 July 1927; AAN MSZ 6706/19–22. Polish spies: Ryszard Wraga [Jerzy Niezbrzycki], "Czwarty marszałek Polski," *Kultura*, January 1950, 120–122. Ukrainian patriots: "Ekselentsie" [to Andrii Livyts'kyi, February 1927], AAN MSZ 6705/113–114; Dmytro Dontsov, "Ukraïns'ko-sovetski psevdomorfozy," *Literaturno-naukovyi vistykyk*, No. 12, 1925, 321–326. The GPU: "Taiemnyi obizhnyk HPU USRR 'Pro Ukraïns'kyi Seperatyzm'," 4 September 1927, Iurii Shapoval, Volodymyr Prystaiko, and Vadym Zolotar'ov, eds., *ChK-HPU-NKVD v Ukraïni: Osoby, fakty, dokumenty*, Kyïv: Abrys, 1997, 257–259.
 44. Mykola Khvylovy, *The Cultural Renaissance in Ukraine: Political Pamphlets 1925–1926*, ed. Myroslav Shkandrij, Edmonton: CIUS, 1986, 222.
 45. Radziejowski, *Communist Party of Western Ukraine*, 66.
 46. Shums'kyi and Stalin: Iurii Shapoval, *Liudyna i systema: Shtrykhy do portretu totalitarnoi doby v Ukraïni*, Kyïv: Natsional'na Akademiia Nauk Ukraïny, 1994, 139.
 47. On Kaganovich's Jewishness consult Simon Sebag Montefiore, *Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar*, New York: Knopf, 2004, 63; and, with care, Stuart Kahan, *The Wolf of the Kremlin*, New York: Morrow, 1987.
 48. The basic work is Martin, *Affirmative Action Empire*.
 49. Mordecai Altshuler, "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in the Soviet Milieu in the Interwar Period," in Peter J. Potichnyj and Howard Aster, eds., *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, Edmonton: CIUS, 1988, 281–308.
 50. Valerij Ju. Vasil'ev, "Le système d'information de la GPU," *Cahiers du Monde russe*, 42:2–3–4, 2001, 247–248.
 51. On ukrainization: Basil Dmytryshyn, *Moscow and the Ukraine, 1918–1953*, New York: Bookman Associates, 1956, 88–89. Party disagreements: Radziejowski, *Communist Party of Western Ukraine*, 112, 117–119; Martin, *Affirmative Action Empire*, 84–87.
 52. Sebag Montefiore, *Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar*, 69.
 53. Stalin's relationship with Kaganovich: Yves Cohen, "Des lettres comme actions: Staline au début des années 1930 vu depuis le fonds Kaganovič," *Cahiers du Monde russe*, 38:3, 1997, 307–346; Khlevniouk, *Le cercle du Kremlin*, 81.
 54. Khvylovy, *Cultural Renaissance in Ukraine*, 170. Khvylovy and Dontsov, the leading Ukrainian communist and nationalist writers of the day, paid close attention to each other's careers.
 55. Kaganovich excerpts and Stalin reacts: Martin, *Affirmative Action Empire*, 215; Vasil'ev, "Le système d'information de la GPU," 249–250; P. P. Bachyns'kyi, ed., *Dokumenty trahichnoi istorii Ukraïny (1917–1927 rr.)*, Kyïv: Okhrona pratsi, 1999, 573–575.

56. Vote of confidence: *Dokumenty trahichnoi istorii Ukraïny*, 584–586. Karlo Maksymovych of the KPZU casts votum separatum: James Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983, 113; Martin, *Affirmative Action Empire*, 218. Shums'kyi organizes KPZU: Radziejowski, *Communist Party of Western Ukraine*, 66.
57. O. N. Ken and A. I. Rupasov, eds., *Politbiuro Ts.K. VKP(b) i otnosheniia SSSR s zapadnymi sosednimi gosudarstvami*, Saint Petersburg: Evropeiskii Dom, 2001, 259–261; Dziewanowski, *Communist Party of Poland*, 123. See also Chubar's address to the Kharkiv regional party committee in *Komunist*, 13 January 1927, 1.
58. This is treated in the next chapter.
59. Michniewicz, *Wielki bluff sowiecki*, 150.
60. Ryszard Torzecki, *Kwestia Ukraińska w Polsce w latach 1923–1939*, Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1989, 209–210. Shums'kyi kept up the pressure, claiming that Russian communists ruled Ukraine thanks to the help of servile "Little Russian" natives: Dmytryshyn, *Moscow and the Ukraine*, 210.
61. Signals: Christopher Andrew, *Her Majesty's Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community*, New York: Viking, 1987, 332. Polish scenario: Michal Reiman, *The Birth of Stalinism: The USSR on the Eve of the "Second Revolution"*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987, 13. In July 1927 Stalin blamed the British, although in the *Short Course* he emphasized that the assassin was a naturalized Polish citizen. An introduction to the period is Jan Karski, *The Great Powers and Poland 1919–1945*, Lanham: University Press of America, 1985. The assassin was a young Russian political émigré.
62. Stalin's use: Alfred G. Meyer, "The War Scare of 1927," *Soviet Union/Union Soviétique*, 5:1, 1978, 4–25; Piotr Wandycz, *Z Piłsudskim i Sikorskim: August Zaleski, Minister Spraw Zagranicznych w latach 1926–1932 i 1939–1941*, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1999, 72.
63. Cited after Dmytryshyn, *Moscow and the Ukraine*, 111.
64. *Dokumenty trahichnoi istorii Ukraïny*, 597–603, for Kaganovich's address to Fifth Congress of KP(b)U on 20 November 1927. Zaton's'kyi's address of October 1928: "Promova Tov. Zaton's'koho," *Vist*, 11 October 1927, 1.
65. Zaton's'kyi on ethnic Jews and Ukrainians in May 1927, and Skrypnyk on "Ukrainian blood" and the national deviation: Radziejowski, *Communist Party of Western Ukraine*, 131 and 133; Comintern statement of June 1927 on the threat of Khvyl'ovyi, Shums'kyi, and Piłsudski: *Dokumenty trahichnoi istorii Ukraïny*, 588–595.
66. Menshist' TsK KPZU to Politburo KP(b)U, 4 November 1927, AAN KPZU 165/V-51 4–5.
67. Radziejowski, *Communist Party of Western Ukraine*, 136–137, Torzecki, *Kwestia Ukraińska w Polsce*, 212.
68. Resolution of the Executive Committee of the Comintern discussed in Mikołaj Kowalewski, *Polityka narodowościowa na Ukrainie sowieckiej*, Jerusalem: Wydział Opieki nad Żołnierzem, 1947, 39–41. At the March 1928 CP(b)U Plenum, Zaton's'kyi called Polish Ukraine "a Piedmont to attract discontented elements within Ukraine": Martin, *Affirmative Action Empire*, 227. Martin calls attention to "the Piedmont principle" in Soviet nationality policy, and its inherent reversibility.
69. Ev. Kosmin, "Ukrainskie plany polskiego faszizmu," *Bolshevik*, Nos. 23–24 (31 December 1928), 112–125, quotation after Dmytryshyn, *Moscow and the Ukraine*, 114.

70. "Komunikat Informacyjny Nr. 46," AAN MSW 1/1039/68–69.
71. G. V. Kostyrchenko, *Tainaia politika Stalina: Vlast' i antisemitizm*, Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2001, 54.
72. Dmytryshyn, *Moscow and the Ukraine*, 129.
73. The use of national questions to manipulate the loyalties of subject peoples has a long history. An early example is the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, between Napoleon and Tsar Alexander. See Daniel Beauvois, *Pouvoir russe et noblesse polonaise en Ukraine 1793–1830*, Paris: CNRS, 2003, 87, 136, 142. Another is Austrian Galicia. See Austro-Hungarian general staff analyses in KA B/1450/81.
74. Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, "Biuletyn Narodowościowy N. 14," January 1929, 4, CAW I/303/4/1787. See also Consul Skrzyński in Kharkiv to foreign ministry, 16 July 1927, AAN MSZ 6706/19–22.

CHAPTER 2. PROMETHEAN UKRAINE

1. There is little secondary literature on prewar Prometheanism. Western studies exaggerate the role of France and Britain. Claims of London's centrality can be traced back to brief mentions of Prometheanism in biographies of British intelligence officers, such as Anthony Cave Brown, *'C': The Secret Life of Sir Stewart Graham Menzies, Spymaster to Winston Churchill*, New York: Macmillan, 1987, 143. A valuable exception is Etienne Copeaux, "Le mouvement 'Prométhéen,'" *Cahiers d'études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien*, No. 16, 1993, 1–36. A Russian article treats Prometheanism as a taboo of Polish historiography: T. M. Simonova, "Prometeizm vo vneshnei politike Pol'shi 1919–1924 gg.," *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, No. 4, 2002, 47. An excellent discussion of the prehistory is Jan Pisuliński, *Nie tylko Petlura: Kwestia ukraińska w polskiej polityce zagranicznej w latach 1918–1923*, Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2004.
2. Polish funding: Edmund Charaszkiewicz, "Strona finansowa problemu prometejskiego," Paris, 1 December 1939, JPI TO 38/1/37–48; Jerzy Nakaszydze, "Professor Dr. Roman Smal-Stocki (1893–1969)," *Zeszyte Historyczne*, No. 17, 1970, 194.
3. Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century*, New York: Vintage Books, 2000, 46–47; Mark von Hagen, "The Great War and the Mobilization of Ethnicity in the Russian Empire," in Barnett R. Rubin and Jack Snyder, *Post-Soviet Political Order*, New York: Routledge, 1998, 39–41.
4. Andrzej Pełtoński, *Wywiad a dyplomacja II Rzeczypospolitej*, Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2004, 268. On Piłsudski's "retirement": Joseph Rothschild, *Piłsudski's Coup d'Etat*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1966, 74–75.
5. Jerzy Stempowski, *Od Berdyczowa do Rzymu*, Paris: Institut Literacki, 1971, 8; Oleksander Shul'hyn to Nikov'skyi, 14 November 1921, AAN MSZ 5324/624. Zeki Velidi Togan, *Hâtıralar*, Istanbul: Hikmet Gazetecilik, 1969, 556–557. Stanisław Stempowski as Promethean: Pełtoński, *Wywiad a dyplomacja II Rzeczypospolitej*, 275.
6. Edmund Charaszkiewicz, "Strona finansowa problemu prometejskiego," Paris, 1 December 1939, JPI TO 38/1/46.
7. Edmund Charaszkiewicz, "Zagadnienie Prometejskie," Paris, 12 February 1940, JPI TO 38/1/31.

8. An appeal: Président de la Délégation d'Azerbaïdjan, Président p.i. de la Délégation du Caucase du Nord, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Géorgie, Président du Conseil des Ministres d'Ukraine, to August Zaleski, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 9 July 1926, AAN MSZ 6687/9. On Hołowko's access to Piłsudski: Iwo Werschler, *Tadeusz Hołowko: Życie i działalność*, Warsaw: PWN, 1984, 223; Wojciech Materski, *Tarcza Europy: Stosunki Polsko-Sowieckie 1918–1939*, Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1994, 219. Hołowko's socialism: Piotr Wandycz, "Czy Hołowko rozmawiał z Leninem i Trockim w 1918 roku?" *Zeszyty Historyczne*, No. 41, 1977, 225–229.
9. Centers of Promethean activity: AAN MSZ 6688. Ankara, Istanbul, and Tehran: Tadeusz Hołowko, "Sprawozdanie z wyjazdu do Konstantynopolu," 21 July 1926, AAN MSZ 6687/22–28; Poselstwo RP w Teheranie do Pana Ministra Schaetzla, MSZ, w Warszawie, 29 April 1931, AAN MSZ 6690/32–42. Turkestan: [To Tadeusz Hołowko], 22 November 1929, AAN MSZ 6689/120–123; [To Tadeusz Hołowko], 18 May 1930, AAN MSZ 6690/1; also files in CAW I/303/4/5460. Permanent outposts: Edmund Charaszkiewicz, "Zagadnienie Prometejskie," Paris, 12 February 1940, JPI TO 38/1/24. See also Jerzy Giedroyc, *Autobiografia na cztery ręce*, Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1994, 108. These are instances of an ambitious policy that cannot be treated globally here. Introductions are Copeaux, "Le mouvement 'Prométhéen,'" and Charles King, *The Black Sea: A History*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, 224–227. A study of Prometheanism as such would be a valuable contribution to interwar international history.
10. "Zarys historyczno-etnograficzny północnego kaukazu," 15 April 1930, JPI UMW 7/5/542–594. See related files in JPI UMW 7/5.
11. Caucasasia: Tadeusz Schätzel, Naczelnik Wydziału Wschodniego, MSZ, "Instrukcja w sprawach narodowościowych, July 1931, AAN MSZ 6690/47–49; "Protokół Posiedzenia Komitetu Niepodległości Kaukazu odbytego dn. 24.5.1930r. w Warszawie," AAN MSZ 6690/205; "Protokół Posiedzenia Komitetu Niepodległości Kaukazu odbytego dn. 27.5.1930r. w Warszawie," AAN MSZ 6690/206.
12. Arrests of Georgians: Werschler, *Tadeusz Hołowko*, 241. Litvinov protests: *Dokumenty i materiały do historii stosunków polsko-radzieckich*, Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, Vol. 5, 1966, 432.
13. Martin Walsdorff, *Westorientierung und Ostpolitik: Stresemanns Russlandpolitik in der Locarno-Ära*, Bremen: Schönmeyer Universitätsverlag, 1971, at 65; see also Peter Krüger, *Die Aussenpolitik der Republik von Weimar*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1985, 280–319.
14. See Sergei Gorlov, *Sovershenno sekretno, Moskva-Berlin, 1920–1933: Voennno-politicheskie otnosheniia mezhdu SSSR i Germaniei*, Moscow: RAN, 1999.
15. Hołowko's centrality: consult AAN MSZ 6687, 6688, 6689. Librarian: MSZ, Wydział Wschodni, "Sprawdzenie Hamsa Tahira w Kairze," 24 March 1931, AAN MSZ 6690/19. Princess: Coded Telegram, Tabryz to Warsaw, 4 May 1931, AAN MSZ 6690/42.
16. Werschler, *Tadeusz Hołowko*, 215–216; Piotr Wandycz, "Z zagadnień współpracy Polsko-Ukraińskiej w latach 1919–20," *Zeszyty Historyczne*, No. 12, 1967, 23.
17. Henry Abramson, *A Prayer for the Government: Ukrainians and Jews in Revolutionary Times*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999, 109–140. See also Symon Petliura, *Statti*, Kyiv: Dnipro, 1993, 185.
18. *Ibid.*, 134–139, 169–178.

19. Saul Friedman, *Pogromchik: The Assassination of Simon Petlura*, New York: Hart, 1976, 65, 342–343, 353.
20. An assassin's account: Pavel and Anatoli Sudoplatov, *Special Tasks*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1995, 7–29.
21. Shimon Redlich, "Jewish-Ukrainian Relations in Interwar Poland as Reflected in Some Ukrainian Publications," *Polin*, Vol. 11, 1998, 236–238.
22. Jerzy Stempowski, *Listy do Jerzego Giedroycia*, Warsaw: LNB, 1991, 68–69.
23. Livyts'kyi's appeal: Andrzej Liwicki and W. Salski to Józef Piłsudski, 4 July 1926, CAW I/303/4/5389. Zaleski's instruction: "W sprawie: Instrukcja informacyjna w sprawie stosunków politycznych wśród emigracji ukraińskiej," 30 December 1926, AAN MSZ 5314/155–157. Hołówko's priorities: Werschler, *Tadeusz Hołówko*, 227; Sergiusz Mikulicz, *Prometeizm w polityce II Rzeczypospolitej*, Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1971, 103. Piłsudski intended that Zaleski convey an image of a peaceful Poland. Wandycz, *Z Piłsudskim i Sikorskim*, 35–36, 42–43, 70.
24. Włodzimierz Dąbrowski, Ekspozytura 2 Oddz[iał] II, 2 March 1940, report reprinted in *Zeszyty Historyczne*, No. 140 (2002), 107.
25. Gen. Bryg. Jacynik, Dowódca O[kręgu] K[orpusu] I, "Oficerowie ukraińscy przydzieleni do armji polskiej," Warsaw, 28 August 1928, CAW I/371/1/A.32. Ukrainian soldiers were already employed in the Polish army: see 1922 lists in CAW I/371/2/A.79; also Józef Lewandowski, *Imperializm słabości: Kształtowanie się koncepcji polityki wschodniej piłsudczyków 1921–1926*, Warsaw: PWN, 1967, 140.
26. A. Livyts'kyi and V. Sal's'kyi, "Nakaz holovnoi komandy viiska i floty Ukraïns'koï Narodn'oi Respubliki," 28 February 1927, JPI UMW 7/4/1/6–8; related "Protokol" of 10 March 1927 at CAW I/380/2/27/466 and JPI UMW 7/4/1/13–19; for the brief mentions in memoir and secondary literature see Pavlo Shandruk, *Arms of Valor*, New York: Speller, 1959, 143; Ryszard Torzecki, *Kwestia ukraińska w Polsce w latach 1923–1939*, Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1989, 162; V. S. Sidak and T. V. Brons'ka, *Spetssluzhba derzhavy bez terytorii: Liudy, podii, fakty*, Kyiv: Tempora, 2003, 61–62; Mykola Livyts'kyi, *D. Ts. U.N.R. v exzylu mizh 1920 i 1940 rokamy*, Munich: Ukraïns'ke Informatsiine Biuro, 1984, 22–23; Robert Potocki, *Idea restytucji Ukraïńskiej Republiki Ludowej (1920–1939)*, Lublin: IESW, 1999, 203.
27. War and occupation planning: "Ts[ilkom] Taiemno. Na chas viiny," Pavlo Shandruk, "Variiant B. Doklad," 15 February 1929; "Pro Etapni Raiony"; "Dyviziia"; all in CAW I/380/2/25; similar records in JPI UMW 7/4/1/39–64.
28. [Pavlo Shandruk], "Protokol konferentsii 10 bereznia 1927 roku v prysutnosti Pana Holovnoho Otomana Viis'ka i fl'ty UNR Andriia Livyts'koho," JPI UMW 7/4/1/15.
29. [Third Section, UNR army], "Przedmiot i srodki pracy III-j sekcji i organizacja jej," [1927], JPI UMW 7/4/1/36–37.
30. His background, V. S. Sidak, *Natsional'ni spetssluzhby v period Ukraïns'koï revoliutsii 1917–1921 rr.*, Kyiv: Al'ternatyvy, 1998, 274.
31. Komendant PKU Warszawa Miasto I, "Zaświadczenie," 25 April 1927, CAW I/303/4/1978; MSW do Ministerstwa Spraw Wojskowych, Oddział II Sztabu Generalnego, 4 March 1924, CAW I/303/4/2698; Ministerstwo Spraw Wojskowych Sztab Generalny, "Palij—Zokowskij—Sidoriansijm," 11 June 1924, CAW I/303/4/2698.

32. His appointment to direct the Second Section: [Pavlo Shandruk], "Protokol konferentsii 10 bereznia 1927 roku v prysutnosti Pana Holovnoho Otomana Viiska i fl'ty UNR Andriia Livyts'koho," JPI UMW 7/4/1/15.
33. Mykola Chebotariv to V. Shevchenko, 20 January 1925, in V. S. Sidak, ed., *Vyzvol'ni zmahannia ochyma kontrovidnyka*, Kyiv: Tempora, 2003, 200–201.
34. "Ekselentsie," [to Andrii Livyts'kyi, February 1927], AAN MSZ 6705/113–114.
35. Second Department, "Plac. H[etman]," 4 May 1927, CAW I/303/4/1978; Second Department, "Okno dla plac[ówki] H[etman]," 12 May 1927, CAW I/303/4/1978. The handler was Petro Doroshenko. 1924 and Kharkiv: Mykola Chebotariv to V. Shevchenko, 15 February 1924, in Sidak, *Vyzvol'ni zmahannia ochyma kontrovidnyka*, 183.
36. See "Zvit Ch. 1," "Orhanizatsiia Shkil'nytstva na Ukraïni," and "Zvit No. 4," CAW I/303/4/1978.
37. Oddział II Sztabu Generalnego, Referat Rosja, "Materiał wywiadowczy," 9 November 1927; idem, "Meldunki wywiadowcze," 1 December 1929, both in CAW I/303/4/1978.
38. Mykola Chebotariv to V. Shevchenko, 12 May 1924 and 31 August 1925, in Sidak, *Vyzvol'ni zmahannia ochyma kontrovidnyka*, 193, 203.
39. "Ekselentsie," [to Andrii Livyts'kyi, February 1927], AAN MSZ 6705/113–114.
40. [Mykola Chebotariv], "Moie zvil'nennia," [no date, Polish translation dated 25 April 1929], CAW I/303/4/5389.
41. *Do Boiu! Orhan Soiuzu Borot'by za Samostiinu Ukraïnu*, No. 1, 28 October 1927, CAW I/303/4/1978.
42. Chebotariv to V. Shevchenko, 22 November 1927, in Sidak, *Vyzvol'ni zmahannia ochyma kontrovidnyka*, 235.
43. This activity will be treated in a later chapter.
44. Chebotariv's attitude: Chebotariv to V. Shevchenko, 12 May 1924, 22 October 1924, in Sidak, *Vyzvol'ni zmahannia ochyma kontrovidnyka*, 193, 196. On the quarrel: [Mykola Chebotariv], "Moie zvil'nennia," [no date, cited after Ukrainian original; Polish translation "Moje zwolnienie" dated 25 April 1929], CAW I/303/4/5389. Suspicions of Chebotariv: Informer's report, 13 December 1927, JPI UMW 7/4/1/237–238; see also Livyts'kyi, *D. Ts. U.N.R. v exzylu*, 27; Sidak and Brons'ka, *Spetssluzhba derzhavy bez terytorii: Liudy, podii, fakty*, 126, 131, 153.
45. Iurii Shapoval, "Vsevolod Balickij: Bourreau et victime," *Cahiers du Monde russe*, 44:2–3, 2003, 371–384.
46. Circular: Iurii Shapoval, Volodymyr Prystaiko, and Vadym Zolotar'ov, eds., *ChK-HPU-NKVD v Ukraïni: Osoby, fakty, dokumenty*, Kyiv: Abrys, 1997, 254–267. Balyts'kyi's earlier activity: *ibid.*, 23.
47. Ivan Kuras, Iurii Levenets', and Iurii Shapoval, "Serhii Iefremov i ioho shchodennyky," in Serhii Iefremov, *Shchodennyky 1923–1929*, Kyiv: Hazeta Rada, 1997, 14.
48. Volodymyr Prystaiko and Iurii Shapoval, eds., *Sprava "Spilky Vyzvolennia Ukraïny"*, Kyiv: Intel, 1995, 25, 37.
49. On the Soiuz Vyzvolennia Ukraïny, Oleh Fedyshyn, "The Germans and the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine," in Taras Hunczak, ed., *The Ukraine, 1917–1921: A Study in Revolution*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977, 310–313.

50. On the student Mykola Pavlushkov: Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Sprava "Spilky Vyzvolennia Ukraïny"*, 46. Diary entries for late May 1926 in Iefremov, *Shchodennyky*, 377–380, at 379.
51. Ukraïns'kyi Revoliutsiinyi Komitet [UNR army, Second Section, Third Referat], "V tretiu richnytsiu smerty Velykoho Vozhdia Ukraïns'koho Narodu Symona Petliury," 25 May 1929, CAW I/380/2/342.
52. "Tretia seksia Heneral'noho Shtabu UNR . . ." 7 April 1931, CAW I/380/2/26/83–88.
53. Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Sprava "Spilky Vyzvolennia Ukraïny"*, 126–127.
54. Konsulat Generalny RP w Charkowie, "Ogólne oświecenie tendencyj procesu 'Spilky Wizwolenja Ukraïny,'" 22 March 1930, JPI UMW 7/5/124.
55. Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Sprava "Spilky Vyzvolennia Ukraïny"*, 202–204.
56. *Dokumenty i materiały do historii stosunków polsko-radzieckich*, Vol. 5, 431–433.
57. Burning in effigy: *ibid.*, 47; Polish consulate "admission" of January: *ibid.*, 238. Chubar claims in 26 November interview with *Izvestiia* that SVU leaders were sent by "Polish fascism": O. N. Ken and A. I. Rupasov, eds., *Politbiuro Ts.K. VKP(b) i otnosheniia SSSR s zapadnymi sosednimi gosudarstvami*, Saint Petersburg: Evropeiskii Dom, 2001, 505.
58. Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Sprava "Spilky Vyzvolennia Ukraïny"*, 220. On Petliura in interrogations, see also Iurii Khorunzhyi, *Opera SVU Muzyka HPU*, Kamians'k-Shakhtyns'kyi, 1992.
59. [Third Section, UNR army], "Treść polityczna propagandy," 1927, JPI UMW 7/4/1/34.
60. Abramson, *A Prayer for the Government*, 112.
61. A. N. Sakharov et al., eds., "Sovershenno sekretno": *Lubianka-Stalinu o polozhenii v strane (1922–1934 gg.)*, Moscow: RAN 2002, Vol. 6, 303–304.
62. Jerzy Stempowski made these points: "Proces Szwarcbarda," 1926, BUWDR 1507/1.
63. On previous show trials, Jurij äapoval, "Die bolschewistische politische Polizei in der Ukraine der Zwischenkriegszeit," in Peter Schapoval et al., eds., *Ukraine*, Vienna: Peter Lang, 2001, 319–338.
64. Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Sprava "Spilky Vyzvolennia Ukraïny"*, 42–43; Anton Antonov-Ovseenko, *Portret tirana*, New York: Khronika, 1980, 146.
65. Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Sprava "Spilky Vyzvolennia Ukraïny"*, 16.
66. Livyts'kyi, *D. Ts. UNR v exyli*, 31; Shandruk, *Arms of Valor*, 144; Mikulicz, *Prometeizm w polityce II Rzeczypospolitej*, 211; Robert Potocki, *Polityka państwa polskiego wobec zagadnienia ukraińskiego w latach 1930–1939*, Lublin: IESW, 2003, 262. Retroactive claims of this kind should be read with suspicion. The evidence adduced above for the existence of the Alliance precedes the arrests and show trial.
67. Jerzy Niezbrzycki, Report on German Military Intelligence on the USSR, London, 22 July 1941, JPI TO 109/1/B/2; Ryszard Wraga [Niezbrzycki], "Czwarty marszałek Polski," *Kultura*, January 1950, 120.
68. Ukraïns'kyi Revoliutsiinyi Komitet [UNR army, Second Section, Third Referat], "Pro Soiuz Vyzvolennia Ukraïny," CAW I/380/2/342.
69. Flag: Ukraïns'kyi Revoliutsiinyi Komitet [UNR army, Second Section, Third Referat], "Cherhova provokatsiia," June 1930, CAW I/380/2/342. Confrontation: Ukraïns'kyi Revoliutsiinyi Komitet [UNR army, Second Section, Third Referat], "Do Intelihentsii na Ukraïni," 1930, CAW I/380/2/342.

70. "Zvit Ch. 3. 2-i Sektii za period vid 15 chervnia 1929 roku—1 chervnia 1930 roku," CAW I/380/2/26/99.
71. "II-ha sektsiia. Stan na I-she liutoho 1931 roku," CAW I/380/2/26/89–90. Zinov'ievs'k was later renamed Kirovo and then Kirovohrad.
72. Ukraïns'kyi Revoliutsiinyi Komitet [UNR army, Second Section, Third Referat], "Pro Soiuz Vyzvolennia Ukraïny," CAW I/380/2/342. The Polish-sponsored organization was the "Soiuz Borot'by za Samostiinu Ukraïnu"; the "organization" on trial was the "Spilka Vyzvolennia Ukraïny." The historical organization was the "Soiuz Vyzvolennia Ukraïny."
73. Andrea Chandler, *Institutions of Isolation: Border Controls in the Soviet Union and Its Successor States, 1917–1993*, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998, 48–54.
74. Consider V. V. Doroshenko et al., eds., *Istoriia sovetskikh organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti: Uchebnik*, Moscow: KGB, 1977, 213–214.
75. Without more Soviet documentation, it is impossible to say which is best. In any event, Hetman and Soiuz Borot'by za Samostiinu Ukraïnu were unknown to scholars. See also Hiroaki Kuromiya, "Stalinskii 'velikii perelom' i protsess nad 'Soiuzom osvobozhdenia Ukraïny'," *Istoriia SSSR*, No. 1, 1994, 190–197; Gordon W. Morrell, *Britain Confronts the Stalin Revolution: Anglo-Soviet Relations and the Metro-Vickers Crisis*, Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1995, 70–73 and passim.
76. Iefremov's contacts: Livyts'kyi, *D. Ts. UNR v exzyl'i*, 19, 31. Shums'kyi's fate: Dmytryshyn, *Moscow and the Ukraine*, 116; Shapoval, Prystaiko, and Zolotar'ov, *ChK-HPU-NKVD v Ukraïni*, 137.
77. Oleh Ilnytzyk, *Ukrainian Futurism 1914–1930*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997, 143–162.
78. The "medical focus": Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Sprava "Spilky Vyzvolennia Ukraïny"*, 49; Piłsudski and Ukrainian scholars: Antonov-Ovseenko, *Portret tirana*, 146.
79. Shapoval, "Vsevolod Balickij: Bourreau et victime," 386.

