

RADICAL NATIONALIST PARTIES AND MOVEMENTS IN CONTEMPORARY UKRAINE BEFORE AND AFTER INDEPENDENCE: THE RIGHT AND ITS POLITICS, 1989–1994

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Introduction

The radical right in the Ukrainian political spectrum is dominated by three movements—the Nationalist Union Ukrainian State Independence (DSU), the Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA, formerly the Ukrainian Inter-Party Assembly, UMPA) and the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN). The UNA is dominated by the highly secretive Ukrainian Nationalist Union (UNS) which grew out of the nationalist wing of the Association of Independent Ukrainian Youth (SNUM). The KUN was launched in 1992 in Ukraine as the overt arm of the émigré Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists-Bandera faction (known commonly as OUN revolutionaries, or OUNr).

Other organisations, such as SNUM and the more radical eastern Ukrainian-based Association of Ukrainian Youth (SUM), increasingly adopted “revolutionary nationalism” as their ideology in 1990–1991, with nationalists propagating a “youth cult” to attract the younger generation (both for members and intellectual support).¹ It is also often pointed out that Ukrainian nationalism will have a large appeal among the youth of tomorrow.² Other nationalist groups, though smaller, have also emerged, such as the Ukrainian National-Radical Party (UNRP) and the Organisation for the Liberation of Ukraine,³ but they have remained largely insignificant. The UNRP was established at the end of 1990 in L'viv, joined the Ukrainian Inter-Party Assembly (UMPA) but remained underground. Its leader, Mykhailo Stasiuk, launched the nationalist and widely read journal *Derzhavnist* in 1991, claiming the highly inflated membership figure of 500 members.⁴ The Ukrainian National Party (UNP) and the Ukrainian People's Democratic Party (UNDP), the founders of the UMPA, amalgamated into the Ukrainian National Conservative Party (UNKP) in 1992. Both the UNKP and the Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party (UKRP) straddle the centre-right and radical right wings of the political spectrum.

The focus of this study will be on the radical right political spectrum within contemporary Ukraine prior to, and since the declaration of, and referendum on, independence in August and December 1991 up to the 1994 parliamentary and presidential elections. A brief historical introduction is provided to acquaint the reader with an understanding of the ideological sources of contemporary Ukrainian

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nationalism and their continued contemporary relevance. The role of émigré nationalist groups is also outlined together with a brief analysis of the divisions that exist within the nationalist camp. Finally, the study covers in greater depth the three main radical right nationalist groups within contemporary Ukraine, focusing on their strengths and the role of their paramilitary forces.

I

Ukrainian Nationalism in Historical and Contemporary Perspective

Historical Background

The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was launched in Vienna, in 1929, by participants in the failed attempt to achieve independence between 1917–1921.⁵ Its main base of operations prior to World War II were in the western Ukrainian territories that were then located within Poland (eastern Galicia), Romania (northern Bukovina) and Czechoslovakia (Trans-Carpathia). The OUN was unable to penetrate into central-eastern Ukraine, which, after 1921, was located in the former USSR as the then newly constituted Ukrainian SSR.⁶

During the inter-war period, the OUN adopted terrorist methods and rejected parliamentary politics, particularly within Poland where repression was perceived to be greatest on the Ukrainian national minority outside Soviet Ukraine. The OUN was also the main force which organised volunteers to defend the short-lived Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic of 1938–1939, especially in its war with Hungary. In 1940, the OUN suffered its first split along generational and operational lines, between the more conservative wing, led by Andrei Melnyk, and the more radical wing, led by Stepan Bandera.

After 1941 and the invasion of the former USSR by Germany, both branches of the OUN turned their attention towards Soviet Ukraine. Between 1941–1942 the OUNm (Melnykites) and the OUNr (Banderites) launched the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which came under the control of the OUNr after 1943 and continued to fight Soviet security forces until the early 1950s. Meanwhile, both the OUNm and OUNr sent expeditionary units into eastern Ukraine to organise a pro-Ukrainian independence infra-structure.

Until 1943, radical right ideologies, then prevalent throughout economically depressed Europe, including Benito Mussolini's fascist movement in Italy, heavily influenced the OUNr. Its main, but not sole, ideologist was the controversial Dmytro Dontsov (particularly his book *Natsionalism*, published in 1926).⁷ Dontsov never actually joined the OUN in his lifetime; arguably, his greatest influence was upon the evolution of the émigré OUNr ideology from the mid-1950s (as his views were rejected in Ukraine after 1943).⁸

In 1943, the Third Extraordinary Congress of the OUNr changed the ideological tenets of the OUNr away from its previous radical right ideology and towards a democratized and even social democratic orientation. In 1944, this culminated in the

creation of an “underground parliament” entitled the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR) that acted as the supervisory body over the OUNr and the UPA within Ukraine.⁹

Between 1941–1945 Bandera and Yaroslav Stetsko were imprisoned in German concentration camps, remaining in Germany after the conclusion of World War II. Therefore, they missed the ideological re-orientation of the OUNr after 1943, which they strongly disapproved of. Between 1945–1954 the émigré branches of the OUNr were dominated by internal disputes over this question, which culminated in the second split of the OUN in 1954. Those that supported the democratic re-orientation of the OUN after 1943 left to form OUNabroad (OUNz), which co-operated with the émigré branches of the UHVR. Meanwhile, those that stuck to the ideological purity of the pre-1943 period, led by the highly charismatic Bandera, maintained the radical right ideology which became increasingly shaped by Dontsov.

From the mid-1950s, therefore, the émigré Ukrainian nationalist spectrum was divided into three movements, which, to some extent, has confused and influenced the picture in contemporary Ukraine. The original OUN formed in 1929 was divided between the radical right OUNr (Banderites), the conservative OUNm (Melnykites) and the social democratic/liberal OUNz (commonly referred to as the “Dvijkari,” because two of the three émigré OUNr leaders joined OUNz after 1954). Only the OUNm and OUNr re-launched themselves in Ukraine in 1992–1993 either as an open structure (OUNm) or through a front organisation (OUNr acting through KUN).

By the early 1950s Soviet security forces had broken the back of the OUN and UPA in their ten year long armed struggle. Many members of the OUN and UPA were sent to the Gulag where they came into contact with the dissident activists who were arrested in various waves after 1965. Although small nationalistic groups were formed in the Brezhnev era in Ukraine, such as the Ukrainian National Front (UNF) and the Committee in Defence of the Catholic Church in Ukraine, these were based only in Galicia.

The UNF did claim to be following the traditions of the OUN and, in this respect, had similar ideological traits with the contemporary DSU. But, as opposed to radical right, the bulk of the dissident movement in Ukraine was liberal and national democratic in its ideological orientation with a concentration upon cultural and linguistic issues, human rights and national oppression.¹⁰ The most notable example of this was the Ukrainian Helsinki Group.¹¹ Representatives of the radical right, such as Valentyn Moroz and Yosyp Terelya, remained in a small minority within Ukraine’s Soviet-era dissident movement. In the Gorbachev era, in late 1989, radical right groups again surfaced only in Galicia but then gradually established bases throughout Ukraine in the early 1990s.¹²

Contemporary Ukrainian Nationalism

Nationalist groups have not united into one large bloc, as have liberal-democratic and

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national-democratic parties,¹³ although, on occasions, such as during the March 1991 referendum on the Union Treaty, they united in a combined call for a boycott.¹⁴ The KUN and UNA also joined the Anti-Imperial, Anti-Communist Front established in January 1993 to oppose the revival of communism in Ukraine.

The main ideological tenets of contemporary Ukrainian nationalism are shared by all three major radical right groups. These include a cult of strength, hostility to “fifth columnists,” contempt for “weak democrats,” demands for revision of Ukraine’s current borders to incorporate her “ethnographic territories,” a cult of violence, xenophobia towards the outside world, domination by conspiracy theories and Russophobia. The UNA and the UNS have both been accused of harbouring fascistic inclinations.¹⁵ But suggestions that the UNA–UNS propagates “fascism” are rejected by UNA leaders: “Ukraine lacks not Italian fascism or German national socialism ... Ukraine lacks Ukrainian nationalism, lacks a new national spirit, a new orientation.”¹⁶

Ukrainian nationalists propagate a cult of strength because weakness is the road to “ruin, anarchy and chaos.” In their world there exists a hierarchy of “strong” and “weak” nations. Oles Babiy, a leading nationalist thinker, believes “[t]he formulation of an idea, to carry along the nation, is only possible by the strong, by those who stand tall above average people because only they can realise the ideal.”¹⁷

Quoting statements that the Security Service of Ukraine has insufficient cadres to counter economic and foreign subversion, the UNS proposed that they begin co-operating with them.¹⁸ This reflected earlier well publicized leaflets, addressed to the Ukrainian KGB and armed forces, to join Ukrainian nationalists in opposing the subversion of Moscow, Washington, Tel Aviv and Tokyo. “If the Communists will sell us only to Moscow, then the ‘democrats’ will sell us to New York, Tokyo and Tel Aviv straight away,” Cherkasy UNS members claimed.¹⁹ The UNS believed that they were proven correct in that only the defection of the *nomenklatura* towards support for independence—and not the influence of the democrats—led to the break with Moscow.²⁰

The radical right press often includes materials warning of the existence of “fifth columns” in Ukraine.²¹ In order to oppose these “fifth columnists” there exists a need for paramilitary formations such as the Ukrainian People’s Self Defence Forces (UNSO).²² Shukhevych threatened that, “only a few thousand UNSO fighters could change the character today of Ukrainian politics.”²³

The “ideology of the weak” Babiy ascribes to the social-democratic leaders of the Central Rada of 1917–1921 and to those running contemporary Ukraine: “Ukrainian democrats, on the right and the left, don’t know what to do when there is a growth of anarchy, chaos, appearance of unemployment, increase in sabotage and the development of separatism in the republic.” Only the nationalists can bring “order, peace and work, can bring a new dazzling, strong idea.” Some young people look towards drugs, sex and rock music to “use up their energy,” whereas “others search for a decisive and brutal idea ... because only the strong and powerful can create a

strong and powerfully great Ukraine.”²⁴ An Odesa-based member of the UNA believed that “History is created by minorities” organised in strong clans or orders.²⁵

This contempt for their democratic opponents permeates the radical nationalist press. Shukhevych called for a struggle against the democrats “and not only in an ideological sense,” while the UNS believed that the democrats should be “isolated” from exerting any influence upon the masses.²⁶ “The newly established Ukrainian democracy is nothing more than a new manner for the strengthening in Ukraine of the Kremlin’s occupation. And these democrats, Kremlin agents, who are hiding under their blue and yellow masks, are already allowing themselves at L’viv meetings to shout ‘Long live great Russia!’” One author wrote that “[t]oday’s democrats, who are following in the footsteps of (Volodymyr) Vynychenko (a social democratic leader of Ukraine’s independent government of 1917), are attempting to suppress the free spirit of Ukraine.”²⁷ Serhei Zhizhko, a KUN activist, claimed that “Abstract democracy borrowed from other political cultures and artificially transferred to us today, during the liberation struggle, weakens Ukrainian society. It allows foreigners into the internal affairs of the nation.”²⁸ In contrast to political parties, the UNA–UNS, “has an ideological activity directed towards the unity of Ukrainian society and its organisation, which has as its aim ensuring the activities of the organs of the future, state authorities in Ukraine.”²⁹

