Magocsi has held the Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Toronto for three decades during which he has devoted himself to both Ukrainian and Rusyn history. Critics of Magocsi, particularly in the Ukrainian diaspora in North America, focus on his Rusyn publications while ignoring his great contribution to Ukrainian history which remains unparalleled among other Western historians of Ukraine and other Chairs of Ukrainian History and academic institutions.

Keywords: Magocsi; Ukrainian history; Rusyns

Paul Robert Magocsi, the holder of the Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Toronto for nearly three decades, poses a three-fold paradox to Ukrainian Studies in the West (“The Scholar as Nation-Builder”). Firstly, he is the most prolific Western historian of Ukraine. As John Paul-Himka pointed out on the occasion of the Chair’s twentieth anniversary: “Few other scholars in the field could match such a record.” His “unusually productive career,” has been characterized by a wide variety of publications in “an unusual, yet unusually fruitful, scholarly style” (Scardellato viii). Himka pointed to highly praised books, such as Magocsi’s bibliographical guide to Galicia, his historical atlas of Ukraine, and the edited collection devoted to Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts’kyi. One could no doubt add his History of Ukraine – first published in the United States and Canada (1996), in a Ukrainian translation in Kyiv (2007), and now entering a revised second English-language edition – and his Ukraine: An Illustrated History (2007 and 2010).

Secondly, he is a multi-vector scholar. In addition to being the leading Western historian of Ukraine, he is also the leading Western scholar of Carpatho-Rusyns. No other Western historian of Ukraine can approach Magocsi in the quantity and quality of his publications on Ukrainian history. The Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University, which has three academic chairs, one of which is in Ukrainian history and was held for two decades by Roman Szporluk, has still to publish a history of Ukraine.

Thirdly, he has been marginalized by other activists in Ukrainian Studies in the West, who instead prefer to focus on his contribution to Rusyn studies. Consequently, his overall contribution to Ukrainian Studies has been downplayed or largely ignored.

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Ukrainian Studies in the West exists in its own ivory tower, which perhaps is the nature of all ethnic studies. Conflicts surrounding ethnic chairs are usually the norm, as seen in the Polish, Hungarian, and, of course, Ukrainian chairs at the University of Toronto. At the same time, the Ukrainian diaspora has never been united in its support for encouraging Ukrainian Studies more broadly. The nationalist wing of the Ukrainian diaspora, which has always been the most organized, in particular never rallied behind the funding drives for academic positions and it generally has not supported or attended academic activities.

The tragedy of the Ukrainian Chair at the University of Toronto is perhaps that a broader coalition of opponents were added to those doubters who always existed within the nationalist wing of the Ukrainian diaspora. Displeasure at the University of Toronto for not hiring “their man” led to a de facto boycott of the Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Toronto. The boycott served nobody, least of all all Ukrainian Studies, since it meant that the Chair was always under-funded. This prevented the emergence of a full academic agenda often associated with university chairs, whether research students and projects, periodicals such as a newsletter and journal, or seminar series and conferences.

The Chair of Ukrainian Studies therefore became de facto a “one-man” show with Magocsi at center stage. This could have turned out to be a disaster if it had been led by other scholars associated with Ukrainian Studies who are on the whole not very prolific. But, the disaster never took hold. Magocsi’s research and publications record outshone in quality, innovation, and quantity those of other Western academic centers devoted to Ukraine and of Western scholars in Ukrainian Studies.

Magocsi is not the typical historian who sits in archives for years pondering over dusty manuscripts, checking the accuracy of dates, and then many years later finally writing a historical work. His prolific nature extends beyond academic scholarship to that more commonly found within political science; namely, public advocacy (in Himka’s words “popular-scientific” or even publitsystyka) that has taken the form of interviews (25 of them by the time of the twentieth anniversary of the Chair), letters to the press, and articles published in newspapers and pamphlets. As Himka notes, Magocsi “is, in short, not studying history, but taking part as actor in the historical process. In other words, he uses his knowledge of history to influence history” (Scardellato 9). Magocsi therefore strays into territory usually reserved for political scientists and publicists. This author sees nothing wrong in this but ivory tower academics no doubt would.