CHAPTER 3. THEATERS OF POLITICS

1. Zofia Nałkowska, *Dzienniki 1930–1939*, Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1988, 343.
2. Polish and Ukrainian theaters: ZP (2), 155–156; Nałkowska, *Dzienniki 1930–1939*, 344 n. 1; [Henryk Józewski], "Sprawozdanie z sytuacji na Wołyniu," September 1933, AAN UWW 979/83/16.
3. On Stanisława Wysocka, Stanislavsky, and the Polish Theater "Studia" in Kyïv, Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz, *Stanisława Wysocka i jej kijowski teatr "Studia"*, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Artystyczne i Filmowe, 1963, 22; on Craig and Stanislavsky, Lija Skalska-Miecik, "Dotknięcia muzy," in Andrzej Stawarz, ed., *Henryk Jan Józewski: Polityk Artysta Malarz*, Warsaw: Muzeum Niepodległości, 2002, 24.
4. Nałkowska, *Dzienniki 1930–1939*, 341–342.
5. Werner Benecke, *Die Ostgebiete der Zweiten Polnischen Republik*, Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 1999, 27.
6. Illiteracy: *ibid.*, 95, 251. Schooling: "Wołyń—Sprawozdanie," June 1937, 1, BUWDR 1549. Illiteracy in Volhynia declined from 69% to 48% between 1921 and 1931: Joseph

- Rothschild, *East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992, 44.
7. Volhynian modernization: Włodzimierz Mędrzecki, "Przemiany cywilizacyjne i socjogeograficzne miast województwa wołyńskiego 1921–1939," *Kwartalnik Historii Kultury Materialnej*, No. 1, 1995, 107–113; ZP (1), 76–77.
 8. Benecke, *Ostgebiete*, 83.
 9. Włodzimierz Mędrzecki, "Liczebność i rozmieszczenie grup narodowościowych w II Rzeczypospolitej w świetle wyników II spisu powszechnego (1931 r.)," *Dzieje Najnowsze*, 15:1–2, 1983, 244.
 10. By 1937, the state had taken 230,883 hectares from Polish landowners in Volhynia, and 174,717 hectares from non-Polish landowners. Of these 404,270 hectares, 198,195 hectares (48.9%) were granted to Poles (16.7% of the population), and 203,417 hectares (50%) were given to Ukrainians (68.1% of the population). "Wołyń—Sprawozdanie," June 1937, 14, BUWDR 1549.
 11. Kpt. Orłowski, Szef Ekspozytury 5, Lwów, to Szef Oddziału II Sztabu Głównego Ref[erat] W[schód], Warszawa, 3 June 1932, CAW I/303/4/1826.
 12. "Protokół konferencji Wojewodów z Kresów Wschodnich," Łuck, 2–3 December 1929, AAN MSZ 5314/31. A National Democratic eastern program: Jędrzej Giertych, *O program polityki kresowej*, Warsaw: Patria, 1932.
 13. Henryk Józewski, "Opowieść o istnieniu," "Sprawa ukraińska," Vol. 2, Part II, p. 2, BUWDR 3189/2; and "Wołyń," Vol. 2, Part IV, p. 5, BUWDR 3189/2.
 14. A local 1937 count recorded 348,079 Poles (16.7%), 205,615 Jews (9.9%), and 1,420,074 Ukrainians (68.1%). "Wołyń—Sprawozdanie," June 1937, 1, BUWDR 1549. Poles were recorded in 1921 as 17.3% of the population. On the general decline: "Zagadnienie Ziemi Wschodnich w świetle bezpośrednich obserwacji terenu," Warsaw, 1935, AAN MSW 1/946/7.
 15. Józewski set out these views clearly in an address to fellow regional governors: "Protokół konferencji Wojewodów z Kresów Wschodnich," Łuck, 2–3 December 1929, AAN MSZ 5314/27–38. Jagiellonian idea: Henryk Józewski, "Memoriał w sprawie kierunku polskiej polityki państwowej na Wołyniu," 1938, 24–27, BUWDR 1549/6; Jan Kościółek, "Doniesienie," 24 May 1952, IPN 0231/44/42; T. Walczak, "Notatka służbowa," Warsaw 28 April 1953, IPN 0231/44/6.
 16. Henryk Józewski, "Opowieść o istnieniu," "Myśli o Józefie Piłsudskim," 47, BUWDR 3189/2.
 17. "Protokół konferencji Wojewodów z Kresów Wschodnich," Łuck, 2–3 December 1929, AAN MSZ 5314/27.
 18. ZP (2), 152.
 19. Brief portraits in Jan Kościółek, "Doniesienie," 24 May 1952, IPN 0231/44/37–38. Additional details from *Kto był kim w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej*, Warsaw: BGW, 1994. Srokowski: Janina Stobniak-Smogorzewska, *Kresowe osadnictwo wojskowe 1920–1945*, Warsaw: Rytm, 2003, 95–96; Benecke, *Ostgebiete*, 123. Okhrana agents: "Zagadnienie Ziemi Wschodnich w świetle bezpośrednich obserwacji terenu," Warsaw, 1935, AAN MSW 1/946/6. Krzakowski: Jolanta Żyndul, *Państwo w państwie? Autonomia narodowo-kulturalna w Europie środkowowschodniej w XX wieku*, Warsaw: DiG 2000, 112. Dębski:

- Cornelia Schenke, *Nationalstaat und nationale Frage: Polen und die Ukrainer 1921–1939*, Hamburg: Dölling und Galitz Verlag, 2004, 186.
20. Shmuel Spector, *The Holocaust of Volhynian Jews 1941–1944*, Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1990, 13.
 21. “Budżet na rok kalendarzowy 1932 gminy wyznaniowej w Korcu,” DAR 216/1/2 = USHMM RG-31.017M-6; “Lista płatników składki Gminy Wyznaniowej Żyd. w Korcu na rok 1932,” DAR 216/1/1 = USHMM RG-31.017M-6.
 22. Stanisław Mauersberg, *Szkolnictwo powszechne dla mniejszości narodowych w Polsce w latach 1918–1939*, Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1968, 184. See also Shaul Stampfer, “Hasidic Yeshivot in Inter-War Poland,” *Polin*, Vol. 11, 1998, 3–24.
 23. The basic treatment is Gershon Bacon, *The Politics of Tradition: Agudat Yisrael in Poland, 1916–1939*, Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1996.
 24. Jeffrey S. Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg, “Who Voted Communist? Reconsidering the Social Bases of Radicalism in Interwar Poland,” *Slavic Review*, 67:1, 2003, 87–109; Andrzej Ajnenkiel, *Polska po przewrocie majowym*, Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna, 1980, 87, 94.
 25. Jews in the BBWR: DOK II, “Referat o sytuacji polityczno-narodowościowej DOK II za czas od 1 V do 1 VIII 1929,” 1 August 1929, 17; CAW I/371/2/A.88; see also Alfred Wiślicki, “Wacław Wiślicki—Działacz polityczny,” *Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego*, No. 158, 1991, 73–85.
 26. DOK II, “Referat o sytuacji polityczno-narodowościowej DOK II za trzeci kwartał 1930 r.,” CAW I/371/2/A.88.
 27. Jerzy Tomaszewski, “The Civil Rights of Jews in Poland, 1918–1939,” *Polin*, No. 8, 1995, 125.
 28. Szmuel Spektor, “Żydzi wołyńscy w Polsce międzywojennej i w okresie II wojny światowej (1920–1944),” in Krzysztof Jasiewicz, ed., *Europa Nieprowincjonalna*, Warsaw: ISP PAN, 1999, 573.
 29. “Zvit z zhovtnevoi konferentsii OK KPZU,” AAN KPZU 165/VII-1 t. 10 24.
 30. For example “Orhanizatsiinyi zvit OK Luts’k,” AAN KPZU 165/VII-1 t. 10 43. The uncorrected election results of 1928 reveal that some Jewish towns in Volhynia voted for communist parties. MSW, Wydział Bezpieczeństwa, “Udział ugrupowań wywrotowych w wyborach do ciał ustawodawczych w Polsce w roku 1928,” Warsaw 1928, AAN MSW I/1186/15.
 31. Correspondence in Ukrainian: BUWDR 432/1/54–60. Speaking Ukrainian: ZP (2), 140.
 32. On these reforms: Włodzimierz Mędrzecki, *Województwo Wołyńskie*, Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1988; Jan Kęsik, *Zaufany Komendanta: Biografia polityczna Jana Henryka Józewskiego 1892–1981*, Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 1995; idem, “Województwo wołyńskie 1921–1939 w świetle liczb i faktów,” *Przegląd Wschodni*, 4:1, 1997, 99–136; Schenke, *Nationalstaat und nationale Frage*.
 33. Schenke, *Nationalstaat und nationale Frage*, 183–190.
 34. The proportion of Polish schoolteachers increased from 69.3% in 1928 to 79.8% in 1933: Kęsik, “Województwo wołyńskie 1921–1939 w świetle liczb i faktów,” 124. End of Ukrainian instruction in teacher academies: Mauersberg, *Szkolnictwo powszechne*, 96.
 35. 1936 school figures: Stanisław Mauersberg, *Szkolnictwo powszechne dla mniejszości naro-*

- dowych w Polsce w latach 1918–1939*, Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1968, 95. 1932 school figures: [Henryk Józewski], "Sprawozdanie z sytuacji na Wołyniu," September 1933, AAN UWW 979/83.
36. Henryk Józewski, "Opowieść o istnieniu," "Wołyń," Vol. 2, Part IV, p. 42, BUWDR 3189/2.
37. Ajnenkial, *Polska po przewrocie majowym*, 94.
38. Petliurites in the church movement: ZP (2), 70; "Memoriał Ukraińskiej Parlamentarnej Reprezentacji Prawosławnych Posłów i Senatorów Wołynia" [1934], AAN MSW 1048; Pułkownik Dyplomowany Korytowski, "Naświetlenie sytuacji na terenie garnizonu . . ." May 1937, CAW I.371.1.2/A.103.
39. "Referat Ukraiński," AAN MSW 1/808/123; also AAN MSW 1/805/139; and Kęsik, "Województwo wołyńskie 1921–1939," 124, 129.
40. Oleksandr Darovanets', "Represywna aktsiia pols'koï vłady schodo Orhanizatsii Ukraïn-s'kykh Natsionalistiv na Volyni," *Ukraïns'kyi Vyzvol'nyi Rukh*, No. 3, 2004, 123.
41. "Likwidacja kooperatyw na Wołyniu," AAN MSW 1/1054; numbers from "Referat Ukraiński," AAN MSW 1/808/123.
42. M. I. Zil'berman, *Revoliutsiina borot'ba trudiashchykh zakhidnoi Ukraïny (1924–1928 rr.)*, L'viv: Vydavnytstvo L'vivs'koho Universytetu, 1968, 40 and 158.
43. "Ogólne wiadomości o partji Sel-Rob Jedność," [1929], AAN UWW 979/25.
44. "Obizhnyk Ts.K. KPZU v spravi pratsi v ukraïns'kii kooperatsii," May 1931, AAN KPZU 165/V-7/53; "Obizhnyk Ts.K. KPZU pro roboty v Prosvitakh," May 1931, AAN KPZU 165/V-7/55–57.
45. DOK II, "Referat o sytuacji polityczno-narodowościowej DOK II za czas od 1 V do 1 VIII 1929," 1 August 1929, CAW I/371/2/A.88.
46. Gen. bryg. Dobrodzicki, "Przyjazd Germanosa na Wołyń," Lublin, 18 December 1930, CAW I/303/4/2661. Electoral figures: Zbigniew Zaporowski, *Wołyńskie Zjednoczenie Ukraïnskie*, Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2000, 61.
47. About this Józewski and his communist foes agree: Henryk Józewski, "Opowieść o istnieniu," Vol. 2, Part IV, p. 5, BUWDR, 3189/1; T. Walczak, "Notatka służbowa," 28 April 1953, IPN 0231/44/6.
48. Ts.K. KPZU, "Do vsikh chleniv partii," 1 May 1928, AAN KPZU 165/V-4/67.
49. DOK II, "Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 15 I do 15 VII 1929 r.," 15 July 1929, CAW I/371/2/A.92/3.
50. Lwów arrests: Ppłk. Niezabotowski, Szef Stabu Dowództwa Okręgu Korpus VI, "Raport o ruchu komunistycznym," Lwów, January 1929, CAW I/303/4/6973 2. Some 1929 liquidations: DOK II, "Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 15 VII [1929 r.] do 15 I 1930 r.," 15 January 1930, CAW I/371/2/A.91/12–24; H. Suchenek-Sucheki, "Biuletyn Informacyjny 19," AAN MSW 1/1039/2; also Janusz Radziejowski, *The Communist Party of Western Ukraine 1919–1929*, Edmonton: CIUS, 1983, 154, 172–173, 177, 186.
51. 1929: AAN KPZU 165/VI-9/t-1; DOK II, "Referat o sytuacji polityczno-narodowościowej DOK II za czas od 1 II do 1 V 1929," 1 May 1929, CAW I/371/2/A.88 22. Local organizations: DOK II, "Referat o sytuacji polityczno-narodowościowej DOK II za pierwszy kwartał 1930 r.," 1 May 1930, CAW I/371/2/A.88.

52. A sample of ideological purity: the KPZU's greeting to the KP(b)U of April 1929, recorded in AAN MSW 1/1152/14.
53. Loss of popularity: DOK II, "Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 15 VII 1930 r. do 15 I 1931 r.," 15 January 1931, CAW I/371/2/A.91/11; also Danylo Shumuk, *Perezhyte i peredumane*, Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo imeni Oleny Telihiy, 1998, 17.
54. Collectivization and refugees will be discussed below. Communism unpopular at the border: DOK II, "Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 15 I 1931 do 15 VII 1931 r.," 1 August 1931, CAW I/371/2/A.91/9. Refugees decrease popularity of communism: DOK II, "Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 16 I do 15 VII 1930 r.," 15 July 1930, CAW I/371/2/A.91/4. Communists do not agitate near refugees: DOK II, "Referat o sytuacji polityczno-narodowościowej DOK II za drugi kwartał 1930 r.," 1 August 1930, CAW I/371/2/A.88/23. A Ukrainian confirmation: Taras Bul'ba-Borovets', *Armia bez derzhavy*, L'viv: Poklyk sumlinnia, 1993, 12.
55. MSW, Wydział Bezpieczeństwa, "Udział ugrupowań wywrotowych w wyborach do ciał ustawodawczych w Polsce w roku 1928," 1928, AAN MSW 1/1186/15. The legal far left parties were Poalej-Zion Left and Sel-Rob Right.
56. "V misto Olyku," AAN KPZU 165/VII-1/t-10/20.
57. Volyn OK KPZU, "Sprawozdania za chas vid VI do IV 1932," 15 September 1932, AAN KPZU 165/VII-1/t-10/24–35.
58. Kowel actions and Łuck arrests: T. Walczak, "Notatka służbowa," 28 April 1953, IPN 0231/44/8.
59. "Zvit z zhovtnevoi konferentsii OK KPZU," AAN KPZU 165/VII-1/t-10/10/41.
60. "Protokół obrad konferencji władz adminstracji ogólnej województwa poleskiego i wołyńskiego oraz przedstawicieli władz wojskowych," conference held 25 August 1932, AAN UWW 979/71. See also Jerzy Tomaszewski, "Zwalczenie 'żywiółów wywrotowych' na Połesiu w r. 1933," *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, 68:2, 1961, 451–455.
61. Piven' incident: ZP (3), 41, 51, at 53; IPHJ, 6 March 1954, WSR 275/54/t-1.
62. In the remorseless ideological rococo of interwar Polish politics, Sel-Rob (the Peasant-Worker Union) occupies a place of pride, surpassed in international entanglements, internal contradictions, and feckless fissiparousness perhaps only by its cousin Poalei Zion. Sel-Rob Right won the elections of 1928, and during the Shums'kyi Affair was associated with the national deviation. The new KPZU leadership succeeded in drawing its supporters to Sel-Rob Unity. On the rise of Sel-Rob Unity in Volhynia: DOK II, "Referat o sytuacji polityczno-narodowościowej DOK II za czas od 1 II do 1 V 1929," 1 May 1929, 22–23; DOK II, "Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 15 VII [1929 r.] do 15 I 1930 r.," 15 January 1930, 3–4; DOK II, "Referat o sytuacji polityczno-narodowościowej DOK II za czas od 1 V do 1 VIII 1929," 16–19; DOK II, "Referat o sytuacji polityczno-narodowościowej DOK II za czwarty kwartał 1930 r.," 10 January 1931, 19; DOK II, "Referat o sytuacji polityczno-narodowościowej DOK II za pierwszy kwartał 1931 r.," 1 May 1931, 19–21; DOK II, "Referat o sytuacji polityczno-narodowościowej DOK II za drugi kwartał 1931 r.," 1 August 1931, 17–18. All located in CAW I/371/2/A.88.

63. Calculations from MSW, Wydział Bezpieczeństwa, “Udział ugrupowań wywrotowych w wyborach do ciał ustawodawczych w Polsce w roku 1928,” Warsaw 1928, AAN MSW 1/1186/8–15. This is a key text for researchers who wish to use Polish electoral data.
64. Zbigniew Zaporowski, *Wołyńskie Zjednoczenie Ukraińskie*, Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2000, 51–58.
65. Politburo commission report on KPZU, in I. I. Kostushko, ed., *Materiały “Osoboi papki” Politbiuro Ts.K. RKP(b)-VKP(b) po voprosu sovetsko-pol’skikh otnoshenii 1923–1944 gg.*, Moscow: RAN, 1997, 36.
66. The Centrolew declaration: Aleksander Łuczak and Józef Ryszard Szaflik, eds., *Druga Rzeczpospolita: Wybór dokumentów*, Warsaw: Ludowa Spółdzielnia Wydawnicza, 1989, 319–321. Piłsudski and Brześć: Felician Sławoj Składkowski, *Strzępy meldunków*, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo MON, 1988, 104–105. See also Andrzej Chojnowski, *Piłsudzczy u władzy: Dzieje Bezpartyjnego Bloku Współpracy z Rządem*, Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1986, 160; M. K. Dziewanowski, *The Communist Party of Poland*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959, 132; George D. Jackson, Jr., *Comintern and Peasant in East Europe, 1919–1930*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1966, 209–210.
67. Bronisław Pieracki, “Selrob-Jedność—uznanie za nielegalną,” circular to governors, 13 September 1932, AAN MSW III/1064.
68. Jolanta Żyndul records none in her *Zajścia antyżydowskie w Polsce w latach 1935–1937*, Warsaw: Fundacja Kelles-Krauza, 1994, 53 and passim. There were surely some, for example those committed by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (see below). This issue of Ukrainian-Jewish relations in Volhynia warrants further investigation.
69. Henry Abramson, *A Prayer for the Government: Ukrainians and Jews in Revolutionary Times*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997, 112–113.
70. “Osnovni zasady pidhotovnoi pratsi do povorotu ta vidnovlennia ukrains’koï derzhavnosti,” [1937], CAW I/380/2/27.
71. “Rezolucje VI rozszerzonego siedzenia CK.KPZU,” Lwów 1932 (summary by the KOP), CAW I/303/4/7016.
72. Józewski to Hołówko, 18 December 1929, AAN MSZ 5314/26. The general line on national minorities: Henryk Suchenek-Suczeki, [1931 report], AAN MSW 1/935/4; MSW do MSZ, “Notatka w sprawie wewnętrznej polityki narodowościowej,” 22 June 1932, AAN MSW 1/936/1–9. A Soviet protest over the Petliura mass: *Dokumenty i materiały do historii stosunków polsko-radzieckich*, Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1966, Vol. 5, 431–433. Hołówko and Józewski’s youthful acquaintance: IPHJ, 17 September 1953, IPN 0330/240/t-1/286.
73. This study, unlike most of the historiography of interwar Polish-Ukrainian relations, concentrates upon Volhynia rather than Galicia. An introduction to the literature is Paul Robert Magocsi, *Galicia: A Historical Survey and Bibliographic Guide*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983, 175–200. See also Alexander Motyl, *The Turn to the Right*, Boulder: East European Monographs, 1980; *Polin*, Vol. 12, 1999. On Austrian rule see Andrei Markovits and Frank Sysyn, eds., *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982.
74. It is difficult to be certain about OUN intentions, not least because the leadership in emigration did not always know in advance about the actions of its followers in Poland. I.e.

- Konovalets', *Ia b'iu v dzvin, shchob zrushty spravu OUN z mertvoi tochky*, Kyiv: Tempora, 2003, 211 and passim.
75. Figures from Ryszard Torzecki, *Kwestia ukraińska w polityce III Rzeszy (1933–1945)*, Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1972, 66.
76. OUN doubts: "Komunikat Informacyjny 50," 4 September 1931, AAN MSW 1039/78. Warsaw had an informer within the inner circle of the OUN. See also Roman Wysocki, *Organizacja Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów w Polsce w latach 1929–1939*, Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2003, 138–144.
77. [Kapitan Edmund Charaszkiewicz], Ekspozytura 2, Second Department, "Zabójstwo ś. p. Tadeusza Hołówki," 15 April 1932, CAW I/303/4/5549 22.
78. Włodzimierz Bączkowski, *O wschodnich problemach Polski*, Cracow: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2000, 92, 149. Prometheans: Edmund Charaszkiewicz, "Zagadnienie Prometejskie," Paris, 12 February 1940, JPI TO 38/1/31. The chief investigator in the Hołówko case was assassinated on 22 March 1932.
79. KPZU reaction: "Rezoliutsiia Ts.K. KPZU," 14 September 1930, AAN KPZU 165/V-4/54. See also MSW, Wydział Bezpieczeństwa, "Sprawozdanie Nr. 3 Sel-Rob Jedność," 5 March 1931, AAN MSW III/1051; Jan Alfred Reguła, *Historia Komunistycznej Partii Polski*, Toruń: Portal, 1994, 212; Dziewanowski, *Communist Party of Poland*, 129.
80. Iwo Werschler, *Tadeusz Hołówko: Życie i działalność*, Warsaw: PWN, 1984, 319.
81. ZP (3), 40. An absorbing discussion of Soviet nationality policy is Yuri Slezkin, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism," *Slavic Review*, 53:2, 1994, 414–452. Its shortcomings: the definition of Leninists as nationalists; the underestimation of the problem of local power; the neglect of international factors in the development of policies of national concessions; and the failure to realize the consequences of "class struggle" within nations. When national elites are required to sacrifice themselves, the nation-building project is difficult.
82. This will be discussed separately.
83. Language and culture: Henryk Józewski, "Opowieść o istnieniu," BUWDR 3189/1, Vol. 2, Part II, p. 2; *ibid.*, "Myśli jakie nadchodzą," BUWDR 3189/3 131–132.
84. "Protokół konferencji Wojewodów z Kresów Wschodnich," Łuck, 2–3 December 1929, AAN MSZ 5314/38–39.
85. ZP (2), 74.
86. Quotations from Henryk Józewski, "Opowieść o istnieniu" "Myśli o władzy," Vol. 4, Part V, p. 91, BUWDR 3189/2. See also "Wołyń—Sprawozdanie," June 1937, 51, BUWDR 1549; Andrzej Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki narodowościowej rządów polskich w latach 1921–1939*, Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1979, 157.
87. Kęsik, *Zaufany Komendanta*, 69, 78.
88. "Protokół konferencji Wojewodów z Kresów Wschodnich," Łuck, 2–3 December 1929, AAN MSZ 5314/36; on the Prometheans generally: Werschler, *Tadeusz Hołówko*, 351.
89. On the dual role of UNR activists in Volhynia: Placówka Barnaba, "Ukrainskaia organizatsiia v Pol'she," 27 January 1934, CAW I/303/4/1942. The connection between domestic toleration and anti-Soviet espionage and diversion was made by Second Department officers interrogated after Józewski's arrest. IP, Tadeusz Nowiński, Warsaw, 30 March 1953; IP, Henryk Borucki, Warsaw, 26 March 1953, both in WSR 275/54/t-2. Former in-

- telligence officers interrogated earlier also noted this connection: IP, Juliusz Wilczur-Garztecki by Jan Dyduch, 8 April 1951, IPN 0192/520/t-1. Compare Robert Potocki, *Idea restytucji Ukraińskiej Republiki Ludowej (1920–1939)*, Lublin: IESW, 1999, 202–204, and Lev Sotskov, *Neizvestnyi seperatizm*, Moscow: Ripol Klassik, 2003, 64–67.
90. Jan Pisuliński, *Nie tylko Petlura: Kwestia ukraińska w polskiej polityce zagranicznej w latach 1918–1923*, Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2004, 127.
 91. “Protokol Konferencji Ministra Viiskovykh Sprav Henerala V. Sal’skoho z Heneralom Stakhevyhom [Stachiewicz] 18’oho sichnia 1928 r.,” CAW I/380/2/27 462.
 92. “II-ha sektsiia. Stan na I-she liutoho 1931 roku,” CAW I/380/2/26 89; V. S. Sidak and T. V. Brons’ka, *Spetssluzhba derzhavy bez terytorii: Liudy, podii, fakty*, Kyiv: Tempora, 2003, 62.
 93. The British in Łuck: Ppłk Leszkowicz, “Do dyr. dep. 1-ego Ministerstwa Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego,” 27 October 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/122; ZP (2), 135.
 94. D. Zaslavskii, “Get’mán Zagloba-Iuzef’s’kii,” *Pravda*, 14 September 1928, 6.
 95. “Otkliki pol’skoi pečhati na vystuplenie volynskogo voevody,” *Izvestiia*, 15 September 1928.
 96. *Izvestiia*, 16 September 1928, 1.
 97. “Ten’ Petliurovshchiny,” *ibid.*, 1; O. Gotlib, “Ukrainskaia sovetskaia obshchestvennost’ o provokatsionnom vystuplenii Iuzefskogo,” *ibid.*, 1.
 98. Voroshilov: “Skutki niezwykłego ‘expose’ wojewody,” *Gazeta Warszawska*, 25 September 1928, 2. Litvinov’s protest: “Komunikat TASS w sprawie protestu rządu ZSRR w związku z przemówieniem wojewody wołyńskiego H. Józewskiego,” *Dokumenty i materiały do historii stosunków polsko-radzieckich*, 343. Litvinov continued to treat the Volhynia Experiment as a violation of the Treaty of Riga. “Gospodin Poslannik,” [May 1931], AAN MSZ 6706b/20–34. See also *Politbiuro Ts.K. VKP(b) i otnosheniia SSSR s zapadnymi sosednimi gosudarstvami*, 259–261.
 99. [Henryk Józewski], “Przemówienie Wojewody Józewskiego na Zjeździe Posłów i Senatorów B.B. z Wołynia,” *Przegląd Wołyński*, 26 August 1928, 2.
 100. For the contents of the 1928 broadsides and booklets, which are treated in the next chapter, “Tretia sektsia Heneralnoho Shtabu UNR . . .,” 7 April 1931, CAW I/380/2/26/83–88. Soviet reaction and quotation: Telegram from Katsnelson, 31 August 1928, in *Pogranichnye voiska SSSR 1918–1929: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov*, Moscow: Nauka, 1973, 540–542.
 101. ZP (3), 53.

CHAPTER 4. SPIES OF WINTER

1. ZP (1), 41.
2. Schätzel and Józewski meet in 1920: IPHJ, 9 October 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/313. Schätzel as Promethean: Poselstwo RP w Teheranie do Pana Ministra Schaetzla, MSZ, 29 April 1931, AAN MSZ 6690/32–42; Tadeusz Schätzel, Naczelnik Wydziału Wschodniego, MSZ, “Instrukcja w sprawach narodowościowych,” July 1931, AAN MSZ 6690/47–49. Schätzel as co-organizer of Winter March: Robert Potocki, *Polityka państwa polskiego wobec zagadnienia ukraińskiego w latach 1930–1939*, Lublin: IESW, 2003, 257.

- Schätzel and UNR General Staff: Ryszard Torzecki, *Kwestia Ukraińska w Polsce w latach 1923–1939*, Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1989, 162.
3. “Placówka O-2, Kwartał III. Rok 1928–1929,” CAW I/303/4/1803.
 4. Memoir of Jerzy Niezbrzycki, JPI 109/1/1–48/7.
 5. Memoir of Jerzy Niezbrzycki, JPI 109/1/1–48/37. The sentiment that a spy, no matter which country he serves, is a “brave and valuable fellow” is indeed expressed in Robert Baden-Powell, *My Adventures as a Spy*, London: C. Arthur Pearson, 1915.
 6. Niezbrzycki in POW KN3: Józef Bromirski, “Wniosek na odznaczenie Krzyżem Walecznych w myśl rozporządzenia ROP z dnia 11 sierpnia 1920 r.,” Warsaw, 10 August 1922, CAW 1769/89/3671 (Teczka personalna: Antoni Jerzy Niezbrzycki); Pełoński, *Wywiad polski na ZSSR*, 41. Raids: Mieczysław Pruszyński, *Migawki wspomnień*, Warsaw: Rosner i Wspólnicy, 2002, 98.
 7. Jerzy Giedroyc, *Autobiografia na cztery ręce*, Warsaw: Czytelnik, 108.
 8. Jerzy Ryszard Antonowicz [Niezbrzycki], “Memorjał. Zamiast odpowiedzi na kwestjonariusz Komisji Historycznej K.N. III. P.O.W. na Ukrainie,” 1 January 1922, BUWDR 1548/11/1–42.
 9. Giedroyc, *Autobiografia na cztery ręce*, 108.
 10. Leszek Gondek, *Wywiad polski w Rzeszy 1933–1939*, Gdynia: Wojskowa Drukarnia, 1982, 163.
 11. Passe-partout: Mjr. Szlaszewski, Sztab Generalny, “Bilety do Cyrku Warszawskiego dla celów wyw.,” 18 September 1924, CAW I/303/4/1760.
 12. On O-2: Kpt. Lewandowski, “Opracowanie Akt Referatu Wschód,” [1950], CAW VIII.800/71/4/1–7; Kapitan Karpiuk, “Placówka O-2 1929–1930 Kijów,” [1950], CAW VIII/800/71/4. These are reports compiled in 1950 at Soviet orders. See “Referat Vostok 2-go otdela Pol’skogo Genshtaba,” 9 May 1950, CAW VIII/800/71/4. Unlike the outposts described below, O-2 no longer seems to have its own dossier in the archives. Its existence is confirmed by the dossiers of other outposts, for example Placówka A-9, a/a Org. Wschód, at CAW I/303/4/1803. It seems likely that Karpiuk’s study was ordered in response to a 1950 article by Niezbrzycki in *Kultura*, in which he boasted of his contacts in Kyiv and Kharkiv. The dossier on O-2 would have been the most important for Karpiuk if this was the case, so it might have been attached to the copy of his report sent to Moscow.
 13. V. V. Doroshenko et al., eds., *Istoriia sovetskikh organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti: Uchebnik*, Moscow: KGB, 1977, 214.
 14. Documents within CAW I/303/4/2011. Stanisław Gano was ultimately responsible for the provision of such equipment. Leica was the name of the model of the camera; the Leitz company took this name in 1986.
 15. Mayer’s biography: Marcin Kwieciń and Grzegorz Mazur, introduction to Stefan Mayer, “Wykłady Pułkownika Stefana Mayera o wywiadzie polskim w okresie II RP,” *Zeszyty Historyczne*, No. 142, 2002, 82.
 16. Sent by Schätzel: [Niezbrzycki] to [Henryk Jankowski, Kh, Kyiv], “Szanowny Panie Konsulu!” 8 June 1932, CAW I/303/4/1982. Signs of acquaintance: [Niezbrzycki] to [Kurnicki, Ku, Ukraine], 2 March 1933. Kurnicki as Promethean: Edmund Charaszkiewicz, “Zagadnienie Prometejskie,” Paris, 12 February 1940, JPI TO 38/1/29.

17. Petr Voikov, Soviet envoy to Poland, reports of 8 June 1926 and 13 July 1926, AVPRF, 122/10/34.
18. Personal problems: {Kurnicki, Ku, Ukraine} to [Niezbzycki], 16 March 1933; [Kurnicki, Ku, Ukraine], to {Niezbzycki}, 30 September 1933, CAW I/303/4/1993. “My dear!” translates not the conventional “Drogi!” but rather “Kochany!” or even “Kochaneńki!”
19. Bushalters, bromide, and boxing: {Niezbzycki} to [Miłoszewski, M-13, Kharkiv], “Drogi Panie!” 2 March 1933, CAW I/303/4/2011.
20. {Miłoszewski, M-13} to [Niezbzycki], 8–10 August 1933; {Miłoszewski, M-13}, to [Niezbzycki], 2 September 1933; {Niezbzycki} to [Miłoszewski, M-13], “Drogi Panie!” 12 September 1933, CAW I/303/4/2011.
21. [Niezbzycki], to [Miłoszewski, M-13], “Drogi Panie!” 7 October 1933; {Niezbzycki} to [Miłoszewski, M-13], 10 November 1933, CAW I/303/4/2011.
22. [Niezbzycki] to [Pisarczykówna, X-22, Kharkiv], 16 February 1933, CAW I/303/4/2099.
23. [Pisarczykówna, X-22] to {Niezbzycki}, 18 January 1933, CAW I/303/4/2099.
24. [Niezbzycki] to {Pisarczykówna, X-22}, 16 March 1933, CAW I/303/4/2099. On agents in Germany: Gondek, *Wywiad polski w Rzeszy 1933–1939*, 284–306 and *passim*.
25. Jan T. Gross, *Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, 47.
26. Fabric and fabrication: KOP, Placówka Wywiadowcza No. 7 Rokitno, “Stachniuk Kyrł—informacje,” to Szef Ekspozytury 5 Oddziału II Sztabu Głównego, CAW I/303/4/7006. Smuggling: Werner Benecke, *Die Ostgebiete der Zweiten Polnischen Republik*, Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 1999, 48–55.
27. Piłsudski's reforms were discussed above. See also Antony Polonsky, “Sikorski as Opposition Politician, 1928–1935,” in Keith Sword, ed., *Sikorski: Soldier and Statesman: A Collection of Essays*, London: Orbis, 1990, 44.
28. “Pratsia 2-i Sektii na Ukraïni (Persha referentura),” [May 1929], CAW I/303/4/1978.
29. Mjr. dypl. Szeligowski, Ekspozytura V Oddziału II Sztabu Głównego, “Raport org. za m. marzec 1930 r.,” Lwów, 12 April 1930, CAW I/303/4/6982; Mjr. dypl. Szeligowski, Ekspozytura V Oddziału II Sztabu Głównego, “Raport org. za m. kwiecień 1930 r.,” Lwów, 8 May 1930, CAW I/303/4/6982.
30. Proskuriv, also known as Ploskuriv, was renamed Khmel'nyts'kyi in 1954.
31. Kpt. Orłowski, Szef Ekspozytury 5, Second Department, “Raport organizacyjny za miesiąc luty 1932 r.,” Lwów, 9 March 1932, CAW I/303/4/1826; Ekspozytura 5, Oddziału II, Sztabu Głównego, “Raport organizacyjny za miesiąc marzec 1932 roku,” Lwów, 9 April 1932, CAW I/303/4/7006. See also Mjr. Demel, “Ocena,” 12 January 1932, CAW I/303/4/1826. One Ukrainian agent captured in 1932 revealed his arrest in a postcard to an acquaintance in Lwów, which the Second Department read: Kpt. Orłowski, Szef Ekspozytury 5, Lwów, to Szef Oddziału II Sztabu Głównego Ref. W[schód], Warszawa, 30 June 1932, CAW I/303/4/1826.
32. Andrzej Peplowski, *Kontrwywiad II Rzeczypospolitej*, Warsaw: Bellona, 2002, 162–163.
33. Równe outpost: KOP, Placówka Wywiadowcza Równe, “Raport organizacyjny za miesiąc marzec 1932 r.,” 2 April 1932, CAW I/303/4/7006. Some missions: “Do Referatu Wschód II Oddziału Szt. Głównego,” 5 February 1932, CAW I/303/4/1939.

