

# The Khmelnytsky Uprising and Ukrainian Nation-Building

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The question of "nation" and "nation-building" is a minefield on which the scholar must tread with trepidation. The terms of the discussion—"nation," "nationality," "people," "nation-state"—are at the core of the problem, because they are invested with diverse meanings and great emotion. In using them we frequently become caught up in models: historical and non-historical nations, West and East European nation-building, old and new nations, etc.<sup>1</sup> For the purposes of this discussion, we shall resort to a tried and true model—the distinction between a cultural nation and a political nation. The cultural nation, today frequently described as "ethnic," is a linguistic and cultural community often encompassing both elites and masses (in the past, however, high culture was confined to the literate minority.) The Germans and Armenians of the seventeenth century were such nations, with the distinction that the latter was also a religious community, followers of the Armenian church. The political nation designates a community with allegiance to a political entity, a sovereign state or a local *patria*.<sup>2</sup> In this sense, Bavaria, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and Scotland were all seventeenth-century political nations. For early modern Europe, political nation refers primarily to the elite orders who enjoyed privileges and rights in a given territory or fatherland. Such elites could belong to two or more political-national communities (e.g., the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.) The distinction between cultural and political nations is not clear-cut, since no one would deny that political circumstances influenced cultural communities and that linguistic, cultural, and religious affairs influenced political communities. The discussion here leaves aside the endless debate on the nature of modern nations and nationalism, since it is confined to the early modern world. It does not deny that national communities and concepts of nation underwent substantive transform-

ations in the modern age, but it assumes that both have their origins in an earlier period.

A Polish scholar, Józef Chlebowczyk, has put forth a heuristic model for European nation-building that emphasizes the relationship between culture and politics.<sup>3</sup> He separates the evolution of the West European model (state community–language community–national community) from that of the East European model (language community–national community–state community). While he examines mainly nineteenth- and twentieth-century processes, Chlebowczyk avoids the mistakes of Western scholars who declare Eastern Europe a *terra incognita* for nation-building before 1800 and who see nation-forming as an almost mechanical process through which nineteenth-century national awakeners, influenced by new German ideology, formed national movements that transmitted nationhood to the masses.

Chlebowczyk is also careful to differentiate what are usually called the historical nations of Eastern Europe from the non-historical. In essence, historical nations are those that have existed for considerable periods as political nations, whereas non-historical nations have been almost exclusively ethno-linguistic or cultural nations. The experience of Eastern Europe, however, shows that Chlebowczyk has inaptly named his models, since his “East European variant” does not apply to the historical nations of the region.

Despite the general “stateless” situation of East European nations in 1800, they had different pasts that were to be reflected in different futures.<sup>4</sup> However unfortunate the terms “historical” and “non-historical” nations are, the Poles and Hungarians certainly differed from the Slovenes and Slovaks. The former had long, continuous state traditions, claimed territories beyond their ethnic-linguistic territory as part of their legacy of political control, and had native political elites—nobles dedicated to national and political traditions. The latter had not formed long-lasting political entities, had never existed as united distinct territories, and had no traditional national elites. Polish and Hungarian nationhood was always political—Slovak and Slovene nationhood was at first merely cultural. The strong traditions of Polish and Hungarian medieval and early modern statehood and the *de facto* existence of Hungarian statehood after 1867 distinguish them from the typically “non-historical” and “East European” (according to Chlebowczyk’s model) Slovaks or Slovenes.

Between these two extremes fall the Czechs and the Ukrainians. The Czechs had an old historic state, a political and cultural tradition of greatness, and a territory that, although integrated into the Habsburg domains, remained distinct as historic provinces. While unsuccessful, the

Czechs of the nineteenth century focused on the Bohemian "State-Right" and their claim that the Habsburgs should restore the rights of the Czech Crown. By the late eighteenth century, however, the Czech literary language had atrophied and the Czech elite had been assimilated to German culture and Habsburg political loyalty. Therefore, the Czech national movement of the nineteenth century revived Czech culture and marshalled Czech speakers to acquire positions of political, social, and economic power.

The Ukrainians had been the centre of a great medieval empire and had maintained distinct political entities to the fourteenth century (Galicia-Volhynia). Then, after they were integrated into Polish and Lithuanian states in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, they lost much of their traditional elite to assimilation and conversion. At that point, they followed a singular course in nation-building in early modern Europe. They engendered a new military elite, the Cossacks, who established two polities in the core Ukrainian lands. In the late eighteenth century these polities, the Hetmanate and the Zaporozhian Sich, were abolished and the elite of the Hetmanate were integrated into the nobility of the Russian Empire. By 1800, the Ukrainians, in contrast to the Czechs, had no distinct administrative historic territorial entity. Nevertheless, they probably retained a higher portion of their traditional elite as part of their cultural nation and had more recent traditions of a distinct political nation in control of a *patria*.

In the nineteenth century, Czech nation-building proceeded much more rapidly than Ukrainian, particularly because language became the most important criterion of nationhood. Crucial to the difference between the two peoples is the distinction between the Western and Eastern Christian worlds. The Western Christian peoples began replacing Latin as their secular language—and, in the case of Protestants, their sacred language—during the late medieval and Renaissance periods. The Eastern Christians clung to their sacral languages, which in many cases were more closely related to their modern vernaculars. By the fifteenth century the Czechs had produced a major vernacular literature that in the nineteenth century would inspire a literary national revival. Old Ukrainian literature was written in the Eastern Church's sacred language. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries early literature written in the vernacular never drove Slavonic from the field. Therefore the modern Ukrainian linguistic-literary movement created a new literary language based on the popular vernacular rather than reviving an earlier tradition.

The vernacular linguistic circumstances of the two nations also differed. While the Czechs' assimilators were the Germans, from whom they were clearly linguistically distinct, the Ukrainians' assimilators were

the linguistically akin Poles and Russians. Hence, in the nineteenth century, the Ukrainian movement was to face greater difficulties than the Czech in forming a modern linguistic-cultural community. The difficulties were magnified by the differing political, cultural, and socio-economic conditions of Bohemia and Galicia within the Habsburg lands and between the Habsburg and Romanov domains. These differences furthered the Czech movement and hindered the Ukrainian.