A bibliography of Magocsi’s publications from 1964 to the twentieth anniversary of the Chair of Ukrainian Studies in 2000 provides an indication of the extensive nature of his contribution to Ukrainian Studies and scholarship more broadly. The bibliography contains 23 books, 17 edited works, 16 brochures, three catalogues of library collections, 48 book chapters, 65 articles in academic journals, 256 articles in other periodicals, 31 encyclopedic entries and 32 book reviews published by Magocsi over a 36 year period.

Quantity and volume do not dominate Magocsi’s extensive publications record. While undoubtedly prolific, his high standards demand quality, a fact that has produced a litany of positive reviews of his publications. His scholarly interests have been that of a historian of Ukraine, of Carpatho-Rusyns, of central Europe more broadly, as well as a scholar of nationalism and national identity (The Roots of Ukranian Nationalism). His approach to the former (history) has been unsurprisingly influenced by his approach to the latter (nationalism and identity questions).

Magocsi’s approach to the treatment of Ukrainian history has not been sufficiently recognized as having revolutionized the manner in which “Ukrainian history” can be
treated. His inclusive approach is based on a civic rather than ethnic view of Ukraine; in other words, an approach that emphasizes the narody Ukraïny (peoples of Ukraine) rather than the more ethnic ukrains’kyi narod (Ukrainian people). Such an approach has provided a great service to Ukrainian Studies by modernizing the study of Ukrainian history based on the civic conceptual framework dominant in Western historiography.

Magocsi’s *History of Ukraine* (1996, 2010) is one of three histories of Ukraine published in the West since Ukraine became an independent state. Interestingly, all three are by Canadian-based scholars. Orest Subtelny’s (*Ukraine. A History*) and Serhiy Yekelchyk’s (*Ukraine: Birth of a Modern History*) histories focus on ethnic Ukrainians and, therefore, continue in the traditional framework of Ukrainian historiography based on histories of the Ukrainian people.

The second expanded edition of Magocsi’s *History of Ukraine* (2010), originally published in 1996, will expand his innovative and thoroughly Western approach to the study of Ukrainian history by including even greater detail on ethnic groups, such as the Crimean Tatars, who lived for centuries within the boundaries of present-day Ukraine. It is regional diversity and ethnic pluralism that go to the heart of Magocsi’s “multicultural” approach to inclusive history that has been long overdue and which integrates Ukrainian history writing into the mainstream “inclusive,” territorial approach favored by Western historians.

The influence of histories of Ukraine published in the West is not confined to the Western world. Subtelny’s *Ukraine: A History* was the first to be translated and published in Ukrainian and Russian in the early 1990s; since then it has had print runs in Ukrainian and Russian that total nearly one million in Ukraine. The Ukrainian-language edition Magocsi’s *History of Ukraine* was not published in Ukraine until 2007, by which time it faced competition from several home-grown historians. Unlike Subtelny, therefore, who had little competition from historians in Ukraine when the first Ukrainian edition of his history appeared in 1991, Magocsi’s *History of Ukraine* will be in a market where competition now exists. Ukrainian readers are, however, now able to compare and contrast Subtelny’s and Magocsi’s different approaches to Ukrainian history and Magocsi’s *History of Ukraine* will undoubtedly leave an intellectual mark.