34. Por. Jan Pietraszkiewicz, Plac. Wyw. Nr. 7 Sarny, "Meldunek o wysiedleniu do ZSRR agenta centrali ref. W," 12 December 1933, CAW I/303/4/1939. They spoke in Russian—but the password was "Shevchenko."
35. [Placówka Barnaba] W. Wołkowski, "Raport," 2 October 1933, CAW I/303/4/1943.
36. Placówka Barnaba, "Wykaz przerzuconych agentów dla Barnaby," [1933], CAW I/303/4/1943. There does not yet seem to be a mature British historiography of these events. The official version: John Curry, *The Security Service 1908–1945: The Official History*, Kew: PRO, 1999, 82–96. Nigel West, *MI6: British Secret Intelligence Service Operations 1909–1945*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983, 38–39 mentions that the British exploited Russian émigrés. He seems to be referring to the Trust embarrassment of the 1920s, not to the border-crossing venture of the 1930s. See also *Intelligence and National Security*, 17:1, 2002.
37. [Jerzy Niezbrzycki], "Będąc kierownikiem Referatu Wschodu," JPI TO 109/1/B.
38. Border crossings and insurrectionary plans: "Sprawozdanie z 2 Sekcji za czas od 1 grudnia 1931 roku do 1 września 1932 roku," translation from Ukrainian, [Second Department, Ekspozytura 2, Warsaw], 1932, CAW I/303/4/5560; Mykola Livyts'kyi, *D. Ts. U.N.R. v ekzyli mizh 1920 i 1940 rokamy*, Munich: Ukraïns'ke Informatsiine Biuro, 1984, 27–28. Connections with the Volhynia Experiment: Placówka Barnaba, "Ukrainskaia organizatsiia v Pol'she," 27 January 1934, CAW I/303/4/1942; IP, Juliusz Wilczur-Garztecki, 8 April 1951, IPN 0192/520/t-1; IP, Henryk Borucki, Warsaw, 26 March 1953, WSR 275/54/t-2.
39. Iaroslav Hrytsak, *Strasti za natsionalizmom*, Kyiv: Krytyka, 2004, 55.
40. Daniel Beauvois, *Pouvoir russe et noblesse polonaise en Ukraine, 1793–1830*, Paris: CNRS Editions, 2003; idem, *Le noble, le serf, et le revizor: La noblesse polonaise entre le tsarisme et les masse ukrainiennes (1831–1863)*, Paris: Editions des archives contemporaines, 1985; idem, *La bataille de la terre en Ukraine, 1863–1914: Les polonais et les conflits socio-ethniques*, Lille: Presses Universitaires de Lille, 1993; Robert Edelman, *Proletarian Peasants: The Revolution of 1905 in Russia's Southwest*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.
41. "Tretia seksia Heneral'noho Shtabu UNR . . ." 7 April 1931, CAW I/380/2/26/83–88.
42. Ukraïns'kyi Revoliutsiinyi Komitet [UNR army, Second Section, Third Referat], "Seliane, ne davaite khliba bolshevikam!" May 1929, CAW I/380/2/342.
43. Ukraïns'kyi Revoliutsiinyi Komitet [UNR army, Second Section, Third Referat], "Do Nezamozhnykiv," CAW I/380/2/342. "Land and Freedom" was a slogan of the Socialist Revolutionaries in the Russian Empire.
44. Ukraïns'kyi Revoliutsiinyi Komitet [UNR army, Second Section, Third Referat], [1930], "Do Ukraïns'kykh Selian," CAW I/380/2/342.
45. Mark B. Tauger, "Grain Crisis or Famine? The Ukrainian State Commission for Aid to Crop-Failure Victims and the Ukrainian Famine of 1928–1929," in Donald J. Raleigh, ed., *Provincial Landscapes: Local Dimensions of Soviet Power, 1917–1953*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2002, 158, 162, and passim.
46. Pace of collectivization: Andrea Graziosi, "Collectivisation, révoltes paysannes et politiques gouvernementales à travers les rapports du GPU d'Ukraine de février–mars 1930,"

- Cahiers du Monde russe*, 34:3, 1994, 543. Figures of resistance (956,587 participants, 4,098 mass manifestations, 2,945 of these in March 1930): V. Danilov et al., eds., *Tragediia sovetskoi derevni: Kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie*, Moscow: Rosspen, 2000, Vol. 2, 803. Balyts'kyi reports: O. N. Ken and A. I. Rupasov, eds., *Politbiuro Ts.K. VKP(b) i otnosheniia SSSR s zapadnymi sosednimi gosudarstvami*, Saint Petersburg: Evropeiskii Dom, 2001, 515.
47. Antichrists and serfdom: Graziosi, "Collectivisation," 464, 453. Despite this Christian overtone, pogroms were not associated with anticolonialization violence in Ukraine. Serfdom: Protokół wywiadowczy, Benedykt Basiuk, 28 March 1930, CAW I/303/4/6982. Propaganda: Ukraïns'kyi Revoliutsiinyi Komitet [UNR army, Second Section, Third Referat], [1930], "Do Ukraïns'kykh Selian," CAW I/380/2/342. See also Lynne Viola, *Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Popular Resistance*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, 45–66; Sarah Davies, *Popular Opinion in Stalin's Russia: Terror, Propaganda, and Dissent, 1934–1941*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 50.
 48. Sulomna: Kapitan Tomaszewski, Placówka Wywiadowcza 9 Czortków, KOP, "Wiadomości wojskowe," 3 April 1930, CAW I/303/4/6982.
 49. Protokół wywiadowczy, Benedykt Basiuk, 28 March 1930, CAW I/303/4/6982.
 50. "Protokół badania Iwanów Mikołaja," KOP, 2 April 1930, CAW I/303/4/6982.
 51. "Protokół spisany dnia 23.IV.1930 r. w kanc. komp. 'Husiatyn' w sprawie nielegalnego przekroczenia granicy przez obywatela sow. Jacentiuka," 23 April 1930; Porucznik Bem, KOP, "Protokół badania Bieluka Trofima," 5 April 1930; "Protokół badania Kupec Fedt," KOP, 2 April 1930; "Protokół Kubiszyna Dominika," KOP, 2 April 1930; Protokół Wywiadowczy, Heronim Kołodyński, 27 March 1930, all in CAW I/303/4/6982.
 52. "Protokół badania dezertera R.K.K.A. Kudrawca Dymytra," 24 March 1930, CAW I/303/4/6982.
 53. Ukraïns'kyi Revoliutsiinyi Komitet [UNR army, Second Section, Third Referat], "Do Chervonoarmiitsiv-Ukraïntsiv," 1930, CAW I/380/2/342.
 54. Kapitan Tomaszewski, Placówka Wywiadowcza 9 Czortków, KOP, "Wiadomości wojskowe," 3 April 1930, CAW I/303/4/6982.
 55. "Protokół spisany dnia 23.IV.1930 r. w kanc. komp. 'Husiatyn' w sprawie nielegalnego przekroczenia granicy przez obywatela sow. Jacentiuka," 23 April 1930, CAW I/303/4/6982; see also (for example) "Protokół Kubiszyna Dominika," KOP, 2 April 1930, CAW I/303/4/6982.
 56. Polish diversions: Włodzimierz Dąbrowski, Ekspozytura 2 Oddz[iał] II, 2 March 1940, report reprinted in *Zeszyty Historyczne*, No. 140 (2002), 112–113; Edmund Charaszkiewicz, "Zagadnienie Prometejskie," Paris, 12 February 1940, JPI 38/1/31. Representative Soviet portrayals of Piłsudski and "fascist Poland": M. I. Zil'berman, *Revoliutsiina borot'ba trudiashchykh zakhidnoi Ukraïny (1924–1928 rr.)*, L'viv: Vydavnytstvo L'vivskoho Universytetu, 1968, 257, 262, 264.
 57. Ol'chak. "Zvit Ch. 3. 2-i Sektii za period vid 15 chervnia 1929 roku - 1 chervnia 1930 roku" "Dodatok Ch. I," CAW I/380/2/26/105.
 58. Mjr. dypl. Szeligowski, Ekspozytura V Oddziału II Sztabu Głównego, "Raport org. za

- m. marzec 1930 r.," Lwów, 12 April 1930, and also his "Raport org. za m. kwiecień 1930 r.," Lwów, 8 May 1930, both in CAW I/303/4/6982.
59. Doroshenko et al., eds., *Istoriia sovetskikh organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti: Ucheb-nik*, 214.

CHAPTER 5. STALIN'S FAMINE

1. V. S. Khristoforov et al., eds., "Sovershenno sekretno": *Lubianka-Stalinu o polozhenii v strane (1922–1934 gg.)*, Moscow: RAN, 2003, Vol. 5, 426–428, at 426. See also G. V. Kostyrchenko, *Tainaia politika Stalina: Vlast' i antisemitizm*, Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2001, 102.
2. G. N. Sevostianov et al., eds., "Sovershenno sekretno": *Lubianka-Stalinu o polozhenii v strane (1922–1934 gg.)*, Moscow: RAN, 2001, Vol. 4, 721.
3. [Pavlo Shandruk], "Protokol konferentsii 10 bereznia 1927 roku v prysutnosti Pana Holovnoho Otomana Viiska i fl'ty UNR Andriia Livyts'koho," JPI UMW 7/4/1/13.
4. V. Danilov et al., eds., *Tragediia sovetskoi derevni: Kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie*, Moscow: Rosspen, 1999, Vol. 1, 319–321, 326–327.
5. Peter Holquist, *Making War, Forging Revolution: Russia's Continuum of Crisis*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002, 1–46, 252–264.
6. There is an enormous literature on Russia's encounter with Europe. On the modern period see, for example, Martin Malia, *Alexander Herzen and the Birth of Russian Socialism, 1812–1855*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961; Andrzej Walicki, *The Controversy over Capitalism: Studies in the Social Philosophy of the Russian Populists*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969; Richard Pipes, *Struve*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970–1980, 2 Vols.
7. 1928 problems in Ukraine: A. N. Sakharov et al., eds., "Sovershenno sekretno": *Lubianka-Stalinu o polozhenii v strane (1922–1934 gg.)*, Moscow: RAN, 2002, Vol. 6, 436–437, 450–451, 663.
8. A cogent account is Oleg Khlevniouk, *Le cercle du Kremlin: Staline et le Bureau politique dans les années 30: Les jeux du pouvoir*, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1996.
9. Andrea Graziosi, "Collectivisation, révoltes paysannes et politiques gouvernementales à travers les rapports du GPU d'Ukraine de février—mars 1930," *Cahiers du Monde russe*, 34:3, 1994, 438–441; see also J. Arch Getty and Oleg Naumov, *The Road to Terror*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 196, 34; Jurij Borys, *The Sovietization of Ukraine 1917–1923*, Edmonton: CIUS, 1980, 246, 287.
10. Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001, 320–322.
11. Rumors of war and proportion of demonstrations at border: O. N. Ken and A. I. Rupasov, eds., *Politbiuro Ts.K. VKP(b) i otnosheniia SSSR s zapadnymi sosednimi gosudarstvami*, Saint Petersburg: Evropeiskii Dom, 2001, 511–512.
12. The social resonance of the war scare in Ukraine: Sevostianov et al., "Sovershenno sekretno", Vol. 4, 721.
13. War scare is true: Ukraïns'kyi Revoliutsiinyi Komitet [UNR army, Second Section, Third Referat], "Seliane, ne davaite khliba bolshevikam!" May 1929; Peasants to arms:

- Ukraïns'kyi Revoliutsiinyi Komitet [UNR army, Second Section, Third Referat], "Pro Soiuz Vyzvolennia Ukraïny"; both in CAW I/380/2/342.
14. Zhytomyr district report of 26 January 1930, in Stanisław Stępien, ed., *Polacy na Ukrainie: Zbiór dokumentów 1917–1939*, Przemyśl: Południowo-Wschodni Instytut Naukowy, 1998, Vol. 1, 188–189.
 15. Polish peasants sometimes asked for their petitions to be submitted to "the Polish king." "Raport polityczno-informacyjny Nr. 5 Konsulatu RP w Kijowie," 18 February 1930, JPI UMW 7/5/76–78.
 16. Ordzhonikidze and Balyts'kyi: Andrea Graziosi, "Collectivisation, révoltes paysannes et politiques gouvernementales à travers les rapports du GPU d'Ukraine de février–mars 1930," *Cahiers du Monde russe*, 34:3, 1994, 458, 461. Voroshilov: Ken and Rupasov, *Politbiuro Ts.K. VKP(b) i otnosheniia SSSR s zapadnymi sosednimi gosudarstvami*, 516–519.
 17. Note to Stalin: Kate Brown, *A Biography of No Place: From Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Heartland*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004, 97. See also M. Narinskii, "Politika SSSR v Evrope i Pol'sha 1933–1938," in E. Durachinski and A. N. Sakharov, eds., *Sovetsko-pol'skie otnosheniia v politicheskikh usloviakh Evropy 30-kh godov XX stoletii: Sbornik statei*, Moscow: Nauka, 2001, 29. Stalin's attitude: Oleg Ken, *Moskva i pakt o nenapadenii s Pol'shei (1930–1932 gg.)*, St. Petersburg: RAN, 2003, 46, 48.
 18. "Zvit pro pratsiu Sh.M.B.C na I kvitnia 1929 r.," CAW I/380/2/26/60; "Pratsia I-oï sektsii na protiazii 1929 i v rotsi bizhuchim . . ." [1930], CAW I/380/2/26/ 57–59.
 19. UNR war proposal: Robert Potocki, *Polityka państwa polskiego wobec zagadnienia ukraińskiego w latach 1930–1939*, Lublin: IESW, 2003, 262–272.
 20. Mjr. Stark, Placówka Wywiadowcza Nr. 8, Równe, "Ogólna sytuacja na przedpolu," to Dowódca Brygady Wołyń in Luck, 7 April 1930; Por. Medyński, "Wiadomości zakordonowe," Równe, 1 April 1930; KOP, Placówka Wywiadowcza Nr. 8, "Raport Wywiadowczy za czas od 15 II do 15 IV 1930 r.," Równe, 14 April 1930, all in CAW I/303/4/6982.
 21. Andrea Chandler, *Institutions of Isolation: Border Controls in the Soviet Union and its Successor States, 1917–1993*, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998, 64–65.
 22. "Kontslager" and kulaks: V. Danilov et al., eds., *Tragediia sovetskoi derevni: Kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie*, Moscow: Rosspen, 2000, Vol. 2, 127, 163 respectively.
 23. Martin, *Affirmative Action Empire*, 313–322.
 24. Graziosi, "Collectivisation," 462.
 25. "Sprawozdanie z 2 Sekcji za czas od 1 grudnia 1931 roku do 1 września 1932 roku," translation from Ukrainian, [Second Department, Ekspozytura 2, Warsaw], 1932, CAW I/303/4/5560. The description is strikingly similar to that of the Soviets, who simply had the advantage of being in power: I. Zelenin et al., eds., *Tragediia sovetskoi derevni: Kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie*, Moscow: Rosspen, 2001, Vol. 3, 199–200.
 26. "Ukraina: Praca Specjalna," Report for Second Department, 31 December 1931, CAW I/303/4/5520; Kapitan Tomaszewski, Placówka Wywiadowcza 9 Czortków, KOP, "Wiadomości wojskowe," 3 April 1930, CAW I/303/4/6982. See the analysis in Potocki, *Polityka państwa polskiego wobec zagadnienia ukraińskiego*, 264 and passim.

27. Antony Polonsky, *Politics in Independent Poland: The Crisis of Constitutional Government 1921–1939*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972, 390.
28. Soviet doctrine: Sally Stoecker, *Forging Stalin's Army: Marshal Tukhachevsky and the Politics of Military Innovation*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1998; Mary Habeck, *Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919–1939*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003.
29. John Erickson, "The Soviet Union 1930–1941," in Ernest R. May, ed., *Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, 200–201.
30. 1930 harvest: Graziosi, "Collectivisation," 463. Nonfulfillment of plan, local cadres, and livestock: Zelenin et al., *Tragediia sovetskoi derevni*, Vol. 3, 318, 319, 324.
31. Zelenin et al., *Tragediia sovetskoi derevni*, Vol. 3, 414. See also Gijs Kessler, "The Passport System and State Control over Population Flows in the Soviet Union, 1932–1940," *Cahiers du Monde russe*, 42:2–3–4, 2001, 480–481.
32. Khlevniouk, *Le cercle du Kremlin*, 81.
33. Simon Sebag Montefiore, *Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar*, New York: Knopf, 2004, 72.
34. Stalin to Kaganovich, 18 June 1932, R. W. Davies et al., eds., *The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003, 138–139.
35. Zelenin et al., *Tragediia sovetskoi derevni*, Vol. 3, 420–422.
36. Nicolas Werth, "La logique de violence dans l'URSS stalinienne," in Henry Rousso, ed., *Stalinisme et nazisme: Histoire et mémoire comparées*, Paris: Editions Complexe, 1999, 109.
37. Zelenin et al., *Tragediia sovetskoi derevni*, Vol. 3, 443.
38. Stalin to Kaganovich, 11 August 1932, Cohen, "Des lettres comme actions: Stalin au début des années 1930 vu depuis le fonds Kaganovič," 319. Another argument connecting Stalin's political thought and the famine can be found in Martin, *Affirmative Action Empire*, 273–308. Stalin's political rationality is presented in Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981, Vol. 3, 5–43.
39. Kaganovich to Stalin, 16 August 1932, Davies et al., *Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence*, 183–184.
40. See for example Bronisław Żongołłowicz, *Dzienniki 1930–1936*, Warsaw: Przegląd Wschodni, 2004, 169.
41. Cited after Mirosław Czech, "Wielki Głód," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 22–23 March 2003, 22. See also Iurii Shapoval, Volodymyr Prystaiko, and Vadym Zolotar'ov, eds., *ChK-HPU-NKVD v Ukraïni: Osoby, fakty, dokumenty*, Kyiv: Abrys, 1997, 47.
42. "II-ha sektsiia. Stan na I-she liutoho 1931 roku," "Dodatok Ch. 1. Vykaz reidiv," CAW I/380/2/26 97.
43. "Zvit Ch. 3. 2-i Sektzii za period vid 15 chervnia 1929 roku—1 chervnia 1930 roku," CAW I/380/2/26 100.
44. Michal Reiman, *The Birth of Stalinism: The USSR on the Eve of the "Second Revolution"*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987, 138–150.
45. 20 December: Zelenin et al., *Tragediia sovetskoi derevni*, Vol. 3, 603. 29 December: *ibid.*, 611. January 1933 decree: *ibid.*, 634–635.
46. See Iurii Shapoval, "Vsevolod Balickij: Bourreau et victime," *Cahiers du Monde russe*, 44:2–3, 2003, 398.

47. Czech, "Wielki Głód," 23.
48. Wojciech Materski, *Tarcza Europy: Stosunki polsko-sowieckie 1918–1939*, Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1994, 262; Marek Kornat, "Ambasador Wacław Grzybowski i jego misja w Związku Sowieckim (1936–1939)," *Zeszyty Historyczne*, No. 142, 2002, 26.
49. {Kurnicki, Ku, Ukraine} to [Niezbrzycki], 22 October 1933; {Kurnicki, Ku}, to [Niezbrzycki], 2 December 1933, both in CAW I/303/4/1993.
50. {Niezbrzycki} to [Kurnicki, Ku, Ukraine], 16 March 1933, CAW I/303/4/1993.
51. Orest Subtelny, "German Diplomatic Reports on the Famine of 1933"; Andrea Graziosi, "Italian Archival Documents on the Ukrainian Famine 1932–1933"; and Jarosław Koshiv, "The 1932–33 Famine in the British Government Archives," in Wsevolod W. Isajiw, *Famine-Genocide in Ukraine, 1932–1933: Western Archives, Testimonies, and New Research*, Toronto: Ukrainian Canadian Research and Documentation Center, 2003, 13–25, 26–48, and 51–65.
52. J. Karszo-Siedlewski, Polish consul general, Kharkiv, 4 February 1933, CAW I/303/4/1867.
53. Juliusz Łukasiewicz, Poseł RP w Moskwie, "Aresztowanie petentów odwiedzających Konsulaty," 27 March 1933, CAW I/303/4/1867.
54. {Pisarczykówna, X-22, Kharkiv} to {Niezbrzycki}, June 1933, CAW I/303/4/2099.
55. [Placówka B-18, Kyiv] to [Second Department, Warsaw], 6 June 1933, CAW I/303/4/1928.
56. J. Karszo-Siedlewski, Polish consul general, Kharkiv, "Sytuacja na Ukrainie," 2 October 1933, CAW I/303/4/1881.
57. Manner of Khvylyovy's passing: Myroslav Shkandrij, "Introduction," in Mykola Khvylovy, *Cultural Renaissance in Ukraine*, Edmonton: CIUS, 1986, 25.
58. {Niezbrzycki} to [Władysław Michniewicz, B-18, Kyiv], "Kochany Panie!" 15 September 1933, CAW I/303/4/1928; {Kurnicki, Ku, Ukraine} to [Niezbrzycki], 18 November 1933, CAW I/303/4/1993; J. Karszo-Siedlewski, Polish consul general, Kharkiv, "Sytuacja na Ukrainie," 2 October 1933, CAW I/303/4/1881.
59. From 1,450,000 to 1,000,000 zlotys. Edmund Charaszkiewicz, "Strona finansowa problemu prometejskiego," Paris, 1 December 1939, JPI TO 38/1/37–48.
60. "Sprawozdanie Drugiej Sekcji za okres od 1.XI.1932 roku do 1.I.1934 roku," translation from Ukrainian, [Second Department, Ekspozytura 2, Warsaw], 1934, and attached "Wykaz podróży od 1.IX.1932 r. do 1.IX.1933 r.," and "Podróże za czas od 1.IX.1933 do 1.I.1934 roku," CAW I/303/4/5560. The Ukrainian originals of the first two documents are "Sprawozdania 2-oї Sektsii" and "Vykaz reïdiv," in CAW I/380/2/27/258–265. GPU reports from *Pogranichnye voiska SSSR 1929–1939*, Moscow: Nauka, 1972, 72.
61. Compare [E. Piwnicki, Second Department], "Protokół z konferencji pomiędzy przedstawicielami 'Prometeusza' warszawskiego a czynnikami polskimi w dniu 7 kwietnia 1933 roku," Warsaw, April 1933, CAW I/303/4/5520; and Ekspozytura 2, Oddz. II. Szt. Główny, "Ogólny stan sprawy prometeuszowskiej w roku 1934," Warsaw 1934, CAW I/303/4/5460. The literature written in People's Poland darkly notes that in 1934 responsibility for Promethean operations passed from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Second Department. This change is of little importance.
62. Quotation from KOP, Placówka Wywiadowcza Nr. 10, Protokół, Aleksander Kramar, 25

- November 1933; see also KOP, Placówka Wywiadowcza No. 8 Równe, “Uciekierierzy z Rosji Sow.,” to Szef Ekspozytury Nr. 5 Oddziału II we Lwowie, 24 March 1932; KOP, Placówka Wywiadowcza No. 8, “Rabczyniuk Kyril—protokoł przesłuchanie,” to Szef Ekspozytury Nr. 5 Oddziału II w Lwowie, 5 April 1932, all in CAW I/303/4/6906.
63. General Żmijenko [Zhmiienko] [Kierownik Sekcji II Grupy III, UNR], “Naikharakterniishi pohliady ukrains’koho selianstva na zemel’nu reformu bolshevikiv,” March 1933, CAW I/303/4/1826; {Kurnicki, Ku, Ukraine} to {Niezbryzcki}, 2 December 1933, CAW I/303/4/1993. See also Sarah Davies, *Popular Opinion in Stalin’s Russia: Terror, Propaganda, and Dissent, 1934–1941*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 94.
64. The orders: {Niezbryzcki} to {Michniewicz, B-18, Kyiv}, “Drogi Panie!” 23 September 1933, CAW I/303/4/1928; {Niezbryzcki} to {Kurnicki, Ku, Ukraine}, 7 December 1933; CAW I/303/4/1993. The decision: {Niezbryzcki} to {Michniewicz, B-18}, 16 December 1933, I/303/4/1928. The 19 October report: CAW I/303/4/7039. Its maps and characterizations are surprisingly good. Piłsudski was the “Starszy Pan.”
65. The five: “Sprawozdanie Drugiej Sekcji za okres od 1.XI.1932 roku do 1.I.1934 roku,” translation from Ukrainian, [Second Department, Ekspozytura 2, Warsaw], 1934, and attached “Wykaz podróży od 1.IX.1932 r. do 1.IX.1933 r.,” and “Podróże za czas od 1.IX.1933 do 1.I.1934 roku,” CAW I/303/4/5560. Five million is a typical estimate; for example James W. Heinzen, *Inventing a Soviet Countryside: State Power and the Transformation of Rural Russia, 1917–1929*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003; Robert Conquest, *Harvest of Sorrow*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1986. A recent demographic study estimates that 3.5 million people were killed by the famine. Jacques Vallin, France Meslé, Serguei Adamets, and Serhii Pirozhkov, “A New Estimate of Ukrainian Population Losses in the 1930s and 1940s,” *Population Studies*, 56:3, 2002, 249–264.
66. Davies et al., *Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 191–192*.
67. Czech, “Wielki Głód,” 23.
68. Shapoval, Prystaiko, and Zolotar’ov, *ChK-HPU-NKVD v Ukraini*, 140, 144–145, and the social observation in Jan Karszo-Siedlewski, Polish consul general in Kharkiv, “W sprawie sytuacji politycznej na Ukrainie,” 30 December 1933, AAN MSZ 6710/4–10.
69. These metaphors were Stalin’s, and they were echoed in summer 1933 in Soviet Ukraine. {Miłoszewski, M-13, Kharkiv} to {Niezbryzcki}, “Zagadnienie Ukrainizacji,” 12 December 1933, CAW I/303/4/2011.
70. Cited after Mikołaj Kowalewski, *Polityka narodowościowa na Ukrainie sowieckiej*, Jerusalem: Wydział Opieki na Żołnierzem, 1947 [Warsaw 1938], 92. See also Shapoval, Prystaiko, and Zolotar’ov, *ChK-HPU-NKVD v Ukraini*, 49; Werth, “La logique de violence dans l’URSS stalinienne,” 111. Ukrainization continued, as Martin has shown in *Affirmative Action Empire*, although in a different political context. Ukrainian culture as politics returns to importance during the Second World War, in a different form. Serhy Yekelchuk, *Stalin’s Empire of Memory: Russian-Ukrainian Relations in the Soviet Historical Imagination*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004; also David Brandenberger, *National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931–1956*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002.
71. Davies et al., *Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence*, 33.

72. M. H. Vavryshyn et al., eds., *Borot'ba za vozz'iednannia Zakhidnoi Ukraïny z Ukraïns'koïu RSR*, Kyïv: Naukova Dumka 1979, 260.
73. On the suicide, Sebag Montefiore, *Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar*, 21; quotation at 107. See also Robert Service, *Stalin: A Biography*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005, 294–295.
74. Zelenin et al., *Tragediia sovetskoi derevni*, Vol. 3, 630–631. See also the 6 May 1933 letter of Stalin reprinted in Nicolas Werth, “La grande famine,” in Stéphane Courtois et al., *Le livre noir du communisme: Crimes, terreur et répressions*, Paris: Robert Laffont, 1997, 187.
75. Stalin to Seventeenth Party Congress, 28 January 1934, after J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov, *Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932–1939*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999, 130. Compare Hiroaki Kuromiya, *Freedom and Terror in the Donbass: A Ukrainian-Russian Borderland, 1870s–1990s*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, 175–200.
76. Some turning points: Khlevniouk, *Le cercle du Kremlin*, 78, 132.
77. Stalin to Seventeenth Party Congress, 28 January 1934, after Getty and Naumov, *Road to Terror*, 130.
78. A satisfying discussion is Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*, Vol. 3. See also Stephen Hanson, *Time and Revolution: Marxism and the Design of Soviet Economic Institutions*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997, 134–155.
79. The loss of contacts was important: [Niezbrzycki], 1 February 1935; [Wiktor Zaleski, B-41, Kyïv] to [Niezbrzycki], 8 February 1935, both in CAW I/303/4/1929.
80. For some examples: Marek Kornat, *Polska 1939 roku wobec Paktu Ribbentrop-Molotov*, Warsaw: PISM, 2002, 104; idem, “Ambasador Wacław Grzybowski,” 17ff.