In 1800, the Ukrainians seemed to have some advantages over the Czechs in the process of nation-building, largely because of the different fate of the seventeenth-century revolts in Bohemia and in Ukraine. The Bohemian estates rose against Habsburg centralizing policies and increasing Catholic pressure. When they were put down, the Habsburgs had a free hand even to create a new elite and to emasculate the Bohemian Crown. The period that followed the Battle of White Mountain of 1620 is usually called the "Darkness" in Czech historiography. In contrast, the Ukrainian Cossacks led a revolt against Poland and Catholic pressure that tore part of Ukraine away from the Polish state. By establishing a new political, social, and cultural order, the revolt engendered a new political nation in Ukraine and renewed the cultural nation. The Bohemian revolt retarded Czech nation-building, whereas the Khmelnytsky revolt advanced the process in Ukraine.<sup>5</sup>

Other early modern revolts also affected the process of nation-building. The primary examples are the Netherlands, Portugal, and Catalonia.<sup>6</sup> In recent years, historians have criticized Pieter Geyl's view that the Dutch-speaking community expressed its nationality in the revolt in the Low Countries.<sup>7</sup> Certainly, however, the revolt cast the die for the nation-forming process in those disparate linguistic, cultural, and political possessions of the King of Spain in the German Reich. Rarely has there been an example as clear-cut of a new political order forging a new culture and identity as in the Dutch Republic. New ruling classes and a new official faith, Calvinism, served to reinforce that national identity.

The Golden Age of the United Provinces overshadowed the destruction and dissension that had occurred during the revolt. The revolt did leave many untidy ends. Begun in the south, it succeeded in the north, leaving the Spanish Netherlands eventually to form a Belgian identity common to French and Dutch speakers, based on Habsburg loyalties and Catholicism. Modern linguistic nationalism has subsequently made Walloons and Flemings "nations" within the "Belgian nation," and history keeps them apart from their respective linguistic kin in the Netherlands and France. But if the Spanish Netherlands and nineteenth-century Belgium were, at least, united in a Catholic faith, the Dutch Republic and its Calvinist ethos were to encounter great difficulties



in trying to integrate the large Catholic minority in the Republic into the national community. If the Dutch Republic was too large in religious territory, it was also too small in linguistic territory. In general, the outcome of the revolt, or war of independence, has been the major determinant of the Dutch nation, but it left behind the major obstacles of integrating divergent religious groups and of dealing with the divide of Dutch speakers.

On the Iberian peninsula, two other early modern national struggles were fought by subjects of the Spanish king.<sup>8</sup> The restoration of the Portuguese Kingdom was the simpler—the elite of a long-separate kingdom reasserted its political separateness and restored a collateral of a traditional dynasty after an interlude in which attempts were made to integrate it into the domains of the Spanish Habsburgs. With this action, the political existence of the Portuguese nation and Portuguese cultural integrity were ensured. There would be at least two national communities in Iberia.

Far different was the revolt of the Catalans.<sup>9</sup> Catalonia, a medieval county that became part of the Kingdom of Aragon, contained most, but not all, of the Catalan-speaking population. Mediterranean-facing Catalonia found itself at odds with the Atlantic Spanish Empire centred in “provincial” Castilian Madrid. At the same time, Castilian had made inroads against the Catalan tongue. Military exactions unleashed a long revolt in which the elite and the masses took part, albeit at different times and for different reasons. The rebels called on the French for aid. Ultimately, Catalonia was reduced to obedience, with the transfer of two Catalan-speaking districts to France as the major political change occasioned by the revolt. Catalonia did not become a third independent Iberian state. Its political autonomy was curtailed further, and use of the Catalan language was continuously circumscribed.

The loss of Catalan political autonomy in an increasingly centralized Spanish state did not put an end to the problem. Linguistic nationalism in the nineteenth century revived Catalan consciousness, and the resistance of the Catalans, based in part on the memory of their great revolt, continues to plague Spain to this day. As we shall see, in Ukraine parallels exist with the Dutch, Portuguese, and Catalan nation-building experiences. Contrasts exist as well, however.

What was the state of Ukrainian nationhood prior to 1648?<sup>10</sup> Of course, we can deal with this complex question only in the most general terms. In contrast to the West Slavs and the South Slavs, who had from the first consolidated into separate political entities generally comparable to the modern nations of the region, the formation of the far-flung Kievan Rus’ state constituted an extremely important, though fleeting, period of

East Slavic unity. This period, which left behind a name, "Rus'," a dynasty, and a faith, made the process of forming nations in the East Slavic territory extremely complex and extended. By the sixteenth century, clear distinctions were made between the Ruthenians and the Muscovites that reflected different political, social and cultural characteristics, though views that they were both part of Rus' were also expressed.<sup>11</sup> The Ruthenians included the Ukrainians and Belarusians, and they were viewed as one cultural-linguistic-religious community of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Had a Ruthenian polity existed, we might have two rather than three East Slavic nations today. Instead, the Union of Lublin of 1569, which removed most Ukrainian-speaking territory from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, furthered the process of differentiating the Belarusian and Ukrainian peoples, who already lived under different geographic and economic conditions. It also served to consolidate a Ukrainian-Ruthenian community by placing Western Ukraine (already Polish-ruled before 1569) and Eastern Ukraine—Lviv and Kiev—into one political entity, the Kingdom of Poland. This furthered the integration and mixing of the Ukrainian population, as did the massive west-to-east migration. All the while, however, the two parts of Ukraine continued to have different legal and linguistic administrations, as well as different social orders, *de facto*. Unlike Western Ukraine, Eastern Ukraine, in particular, contained numerous magnate-princes and the Zaporozhian Cossacks.