Subtelny’s one-volume survey was the first in 50 years to bring Ukrainian history up to the present. Conceptually, it is similar to early one-volume histories of Ukraine by Dmytro Doroshenko (*A Survey of Ukrainian History*) – and Ukraine’s most pre-eminent historian, Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi (*A History of Ukraine*). All three histories are devoted to the Ukrainian people, that is, ethnic Ukrainians who have lived on the territory known since 1992 as Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russians, Poles, Crimean Tatars, and Jews, who undoubtedly played an important role in the history of Ukrainian territory, are only treated in a minor way. In contrast to these earlier histories, Magocsi provides a survey of all peoples and events that took place on Ukrainian territory. By using this framework he follows the standard Western civic historiographical approach, which treats events that took place among all peoples living within a given state and that in this case constitutes the narody Ukraïny (peoples of Ukraine).

Magocsi’s innovative methodology is therefore different to the traditional approach of his predecessors. By integrating Ukrainian history into a Western framework he is drawing on a civic nationalist approach, something that is likely to be more unsettling to Russian historiography than is the traditional ethnic approach favored by historians from Hrushevs’kyi to Subtelny. Magocsi’s history inevitably contributes to the ongoing debate as to where and what constitutes “Russia” and who, therefore, are the “Russians.” Should not Ukrainian nationalists, whether in the diaspora or in Ukraine, therefore reappraise
Magocsi because of his preeminent contribution to defining “Ukrainian history” as that associated with Ukraine’s borders since becoming an independent state?

As a scholar of nationalism, Magocsi’s scholarship invites greater controversy. This aspect of his career includes his contribution as a scholar and also his public advocacy of Carpatho-Rusyns. The field of nationalism studies is an area that Magocsi contributed to in his seminal article, “The Ukrainian National Revival: A New Analytical Framework.” The framework stresses the importance of intellectuals, such as himself, in the construction of ethnic groups (“The Ukrainian National Revival”; “Ukrains’ke natsional’ne vidrodzhennia”). Magocsi’s understanding of nationalism is impressive, and it is therefore a loss to the scholarly world that he has not devoted greater energy to this field. His first presence at the pre-eminent scholarly body that focuses on nationalism and identity in central and eastern Europe and Eurasia, the Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN), was in 2007. The association’s quarterly journal Nationalities Papers had previously published articles by Magocsi on Hungarians in Transcarpathia and the 1918–1920 Lemko Rusyn Republic, and since then the remarks at a panel devoted to his career that was organized by the ASN’s president, Dominique Arel.

Magocsi’s involvement in the Carpatho-Rusyn movement has been subjected to criticism not only by the Ukrainian diaspora but also by his scholarly colleagues. It is indeed difficult to see where to draw the line of “objectivity” between impartial scholarship and direct and high level involvement in politics and nation-building. In the field of political science, individuals such as myself, have been pigeon-holed as “nationalists,” simply because of the ethnic group to which I am presumed to belong (I am actually of Ukrainian-Italian ethnicity and hold British citizenship). Is then Magocsi as a public advocate also a “nationalist,” whether Ukrainian, Rusyn, or both? Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi, the doyen of Ukrainian historical scholarship, did combine history writing and politics, but this was over a century ago and in a different era, when Ukraine was not an independent state. Magocsi has been accused of instigating the Rusyn revival, an allegation he categorically denies by saying that he has followed, not initiated, developments among Carpatho-Rusyns.

Magocsi helped to found the Carpatho-Rusyn Research Center in 1978 and remains its president; he has also regularly participated in the World Congress of Rusyns held every two years, and since 2005 he has been its chairman. His writings and involvement have given Carpatho-Rusyns a strong sense of self-confidence by providing them with language books, maps, and histories. Two of the histories were funded by the government of Slovakia, although not without controversy that led to the banning of one of the books, ironically in post-Communist, “democratic” Slovakia. The first of the histories was published in 1994 by a civic organization, the Rusyn Renaissance Society, with funding and approval from Slovakia’s Ministry of Education. However, within a few months of the book’s appearance, in early 1995 the Slovak government, headed by the nationalist-populist leader Vladimír Mečiar, confiscated all copies from the publisher and demanded a list of all names to whom the book had been given. The move was based on a report from the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, which was allegedly critical of Magocsi’s characterization of the World War II Slovak state’s alliance with Nazi Germany and its deportation of Jews to the Auschwitz death camp, as well as with a historical map among the illustrations, which depicted a proposed Rusyn state far into “Slovak” territory. After four years of protest by the Rusyn Renaissance Society, the confiscated copies were returned to the publisher and the book was finally “released” to the public by the Ministry of Education in 1999; that is, soon after the Western-oriented coalition government under Mikuláš Dzurinda came to power following the 1998
Slovak democratic revolution. The fate of Magocsi’s second and more general survey (2007), has been more positive as its appearance was made possible with special funds provided by Slovakia’s Vice-Premier and Minister of Nationalities and Human Rights, and the book has been widely promoted and distributed with the government’s imprimatur. Magocsi has also been proactive in promoting three language congresses (1992, 1999, 2007) to promote the creation of Rusyn speak as a literary language in its own right and not just a dialect of Ukrainian.