CHAPTER 6. THE POLISH TERROR

1. Skarbek: Oleksandr Rubl'ov and Vladimir Reprintsev, “Represii proty poliakiv v Ukraïni u 30-ti roky,” *Z arkhiviv V.U.Ch.K H.P.U N.K.V.D K.H.B.*, 1:2, 1995, 121; Mikołaj Iwanow, *Pierwszy naród ukarany: Stalinizm wobec polskiej ludności kresowej 1921–1938*, Warsaw: Omnipress, 1991, 141–145. The GPU, claiming to have broken a ring of the Polish Military Organization in Kyïv, arrested about twenty Polish communists in August and September 1933. Another ring was supposedly broken later in 1933 in Vinnytsia.
2. Henryk Stroński, *Represje stalinizmu wobec ludności polskiej na Ukrainie w latach 1929–1939*, Warsaw: Wspólnota Polska, 1998, 121–122.
3. Piotr Mitzner, “Widmo POW,” *Karta*, No. 11, 1993, 22.
4. Stanisław Stępien, ed., *Polacy na Ukrainie: Zbiór dokumentów*, Przemyśl: Południowo-Wschodni Instytut Naukowy, 1998, Vol. 1, 256, 301.
5. “Zeznanie Witolda Wandurskiego w więzieniu GPU,” *Przegląd Teatralny*, Nos. 3–4, 1994, 487–510; Rubl'ov and Reprintsev, “Represii proty poliakiv,” 141 and passim. On Wandurski and his milieu: Marci Shore, *Caviar and Ashes: A Warsaw Generation's Life and Death in Marxism, 1918–1968*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.
6. Mitzner, “Widmo POW,” 22. See also Henryk Cimek, *Komuniści, Polska, Stalin*, Białyłstok: Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, 1990, 114; Andrzej Paczkowski, “Pologne, la 'na-

- tion ennemie’,” in Stéphane Courtois et al., *Le livre noir du communisme: Crimes, terreurs et répressions*, Paris: Laffont, 1997, 399.
7. S. Gregorowicz, “Mesto i rol’ SSSR v politike Pol’shy v 30-e gody,” in E. Durachinski and A. N. Sakharov, eds., *Sovetsko-pol’skie otnosheniia v politicheskikh usloviakh Evropy 30-kh godov XX stoletii: Sbornik statei*, Moscow: Nauka, 2001, 46ff; Andrzej Ajnenkiel, *Polska po przewrocie majowym*, Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna, 1980, 367–368.
 8. Maria Pasztor, “Problem wojny prewencyjnej w raportach belgijskich dyplomatów z lat 1933–1934,” in Andrzej Ajnenkiel et al., eds., *Międzymorze: Polska i kraje Europy środkowo-wschodniej XIX–XX wieku*, Warsaw: IH PAN, 1995, 313–320. On doctrine see also Waldemar Paruch, *Myśl polityczna obozu piłsudczyńskiego 1926–1939*, Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2005, 707–708.
 9. Vladimir Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti NKVD SSSR (1934–1941 gg.),” Doctoral Dissertation, Akademia Federal’noi Sluzhby Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1997, 229.
 10. Oleg Khlevniouk, *Le cercle du Kremlin: Staline et le Bureau politique dans les années 30: Les jeux du pouvoir*, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1996, 170.
 11. Iurii Shapoval, “Vsevolod Balickij: Bourreau et victime,” *Cahiers du Monde russe*, 44:2–3, 2003, 389.
 12. William Chase, *Enemies Within the Gates? The Comintern and the Stalinist Repression, 1934–1939*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001, 120; Celina Budzyńska, *Strzępy rodzinnej sagi*, Warsaw: ŻIH, 1997, 266.
 13. Politburo protocol of 8–9 June 1934, in I. I. Kostiusko, ed., *Materiały “Osoboi papki” Politbiuro Ts.K. RKP(b)-VKP(b) po voprosu sovetsko-pol’skikh otnoshenii 1923–1944 gg.*, Moscow: RAN, 1997, 76.
 14. Cited after Cimek, *Komuniści, Polska, Stalin*, 115. See also Jan Alfred Reguła, *Historia Komunistycznej Partii Polski*, Toruń: Portal, 1994, 271; M. K. Dziewanowski, *The Communist Party of Poland*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959, 147–148. Compare Robert Thurston, “Fear and Belief in the USSR’s ‘Great Terror’: Response to Arrest, 1935–1939,” *Slavic Review*, 45:2, 1986, 220.
 15. “Komunistyczna broszura z listą prowokatorów,” *Zeszyty Historyczne*, No. 5, 1964, 58–61.
 16. Mitzner, “Widmo POW,” 22.
 17. Rubl’ov and Reprintsev, “Represii proty poliakiv,” 126; Paczkowski, “Pologne, la ‘nation ennemie,’” 400.
 18. Rubl’ov and Reprintsev, “Represii proty poliakiv,” 125.
 19. Terry Martin, “The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing,” *Journal of Modern History*, 70:4, 1998, 848–849.
 20. Order of 20 September 1935: Stępien, *Polacy na Ukrainie*, Vol. 1, 283. Percentage: Bohdan Chyrko, “Natsmen? Znachyt’ voroh. Problemy natsional’nykh menshyn v dokumentakh partiinykh i radians’kykh orhaniv Ukraïny v 20–30-kh rr.,” *Z arkhiviv V.U.Ch.K H.P.U N.K.V.D K.H.B.*, 1:2, 1995, 98. Overall percentage (11.2%): Gabor Rittersporn, *Stalinist Simplifications and Soviet Complications: Social Tensions and Political Conflict in the USSR, 1933–1953*, Chur: Harwood, 1991, 46.
 21. Balyts’kyi’s January 1936 rationale: Chyrko, “Natsmen? Znachyt’ voroh,” 99; and February 1936 guidelines: Rubl’ov and Reprintsev, “Represii proty poliakiv,” 140.

22. Shiian to Krulov, 21 March 1953, CAW VIII/800/19/5. James Morris gives a slightly higher estimate of the number of Poles: "The Polish Terror," *Europe-Asia Studies*, 56:4, 2004, 758. Polish observations of ethnic cleansings: {Stanisław Nawrocki, E-15, Ukraine}, "Wysiedlanie Polaków na Ukrainie," 23 December 1936, CAW I/303/4/1956.
23. Henryk Stroński, "Deportacja—Masowe wywózki ludności polskiej z Ukrainy do Kazachstany w 1936 roku," *Przegląd Polonijny*, 23:3, 1997, quotations at 113 and 114, estimate at 120.
24. Oleg Khlevnyuk, "The Objectives of the Great Terror," in David L. Hoffmann, ed., *Stalinism: The Essential Readings*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2003, 88.
25. Khlevniouk, *Le cercle du Kremlin*, 170, 212, and passim.
26. Chase, *Enemies Within the Gates*, 123.
27. Henryk Cimek, *Tomasz Dąbal 1890–1937*, Rzeszów: Wyższa Szkoła Pedagogiczna, 1993, 205–211.
28. MSW, Wydział Bezpieczeństwa, Referat Wywrotowy, "Sprawozdanie z działalności Kompartii za m. październik 1936 r.," Warsaw, 15 December 1936, CAW I/302/10/1; Teresa Torńska, *Oni*, Warsaw: Agencja Omnipress, 1990, 17.
29. Morris, "Polish Terror," 754.
30. Nikita Pietrow, "Polska operacja NKWD," *Karta*, No. 11, 1993, 24–25.
31. Rubl'ov and Reprintsev, "Represii proty poliakiv," 144; Paczkowski, "Pologne, la 'nation ennemie,'" 400; Cimek, *Komuniści, Polska, Stalin*, 121.
32. Order 00485 of 11 August 1937 and letter of instruction in Iurii Shapoval, Volodymyr Prystaiko, and Vadym Zolotar'ov, eds., *ChK-HPU-NKVD v Ukraini: Osoby, fakty, dokumenty*, Kyiv: Abrys, 1997, 347–377. The order is also reprinted in *Leningradskii martirolog 1937–1938*, St. Petersburg: Rossiiskaia natsional'naia biblioteka, 1996, Vol. 4, 454–456.
33. Rubl'ov and Reprintsev, "Represii proty poliakiv," 146.
34. Figures for Poles from N. V. Petrov and A. B. Roginskii, "'Pol'skaia operatsiia' NKVD 1937–1938 gg.," in *Repressii protiv poliakov i pol'skikh grazhdan*, Moscow: Zven'ia, 1997, 33. The "Polish Military Organization" actions served as a model for further NKVD decrees, targeting Soviet nationalities who lived on both sides of the Soviet border. Including the Polish operation, these national operations killed 247,157 Soviet citizens. On this point and for statistics, see Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001, 337–340. Morris gives the proportion of Poles among those killed in the Terror as 17.9%: "Polish Terror," 762. On the national actions, see also J. Otto Pohl, *Ethnic Cleansing in the USSR, 1937–1949*, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1999. The Polish action might be included in debates about "racial politics" in the Soviet Union. See *Slavic Review*, 61:1, 2002.
35. Of 265,039 total arrests, 99,665 were of people accused of spying for Poland, 39,300 for Germany, and 52,906 for Japan. Khaustov, "Deiatel'nost' organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti NKVD," 316.
36. This problem is raised by recent work on the Terror: see Chase, *Enemy Within the Gates*, 457 n. 66: "scholarly research into whether there were Polish intelligence networks in the USSR has been nil"; likewise Rubl'ov and Reprintsev, "Represii proty poliakiv," 119. De-

- tail provided here is intended to address this problem. Emphasis upon Polish operations here should not be understood to mean that only Poland had a presence in the Soviet Union.
37. A. N. Sakharov et al., eds., *"Sovershenno sekretno": Lubianka-Stalinu o polozhenii v strane (1922–1934 gg.)*, Moscow: RAN, 2002, Vol. 6, 277–278.
 38. The local Polish leadership of the region made demands upon Moscow: that swamps be drained, factories be built, schools be reformed, anti-Semitism be combated. As the agent concluded, this complaining "was the most interesting point of the congress" of local soviets in Marchevsk of April 1929. MSW, "Informacja o ZSRR i Kominternie Nr. 3," 6 May 1929, AAN MSW 1151/15.
 39. KOP, Placówka Wywiadowcza Równe, "Raport organizacyjny za miesiąc marzec 1932 r.," Równe, 2 April 1932, CAW I/303/4/7006.
 40. {Kurnicki, Ku}, 18 December 1932, CAW I/303/4/1993.
 41. Handkerchiefs in CAW I/303/4/1993. Auto: {Wiktor Zaleski, B-41, Kyiv} to [Niezbzrzycki], "Kochany Kolego i Zacny Szeffie," 4 November 1935, CAW I/303/4/1929.
 42. List: Porucznik Niezbzrzycki to Szef Ekspozytury Nr. V. w Lwowie, 19 May 1932, CAW I/303/4/1826. Pisarczykówna: {Pisarczykówna, X-22, Kharkiv} to {Niezbzrzycki}, 18 January 1933, CAW I/303/4/2099.
 43. Missing digit: "Kontakty," [B-18, Kyiv], 15 June 1936, CAW I/303/4/1927. Ruble: "Kontakt," [B-18, Kyiv], 18 May 1936, CAW I/303/4/1927.
 44. Characterization based on these descriptions of informants: {Stanisław Nawrocki, E-15, Ukraine}, 9 January 1937, CAW I/303/4/1956; {Ludwik Michałowski, Placówka G-27}, "Wiadomości wojskowe," 14 December 1935, CAW I/303/4/1958; [B-18, Kyiv], [1936]. Also "Kontakty," [B-18, Kyiv], 15 February 1936; "Kontakty," [B-18, Kyiv], 20 March 1936; "Kontakt," [B-18, Kyiv], 18 May 1936; "Kontakty," [B-18, Kyiv], 15 June 1936; "Kontakt w Żytomierzu," [B-18, Kyiv], 17 July 1936, in CAW I/303/4/1927.
 45. Aleksander Wat, *Mój wiek*, London: Polonia Book Fund, 1981, 233.
 46. {Zaleski, B-41, Kyiv} to [Niezbzrzycki], 19 February 1935, CAW I/303/4/1929.
 47. {Józef Jedynak, KJD, Moscow} to [Niezbzrzycki], telegram, 6 February 1934, CAW I/303/4/1990; {Jedynak, KJD} to [Niezbzrzycki], 13 February 1934, CAW I/303/4/1990.
 48. Tadeusz Jankowski, "Szanowny Panie!" [November 1934], CAW I/303/4/1951.
 49. [Niezbzrzycki] 31 January 1935, CAW I/303/4/1929; "Marian Wiśniewski" [Second Department] to [Wiktor Bagiński, E-9, Moscow], 31 January 1935, CAW I/303/4/1951; Niezbzrzycki to Szef Wydziału II-b, Oddział II Sztabu Głównego, 6 August 1937, CAW I/303/4/1929.
 50. Cimek, *Komuniści, Polska, Stalin*, 118–120.
 51. An example: Kpt. Gzylewski, Kierownik Ekspozytury Sam. Ref. Inf. Szt. Nr. 1, "Dębski Eugeniusz—inf.," 11 January 1937, CAW I/371/1/A.32.
 52. Jan Alfred Reguła [Józef Mitzenmacher or Mieczysław Mützenmacher], *Historia Komunistycznej Partii Polski*, Toruń: Portal, 1994 [reprint of second 1934 edition], details at xi. See also Barbara Fijałkowska, *Borejsza i Różański: Przyczynek do historii stalinizmu w Polsce*, Olsztyn: Wyższa Szkoła Pedagogiczna, 1995, 43.
 53. {Kurnicki, Ku, Ukraine} to [Niezbzrzycki], 29 November 1933, CAW I/303/4/1993.
 54. "Antoni Pieniążek," Samodzielny Referat R[osja], Second Department, to X-37, Moscow, 7 March 1937, CAW I/303/4/2100.
 55. Włodzimierz Dąbrowski, Ekspozytura 2 Oddz[iał] II, 2 March 1940, report reprinted in

- Zeszyty Historyczne*, No. 140, 2002, 112–113; see also Andrzej Peplowski, *Wywiad a dyplomacja II Rzeczypospolitej*, Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2004, 277.
56. Shapoval, “Vsevolod Balickij: Bourreau et victime,” 390. The continued Polish ability to mount expeditions of shallow penetration is suggested by the later existence, in 1939–1940, of a Polish network in Belarus. NARA RG263/NNd36821/A1-87/56, 102.
 57. Władysław Miłkiewicz, [B-18], Kyiv, 10 November 1935, CAW I/303/4/1926.
 58. The two outposts, respectively: {Kurnicki, Ku}, “Sprawozdanie ogólne za m-c grudzień 1935 r.,” January 1936, CAW I/303/4/1993; {Nawrocki, E-15, Ukraine}, to [Niezbrzycki], “Mój kochany,” 1 May 1937, CAW I/303/4/1956. Measures against diplomats: Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti NKVD SSSR,” 293, 304.
 59. Iwanow, *Pierwszy naród ukarany*, 135.
 60. Decreased number of applications: {Stpiczyński, F-8, Kyiv}, “Ogólny raport za m. wrzesień,” 14 October 1935, CAW I/303/4/1926. Disproving contacts: {Kurnicki, Ku}, to “Wacek,” January 1936, CAW I/303/4/1993. Denial of visits and innocence: Tad[eusz] Błaszkiwicz, Polish consul in Kharkiv, to Polish ambassador in Moscow, “Aresztowań obywateli polskich,” November 1936, CAW I/303/4/1867.
 61. Jan Karszo-Siedleński, Polish consul general in Kyiv, “Antypolskiej akcji prasowej na Ukrainie Sow.,” 13 September 1937, CAW I/303/4/1867.
 62. “Mateusz Mroziński” to [E-15 in Ukraine], “Instrukcja tymczasowa zachowania się poszczególnych eksponentów na wypadek zatrzymania,” 7 August 1936, CAW I/303/4/1956. The same document was sent to the other outposts.
 63. [Niezbrzycki], “Pewne charakterystyczne momenty z przebiegu sprawy Rana,” 21 August 1936, CAW I/303/4/1989. The adjective Niezbrzycki used to describe the tainted contact was “trefny,” from the Yiddish *tref* (not kosher). Soviet account: Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti NKVD SSSR,” 295.
 64. Finding based on a review of cited documents, as well as those concerning Outpost X-37 in Kharkiv and Moscow, CAW I/303/4/2100; Outpost A-7 in Moscow, CAW I/303/4/1911; and Outpost E-9 in Moscow, CAW I/303/4/1951.
 65. “Bolesław Wasilewski” [Second Department] to [K-10, Leningrad], 19 November 1937, CAW I/303/4/1983; see also the report on G-27’s meeting with Niezbrzycki in Warsaw in September 1937 in CAW I/303/4/1958.
 66. Amir Weiner, “Nature and Nurture in a Socialist Utopia: Delineating the Soviet Socio-Ethnic Body in the Age of Socialism,” in Hoffmann, *Stalinism*, 247.
 67. “Bolesław Wasilewski” [Second Department] to [K-10, Leningrad], 19 November 1937, CAW I/303/4/1983. Compare Anthony Cave Brown, *C: The Secret Life of Sir Stewart Graham Menzies, Spymaster to Winston Churchill*, New York: Macmillan, 1987, 143; David Shearer, “Social Disorder, Mass Repression, and the NKVD during the 1930s,” *Cahiers du Monde russe*, 42:2–3–4, 2001, 590.
 68. Memoir of Jerzy Niezbrzycki, JPI TO 109/1/36–40.
 69. Paweł Piotr Wiczorkiewicz, *Łańcuch śmierci: Czystka w Armii Czerwonej 1937–1939*, Warsaw: Rytm, 2001, 1088–1089.
 70. Reorganization: Marek Kornat, *Polska 1939 roku wobec Paktu Ribbentrop-Mołotow*, Warsaw: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2002, 112–135. Infighting: Leszek Gondek, *Wywiad polski w Rzeszy 1933–1939*, Gdynia: Wojskowa Drukarnia, 1982, 175.

71. Poland's major intelligence success of the late 1930s concerned Nazi Germany rather than the USSR. The Second Department unlocked the secrets of the German encrypting device Enigma, and gave replica Enigma machines to Britain and France.
72. Such as Włodzimierz Lechowicz and Alfred Karol Jaroszewicz, "Sprawa wewnętrzna," *Karta*, No. 37, 2003, 50. This is a subject that would reward further study.
73. V. V. Doroshenko et al., eds., *Istoriia sovetskikh organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnost: Uchebnik*, Moscow: KGB, 1977, 241–242, 246.
74. "Otkliki pol'skoi pechati na vystuplenie vołynskogo vovody," *Izvestiia*, 15 September 1928.
75. Mikhail Kichygin's account: Budzyńska, *Strzępy rodzinnej sagi*, 266–267. On Ezhov's worldview, instructive is Chase, *Enemies Within the Gates*, 186–187. The Moscow phone book: Kate Brown, *A Biography of No Place: From Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Heartland*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004, 159.
76. Quotations from: "Kwestionariusz No. 164" (Anna z Jaworskich Klinberg); {Niezbrzycki} to [Kurnicki, Ku, Ukraine], 16 March 1933. See also {Kurnicki, Ku}, 2 March 1933; {Niezbrzycki} to [Kurnicki, Ku], 16 June 1933; "Otrzymałam Anna z Jaworskich Klinbergowa," all in CAW I/303/4/1993.
77. {Niezbrzycki} to [B-18, Kyiv], 8 June 1935; {Niezbrzycki} [to B-18, Kyiv], "Przesyłam poniżej spis pobojuwisk POW Wschód," 24 July 1935; {Michniewicz, B-18, Kyiv} to [Niezbrzycki], "Ziemia na kopiec Marszałka," Kyiv, 31 August 1935; {Michniewicz, B-18}, to [Niezbrzycki], "Ziemia z pobojuwisk POW," Kyiv, 14 October 1935, all in CAW I/303/4/1926.

CHAPTER 7. A REVOLUTION PREPARED

1. Maria Dąbrowska, *Dzienniki 1933–1945*, Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1988, 26, 66, 105–107, 125.
2. Jerzy Stempowski to Adam Zieliński, 15 May 1942, *Zeszyty Historyczne*, No. 45, 1978, 24–35. Jonah and the whale: 28.
3. Ksawery Pruszyński, *Niezadowoleni i entuzjaści*, Warsaw: PWN, 1990, reprinting a 1935 article for *Czas*. Pruszyński was born in Volhynia.
4. Distribution: "Wołyń—Sprawozdanie," June 1937, 14, BUWDR 1549. Yields: Werner Benecke, *Die Ostgebiete der Zweiten Polnischen Republik*, Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 1999, 133.
5. Benecke, *Ostgebiete*, 96–115.
6. Andrzej Ajnenkiel, *Polska po przewrocie majowym*, Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna, 1980, 48–49.
7. Officers are not surprised by the turn to communism. DOK II, "Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 16 X 1932 do 15 I 1933 r.," January 1933, CAW I/371/2/A.91/3; DOK II, "Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 15 I 1933 do 15 IV 1933 r.," 13 April 1933, CAW I/371/2/A.91; DOK II, "Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 15 VI do 15 X 1933 r.," 13 November 1933 CAW I/371/2/A.91.
8. Włodzimierz Mędrzecki, "Przemiany społeczne i polityczne na Wołyniu w latach 1917–1921," in Janusz Żarnowski, ed., *Metamorfozy społeczne: Badania nad dziejami społeczeństwa polskiego XIX i XX wieku*, Warsaw: Instytut Historii PAN, 1997, 168–170.

9. Józef Łobodowski, "O cyganach i katastrofistach," *Kultura*, No. 10, 1964, 37.
10. Land without compensation and hunger in Poland: M. H. Vavryshyn et al., eds., *Borot'ba za vozz'iednannia Zakhidnoi Ukraïny z Ukraïns'koïu RSR*, Kyïv: Naukova Dumka, 1979, 335, 354. Solomea Plis, the Soviet spy: Andrzej Peptowski, *Kontrwywiad II Rzeczypospolitej*, Warsaw: Bellona, 2002, 288–290. Abundance during famine: W. Michnowski, Samodzielny Referat Informacyjny, DOK II, to Szef Oddziału II w Warszawie, "Raport kontrwywiadowczy i statystyka spraw szpiegowskich za rok 1933," 10 March 1934, CAW I/303/4/2629/8.
11. Ukrainian culture: "Polozhenie v KP ZU," informer's report, 27 November 1936, CAW VIII/800/71/3; also *Borot'ba za vozz'iednannia Zakhidnoi Ukraïny z Ukraïns'koïu RSR*, 335, 337, 339, 442, 447. Independence: DOK II, "Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 15 VI do 15 X 1933 r.," 13 November 1933, CAW I/371/2/A.91.
12. Bolesław Podhorski, "Uwagi o stosunkach we wsi Kotów gm Tuczyń," 11 January 1938, CAW I/371/1/2/A.103; also ZP (3), 56.
13. DOK II, "Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 16 I do 15 IV 1935 r.," 25 May 1935, CAW I/371/2/A.92.
14. For a sense of how popular communism in Volhynia had been: MSW, Wydział Bezpieczeństwa, "Udział ugrupowań wywrotowych w wyborach do ciał ustawodawczych w Polsce w roku 1928," Warsaw 1928, AAN MSW 1/1186/15.
15. DOK II, "Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 16 X 1932 do 15 I 1933 r.," January 1933, CAW I/371/2/A.91/3. On the tactics of 1932 and 1933 see also: DOK II, "Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 15 VI do 15 X 1933 r.," 13 November 1933, I/371/2/A.91.
16. Urząd Wojewódzki Wołyński, Wydział Bezpieczeństwa, "KPZU: opracowanie monograficzne na dzień 1.VIII.34 r.," 21 July 1934, AAN UWW 979/25.
17. DOK II, "Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 16 IV do 15 VII 1934 r.," 21 July 1934; I. M. Shumeiko and P. M. Iatskiv, *Komunistychna Partiia Zakhidnoi Ukraïny u borot'bi za narodnyi front*, L'viv: Vydavnytstvo pry L'vivs'komu Derzhavnomu Universyteti, 1985, 33–35.
18. DOK II, "Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 16 IV do 15 VII 1934 r.," 21 July 1934; DOK II, "Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 16 VII do 15 X 1934 r.," 15 December 1934, both in CAW I/371/2/A.92.
19. W. Michnowski, Samodzielny Referat Informacyjny, DOK II, "Raport kontrwywiadowczy i statystyka spraw szpiegowskich za rok 1934," 15 March 1935, CAW I/303/4/2629.
20. "Rezoliutsiia Ts.K. KPZU pro perebih i travnia na Zakhidnii Ukraïni," May 1934, AAN KPZU 165/V-6/23–25.
21. Shumeiko and Iatskiv, *Komunistychna Partiia Zakhidnoi Ukraïny u borot'bi za narodnyi front*, 44–51.
22. Jan Kościółek, "Doniesienie," 24 May 1952, IPN 0231/44/55; *Borot'ba za vozz'iednannia Zakhidnoi Ukraïny z Ukraïns'koïu RSR*, 392–402; Urząd Wojewódzki Wołyński, Wydział Społeczno-Polityczny, "Wystąpienia masowe KPZU w powiecie dubieńskim," 23 April 1935, WSR 275/54/t-2; idem, "Komunistyczna Partja Zachodniej Ukrainy—opracow-

- anie monograficzne w/g stanu na 1.7.1935,” 7 August 1935, WSR 275/54/t-2; DOK II, “Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 16 I do 15 IV 1935 r.,” 25 May 1935, CAW I/371/2/A.92; DOK II, “Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 16 X 1935 do 15 I 1936 r.,” CAW I/371/2/A.92.
23. Urząd Wojewódzki Wołyński, Wydział Społeczno-Polityczny, “KPZU—opracowanie monograficzne w/g stanu na 1/I 1936,” 20 January 1936; Urząd Wojewódzki Wołyński, Wydział Społeczno-Polityczny, “Akcja 1-szo majowa kompartji na Wołyniu,” Łuck, May 1936; Urząd Wojewódzki Wołyński, Wydział Społeczno-Polityczny, “KPZU—opracowanie monograficzne w/g stanu na 1 VII 1936 r.,” 18 July 1936; Urząd Wojewódzki Wołyński, Wydział Społeczno-Polityczny, “KPZU—opracowanie monograficzne na dzień 31/XII.1936,” 10 February 1937, all in WSR 275/54/t-2. Also DOK II, “Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 16 VII do 15 X 1936 r.”; DOK II, “Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 16 IV do 15 VII 1936 r.”; DOK II, “Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 16 X 1936 do 15 I 1937 r.,” all in CAW I/371/2/A.92.
24. W. Michnowski, Samodzielny Referat Informacyjny, DOK II, “Raport kontrwywiadowczy i statystyka spraw szpiegowskich za rok 1936,” 9 March 1937, CAW I/303/4/2629/16.
25. DOK II, “Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 16 I 1937 r. do 15 IV 1937 r.”; DOK II, “Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 16 IV 1937 do 15 VII 1937 r.,” 27 July 1937; DOK II, “Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 15 VII 1937 do 15 X 1937 r.” (on Szpringer and “Hitler”); DOK II, “Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 15 X 1937 do 15 I 1938 r.,” 31 January 1938; all in CAW I/371/2/A.92.
26. “Deiatel’nost’ KP ZU,” 2 May 1938 r., CAW VIII/800/71/3. See also Shumeiko and Iatskiv, *Komunistychna Partiia Zakhidnoi Ukraïny u borot’bi za narodnyi front*, 152–161.
27. DOK II, “Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 16 I 1937 r. do 15 IV 1937 r.”; DOK II, “Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 16 IV 1937 do 15 VII 1937 r.,” 27 July 1937; DOK II, “Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 15 VII 1937 do 15 X 1937 r.,” all in CAW I/371/2/A.92.
28. Calm: DOK II, “Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 15 X 1938 r. do 15 I 1939 r.,” CAW I/371/2/A.92. Truce: DOK II, “Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 15 I 1939 do 15 IV 1939 r.,” CAW I/371/2/A.92.
29. Nationalist tone: DOK II, “Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 15 X 1934 do 15 I 1935 r.”; DOK II, “Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 16 IV do 15 VII 1935 r.”; both in CAW I/371/2/A.92. Model political education: AAN MSW 1/1040/21.
30. Resolutions of KPZU Fourth Congress of 1934: AAN KPZU 165/I-4/t-2/35.
31. Mjr. W. Michnowski, Samodzielny Referat Informacyjny DOK No. 2, “Wykaz osób karanych za komunizm,” 31 June 1938, CAW I/371/2/A.96.

32. My count from reports in CAW I/371/2/A.92 and WSR 275/54/t-2. Aleksander Hauke-Nowak estimated the number of communists imprisoned from April 1938 through September 1939 at 2,300–2,500. Ireneusz Polit, “Program wołyński wojewody Aleksandra Hauke-Nowaka 1938–1939,” *Przegląd Wschodni*, 5:4, 1999, 707. See also Shumeiko and Iatskiv, *Komunistyczna Partia Zakhidnoi Ukrainy u borot’bi za narodnyi front*, 57.
33. MSW, Wydział Bezpieczeństwa, “Statystyka przestępczości politycznej na tle przestępczości ogólnej w latach 1934–1937,” 17 December 1937, CAW I/302/10/4. The Polish police might have exaggerated the absolute figures, but it seems unlikely that in their own internal record keeping they would overstate the *relative* importance of communism in Volhynia.
34. “Psy policyjne w Łucku,” composed in 1930 or 1931, unpublished until 1956. Sławomir Kędzierski located this poem. It immortalized Commissioner Zaremba, who was recalled more than three decades later by Zaremba’s communist successors as they interrogated Zaremba’s onetime governor Henryk Józewski: T. Walczak, “Notatka służbowa,” 28 April 1953, IPN 0231/44/8.
35. Danylo Shumuk, *Perezhyte i peredumane*, Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo imeni Oleny Telihi, 1998, 48; also 35, 45, 49, 51, 52. The KPZU commune: Marcin Mazurek, *Ku przyszłości szliśmy*, Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1979, 182–191.

CHAPTER 8. REVINDICATIONS OF SOULS

1. ZP (3), 49–50.
2. Jerzy Kłoczowski, *A History of Polish Christianity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 271; Mirosława Papierzyńska-Turek, *Między tradycją a rzeczywistością: Państwo wobec prawosławia 1918–1939*, Warsaw: PWN, 1989, 67–75.
3. The Orthodox population of Volhynia had long been instructed by the Orthodox hierarchy that Polish rule was ruinous and Roman Catholicism a “heresy.” Mitropolit Antonii, *Słowa, besedy i rechi*, St. Petersburg: Bibliopolis, 2002, 415.
4. Tikhon’s major struggles were in Russia. For an introduction: Edward Roslof, *Red Priests: Renovationism, Russian Orthodoxy, and Revolution, 1905–1946*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002, 18–35.
5. Autocephaly imbroglio treated admirably in Papierzyńska-Turek, *Między tradycją a rzeczywistością*, 15–123.
6. Legal limbo: *ibid.*, 123, 142–143. Temporary regulations: AAN MWRiOP 960.
7. Projects of law: AAN MWRiOP 961.
8. The about-face: “Projekt statutu o stosunku prawnym polskiego kościoła prawosławnego,” 9 March 1926, AAN MWRiOP 961/298–307; [Stanisław Grabski], “Projekt ustawy o stosunku prawnym Kościoła Prawosławnego,” 12 April 1926, AAN MWRiOP 961/321; Dionysius to Grabski, 25 May 1926, AAN MWRiOP 961/381.
9. On earlier movements: Bohdan Bociurkiw, “The Church and the Ukrainian Revolution,” in Taras Hunczak, ed., *The Ukraine, 1917–1921: A Study of Revolution*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977, 220–246; Ricarda Vulpius, “Ukrainische Nation und zwei Konfessionen: Der Klerus und die ukrainische Frage 1861–1921,” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 49:2, 2001, 252–255.

10. Sam. Ref. Przyg. Bezp. Woj., DOK II, "Cerkiew prawosławna na terenie O. K. II," Part 2, 1937, CAW I/371/21A.98. Examples of petitions: "Do Wysokiego Rządu, do Izby Poselskiej, i Obywateli Rzeczypospolitej," [May 1927], AAN MWRiOP 961/543–545; "Do Jego Ekselencji Pana Ministra Oświaty i Wyznań Religijnych, Memorjał," [1927], AAN MWRiOP 961/559.
11. Desire to regulate relations: Czesław Madajczyk, ed., "Dokumenty w sprawie polityki narodowościowej władz polskich po przewrocie majowym," *Dzieje Najnowsze*, 4:3, 1972, 154, 159. Józewski's visits in 1926 and 1927: Ryszard Torzecki, *Kwestia Ukraińska w Polsce w latach 1923–1939*, Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1989, 136; Andrzej Chojnowski, *Piłsudczy u władzy: Dzieje Bezpartyjnego Bloku Współpracy z Rządem*, Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1986, 38; Andrzej Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki narodowościowej rządów polskich w latach 1921–1939*, Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1979, 92–93.
12. Księży dziekanów powiatu krzemienieckiego prawosławnej diecezji wołyńskiej, "Oświadczenie," 27 November 1927, AAN MWRiOP 961/567–568.
13. Metropolitan Dionysius, "Do Jego Ekselencji Pana Ministra Wyznań Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego," 26 October 1929, AAN MWRiOP 961/641.
14. Henryk Suchenek-Sucheki, 1 November 1936, BUWDR 432(2)/83; also Papierzyńska-Turek, *Miedzy tradycja a rzeczywistością*, 151.
15. Henryk Suchenek-Sucheki, November 1936, BUWDR 432(2)/83; also letters of 10, 11, 16 and 17 March 1931 in BUWDR 432(2)/95.
16. ZP (2), 66, 72.
17. Andrzej Peplowski, *Wywiad a dyplomacja II Rzeczypospolitej*, Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2004, 275.
18. Werner Benecke, *Die Ostgebiete der Zweiten Polnischen Republik*, Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 1999, 95, 230.
19. Prime Minister Walery Sławek, Protocol of 23 April 1931 meeting of Council of Ministers, BUWDR 432(2)/81.
20. Bronisław Żongołłowicz, *Dzienniki 1930–1936*, Warsaw: Przegląd Wschodni, 2004, 151, 157, 158, 169–170, 176, 180, 186, 189, 196–197.
21. Mohyla: Ihor Ševčenko, *Byzantium and the Slavs*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991, 651–688. See also David Frick, *Meletij Smotryc'kyj*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995.
22. Żongołłowicz, *Dzienniki*, 166.
23. Ibid., 290, 510, 525.
24. Quotation: Józewski to Potocki, Dyrektor Departamentu Wyznań, 6 December 1933, BUWDR 432(1)/54. The Mohyla Society and the UNR parliamentarians: "Memorial do Pana Volyns'koho Voievody v Luts'ku," January 1934, BUWDR 432(1)/45; Sam. Ref. Przyg. Bezp. Woj., DOK II, "Cerkiew prawosławna na terenie O. K. II," Part 2, 1937, CAW I/371/21A.98/4–5; and "Memorjał," AAN MSW 1/1048. On the 1933 demonstration, Papierzyńska-Turek, *Miedzy tradycja a rzeczywistością*, 220–221.
25. Józewski to Potocki, Dyrektor Departamentu Wyznań, 6 December 1933, BUWDR 432(1)/54.
26. Sam. Ref. Przyg. Bezp. Woj., DOK II, "Cerkiew prawosławna na terenie O. K. II," Part 2, 1937, CAW I/371/21A.98/9.