Therefore, the “enemies of Ukraine” are also the numerous “collaborators” within Ukraine itself (that is democrats), a view which also led to their opposition towards the democratically-controlled local councils in Galicia, which came under democratic control after April 1990.³⁰ “It is on the shoulders of the collaborators that the main blame rests for all the defeats of Ukraine in its struggle for liberty” because, “it is better to die in battle with the enemy, than to submit,” one author wrote. “The Ukrainian nation finds itself in a state of war; therefore, a democratic basis for its internal organisational system is not possible.”³¹ This has led to some nationalists, such as the SUM and the leading nationalist writer Vasyl Barliadanu, to propagate monarchism.³²

Another pre-occupation of Ukrainian nationalists are demands for the return of “ethnographic territories” where Ukrainians live outside the Ukrainian state, whose borders were established by the USSR.³³ The UNS sent a telegram to Boris Yeltsin after his press secretary made territorial claims upon Ukraine in the aftermath of its declaration of independence in August 1991, which, in retaliation, questioned Russian control of Ukrainian borderlands.³⁴ This irredentism is coupled with both a xenophobic view of the outside world as being hostile towards Ukrainian aspirations,³⁵ as well as a paranoid view of the presence of “fifth columnists” fomenting separatism and working through the Supreme Council and local councils who are “sabotaging the re-building of the state.” Korchynskyi believes discussions about peace and agreements “are all shameful liberal lies” and “liberal-democratic demagoguery” because the “formation of the history of people is war.”³⁶

Ukrainian nationalists believe that the “cult of strength” automatically leads to the

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“cult of violence.”³⁷ The UNA created the first paramilitary organisation in 1991 which is recruited primarily from its own members. The leader of the UNA–UNS, Oleh Vitovych, wrote that “Belief in the correctness of only the peaceful, parliamentary, non-violent method of struggle is absolutely incompatible with our understanding of revolution ... Basing oneself upon peaceful methods does not always save one from violent events. Pacifist, ‘neutral’ tendencies lead only to the situation which makes the nation undefended at the moment when it is most dangerously tested.” Therefore, “revolutionary Ukrainian nationalism is a radical, violent method of struggle against the occupier, whatever his reaction towards it.”³⁸

While others cover the alleged “World Masonic Conspiracy,”³⁹ some radical nationalist publications contain articles dealing with the Klu Klux Klan (KKK),⁴⁰ although the KKK’s emphasis on ethnic purity is not reflected in UNA–UNS literature.⁴¹ Another curiosity, in light of the widely held view in the West that antisemitism is traditionally deeply rooted within Ukraine, is the near absence of antisemitism in the Ukrainian nationalist literature of the UNA and the KUN.⁴² An exception was a Kharkiv-based SUM newspaper which published an article by Yosyp Terelya (the Ukrainian Catholic activist deported to Canada in 1988) entitled “What is the origin of anti-semitism? Why it is forbidden for Christians to read the Talmud?,” which led to a wide public outcry.⁴³ The DSU is the only radical right group which openly attacks Jews and Israel.

II

Radical Right Groups and Parties

Divisions Within the Nationalist Camp

Because, since 1993, they have been in conflict with each other, it is highly unlikely that the radical right spectrum will move towards amalgamation or co-operation. Each of the three movements claims for itself the mantle of being the only “pure” nationalist structure in Ukraine. Despite this conflict within the radical nationalist camp, their programs, attitudes and ideologies all have some similar traits.

Roman Zvarych, formerly a leading émigré OUNr and KUN ideologist now resident in Ukraine, rejected the view that either UNA–UNS or national democrats have a right to claim that they are “nationalists.” The former once co-operated with the Ukrainian KGB (since 1992, the Security Service of Ukraine) while the latter originally argued for co-operation with “sovereign communists.”⁴⁴ Zvarych claimed that “Ukrainian nationalism” had nothing in common with fascism, the Klu Klux Klan or racist xenophobia towards non-Ukrainians but had always “stood on a democratic basis.” Although not naming the UNA–UNS, Zvarych believed that they have misunderstood the slogan “Ukraine for Ukrainians” first coined, at the turn of this century, by the Ukrainian thinker, Mykola Mikhnovsky.

At the same time, the KUN, SUM-SNUM and the DSU all propagate the slogan

“Kyiv Against Moscow!,” while the anti-Russian tone and “anti-cosmopolitanism”⁴⁵ evident in both the DSU and UNA–UNS literature is similar.⁴⁶ In the words of an editorial in a SUM journal, “Each victor in the struggle for power in Moscow will be our first enemy. This is the primary logic of their statehood. Kyiv against Moscow!”⁴⁷

One major difference between the “pragmatic” UNA–UNS and the more “romantic” DSU and KUN is in relation to their attitude towards communists. The latter espouses a traditional anti-communism close to that of those political parties on the radical wing of the centre-right, who also oppose any co-operation (e.g., the UKRP and UNKP). In contrast, “revolutionary nationalism,” the ideology originally elaborated by the émigré OUNr, initially rejected the peaceful parliamentary road towards independence.

The dispute between the DSU and the UNA–UNS openly existed since mid-1991. The editor of the UNS newspaper *Zamkova Hora*, Oleksander Kovalenko, pointed out that “[t]he UNA–UNS, in contrast to the small nationalist groups of ‘romantic nationalists,’ does not stand on a position of ethnic nationalism. We are nationalists–pragmatists, statist. We are interested in the spirit of people, the area of their activity. But this does not mean in any way that we reject the slogan ‘Ukraine for Ukrainians.’”⁴⁸ Another aspect of the dispute is that the DSU is still primarily a Galician nationalist movement which follows in the traditions of the OUNr (and the Ukrainian National Front of the 1960s). Whereas the UNA–UNS has support outside west Ukraine and, although respects the integral nationalistic traditions and writers of the pre-World War II era, it has evolved its own more contemporary ideology along more clearly defined neo-fascist, statist lines.

In late 1992 Valentyn Moroz, a leading ideologue of UNA (who himself, had fallen into dispute with the OUNr when he was expelled to the West in 1979), attempted to take over the L’viv *oblast* structure of Rukh to use as a springboard in order to shift it on to a platform of integral nationalism.⁴⁹ The break-away nationalist wing of Rukh in L’viv was reportedly allied to the All-Popular Movement of Ukraine (VNUR),⁵⁰ led by Larysa Skoryk. At the third congress of Rukh, in February 1992, the VNUR united those who opposed Viacheslav Chornovil’s line as to whether it should continue in opposition to the then President Leonid Kravchuk or co-operate with the national communists. Consequently, the statist in the UNA and VNUR found common ground in their support of the primacy of the building of a Ukrainian state, support for Kravchuk and his success in winning over the *ancien régime* to independence. This statist *realpolitik* approach of prioritising the building of the state was also the dominant programme of the centre right Congress of National Democratic Forces (KNDS), launched in Autumn 1992 by nation democrats, in favour of co-operation with Kravchuk, and hostile to Chornovil and Rukh. The VNUR and the KNDS had, therefore, similar constituencies.

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Émigré Groups

In May 1993 near Kyiv the inaugural congress of the OUNm, after a fifty year hiatus, clouded the situation even further by adding another nationalist group to Ukraine's political spectrum.⁵¹ The OUNm claims for itself the title of the "maternal OUN," arguing that the other two branches of the OUN which split off in 1940 (OUNr) and 1954 (OUNz), are only "splittists" who have no title to the original OUN founded in 1929 by Yevhen Konovalets. Although the addition of another nationalist structure to Ukrainian politics will, therefore, increase conflict and confusion within the overall nationalist camp, the OUNm has both a less abrasive style and a more moderate profile allowing them to co-operate with the Ukrainian Republican Party (URP) (both of whom are on the centre-right of Ukrainian national democratic politics). The OUNm and the URP co-operated most openly on the monthly journal *Rozbudova Natsia*.⁵²

Between 1990–1991 the émigré OUNr supported both the DSU and the UMPA, even though the DSU and UMPA refused to co-operate with each other. After the aborted August 1991 *coup d'état* the OUNr and the re-named UNA went their separate ways. By early 1993, the KUN (the Ukrainian arm of the OUNr within Ukraine) and the DSU had also taken their separate paths. In both cases this was partly connected to the perennial problem of whether an émigré group should control (or merely cooperate with) a group based in the *kraj*, as well as questions of ideology, ways of operating and attitudes to the current situation.

These problems were coupled with the KUN's attempt to re-portray itself in "democratic" colours in order to be attractive to the electorate and its support for co-operation with national democratic groups. Chornovil, leader of the Ukrainian Popular Movement (Rukh), told the inaugural congress of the KUN that "I do not see a single divergence between the ideological platform of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists and the ideological platform of the People's Movement of Ukraine—the primacy of the national state is unconditional."⁵³

In spring 1992, the OUNr attempted to "help unite all nationalist forces in Ukraine" through conferences and meetings, trying to give radical nationalism a more "moderate" image in order to widen its popular base.⁵⁴ The Kyiv conference prevented members of the UNA–UNS from attending. But, not all members of the radical right, such as DSU leader Roman Koval, were happy at the more "moderate" image propagated by émigré leaders of the OUNr.⁵⁵ They accused the KUN and its émigré backers of betraying the integral nationalism of Dontsov merely to win popularity and votes.

In L'viv, January 1993, former members of the OUN from the 1940s, together with the DSU, organised a congress to revive the OUN as an official structure in Ukraine.⁵⁶ Both the UNA and the DSU had long held the view that in an independent Ukraine nationalist movement should not remain underground, but operate openly. This view was in contrast to that of the OUNr which continues to believe in the need

for underground cells and the use of a “front” structure, the KUN. The OUNr, therefore, condemned the organisers of this congress as acting without their mandate and “illegally,”⁵⁷ further placing them into conflict with the DSU and its former-leader and long term political prisoner, Ivan Kandyba, prime organiser of the congress. The OUNm followed the OUNr condemnation with its own, arguing that the OUNr were themselves “splittists” and the only “real” and “maternal” OUN dating back to 1927–1929 are the OUNm.⁵⁸ The congress went on to create an Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists in Ukraine (OUNvU), the main purpose of which was to prove that it—not the KUN—was the true inheritor of the mantle of Stepan Bandera, the 1940s nationalist leader assassinated in 1959 by a Soviet agent in Munich.⁵⁹

The Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN)

The KUN was launched in Ukraine on 28–29 March 1992 by the émigré OUNr under the guise of its front organisation, the Institute for Education and Politics (Munich) and the All-Ukrainian Brotherhood of OUN–UPA Veterans. The KUN held its inaugural congress in Kyiv’s Palace Ukrainy in October of the same year attended by 5,072 delegates and participants.⁶⁰ Throughout summer 1992, *oblast* conferences of KUN were held to establish local chapters, and 13 *oblast* branches were established in time for the inaugural congress. The ties of the KUN to the OUNr can be seen in the fact that the leader of both organizations is Slava Stetsko, who was in exile in Munich until 1991. Three hundred delegates from 14 *oblasts* attended the inaugural congress, with the largest delegations from Donetsk, Luhansk, L’viv, Kharkiv and Ivano-Frankivsk.