Although the Volhynian, Kiev, and Bratslav palatinates that were annexed to the Kingdom of Poland in 1569 were not a united political entity, they shared a legal code different from that of the Kingdom, Ruthenian as their official language, and guarantees for the Orthodox church. These particularities made these territories (to which the Chernihiv palatinate, conquered from Muscovy in 1618, was added in 1635) a *de facto* Ruthenian-Ukrainian regional bloc, an incipient *patria*, and engendered in its noble elite the sense that they were a Rus' political nation. The West Ukrainian territories, although not part of this political grouping, contained many petty nobles who had a strong identity as Ruthenians. But, just as the Ruthenian nobles of the Ukrainian lands were becoming more articulate in expressing their Ruthenian identity, they were diminishing in number through assimilation and religious conversion and were being diluted by migrants from Poland, thereby undermining the sense of a separate identity for a Ruthenian political elite. While nobles were the only recognized political nation in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, three other social groups played a major role in early modern Ukrainian nation-building. The Ruthenian burghers, discriminated against by the Catholic urban patriciates, developed a

strong Ruthenian identity and communal organizations. At times they cooperated with the nobles in defending the Orthodox church, thereby emphasizing a Ruthenian link across the noble-common divide. The Cossacks in Eastern Ukraine were a military frontier population excluded from participating in the nobles' Commonwealth, but possessing an organizational structure that at times made them a virtually autonomous entity in the lands they inhabited. They had the potential to contest the nobles' political and social position, and their support of the Orthodox church associated them strongly with the Ruthenian identity. The identification of the Cossacks with the Ruthenian tradition was primarily propagated in writings of the Orthodox clergy. Although composed of both nobles and commoners, all the Orthodox clergy was relegated to a subordinate position in Catholic Poland and Lithuania.

The entire Ruthenian community of the Commonwealth—Belarusians and Ukrainians—drew its identity largely from the Orthodox Rus' church. In its popular name (the Rus' faith) and in its historical-cultural traditions, the Orthodox church provided an institutional structure that united the Ruthenians and demarcated them from the Latin Christian Poles and Lithuanians. From the early fourteenth century, after the metropolitans of Kiev took up residence in Russian territory (end of the thirteenth century), the rulers of Galicia-Volhynia, the grand dukes of Lithuania, and the kings of Poland had sought a separate metropolitan for their Orthodox subjects. The final creation of two metropolitan sees for the East Slavs in 1458, and the severance of the allegiance to Constantinople of the metropolitan see of Moscow, furthered the differentiation of religious and cultural life between the Ruthenians and the Russians. The existence of one church structure for the Belarusians and Ukrainians served to reinforce the perception of the unity of one Ruthenian nation. The shift of the church's centre to Kiev with the return of the metropolitan to his titular city in the 1580s made the Ukrainian land, in general, and the city of Kiev, in particular, the focus of the Rus' community.

In the sixteenth century the Ruthenian community declined in number as many nobles and burghers converted to Protestantism and Catholicism. Despite translations of scriptural works into Ruthenian in the 1560s, a separate Ruthenian branch of Protestantism, which would have made the Ruthenian community multi-religious, did not emerge. Also, despite loyalties to the Rus' land and Ruthenian ancestors, Orthodox converts to Roman Catholicism inevitably came to be viewed as Poles as they accepted the faith of the *Liakhs* or Poles.

The Union of Brest was the first real fissure in the conterminous situation of the Orthodox church and the Rus' "nation." The refusal of

both Uniates and Orthodox to accept a religious divide in the Rus' church seems to have been motivated partly by concepts of communal unity. By the first decade after the Union, the Orthodox showed that they would continue to wear the mantle of the Rus' national church, for the Uniates had proved unable to inspire widespread loyalty or to gain numerous converts. Even as this situation changed, the Uniates had more success in the Belarusian than in Ukrainian territory. That created a religious divide between Belarusians and Ukrainians, since the Ukrainian areas of Galicia, the Dnieper basin, and most of Volhynia remained staunchly Orthodox. Conversions of Orthodox in Ukraine were almost all to Roman Catholicism rather than to the Union, although the energetic efforts of Bishop Metodii Terletsky of Kholm in the 1630s demonstrated that in time the Union might have more success in the Ukrainian lands.

The defence of the faith was described as the defence of the Rus' nation. The enterprise drew in more and more elements of the population, including Cossacks and burghers, just as religious polemics were sharpening the arguments of the literate classes on national history and traditions. Schools, printing presses, and confraternities arose as part of a cultural revival stimulated initially by the Latin Christian and Polish challenge and later by the internal community religious polemics. It was accompanied by a rediscovery of the Rus' past—an argument on the tenth-century conversion of Volodymyr resounded throughout the Rus' land. With it came greater attention to the Rus' state that once had been centred in Kiev.

The weakest link of this cultural revival for Ukrainian nation-building was the language question. Even though Slavonic was not fully comprehensible to most Ukrainian speakers, the clerical intelligentsia viewed it as the preferred literary language. Ruthenian was used for a new literature and for communication, but, deprived of the authority of Slavonic, it began to give way to Polish, a closely related language useful throughout the Commonwealth.

By 1648, Ukraine was a land in which the elements of national consciousness were rapidly developing, precisely because of the threat to the national inheritance. Still, they remained inchoate. The Ruthenian nobility had only somewhat coalesced into a political nation, with a national myth distinct from that of the Polish nobility. The lands incorporated into Poland at the Union of Lublin had only the rudiments of a separate administrative-legal structure. The various orders cooperated only under duress. The native culture had developed rapidly, but still continued to lose the elite to Polish culture. The Orthodox church had revived and it continued to serve as an institutional framework for Ruthenian identity, but the Uniate church put the association to the challenge, while the



increasing influx of Latin Christians and the growing number of converts undermined the position of the Orthodox church in the Ukrainian lands. The Ruthenians of Ukraine had a more developed sense of being a cultural nation, an ethno-linguistic-religious community with a history and culture (albeit frequently in conjunction with the Ruthenians of Belarus), than the socio-political elite had of being a political nation defending regional particularism in a Rus' *patria* in Ukraine. But, by 1648, a Rus' national consciousness, which had barely existed in Ukraine in the mid-sixteenth century, had strongly emerged. With it, nation-building made major advances just as major losses were also occurring by assimilation and integration into the Kingdom of Poland.