27. Papierzyńska-Turek, *Między tradycją a rzeczywistością*, 241–242.
28. Transfers: BUWDR 432(1)/61; BUWDR 432(1)/65.
29. On Pavel Pashchevs'kyi, ZP (2), 71. Soviet intelligence: Andrzej Pełoński, *Kontrwywiad II Rzeczypospolitej*, Warsaw: Bellona, 2002, 305–306.
30. 1,455,882 Orthodox believers in Volhynia: Sam. Ref. Przyg. Bezp. Woj., DOK II, “Cerkiew prawosławna na terenie O. K. II,” Part 1, 1937, CAW I/371/21A.98 3. Church lands: BUWDR 432(1)/77. Number of parishes (in 1935): letter from Oleksii, 16 February 1935, BUWDR 432(1)/64.
31. Letter of 5 April 1935, BUWDR 432(1)/66.
32. Żongołłowicz, *Dzienniki*, 697–698.
33. Travel: Henryk Suchenek-Sucheki, 1 November 1936, BUWDR 432(2)/83; projects of law: AAN MWRiOP 962/284–309; AAN MWRiOP 962/311–335; AAN MWRiOP 972/1–14.
34. Żongołłowicz, *Dzienniki*, 588, 598, 690.
35. *ibid.*, 721ff.
36. Felicjan Sławoj-Składkowski to Henryk Józewski, 3 November 1937, BUWDR 432(2)/92.
37. The decree: *Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, 19 November 1938. This narrative concentrates upon the statute regulating church-state relations. A parallel account could describe the evolution of the church's internal statute, published in *Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, 30 December 1938, position 103. Meeting count: BUWDR 432(2)/94.
38. Maneuvering: BUWDR 432(1)/63.
39. Quotations, respectively: Dionysius to Józewski, 10 November 1938, BUWDR 432(2)/95; Dionysius to Józewski, telegram, November 1938, BUWDR 432(2)/97.
40. Mieczysław Pruszyński, “Wojewoda Józefski o sprawie ukraińskiej,” interview with Henryk Józewski, 5 September 1935, AAN UWW 299/I-1/34. Mieczysław became a Promethean as his brother Ksawery became a doubter. Their family hailed from Volhynia. See Mieczysław Pruszyński, *Migawki wspomnień*, Warsaw: Rosner i Wspólnicy, 2002, 98.
41. Consult materials in CAW I/302/298, CAW I/302/4/1090, CAW I/302/4/1092, CAW I/302/4/1108, especially “Podróż taktyczna ‘Wschód’,” [May-June 1937]. See also Robert Potocki, *Polityka państwa polskiego wobec zagadnienia ukraińskiego w latach 1930–1939*, Lublin: IEŚW, 2003, 174.
42. “Wyciąg z Protokołu konferencji odbytej w dniu 11.XII.1934 w Dowództwie Okręgu Korpusu Nr. II. w Lublinie,” CAW I/371/2/A.80; also DOK Nr. II, Sztab Sam. Ref. Przyg. Bezp. Woj., “Konferencja z Wojew. Wołyńskim w sprawach bezpieczeństwa woj.—sprawozdanie,” 10 April 1935, CAW I/371/1/2/A.104.
43. Early support: Gen. bryg. Dobrodzicki, “Przyjazd Germanosa na Wołyń,” Lublin, 18 December 1930, CAW I/303/4/2661.
44. 1933 Józewski report: Mykola Kuczerepa, ed., “Dokumenty i materiały,” *Przegląd Wschodni*, 4:1, 1997, 162. See also Roman Wysocki, *Organizacja Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów w Polsce w latach 1929–1939*, Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2003, 320.

45. 1934 ministry of internal affairs report: AAN MSW 1/1152/13.
46. "OUN—sprawozdanie doraźne z 27.10.1934," AAN MSW 1/1252/13; "OUN—sprawozdanie doraźne Nr. 4," 6 January 1935, AAN MSW 1/1252/50.
47. Piotr Stawicki, ed., "Polityka wołyńska Henryka Józewskiego w świetle nieznanych źródeł z lat 1935–1936," *Przegląd Wschodni*, 4:1, 1997, 200, 195.
48. "Stan organizacyjny OUN," 1936, AAN UWV 979/85/9.
49. Arrests in 1935–1937: MSW, Wydział Bezpieczeństwa, Referat Ukraiński, "Sprawozdanie z przejawów ruchu nielegalnego /UWO-OUN/ w Małopolsce Wschodniej i na Wołyniu za rok 1937," 9 June 1938, CAW VIII/72/1.
50. Quotation from 9 June 1936 procurator report: Stawicki, "Polityka wołyńska Henryka Józewskiego w świetle nieznanych źródeł z lat 1935–1936," 202. "Polaks" translates "Lachy" (in the original), "Liakhy" in Ukrainian.
51. Rooster row: "Akta w sprawie Biskupa Polikarpa," BUWDR 432(1)/73. Galicians: "Wyciąg z not R'a w sprawie biskupa Polikarpa," BUWDR 432(1)/73.
52. Generał brygady Drapella, Dowódca 27. Dywizji Piechoty, "Sytuacja bezpieczeństwa na terenie dywizji," Kowel, 24 April 1937, CAW I/371/1/2/A.103; Szretter, "Charakterystyka arcybiskupa Aleksego," August 1934, CAW I/371/2/A.87; Sam. Ref. Przyg. Bezp. Woj., DOK II, "Cerkiew prawosławna na terenie O. K. II," Part 1, 1937, CAW I/371/21A.98 1–27; Sam. Ref. Przyg. Bezp. Woj., DOK II, "Cerkiew prawosławna na terenie O. K. II," Part 2, 1937, CAW I/371/21A.98 1–40.
53. Mjr. [Tadeusz] Skinder, Szef Wywiadu, KOP, "Konferencja Wojewody Józewskiego z kier. Plac. Wyw. KOP Nr 8—informacja," Warsaw, 22 July 1936, WSR 275/54/t-2.
54. The two meetings with Józewski: General brygady [Mieczysław] Smorawiński, Dowódca Okręgu Korpusu Nr. II, "Sprawozdanie z Konferencji w dniu 13.IX.37 r. w Kuratorium Okr. Szk. Łuck w Równem," CAW I/371/1/2/A.103. Compare Giennadij Matwiejew, "Akcja 'rewindykacji' na Wołyniu w końcu lat 30-tych," *Przegląd Wschodni*, 5:4, 1999, 688. The communist view: I. M. Shumeiko and P. M. Iatskiv, *Komunistyczna Partia Zakhidnoi Ukrainy u borot'bi za narodnyi front*, L'viv: Vydavnytstvo pry L'viv's'komu Derzhavnomu Universyteti, 1985, 55–57.
55. Urząd Wojewódzki Wołyński, Wydział Społeczno-Polityczny, "Monografia OUN na Wołyniu," May 1935, CAW VIII/800/70/19.
56. W. Michnowski, Samodzielny Referat Informacyjny, DOK II, "Raport kontrwywiadowczy i statystyka spraw szpiegowskich za rok 1936," 9 March 1937, CAW I/303/4/2629/16.
57. W. Michnowski, Samodzielny Referat Informacyjny, DOK II, "Raport kontrwywiadowczy i statystyka spraw szpiegowskich za rok 1935," 9 March 1936, CAW I/303/4/2629/2.
58. Mjr. [Tadeusz] Skinder, Szef Wywiadu, KOP, "Konferencja Wojewody Józewskiego z kier. Plac. Wyw. KOP Nr 8—informacja," Warsaw, 22 July 1936, WSR 275/54/t-2; General brygady Smorawiński, Dowódca Okręgu Korpusu Nr. II, "Sprawozdanie z Konferencji w dniu 13.IX.37 r. w Kuratorium Okr. Szk. Łuck w Równem," CAW I/371/1/2/A.103.
59. Skinder's background: "Karta kwalifikacyjna"; "Arkusze ewidencyjno-kwalifikacyjny"; "Karta kwalifikacyjna dla Komisji Weryfikacyjnej"; Gen. [Stanisław] Szeptycki, Dowódca I. Lit.-Biał. Dyw. Strzelców, "Rozkaz," 23 March 1920; "Wniosek o nadanie kapitanowi dypl. Skinderowi Tadeuszowi Krzyża Niepodległości z Mieczami," July 1920; "Wniosek

- na odznaczenie Krzyżem Walecznych,” Vilnius, 3 February 1921; all in CAW 1769/89/4632, Teczka personalna Tadeusza Skindera.
60. Marek Jabłonowski and Jerzy Prochwicz, *Wywiad Korpusu Ochrony Pogranicza 1924–1939*, Warsaw: ASPRA-JR, 2004, 130–138.
 61. Ryszard Torzecki, *Kwestia ukraińska w polityce III Rzeszy (1933–1945)*, Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1972, 128, 156.
 62. Major Krogulski, “Przebieg zebrania w dniu 12.IX.1937 w mieszkaniu Kmdt. Garnizona Równego, w związku z pobytem na Wołyniu Grupy Parlamentarnej,” CAW I/371/1/2/A.103.
 63. IPHJ, 7 October 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/310; IR, 25 June 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/225.
 64. Referat Informacyjny, Generalny Inspektor Sił Zbrojnych, Biuro Inspekcji, “Meldunek sytuacyjny Nr. 24 za czas od 19.X do 25.X.1937,” Załącznik Nr. 1, “Sytuacja polityczna na Wołyniu,” CAW I/302/10/7.
 65. Referat Informacyjny, Generalny Inspektor Sił Zbrojnych, Biuro Inspekcji, “Meldunek sytuacyjny Nr. 27 za czas od 9.XI do 16.XI.1937,” Załącznik Nr. 1, “Sprawozdanie ze zjazdu Wołyńskiego Ukraińskiego Objednania odbytego jako ‘nadzwyczajny’ w Równem w dn. 7.XI.1937,” CAW I/302/10/7; “Pan Wojewoda na Baczność Słucha Hymnu Szewczenki,” *ABC*, December 1937, copy in CAW I/371/1/2/A.103. See also Jerzy Stempowski, *W dolinie Dniestru*, Warsaw: LNB, 1993, 202, 272.
 66. Cornelia Schenke, *Nationalstaat und nationale Frage: Polen und die Ukrainer 1921–1939*, Hamburg: Dölling und Galitz Verlag, 2004, 438; ZP (2), 87–88.
 67. This chapter is intended to contribute to the study of the hardening of Polish domestic policy in the east. See Potocki, *Polityka państwa polskiego wobec zagadnienia ukraińskiego*; see also Mykola Kucherepa, “Do henezy konfliktu: Ukraïns’ko-Pols’ki vidnosyny na Volyni naperedodni druhoi svitovoi viiny,” in Iaroslav Isaievych, ed., *Volyn’ i Kholmshchyna 1938–1947 rr.*, L’viv: NAN Ukrainy, 2003, 59–69.
 68. “Revindication of souls”: T. Broszkiewicz, Komitet Koordynacyjny, Lublin, 20 September 1938, CAW I/371/2/A.105.
 69. Gen. bryg. Olbrycht, [DOK I], “Do Kierowników Akcji,” Zamość 8 March 1938, CAW I/371/2/A.105. Plans: Papierzyńska-Turek, *Między tradycją rzeczywistością*, 260–271.
 70. Generał brygady M. Smorawiński, Przewodniczący Komitetu Koordynacyjnego przy DOK II, “Komunikat Nr. 3: Akcja prostowania skażonej pisowni nazwisk,” Lublin, 20 July 1938, CAW I/371/1/2/A.104; “Zagadnienie Szlachty Zagrodowej na wschodzie Polski,” CAW I/371/1/2/A.106. On the circumstances that led to the ukrainization of Polish petty *szlachta*, see Daniel Beauvois, *La bataille de la terre en Ukraine*, Lille: Presses Universitaires de Lille, 1993.
 71. “Szlachta Zagrodowa—przesłanie danych,” to Ppł. Dypl. Sadowski in Warsaw, October 1938, CAW I/371/2/A.105. See also Kapitan Wysocki, Kierownik Akcji Rewindykacyjnej na powiat dubieński, Dubno, 21 September 1938, CAW I/371/2/A.105; Generał brygady M. Smorawiński, Przewodniczący Komitetu Koordynacyjnego, “Komunikat Nr. 4,” Lublin, 29 July 1938, CAW I/371/1/2/A.104.
 72. Potocki, *Polityka państwa polskiego wobec zagadnienia ukraińskiego*, 172–173.
 73. Major M. Turczyn, “Meldunek o stanie rewindykacji od dnia 26/I do dnia 18/X r. b.,” Włodzimierz, 20 October 1938, CAW I/371/2/A.105.

74. Jobs: Kapitan Wysocki, Kierownik Akcji Rewindykacyjnej na powiat dubieński, "Interwencja w sprawie niewydalenia robotników kolejowych w Dubnie," Dubno, 29 August 1938; Ppłk. Żółkiewski, KOP, Pułk Zdobunów, "Mielnik Onufry—uzyskanie pracy," to Komitet Koordynacyjny Przy DOK II, Równe, 20 July 1938. Children: Kapitan Wysocki, "Tygodniowy meldunek sytuacyjny," to Kierownik Okręgowego Urzędu PF i PW w Lublinie, Dubno, 27 July 1938; Major M. Turczyn, "Wyjednanie stypendium i umieszczenie chłopca na praktykę term.," to Komitet Koordynacyjny DOK II w Lublinie, Włodzimierz, 26 June 1938. Church: DOK Nr. II, Sztab Sam. Ref. Przyg. Bezp. Wojen., "Budowa kościoła w Oryszkowcach," September 1938; Mjr. M. Turczyn, Kierownik Akcji Komitetu Koordynacyjnego, "Polonizacja cerkwi praw. w Horochowie," 7 August 1938. All in CAW I/371/2/A.105.
75. "Hósciowe zestawienie" [December 1938 or early 1939], CAW I/371/2/A.97.
76. My count of county-level reports, filed in AAN MSW 1746/1–318.
77. The fruit of an older Union (Brest 1596) was the Uniate Church, renamed the Greek Catholic Church under Austrian rule, which preserved the eastern rite while accepting the supremacy of the pope. Its metropolitan, Andrii Skeptyts'kyi, had named a Greek Catholic bishop of Łuck in 1914. The Basilian Order of the Greek Catholic Church had plans to convert Volhynian Ukrainians from Orthodoxy to Greek Catholicism, in anticipation of the conversion of all of Russia to Greek Catholicism after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Vatican entrusted missionary activity in Volhynia to priests of the Latin rite, thereby halting the plan (but not ending the aspiration).
78. Rome's approach in 1937: "Instructio de cura pastorali christifidelum orientalium," copy in CAW I/371/2/A.105; see also AAN MWRiOP 434.
79. See generally Krzysztof Krasowski, *Episkopat Katolicki w II Rzeczypospolitej*, Poznań: Ławica, 1992, 184–185; Hansjakob Stehle, *Eastern Politics of the Vatican 1917–1979*, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981, 146, 191–192.
80. Konrad Sadkowski, "From Ethnic Borderland to Catholic Fatherland: The Church, Christian Orthodox, and State Administration in the Chełm Region, 1918–1939," *Slavic Review*, 57:4, 1998, 813–839.
81. Pułkownik Turkowski, Kierownik Akcji Koordynacyjnej na Lubelszczyźnie, to Ks. Biskup Władysław Góral w Lublinie, 19 November 1938, I/371/2/A.105; Gen. Bryg. Smorawiński, "Współpraca duchowieństwa rzym.-kat. w akcji Komitetu Koordynacyjnego," to Ks. Biskup Fulman w Lublinie, December 1937, CAW I/371/1/2/A.104; Kpt. Filar, Komendant Podokręgu Związku Strzeleckiego "Wołyń," to Ksiądz Biskup Dr. Adolf Szelązek, Łuck 8 August 1938, CAW I/371/1/2/A.104.
82. Ppłk. Miś, Komendant Garnizonu i Miasta Lublina, "Sprawa odnoszenia się kadry wojskowej do ludności Wołynia," 7 August 1939, CAW I/371/1/2/A.104.
83. Uncertainties: Kpt. W. Woytych, Kierownik Akcji Komitetu Koordynacyjnego na powiat Łucki, 21 October 1938, CAW I/371/2/A.105. Research: Ppłk dypl. Sadowski, Ministerstwo Spraw Wojskowych, Departament Dowodzenia Ogólnego, to Dowódca Okręgu Korpusu Nr. II in Lublin, "Prace Komisji Naukowych Badań Ziem Wschodnich," 21 July 1938; CAW I/371/2/A.105; Ppłk. dypl. Sadowski, Przewodniczący Komitetu, Komitet do Spraw Szlachty Zagrodowej na Wschodzie Polski, to Dowódca Okręgu Korpusu Nr II in Lublin, 13 September 1938, CAW I/371/2/A.105.

84. Goals for the Chełm region: Grzegorz Kuprianowicz, "Projekty 'rozwiązania kwestii ukraińskiej' na Chełmszczyźnie i podlasiu południowym w drugiej połowie lat trzydziestych XX wieku," in Isaievych, *Wołyn' i Kholmshchyna*, 99–118.
85. Mention of five-year plan: Generał brygady M. Smorawiński, Przewodniczący Komitetu Koordynacyjnego, "Komunikat Nr. 4," Lublin, 29 July 1938, CAW I/371/1/2/A.104. The plan seems to have existed in a full draft, but I was unable to find a copy. Colonization: "Mapa rozmieszczenia osad wojskowych i proponowanych rejonów osadnictwa polskiego na obszarze Województwa Wołyńskiego," CAW I/371/2/A.105. Churches: plans in CAW I/371/1/2/A.103. Modernization: Major M. Turczyn, "Preliminarze," CAW I/371/1/2/A.103.
86. Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century*, New York: Vintage Books, 2000, 28–29, 128–133.
87. "Protokół z Posiedzenia Komisji Naukowych Badań Ziem Wschodnich odbytej dnia 8 października 1935, AAN MSZ 5217/2–16; "Sprawozdanie z prac badawczo-naukowych Komisji Naukowych Badań Ziem Wschodnich za czas od 10.III to 1.X.1934 r na Posiedzeniu Komisji dn.8.X.1934 r.," AAN MSZ 5217/7–47; Władysław Wielhorski, "Myśli przewodnie przy studiach Kresów wschodnich," 2 March 1934, MSZ 5219/24–36; "Program badań zagadnień demograficzno-narodowościowych Komisji Naukowych Badań Ziem Wschodnich," 8 October 1934, AAN MSZ 5217/71–79; "Szkielet programu pracy w dziedzinie warunków naturalnych na Ziemiach Wschodnich," 1 October 1934, AAN MSZ 5217/48–55.
88. "Protokół z zebrania polskiej grupy parlamentarnej Wołynia, odbytego w niedzielę dnia 19.II.1939 r. w Łucku z inicjatywy i na zaproszenie Wojewody Wołyńskiego," CAW I/302/4/122.
89. Polish base: Aleksander Hauke-Nowak, "Do Pana Prezesa Rady Ministrów w Warszawie," Łuck, 11 April 1939, CAW I/302/4/122. Language rules: Kuczerepa, "Dokumenty a materiały," 175. Ukrainian institutions: Jan Kościółek, "Doniesienie," 24 May 1952, IPN 0231/44/48.
90. Schenke, *Nationalstaat und nationale Frage*, 437.
91. Jerzy Stempowski to Adam Zieliński, 15 May 1942, *Zeszyty Historyczne*, No. 45, 1978, 32.
92. DOK II w Lublinie to I Wiceminister Spraw Wojskowych w Warszawie, "Nastroje wśród mniejszości narodowych," 8 October 1938, CAW I/371/2/A.87; also Podpułkownik Czajkowski, Kierownik Akcji Koordynacyjnej, Zamość, 12 November 1938, CAW I/371/2/A.105.
93. Quotation: DOK II, "Sprawozdanie o ruchu komunistycznym na terenie DOK. Nr. II za czas od dn. 15 VII do 15 X 1938 r.," 31 October 1938, CAW I/371/2/A.92. Another example: DOK II, "Akcja wywrotowa na terenie Ok. II.—informacja," 7 June 1938, CAW I/371/2/A.87.
94. Jerzy Stempowski to Adam Zieliński, 15 May 1942, *Zeszyty Historyczne*, No. 45, 1978, 32.

CHAPTER 9. GLASS HOUSES

1. Marek Gałęzowski, "Henryk Jan Józewski," in *Konspiracja i opór społeczny w Polsce 1944–1956: Słownik biograficzny*, Vol. 2, Warsaw: IPN, 2004, 187.

2. For details see Ludwik Mrocza, "Die Berufs- und Sozialstruktur der wichtigsten ethnischen Gruppen in Lodz und ihre Entwicklung in den Jahren 1918–1939," in Jürgen Hensel, ed., *Polen, Deutsche und Juden in Lodz 1820–1939*, Osnabrück: Fibre Verlag, 1999, 59–63. The total population of the city was about 672,000.
3. Wiesław Puć, "The Development of the City of Łódź," *Polin*, Vol. 6, 1991, 3–18; Stanisław Liszewski, "The Role of the Jewish Community in the Organization of Urban Space in Łódź," *ibid.*, 31.
4. Beata Kosmala, "Lodzer Juden und Deutsche im Jahr 1933," in Hensel, *Polen, Deutsche und Juden in Lodz*, 239–245.
5. *Głos Prawdy*, Gałęzowski, "Henryk Jan Józewski," 187.
6. Robert Moses Shapiro, "Aspects of Jewish Self-Government in Łódź 1914–1939," *Polin*, Vol. 6, 1991, 136, 146–148. See generally Gershon C. Bacon, *The Politics of Tradition: Agudat Yisrael in Poland, 1916–1939*, Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1996.
7. Shapiro, "Jewish Self-Government in Poland," 212, 214, 272; Jacek Walicki, "Juden und Deutsche in der Lodzer Selbstverwaltung 1917–1939," in Hensel, *Polen, Deutsche und Juden in Lodz*, 226.
8. Antony Polonsky, *Politics in Independent Poland: The Crisis of Constitutional Government 1921–1939*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972, 467–468.
9. ZP(1) 70.
10. Jabotinsky laid a wreath on the assassinated Petliura's grave. G. V. Kostyrchenko, *Tainaia politika Stalina: Vlast' i antisemitizm*, Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2001, 69.
11. Quotation ZP (1), 70.
12. Maria Dąbrowska, *Dzienniki 1933–1945*, Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1988, at 323, see also 319; Interview, Zbigniew Chomicz, 18 September 2004, Warsaw. Józewski had stayed in a sanatorium in Jaworze in summer 1932. Bronisław Żongołłowicz, *Dzienniki 1930–1936*, Warsaw: Przegląd Wschodni, 2004, 367.
13. ZP (1), 116–122, first quotation at 120, second at 122. Preparations for a Soviet invasion, never used: CAW I/302/298.
14. Language of invasion: CAW VIII/800/7/3. Arrival in Łuck: SHTARM 5, 5 Armia, "Dokład o provedennoi operatsii po osvobozhdeniiu Zapadnoi Ukrainy 17–30 sentiabria 1939 goda," CAW VIII/800/7/19/18. Bands: Koshcheev, "Komandiram, Komissaram . . ." 24 September 1939, CAW VIII/800/7/15.
15. HI 209/13/2935; HI 209/13/3124; HI 210/1/4372; HI 210/5/4040; HI 210/14/4908; HI 209/7/799.
16. "Voennym Sovetam . . ." 19 September 1939, CAW VIII/800/7/15. The coordination between Soviet organs and communist parties in Poland would reward further study.
17. Revolutionary committees: Andrii Rukkas, "Antypol's'ki zbroyini vystupy na Volyni," in Iaroslav Isaievych, ed., *Volyn' i Kholmshchyna 1938–1947 rr.*, L'viv: NAN Ukraïny, 2003, 134–135.
18. Prison to power: HI 209/1/10420, HI 209/1/2660, HI 209/1/3571, HI 209/1/3817/19, HI 209/1/3517, HI 209/1/6896 (Dubno county); HI/209/3/6238 (Horochów county); HI 209/6/5157, HI 209/6/2376, HI 209/6/2652, HI 209/6/4303, HI 209/6/4284, HI 209/6/9083 (Kostopol county); HI 209/11/4217, HI 209/11/3887, HI 209/11/4049, HI 209/11/3238, HI 209/9/6105 (Krzemieniec county); HI 210/14/10544, HI 210/14/4527,

- HI 210/14/2526 (Zdołbunów county); HI 209/13/2935, HI 209/13/8034 (Luboml county); HI 210/12/1467, HI 210/12/9728, HI 210/12/5945 (Włodzimierz county). See also Marek Wierzbicki, *Polacy i Żydzi w zaborze sowieckim*, Warsaw: Fronda, 2001, 94. Power to prison: HI 209/9/3889; HI 209/10/688. See also Jan T. Gross, *Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, 57.
19. Danylo Shumuk, *Perezhyte i peredumane*, Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo imeni Oleny Telihy, 1998, 57.
 20. Janina Stobniak-Smogorzewska, *Kresowe osadnictwo wojskowe 1920–1945*, Warsaw: Rytm, 2003, 275.
 21. HI 209/11/7956; HI 209/10/677; HI 209/11/688; HI 209/13/8846.
 22. HI 210/5/10796; HI 210/11/6094; HI 209/6/4240; HI 209/8/10630. On the electoral campaign, Zelenkov, "Tov. Mekhlisu . . ." 21 October 1939, CAW VIII/800/7/15.
 23. HI 209/1/3817/19 (Dubno county); HI 209/6/4240, HI 209/6/4303 (Kostopol county); HI 209/8/10630 (Kowel county); HI 209/9/3889, HI 209/10/5159, HI 209/10/6280 (Krzemieniec county); HI 210/1/9845 (Łuck city); HI 210/2/7048 (Łuck county); HI 210/5/10796 (Równe city); HI 210/9/4061 (Sarny county); HI 210/11/6094, HI 210/12/9728, HI 210/12/1993, HI 210/12/5945 (Włodzimierz county); HI 210/13/1997 (Zdołbunów county).
 24. HI 209/8/3240. See also Gross, *Revolution from Abroad*, 76–97.
 25. Posters: E. Pozhidaev, Nachal'nik Politupravleniia Ukrainского Fronta, "Tov. Mekhlisu . . ." 17 October 1939, CAW VIII/800/7/15. Search: Jędrzej Tucholski, "Polskie podziemie antysowieckie w województwie wołyńskim w latach 1939–1941," in Krzysztof Jasiewicz, ed., *Europa nieprowincjonalna*, Warsaw: Rytm, 1999, 683; Iurii Shapoval and Jędrzej Tucholski, et al, eds., *Pol's'ke pidpillia 1939–1941/Polskie podziemie 1939–1941*, Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narowej-Derzhavnyi arkhiv Sluzhby bezpeky Ukraïny, 2004, Vol. 1, 216–218.
 26. The estimate of 40,000 for Volhynia is based upon the estimate of 35,700 for Volhynia in 1940 from A. Ie. Gurbianov, "Pol'skie spetspereselentsy v SSSR v 1940–1941 gg.," and the estimate of 11,093 for all of West Ukraine in idem, "Masshtaby deportatsii naseleniia v glub' SSSR v maie–iiune 1941 g.," in *Repressii protiv poliakov i pol'skikh grazhdan*, Moscow: Zven'ia, 1997, 119 and 156.
 27. The text of the first deportation order can be found at CAW VIII/800/19/1, and also in I. I. Kostiusenko, ed., *Materialy "Osoboi papki" Politburo Ts.K. RKP(b)-VKP(b) po voprosu sovetsko-pol'skikh otnoshenii 1923–1944 gg.*, Moscow: RAN, 1997, 98. A full complement of documents regarding the first three actions can be found in Russian originals and Polish translations in *Deportacje obywateli polskich z Zachodniej Ukrainy i Zachodniej Białorusi w 1940/Deportatsii pol'skikh grazhdan iz Zapadnoi Ukrainy i Zapadnoi Belorusii v 1940 godu*, Warsaw: IPN, 2003. Its editors present a total figure for 1940 of 292,513 deported in the four waves (29). See also Catherine Goussef, "Kto naś, kto ne naś: Théorie et pratique de la citoyenneté à l'égard des populations conquises: Le cas des Polonais en URSS, 1939–1956," *Cahiers du Monde russe*, 44:2–3, 2003, 519–558. On the experience of deportation: Gross, *Revolution from Abroad*, 199–224.
 28. Vladimir Khaustov, "Deiatel'nost' organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti NKVD SSSR

- (1934–1941 gg.),” Doctoral Dissertation, Akademia Federalnoi Sluzhby Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1997, 306.
29. A German count found 45,000 fewer Poles in 1941 than in 1939: not my source for this calculation, but rather a confirmation. “Sprawa Ukraińska. Egzemplarz dla Pana Premiera,” [1943], reprinted in *Zeszyty Historyczne*, No. 71, 1985, at 142.
 30. Jan T. Gross, “Polish POW Camps in Soviet-Occupied Western Ukraine,” in Keith Sword, ed., *The Soviet Takeover of the Polish Eastern Provinces, 1939–1941*, London: Macmillan, 1991, 52–54.
 31. Leon Maks, *Russia by the Back Door*, London: Sheed and Ward, 1954.
 32. I have in mind the Związek Walki Zbrojnej. See Iurii Shapoval and Jędrzej Tucholski et al., eds., *Pol’s’ke pidpillia 1939–1941/Polskie podziemie 1939–1941*, Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narowej/Derzhavnyi arkhiv Sluzhby bezpeky Ukraïny, 2004, Vol. 1, 137ff; *Polska-Ukraina: Trudna odpowiedź*, Warsaw: Karta, 2003, 70; Elżbieta Kotarska, *Proces czternastu*, Warsaw: Volumen, 1998.
 33. This follows Jan Nowak Jeziorański, “Gestapo i NKVD,” lecture delivered 4 May 1951, reprinted in *Karta*, No. 37, 2003, 88–97; see also Jeffrey Burds, “Agentura: Soviet Informant Networks and the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia,” *East European Politics and Societies*, 11:1, 1997, 92; *Cahiers du Monde russe*, 42:2-3-4, 2001. The Polish underground state: Stefan Korboński, *The Polish Underground State*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1978; Jan Gross, *Polish Society under German Occupation: The Generalgouvernement, 1939–1944*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979. On wartime Polish-Japanese cooperation, see NARA RG263/NN36821/A1-87/4/2/1–102. Jeffrey Burds supplied copies of these files, which are analyses of interrogations of senior Japanese officers. The issue of Polish-Japanese intelligence cooperation, which begins before the First World War and continues through the Second, cannot be treated here. For an introduction, see J. W. M. Chapman, “Japan in Poland’s Secret Neighborhood War,” *Japan Forum*, 7:2, 1995, 226–283.
 34. *Polska-Ukraina: Trudna odpowiedź*, 71; David Marples, “The Ukrainians in Eastern Poland under Soviet Occupation, 1939–1941: A Study of Soviet Rural Policy,” in Sword, *Soviet Takeover*, 247.
 35. Stobniak-Smogorzewska, *Kresowe osadnictwo wojskowe*, 293ff.
 36. Ukrainians disillusioned: HI 210/11/8920. Collectivization unpopular: “Kalina,” “Mel-dunek specjalny—Sprawa Ukraińska,” 25 November 1941, SPP 3/1/1/1/1. Motion to murder colonists: HI 209/6/2652. Deportation of Ukrainian nationalists: HI 210/14/7912. Youthful commissars: “Holosuite za kandydativ stalins’koho bloku komunistiv i bezpartiinykh!” DAR 30/1/4 = USHMM RG-31.017M-1. Elections and conduct: Shumuk, *Perezhyte i peredumane*, 61. See also Milena Rudnyts’ka, *Zakhidna Ukraïna pid bol-shevikami*, New York: Naukove tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 90, 283 (communists losing faith) and 101 (expropriations).
 37. Piotr Kołakowski, “Działalność sowieckich służb specjalnych na ziemiach polskich 1939–1945,” *Przegląd Wschodni*, 6:3 2000, 501; S. V. Stepashin et al., eds., *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR v Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine*, Moscow: Kniga i Biznes, 1995, Vol. 1, 172–173; *ibid.*, Vol. 2, 118–121.
 38. Number of Jewish refugees: Andrzej Żbikowski, “Konflikty narodowościowe na pols-

- kich Kresach Wschodnich (1939–1941) w relacjach żydowskich bieżących,” in Krzysztof Jasiewicz, ed., *Tygiel narodów: Stosunki społeczne i etniczne na dawnych ziemiach wschodnich Rzeczypospolitej 1939–1953*, Warsaw: Rytm, 2002, 413.
39. HI 210/9/4061. This is a good example of the disagreements about who greeted the Soviets: a Sarny resident claimed that the only people greeting them were refugees from western Poland. HI 210/8/7607. A Równe resident believed that refugees from the west created anti-Semitism among the local gentiles. FVA T-640.
 40. Ukrainians as local authority: see the list of names in Burmist Bul’ba, “Prykaz po Mis’komu Upravlinniu міста Rivnoho vid 17 lypnia 1941 roku,” DAR 33/13/S = USHMM RG-31.017M-2.
 41. Jedwabne is the best known incident: Jan Gross, *Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001; Paweł Machcewicz and Krzysztof Persak, eds., *Wokół Jedwabnego*, 2 vols., Warsaw: IPN, 2002; Antony Polonsky and Joanna Michlic, *The Neighbors Respond: The Controversy over the Jedwabne Massacre in Poland*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. See also Andrzej Żbikowski, “Lokalne pogromy Żydów w czerwcu i lipcu 1941 r. na wschodnich rubieżach II Rzeczypospolitej,” *Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego*, Nos. 162–163, 1992, 3–18.
 42. Karel Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004, 14–16; Yitzhak Arad, Shmuel Krakowski, and Shmuel Spector, eds., *The Einsatzgruppen Reports*, New York: Holocaust Library, 1989, 11, 31, 39; Rudnyts’ka, *Zakhidna Ukraina za bolshevikami*, 491.
 43. Estimate based upon A. I. Kruglov, *Entsiklopediia Kholokosta*, Kyiv: Evreiskii sovet Ukrainy, 2000, 30, 146. Shmuel Spector, “Żydzi wołyńscy w Polsce międzywojennej i w okresie II wojny światowej (1920–1944),” in Krzysztof Jasiewicz, ed., *Europa Nieprowincjonalna*, Warsaw: ISP PAN, 1999, 575, gives a similar estimate.
 44. Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, New York: Octagon Books, 1978, 196; Christian Gerlach, *Krieg, Ernährung, Völkermord: Forschungen zur deutschen Vernichtungspolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg*, Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1998, 238; Kruglov, *Entsiklopediia Kholokosta*, 147.
 45. The major work is Shmuel Spector, *The Holocaust of Volhynian Jews 1941–1944*, Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1990. See generally Omer Bartov, *The Eastern Front, 1941–45: German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare*, New York: Palgrave, 2001; Dieter Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941–1944*, Munich: Oldenbourg, 1996.
 46. ŻIH 301/1477; “Calendar of Pain, Resistance and Destruction,” in *Sefer Lutsk*, Tel Aviv: Irgun Yots’e Lutsk be-Yisrael, 1961.
 47. Shmuel Spector, “Żydzi wołyńscy,” 576; “Calendar of Pain, Resistance and Destruction.”
 48. ŻIH 301/1623.
 49. Deutscher Bürgermeister der Stadt Rowno, An den Judenobmann Dr. Bergmann, 8 May 1942; Judenrat in Rowno, An Herrn deutschen Bürgermeister der Stadt Rowno, 10 May 1942, DAR 22/1/19 = USHMM RG-31.017M-2.
 50. Martin Dean, *Collaboration in the Holocaust: Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine*, London: Macmillan, 2000, 93.
 51. Gerlach, *Krieg, Ernährung, Völkermord*, 239–243.