The East Slavic inhabitants of the Carpathians could have adopted a Rusyn, (as a fourth East Slavic group), a Ukrainian, or a Russian national identity. Magocsi’s preference is for a Rusyn identity, and he has condemned the marginal pro-Russian orientation with its aggressive anti-Ukrainianism (notably in a 2008 open letter). He also opposes Rusyn political separatism which has never been popular in Transcarpathia. Western scholars, however, have often confused regionalism and minority rights with separatism and they have included Transcarpathia alongside Crimea as threats to Ukraine’s territorial integrity. This is a major mistake as separatism in Ukraine has only manifested itself in the Crimea.

Magocsi supports a resolution of the Rusyn question through Ukraine’s integration into the European Union (EU) and therefore has distanced himself and moderate Rusyns from the extremist pro-Russian wing of the Rusyn movement. In the 2010 presidential elections Viktor Yanukovych’s association with granting greater support for national minority rights and his opposition to Yushchenko’s Ukrainian nationalism was undoubtedly something that Magocsi could sympathize with. Within the Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko camps there are nationalists who hold radically anti-Rusyn views. At the same time, the Yanukovych presidency is far more unlikely to be successful in Ukraine’s integration into the EU, as seen by the growing criticism already in autumn 2010 of threats to Ukrainian democracy. Tymoshenko, alone among Ukrainian politicians, has the greatest level of contacts to the EU through the membership of the Fatherland Party that she leads in the center-right European Peoples Party (EPP), the largest political group in the European Parliament. The EPP issued a highly critical statement about threats to Ukraine’s democracy in September 2010.

Magocsi has had a long-term interest in ethnic groups in North America and in national minorities throughout Europe and was a major contributor and map editor to the *Harvard Encyclopaedia of American Ethnic Groups* (1980). He conceived and was the editor-in-chief of the monumental 1400-page *Encyclopedia of Canada’s Peoples* (1999), a project undertaken in the 1990s when he was a director of the Ontario provincially-funded Multicultural Society of Ontario.

He supports a future Europe that emphasizes regions over states. Magocsi’s views on this issue, first presented in French at a colloquium on Europe’s threatened languages and cultures held in 1990 in Nice, France were subsequently published in various languages throughout Europe and North America (*The End of the Nation-State? The Revolution of 1989 and the Future of Europe*). Therefore, in Magocsi’s view the Rusyn revival is not a unique phenomenon in Europe, but follows a general trend in the 1990s that coincided with the collapse of Communism in central and eastern Europe and decentralization among traditional nation-states in the EU. National minorities, such as the Bretons and Corsicans in France, or the Carpatho-Rusyns of Slovakia, have used this newly available political space to revive identities that were previously hidden from view by homogenising nation-states. The revival of a Rusyn orientation is therefore, in Magocsi’s view, a normal part of the revival of minorities throughout Europe, including Ukraine. If Ukraine wishes to be treated as a “European” state that upholds human and minority rights, then the
authorities in Kyiv should recognize Rusyns as a distinct nationality. This issue was even raised in direct communication with President Viktor Yushchenko in a 1996 letter from Senator John McCain and later in a meeting with his vice-presidential running-mate, Sarah Palin, during the visit of Ukraine’s president to the United Nations in September 2008.