To what degree did national sentiment inspire and influence the Khmelnytsky revolt? We do, after all, have a contemporary case, Portugal, in which a successful revolt was undertaken primarily for national reasons—the restoration of national statehood. We also have the example of the Catalan revolt, in which the opposition to Castilian intrusion combined with Catalan patriotism to incite a great uprising. In judging the role of national sentiment in the Khmelnytsky revolt, we must be careful to distinguish elaborated expressions of national sentiment from widespread popular xenophobia. We also face difficulties in separating the general expressions of national sentiment from the usual goal of nationalism in the modern age, namely, the establishment of a national state. Finally, we must be aware of how closely religious and national sentiments were intertwined in the conception of Rus'.

Extant general manifestos of the rebels in which they presented their reasons for embarking on the war are few. Among them there are certainly no calls for a "national-liberation" war. Unlike in Portugal or Catalonia, no kingdom or well-defined united regional institutions existed for a traditional elite to defend as an embodiment of the "nation." Indeed, the Ukrainian revolt was not launched by a traditional political elite, and even though many nobles joined the revolt, the great nobles opposed its social radicalism. The first statements by the rebels declaring national goals were not made until after Christmas of 1648, including Khmelnytsky's vow that no longer was he fighting for his own cause, but for the liberation of the entire Ruthenian people as far as Kholm and Lviv. While the account of Khmelnytsky's comments of early 1649 included a programme for overthrowing Polish rule in all the Ukrainian lands, and a declaration of hostility against the Poles, the years following brought few elaborated statements of the national elements of the revolt, and those few were intermixed with views of the "Poles" as class and religious enemies. It was not until 1655-56 that Khmelnytsky returned to an open espousal of the unification of the Ukrainian lands and the

overthrow of Polish rule in Western Ukraine as his goal.<sup>12</sup>

If we have few "proto-nationalist" statements by the rebels, we do find that the revolt was immediately viewed by its contemporaries as a conflict between the Rus' and Polish nations. The Rus' "nation" was in rebellion, and in Polish statements resentment against the Rus' nation was expressed in conjunction with anti-Orthodox and anti-Cossack feelings.<sup>13</sup> The amalgam of national, religious, and social factors makes each component difficult to delineate, but, in seventeenth-century terms, the war certainly took on national dimensions. Regrettably, we know more about Polish attitudes toward the war as a national conflict than we know about national sentiments among the Ukrainians. Nevertheless, the taunt of a Cossack colonel to the Ukrainian Orthodox magnate, Adam Kysil, who served as a Polish emissary—"Bone of our bone, you have abandoned us and joined the Poles"—apparently conveyed a widely held sentiment.<sup>14</sup> Whether we choose to call this sentiment national, tribal, or xenophobic, it is clear that anti-Polish feeling, strengthened by its combination with anti-Catholic and anti-landlord-magnate views, pervaded the revolt.

The rebirth of Ruthenian historical consciousness that began in the late sixteenth century informed the leadership of the revolt, which was in practice establishing a new political entity. Knowledge of a Rus' political past underlay Khmelnytsky's self-designation as Rus' autocrat (*samoderzhavets' ruskyi*), as it did the expression of the poet who attached a panegyric to the Zboriv register of 1649, stating that "Rus' had fallen under the twelve sons of Volodymyr, and was being raised up under the twelve sons of Bohdan."<sup>15</sup> The idea that the Volhynian, Kiev, Bratslav, and Chernihiv palatinates or some part of them formed a political entity derived from the regional concepts of the pre-1648 Rus' nobility. Khmelnytsky echoed that political idea when he asserted that unlike Poland and Lithuania, Rus' had not sworn allegiance to Jan Kazimierz. In reality, however, the Ruthenian nobles of the lands incorporated under the Union of Lublin had provided no full political programme for a Ruthenian *patria* before 1648, although they had expressed regionalist dissent in the name of Rus' and its Orthodox church. In this fluid situation the Zaporozhian Cossacks, as they formed their new polity, were ultimately able to take over the role of a Ruthenian "political nation," but the process was a slow one and its articulated programme emerged only at the end of Khmelnytsky's hetmancy and the beginning of Ivan Vyhovsky's. A national interpretation of the revolt was fully elaborated only at the beginning of the eighteenth century, in the works of Samuil Velychko and Hryhorii Hrabianka.

To what degree the popular masses viewed themselves as part of a

Ruthenian national community cannot be known. Two factors speak for widespread Ruthenian national sentiment. First, the church was defined as Ruthenian; the faith was the Ruthenian faith. The struggle between the Uniates and Orthodox for control of the Ruthenian church had involved large segments of the population. Certainly the burghers had been active in forming a network of Rus' Orthodox confraternities that spread throughout the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands, and the Cossacks had actively intervened in church affairs. Through such struggles and organizational activities, some sort of Ruthenian consciousness that united men beyond their village or town must have reached much of the population. Second, the seventeenth-century Ukrainians were a mobile people. The Carpathians were still being colonized through the sixteenth century. Men from all over the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands were being brought together in the Bratslav, Kiev, and Zaporozhian lands, far from their native villages. Here a heightened consciousness could form, as it would among immigrants to the New World in the nineteenth century, who only became aware of their common Italian, Polish, or Ukrainian identity when they contrasted their linguistic and cultural similarities to inhabitants of distant villages and towns in the Old Country with their "otherness" from other immigrant groups and the native American population. Indeed, seventeenth-century Ukraine contained "other" groups—Poles, Jews, Tatars, Armenians—who could serve to remind the peasants, burghers, and Cossacks that they were all Ruthenians.

In 1648, economic interest, ties of corporate order, religious loyalty, regional solidarity, and sentiments of ethno-historical community all combined into what was perceived as a struggle of the Ruthenians against the Poles. One need not believe in the primacy of national allegiance or the unity of all Ruthenians who carried on the struggle to see that the revolt took on the coloration of a national struggle. The leaders put forth their claims as representatives of Rus', and their opponents saw all Ruthenians as potential traitors. Regional particularism and historical consciousness of the pre-1648 period served as a basis for the view that the emerging Cossack polity represented the Rus' nation and tradition.