Whereas the DSU rejected outright any co-operation with democratic groups and is a *de facto* political party, the KUN claimed its readiness to co-operate with national democratic groups and declared itself as a unifying umbrella group for nationalist bodies. (In this quest, it, therefore, competed with the UNA.) The KUN was registered as a new political association in January 1993.⁶¹

In early July 1993, a world Congress of Nationalists was held in Kyiv, with 500 delegates from the diaspora.⁶² The congress included talks by well known activists from the émigré OUNr and represented the public’s arrival onto the political scene of Ukraine’s latest radical right group.⁶³ The OUNr, and, therefore, its ideological child, the KUN, were already in conflict with the UMPA/UNA since late 1991. With the launching of the KUN on to Ukraine’s political stage by the émigré OUNr as a “national democratic” (centre-right) political group, this also led to divisions with the DSU.

The move towards “national democracy” and “pragmatism” for the KUN and the UNA respectively left the field increasingly open for the DSU to adopt a profile on the far right of the political spectrum, close to the newly created Social National Party of Ukraine. To what degree the KUN’s new democratic face was genuine is open to question. Zvarych was removed unconstitutionally from his position as

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deputy head of the KUN. Elected at the annual congress, Zvarych could only be removed from his post by the annual congress. As Zvarych was the leading proponent of “democratizing” the KUN’s ideology and moving it away from integral nationalism, his departure from its ranks removed the main spokesman for this democratisation within its ranks.⁶⁴

The evolution of the KUN’s ideology away from the integral nationalism of its parent body, the OUNr, which it had espoused in the West since World War II, placed them in a similar position to that of the UKRP. Both the KUN and the UKRP straddled the national-democratic (centre-right) and radical right wing of the Ukrainian political spectrum. Both were anti-communist and opposed to cooperation with the national communists (something which brought them close to Rukh) while rejecting non-parliamentary paths to power. In the dispute between the DSU/OUNvU, on the one hand, and the KUN, on the other, the UKRP backed the former. The KNDS and UNA, on the other hand, held similar views of the primacy of the state with regard to the need for cooperation with national communists.

The Ukrainian National Party (UNP)

The UNP was formed in October 1989 in L’viv with a small program that was solely geared towards one aim—state independence—with no discussion of its policies after this goal was eventually attained. The UNP program, therefore, did not possess any separate sections devoted to politics, economics, ecology, religion or culture, but, was geared solely towards “state-building demands.” It rejected violence as a means to attain one’s political objectives.⁶⁵ Unlike national-democratic parties, the UNP refused to recognize the Soviet or Soviet Ukrainian constitutions. By the following year there were reports that UNP branches were being established in eastern Ukraine, with even members of Rukh defecting to it.⁶⁶ In Cherkasy, the URP defected to the UNP over the former’s recognition of the USSR and Ukrainian SSR. To aim its views the UNP published the *Visnyk UNP*, *Informatsynyi Bulletin* and *Ukrainsky Chas*.

Pryhodko was elected chairman at the second congress of the UNP, held on 7 April 1990, in L’viv.⁶⁷ One of the resolutions of the congress argued against participation in the Supreme Council of Ukraine which, “contradicts the colonial status of Ukraine, and, thus, contradicts the lawfulness of the struggle of Ukrainians for decolonisation ...;” it also, “creates the illusion of the democratic nature of the parliaments and the legality of their laws.”⁶⁸

The UNP was one of the first political groups to agitate for separate Ukrainian armed security forces. In its program it stood for the legalization of the right of private citizens to hold arms: “The absence of these weapons in citizens is the main obstacle to the democratization of society. Without private arms democracy becomes a farce with the usurpation of power by one party.”⁶⁹ At the congress a resolution

called for a, “wide-scale campaign of all the patriotic forces of Ukraine for the creation of Ukrainian armed forces, a Ukrainian security service and a Ukrainian police force, as guarantees of the inviolability of Ukrainian borders, the integrity of its territory, and as safeguards of its national and individual security and civic peace.”⁷⁰ Meanwhile, the UNP condemned attempts at “divide and rule” of ethnic groups in the USSR.

The UNP criticized the July 1990 Ukrainian Declaration of Sovereignty as a vehicle for the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU) to begin negotiations on the Union Treaty: “The Declaration of Sovereignty of Ukraine has become the main basis for the continuation of the colonial enslavement of the Ukrainian nation and to preserve the empire in a somewhat reformed variant.”⁷¹ Consequently, the UNP was a constant critic of Rukh and the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHS), in particular over their initial support for “confederation” and their willingness to undertake dialogue with “the governing clique in Ukraine.”⁷²

The UNP believed there were important “principled differences” between itself and the UHS, and, therefore, was in “radical opposition” to both it and the KPU. The UNP refused to compromise over its demands for state independence and looked to build an elitist party, not a mass-based one, although its membership never surpassed one hundred.⁷³ A mass party, Pryhodko believed, “would be forced to compromise with the authorities.”⁷⁴ In the view of Pryhodko, by the second half of 1990 the USSR was “on the threshold of disintegration. It is unfortunate that the civilized world did not perceive the inevitability of this development soon enough; and, it is unfortunate that they continued to believe the myths of perestroika and the viability of the ‘evolutionary’ transformation of the USSR into a democratic confederation.” This, he believed, however, would not prevent the USSR from disintegrating.⁷⁵

These views led the UNP to become one of the two main founders of the UMPA on 1 July 1990, a day after the Ukrainian Declaration of Sovereignty. But, splits were already in evidence at its fourth congress on 23 March 1991 in Vynnytsia, when seven members were expelled from the UNP for establishing a parallel organisation with the same name, (while the UNP and Pryhodko resigned from the UMPA). On 16 September 1990, the UNP requested to join the *Derzhavne Pravlinnia*, the exile government of the OUNr, a reflection of the political profile of UNP. At the academic-theoretical conference on 8 June 1991 in Ternopil, the UNP called for its transformation into a “national-patriotic organization” and for the unification of all “radical” parties and groups who stand for the revolutionary road towards independence.⁷⁶ Little was then heard of the UNP until it merged a year later with the UNDP, the other original co-founder of the UMPA, into the Ukrainian National Conservative Party (UNKP). This placed them both on the radical wing of the center right, together with the UKRP.

“Romantic Nationalists” (DSU)

The DSU represents the radical wing of the nationalist right in Ukraine, which has

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inherited and stuck to the ethnically based, traditional, authoritarian nationalism of the émigré-based Bandera faction of the OUN. It was established on 7–8 April 1990 in L'viv, where the inaugural congress was attended by 66 delegates who elected Ivan Kandyba as chairman.⁷⁷ A number of resolutions were adopted dealing with the Ukrainian diaspora, the Law making Ukrainian the State Language, separate armed forces, and Lithuania. The statement read “[t]o avoid dissipating patriotic forces, we have reached the conclusion that it is necessary to establish the Union Ukrainian State Independence, whose task would be to monopolize the people for the establishment of an independent state ...”⁷⁸ A program and a statute were ratified.⁷⁹ The DSU then launched the publications *Poklyk Voli* (L'viv), *Zahrava* (Stryj) and later *Neskorena Natsiya* (Kyiv).

At its second congress on 22 December 1991 the DSU ratified amendments to its program and continued to call for the establishment of an “All-Ukrainian Political Co-ordinating Centre,” which would unite Ukrainian nationalists in a broad movement led by the DSU and its émigré OUNr supporters (whose leaders resided full-time in Ukraine since 1992).⁸⁰ In contrast to the more “pragmatic” UNA, the DSU’s new program called for the banning of former Ukrainian KGB employees from employment in the Security Services and other state positions, while placing them on trial “for criminal activities.” Former “KPU activists” would also be put on trial and prevented from holding state posts.

The third congress of the DSU was held in December 1992 attended by 102 delegates from 16 *oblasts* representing only 530 members.⁸¹ The congress speakers attacked not only communists but also, with equal venom, democratic groups, including Rukh. They accused the KUN of “splitting” the nationalist camp. Calls were made for Ukraine to possess a million-strong army and to keep hold of its nuclear weapons. The DSU created an internal counter-espionage service entitled “Information Service.” Kandyba stepped down as leader to work on the revival of the OUN in Ukraine. He was replaced by the 37-year old Volodymyr Shemka, with Koval as his deputy. The congress was greeted by like-minded groups such as Stepan Khmara (leader of the UKRP), the SUM, the E. Konovalts Military Organization, the Club of Ukrainian Young Elite and the L'viv nationalist wing of Rukh. The DSU was finally registered in March 1993 as a nationalist movement which only accepted ethnically pure Ukrainians as members.⁸² After Kandyba left to lead the OUNvU, the more younger and radical Koval took over the leadership of the DSU.

Many former members of the OUNr (*e.g.*, Petro Duzhyi) and former members of the UPA (Mykhailo Zelenchuk) joined the DSU; (when the DSU quarreled with the KUN, the Association of Former OUN–UPA Veterans switched allegiances to the KUN). Indeed, on numerous occasions the DSU stressed that it, like the Ukrainian National Front of the 1960s, continued in the traditions of the OUNr,⁸³ although in a modernized format.⁸⁴ While the DSU program differed little from that of the émigré OUNr.⁸⁵ DSU began to re-print the London-based émigré OUNr journal

Vyzvolny Shliakh beginning with the December 1991 issue.⁸⁶ Deputy head of the DSU, Zinoviy Krasivskiy, until his death in September 1991, was also “head of the OUNr” in Ukraine.⁸⁷

The DSU did not call itself a “party” because this word was discredited in the eyes of the population, and it could not use the word “organization,” as this already existed in the OUN. Significantly, the DSU only accepted into its ranks ethnic Ukrainians, in contrast to the UNA.⁸⁸ A major difficulty with the DSU was its lack of a program on how to achieve independence. If it followed in the path of the OUNr, but rejected violent methods, while, at the same time, rejecting the parliamentary path, then it was left with few options. In the case of UMPA (since 1991 UNA) it, at least, had a clear program prior to August 1991, namely, to elect a National Congress after signing up over 50% of Ukrainian citizens.

Until Summer 1991, the émigré OUNr had close relations with both the DSU and UNA.⁸⁹ In late June 1991, Stetsko, leader of the émigré OUNr, attended the fifth session of the UMPA for the last time.⁹⁰ The DSU consistently refused to join the UMPA and later to UNA. The differences between the DSU and UNA could be seen in their attitudes towards participating in the December 1991 presidential elections. Whereas the UNA promoted their chairman, Shukhevych (who failed to obtain the 100,000 signatures necessary for registration), the DSU were opposed to taking part, and believed, like the OUNr at the time, of the necessity of boycotting official structures.⁹¹ The UNS press also began to feature articles critical of the émigré OUNr.⁹²

In 1990, the failure to attract the DSU and the Ukrainian Christian-Democratic Party into the UMPA ([UKhDP], which had also called for a boycott of the March 1990 republican elections) led to calls for the establishment of a nation-wide “National Revolutionary Front.” This was planned to include the UMPA, the DSU and the UKhDP, but the unification of nationalist groups into one body failed. In 1993, the DSU also called for a “Ukrainian National Front” which was not backed by other radical right groups.

Krasivskiy believed that former prisoners of conscience, such as Viacheslav Chornovil and Levko Lukianenko, had been calling for participation in the Supreme Council and local councils since the 1960s. Since 1988, their big mistake, in his view, was not to put forward, immediately, the demand for independence, in order to create an alternative to the existing regime (until late 1989 only small nationalist groups in western Ukraine advocated independence) but, instead, to work within the existing Soviet system.