The EU’s supra-national framework has traditionally been supported by minority and regional groups, such as the Scots and Catalans (and Rusyns), because its existence is seen as a counterweight to the centralizing tendencies of traditional nation-states. Ukraine’s national democrats, who are traditionally the country’s staunchest supporters of European integration, have yet to come to terms with the EU as an institution that by its very existence undermines the sovereignty of nation-states. This consequence of EU integration is something Magocsi applauds but which Ukrainian national democrats most certainly will not.

One difficulty noted by the British-German anthropologist Chris Hann is the assumption by Magocsi that all East Slavs living in Transcarpathia are in fact Rusyns who are being forcibly designated as “Ukrainians” (Hann). The few Western scholars who have surveyed the region follow Magocsi’s lead by either designating all of its inhabitants as “Rusyn” or in defining the region as “multi-ethnic.” Lemkos, Boikos, and Hutsuls in Galicia and Transcarpathia were collectively defined as “Rusyns” until the twentieth century, while Lemkos and Boikos also called themselves “Rusnaks.” During the Soviet era, those groups as well as Cossacks, Pinchuks, Polishchuks, and Lytvyns were classified as Ukrainian sub-groups and the idioms spoken by these groups were therefore classed as “Ukrainian dialects.”

In the 1989 Soviet census, 78.4% of the inhabitants of Transcarpathia claimed Ukrainian ethnicity, close to the average throughout Ukraine. That figure grew to 80.5% in the 2001 census (Natsional’nyi sklad). Official data, therefore, would support the argument that during the 1990s there was a Ukrainian and not a Rusyn revival in Transcarpathia; that is, the very opposite of what is claimed by Magocsi. Nevertheless, any claim regarding a Ukrainian national revival is undermined by the unwillingness of Ukrainian census takers to include an entry category for “Rusyn” in the 2001 census, perhaps out of a fear that some inhabitants of Transcarpathia would indeed re-define their identity from Ukrainian to Rusyn (see Kuzio “Rusyns in Ukraine: Sorting Out Fact from Fiction”).

One problem for official and parallel census-takers is that many people do not see the need propounded by intellectuals such as Magocsi, policy makers, NGO’s, and nation-builders to adopt hard decisions as to whether they are Rusyns, Ukrainians, or Ukrainian-Rusyns. Most people in Transcarpathia, after all, were free in the 2001 Ukrainian census to declare themselves as being both Ukrainian citizens and Rusyns. Another way to define their identity could be for the inhabitants of Transcarpathia to declare themselves to be Ukrainian by ethnicity and by citizenship while at the same time they could still adhere to a Rusyn regional identity. National identity in general is always in flux and even more so on the ground in border regions such as Transcarpathia. Different options are available to local citizens who could identify themselves in a civic sense according to their citizenship (Ukrainian) or ethnicity (Ukrainian, Rusyn, or Ukrainian-Rusyn). An added confusion rests on the conflation of “citizenship” and “nationality” that is commonly found in the West; Western customs and immigration forms regularly ask for one’s “nationality” when they mean citizenship.