The most important result of the revolt of 1648 was to reintroduce the political element in defining Ruthenians. From the Zboriv Agreement of 1649 to the Hadiach Agreement of 1658, recognition grew that at least the territories of the old palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav, and Chernihiv should be organized as a Rus' political entity. Of more significance in the long term, the Cossack Host evolved into the civil administration of the core Ukrainian territory. Over the next one hundred years, the polity headed

by the hetman and administered by the Cossack *starshyna* shaped political and national allegiances in Ukraine. The new political formation, combined with its particular social composition, i.e., the designation of a large part of the population as Cossacks, provided the context for a Ukrainian political nation and *patria*. Since this political social order did not encompass all the Ukrainian lands, its role was ambiguous. It was both a piedmont and a distinctive land with a particularist identity.

The revolt was especially significant in differentiating Ukrainians from Poles. The period prior to 1648 had been one in which a maturation of Rus' consciousness occurred simultaneously with an acculturation of the Ukrainian elite to Polish models and, in some cases, assimilation to Polish or Commonwealth identity. Despite their early seventeenth-century development, the distinctly Ruthenian identity and culture were showing signs of slow but inevitable erosion and disintegration within the Kingdom of Poland. That would prove to be the fate of the Ukrainian lands that remained part of the Polish state, but the process was greatly accelerated by the Khmelnytsky revolt, which drew the centre of the Ruthenian cadres and Ruthenian political activities eastward.

In the area where the revolt succeeded, it halted the process of integration of Ukrainians into Polish identity. The revolt drew a sharp line between Poles and Ukrainians as political nations, between the nobles' Commonwealth and the Cossack Hetmanate and Sich. Poles and Polish culture still influenced the Ukrainians of the lands where the revolt succeeded, but they did so as a foreign influence on a community distinct in politics, religion, culture, social structure, and identity. The failure of the Hadiach Agreement demonstrated that the break was final. The Cossack polity became a Rus' in which there could be no *natione Polonus, gente Ruthenus*.

If the Cossack revolt changed the direction of Polish-Ukrainian relations, it nonetheless hastened the preexisting processes that differentiated between Belarusians and Ukrainians. The Union of Lublin had reinforced cultural, economic, and social factors that were dividing the Ruthenians of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania from the Ruthenians of the Kingdom of Poland. These differences were only occasionally expressed, as when Belarusians were called "Litva" and Ukrainians "Rus'." Although the Cossack revolt had reached the Grand Duchy of Lithuania—in particular, the ethnically Ukrainian territories around Horodnia—the "Belarusian" regiment proved to be an ephemeral phenomenon. Cossack campaigns were largely directed toward the West Ukrainian lands, for after 1654, the Muscovites dominated the northern or Belarusian front. Khmelnytsky and, later, the Ukrainian planners of the Union of Hadiach sought to include all the Ruthenian lands of the



Kingdom of Poland in their Cossack polity—that is, the Ukrainian lands. The Ruthenians of the Grand Duchy were falling out of their horizons. Distinctions increased as Ukraine began to be called “Little Russia” and Belarus “White Russia.” “Little Russia” had long described Ukraine in whole and in part. In the early seventeenth century it had been used by the Ukrainian Orthodox clergymen to discuss their *Rossiia* and its relationship to Muscovy—*Velikaia Rossiia*. The term *Belaia Rossiia* did not have the antiquity or stability of *Malaia Rossiia*. At first it designated the northeastern lands of Belarus. Now it was broadened to include the Ruthenian lands of the Grand Duchy. In both objective characteristics and subjective views, the Khmelnytsky revolt differentiated between the Belarusians and Ukrainians on a level other than the vernacular linguistic, thus furthering the evolution of two modern nations.<sup>16</sup>

The long-term impact of the period on Russian-Ukrainian national relations is much more ambiguous. The most obvious answer is that through the Pereiaslav Agreement, Khmelnytsky brought the Ukrainians into a political connection with the Russians that was ultimately to result in the political unification of Ukraine and Russia, the creation of the ideology of a “Russian” nation composed of Great and Little Russia, the formation of a joint Russian literary language and culture for the elite, and the linguistic russification of the Ukrainian elite. Such a view is based on the nineteenth-century outcome of the events, far removed from the situation as it existed in 1650s, or, for that matter, from the situation until the early eighteenth century.

What is quite correct is that the revolt and the Pereiaslav Agreement brought Russians and Ukrainians closer than they had been earlier.<sup>17</sup> Before 1648, Russian-Ukrainian relations had consisted of border trade and merchant trips, journeys by Ukrainian clerics to Muscovy in search of alms, settlements by Ukrainians across the frontier into the area of Putyvl and Sloboda Ukraine, and the intervention of Ukrainians in Muscovite affairs during the Time of Troubles, especially the campaign of Hetman Petro Sahaidachny of 1618. These relations were to intensify greatly after 1648, as refugees fled war and plague to Sloboda Ukraine and as more and more Ukrainian clerics took up residence in Muscovy. The settlement of Sloboda Ukraine brought Ukrainian and Russian populations into close proximity for the first time. The Ukrainian clergy’s migration to Russia, accompanied by Patriarch Nikon’s desire to reform the Russian church, resulted in the recasting of the Russian church and the intensification of the Old Belief schism. The split in the Russian church opened Muscovy to a virtual invasion of Ukrainian churchmen in the late seventeenth century. A third group who came into direct contact with Russians were Cossack envoys and officers, who journeyed to the

Muscovite capital more and more frequently, in contrast to the relatively few missions of the preceding fifty years.

Whereas Ukrainian trips to Muscovy represented tendencies that had predated 1648, Russian trips to Ukraine, except for those made by merchants, were a relatively new phenomenon. Russian clergymen (among them Arsenii Sukhanov) accompanied the Pereiaslav negotiators and then made numerous trips through Ukraine. Russian embassies came to Ukraine frequently and Russian voevodas took up residence in Kiev. Then, too, Russian armies marched into Ukraine.