In the course of the URP’s existence it had constantly suffered from internal struggles against its radical wing. These radicals had either been expelled or resigned; some had joined the DSU (Koval, Hryhorii Hrebenuk and Anatoly Sherbatiuk) while others had formed new parties (Khmara), such as the UKRP. In certain regions, such as Rivne and Zaporizhzhia, entire local branches of the URP had defected to the DSU.⁹³ Koval became editor of the DSU publication *Neskorena*

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Natsiya during 1992–1993. From 1994 *Neskorena Natsiya* became the organ of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in Ukraine (OUNvU), led by Kandyba, while Koval, who replaced Kandyba as head of DSU, launched his own new DSU publication, *Nezboryma Natsiya*.

Many young defectors from the URP joined the DSU because of the URP's leadership's decision to co-operate with "sovereign communists" from 1991 onwards. Stepan Khura, formerly head of the URP in Kherson *oblast*, argued that any agreement between the Communists and the People's Council in the Supreme Council, "was always a risky path. While collaborating with the occupier never ensured the path to liberty."⁹⁴ Local branches of the URP in Rivne and Zaporizhzhia also complained about "collaboration with the enemy" and of the URP "distancing itself from nationalism," after which these branches seceded from the URP. Ivan Panchenko, former member of the URP and since a member of the DSU in Zaporizhzhia, believed that "[w]e should get rid of the illusions about peaceful relations between Russians, who rule Ukraine, and Ukrainians, who want to free themselves from national oppression and become rulers of their situation."⁹⁵ Koval, meanwhile, re-named the URP the "Ukrainska Radianska Partiya" (Ukrainian Soviet Party), which would soon be included within the ranks of the "post-communist parties," "especially as it is led by a former Leninist."⁹⁶ This influx of individuals from the URP undoubtedly helped the DSU in terms of improving its intellectual weight, which, at the time of its foundation, it admitted it was weakly endowed with.⁹⁷

In Koval's view, democrats are incapable of building a state: "One cannot democratize the colonial structure, the empire, and take the path of voting in a 'parliament' to become free." All efforts should, therefore, be placed not on democratization but on the struggle against the occupiers. The government should put forward the question of de-colonization (and not democracy), supporting its core ethnic groups (Ukrainians and Tatars).⁹⁸ Leading members of the DSU, such as Krasivskyi, believed that the parliamentary path would not bring independence.⁹⁹

The DSU's main ideologist and chairman since 1993 is Koval, and, therefore, a closer look at his essay "What Kind of Ukraine Do We Want" is in order.¹⁰⁰ The essay begins by stating that with the decline of Russian imperialism, which presents less of a threat to Ukraine, a new threat has grown—that of "international liberalism" with its campaign for "human rights." Support for individual over national rights, at a time when the state is in formation, harms the establishment of a Ukrainian state. The independent state will be irreversible only when "the idea that the priority of state rights [becomes] higher than individual rights ... in Ukrainian society." The nation, Koval believed, is the highest form of good and it, in itself, guarantees human rights.

The unification of all ethnic Ukrainian territories is a "fundamental principle of the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism." On the other hand, "Ukrainian liberals and socialists understand unity only within the existing borders of the former Ukrainian

SSR.” But Ukrainian nationalists regard, “the question of ethnic Ukrainian lands which are outside the state, as remaining open for dispute.” In that context, Ukrainian nationalists also stand for the liquidation of Crimean territorial autonomy. Ukrainian nationalists are in favour of “determined state actions in defense of national interests.” “We do not want peace in exchange for our territory,” Roman Koval stated.

Ukrainian nationalists stand for “the cult of strength—spiritual, physical, economic and military because they know that strength is everything.” “If we stand on our own two feet, we will learn how to dictate, and we will get allies; if we kneel, we will receive only humanitarian aid,” Koval argued. Therefore, they are in favour of strong borders, a strong army and nuclear weapons. “We need a *Great Ukraine*. We are not only statist—we are great statist.”

A major difference between nationalists and liberals is in the question of “enemies.” Liberals are afraid of saying who the enemy of Ukrainian independence is—namely, imperialist Russia. Hence, “the question of an ‘enemy’ is one of the more central in our philosophy. The enemy, and hatred for him, is a great integrating element” because “when a nation ‘loses’ the image of the enemy she becomes disorientated.” “A neutral Ukraine today is a colonial Ukraine tomorrow,” Koval believed.

Pluralism only divides society, whereas nationalists want unity, and, therefore, they are in favour of “democracy within certain boundaries.” The state sets these boundaries in order to control the ambitions of parties and individuals while the state has “the right to neutralize state ruining actions.” “Until we become a nation state, until we solve our national problems and aims, we cannot blindly be lead by the basics of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” Koval argued. For example, the state has the right to halt migration into the country, first to ensure that Russians living in Ukraine learn the state language and secondly to prevent them from forming autonomous regions.

A person’s liberty “is not absolute but is only relative. Citizens of Ukraine have to be responsible before their state.” Because Ukrainian nationalists regard the state as being higher than the individual, there is a need for a “permanent politicization and idealization of society.” In addition, the question of “order” is paramount with a hierarchical structure for society because “inequality is a fundamental principle of the law-based society.” The state should first and foremost help the “strong and talented.”

For the foreseeable future, the question of security will remain an important question for the Ukrainian state. Liberals are unable to ensure the defensive capability of the country. “And, is this not why the West supports Ukrainian liberals? And, is this not why America implants into Ukraine liberalism which disarms the young Ukrainian state? It is obvious that America is not interested in the entry on the geopolitical arena of the new super-state Ukraine, which, in the near future, could become a serious opponent of American hegemonism,” Koval argued. That is, why

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the Americans supported those political groups who stood for nuclear disarmament, who place "American values" over the Ukrainian state and are in favour of open borders.

Ukraine should earnestly search out allies abroad, in particular in central Europe, the Baltic Republics and Turkey. In addition, good relations should be cultivated with Germany, Italy, Austria and Scandinavia. The axis that Ukraine could develop should rest upon "Kyiv–Berlin–Vienna–Budapest–Rome."

Finally, the conservative basis of Ukrainian nationalism rests upon the following principles: "national interests, unity of all Ukrainian lands, militarism, hierarchy, order, superiority of the nation-state, anti-communism, anti-liberalism and responsibility before the nation." Ukrainian nationalism is "state creative" and should strive to "become the state ideology of the Ukrainian revival."

The only political groups close to the ideals of the DSU were the UNP, UKhDP, UKRP and the SNUM.¹⁰¹ Nevertheless, Kandyba on many occasions ruled out co-operation with the UNP or the UMPA. The UNP was "avanturistic" while the UMPA appeal "was signed by unauthorized people ..."¹⁰² Like other nationalist groups, they believed that the DSU should not strive to become a mass organization, although, whether it could do so was open to question. At the time of its foundation the DSU had 300 members,¹⁰³ which by December 1991 had increased to only 650 (less than that given at the previous congress).¹⁰⁴ While at the DSU inaugural congress 75% of its members were reportedly from L'viv *oblast* alone. The DSU, like OUN previously, should be a vanguard, elitist organization which enjoyed great influence over the masses.¹⁰⁵ But, by the fifth congress of the DSU in October 1994, only 168 delegates attended it representing 1,344 members.

Until 1993, the DSU was led by Kandyba, while Koval edited its organ *Neskorena Natsiya*. The departure of Kandyba in 1993 to establish the OUNvU opened the way for the DSU's radicalization after Koval became its undisputed leader.¹⁰⁶ 1993 also witnessed the final split between the KUN and the DSU/OUNvU over attempts by the KUN to recruit DSU members into its own organisation and its movement away from integral nationalistic and the ideology of Dontsov. Kandyba took with him the newspaper *Neskorena Natsiya*, so, the DSU had to search for sponsors to launch a new publication, *Nezboryma Natsiya*.

The DSU demanded the adoption of a new citizenship law because they did not believe "foreigners" should not be allowed to occupy leading positions. Citizenship would be dependent upon residence in Ukraine for ten years, "loyalty" to the Ukrainian state, knowledge of the Ukrainian language, and no past membership of "punitive organs" or separatist movements.¹⁰⁷

The program of the DSU was adopted by its third congress on 12 December 1992 in Kyiv, while changes and additions were made at its fourth congress on 4 December 1994 in Dnipropetrovsk. Although the DSU did not rule out parliamentary methods to achieve its aims, as well as working within state organs, in the event "of the restoration of the colonial regime" in Ukraine, they "would utilize all methods

and means to struggle with the enemy.”¹⁰⁸ The DSU again called for the creation of a united Ukrainian National Front with other patriotic organizations, but the only groups which positively responded were the OUNvU, the OUNm, the SUM and the Ukrainian Cossacks.

“Pragmatic Nationalists” (UMPA)

The UMPA was established on 1 July 1990 as an alternative to those political groups who were in favour of taking part in official structures, such as the Supreme Council. But, it never united all of the nationalist groups who had called for a boycott of the March 1990 elections, notably the DSU and the UKhDP. Many of the members of the UMPA were small or in the process of formation. These included the UNRP, SNUM-nationalists (who later re-named themselves UNS), the Dmytro Dontsov Supporters Club and the Ukrainian Catholic Youth Committee.¹⁰⁹ The two main groups which launched the UMPA were the UNP and the UNDP. Both of these were eventually forced out by the increasingly dominant UNS. The UNDP had limited its involvement to the UMPA Citizen’s Committees due to ideological differences with the UNP.¹¹⁰

The Club of Supporters of Dmytro Dontsov was established in L’viv on 17 December 1990 and published the journal *Natsionalist*.¹¹¹ It grew out of former members of SNUM-nationalist faction, which later transformed itself into the UNS. *Natsionalist* later became the UNA’s theoretical organ.

The first session of the UMPA was attended by “observers” from the URP and Rukh, but the relations between national-democrats (based in the Supreme Council) after March 1990 and nationalists (based in the UMPA) became increasingly bitter. Although the UMPA established itself as an alternative to the Supreme Council, Petro Kahui, head of the UMPA executive committee, initially claimed that it never regarded itself as an alternative to Rukh, while their aims coincided after Rukh’s second congress when it stood for full independence. The UMPA merely believed that the parliamentary path was insufficient to gain Ukrainian independence.¹¹² Nevertheless, “[t]he very activities of the deputies of the Democratic Bloc promoted a quick recognition, by a large mass of the population of Ukraine, of the ineffectiveness of the parliamentary path to achieve independence ...,” in the view of Anatoly Lupynis.¹¹³

Indeed, initially many groups had over-lapping membership of both Rukh and the UMPA (such as the Ukrainian Peasant Democratic Party), “whereas the Assembly was directing its efforts at the implementation of an entire range of complex practical issues which will be an important addition to the activities of Rukh.”¹¹⁴ On a visit to the West, Pryhodko, leader of the UNP and a leading member of the UMPA, argued that “in the near future it will be possible to create a joint national liberation front” with the “patriotic forces of the Democratic Bloc” in the Supreme Council.¹¹⁵

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Yet, Pryhodko also called the Supreme Council and the UMPA “two antagonistic structures,” condemning Lukianenko’s view (leader of URP) that “there was nobody to co-operate with in the UMPA.” In Pryhodko’s view, the UMPA had “forced the leaders of the UHS to abandon the idea of confederation” in support of, at least, a declaration in favour of independence.¹¹⁶ But, at the local level, some members of the URP nevertheless, helped organize the registration of UNR citizens.¹¹⁷ Lupynis, pointed out, at the second UMPA session that “[t]hese people (*i.e.*, the UHS) made a tremendous contribution to the propagation of the idea of an independent Ukrainian state during the election campaign and for the time of their work in the Soviets to which they were elected.”¹¹⁸

The first session of the UMPA created the National Council on the Rebirth of Ukraine’s Statehood and the Executive Committee (which registered citizens on the basis of the March 1918 Ukrainian People’s Republic citizen law). The first action of the National Congress, after it had collected more than 50% of registered citizens, would be to declare independence, take power unto itself and dissolve the Ukrainian SSR structures. Then it would ensure defense of its borders, establish diplomatic relations and conduct negotiations with Ukraine’s neighbors.¹¹⁹ The head of the National Council, elected at the first session, was Pryhodko, while Arkady Kireyev (leader of UNDP) was elected head of the Co-ordinating Council of Committees of Ukrainian citizens.