The situation is changing on the ground in Transcarpathia, although it is too early to ascertain if the trend will be in the direction of a greater distinct Rusyn identity or the reinforcement of a regional Ukrainian-Rusyn identity, or more likely both. The Transcarpathian Oblast Council voted on 7 March 2007 to officially recognize the Rusyn people as
an indigenous nationality in the region, meaning presumably that the next census (in 2011 if they are to be conducted every decade) may include an entry category for “Rusyn.” The 90 council members voted 71 for, two against, with two abstaining. The obląst council vote was promoted, or instructed, by presidential secretariat head Viktor Baloga, himself a native of the Mukachevo region of Transcarpathia. It is therefore a second irony that has been lost on Ukrainian nationalists both in Ukraine and in the diaspora that Rusyns were recognized not by the “russophile” former President Leonid Kuchma but by “their” national-democratic President Viktor Yushchenko. During the Yushchenko era (2005–2010) the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) combatted separatism in Donetsk, Crimea and the pro-Russian extremist wing in Trans-Carpathia (Kuzio “SBU Stops Separatism in Its Tracks,” “Yanukovych’s Election Opens up Crimean Separatist Threat”); the latter case had been condemned by Magocsi as President of the World Congress of Rusyns.

This is now a golden opportunity for Magocsi to apply his scholarship on Ukrainian and Rusyn national identity and national revivals through integrating Transcarpathia into nationalism studies and political science, which has largely not been undertaken (Národ znikadial). But, here is where Magocsi could, just as many nation builders have elsewhere, come unstuck.

Let us return to the question of who are the Rusyns? As Hann pointed out, “the term Lemko must be seen as part of the problem. It does not emerge ‘naturally’ from within the group so defined, but is an attempt to impose order and borders on a continuum of cultural variation” (195). Hann argues that Magocsi does not believe that Lemkos are a nation in their own right, “but part of a nation of Carpatho-Rusyns, with a larger component in Ukraine,” and smaller fragments in Slovakia, Romania, and Serbia. But, who are we to say whether Lemkos are not a separate, fifth East Slavic group, part of the Rusyn nation (Magocsi’s preference), or part of the Ukrainian nation (the Ukrainian nationalist and traditional viewpoint)? The 1947 Vistula Operation (Akcja Wisła), which completed the ethnic cleansing of East Slavs from southeastern Poland, could have ukrainianized the Lemkos, while the post-1945 Soviet occupation of Transcarpathia may have ukrainianized the majority of that region’s inhabitants (as Magocsi initially included in his Harvard monograph). Magocsi’s (The Shaping of a National Identity, 275) concluding line of his monograph reads: “Although any one of the three [Russian, Ukrainian, and Rusyn orientations] may have been implemented, because of the specific culture of the region and the demands of political reality, only the Ukrainian orientation proved to be enduring.”

Two questions spring to mind. Firstly, did Communist Poland’s inadvertent mistreatment of Lemkos lead to their Ukrainianization? Secondly, was the USSR a nation-builder in western Ukraine as much as it most certainly was a nation-destroyer in eastern Ukraine?

After 1945, Soviet nation-building policies in Transcarpathia redefined East Slavs from “Rusyns” into “Ukrainians.” Following the disintegration of the USSR in 1991, some of these Transcarpathian “Ukrainians” have redefined themselves as “Rusyns.” But the limited available data point to only a small proportion of East Slavs in Transcarpathia redefining themselves as Rusyns, at least until now. The March 2007 decision of the Transcarpathian Obląst Council to recognize Rusyns as a distinct nationality could undermine post-1945 Soviet Ukrainian nation-building in Transcarpathia, or it could have limited impact. It is perhaps too early to reach any conclusion. In a major scholarly study of censuses in Ukraine written before the obląst council’s 2007 decision, Arel believed it unlikely that there would be an increase in the number of Rusyns after decades of Ukrainian nation-building in Transcarpathia. Who will be proven correct in the years to come: Arel or Magocsi? This issue remains a fascinating potential area for future researchers.
The *Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture* (2002, 2005), co-edited by Magocsi, uses the term *Rusyn* to cover a broad variety of East Slavic peoples living in the Carpathians, a problem that re-occurs in Magocsi’s other scholarship on Rusyns. Those who have been defined in the past as Rusyns, Ruthenians, Carpatho-Ukrainians, Carpatho-Russians, and Lemkos are often included as sub-groups of “Rusyns” in a manner that could be readily compared to the Ukrainian homogenizing tendency of defining Rusyns as one of many sub-Ukrainian ethnic group. The maps that appear in the *Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture* implicitly assume that the East Slavic population of the Carpathian region – that is, Transcarpathian Ukraine, southeastern Poland, and northeastern Slovakia – is entirely Rusyn. For example, the map entitled “Carpathian Rus’, 2000,” indicates with shading Carpatho-Rusyn settlements as of the year 1920 (186). That time frame precedes Soviet ukrainization after 1945 in Transcarpathia and the ethnic cleansing of Lemkos in 1947 in Poland, two events that may have inadvertently contributed to their ukrainianization. Therefore, a map indicating the situation in 1920 tells us little about the national identity of Transcarpathians nearly a century later.