All these contacts were the beginning of a process of interpenetration that would ultimately culminate in the situation of 1800. In the 1640s and 1650s, however, the results of these contacts were very different. Apparently, they led to an increased consciousness of the two peoples' differences that could not be overcome by any theory of dynastic rights or historical descent. Even linguistic similarities and a common Orthodox faith did not become binding forces, for translations between the two peoples' literary languages were necessary, and then two very different Orthodox traditions viewed each other with hostility. Different political and social structures served to reinforce concepts of estrangement between the *moskali* and the *rusyny* or *cherkesy*. The triumph of the Cossack system in Ukraine probably only reinforced the differences between the two societies, as even the formerly similar institution of serfdom went into decline in Ukraine. Hence, in their early stage, the new contacts probably reinforced the views and broadened the numbers of people in Ukraine who saw themselves as distinct from the Muscovites or Great Russians. Paul of Aleppo, an Arab prelate who travelled in Muscovy and Ukraine, left some of the best testimony of the popular conception of how alien the two lands were at the time.<sup>18</sup>

While the revolt of 1648 in general served to reinforce the Ukrainians' sense of distinctiveness from their neighbours, it also began to break down concepts of unity among Ukrainians. Before 1648, the centre of Ruthenian cultural and religious life had shifted to Kiev, and the Zaporozhian Cossacks had come to play an important role in Ruthenian consciousness and "national" life (albeit more actively in the 1620s than in the early 1640s). In the first surge of the revolt, the Cossack order extended through the entire Ukrainian territory, and in the late 1640s and early 1650s it still had a chance of embracing almost all the lands incorporated into the Kingdom of Poland by the Union of Lublin, including Volhynia, as well as the Podolian palatinate. But despite Khmelnytsky's plans in 1656 and the strivings of the negotiators of the Hadiach Agreement, the land of the Cossacks, "Ukraine," did not include the West Ukrainian lands. Instead, it expanded eastward and northward

to include the Left Bank. Ukrainian Cossack formations even extended into former Russian territory. The centre of the new polity and the Ukrainian nation was situated firmly on the banks of the Dnieper. Ultimately, the "old Ukraine," the Right Bank and towns such as Chyhyryn, would be lost to this socio-political order and the "new Ukraine" of the Poltava and Chernihiv region would remain the heartland of the Hetmanate and later Ukrainian national tradition. It played this latter role until at least the 1930s. The regional division of the Ruthenians of Ukraine into the Cossack nation of the centre and east and the non-Cossack nation of the west had already begun by 1658. With the shrinking of the Cossack Ukrainian polity, even the seventeenth-century concepts of Ruthenian unity of all "Little Rus'" receded. By the late eighteenth, the political or historical unity of "Ukraine on Both Banks of the Dnieper" had also become merely a memory.

The Khmelnytsky uprising is an important example of change in a social constituency and a political nation during the process of nation-building. Before 1648, Ruthenian nationhood had been embodied in the nobility in accordance with the Polish model, although the princes occupied a special position that had no place in the Polish system. The role of the princes, epitomized at the end of the sixteenth century in the powerful figure of Prince Konstantyn Ostrozky, declined as the Polish *szlachta* model took root and as more and more wealthy and great princes converted to Catholicism. At the same time, the nobles of both the old lands of the Kingdom of Poland and the lands incorporated during the Union of Lublin were assuming the social and political outlook, but not the social structure, of the Polish nobility. With this came the view that the Ruthenian Orthodox nobles were the political nation of Rus', an allegiance that did not, however, negate their participation in the political nation of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as a whole. Conversions in the sixteenth and early seventeenth century diminished the numbers and influence of this Rus' political nation. Consequently, the burghers of the major cities and, later, the Cossacks came to play a greater role in Ruthenian national affairs than that exercised by any non-noble group in the Polish territories in Polish affairs. Although the burghers began the Rus' cultural and religious revival and pioneered concepts of a Rus' *natio*, or cultural-religious-historical community, they lacked the wealth, the strength of arms, and the unity among their burgher communities to supplant the noble Rus' nation. By contrast, the Cossacks, despite their lower cultural level and weaker tradition as representatives of the Rus' nation, had the strength and the means to protect the Rus' church and to overturn the political and social order. The "nationalization" of the Cossacks in the 1620s and the extension of the Cossack order beyond the

lower Dnieper, which had waxed and waned since the 1590s, prepared the ground for the shift of the Rus' political nation to the Cossacks.

The number of inhabitants of Ukraine who were officially recognized as Cossacks by being enrolled in the register and who called themselves Cossacks expanded tremendously. The Zboriv Agreement mandated 40,000 Cossacks, and the Pereiaslav Agreement authorized 60,000. Counting wives and children, this made hundreds of thousands of people part of the new Cossack order. Even larger numbers were considered Cossacks in mid-seventeenth-century Ukraine. Indeed, central Ukraine, where about one million people lived, became the Cossack land, although large numbers of burghers and peasants still lived there, as did some nobles and clergy. Between 1648 and 1658, the terms "Cossack," "Ruthenian," and "Ukrainian" came, in a loose sense, to be synonyms. The process was far from smooth, as the Cossacks only gradually took on their new role and Ruthenian society only slowly accepted the change. By the late 1650s, the Cossacks had come to represent the land of Ukraine and Ruthenian national interests. Their military conquest had created a new political nation to embody early modern Ukrainian nationhood, although from the first the officers and elite groups sought to monopolize rights and privileges.

The revolt ensured that Ukrainians—Cossacks, burghers and clergy—would remain the dominant group in the cities and towns of the area where the revolt succeeded. Otherwise, the towns might have followed the pattern of Ukrainian towns further west, where Poles, Jews, and others were gaining dominance in the economy and later in number. It was still realized that the Ruthenians of the West Ukrainian lands, where Cossacks did not take root, were part of the same cultural-historical community as Cossack Ukraine. But after the 1650s, the Western Ukrainians had almost no political nation left to represent them, and their "nationhood" was institutionalized solely in their church. Only in areas of the Hetmanate did a native Ukrainian landed gentry (Cossack *starshyna*) and burgher traditions develop in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The Khmelnytsky years reshaped the religious component in Ukrainian nation-building. Khmelnytsky's victories sealed the unity of church and nation. The Union was rooted out and Roman Catholics and Protestants were weakened wherever the rebels triumphed. Nevertheless, the higher Orthodox clergy, many of whom were nobles, only reluctantly accepted the new role of the Cossacks. They were also aware that any identification with the rebels on their part might cause the loss of the Ukrainian and Belarusian eparchies and parishes outside the rebels' control, and they strove mightily to keep their jurisdiction over them.