52. A good discussion is FVA T-3237.
53. ŽIH 301/1982; ŽIH 301/5657; “Calendar of Pain, Resistance and Destruction.”
54. Spektor, “Žydzi wołyńscy,” 577.
55. I treat the Holocaust of Volhynian Jews at greater length in Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower, eds., *The Shoah in Ukraine*, forthcoming.
56. From the OUN-B, three expeditionary groups known as North, Central, and South. *Polska-Ukraina: Trudna odpowiedź*, 76.
57. Truman Anderson, “Incident at Baranivka: German Reprisals and the Soviet Partisan Movement in Ukraine, October–December 1941,” *Journal of Modern History*, No. 71, 1999, 592, 602, 604.
58. Erich Koch, “Oholoshennia pro pobyrannia podatkov ta inshykh danyn,” 21 October 1941, DAR 33/1/4 = USHMM RG-31.017M-1.
59. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 43.
60. “Nakaz No. 1 do vs’oho naselennia Mizochs’koï Volosti,” 22 July 1941, DAR 22/1/15 = USHMM RG-31.017M-2.
61. Bürgermeister P. Bul’ba, “Bekanntmachung,” 19 July 1941, DAR 33/1/4 = USHMM RG-31.017M-1.
62. FVA, Memoir T640.
63. Erich von dem Bach, “Ukraïntsi v lisakh! Tut hovoryt’ Nimets’kyi Raikh v imeni Evropy ta ii velykoï i staroï kul’tury!” [1943], DAR 30/1/13 = USHMM RG-31.017M-1. The Wehrmacht’s entertainments summarized on the basis of programs in DAR 33/13/10 = USHMM RG-31.017M-2. Koch’s game reserve: Wendy Lower, “Anticipatory Obedience and the Nazi Implementation of the Holocaust in the Ukraine,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, 16:1, 2002, 1–22.
64. Ryszard Torzecki, *Kwestia ukraińska w polityce III Rzeszy (1933–1945)*, Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1972, 292.
65. Erich Koch, “Do naselennia Ukraïny!” *Volyn’*, 25 December 1941, 1.
66. Bürgermeister P. Bul’ba, “Zaklyk!” 29 December 1941, DAR 33/1/4 = USHMM RG-31.017M-1.
67. [Werner] Beer, “Bekanntmachung,” 17 September 1942, Amtsblatt des Gebietskommissars in Rowno, 1 April 1942, DAR 33/1/3 = USHMM RG-31.017M-2.
68. Gerlach, *Krieg, Ernährung, Völkermord*, 244 and passim.
69. Increased requisitions: [Heinrich Schöne], Heneral’nyi Komisar Volyni-Podilia, “Vidnosno supriazhy koriv,” 9 October 1942, DAR 37/3/2 = USHMM RG-31.017M-3. Forced labor: [Erich Koch], Heneralkomisar, “Ukraïns’ka molod’!” 20 July 1943, DAR 30/1/16 = USHMM RG-31.017M-1; Gebietskommissar [Werner] Beer, “Oholoshennia: Vsi choloviky Rivnens’koï Okruhy!” 11 December 1943, DAR 30/1/13 = USHMM RG-31.017M-1.
70. “Protokol Konferentsii Ministra Viiskovykh Sprav Henerala V. Sal’s’koho z Heneralom Stakhevychem [Julian Stachiewicz] 18’oho sichnia 1928 r,” CAW I/380/2/27 462. See also Mykola Livyts’kyi, *D.Ts. U.N.R. v exzylu mizh 1920 i 1940 rokamy*, Munich: Ukraïns’ke Informatsiine Biuro, 1984, 28; V. S. Sidak and T. V. Brons’ka, *Spetssluzhba derzhavy bez terytorii: Liudy, podii, fakty*, Kyïv: Tempora, 2003, 68; and John Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, Englewood: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1990, 102–103.

71. Edmund Charaszkiewicz, "Zagadnienie Prometejskie," Paris, 12 February 1940, JPI 38/1/15.
72. Roman Petrenko, *Slidamy Armii bez Derzhavy*, Kyiv: Ukraïns'ka Vydavnycha Spilka, 2004, 43 and passim.
73. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 64. German records: Taras Hunchak, ed., *The UPA in Light of German Documents*, Toronto: Litopys UPA, 1983, 47, 70–78.
74. Taras Bul'ba-Borovets; *Armiia bez derzhavy*, L'viv: Poklyk sumlinnia, 1993, 7–8, 12–14, 18, 20, 24, 26, 32, 40, 48.
75. *Polska-Ukraina: Trudna odpowiedź*, 89–90.
76. Reports from February 1943 in Ivan Bilas, *Represyvo-karal'na systema v Ukraïni, 1917–1953*, Kyiv: Lybid', 1994, 367–369.
77. Torzecki, *Kwestia ukraińska*, 295.
78. Kraievyi Provid OUN [Bandera], "Provokatsii," TsDAVO, 3833/1/86/6a; Kraievyi Provid OUN [Bandera], "Partyzantka i nashe stanovyshche do nii," TsDAVO 3833/1/87/1.
79. Some particulars: Timothy Snyder, "The Causes of Polish-Ukrainian Ethnic Cleansing, 1943," *Past and Present*, No. 179, 2003, 217–221. The classic account: Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 94–123.
80. A. V. Kentii, "Stratehiia i taktyka Ukraïns'kykh natsionalistiv," in S. V. Kul'chyts'kyi, ed., *Problema OUN-UPA*, Kyiv, 2000, 56.
81. Volodymyr Makar, "Pivnichno-zakhidni ukraińs'ki zemli," April 1943, in *Litopys UPA*, Vol. 5, 1985, 23.
82. The surviving participant, Roman Petrenko, denies that ethnic cleansing was discussed. His credibility on this point is undermined by his failure to acknowledge that ethnic cleansing took place.
83. Władysław Filar, *Wółyn 1939–1944: Eksterminacja czy walki polsko-ukraińskie*, Toruń: Adam Marszałek, 2003, 78–79; *Polska-Ukraina: Trudna odpowiedź*, 112.
84. FVA T-1740.
85. Okruzhnyi Provid OUN, "U spravi ostannikh podii na nashykh zemliakh," April 1943, TsDAVO 3833/1/87/1.
86. Famine and land: UPA, "Ukraïntsi! Braty i sestry!" November 1943. DAR 30/1/16 = USHMM RG-31.017M-1. See also "Postanovy II. Velykoho zboru Orhanizatsii Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv, 1941 r.," DAR 30/1/5 = USHMM RG-31.017M-1. Hope to youth: Holovna Komanda UPA, "Molodi khloptsi i divchata!" June 1943, DAR 30/1/4 = USHMM RG-31.017M-1. See also Mykola Lebed', *UPA*, Presove Biuro UHVR, 1946, 24–25.
87. On its origins see Oleksandr Panchenko, *Mykola Lebed': zhyttia, diialnist', derzhavno-pravovi pobliady*, Poltava, 2001, 67.
88. "Zi slova uradiuichoho providnyka OUN na 1943 r.," January 1943, DAR 30/1/13 = USHMM RG-31.017M-1; OUN, "Seliany!" August 1943, DAR 30/1/13 = USHMM RG-31.017M-1.
89. "Seliany!" August 1943, DAR 30/1/13 = USHMM RG-31.017M-1.
90. "Ukraïntsi pam'iatate," DAR 30/1/13 = USHMM RG-31.017M-1.
91. OUNSD, "Instruktsiia ch. 20 zhovten'" [1943], DAR 30/1/13 = USHMM RG-31.017M-1.

92. UPA, "Ukraïntsi! Braty i sestry!" November 1943, DAR 30/1/16 = USHMM RG-31.017M-1; OUN, "Seliany!" August 1943, DAR 30/1/13 = USHMM RG-31.017M-1.
93. UPA, "Ukraïntsi! Braty i sestry!" November 1943, DAR 30/1/16 = USHMM RG-31.017M-1. Compare Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 91–92.
94. Erich von dem Bach, "Ukraïntsi v lisakh! Tut hovoryt' Nimets'kyi Raikh v imeni Evropy ta ii velykoï i staroï kul'tury!" [1943], DAR 30/1/13 = USHMM RG-31.017M-1; "Aufruf des Bischofs Manuel an die ukrainische Bevölkerung," [German translation, original in *Volyn'*], [1943], DAR 22/15/14 = USHMM RG-31.017M-2.
95. N. I. Makarov et al., *Partiinoe podpol'e*, Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1983, 298.
96. "Meldunek Specjalny—Sprawa Ukraïńska," 15 November 1941, SPP VI/3/1/1/1/1.
97. "Borot'ba i diialnist' pidchas viiny," May 1941, TsDAVO 3933/3/1/60.
98. "Zi slova uradiuiuchoho providnyka OUN na 1943 r.," January 1943, DAR 30/1/13 = USHMM RG-31.017M-1.
99. M. Omeliusik, "UPA na Volyni v 1943 rotsi," *Litopys UPA*, Vol. 1, 23–26; Rostyslav Voloshyn, "Na shliakakh zbroinoï borot'by," *ibid.*, Vol. 2, 19–24; Volodymyr Makar, "Pivnichno-zakhidni Ukraïns'ki zemli," *ibid.*, Vol. 5, 15; IP, I. I. Iavorskii [Iavors'kyi], 14 April 1944, GARF, R-9478/1/398.
100. Snyder, "Causes of Ethnic Cleansing." See also *Polska-Ukraina: Trudne pytania*, Warsaw: Karta, 1997–2003, 8 vols.; Grzegorz Motyka, *Tak było w Bieszczadach: Walki polsko-ukraińskie, 1939–1947*, Warsaw: Volumen, 1999, I. I. Il'ushyn, *OUN-UPA i Ukraïns'ke pytannia v roky druhoï svitovoi viiny v svitli pol's'kykh dokumentiv*, Kyiv: NAN Ukraïny, 2000.
101. "Za shcho boreťsia UPA," *Do zbroi*, July 1943, in *Litopys UPA*, 2d ser., Vol. 1, 7–8.
102. Concerning a different region, but likely representative: Waldemar Lotnik, *Nine Lives: Ethnic Conflict in the Polish-Ukrainian Borderlands*, London: Serif, 1999.
103. For some sources on Polish collaboration: Volodymyr Serhiichuk, *Poliaky na Volyni u roky druhoï svitovoi viiny*, Kyiv: Ukraïns'ka Vydavnycha Spilka, 2003, 93–110. I am arguing that the conditions of occupation made these events possible, but not that the Soviets or Nazis planned them. In my view the evidence thus far does not support the "third force" theory. Compare Iurii Shapoval, "Volyns'ka trahediia i pol's'ko-ukraïns'ki vzaiemyny 1943–1944 rr.," *Z arkhiviv VUCHK-HPU-NKVD-KGB*, No. 1, 2003, 198–200.
104. *OUN v svitli postanov Velykykh Zboriv*, n.p., 1955, 117–118. Local propaganda: Holovna Komanda UPA, "Ukraïntsi," June 1943, TsDAVO 3833/1/86/19–20; *Litopys UPA*, 2d ser., Vol. 2, 283–289, 296–299.
105. The entirety of this ethnic cleansing is treated in Timothy Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003, 154–214; a summary is Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 285–300; a chronology is *Polska-Ukraina: Trudna odpowiedź*, 92–122; an introduction to ethical issues is Iaroslav Hrytsak, *Strasti za natsionalizmom*, Kyiv: Krytyka, 2004, 90–113.
106. TsDAVO 3833/1/131/13–14.
107. ŽIH 301/1011.
108. FVA T-1740; FVA T-1645; ŽIH 301/1222.

109. ŻIH 301/1982; ŻIH 301/1222; AWK II/1362/2kw; AWK II/1350; Ppłk Protasewicz, "Położenie na Wołyniu i w Małopolsce Wschodniej," 8 January 1944, SPP 3/1/1/13/2.
110. Farming: FVA T-1740, ŻIH 301/1982, ŻIH 301/297. Sheltering: FVA T-1645.
111. Yitshakh Fisher memoir, in Ya'acov Adini, *Dubno: sefer zikaron*, Tel Aviv: Irgun yots'e Dubno be-Yisra'el, 1966, 717–718.
112. Purification: Amir Weiner, *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001, 149ff. These operations: Snyder, *Reconstruction of Nations*, 182–191.
113. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 220–227; Burds, "Agentura."

CHAPTER 10. NAZI OCCUPATION

1. Salvation and drowning: Maria Dąbrowska, *Dzienniki 1933–1945*, Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1988, 326, 315. Funeral and achievements: "Ś. P. Julia Józewska," *Życie Krzemieńskie*, May 1939, 148; Halina Czarnocka, "Henryk Józewski," *Tydzień Polski*, 23 May 1981. Julia Józewska died in Łódź on 20 May and was buried in Warsaw on 24 May 1939.
2. ZP (1), 123–124; Zygmunt Zaremba, *Wojna: Konspicja*, Cracow Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1991, 153. Jan Kęsik, *Zaufany Komendanta: Biografia Polityczna Jana Henryka Józewskiego 1892–1981*, Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 1995, 123.
3. Andrzej Ajnenkiel, *Polska po przewrocie majowym*, Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna, 1980, 10–11.
4. Noëlle Charpentier, *La franc-maçonnerie mixte et le Droit humain*, Paris: Editions Maçonniques de France, 1998, 39, 73.
5. On Tokarzewski, Daniel Bargiełowski, *Po trzykroć pierwszy: Michał Tokarzewski-Karszewicz: Generał broni, teozof, wolnomularz, kapłan kościoła liberalno-katolickiego*, Warsaw: Rytm, 2000, Vol. 1., 490–496, 640–641, and passim; Michał Tokarzewski-Karszewicz, "U podstaw tworzenia Armii Krajowej," *Zeszyty Historyczne*, No. 56, 1981, 124–157. On Tokarzewski, Korczak, and Polish lodges, Ludwik Hass, *Wolnomularzy polscy w kraju i na świecie 1821–1999: Słownik biograficzny*, Warsaw: Rytm, 1999, 230, 504–505, 580, and passim. On Major Janina Karasiówna, see her "Zadania, organizacja i rozwój oddziału łączności konspiracyjnej," in Halina Czarnocka et al., eds., *Łączność, sabotaż, dywersja: Kobiety w Armii Krajowej*, London: Zarząd Główny Armii Krajowej, n.d., 11–26.
6. Leon Chajm, *Polskie wolnomularstwo 1920–1938*, Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1984, 425.
7. Hass, *Wolnomularzy polscy*, appropriate entries.
8. Piotr Mitzner, "Instynkt podziemia," *Karta*, No. 5, 1991, 80. The evidence that Józewski was at least a sympathizer of the theosophic trend in Polish freemasonry is circumstantial, but strong.
9. Bargiełowski, *Po trzykroć pierwszy*, Vol. 1, 592. Date: [Henryk Józewski], "Do Pana Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Pana Władysława Rackiewicza," ZDB.
10. IPHJ, 31 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/191; ZP (1), 124.
11. IPHJ, 2 April 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/199; ZP (1), 131.
12. ZP (1), 133. Wolff joined in November: Felicja Wolff, Memoir, 5, ZDB.
13. Felicja Wolff, Memoir, 4, ZDB.

14. Czesław Partacz and Krzysztof Łada, *Polska wobec ukraińskich dążeń niepodległościowych w czasie II wojny światowej*, Toruń: CEE, 2004, 134.
15. Iurii Shapoval and Jędrzej Tucholski et al., eds., *Pol's'ke pidpillia 1939–1941/Polskie podziemie 1939–1941*, Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej-Derzhavnyi arkhiv Sluzhby bezpeky Ukrainy, 2004, interrogation protocols 28ff, sentence 36, 1941 confessions 38ff.
16. Wojciech Frazik, “Mogę kursować jak autobus: Felicja Władysława Wolff—Anna Neuman,” *Zeszyty Historyczne WiN-u*, Vol. 8, 1999, 109. The Soviet camps cannot be discussed here. An introduction is Anne Applebaum, *The Gulag: A History*, New York, Doubleday, 2003.
17. *Armia Krajowa w Dokumentach, 1939–1945*, London: SPP, 1970, Vol. 1, 123, 125–126; IPHJ, 31 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/191–192; Jan Rzepecki, *Wspomnienia i przyczynki historyczne*, Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1983, 238; Kęsik, *Zaufany Komendanta*, 160–164; but especially Bargiełowski, *Po trzykroć pierwszy*, Vol. 1, 253, 334, 336; and Czarnocka et al., *Łączność, sabotaż, dywersja*, 100.
18. Stempowski and Dąbrowska: ZP (1), 134; Kęsik, *Zaufany Komendanta*, 167. Sipayłłos: IPHJ, 16 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/164. Waław Drojanowski, once mayor of Kowel: IPHJ, 13 August 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/259. Adolf Abram, of the military colonists' union: IPHJ, 12 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/144; Rzepecki, *Wspomnienia*, 241; Janina Stobniak-Smogorzewska, *Kresowe osadnictwo wojskowe 1920–1945*, Warsaw: Rytm, 2003, 320. Zygmunt Kubicki, once an official in Dubno county: IPHJ, 1 April 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/194.
19. Jacek Piotrowski, *Płsudczycy bez lidera*, Toruń: Adam Marszałek, 2003, 195, 210, 252.
20. Pełczyński's work in the Second Department: documents in CAW I/303/4/1985 and CAW I/303/4/5460. Wartime contacts with Pełczyński: IPHJ, 31 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/191; also “Informacja dot[ycząca] byłego ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych Józefskiego Henryka,” from Departament V to Departament I, 26 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/80, on contacts with other Second Department officers during the war.
21. Wanda Gertz. Halina Martinowa, “DISK,” in Czarnocka et al., *Łączność, sabotaż, dywersja*, 217.
22. Frazik, “Felicja Wolff,” 110; Shapoval and Tucholski, *Pol's'ke pidpillia*, 128.
23. On relations between the Home Army and the Jewish Fighting Organization, consult Yitzhak Zuckerman, *A Surplus of Memory*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, 222, 249–257, 268–274.
24. *Biuletyn Informacyjny*, 29 April 1943, 1.
25. Some documents are collected in Marian Marek Drozdowski, *Polska walcząca wobec powstania w getcie warszawskim*, Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 2003; see also Andrej Kunert, ed., *Żegota: Rada Pomocy Żydom, 1942–1945*, Warsaw: Rada Ochrony Pamięci Walk i Męczeństwa, 2002. On arms see also Stanisław Wroński and Maria Zwolakowa, *Polacy Żydzi 1939–1945*, Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1971, 166–167. There is disagreement about the priority the Polish government placed upon its Jewish citizens. See the exchange between David Engel and Dariusz Stola in *Polin*, Vol. 8, 1994.
26. Recruitment of Mudryi: ZP (1) 135. Political line: [Henryk Józewski], “Nasze stanowisko w sprawie ukraińskiej,” Wydawnictwo ZWR, April 1943. Meetings organized: IR, 25

- June 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/228. Plans for Home Army division: IP, Henryk Borucki, Warsaw, 26 March 1953, WSR 275/54/t-2.
27. Scholarship on the Polish government and the Ukrainian question is reviewed in Leonid Zashkil'niak, "Ukraïns'ke pytannia v politytsi pol's'koho emihratsiinoho uriadu i pidpillia v 1939–1945 rokakh," in Iaroslav Isaievych, ed., *Volyn' i Kholmshchyna 1938–1947 rr.*, L'viv: NAN Ukraïny, 2003, 161–224.
28. Jan Brzeski and Adam Roliński, eds., *Archiwum Adama Bienia: Akta narodowościowe (1943–1944)*, Cracow: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2001, 157–159, 201–203, 244–251; Czesław Partacz and Krzysztof Łada, *Polska wobec ukraińskich dążeń niepodległościowych w czasie II wojny światowej*, Toruń: CEE, 2004, 270–272.
29. On Iakiv Hal'chevs'kyi and arrests of UNR officers: V. S. Sidak and T. V. Brons'ka, *Spetssluzhba derzhavy bez terytorii: Liudy, podii, fakty*, Kyiv: Tempora, 2003, 65–67.
30. Józewski's account is the same in his memoirs and in his interrogation: ZP (1), 136–138; IPHJ, 31 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/191. Dąbrowska had learned of the attack by 8 July: Dąbrowska, *Dzienniki 1933–1945*, 401.
31. ZP (1), 125. The Dąbrowska story is "W piękny letni poranek," in *A teraz wypijmy . . .*, Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1981, 17–44.
32. ZP (1), 138–139; IP, Henryk Borucki, Warsaw, 26 March 1953, WSR 275/54/t-2.
33. Lucjan Niemyski and Stanisław Stempowski had edited a socialist journal together some forty years before, when Warsaw was still under Russian rule (*Ogniwo*). Both men were influenced by the socialist and sociologist Ludwik Krzywicki.
34. Stanisława Mysłakowska [née Niemyska], "Borowin w czasie okupacji," *Podkowiński Magazyn Kulturalny*, Nos. 35–36, 2002; Joanna Walcowa, personal correspondence, 9 February 2004; Stanisław Stempowski, *Pamiętniki*, Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1953, 277. The Niemyski's certificate at Yad Vashem as "Righteous among the Nations" is dated 24 December 2000. On the family history: *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, Wrocław: PAN, 1978, Vol. 23, 38; also Stanisław Stempowski, "Ukraina 1919–1920," *Zeszyty Historyczne*, No. 21, 1972, 65.
35. The dilemmas: Norman Davies, *Rising '44: The Battle for Warsaw*, London: Macmillan, 2003.
36. Zygmunt Woźniczka, *Zrzeszenie Wolność i Niezawisłość, 1945–1947*, Warsaw: Novum-Semex, 1992, 31.
37. Andrzej Przemyski, *Ostatni komendant Generał Leopold Okulicki*, Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie, 1990, 198.
38. ZP (1), 143; Jerzy Kochanowski, *Proces szesnastu*, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Szkolne i Pedagogiczne, 1993, 56.
39. On the arrest and show trial: Przemyski, *Ostatni komendant*, 200–205; Kochanowski, *Proces szesnastu*; Maria Turlejska, *Tę pokolenia żałobami czarne . . . : Skazani na śmierć i ich sędzowie 1944–1954*, London: Aneks, 1989, 39; Komisariat Ludowy Sprawiedliwości ZSRR, *Sprawozdanie sądowe w sprawie organizatorów, kierowników, i uczestników polskiego podziemia rozpatrzonej przez Kolegium Wojskowego Sądu Najwyższego ZSSR 18–21 czerwca 1945 r. w Moskwie*, Moscow 1945.
40. Reflections on the function of show trials can be found in Jonathan Glover, *Humanity: A*

- Moral History of the Twentieth Century*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001, 244–246, 277–278.
41. [Henryk Józewski], “Do Pana Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Pana Władysława Rackiewicza w Londynie,” ZDB.
 42. Stays in Milanówek May 1944 to April 1945: IPHJ, 11 July 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/232.
 43. Gunnar S. Paulsson estimates 11,500: *Secret City: The Hidden Jews of Warsaw 1940–1945*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002, 198.
 44. ZP (1), 140.
 45. T. Walczak, “Notatka służbowa,” 28 April 1953, IPN 0231/44/9.
 46. Andrzej Friszke, *Opozycja polityczna w PRL 1945–1980*, London: Aneks, 1994, 45.
 47. ZP (1), 134; IPHJ, 9 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/136; T. Walczak, “Notatka służbowa,” 28 April 1953, IPN 0231/44/11.
 48. Quotation from *Polska Niezawista*, 20 August 1945, 4; see also “Instynkt życia i instynkt moralny,” *ibid.*, 2 July 1945.
 49. *Ibid.*, 18 September 1945, 4.
 50. Krystyna Kersten, *Między wyzwoleniem a zniewoleniem: Polska 1944–1956*, London: Aneks, 1993, 63.
 51. Piotr Kołakowski, “Działalność sowieckich służb specjalnych na ziemiach polskich 1939–1945,” *Przegląd Wschodni*, 6:3, 2000, 499–519.
 52. Czarnocka, *Łączność, sabotaż, dywersja*, 246; Woźniczka, *Zrzeszenie Wolność i Niezawistość*, 77–78.
 53. IP, Anna Babulska by Gutowski, 24 September 1947, IPN 01208/36, mikroform 4485/2/4.
 54. [Henryk Józewski], “Wigilia Polska 1945 r.,” *Polska Niezawista*, 2 January 1946.
 55. Sipayłło and *Polska Niezawista*: IPHJ, 16 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/164. Sipayłło, Sosnowska, and WIN: T. Walczak, “Notatka służbowa,” 28 April 1953, IPN 0231/44/11; also Woźniczka, *Zrzeszenie Wolność i Niezawistość*, 93–95. Sosnowska’s intelligence reports: IPHJ, 10 July 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/231.
 56. IPHJ, 18 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/173; Mjr. Zofia Kołodzińska, “Charakterystyka Nr. 11 dotycząca nielegalnej organizacji p. n. ‘Komitet Porozumiewawczy Organizacji Polski Podziemnej,’” 10 May 1980, IPN 0189/11.
 57. Stefan Korboński, *Polskie państwo podziemne*, Paris: Instytut Literacki, 1975, 169; Kęsik, *Zaufany Komendanta*, 169. This was perhaps because Józewski was seen to have good contacts abroad: “Plan przedsięwzięć w sprawie Internat,” 21 February 1948, Departament I, MBR, IPN 0192/520/t-1/24.
 58. [Henryk Józewski], “Oświadczenie,” *Polska Niezawista*, 14 January 1946.
 59. [Henryk Józewski], “Okupacja niemiecka i ‘wyzwolenie’ rosyjskie,” *ibid.*, 14 January 1946.
 60. Henryk Józewski, report of 12 May 1946, ZDB.
 61. Woźniczka, *Zrzeszenie Wolność i Niezawistość*, 14, 95. Sosnowska was arrested on 19 November 1946.
 62. Mitzner, “Instynkt podziemia,” 68; [Felicja Wolff], “Obserwacja z drogi,” SPP 11/55.
 63. Jadwiga Zielińska. IPHJ, 21 August 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/249–250. Sipayłło later stayed with the Liprzc family. IPHJ, 21 November 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/321.

64. [Felicja Wolff], "Obserwacja z drogi," SPP, 11/55.
65. "W drugą rocznicę Powstania Warszawskiego," *Polska Niezawisła*, 1 August 1946.
66. "Nieobecni," *Polska Niezawisła*, 22 August 1946.
67. Kersten, *Miedzy wyzwoleniem a zniewoleniem*, 82.
68. Timothy Snyder, "'To Resolve the Ukrainian Problem Once and for All': The Ethnic Cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland, 1943–1947," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 1:2, 1999, 86–120.
69. "Przemówienie Churchilla," *Polska Niezawisła*, 15 March 1946.
70. Dariusz Stola, "Zamknięcie Polski," in Dariusz Stola and Marcin Zaremba, eds., *PRL: Trwanie i zmiana*, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Przedsiębiorczości i Zarządzania, 2003, 182–183.
71. "Przemówienie Churchilla," *Polska Niezawisła*, 15 March 1946.