At the second session of the UMPA, on 6–7 October 1990, the UNDP refused to put forward candidates for the National Council because the ideological views the UMPA propounded were “undemocratic” and, therefore, in conflict with the program of the UNDP. A certain section of the UNDP, led by Kireyev, attempted to split the Citizens Committees away from the UMPA.¹²⁰ By its second session the UMPA had registered 729,000 people as UNR citizens. The largest number were in L’viv and Kyiv *oblasts* and the lowest in Odesa and Chernihiv.¹²¹ At the second session it was proposed to establish a Constitutional Committee to draw up a draft constitution for an independent Ukrainian state, a law on citizenship and other draft laws.¹²² The second session also called upon “all patriotic forces in Ukraine” to co-ordinate their activities within the UMPA.¹²³

On 30 June 1941, the second session of the UMPA sent an appeal to the émigré OUNr government in exile (*Derzhavne Pravlinnia*),¹²⁴ which it increasingly leaned towards and which was dominated by the émigré OUNr. This was to the discomfort of the UNDP who were closer to the more moderate Ukrainian Peoples Republic government (*Ukrainska Narodna Respublika*), in exile from 1917–1921 (the UNR government in exile was dominated by the OUNm). This gave rise to the question: to which government in exile should the UMPA, therefore, owe its allegiance? Although UMPA registered citizens with the UNR citizenship law, the UNR government—in exile—nevertheless refused any dealings with it because of its

domination by radical right elements that leaned towards its arch rival, the OUNr. Therefore, only *Derzhavne Pravlinnia* ever co-operated with the UMPA.

At the third session of the UMPA on 21–22 December 1990 the UNDP issued a statement outlining that it could no longer take part in the UMPA because of ideological differences which contradicted its program.¹²⁵ It would continue to function solely through the Citizens Committees, where it could propagandize the traditions of the UNR, pointing out that it had first proposed the idea of registering citizens as early as January 1990.¹²⁶ In addition, Pryhodko walked out of the session with a section of the UNP, which led to its split into two groups. Pryhodko was criticized for his personal ambitions and “dictatorial, destructive activities.”¹²⁷

Shukhevych was then elected chairman of the UMPA, a post he remained in until his resignation from the UNA in 1994. The UMPA outlined its main goals as the creation of the Ukrainian armed forces, boycott of the March 1991 referendum on the Union Treaty, and organisation of a political strike in defense of Khmara who had been arrested a month earlier.¹²⁸ Pryhodko’s proposal to begin organizing a National Congress was voted out.¹²⁹

On 30 March 1991 the fourth session of the UMPA was held in Kyiv, which was still marred by conflict between Pryhodko and the executive committee, as well as by the UNDP announcement that it was resigning completely from the UMPA.¹³⁰ In the appeals issued by the fourth session, they repeated the call that only through the registration of citizens of the UNR would Ukraine be able to hold genuinely free elections to a Ukrainian National Congress, leading to Ukrainian independence.¹³¹

At the fifth congress of UMPA, on 29–30 June 1991, a “Political Resolution” and “Economic Platform” were discussed. The UMPA regarded both the workers movement and youth groups as the main areas where it could find potential supporters.¹³² The UMPA placed great emphasis upon the independent workers movement and, in particular, the Strike Committees. Mykhailo Ratushnyi, head of the Kyiv Strike Committee and a member of the National Council, was a member of the UMPA (Ratushnyi was elected in 1994 as a member of parliament from the KUN). But, the UMPA only looked upon the Strike Committees from the viewpoint of dominating them, and their delegations within the UMPA were supposed to “personify the idea that the workers movement is an integral part of the national-liberation movement.” From the second session of the UMPA the delegations were divided into three groups: Citizens Committees, Strike Committees, political parties and groups which represented “various ideological, political and social concepts in present-day Ukraine, all united by the concept of the Ukrainian national-liberation movement in the form of a congressional path towards independence.”¹³³

Ratushnyi proposed that, at the initiative of the Kyiv Strike Committee, an all-Ukrainian conference of Strike Committees and Workers Committees be called, where the question of convening an inaugural congress of the Conference of Workers of Ukraine would be decided.¹³⁴ Shukhevych led the Ukrainian National Confeder-

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ation of Labor, the basis of which was the free trade union *Volia*. But, it failed to unite all free trade unions on a nationalist platform.¹³⁵

The UMPA/UNA failed in its attempt to gain control of the workers movement, yet the All-Ukrainian Solidarity Trade Unions (VOST), although small in membership, remained anchored within the national-democratic camp (with its offices on the same premises as Rukh). A middle force between the relatively radical VOST and the official Federation of Independent Trade Unions—entitled the Confederation of Free Trade Unions—also developed. It was under the control of no political group and launched its first successful strike on 2–3 September 1992. But, most political parties opposed it, including the UNA. The UNSO occupied the premises of the Strike Head Quarters and released a statement saying that the strike had been organized by “scum”: “The strike is aimed at the complete destruction of Ukraine’s economy; it threatens Ukraine’s independence. The UNA demands that the authorities and Procurator’s office prosecute the provocateurs pursuant to the law.”¹³⁶

After the declaration of independence by Ukraine on 24 August 1991, the UMPA changed its name to the UNA and halted the registration of UNR citizens. The UNA then began an unsuccessful campaign to collect 100,000 signatures to register Shukhevych as a presidential candidate in the December 1991 elections. The fifth session of the UNA, attended by the same as before, including the UKRP which had broken away from the URP in Summer 1992, stated that in Ukraine there were only three political forces. The first two (the Socialist Party and the New Ukraine bloc) were orientated, respectively, towards Moscow and Washington and would lose Ukrainian independence. Only the third—the UNA—would guarantee reform and statehood through the establishment of “order.” The UNA also claimed as its success the change in former President Kravchuk’s attitudes towards the Trans-Dniester Republic of Moldova in June 1992, after members of the UNSO had undertaken combat operations there.¹³⁷ In May 1992, by the time of UNA’s registration, it claimed a total of 16,000 individual, association and collective members.¹³⁸ The UNSO though, maintaining its conspiratorial organisation, refused to request official registration, while the Ministry of Justice refused registration to the paramilitary UNSO.

The UNA’s adopted slogan was “Order, Strength, Well Being.” It called for strong armed forces, the maintenance of a nuclear arsenal, a “vigorous national policy,” rapid establishment of state structures and support for Ukrainian industry until it was in a position to compete with foreign enterprises.¹³⁹ The fifth session of the UNA, on 8 September 1991, outlined the continued threat to the Ukraine’s declaration of independence from Russia, and criticized Ukrainian democrats for struggling against the national-communist elite in Ukraine (which was helping to build an independent state) while, at the same time, looking for allies with Russian democrats. By 1993–1994, the UNA’s support for the national communists had waned due to their mishandling of the economy, corruption and their lack of firm action against separatism.

In a statement released on the eve of the sixth session of the Supreme Council, the

UNA admitted that both the government and parliament are not those “which Ukraine needs today.” But, a government created by New Ukraine, Rukh or the KNDS, would be far worse, the UNA believed. Any new elections would merely increase the number of (democratic) “demagogues” in the Ukrainian parliament. Although the democrats know this, their ambitions, nevertheless, will lead to greater chaos in society. Only the UNA could guarantee the social stability necessary to undertake economic reform, maintain law and order, and provide the base for Ukrainian statehood.¹⁴⁰ As Andrij Shkil, a leading UNA ideologist explained, “when the law did not operate as a stick, then the stick should operate as the law.”¹⁴¹ The UNA, therefore, also opposed the more reformist government of the then Premier Leonid Kuchma calling for the president to head the government.¹⁴²

Korchynskyi, a leading member of the UNA, claimed when the UNA was re-registered that it was “the most mobile organisation in Ukraine” with 10,000 members and seven publications (one of the few political parties with such a large number of party organs). These included *Nasha Sprava* (Rivne), *Cherkaska Zona* (Cherkasy) and *Trybuna Narodu* (Vinnytsia), as well as *Holos Natsii* (L’viv), *Natsionalist* (L’viv), *Ukrainski Obrii* (Kyiv) and *Zamkova Hora* (Kyiv). “We are able at any time and place to bring together a large number of organized and disciplined people. We have within our organisation the qualities we want to see in Ukraine—order, discipline and decisiveness,” Korchynskyi claimed.¹⁴³

Although the UNA put forward 81 candidates in the March 1994 parliamentary elections, with another 80 sympathetic to its ideals, only three members were elected (two in L’viv and one in Ternopil). All three parliamentarians are from western Ukraine, but the UNA candidates came through to the second round even in Kyiv city constituencies. Yury Tyma, a UNA parliamentarian from Ternopil, was a candidate for the post of parliamentarian speaker.¹⁴⁴ The UNA’s representation in parliament conferred prestige and legitimacy upon the organisation, thereby raising its public profile. UNA leaders claim that twelve members of parliament are sympathetic towards the UNA.¹⁴⁵

The UNA’s ideological profile developed in 1993 away from older Ukrainian nationalistic thinkers, such as Dontsov (who continued to dominate the DSU and the KUN), to encompass challenges to Russia as the dominant nation of the eastern Slavs. Korchynsky argued that the UNA must propose that Ukraine be “the main defender of Slavonic interests and kernel of Slavic unity,” as well as “the best friend of the Turkic peoples.”¹⁴⁶ An election leaflet from 1994 reminded voters that, “our people used to live in a superpower state. We will make Ukraine a superpower again so people won’t have to change their habits.”¹⁴⁷

Ukraine should propagate the idea of Pan-Slavism and “Ukrainian Imperial Spirituality” where Ukrainian national interests could only be defended by going on the “attack.”¹⁴⁸ At the end of 1993, the UNA organized in Kyiv a congress of radical nationalistic organizations from Poland, Serbia, the Czech Republic, Russia and Belarus to support its thesis of creating a new Eastern Slavic geopolitical center

based upon Kyiv. The Russian Liberal Democratic Party has experienced an interest in these goals: "The main thing is a great Slavic state, and then we will sort out the question of the capital" (Kyiv or Moscow).¹⁴⁹ A joint declaration with the Islamic Renaissance Party (IPV) held that the revival of eastern Slavdom and the Islamic people's of the former USSR, the aims of the UNA and IPV respectively, were complimentary and that they would co-operate together against "trans-national financial structures" within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).¹⁵⁰ The DSU leader, Koval, believes that the UNA's propagation of "Ukrainian imperialism" and Pan-Slavism was the main obstacle preventing any co-operation between the DSU and the UNA. The DSU ruled out any co-operation whatsoever with Russians.¹⁵¹