While their efforts in the eparchies of Lviv and Peremyshl constituted, in practice, an attempt to maintain Ukrainian national unity, their striving to retain the Belarusian lands was an attempt to keep the entire Ruthenian community intact. Their subsequent failure, and the Muscovite church's assumption of authority over the Belarusian dioceses conquered by Muscovite armies in 1654, would further the national differentiation between the Belarusians and the Ukrainians.

Although in the long run the common Orthodoxy of Russia and Ukraine would retard Ukrainian nation-building, in the 1650s the church continued to play a largely positive role in the process. The higher clergymen strove to keep their church separate from the Moscow patriarchate and to maintain the particular legal order and religious customs of Ukraine. While the Muscovite delegation in 1654 cited a common Orthodoxy as a reason for Ukraine to pass under the tsar's suzerainty, the Ukrainian higher clergy seemed to view Moscow's Orthodoxy as a threat to their autonomy. By reaffirming the ties of "*Little Rossiia*" to Constantinople, Metropolitan Sylvestr Kosov sought to keep his church as distant as possible from "*Great Rossiia*" and its church. Through most of the 1650s, the church continued to be a unifying and differentiating factor for Ukrainian nationhood and to have an integrating role for the new Cossack Ukrainian identity, despite its reservations about the Cossack leaders. In 1659, however, the insistence of Russian envoys that the Pereiaslav Agreement had included the transfer of Kiev to Moscow's jurisdiction prefigured an end to this role for the church. With the transfer of the Kiev metropolitan see to the Moscow patriarchate in 1685-86, the Orthodoxy viewed as a necessary characteristic of Ukrainian nationhood could be seen as a unifying factor for "*All-Russian nationhood*." At the end of the seventeenth century, the Kievan see was diminished, Western Ukraine went Uniate, and the autonomy of the Orthodox church eroded, thereby greatly changing the role of the church and religion in Ukrainian nation-building.<sup>19</sup>

For Ukrainian nation-building, the study of the national past was essential in establishing Ukrainian identity. Interest in the past of the Ukrainian land and writings about the history of Kievan Rus' had characterized the decades prior to 1648. That history-writing both answered the needs of a newly awakened historical consciousness and stimulated further growth of that consciousness. At the same time, by the 1620s, the Zaporozhians had become the subject of historical discussion (the *Hustyn Chronicle*).

Little new historical writing was composed by Ukrainians in the period 1648-1658. Rather, the decade was one in which history was being made, so much so that it would remain the focal point for all writings on

the Ukrainian national past well into the nineteenth century. It redirected history-writing from the Kievan Rus' past to the causes and aftermath of 1648, and provided a heroic age that occupied both the learned and the popular imagination. It also provided new producers and consumers of history in the persons of the Cossack administration: by the turn of the eighteenth century, the officials of the Cossack Hetmanate—Roman Rakushka, Samuil Velychko, Hryhorii Hrabianka and Stefan Savvitsky—were setting down the history of Khmelnytsky's great war. Among the clergy, too, writers of its history were to be found. By 1672-73, the abbot of St. Michael's Monastery of the Golden Domes, Teodosii Sofonovych, included the Cossack wars in his account of the Ruthenian people's history. The panegyrist who wrote in the Zboriv register that what the sons of Volodymyr had let fall, the sons of Bohdan would elevate gave expression to an essential change in Ukrainian historical consciousness. By restoring a political history to the Ruthenians, the revolt created a heroic age that would become the subject of a new national historiography within two generations after the uprising.<sup>20</sup>

The Cossack revolt also had positive consequences for the national language. The administration of the Hetmanate used a Ruthenian language close to the vernacular Ukrainian of its inhabitants. Both the decline in use of Ruthenian and the polonization of the language were reversed. Polish was not, of course, forgotten: it continued to have a major influence in the Hetmanate well into the eighteenth century. What did occur was that numerous official and literary works were written in Ukrainian, and these, in turn, became part of the national legacy. Still, in the fervently Orthodox Hetmanate, Slavonic continued to be the preferred tongue of the clerical and lay elite, educated together at the Kiev and, later, Chernihiv and Pereiaslav academies. That preference retarded the growth of the vernacular as education reached deeper and deeper into the Hetmanate's society. Ultimately, the Slavonic that tied the Ukrainian cultural elite to Russian Slavonic culture would be transformed into a Slavono-Rhossic language that came to be more and more like the hybrid Russian language of the eighteenth-century Empire.

In the first decade of the revolt, few works of art and literature were created and many others destroyed. Nonetheless, the uprising greatly influenced the revival of a distinct and vigorous Ukrainian culture. Paul of Aleppo, travelling in Ukraine with Patriarch Macarius in the 1650s, was impressed by the beauty of the singing, painting, and architecture he encountered there. These attainments stemmed from an amalgam of Slavonic Orthodox and Western culture that was forged throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Although declining in numbers, the Ruthenian Orthodox nobles had continued to patronize the work of

churches and monasteries throughout Ukraine. Nevertheless, by the 1640s, the convert Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, the Chernihiv castellan Aleksander Piaseczyński, and new Polish migrants to Ukraine were channelling Ukraine's wealth toward Latin Christian churches and art works. Suddenly the revolt shifted the government and the lay elite back to patronage of the Eastern church. From the benefactor Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky to Cossack colonels and Kaniv burghers, those who rose through the revolt were building churches and schools and commissioning icons and portraits. The process began as early as the 1650s. By the early eighteenth century, the new patronage had produced the famed Kiev of the Golden Domes.