CHAPTER 11. CONSPIRING WOMEN

1. Pyke and Bulik: Ppor. Zatorska, "Charakterystyka Sprawy 'Internat'," 5 March 1949, IPN 01208/36, mikroform 4485/2/1; Kpt. Gutowski, Kier. S. II. W. II. D. I, "Notatka informacyjna, Dotyczy: Sprawy 'Zdrajcy' grupa 'Warszawa,'" 27 September 1947, IPN 01208/36, mikroform 4485/2/2.
2. Kpt. Gutowski, "Dotyczy: Sprawy 'Zdrajcy' grupa 'Warszawa,'" 27 September 1947, IPN 01208/36, mikroform 4485/2/2.
3. New operation: "Plan operacyjnych przedsięwzięć w sprawie 'Zdrajcy,' grupa 'Warszawa,'" 15 September 1947, IPN 0192/520/t-1/9. Maciejewska's past: IP, Aniela Maciejewska, 15 September 1947, IPN 01208/36, mikroform 4485 2/9. Maciejewska on letters: IP, Aniela Maciejewska, 17 September 1947, IPN 01208/36, mikroform 4485 2/9. Contact is Babulska: Kpt. Gutowski, "Dotyczy: Sprawy 'Zdrajcy' grupa 'Warszawa,'" 27 September 1947, IPN 01208/36, mikroform 4485/2/2.
4. ["Ela"] Gradowska, "Notatka," 22 September 1947, IPN 01208/36, mikroform 4485/2/4.
5. ["Ela"] Gradowska, "Notatka," 23 September 1947, IPN 01208/36, mikroform 4485/2/4; IP, Anna Babulska by Gutowski, Warsaw 24 September 1947, IPN 01208/36, mikroform 4485/2/4; Kpt. Gutowski, "Dotyczy: Sprawy 'Zdrajcy' grupa 'Warszawa,'" 27 September 1947, IPN 01208/36, mikroform 4485/2/2.
6. Kpt. Gutowski, "Dotyczy: Sprawy 'Zdrajcy' grupa 'Warszawa,'" 27 September 1947, IPN 01208/36, mikroform 4485/2/2.
7. IP, Anna Babulska by Gutowski, Warsaw 24 September 1947, IPN 01208/36, mikroform 4485/2/4.
8. "Plan przedsięwzięć w sprawie ustalenia osoby Profesora przez Krzyżanowską," 27 September 1947, IPN 0192/520/t-1/10.
9. Repp: Kpt. Gutowski, "Dotyczy: Sprawy 'Zdrajcy' grupa 'Warszawa,'" 27 September 1947, IPN 01208/36, mikroform 4485/2/2.
10. "Do Ministerstwa Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego Department I—Wydział II. Dot. Krzyżanowskiej Michaliny," Kraków, 31 October 1947, IPN 0192/520/t-4/76.
11. Kpt. Gutowski, "Dotyczy: Sprawy 'Zdrajcy' grupa 'Warszawa,'" 27 September 1947; Piotr Mitzner, "Instynkt podziemia," *Karta*, No. 5, 1991, 69.

12. In the words of Janina Parys. Mitzner, "Instynkt podziemia," 77.
13. The account of the arrest attempt compiled from: IP, Helena Święcka, 19 December 1947, IPN 0192/520/t-2/74–75; "Plan przedsięwzięć w sprawie Internat," 21 February 1948, Departament I, MBP, IPN 0192/520/t-1/24; ZP (1), 143; Mitzner, "Instynkt podziemia," 69.
14. IP, Helena Święcka, 2 October 1947, IPN 0192/520/t-2/58–67.
15. Cigarettes: IPN 0192/520/t-2/78–79. Pani: IP, Helena Święcka, 2 October 1947, IPN 0192/520/t-2/59.
16. IP, Helena Święcka, 19 December 1947, IPN 0192/520/t-2/73–74.
17. "Rozkaz zatrzymania," 2 October 1947, IPN 0192/520/t-2/53; Dr. Maksymilian Lityński, mjr., "Postanowienie o umorzeniu postępowania karnego," Warsaw 10 April 1948; IPN 0192/520/t-2/80.
18. IP, Helena Józefka by Pawelec, 20 April 1948, IPN 0192/520/t-2/81; "Karta zwolnienia więźnia śledczego," 20 April 1948, IPN 0192/520/t-2/84; [Obligation of silence]: IPN 0192/520/t-2/86.
19. "Dodatkowy plan agenturalnych przedsięwzięć do sprawy agenturalnej kryptonim 'Internat'," 30 September 1948, IPN 0192/520/t-1/35; Kierownik Sekcji VI Wydziału I W.W.U.B.P do Ministerstwa Bezp. Publicznego Dep. I-szy Wydział VI-ty, 27 November 1948, IPN 0192/520/t-4/105.
20. "Raport na dokonanie werbunku w charakterze agenta Babulskiej Anny," 21 October 1947; IPN 0192/520/t-2/42.
21. Anna Babulska, "Zobowiązanie," 22 October 1947, Warsaw, IPN 0192/520/t-2; ["Ela"] Gradowska, "Raport dot. spotkania z Prawdą [Anną Babulską]," 3 November 1947; IPN 01208/36, mikroform 4485 2/5; "Raport," IPN 01208/36, mikroform 4485 2/5; [Release, July 1948], IPN 0192/520/t-2.
22. "Do Ministerstwa Bezpieczeństwa," 2 November 1947, IPN 01208/36, mikroform 4485 2/10; "Plan przedsięwzięć w sprawie 'Internat'," Kier[ownik] Sek[cji] II Wyd[ziału] II Dep[artamentu] I, MBP, 28 January 1948, IPN 0192/520/t-1/18, ["Ela"] Gradowska, "Raport do Kierownika Sekcji Wydz. VI Dep. I Kpt. Gurowskiego," 20 February 1948, IPN 01208/36, mikroform 4485 2/9; Płk. Czaplicki, "Do W.U.B.P. w Warszawie Nacz. Wydz. I-ego," 16 April 1948, IPN 01208/36, mikroform 4485 2/10; Mjr. Z. Rychlik, "Postanowienie o umorzeniu śledztwa," 15 July 1948, IPN 01208/36, mikroform 4485 2/10; Por. Pawelec, "Postanowienie o umorzeniu śledztwa," July 1948, IPN 01208/36, mikroform 4485 2/10.
23. "Plan przedsięwzięć w sprawie 'Internat'," Kier[ownik] Sek[cji] II Wyd[ziału] II Dep[artamentu] I, MBP, 28 January 1948, IPN 0192/520/t-1/18; "Notatka agenturalna, Olga," 3 April 1948, IPN 0192/520/t-1; "Dodatkowe przedsięwzięcia d[otyczące] sprawy agenturalnej kryptonim 'Internat'," 9 April 1948, IPN 0192/520/t-1/31.
24. IPHJ, 18 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/172; Mitzner, "Instynkt podziemia," 71.
25. Zygmunt Woźniczka, *Zrzeszenie Wolność i Niezawistość*, 1945–1947, Warsaw: Novum-Semex, 1992, 207.
26. Andrzej Friszke, *Opozycja polityczna w PRL 1945–1980*, London: Aneks, 1994, 60.
27. Woźniczka, *Zrzeszenie Wolność i Niezawistość*, 117–121; John J. Dziak, *Chekisty: A History of the KGB*, Lexington: Lexington Books, 1988, 123–124; also Peter Grose, *Operation*

- Rollback: America's Secret War Behind the Iron Curtain*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000, 176–179.
28. Noted by Stephen Dorril, *MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations*, London: Fourth Estate, 2000, 264; on Angleton see Robin Winks, *Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War 1939–1961*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987, 322–438.
 29. R. Vraga [Jerzy Niezbrzycki], “‘Trest’,” *Vozrozhdenie*, 7:1, 1950, 119. English original at JPI 109/96–143, warning at 126.
 30. V. V. Doroshenko et al., eds., *Istoriia sovetskikh organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti: Uchebnik*, Moscow: KGB, 1977, 211.
 31. Rejection letters: JPI 109/1.
 32. Józewski spreads rumor: “Meldunek Zródło ‘Zielieński’,” 16 January 1948, IPN 0192/520/t-1. Disconfirmation: “Wyciąg z uzyskanej informacji drogą agencyjną dot[yczącej] wypowiedzi kuriera WiN Boryczki Adama ps[eudonym] ‘Adam’ podczas jego pobytu w kraju w marcu 1950,” IPN 0330/249/t-1/123.
 33. Daniel Bargiełowski, *Po trzykroć pierwszy: Gen. Michał Tokarzewski Karaszewicz General broni, teozof, wolnomularz, kapłan Kościoła liberalnokatolickiego*, Warsaw: Rytm, 2001, Vol. 2, 336; [T.] Walczak, “Notatka służbowa,” 28 April 1953, IPN 0231/44/12.
 34. *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, Wrocław: PAN, 1980, Vol. 35, 566–568; Robert Potocki, *Polityka państwa polskiego wobec zagadnienia ukraińskiego w latach 1930–1939*, Lublin: IEŚW, 2003, 173.
 35. IPHJ, 27 February 1954, IPN 0330/249/t-1/346.
 36. Ela [Felicja Wolff], “Panie Pułkowniku!” SPP 11/55.
 37. Franciszek Demel, “Projekt planu rozwinięcia sieci pracy krajowej w związku z przejściem 2 Korpusu do Wielkiej Brytanii,” 20 June 1946, SPP 11/55; [MBP, First Department], “Zmiany organizacyjno-strukturalne ‘Biura Planowania’ za okres 1946–1949,” ZDB.
 38. “Referat,” “Budżet Franciszka Zaczerniańskiego na rok 1947–1948,” “Zastawienie rachunkowe,” SPP, 11/55.
 39. “Wykaz oficerów i szeregowych Biura Planowania,” SPP 11/55.
 40. IPHJ, 13 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/152; T. Walczak, “Notatka służbowa,” 28 April 1953, IPN 0231/44/12; Kpt. Jan Dyduch, “Projekt planu operacyjno-sledczych przedsięwzięć w sprawie p[rzeciwi]ko Henrykowi Józewskiemu,” [1953], IPN 0330/249/t-1/84. Józewski confessed to receiving \$1,000; the actual amount dispatched to him was \$2,000; he also lied about Wolff’s return date: Ela [Felicja Wolff], “Panie Pułkowniku!” SPP 11/55; Wojciech Frazik, “Mogę kursować jak autobus: Felicja Władysława Wolff—Anna Neuman,” *Zeszyty Historyczne WiN-u*, Vol. 8, 1999, 112.
 41. Ela [Felicja Wolff], “Panie Pułkowniku!” SPP 11/55.
 42. [Felicja Wolff], “Obserwacja z drogi,” SPP 11/55.
 43. “Dyspozycja dla Ciotki,” 21 September 1947, SPP 11/55; Frazik, “Felicja Wolff,” 112.
 44. IPHJ, 12 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/144; IPHJ, 17 July 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/246; IPHJ, 25 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/181. Jodko’s prewar activity: Timothy Snyder, *Nationalism, Marxism, and Modern Central Europe: A Biography of Kazimierz Kelles-Krauz*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997.
 45. “Dyspozycja dla Ciotki,” 21 September 1947, SPP 11/55; Frazik, “Felicja Wolff,” 112;

- IPHJ, 13 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/151; IPHJ, 25 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/181. Here Józewski confessed to the \$100 from Tokarzewski, but not to the \$2,000 from the Planning Bureau.
46. IPHJ, 17 July 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/246.
47. IPHJ, 30 July 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/252; Frazik, "Felicja Wolff," 113.
48. Norman Davies and Roger Moorhouse, *Microcosm: Portrait of a Central European City*, London: Jonathan Cape, 2002, 419.
49. Jan Kęsik, "Henryk Jan Józewski—Polityk," in Andrzej Stawarz, ed., *Henryk Jan Józewski: Polityk, Artysta, Malarz*, Warsaw: Muzeum Niepodległości, 2002, 17.
50. Maria Dąbrowska, *Dzienniki 1951–1957*, Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1988, 87.
51. Andrzej Paczkowski, *Od sfalszowanego zwycięstwa do prawdziwej klęski*, Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1999, 50.
52. "Plan agenturalnego rozpracowania sprawy pod krypt[onimem] Internat," 23 August 1949, IPN 0192/520/t-1/42.
53. "Wyciąg z doniesienia agenturalnego ag[enta] 'Zieliński' z dn[ia] 22 iv 1949," 22 April 1949, IPN 0192/520/t-1.
54. Mjr. Kon, Naczelnik Wydz[iału] II Dep[artamentu] I-ego, "Do Naczelnika Wydz[iału] Sledczego ppłk Róžańskiego," IPN 0330/249/t-1/32.
55. "Plan przedsięwzięć w sprawie Internat," 21 February 1948, Departament I, Ministerstwo Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego, IPN 0192/520/t-1/24; "Meldunek Źródło 'Zieliński'," 16 January 1948, IPN 0192/520/t-1.
56. Based upon a review of ten numbers of the *Intermarium Bulletin* from 1945 through 1948, and associated proclamations, declarations, and programs. See also Jan Kieniewicz, *Spotkanie wschodu*, Gdańsk: Orbis, 1999, 194–219.
57. *Intermarium Bulletin*, No. 5, January 1947, 61; No. 7, October 1947, 58.
58. Ela [Felicja Wolff], "Panie Pułkowniku!" SPP 11/55; letter of 6 March 1947, SPP 11/55. It is impossible to be more precise without better documentation.
59. Urząd BP, "Do Naczelnika Wydziału II Dep[artamentu] III MBP Obywatela Majora Wysockiego," 22 March 1949, IPN 0192/520/t-1.
60. "Dodatkowy plan agenturalnych przedsięwzięć do sprawy agenturalnej kryptonim 'Internat'," 30 September 1948, IPN 0192/520/t-1/35; Płk. Andrzejewski, "Do Dyrektora Departamentu I," 13 October 1950, IPN 01208/36, mikroform 4485/2/3.
61. "Plan operacyjnych przedsięwzięć w sprawie krypt[onim] 'Internat'," Departament III, MBP, 10 October 1950, IPN 0192/520/t-1/53.
62. "Raport o wykonaniu planu operac[yjnych] przedsięwzięć z dnia 28 X 50 dot[yczącego]: Szuyskiego Wacława," 10 November 1950, IPN 0192/520/t-1/62.
63. "Plan agenturalnego rozpracowania sprawy pod krypt[onimem] Internat," 23 August 1949, IPN 0192/520/t-1/42.
64. "Raport specjalny do Naczelnika Wydz[iału] III-go Departamentu III-go MBP," 25 November 1950, IPN 0192/520/t-1.
65. "Do Naczelnika Wydziału II Dep[artamentu] III MBP," 21 November 1949, IPN 0192/520/t-1.
66. Podpułkownik Pluto, "Do Naczelnika Wydziału III-go Woj[ewódzkiego] Urzędu Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego w Olsztynie," 16 December 1950, IPN 0192/520/t-1.

67. "Uwagi do prowadzonego rozpracowania Józewskiego i jego grupy p[od] n[azwą] 'Stronictwo Polskich Demokratów' przez WURP Warszawy," 17 October 1950, IPN 0192/520/t-1.
68. Jan Kościółek, "Doniesienie," 24 May 1952, IPN 0231/44/52.
69. The women hiding: Mitzner, "Instynkt podziemia," 71; Ppłk Leszkowicz, "Do dyrektora departamentu I-go MBP," 29 October 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/105; IPHJ, 25 January 1954, IPN 0330/249/t-1/336. Mountain people: Płk Różański, "Do dyrektora departamentu I-go MBP," 24 September 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/105.
70. Maria: IPHJ, 21 August 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/262; IPHJ, 1 April 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/194. Janusz: IR, 13 August 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/276; Ppłk Leszkowicz, "Do dyrektora departamentu I-go MBP," 17 September 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/104.
71. Frazik, "Felicja Wolff," 116.
72. IPHJ, 25 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/181; IR, 26 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/185; IPHJ, 12 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/144.
73. IPHJ, 18 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/172.
74. IPHJ, 25 January 1954, IPN 0330/249/t-1/336.
75. IR, 9 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/133.
76. IPHJ, 25 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/181; IR, 26 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/185; IPHJ, 12 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/144.
77. Frazik, "Felicja Wolff," 117.
78. Mitzner, "Instynkt podziemia," 72; Kpt. Gutowski, "Notatka informacyjna," Warsaw 9 November 1951, IPN 0231/44/33–35.
79. Halina Zakrzewska, *Niepodległość będzie twoją nagrodą*, Warsaw: PWN, 1994, Vol. 2, 171–178.
80. Drawn from Stanisława Sowińska, "Z praktyk oficera śledczego," *Karta*, No. 37, 2003, 28–29. See also the memoirs of five women prisoners, *ibid.*, 6–49, as well as Zakrzewska, *Niepodległość będzie twoją nagrodą*, and Krzysztof Madeja, Jan Żaryn, and Jacel Żurek, eds., *Księga Świadczeń: Skazani na karę śmierci w czasach stalinowskich i ich losy*, Warsaw: IPN, 2003.
81. Kpt. Gutowski, "Notatka informacyjna," 9 November 1951, IPN 0231/44/35.
82. This was Jan Kościółek, "Doniesienie," 24 May 1952, IPN 0231/44/35–55.
83. Andrzej Stanisław Kowalczyk, "Biografia eseisty," in Jerzy Stempowski, *Listy do Jerzego Giedroycia*, Warsaw: LNB, 32, 75.
84. "Notatka scaleniowa dot. Dąbrowskiej Marii," 7 August 1953, IPN 0192/520/t-3/31; "Plan operacyjnych przedsięwzięć w sprawie krypt. 'Internat' p-ko Józewskiemu," 10 October 1950, IPN 0192/520/t-3/64; Kpt. Gutowski, "Postanowienie o wszczęciu rozpracowania," 25 September 1947, IPN 0192/520/t-1/2; Kpt. Gutowski, "Dotyczy: Sprawy 'Zdrajcy' grupa 'Warszawa'," 27 September 1947, IPN 01208/36, mikroform 4485/2/2.
85. Dąbrowska, *Dzienniki 1951–1957*, 87.

CHAPTER 12. COMMUNIST PRISON

1. Maria Dąbrowska, *Dzienniki 1951–1957*, Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1988, 109, 112.
2. Counting on war: IR, 23 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/187. Manifesto: IR, 17 March

- 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/170. His instincts about Eisenhower were perhaps near the mark. See Scott Lucas, *Freedom's War: The U.S. Crusade Against the Soviet Union, 1945–1956*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999; Gregory Mitrovitch, *Undermining the Kremlin: America's Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947–1956*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000; but also Ronald Krebs, *Dueling Visions: U.S. Strategy Toward Eastern Europe under Eisenhower*, College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2001.
3. IPHJ, 14 October 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/319; Interview, Zbigniew Chomicz, Warsaw, 18 September 2004.
 4. Interview, Zbigniew Chomicz, Warsaw, 18 September 2004.
 5. Andrzej Paczkowski, *Od sfalszowanego zwycięstwa do prawdziwej klęski: Szkice do portretu PRL*, Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1999, 37.
 6. Krzysztof Madeja, Jan Żaryn, and Jacel Żurek, eds., *Księga Świadectw: Skazani na karę śmierci w czasach stalinowskich i ich losy*, Warsaw: IPN, 2003, xvii, xxi.
 7. Interview, Zbigniew Chomicz, Warsaw, 18 September 2004.
 8. The Audziejczuk family: "Od oficera śledczego Dep[artamentu] śledczego MBP Dudy Czesława ppor.—Do Szefa Wojewódzkiego Urzędu BP, Raport," 17 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/76; "Od Dudy Czesława do Naczelnika Wydziału IIgo Dep[artamentu] Śledczego MBP w miejscu," 19 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/78; IR, [March 1953], IPN 0330/249/t-1/162; IPHJ, 19 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/177; IR, 23 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/187.
 9. IR, 9 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/133.
 10. Maria Turlejska, *Tę pokolenia żałobami czarne . . . : Skazani na śmierć i ich sądownie 1944–1954*, London: Aneks, 1989, 49.
 11. She was arrested on 11 March 1953, after Public Security had ascertained Józewski's identity. Public Security decided that she had passed information to Józewski, but nothing that would damage the interests of the state.
 12. Michał Zarzycki, "To nie wiatr, to szloch," *Karta*, No. 37, 2003, 54–87.
 13. ZP (1), 146–148.
 14. ZP (1), 36.
 15. IR, 26 March 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/185.
 16. No torture: ZP (1), 145. Conditions and declaration: IPN 0330/249/t-1/170 IR, 17 March 1953. Food: IR, 25 June 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/224.
 17. ZP (1), 144–149, at 149.
 18. Ppłk Leszkowicz, Wice-d[yrektor] Dep[artamentu] Śledczego MBP, "Do dyrektora departamentu I-go MBP," 27 October 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/121; IR, 15 April 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/210; IR, [April 1953], IPN 0330/249/t-1/219. Różański: IR, 24 April 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/217.
 19. IR, 13 August 1953, IPN 0330/249/t-1/280.
 20. Protocols from September–November 1953, in IPN and WSR, cited in earlier chapters.
 21. An 8 March 2004 communication on behalf of Major General John F. Kimmons of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command indicated that no pertinent records had been found in the Defense Clearance and Investigations Index. A 26 April 2004 letter from Alan W. Tate of the Central Intelligence Agency indicated that the agency "can nei-

- ther confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence of records responsive to your request,” on national security grounds.
22. Legalism: Turlejska, *Te pokolenia żałobami czarne*, 31–38. Charges: Chor. Sławomir Starzewski, Oficer śledczy MBP, “Postanowienie o pociągnięciu do odpowiedzialności karnej,” 1 June 1954, WSR 275/54/t-3/314–316.
 23. Kpt. Jan Dyduch, Oficer Śledczy MBP, “Projekt planu operacyjno-śledczych przedsięwzięć w sprawie p[rzeciw]ko Henrykowi Józewskiemu,” [1953], IPN 0330/249/t-1/84.
 24. ZP (1), 150–154, at 154.
 25. Madeja, Żaryn, and Żurek, *Księga Świadectw*, xxix. About 4,000 people were executed in Stalinist Poland.
 26. ZP (1), 156–162.
 27. Andrzej Paczkowski, “Trzy twarze Józefa Światły,” *Rzeczpospolita*, 20–21 December 2003, A8–9.
 28. See also Barbara Fijałkowska, *Borejsza i Różański: Przyczynek do historii stalinizmu w Polsce*, Olsztyn: Wyższa Szkoła Pedagogiczna, 1995, 216–217.
 29. Dąbrowska scolded him for this in her diary, without seeming to understand her friend’s motive: that any formal interaction with the regime would confirm its legitimacy. Dąbrowska, *Dzienniki 1951–1957*, 272.
 30. Marek Gałęzowski, “Henryk Józewski ‘Olgierd,’” *Zeszyty Historyczne*, No. 150, 2004, 120.
 31. St. Gulaker, Zastępca szefa Wojskowego Sądu Garnizonego w Warszawie to Prezydium Powiatowej Rady Narodowej w Bielsku-Białej, 13 July 1956, WSR 275/54/t-3/208; Wojskowy Sąd Rejonowy w Warszawie do Naczelnika Więzienia w Wronkach, “Zarządzenie zwolnienia,” 3 November 1956, WSR 275/54/t-3/225; Pułkownik Jan Mitek, Prezes Najwyższego Sądu Wojskowego, “Wniosek Rewizyjny na korzyść Józefskiego Henryka, Sipayłło Marii, Sipayłło Janusza,” Warsaw, 27 November 1956, WSR 275/54/t-3/233–238; Zgromadzenie Sędziów Najwyższego Sądu Wojskowego, “Postanowienie,” 19 December 1956, WSR 275/54/t-3.
 32. Józewski’s version: ZP (1), 156; Dąbrowska, *Dzienniki 1951–1957*, 272. Janina Parys’s version: Piotr Mitzner, “Instynkt podziemia,” *Karta*, No. 5, 177.
 33. Wojciech Frazik, “Mogę kursować jak autobus: Felicja Władysława Wolff—Anna Neuman,” *Zeszyty Historyczne WiN-u*, Vol. 8, 1999, 121.
 34. Dąbrowska, *Dzienniki 1933–1945*, Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1988, 326.
 35. See Padraic Kenney, “The Gender of Resistance in Communist Poland,” *American Historical Review*, 104:2, 1999, 399–425. This literature is concerned with adding women to accounts of important events, and revealing less obvious forms of “female” resistance. Women were crucial to frontal resistance to the communist regime at the most dangerous moment. See also Halina Czarnocka et al., eds, *Łączność, sabotaż, dywersja: Kobiety w Armii Krajowej*, London: Zarząd Główny Armii Krajowej, n.d.; Maria Trojanowska, “Nieudana wyprawa kurierska i jej skutki,” *Zeszyty Historyczne*, No. 56, 1981, 157–181; Katherine Jolluck, *Exile and Identity: Polish Women in the Soviet Union During the Second World War*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2002, 14; Jeffrey Burds, “Gender and Policing in Soviet West Ukraine, 1944–1948,” *Cahiers du Monde russe*, 42:2–4, 279–320.

36. Lija Skalska Miecik, "Dotknięcia muzy," in Andrzej Stawarz, ed., *Henryk Jan Józewski: Polityk, Artysta, Malarz*, Warsaw: Muzeum Niepodległości, 2002, 26.

EPILOGUE

1. The historiography of Cold War intelligence might benefit from prewar comparisons. Two soundings: John Lewis Gaddis, "Intelligence, Espionage, and Cold War Origins," *Diplomatic History*, 13:2, 1989, 191–212; and Raymond Garthoff, "Foreign Intelligence and the Historiography of the Cold War," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 6:2, 2004, 21–63. Washington, like Warsaw, also used balloons. László Borhi, "Rollback, Liberation, Containment, or Inaction?" *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 1:3, 1999, 84. See also Christopher Felix [James McCarger], *A Short Course in the Secret War*, Lanham: Madison Books, 1992.
2. The immense literature on the Cold War cannot be discussed here. Basic treatments of its east European origins are Vojtech Mastny, *Russia's Road to the Cold War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1979; Włodzimierz Borodziej, *Od Poczdamu do Szklarskiej Poręby*, London: Aneks, 1990. Recent research and new documentation are available on the websites of the Harvard Cold War History Project, the Cold War International History Project, and the National Security Archive.
3. Shandruk's interwar activity was discussed above. On 1939–1945, Ryszard Torzecki, *Kwestia Ukraińska w Polsce w latach 1923–1939*, Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1989, 214, 223, 246, 340, 333, 343; and Pavlo Shandruk, *Arms of Valor*, New York: Speller and Sons, 1959. Compare Christopher Simpson, *Blowback: America's Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War*, New York: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1988, 170; Mark Aarons and John Loftus, *Unholy Trinity: How the Vatican's Nazi Networks Betrayed Western Intelligence to the Soviets*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991, 200.
4. Pułkownik Dyplomowany Korytowski, "Naświetlenie sytuacji na terenie garnizonu . . .," May 1937, CAW I/371/1/2/A.103; Ppłk. Żołkiewski, KOP Pułk Zdobunów, "Były poseł Skrypnik—działalność nacjonalistyczna," 21 October 1938, CAW I/371/2/A.105; Zbigniew Zaporowski, *Wołyńskie Zjednoczenie Ukraińskie*, Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2000, 147.
5. Jan Kościółek, "Doniesienie," 24 May 1952, IPN 0231/44/54–55; Andrzej Zięba, "'Wojna popów': Polskie prawosławie na emigracji po II Wojnie Światowej," *Przegląd Polonijny*, 23:3, 1997, 41–42; Karel C. Berkhoff, "Was There a Religious Revival in Soviet Ukraine under the Nazi Regime?" *Slavonic and East European Review*, 78:3, 2000, 545; idem, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004, 51, 89; *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984–1993, Vol. 4, 717; Vol. 5, 352.
6. Edmund Charaszkiewicz, "Zagadnienie Prometejskie," Paris, 12 February 1940, JPI 38/1/36; idem, "Strona finansowa problemu prometejskiego," Paris, 1 December 1939, JPI 38/1/47–48.
7. Etienne Copeaux, "Le mouvement 'Prométhéen,'" *Cahiers d'études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien*, No. 16, 1993, 20–21.

8. Such as Roman Smal-Stocki and Edmund Charaszkiewicz. Charles King, *The Black Sea: A History*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, 225–227.
9. Interview with Jerzy Giedroyc, Maisons-Laffitte, 7 November 1998; Mieczysław Pruszyński, *Migawki wspomnień*, Warsaw: Rosner i Wspólnicy, 2002, 98; Jerzy Giedroyc, *Autobiografia na cztery ręce*, Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1994. On Niezbrzycki's postwar work in Paris and Washington and at the Hoover Institution, see "Biographical Note," HI, Ryszard Wraga Papers, Box 1.
10. Inter alia Jerzy Stempowski, *Listy do Jerzego Giedroycia*, Warsaw: LNB, 1991, 7, 11; Ryszard Wraga [Jerzy Niezbrzycki], "Czwarty marszałek Polski," *Kultura*, No. 1, 1950, 119–132; Józef Łobodowski, "O cyganach i katastrofistach," *ibid.*, Nos. 7–8, 9, 10, 1964, 29–37, 59–68, 35–53; Stanisław Stempowski, "Ukraina 1919–1920," *Zeszyty Historyczne*, No. 21, 1972, 65.
11. Juliusz Mieroszewski, *Materiały do refleksji i zadumy*, Paris: Instytut Literacki, 1976, 110–122, 175–186. See also Roman Szporluk, *Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union*, Stanford: Hoover Press, 2000.
12. Timothy Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003, 217–231.
13. Compare Leszek Moczulski, "Żywot z koszmarem w tle," *Gazeta Wyborcza* (Świąteczna), 26 July 2003, 18.
14. A contrast: Igor Lukes, "Changing Patterns of Power in Cold War Politics: The Mysterious Case of Vladimír Komárek," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 3:1, 2001, 61–102.
15. Zbigniew Chomicz, "Na Koszykowej," in Andrzej Stawarz, ed., *Henryk Jan Józewski: Polityk, Artysta, Malarz*, Warsaw: Muzeum Niepodległości, 2002, 31. Zbigniew Chomicz refers to Józewski as his uncle; technically Józewski was his first cousin once removed. Zbigniew's father Jan Chomicz was Józewski's mother Józefa's sister Ewa's son.
16. Interview, Zbigniew Chomicz, Warsaw, 18 September 2004.
17. "Nieobecni," *Polska Niezawisła*, 22 August 1946.
18. Maria Dąbrowska, *Dzienniki 1958–1965*, Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1988, 35. Similarly: Interview, Zbigniew Chomicz, Warsaw, 18 September 2004; Zbigniew Chomicz, "Na Koszykowej," in Stawarz, *Henryk Jan Józewski*, 31.
19. Marek Gałęzowski, "Henryk Jan Józewski," in *Konspiracja i opór społeczny w Polsce 1944–1956: Słownik biograficzny*, Warsaw: IPN, 2004, 191.
20. Chomicz, "Na Koszykowej," 33.
21. Consult Jan Józef Lipski, *KOR*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985; Timothy Garton Ash, *The Uses of Adversity*, Cambridge: Granta, 1989; Jacek Kuroń, *Wiera i wina*, London: Aneks, 1989.
22. Henryk Józewski, "Opowieść o istnieniu," BUWDR, 3189/1–2, *passim*. His philosophy awaits a separate study.
23. [Henryk Józewski], "Przemówienie Wojewody Józewskiego na Zjeździe Posłów i Senatorów B.B. z Wołynia," *Przegląd Wołyński*, 26 August 1928, 2.
24. Dąbrowska, *Dzienniki 1958–1965*, 25.
25. Connection noted in both Lija Skalska Miecik, "Dotknięcia muzy," and Chomicz, "Na Koszykowej," in Stawarz, *Henryk Jan Józewski*, 29, 32.