The UNA's Pan-Slavism is merely a tactic to win popularity in eastern Ukraine.¹⁵² As Korchynsky explained: "I am a real patriot. A great country must be strong. Only the strong are given consideration. If Ukraine is really to be such a country, and Kyiv a great capital of Slavic culture, then Russia will disappear as the empire of evil." Vitovych, leader of the UNA and member of parliament from L'viv, added that "[w]e are today no longer satisfied with the slogan 'Ukrainian independent power.' We dream of a super power. We dream of the supremacy of the Ukrainian nation. We dream of such a power which will itself be able to dictate conditions to the whole world. We understand that this will be a struggle to the death. Either the Muscovites will defeat us or we will defeat them ..."¹⁵³

The UNA and the UNSO appealed to Cossack groups in Russia, with whom they had jointly fought against Moldovans in the Trans-Dniester Republic, for a "confederation of Cossack republics" which would replace the former USSR and the CIS with Ukraine as its core.¹⁵⁴ The UNA threatened to impede the withdrawal of property belonging to the Russian 14th Army which should be handed over to the Trans-Dniester Republic. This region should then be reincorporated within Ukraine which would establish Ukraine's "natural borders" along the Dniester river (the region had been part of Ukrainian territory during the inter-war period). As regards the Crimea, UNA members of parliament proposed a draft resolution which called for the Crimea to be administered by the Ministry of Defense through additional military and national guard units after the declaration of a military state of emergency, the arrest of Crimean leaders and the annulment of Crimean autonomy.¹⁵⁵

This evolution of the UNA's ideology away from the ethnic nationalism of Dontsov and Bandera was rejected by Shukhevych, who resigned as UNA leader after accusing the UNA leadership of "compromising the idea of Ukrainian nationalism" (similar arguments were made by the DSU against the KUN's "betrayal" of integral nationalism). Shukhevych claimed that the UNA leadership were engaged in activities which only benefited "forces hostile to our state," turning the UNA into racketeers and a "pack of wolves." Shukhevych, who continued to stand on the ideological platform of Dontsov, claimed that the UNA had been ruined by its evolution away from traditional Ukrainian integral nationalism: lower ranking mem-

bers were treated worse than cattle; there was hostility towards the Ukrainian Catholic Church, and support for Pan-Slavism and Serbia in the Bosnian conflict.¹⁵⁶

The UNS was established on 3–4 November 1990 by SNUM-nationalists who had broken away from the moderate SNUM, with one of its leaders, Vitovych, having been expelled for calling for an armed struggle. (Vitovych took over the UNA in 1994 after Shukhevych's resignation.) In Kyiv the Ukrainian Nationalist Club was established in May 1990, taking over the SNUM organ, *Zamkova Hora*, which now is the organ of the UNS.¹⁵⁷ Its leadership is collective and the organisation maintains an underground structure, "multi-structured with a severe, hierarchically built, spiritual order."¹⁵⁸ Originally, in 1990, the SNUM-nationalists and the UNS espoused "revolutionary nationalism" (the ideology of the émigré OUNr). But, they gradually formulated their own ideological platform during 1991–1992, increasingly distancing themselves from the émigré OUNr and, therefore, away from the DSU. One of the UNS's most controversial early actions was the burning of a cross on the site where statues of Adolf Hitler and Vladimir Lenin had stood in L'viv in order to "cleanse" the area.

The threat of another military *coup d'état*, the unreadiness of Ukrainian armed forces, and an aggressive Russia led the UNA to launch a call-up for their newly created paramilitary UNSO in September 1991.¹⁵⁹ The idea for the formation of the UNSO also grew out of the Congress in Support of Nationalism, held in the Writer's Union of Ukraine building on 30 August 1991.¹⁶⁰ The UNSO quickly established itself in seven out of twenty-five of Ukraine's *oblasts*, with nucleus groups in many others.¹⁶¹ The student group within the UNA also undertook paramilitary training.¹⁶² In order to get around the ban on paramilitary groups the UNA, like the KUN and the DSU, re-named the UNSO a "sports" organisation, the Ukrainian National Sports Organisation, which had the same Ukrainian abbreviation as the Ukrainian People's Self Defense Forces.¹⁶³

Since then, the UNSO has steadily increased its activities and numbers, often trained by retired military officers or members of the Union of Ukrainian Officers in the diaspora, whose office is also located in the UNA. The UNSO's most controversial action was to go to the Trans-Dniester Republic in April 1992 (where Ukrainians outnumber Russians in a territory which belonged to the Ukrainian SSR during the inter-war period).¹⁶⁴ Although their ostensible reason was to "defend the Ukrainian minority" against both Moldovan attacks and the influence of the Russian authorities and Cossack mercenaries, speculation has centered upon other motives. The Dniester Republic is both a convenient area to obtain "military training" as well as weapons which could then be smuggled back to Ukraine and placed in hiding.

The UNSO has also been involved in a number of other notorious actions. When the Crimea declared independence on 5 May 1992, the UNA released a statement which stated bluntly: "The Crimea will be Ukrainian or it will be de-populated!" In early March 1992, at a time of bitter Russian–Ukrainian conflict over the future of the Black Sea Fleet, 900 members of the UNSO took a specially commissioned train

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from L'viv to Sevastopol to hold a requiem service for 120 sailors who raised the Ukrainian flag on the Russian Navy in 1918 but who were subsequently drowned by the Bolsheviks. The authorities at first refused them entrance to the closed city of Sevastopol, but relented after they physically blocked the train lines. In Sevastopol they ripped down Soviet and Russian flags, replacing them with the Ukrainian blue and yellow national colors, held placards with the inscriptions "Crimea for the Ukrainians!" and "The Black Sea Fleet is Ukrainian!"¹⁶⁵ The Republican Movement of the Crimea claimed that the provocative arrival of UNSO actually helped them to gather signatures for a referendum on Crimean independence, and they called for the creation of their own "self defense groups."¹⁶⁶

In addition, UNSO has provided "bodyguards" for Metropolitan Filaret when he seceded from the Russian Orthodox Church in June 1992 and joined with his former rival, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church—Kyiv Patriarch. Afterwards, a large group of UNSO members attacked the residence of Metropolitan Filaret's rival (who had been dispatched from Moscow) in the Kyiv-Pecharsk Lavra monastery, Metropolitan Vladimir of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarch).¹⁶⁷

In July 1993, UNSO units traveled to support the Georgian forces against Russian-backed Abkhaz separatists. Shukhevych claimed that the Georgians were actually fighting "regular Russian units," including units of the 14th Army from the Trans-Dniester Republic. The regional commander of the UNSO offered his paramilitary forces to any "republic that will fight against the Russian empire." UNSO leaders argued that "[t]he blood of our compatriots has been shed for the freedom and independence of Ukraine. By aiding Georgia in repulsing Russian aggression, we are helping to prevent Russia from unleashing a full scale war against Ukraine."¹⁶⁸ By early August 1993, the UNSO had received casualties in the Abkhaz conflict, including four dead and 20 wounded. Another 10 volunteers had received Georgian military decorations, including personal thanks from Georgian head of state, Eduard Shevardnadze.¹⁶⁹

Conclusion

Although Ukraine has witnessed the growth of numerous nationalist parties and groups, they tend to be divided by personalities, historical disputes, émigré influence, and ideological tendencies. The radical right in Ukraine is, therefore, divided into three groups: between the KUN, backed by the émigré OUNr, the DSU (supported by the SUM and the UKRP), and the UNA. Both the KUN and the UKRP straddle the center-right and radical right political spectrum, whereas, the KUN, the UKRP and the DSU stress ethnic Ukrainian nationalism. The UNA's pragmatic nationalism, places greater emphasis upon the state—not on the ethnic group—which gives it greater opportunity to attract support in central and eastern Ukraine.

The UNA is more broadly based throughout Ukraine. While not looking to the

past as a guide to its policies, it is also the most influential one in terms of its older paramilitary structure, large membership, and range of publications. But, the KUN can count on utilizing its historical association with Stepan Bandera, Yaroslav Stetsko and the nationalist struggle of the OUN–UPA in the 1940s.

The KUN and DSU, which until the end of 1992 closely co-operated, both look backwards to the OUNr for ideological inspiration and both are more ethnically orientated. Undoubtedly, the KUN's association and control by the émigré OUNr has, and will continue to be, a handicap to its performance in Ukraine. The KUN and OUNr are in competition with the other two branches of the émigré OUN (OUNm and OUNz) for the allegiance of Ukrainians to the historical ideals of the OUN. The OUNm itself is active in Ukraine in the publishing and political fields, co-operating with the URP, the OUNvU and the DSU.

The cultivation of the need for a strong state moved the UNA–UNS closer to the national communists, such as Kravchuk, who had voted for independence. During the December 1991 presidential campaign the UNA gave instructions to its members to vote for Kravchuk, the only candidate not supported by democratic parties.¹⁷⁰ As Kovalenko, editor of *Zamkova Hora*, noted, “the people have become tired of democratic anarchy,” and former President Kravchuk's supporters from the former *nomenklatura* were more likely to move to the nationalist than the democratic camp.¹⁷¹

According to Ukrainian nationalist thinkers thus far, democrats have not been able to organise the population, while the nationalists are still weak. Ukraine, therefore, will be led to independence and beyond by those still in power: “The enemy of the Ukrainian administration is Russian democracy. The only weapon for it is state independence.” Hence, the UNA believed that Kravchuk's anathema for Russian democracy would have transformed itself into support for authoritarianism and nationalism within an independent Ukraine, especially as both the UNA and the national communists supported state-based (not ethnic) nationalism and allegiance to independent Ukraine.¹⁷²

“The vote in favour of independence, which was made by the population of Ukraine, was not the result of the activity of the so-called ‘democratic forces’ (apart from, possibly, in the territory of western Ukraine), but was the result of the turn towards independence of the higher organs of power in Ukraine, as was seen in the election of Kravchuk as president of Ukraine,” claimed Melnyk, head of the UNA executive. The state can be governed only by those able to take upon themselves this function. Therefore, until a new generation of administrators, managers and academics appears, the former “apparatchiki” remain “the only real, ruling layer. Yes, they poorly govern the state, but the ‘democrats’ (which is evident from the L'viv *oblast* executive) cannot govern in any manner whatsoever. The movement from a bad to a worse governance of the state, which the ‘democrats’ are proposing at the moment (by taking power into their own hands), would signify a quickening of the arrival of a catastrophe.”¹⁷³

The radical right noted that the new Ukrainian state did not have a “contemporary ideology and philosophy,” the vacuum which they hoped to fill: “Ukrainian nationalism in Ukraine has a perspective. The pointer to this is the position of the authorities now towards the UNA–UNS. It is not rushing to cut the branch upon which it will sit tomorrow.”¹⁷⁴ But, an alliance between the UNA and national communists failed to openly materialize,¹⁷⁵ despite allegations that elements within the Kravchuk administration directed funds to the UNA have circulated in Ukraine.¹⁷⁶

Its proponents believe that time is on their side.¹⁷⁷ The disillusionment of the public with democratic ideals, internal disputes within the democratic camp, and the economic crisis will, they believe, lead to a growth in their support. As Dashkevych points out, in post-war Germany and Italy, the Social-Democrats and the Christian-Democrats emerged as the strongest parties because of their pre-fascist roots. In contrast, in Ukraine, the only pre-Communist political movement was the OUN (but, this is true only for western Ukraine). The growing economic and social crisis will also lead to a demand for a “strong hand,” Shukhevych, former leader of the UNA, believed.¹⁷⁸ “The Ukrainian revolution will have two stages: the first will be national-democratic (the establishment of a Ukrainian Weimar republic, its selling off and parceling up into small bits); the second will be the energetic arrival onto the stage of nationalism in an organized form ...,” the UNA has argued.¹⁷⁹

In particular, therefore, Ukrainian nationalism has to adopt a more “respectable” profile, something evident in the activities both of the KUN and the UNA. Korchynskyi, the leading UNA–UNS thinker, has argued that, “[i]n Ukraine the time has arrived to reject basic, primitive nationalism, which looked at things only from the point of view of national-liberation.”¹⁸⁰ This attempt to give Ukrainian nationalism a more respectful image has also been attempted by the KUN which has shied away from the Dontsovite legacy found in the émigré OUNr.