Such wide-embracing claims are impossible to prove without survey data, opinion polls, or census results. Without these, an accurate national (Ukrainian, Rusyn, or Ukrainian-Rusyn) affiliation within the East Slavic population of Transcarpathia cannot be ascribed. The data available from official and unofficial census surveys conducted in 2001 show that only a small minority of the Transcarpathian’s East Slavic population defined itself as “Rusyns.” The 2001 official census reported 10,200 Rusyns, 672 Lemkos, and 131 Boikos in Transcarpathia (*Natsional’nyi sklad*). The ten-thousand figure is somewhat close to the 6004 and 22,000–28,000 Rusyns found in two parallel unofficial censuses conducted by local Rusyn civic organizations, including the Soim (Diet) of Transcarpathian Rusyns which arrived at a 6000 figure. Thus, only between 0.67 and 3.11% of East Slavs in Transcarpathia defined themselves as Rusyns in the 2001 census.

The integration of Rusyn studies within political science has not yet taken place. Although Magocsi holds a joint history-political science appointment at the University of Toronto he would never claim to be a political scientist. Nevertheless, he undoubtedly understands the importance of discussing the Rusyn question within the framework of political science. The gap in Magocsi’s present studies of Transcarpathia is caused in part by the absence of survey and polling results. Not a single Western academic study published since Ukraine became an independent state has looked at Transcarpathia through the use of survey results or opinion polls. Within political science in North America the use of such quantitative data is central to the study of attitudes, feelings, orientations, and views. Surveys and polls on Ukrainian issues have been used extensively in Western scholarship of Ukrainian national identity and regionalism in the works of Western scholars. Surveys and public opinion polls by well-known and respected Ukrainian sociological institutions, such as the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), the Razumkov Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Studies, Sotsis and Democratic Initiatives, have not been urged to collect survey data on national identity in Transcarpathia or on Rusyns.

Such a lack of survey data has been coupled by the general neglect within political science studies of Transcarpathia and of Rusyns in Ukraine. While Western studies of Ukrainian regionalism have been extensive, they have tended to focus on the polar opposites of L’viv and Donets’k with Kyiv as the midpoint. Crimea has also been studied extensively because of its separatist challenge to the Ukrainian state and its vantage point as the only region with an ethnic Russian majority. At the same time, Western studies of Ukrainian regionalism have until now ignored Transcarpathia, something that one would hope could become a future priority in Magocsi’s scholarship.
Paul Robert Magocsi the multi-vector scholar is by far at one and the same time the leading Western historian of Ukraine and the leading Western scholar of Rusyns. As Alexander Motyl points out in his remarks at this symposium, the Ukrainian aspect of his scholarship could act as the “Other” for his Rusyn scholarship. Or, perhaps the answer is more straightforward; namely, that Magocsi is a member of a small group of uncommon academics who have a gift of project management in publishing, teaching, and public advocacy that spans two fields of scholarly interest, in this case Ukrainian and Rusyn Studies.

In our personal and academic lives we all eventually conclude that it would be pointless to attempt to agree with everything that a partner, a friend, or a colleague publishes and advocates, especially if that person is a prolific scholar. Why then are some of us attempting to accomplish this impossible feat in the case of Magocsi?

References