26. Piotr Mitzner, "Instynkt podziemia," *Karta*, No. 5, 1991, 80.
27. Dąbrowska, *Dzienniki 1958–1965*, 85.
28. Skalska Miecik, "Dotknięcia muzy," 27.
29. Dąbrowska, *Dzienniki 1958–1965*, 146.
30. Cezary Popławski, "Ze wspomnień osobistych," 12 December 1945, ISPAN.
31. Interview, Zbigniew Chomicz, Warsaw, 18 September 2004. Chomicz obeyed this instruction in letter but not in spirit. With the help of a sign that Chomicz left in the Powązki Cemetery in Warsaw, the grave can be located. One recalls Keats's tombstone in Rome: "This grave contains all that was mortal of a young English poet who on his deathbed in the bitterness of his heart at the malicious power of his enemies desired these words to be engraven on his tombstone: 'Here lies one whose name was written on water.'" Oscar Wilde's comment in "The Grave of Keats": "Thy name was writ in water—it shall stand."
32. Timothy Garton Ash, *The Polish Revolution: Solidarity*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002; Michael Bernhard, "Reinterpreting Solidarity," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, 24:3, 1991, 313–330; David Mason, "Solidarity as a New Social Movement," *Political Science Quarterly*, 101:1, 1989, 41–58; Andrzej Friszke, *Opozycja polityczna w PRL*, London: Aneks, 1994.
33. Iurii Zaitsev, "Pol's'ka opozytisia 1970–80 rokiv pro zasady ukraïns'ko-pols'koho porozuminnia," in Iurii Slivka, ed., *Deportatsii ukraïntsiiv ta poliakiiv*, L'viv: NAN Ukraïny, 1995, 54; Taras Kuzio, "The Polish Opposition and the Ukrainian Question," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, 12:2, 1986, 51; *Nashe Slovo* (Warsaw), 8 October 2000; Snyder, *Reconstruction of Nations*, 228–231.
34. On connections between 1989 and 1991 see articles by Mark Kramer and discussion in *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 5:4, 2003, and 6:4, 2004. On *Ostpolitik*: Stephen Burant, "Poland's Eastern Policy 1990–1995," *Problems of Post-Communism*, 43:2, 1996, 48–54; Ilya Prizel, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998; Snyder, *Reconstruction of Nations*, 232–255.
35. *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 18 October 1990, 6; Stephen Burant, "International Relations in a Regional Context: Poland and Its Eastern Neighbors," *Europe-Asia Studies*, 45:3, 1993, 409.

Acknowledgments

This is a study based upon documents, and I would like first to thank the colleagues who directed me to archival collections. Andrzej Paczkowski provided excellent advice at all stages. Jan Kęsik, Włodzimierz Mędrzecki, and Cornelia Schenke made timely recommendations. I am grateful to archivists for their professionalism and good will. The directors and the archivists of the Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe deserve special mention for their kind help during a fruitful summer.

This is also a book about a visual artist, and includes a sample of his work. Permission to reproduce the cover photograph and the paintings and photographs in Figures 1, 16, 17, 27, and 29 was granted by Zbigniew Chomicz; the drawings in Figures 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, and 23 by the Warsaw University Library; the photographs in Figures 3, 5, and 18 by the Museum of Literature, Warsaw; the propaganda posters in Figures 8 and 13 by the Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe, Rembertów; the photographs in Figures 10, 14, and 15 by the Archiwum Dokumentacji Mechaniczne, Warsaw; the photograph in Figure 19 by Daniel Bargiełowski; the photograph in Figure 21 by the Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Warsaw; and the photographs of paintings in Figures 24, 25,

26, and 28 by the Institute of Art of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw. The painting in Figure 22 is privately owned. Andrzej Stawarz and Tadeusz Stani provided the reproduction. The owners, who wish to remain anonymous, have expressed their permission that Józewski's *The Sea* be reproduced in this book.

A number of groups provided fora where portions of the manuscript were discussed: the Russian and East European Reading Group at Yale University, the European Council of the Yale Council of International and Area Studies, the Annenberg Colloquium at the University of Pennsylvania, the Harvard-Maryland Russian History Workshop (twice), and the Borderlands Seminar at the Watson Institute of Brown University (twice). Students of Yale graduate courses on "Ukraine and Poland" and "Theory and History of Toleration" provided valuable comments. I would also like to thank the organizers of public lectures at the United States Memorial Holocaust Museum, The Ecole Normale Supérieure, Indiana University, the University of Michigan, the University of Alabama, and the Società Italiana per lo Studio della Storia Contemporanea. Research grants from the Yale Council on International and Area Studies and the Whitney Humanities Center enabled the necessary travel. The Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen in Vienna, where I was supported by a Morse Fellowship, provided ideal conditions for revision.

Several friends and colleagues read drafts, among them Ray Brandon, Paul Bushkovitch, Laura Engelstein, Timothy Garton Ash, Hiroaki Kuromiya, Daniel Markovits, Stuart Rachels, Marci Shore, and Iryna Vushko. Thanks are also due to the anonymous reviewers, and to one of them in particular. Omer Bartov, Jan Gross, Liliana Hentosh, Wendy Lower, Michael Snyder, and Piotr Wandycz commented upon individual chapters. Several colleagues intervened with citations, sources, or advice, among them Daniel Bargiełowski, Jerzy Borzęcki, Jeffrey Burds, Etienne Copeaux, Ola Hnatiuk, Andrew Koss, Jan Malicki, Stephen Pallavicini, Roman Szporluk, and Rafał Wnuk. Andrzej Waśkiewicz, Agnieszka Waśkiewicz, and Katarzyna Jesień made Warsaw hospitable. Philip Snyder returned me, at the proper moment, to the digital age. Larisa Heimert, Molly Eglund, Margaret Otzel, and Gavin Lewis treated the manuscript with care and competence. For all of this, I am very grateful. Responsibility for this work and its defects is my own.

Index

- Abram, Adolf, 198
 Abwehr, 31, 122, 157
 Action (philosophical concept), 17–20, 256–257
 Affirmative action. *See* Ukrainization; Marchlevsk
 Alliance of Struggle for an Independent Ukraine, 45–47, 55–59
 Anders, Władysław, 199, 205
 Anders Army, 199–200, 223, 250
 Angleton, James, 222
 Ankara, 250
 Anti-Semitism, 35, 43–44, 52–53, 63, 74, 172
 Aristotle, 17, 128
 Artistic fraternity, xix, 17, 25
 Auschwitz, 198, 217
 Austria (interwar), 133–134, 173
 Austria-Hungary, 1–2, 4, 75
 Azerbaijan, 42
 Babulska, Anna, 198, 215–217, 220–221, 229, 246
 Baden-Powell, Robert, 85
 Balyts'kyi, Vsevolod, 48–51, 54–57, 106–108, 111–112, 115–116, 124, 129–130
 Bandera, Stepan, 186–187
 Barnaba Outpost, 90
 Battle of Britain, 199
 Beczkowicz, Zygmunt, 229
 Belarusian minority, Polish, 74–75
 Beriia, Lavrentii, 175
 Berman, Jakub, 226, 233, 245
 Bielewski, Jan, 123
 Bierut, Bolesław, 245
 Bolewski, Jerzy, 7, 10
 Bolshevik Party (VKP(b)), 59, 100, 107, 112
 Bolshevik Revolution, 3–4, 241, 247
Book of Tao, 196, 254
 Border control, 31–32, 92–94, 101, 116, 210–211, 213, 231

- Border crossing, 88–91, 109–110, 224–225, 228, 231, 248, 255–256
- Border Defense Corps, 31–32, 89, 121, 124, 157, 159–160, 162, 174
- Borejsza, Jerzy, 233
- Borovets', Taras, 185–187, 201
- Boy-Żeleński, Tadeusz, 134
- Broniewski, Władysław, 145
- Brześć Fortress, 73
- Buddhism, 195
- Bulgakov, Mikhail, 5
- Bulik, Władysława, 214
- Bund, 66
- Cairo, 43, 248
- Camp of National Unity (OZON), 161, 166, 167, 198
- Canada, 249
- cannibalism, 108, 109
- Catholic Church, 163–164. *See also* Greek Catholic Church; Roman Catholic Church
- Celkowski, Ryszard, 214, 229
- Central Intelligence Agency, 222, 227
- Centrolew, 73
- Chaplin, Charlie, 25
- Chebotariv, Mykola, 45–48, 52, 56–58
- Cheka, 7, 10–11, 13–14, 30, 48, 248. *See also* GPU; KGB; NKVD
- Chełm, 164–165
- China, 227
- Chomicz family, 231, 236–237, 253
- Church Slavonic, 151, 153, 158
- Churchill, Winston, 211
- Cieplce, 217
- Cold War, 211–212, 248–250, 252, 262
- Collaboration. *See* German occupation; Soviet occupations of Poland
- Collectivization, xix, 72, 84, 89, 91–95, 99–101, 104–106, 116, 139, 179
- Committee for the Defense of Workers, 253
- Communist International, 28–29, 37, 71, 119–120, 123
- Communist Party of Poland, 28–29, 117–121, 129, 140, 143, 202
- Communist Party of West Belarus, 28
- Communist Party of West Ukraine, xiv, 28–30, 34, 36–38, 67, 69, 70–74, 77, 137–146, 167, 175–176
- Congress of Victors (1934 VKP(b)), 112–113
- Conrad, Joseph, 134
- Contemplation (philosophical concept), 17–20, 256–257
- Cooperative movement, Ukrainian, 69
- Council of National Unity, Polish, 204
- Coup d'état, Poland 1926, 23–25, 29
- Couriers: Polish Military Organization, 6–7, 193, 252; Planning Bureau, 223–225, 230, 232–233, 235, 238
- Cracow, 1, 2, 7, 8, 84
- Craig, Gordon, 60
- Cryptography, 31, 36, 86
- Cubism, 6
- Czechoslovakia, 173, 230, 231
- Czeszejko-Sochacki, Jerzy, 117, 123
- Dąbal, Tomasz, 119–120
- Dąbrowska, Maria, xix, 25, 133–136, 172–174, 193, 195, 198, 202, 223, 226, 233–236, 242, 244, 245, 246, 252, 253, 255
- Dada, 17
- Dębski, Aleksander, 65
- Demel, Franciszek, 223
- Democratic Unification Party, 204
- Denikin, Anton, 5
- Deportations: Russian subjects, 1915, 2–3; in Soviet Ukraine 1930, 102; in Soviet Ukraine 1935–1936, 118–120, 129; in West Ukraine 1940–1941, xv, 176–177, 179; in West Ukraine 1944–1946, 190
- Descartes, René, 253
- Dickens, Charles, 6
- Dionysius (Metropolitan), 149–150, 152–153, 156
- Disinformation. *See* Inspiration

- Dobrzyński, Ignacy, 10–11, 248
 Dontsov, Dmytro, 5, 35
 Dostoyevsky, Fyodor, 134
 Le Droit humain (masonic lodge), 195
 Drojanowski, Waław, 198
 Dubno, 61, 90, 144
 Dyduch, Jan, 237–238, 243
 Dzierżyński, Feliks, 11, 120
- Eastern Command. *See* Polish Military Organization
 Einsatzgruppen. *See* SS
 Elections: in interwar Poland, 70, 72, 73, 137; in Soviet West Ukraine, 176, 179; in postwar Poland, 209–210
 Enlightened absolutism, 25
 Ethnic cleansing: by Soviets, 102, 118–120, 190; by UPA, 189–190, 201, 252; by Polish communist regime, 210
 European Union, 262
 Existence (philosophical concept), xvii, 253–254
 Existentialism, 253
 Express (telegraph agency), 32
 Ezhov, Nikolai, 120, 124, 128
- Famine (Soviet Ukraine), xiv, 104–110, 116, 123, 139
 Fascism, 24, 133
 First World War, xxiii, 1–5, 40–41, 61, 247. *See also* Polish-Bolshevik War; Russian Civil War
 Flowers, 6, 257
 France, 40, 104, 117, 195, 199
 Freedom and Independence. *See* WIN
 Freemasonry, xviii, 196–197
 Futurism, 17
- Galicia (eastern, Halychyna), 29–30, 75–76, 122, 133, 157, 176, 189, 260
 Gdańsk, 42
 Georgia, 42
 German Army, 174, 180–181, 184, 200. *See also* German occupation
 German occupation: of Poland, 173–174, 178, 180, 203–204; of Volhynia, 180–185, 201, 249. *See also* Holocaust
 Germany: Wilhelmine, 1–4; Weimar, 42–43, 76, 86; Nazi, 117, 157, 160–161, 171, 173, 174, 178, 180–185, 249
 Gertz, Wanda, 246
 Gestapo, 178, 188, 202–203
 Giedroyc, Jerzy, 85, 250–252
 Gliwice, 224
 Goldman, Ryszard, 209
 Gowronek, Stanisław, 123
 GPU, 30, 48–51, 58–59, 72, 95, 102, 104–105, 107, 110, 116–118. *See also* Cheka; KGB; NKVD
 Grabski, Stanisław, 149
 Gradowska, Ela, 213–218
 Great Britain, 36, 40, 79, 90, 104, 199, 204, 205, 211, 213, 222, 242, 248
 Great Depression, 62, 137, 248
 Greek Catholic Church, 148, 164
 Gulag, 197
- Habsburg, Wilhelm, 5
Hamlet, 17–20, 60, 193, 255
 Hauke-Nowak, Aleksander, 166
 Hetman Outpost, 45–48, 55–59
 Hitler, Adolf, 138, 157
 Holocaust, 180–184, 190, 192, 200–201, 210, 226
 Hołowko, Tadeusz, xix, xxi, 16, 32–33, 41–43, 50, 74–75, 76–77, 83, 195
 Home Army, 198–201, 203–207, 250
 Horses, 63, 134, 172, 250, 255
 Hromads'kyi, Oleksii, 153, 158, 166
- Iefremov, Serhii, 8–9, 49–50, 54–56
 Imprisonment, communists in Poland, 145–146, 174–175; in communist Poland, 244–246, 252
Independent Poland, 206–208, 209, 233, 252
 Information, 128–130

- Information Bulletin*, Home Army organ, 197, 200
- Inspiration (counterintelligence), 31, 56–57, 82, 86, 89, 222, 248
- Institute for the Study of Nationality Affairs, 32
- Intermarium, 227–228
- Interrogation, postwar Poland, 215, 219, 232, 237–242
- Irrationalism, 25–27, 81
- Istanbul, 42, 248
- Italy, 133, 173, 223
- Izvestiia*, 79–80, 82
- Jabotinsky, Vladimir, 172
- Japan, 173, 178, 248
- Jaszców, 231
- Jaworska, Anna, 130–131
- Jaworze, 172–173
- Jaworzno, 210
- Jelenia Góra, 213, 218, 231
- Jerzy (Metropolitan), 149
- Jesuit Order, 164
- Jewish Fighting Organization, 200
- Jewish commune, 65–67
- Jews: in Volhynia, xv, xxii, 61, 64–67, 74, 136; in Ukraine, 15, 43–44, 74; in Poland, 15, 66, 155, 161, 171–172, 206–207; in USSR, 34–35, 52–53; under German occupation, 180–184, 190–192, 200–201, 203, 206–207
- Jodko, Witold, 224
- Józewska, Helena, 217–220, 229, 230, 244, 246
- Józewska, Józefa (née Świącka), 3
- Józewska, Julia (née Bolewska), 7, 16, 133, 193–194, 218, 231, 246
- Józewski, Przemysław, 2, 236
- Józewski, Walery, xix, 2–3
- Judiciary, postwar Poland, 220, 222, 242–245
- Kaganovich, Lazar, 34–35, 37, 46, 105–107, 111–113
- Kam'ianets Podil's'kyi, 8, 89
- Kamiński, Aleksander, 200
- Karasiówna, Janina, 196
- Kasprzycki, Tadeusz, 154
- Katyn, murder of Polish officers at, 177
- Kazakhstan (Soviet Republic), 101, 118, 189
- Kehilla. *See* Jewish commune
- KGB, 86, 127, 222. *See also* Cheka; GPU; NKVD
- Kharkiv, 10, 36, 42, 46, 54, 89, 101, 109, 114, 122, 131
- Khrushchev, Nikita, 245
- Khvył'ovyi, Mykola, 33–34, 58–59, 87, 109
- Koch, Erich, 184
- Korczak, Janusz, 195, 208, 217
- Korsak, Idalia, 198, 202, 217, 220, 228, 230, 243, 246
- Korsak, Władysław, 17, 196
- Kostopol, 183
- Kowalewski, Jerzy, 12–13, 16
- Kowel (Kovel), 66, 72, 140
- Kraków. *See* Cracow
- Krzyżanowska, Michalina, 198, 217–218, 220, 228–230, 242, 243, 246
- Krzakowski, Jan, 65
- Krzemieniec (Kremenets'), 181
- Kubicki, Zygmunt, 198
- Kultura*, 250–252, 260
- Kurnicki, Piotr, 86–87, 108, 110, 122, 124, 130
- Kwieciński, Ryszard, 209
- Kyiv, xiv, 1–2, 4, 6, 8–10, 84–87, 89, 117, 122, 123, 131, 156, 255
- Land reform, 62, 137–138
- League of Nations, 76
- Lebed', Mykola, 187
- Lemański, Jan, 254
- Lemkos, 210
- Lenin, Vladimir, 11, 14, 128, 237
- Leningrad, 125, 131
- Leninism. *See* Marxism-Leninism

- Literacy, 61–62
 Litvinov, Maxim, 42, 52, 101
 Livyts'kyi, Andrii, 44, 47–48, 56
 Łobodowski, Józef, 250
 Łódź, 171–172, 253
 London, 223, 230, 233, 235, 242
 Lorentz, Stanisław, 253
 Lublin, 231, 236, 237
 Lublin field command, Polish Army, 64, 69–70, 157–160, 163, 165, 167
 Łuck (Luts'k), 61, 72, 77, 142, 147–148, 174–176, 180, 182
 Lwów (L'viv), 71, 75, 204
 Lwów field command, 12–13, 88–91

 Maciejewska, Aniela, 214–215, 217, 221, 246
 Marchlevsk, 116, 118, 121–122, 124
 March on Kyiv (1920), 7–11, 79, 84–85, 95, 103, 131, 197
 Marshall Plan, 248
 Marx, Karl, 145, 179
 Marxism-Leninism, 104–105, 113–114, 128, 188–189
 Maskirovka. *See* Inspiration
 Mayer, Stefan, 31, 86
 Mech, Władysław, 65, 196
 Mel'nyk, Andrii, 186
 Men of trust, 24, 26, 39, 74
 MI6. *See* Secret Intelligence Service
 Michniewicz, Władysław, 31, 124
 Mikołajczyk, Stanisław, 205–206, 209–210
 Milanówek, 204–208, 218–219
 Military colonization (Polish in Volhynia), 16, 165
 Miłoszewski, Zdzisław, 87
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interwar Polish, xvii, 39, 41–43, 44, 83, 88
 Ministry of Internal Affairs, interwar Polish, xvii, 41, 166, 241
 Ministry of Public Security, postwar Polish, 207, 213–221, 226, 228–232, 236–242

 Ministry of Religion, interwar Polish, xvii, 41
 Minsk, 90, 118
Modern Woman, 223
 modernism, 17, 60–61, 134, 171, 255
 modernization, 61–63, 100, 165, 167
 Mohyla, Petro, 152
 Mohyla Society, 67, 152
 Mokotów Prison, 237, 244, 253
 Molière, 60
 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 121, 174, 199
 Monte Cassino, Fourth Battle of, 200
 MOR-Trust, 30–31, 36, 57, 124, 222, 248
 Mościcki, Ignacy, 69, 150, 162
 Moscow, 10, 90, 118, 122, 125, 131, 197, 237–238
 Multiculturalism, xiv
 Munich, 230, 241
 Muscovy, 148

 Nałkowska, Zofia, 60–61, 134, 223
 Narutowicz, Gabriel, 16, 19
 National Democrats, 11–12, 14, 25, 28, 32, 61, 63–65, 66, 68, 161, 165
 Nationalism, Polish, 63, 66. *See also* National Democrats
 Nationalism, Ukrainian. *See* Communist Party of West Ukraine; Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
 Nawrocki, Stanisław, 124
 Nemezhynsi, 94
 NIE. *See* Operation Independence
 Niemyski family, 202–203, 221
 Niezbrzycki, Jerzy, xx, 83–88, 90, 95, 108–110, 127, 130, 178, 222, 250
 NKVD, 119–120, 130, 176–180, 188, 205, 207. *See also* Cheka, GPU, KGB
 Non-Agression Pacts: Polish-Soviet 1932, 102–104, 108, 110, 117, 128; Polish-German 1934, 117. *See also* Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact

 October Revolution. *See* Bolshevik Revolution

- Okulicki, Leopold, 204–206
 Olevs'k, 14, 186
 Olgierd's Group, 198, 204, 208. *See also*
 Polish Democratic Party
 Olszewski, Bolesław, 65
 Operation Barbarossa, 180, 199
 Operation Independence, 204–205
 Operation Tempest, 202–204
 Ordzhonikidze, Sergo, 101
 Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
 (OUN), xv, 75–78, 144, 157–158, 166–
 167, 180, 186–190
 Orthodox Church, 30, 32, 67, 77, 147–
 172, 189. *See also* Polish Autocephalous
 Orthodox Church; Ukrainian Auto-
 cephalous Orthodox Church
 Ostrih, 153
 Ostrówek, 231
 Outpost O-2, 84, 86–87, 88, 109, 114
- Pandora, 39, 132
 Paris, 16, 20, 42, 199
 Parys, Janina, 221–222, 230, 243, 246
 Pechyvoda, 94
 Pełczyńska, Wanda, 200, 222–223, 246
 Pełczyński, Tadeusz, 127, 199, 202, 211,
 222–224, 243, 252
 Pepys, Samuel, 252
 Petliura, Ol'ha, 16, 44
 Petliura, Symon, 4, 8, 12, 16, 40, 43–44,
 48, 49–51, 78, 81, 162
 Petliurites. *See* Ukrainian People's Repub-
 lic; Prometheanism
 Petty nobles, 163–164, 167
 Philby, Kim, 228, 248
 Piekarska, Jadwiga, 231–232, 246
 Piłsudski, Józef, xiv, xxii, 1–2, 7–8, 11, 14–
 16, 23–27, 29, 31–32, 36, 41, 42, 48, 56,
 59, 64, 71, 74, 83–85, 88, 103, 104, 105–
 106, 110, 118, 128, 131–132, 134, 137, 149–
 151, 154, 162, 198, 243, 244
 Pisarczykówna, Józefina, 87–88, 109,
 122
- Planning Bureau, 223–224, 228, 243, 256
 Pochaiv, 153
 Podkowa Leśna, 198, 202, 204, 209, 217,
 218, 221
Poland Fights, 198, 223
 Polish Army, 103–104, 156–157, 163, 177.
 See also Lublin field command; Lwów
 field command
 Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church,
 149–167, 249
 Polish-Bolshevik War, xiv, xxi, 8–11, 48,
 101, 115, 131, 138–139, 156, 211, 241, 260
 Polish Democratic Party, 208. *See also*
 Olgierd's Group
 Polish Legions, 2
 Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, 1, 64,
 148, 196
 Polish Military Organization: as paramili-
 tary, 1918–1921, xiii–xiv, xviii, xx, 2–4,
 6, 8, 10–11, 19, 24, 83, 84–85, 87, 115,
 130, 161, 193, 241, 259; as pretext for ter-
 ror, 1932–1938: 115–121, 126–131, 178
 Polish Peasant Party, 205–206, 209
 Polish Socialist Party, 3, 24, 120
 Polish Theater (interwar Volhynia), 60
 Polish Theater (interwar Warsaw), 7–8
 Polish Theater (Soviet, in Kyiv), 6, 116.
 See also Wandurski, Witold
 Polish Workers' Party, 202
 Politburo (Soviet), 99–100, 104, 117
 Poniatowski, Julian, 227
 Potsdam summit, 248
Pravda, 79
 Praxis (philosophical concept), 113
 Preemption, 117, 121, 185
 Prometheanism, xvii–xxi, 39, 40–44, 53,
 59, 74–75, 77–82, 86, 109, 111, 114, 131–
 132, 154, 155, 159, 165–166, 211, 249–
 252, 262
Promethée, 42
 Proskuriv, 89
 Prosvita, 69
 Proust, Marcel, 133

- Pruszyński, Ksawery, 136–137
 Pyke, Imgard, 213–214, 217
- Radziwiłł, Janusz, 68, 138
 Ran, Alfred, 125
 Ravensbrück, 215
 Rawicz Prison, 244, 253
 Red Army, 5–7, 9–11, 94, 103–104, 156, 174–176, 203–204
 Red Cross, 215
 Reichskommissariat Ukraine, 183–186
 Repp, Irena, 198, 208, 216, 217, 246
 Repp, Mieczysław, 208, 221, 229
The Republic's Eastern Lands, 198
 Revindication: of churches, 30, 147–148; of souls, 162–167
 Rolland Battalion, 249
 Roman Catholic Church, 30, 133, 147–148, 153, 163–164, 167, 231
 Romanticism, 111, 131–132
 Roosevelt, Theodore, 207
 Rowecki, Stefan, 198–199
 Równe (Rivne), 61, 121, 181, 182, 184, 249
 Różański, Jacek, 207–208, 233, 238, 245
 Russia (Soviet Republic, RSFSR), 101
 Russian Civil War, 3–11, 61, 138–139
 Russian Empire, xxi, 1–3, 86, 100, 114, 163
 Russian Revolution. *See* Bolshevik Revolution
 Rzepecki, Jan, 206–208
- Salinger-Gierzyńska, Maria (née Świącka), 5
 Saratov, 3
 Scenography, 6–8, 17–18, 60
 Schätzel, Tadeusz, 83–84, 86, 95, 110, 195
 Schools, Volhynia, 66, 68, 136
 Schwartzbard, Samuel, 43–44
 Second Department, xviii, xix, 6, 12–13, 30–32, 41–42, 44–46, 55, 58, 77, 83–91, 95, 105–106, 114, 121–126, 131–132, 140, 160, 166, 174, 178, 242
 Second Section. *See* Ukrainian People's Republic, army in exile
- Second World War, 174–192, 248. *See also* German occupation; Soviet occupations of Poland
 Secret Intelligence Service, 30, 227
 “Secret Speech,” 245
 Sel-Rob, 73, 137
 Serfdom, 91, 93–94
 Servants of the Victory of Poland, 195–197, 242
 Shakespeare, 17–20, 60, 193, 255
 Shandruk, Pavlo, 45, 249
 Shaw, George Bernard, 60
 Shevchenko, Taras, 162
 Show trials, 54–56, 109, 112, 205
 Shukhevych, Roman, 184
 Shul'gin, Vasilii, 5
 Shul'hyn, Oleksandr, 5, 44
 Shums'kyi, Oleksandr, 14, 34–38, 58, 109
 Shums'kyi Affair, 34–39, 46, 58, 71, 112
 Siberia, 24, 189
 Sikorski, Władysław, 13, 197
 Sikors'kyi, Polikarp, 153, 158
 Sipayłło, Janusz, 198, 202, 209, 230
 Sipayłło, Maria, 198, 209, 228–231, 246
 Skamandrites, 171
 Skarbek, Bolesław, 115
 Skierniewice, 208
 Skinder, Tadeusz, 160–161
 Skrypnyk, Mykola, 111–112
 Skrypnyk, Stepan, 69, 249
 Słonimski, Antoni, 253
 Śmigły-Rydz, Edward, 161–162
 Smorawiński, Mieczysław, 159, 177
 Sobor, 150, 152, 162
 Sochi, 105
 Socialism, 27–28, 114, 196, 207
 Sokołowska, Wanda, 221, 225, 230, 232, 243
 Solidarity, 260–261
 Sorbonne, xix, 5
 Sosnowska, Helena, 208, 209, 246
 Soviet occupations of Poland: 1939–1941, 174–180, 191; after 1944, 205–212

- Srokowski, Stanisław, 65
 SS (Schutzstaffel), 180, 181, 184, 200. *See also* Waffen-SS
 Stalin, Iosif, xiii, 11, 29, 35, 54, 59, 99–101, 113–114, 115, 123, 128, 205, 210, 227, 237, 239
 Stalingrad, Battle of, 184, 202
 Stalinism, 111–114, 126, 226–227, 230
 Stanislavsky, Konstantin, 60
 Starzewski, Sławomir, 237, 243
 Steckiewicz, Wiktor, 10–11
 Stempowski, Jerzy, xix, 17, 25–27, 41, 44, 136, 166, 233, 250, 251
 Stempowski, Stanisław, xix, 8, 17, 41, 85, 195, 196, 198, 226, 233–236, 242, 250
 Still life, 6, 257
 Stolypin reforms, 91
 Strike actions (Volhynia), 140–145
 Suchenek-Sucheki, Henryk, 151, 155
 Światło, Józef, 244–245
 Szpringer, Fryda, 143–144
 Szujski, Wacław, 229

 Teheran, 42, 248, 250
 Teheran summit, 205, 248
 Telos (philosophical concept), 113–114
 Temporary Government of National Unity, Polish, 205–206
 Terror (1937–1938), xv, 119–121, 126–128, 146, 177–178
 Theosophy, 195–196, 231, 253–255
 Third Command. *See* Polish Military Organization
 Tikhon (Patriarch), 149
 Tiutiunnyk, Iurko, 5, 12–13, 15, 30
 Togan, Zeki Velidi, 41
 Tokarzewski-Karaszewicz, Michał, 195–196, 200, 208–209, 211, 222–224, 231, 243
 Tokyo. *See* Japan
 Tragedy, 17–20
 Treaty of Riga, 11–13, 148, 211, 248
 Treblinka, 200

 Trest. *See* MOR-Trust
 Trotsky, Lev, 11, 237
 Truman, Harry S., 211
 Trust (Cheka operation). *See* MOR-Trust
 Trust (political concept), 23–24
 Turkey, 42–43, 224
 Tuwim, Julian, 171

 Ukraine (independent state), 262. *See also* Ukrainian People's Republic; West Ukrainian People's Republic
 Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, 249
 Ukrainian Central Council, 4–5
 Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), 185–191, 206, 210
 Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR): independent state 1918–1921, 8–9, 54, 79; in exile 1921–1939, 16, 47–48, 55, 102–103, 187; army in exile, xviii, 36, 45, 47, 49–50, 55, 56, 79, 81, 89–91, 99, 102–103, 106–107, 109–110, 159, 185; propaganda in USSR, 81, 90–93, 107, 185; represented in Volhynia, 69, 74, 78–79, 152, 158; partisans during Second World War, 185–187
 Ukrainian Scholarly Institute, 32
 Ukrainian section of Bolshevik Party (KP(b)U), 36–39, 105–107, 111–112, 119, 140
 Ukrainian Theater (Volhynia), 67
 Ukrainization: Soviet policy, 32–35, 38–39, 45–47, 48–49, 54–55, 77, 84, 139, 175; of Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church, 150–154
 Underground resistance, Polish, 178, 186, 207. *See also* Servants of the Victory of Poland; Union of Armed Struggle; Home Army
Undivine Comedy, 7–8
 “Union for the Liberation of Ukraine,” 49–59, 109, 112
 Union of Armed Struggle, 197–198, 223

- United Kingdom. *See* Great Britain
 United States, 84, 204, 205, 211, 222, 235, 248–249, 262
 UPA (Ukraïns’ka Povstans’ka Armiia). *See* Ukrainian Insurgent Army
 Ursuline Order, 230

 Vilnius, 204
 Vinnytsia, 83, 84
 Volhynia Experiment, xiv, xv, xix, 60–82, 114, 135–138, 151–153, 158–162, 166, 185, 191–192, 207, 241–242, 248, 249, 251
 Volhynian Ukrainian Alliance, 67, 69, 73–74, 162, 241
 Voroshilov, Kliment, 101

 Waffen-SS, 249
 Wandurski, Witold, 116, 122
 Warsaw, 23–24, 29, 147, 194–197, 200–201, 205, 219, 221–222, 224, 252, 256
 Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, 200–201
 Warsaw Uprising, 204, 205, 209, 221, 223
 Water (allegory), 17, 27, 81, 254
 Wehrmacht. *See* German Army
 West Ukrainian People’s Republic, 75
 White Russians, 4–7

 Wilson, Woodrow, 14
 WIN (Wolność i Niepodległość), 206–207, 210, 222, 230
 Winter March, 12–14, 34, 58, 84, 88, 95, 131, 186
 Wiślicki, Wacław, 69
 Witwicki (Józewski’s cellmate), xiii, 240–242
 Wolff, Felicja, 197, 200, 223–225, 230, 232–233, 235, 238, 245, 246
 Wojnicz, Irena, 230, 246
 Wraga, Richard. *See* Niezbrzycki, Jerzy
 Wrocław, 226
 Wronki Prison, 244, 253
 Wysocka, Stanisława, 60
 Wyszyński, Stefan, 245

 Yalta summit, 248

 Zajm, Jadwiga, 214
 Zakopane, 230
 Zaleski, August, 4, 79–80
 Żeromski, Stefan, 172–173
 Zionism, 66, 172
 Żongołłowicz, Bronisław, 152, 155