As one author has pointed out elsewhere, the armed forces are too closely tied to the *raison d'être* of the Ukrainian state and, in the event of widespread secessionist demands, could be tempted to intervene in the political process.¹⁸¹ In addition, existing democratic parties are still weak and unable to fill the political vacuum created by the collapse of the soviet regime.¹⁸² This is fertile ground for the revival of authoritarianism; a future scenario that can not be ruled out in post-soviet societies such as Ukraine.

NOTES

1. See the L'viv ideological conference of SNUM in *Molod Ukrainy*, 18 June 1991 and the statement by the L'viv *oblast* SNUM “The Democrats have betrayed Ukraine,” in *Napriam*, No. 5, 1991.
2. *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 20 February 1992.
3. See the draft programme of the Organisation for the Liberation of Ukraine in *Samostiina Ukraina*, No. 2, April 1990.

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4. Text entitled "The Ukrainian National-Radical Party," by Evhen Baltserowycz, a L'viv-based analyst of the Ukrainian Republican Party, in the possession of the author.
5. See Alexander J. Motyl, *The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929. East European Monographs* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980).
6. See John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism* (Littleton, CO: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1980).
7. See Mykhailo Sosnovsky, *Dmytro Dontsov. Politychnyj Portret. Shevchenko Scientific Society*, Vol. 33 (New York: Trident International, Inc., 1974).
8. See Taras Kuzio, "OUN v Ukraini, Dmytro Dontsov i zakordonna chastyna OUN," *Suchasnist*, No. 12, December 1992, pp. 33–38.
9. See Peter J. Potichnyj and Yevhen Shtendera, *Political Thought of the Ukrainian Underground, 1943–1951* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986).
10. See Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "The Political Thought of Soviet Ukrainian Dissent," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 11, Fall 1981, pp. 3–16.
11. See V. Haynes, "Postmortem of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 15, Winter 1983, pp. 102–113.
12. See Taras Kuzio and Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence* (London: Macmillan, 1993), chapters 3–5.
13. See Taras Kuzio and Roman Solchanyk, "Democratic Political Blocs in Ukraine," *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 2, No. 16, 16 April 1993.
14. These included DSU, UNS, UNRP, UNP and SNUM. See *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 19 March 1991.
15. V. Korobeynyk, a leading member of the Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine, claimed that the organisations involved in the UNA had an "openly fascist orientation." See *Ukrainski Visti*, 5 May 1991. This is why the PDVU, and the New Ukraine bloc, of which it was the main member, refused to join the Anti-Imperial, Anti-Communist Front, established in January 1993 to oppose the revival of communism in Ukraine because the UNA had joined it. Oksana Khomchuk argues that the radical right in Ukraine cannot be labelled as "fascist" because they are primarily statist, aiming to preserve the unity and independence of Ukraine on Ukrainian "ethnic territory." See her, "The Far Right in Russia and Ukraine," *The Harriman Review*, Vol. 8, No. 2, July 1995. They are, therefore, very different from the radical right in Russia.
16. Oleh Vitovych, "Not Nazism, But a Change in Orientation," *Biblioteka Ukrainskoi Natsionalistychnoi Spilky. Zbirka Statyi*, July 1990, "Chastyna 1," 1991. But the L'viv-based UNA newspaper *Holos Natsii*, No. 6, February 1993 includes at least one article by Benito Mussolini.
17. *Neskorena Natsiya*, No. 4, November 1991.
18. *Zamkova Hora*, No. 10, 1992.
19. Copies of all three leaflets are in the possession of the author. See also the UNS bulletin directed towards military officers entitled *Kapitulatsiya*, no date.
20. *Natsionalist*, No. 7, 1992.
21. See the article by Anatol Bedriy entitled "The enemies of Ukraine are also in Ukraine!" in *Natsionalist*, No. 2, 1992; and Anatoliy Shcherbatiuk, "Fifth Columnists," *Nezaboryma Natsiia*, No. 1, January 1994 on the pro-Russian separatist and Cossack groups active in Ukraine.
22. On UNSO see *Holos Ukrainy*, 7 March, 13 May, 26 June and 3 July; *Nezavisimost*, 26 June 1992.
23. *Natsionalist*, No. 2, 1992; and *Nash Klych*, Nos. 2–3, 1992.
24. *Neskorena Natsiya*, No. 4, November 1991.

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25. *Natsionalist*, No. 7, 1992.
26. *Moloda Halychyna*, 30 April 1991. See the critique by Taras Chornovil of the integral nationalists in *Moloda Ukraina*, No. 12, 1990; and the criticism in *Holos Ukrainy*, 22 April 1992, both of which insinuate that either the security forces and/or Russia support these structures.
27. *Natsionalist*, No. 1, February 1991. This was formerly the organ of "Young Nationalists" but then became the journal of the Club in Support of Dmytro Dontsov (the leading pre-war Ukrainian integral nationalist thinker). The Club is a collective member of the UNA.
28. *Natsionalist*, No. 7, 1992.
29. See the interview with Slavko Artymenko in *Ukrainsky Obrii*, no date, 1991.
30. See the comment by Shukhevych: "The activities of the L'viv *oblast* council are not in the interests of Ukraine," *Moloda hvardiya*, 14 May 1991.
31. *Napriam*, No. 5, 1991.
32. See the article "Ukrainian Perspective: Monarchy or Republic?" by Les Bondarenko, a leading member of the SUM, in *Nova Ukraina*, No. 3, December 1991.
33. See Vasyl Barliadianu in *Derzhavnist*, No. 1, 1991.
34. *Neskorena Natsiya*, No. 2, September 1991. See also the map in *Ukrainsky Chas*, No. 1, December 1991.
35. *Napriam*, No. 5, 1991.
36. See his speech to a meeting of "Supporters of Nationalism," Kyiv, 11 October 1991 (*Neskorena Natsiya*, No. 4, November 1991).
37. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 20 June 1991.
38. *Do Natsii (Nezalezhny Natsionalistychny Vydanniu)*, No. 2, 1990. UNS organs, such as *Zamkova Hora*, often publish information on military knives, molotov cocktails and weapons.
39. *Nash Klych*, Nos. 2-3, 1992.
40. *Zamkova Hora*, Nos. 1 and 19, 1992.
41. *Zamkova Hora*, No. 1, 1992.
42. An exception was the arrest of two members of the UNA in Odesa on charges of calling for a "religious war against Muscovites and Yids." See *Robitnycha Hazeta*, 24 March 1992.
43. *Nova Ukraina*, No. 3, December 1991.
44. *Sobornist*, No. 3, May 1992.
45. Korchynsky believes that the two enemies of Ukrainian nationalism are "the ideologies of cosmopolitanism and democracy." See *Kyivsky Klub*, No. 1, 1992; and *Natsionalist*, No. 7, 1992.
46. A survey of Ukrainian attitudes towards other nationalities showed that only 3% of Kyivites harboured anti-Russian attitudes, while 51% expressed warm views. See *Ukrainsky Ohliadach*, No. 1, January 1992.
47. *Nash Klych*, No. 1, 1991.
48. *Zamkova Hora*, No. 10, 1992; and *Vizti z Ukrainy*, No. 35, 1992.
49. See *Za vilnu Ukrainy*, 26 September; *Molod Ukraina*, 29 September; and *Holos Ukrainy*, 31 October 1992.
50. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 2 March; and *Narodna Armiya*, 18 March 1993.
51. On the congress and resolutions see *Ukrainske Slovo*, Kyiv, 21 May, 28 May and 4 June 1993.
52. See *Rozbudova Derzhavy*, No. 8, 1993.
53. *Radio Ukraine*, 19 October 1992. The UNA described the KUN as "uniting former democrats from the URP, Rukh, coupled with a section of the diaspora which ties itself to the activities of the OUN, but to which they have no relation to the armed struggle of the 1940s and 1950s ..." *Holos Natsii*, No. 6, February 1993.

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54. *Shliakh Peremohy*, 8 March; and *Narodaya Armiya*, 3 April 1992.
55. Privately Roman Koval was also pessimistic about "a fertile ground" being found for Ukrainian nationalism in Ukraine. Conversations with Koval, Kyiv, August 1992 and September 1995.
56. *Samostiina Ukraina*, No. 5, 10 February 1993.
57. *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 24 April 1993.
58. *Ukrainske Slovo*, Kyiv, 11 May 1993.
59. Conversation with Zvarych, Kyiv, 29 September 1995. Zvarych believed that the OUNvU was a "ridiculous" invention.
60. *Konferentsiia Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv. Vybrani Materialy* (Kyiv: Ukrainian Information Service, 1992).
61. *Kyivska Pravda*, 29 January 1993.
62. On the July 1993 congress of the KUN see *Narodna Armiya*, 8 July 1993 and Slava Stetsko, Petro Duzhy *et al.*, eds, *Materialy Pershoho Kongresu Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv* (Kyiv: Kongres Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv, 1995).
63. The program of the congress was published in *Shliakh Peremohy*, 26 June 1993.
64. *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 14 May 1994.
65. *Visnyk UNP*, No. 4. The program was published in *Shliakh Peremohy*, 21 October 1990. The socio-economic and political conceptions of the UNP are outlined in *Ukrainsky Chas*, Vol. 1, No. 8, 1991, pp. 23–31.
66. See the report on the establishment of Kharkiv branch in *Visti Slobozhanshina*, No. 1, June–July 1990.
67. *Moloda Halychyna*, 10 April 1990.
68. *The Ukrainian Review*, Vol. 28, No. 2, Summer 1990, pp. 79–82.
69. *Visnyk UNP*, No. 4.
70. *Op. cit.*,
71. *Visnyk UNP*, No. 3, September 1990.
72. *Informatsiinyi Bulletin UNP*, No. 3.
73. *Visnyk UNP*, No. 1, June 1990.
74. Interview with Pryhodko in *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 21 October 1990.
75. H. Pryhodko, "The Present Situation in Ukraine," *The Ukrainian Review*, Vol. 38, No. 4, Winter 1990, p. 84.
76. *Ratusha*, 14–15 June 1991.
77. *Moloda Halychyna*, 10 April 1990.
78. *Shliakh Peremohy*, 22 and 29 April 1990; *The Ukrainian Review*, Vol. 38, No. 2, Summer 1990, pp. 71–79.
79. *Prohrama Vseukrainskoho politychnoho obiednannia Derzhavna Samnostijnist Ukrainy* (Kyiv-L'viv: DSU, 1990). See also *Homin Voli*, 26 January; and *Za nezalezhnist*, 2 March 1991. The statute is published in the same issue of *Homin Voli*; and *Za nezalezhnist*, 23 March 1991.
80. *Statut i Prohrama DSU* (Kyiv-L'viv, 1992). See also the appeal dated April–May 1991 in *Shliakh Peremohy*, 11 August 1991.
81. *Narodna Armiya*, 18 December 1992. The congress speeches and resolutions are printed in *Neskorena Natsia*, No. 1, 1993. A critical account is given in *Holos Ukrainy*, 23 December 1992.
82. *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 30 March 1993.
83. See the interview with Kandyba in *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 16 May 1991; and "Who are We?" in *Neskorena Natsiya*, No. 2, 1992.
84. *Zahrava*, No. 1, 20 April 1991.

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85. *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 26 December 1991.
86. *Neskorena Natsiya*, No. 7, April 1992. Supporters of the DSU, like the OUNr, are critically disposed towards the democratisation of the OUN which took place at its third extraordinary congress in 1943 in Ukraine. Different attitudes towards this democratization led to the second split in the OUN in 1954 in the emigration. See the article by Stanislav Ishenko in *Napriam*, No. 5, 1991.
87. Krasivskyi was imprisoned in the 1960s and 1970s for organising the Ukrainian National Front, which also followed in the traditions of the OUN and was primarily based in western Ukraine.
88. *Moloda Halychyna*, 18 September 1990.
89. As Stanislav Ishenko pointed out, although the DSU was the closest in Ukraine to the traditions of the OUNr, nevertheless, "you have to renew it, modernise nationalist ideology and raise its level of activity." This was a major cause in the split between the émigré OUNr, its traditionalist allies (DSU) and the UNA. See *Napriam*, No. 9, 1991.
90. *Holos Ukrainy*, 4 July 1991. According to Zvarych, the OUNr cut off its contacts and financial assistance to the UMPA/UNA in September 1991 because it no longer complied with the ideological tenets of the émigré OUNr. The OUNr did not, therefore, back the presidential campaign of Shushkevych launched by the UNA. Conversation with Zvarych, Kyiv, 29 September 1995.
91. *Neskorena Natsiya*, No. 2, September 1991.
92. *Zamkova Hora*, No. 18, 1992.
93. See the speech by the leader of the DSU, Ivan Kandyba, at the inaugural congress of the UKRP, in *Neskorena Natsiya*, No. 11, June 1992.
94. *Visti UMA*, No. 7, 25 October 1990.
95. *Neskorena Natsiya*, No. 3, 1992.
96. *Neskorena Natsiya*, No. 3, 1992. The URP constantly criticised the slogan "Ukraine for Ukrainians!" promoted by integral nationalists. See *L'vivski Novyny*, No. 21, 21 May 1991.
97. *Moloda Halychyna*, 18 September 1990.
98. *Neskorena Natsiya*, No. 2, September 1991.
99. *Zahrava*, No. 1, April 1991.
100. *Neskorena Natsiya*, No. 1, 1992; *Derzhavnist*, No. 2, April–June 1992, pp. 33–36; and *Ukrainian Reporter*, Vol. 2, Nos. 7–8, July–August 1992. All subsequent quotations are taken from this text.
101. See the interview with Zelenchuk in *Halychyna*, 22 July 1990.
102. See interview with Kandyba in *Visnyk UNP*, No. 1, June 1990.
103. *Moloda Halychyna*, 18 September 1990.
104. *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 26 December 1991.
105. See the interview with Yaroslav Prypin, head of the DSU in Sambir, L'viv *oblast* in *Sambirsky Visti*, 12 March 1991.
106. Originally, Kandyba had planned to simply re-name the DSU as the "OUN" but this had been opposed by those who had a continued interest in the DSU's further existence.
107. *Neskorena Natsiya*, No. 16, November 1993.
108. *Neskorena Natsiya*, No. 19, December 1993.
109. *Molod Ukrainy*, 10 April 1991.
110. By April 1991, they claimed to have registered 2.8 million people.
111. *Klych Ukrainy*, No. 1, 1991.
112. Open letter to the leadership of Rukh by P. Kahuy dated 5 February 1991, in the possession of the author.
113. *Visti UMA*, No. 4, 3 October 1990. Stepan Khmara, then joint deputy head of the Ukrainian Republican Party, believed that only 20 deputies of the People's Council were in favour of

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- independence. The remainder had become "collaborators," little different from the Communist "Group of 239." See *Visti UMA*, No. 6, 19 October 1990.
114. *Visnyk Rukhu*, No. 6.
 115. *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 21 October 1990.
 116. H. Pryhodko, "Three Months of Ukrainian Statehood." Unpublished text, in the possession of the author.
 117. *Ukrainski Novyny*, Warsaw, No. 261, 14 October 1990.
 118. *News from Ukraine*, No. 31, 1990.
 119. *Visnyk UNP*, No. 3, September 1990.
 120. *Ratusha*, 18 October 1990.
 121. *Visti UMA*, No. 3, 27 September 1990.
 122. *The Ukrainian Review*, Vol. 38, No. 4, Winter 1990, p. 65.
 123. *Visti UMA*, No. 4, October 1990.
 124. *Shliakh Peremohy*, 11 October 1990; and *Visti UMA*, No. 5, 10 October 1990.
 125. At both the second and third sessions of the UMPA the UN Declaration of Human Rights was called a "document foreign to us." See *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 5 July 1991.
 126. *Ukrainsky Novyny*, No. 309, 30 December 1990.
 127. *Ratusha and Moloda Halychyna*, 10 January 1991.
 128. *Radio Kyiv*, 1 February 1991.
 129. *Visti z Ukrainy*, No. 2, 1991.
 130. *Visti UMA*, No. 3, April 1991.
 131. *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 17 April 1991. See also *Visti UMA*, No. 3, April 1991; and *Shliakh Peremohy*, 21 April 1991.
 132. *Holos Ukrainy*, 4 July 1991.
 133. *The Ukrainian Review*, Vol. 38, No. 4, Winter 1990, p. 53.
 134. In fact, such a conference took place in May 1991 and led to the creation of VOST, but it allied itself with Rukh—not the UMPA. See *Ukrainian Reporter*, Vol. 1, No. 10, May 1991.
 135. *Visti UMA*, No. 3, April 1991.
 136. *Ukrainian News*, Kyiv, No. 35, 1992. The only organisation which came out in support of the strikers was the New Ukraine bloc. See *Ukrainian News*, Kyiv, No. 36, 1992.
 137. *Zamkova Hora*, No. 8, 1992.
 138. *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 14 May 1992.
 139. *Zamkova Hora*, No. 19, 1991.
 140. *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 17 September 1992.
 141. Andriy Shkil, head of L'viv *oblast* UNA and editor of *Holos Natsii*, at a meeting in Stryj attended by the author on 21 May 1995.
 142. *Holos Natsii*, Nos. 3–4, January 1993.
 143. *Reuters*, 30 December 1994.
 144. See his speech in *Holos Ukrainy*, 21 May 1994.
 145. Andriy Shkil, head of L'viv *oblast* UNA and editor of *Holos Natsii*, at a meeting in Stryj attended by the author on 21 May 1995.
 146. *Holos Natsii*, No. 7, February 1993.
 147. *The Guardian*, 21 March 1994.
 148. *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 16 February 1993.
 149. *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 15 February 1994.
 150. *Holos Natsii*, No. 9, February 1994.
 151. Conversation with Koval, Kyiv, 1 October 1995.
 152. Conversation with Yuriy Tyma, a UNA member of parliament from Ternopil, in Kyiv, 19 May 1995.

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153. *Granitsa Rossii*, No. 41, December 1995, p. 2.
154. *Trudovoi Tyraspol*, 17–23 February 1993.
155. *Holos Natsii*, Nos. 16–17, May 1994.
156. *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 1 and 19 November 1994.
157. The remainder of the SNUM and the Association of Ukrainian Youth (SUM) united into one organisation in 1991 and cooperated with the DSU. In the West the SUM belongs to the OUNr orbit.
158. *Ratusha*, 3–4 July 1991.
159. See two articles by Taras Kuzio, "Ukrainian Paramilitaries," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 4, No. 12, December 1992; and "Paramilitaries in Ukraine," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 6, No. 3, March 1994.
160. *Holos*, No. 17, 1991.
161. *News from Ukraine*, No. 41, 1991.
162. See the photograph in *Holos Natsii*, Nos. 16–17, May 1994.
163. *The Washington Times*, 25 February 1994.
164. See *Holos Ukrainy*, 24 and 25 April 1992.
165. See *Nezavisimost*, 6 March; and *Holos Ukrainy*, 7 March 1992.
166. *Molod Ukrainy*, 4 March 1992.
167. *Nezavisimost*, 26 June; and *Holos Ukrainy*, 3 July 1992. Korchynsky claimed that the counter-Sobor of those Bishops opposed to Filaret, who formed the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarch), had been funded by the Gorbachov Foundation.
168. *Moscow News*, No. 33, 1993.
169. *Molod Ukrainy*, 3 August 1993.
170. Personal Conversation with Yuri Mykolsky, deputy head of the UNA, February 1992, L'viv. Mykolsky was expelled from the URP where he had held the position of deputy head of the L'viv *oblast* branch.
171. *Natsionalist*, No. 2, 1992.
172. Comments by Korchynskyyi in *Neskorena Natsiya*, No. 2, September 1991.
173. *Neskorena Natsiya*, No. 2, September 1991.
174. *Zamkova Hora*, No. 10, 1992; and *Visti z Ukrainy*, No. 35, 1992.
175. *Natsionalist*, No. 7, 1992.
176. Zvarych believes these allegations have some truth behind them: "In the previous administration there were some people interested in supporting on a political level the UNA for one reason—when Kravchuk has an extreme right and left he has a better foothold in the centre." Conversation with Zvarych, Kyiv, 29 September 1995. Similar allegations of Soviet and since Russian state funding for the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia have surfaced in the Russian Federation.
177. *Ukrainska Dumka (London)*, 14 May 1992. Serhei Zhizhko argued that the main reason why Ukrainian nationalist groups are still weak is the lack of a Ukrainian national consciousness (*Slovo*, No. 10, 1992). Slavko Artymenko, meanwhile, argues that there is no civil society and class differentiation of society in Ukraine and, therefore, ethnic nationalism will not have a popular base, while political parties (in contrast to nationalist movements) do not yet have public constituencies. See *Ukrainsky Obrii*, no date, 1991.
178. *Ratusha*, 28 January 1991.
179. See the Ideological Platform of the UNS in *Ukrainsky Obrii*, No. 6, 1992.
180. *Kyivsky Klub*, No. 1, 1992; and *Natsionalist*, No. 7, 1992.
181. Alexander J. Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence. Ukraine After Totalitarianism* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), p. 173.
182. Andrew Wilson and Artur Bilous, "Political Parties in Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 4, 1993, p. 693.