It would be impossible to envisage the flourishing of the Cossack or Ukrainian Baroque without the great revolt. War and the Soviet authorities have destroyed much of this inheritance, but in literature, music, art, and architecture, the Baroque of Cossack Ukraine still stands as the Ukrainian national period *par excellence*—a fusion of Western, Eastern, and indigenous traditions. A comparison of its achievements with the relative poverty in national culture of the Ukrainian lands that remained under Poland in the eighteenth century shows how great a difference the uprising, the reassertion of Orthodox dominance, and the creation of a new Ukrainian political nation made. With the decline of the Hetmanate and the coming of new styles—classicist and international—the tradition of the Ukrainian Baroque would give way to a new Imperial tradition: painters—Boryvykovsky, Levytsky—and musicians—Bortniansky, Vedel—who had been nurtured in the Ukrainian cultural milieu would contribute their talents to the new Imperial culture and capitals. Without the period from 1650 to 1750, however, it would be impossible to speak of a distinctive national Ukrainian style before the nineteenth century, with the possible exceptions of Kievan Rus' architecture and the Galician icon school. Modern Ukrainian intellectual and cultural leaders turn to this period again and again as a source of inspiration and self-identification.<sup>21</sup>

The uprising also affected the complex question of the Ukrainian national name.<sup>22</sup> The traditional Ukrainian *Rus'*, *Rusyn*, *ruskyi* (in various spellings) had in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries been supplemented by *Rossiia* and *rossiiskii* in Orthodox clerical and intellectual circles. In reviving the higher and Hellenistic form, some clerics also resurrected *Malaia Rossiia* for their land, differentiating it from the state and people of *Velikaia Rossiia*, usually called *Moskva*. More and more frequently, the inhabitants of the Ukrainian lands used *Rus'* to define their territory alone, rather than in combination with the Belarusian lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. This geographic use of *Rus'* was often

confined to the palatinates of Volhynia, Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv. In the seventeenth century *Ukraina* was the borderland of the Polish-Lithuanian state—usually the Bratslav and the vast Kiev palatinates, although the *ukrainni* or borderland palatinates at times also included Volhynia and Chernihiv. Among the Muscovites, the place or population of Ukraine were often called *Litva*, referring to its former inclusion in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, while the Cossacks and the Ukrainians were called “Cherkassians,” referring to a major town of the region.

The revolt changed this complex onomastic-topographic mix in a number of ways. First, “Ukraine” came to be used more frequently and widely as a geographic and national name for the territories of the Cossacks. That term, as well as “Rus’,” often figured in discussions as equivalents of “Poland” and “Lithuania.” The secular Khmelnytsky employed *Rus’* and *ruskyi* to define his people—a people centred on the Dnieper, primarily the inhabitants the Kingdom of Poland, but still potentially including the Orthodox of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Clerics continued to prefer *Rossiiia*. The major path of development, however, was to accept the Ukrainian convention of calling Ukraine *Malaia Rossiiia* to distinguish it from *Velikaia Rossiiia* (Muscovy). By 1654, the tsar altered his title to reflect the Pereiaslav Agreement, changing the former “Rusiia” to “Velikaia and Malaia Rossiiia.” “Belaia,” reflecting the Muscovite triumphs in the Belarusian lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, was added in 1655. In everyday practice the Muscovite officials continued to regard Ukraine as the “Cherkassian” or “Cossack” land, a reflection of Khmelnytsky’s use of “Zaporozhian Host” to define his Cossack polity.

The revolt had, therefore, advanced the process of naming the Ukrainian land and people. It had increased the use of “Ukraine” by expanding the territory served by the designation and giving it political and cultural connotations. “Ukraine on Both Sides of the Dnieper,” as early eighteenth-century Cossack historians called it, evoked loyalty and emotion as the homeland of the great revolt and the Cossacks and was anthropomorphized in historical and folk songs. When Ukraine was divided into a Polish-controlled Right Bank and an autonomous Hetmanate on the Left Bank at the turn of the eighteenth century, the Hetmanate used *Malorossiiia* as its self-designation, whereas the use of “Ukraine” for the Right Bank reflected a return to the concept of Poland’s borderland. Still, the Ukrainian national awakeners of the early nineteenth century chose “Ukraine” and “Ukrainians” rather than the more historically based and commonly used “Rus’” and “Rusyny” in part because of the identification of “Ukraine” with the revolt and the seventeenth-century Cossack Hetmanate.



If "Ukraine" was to be a term beloved by the Ukrainian national awakeners and resisted by opponents of the national movement (tsarist Russia and interwar Poland), *Malorossiiia* was in modern times to be viewed as a term of derision or capitulation to Russian imperialism. It was not always so. In the eighteenth century, Ukrainians of Left-Bank Ukraine proudly called their homeland *Malorossiiia*, identifying the term specifically with the Cossack Hetmanate. In the seventeenth century, *Malorossiiia*, like the Cossack Hetmanate, encompassed a much larger part of Ukrainian territory. As used by the Ukrainian clergymen of the early seventeenth century and by the tsarist officials of 1654, *Malorossiiia* included the Ruthenian lands of the Kingdom of Poland to the very Lviv and Kholm that Khmelnytsky claimed. Therefore, while the Cossack hetman and his followers preferred "Ukraine" and "Rus'" as designations, the revolt also stabilized *Malorossiiia* as a national name for Ukraine and Ukrainians. By the early eighteenth century, the term *Malaia Rossiia* diminished in usage to the territories of the Cossack Hetmanate still under the tsar's sovereignty. In practice this polity claimed the "Little Russian" political-cultural inheritance. By the nineteenth century, *Malorossiiiane* was once again used to name all Ukrainians, albeit, increasingly, only by those who viewed them as a branch of the Russians. The usage had roots in early seventeenth-century Ukrainian clerical circles, but it was the revolt that had given *Malorossiiia* a new political significance.

Finally, the revolt made "Cossack" a common adjective for defining national and political entities in Ukraine. "Cossack Ukraine," the "Cossack Ruthenian people," the "Cossack language," and "Sarmatian Cossack Little Russia" were all terms in use by the late seventeenth and the early eighteenth centuries. As Ukraine became the land of the Cossacks, so the Ukrainians became a "Cossack people." Since, during the revolt, at least half the population of the Dnieper basin called themselves Cossacks, the identification reflected a reality. Even by the end of the century, the Cossack political nation remained a greater percentage of the population of the Dnieper basin than the *szlachta* nation was of the population of the Commonwealth. As the "Land of the Zaporozhian Army," "Ukraine on Both Banks" was a Cossack land, with offshoots—Sloboda Ukraine in the east and Zaporizhzhia in the south—created by advancing Ukrainian settlement.

The revolt thus established and defined national names for the Ukrainians that have continued to be used variously to the present time. There are those who believe that the revolt merely impeded the difficult process of selecting a national name by undermining "Rus'" and "Ruthenian (Rusyn)." From the seventeenth-century perspective, however,

the revolt created new political, social, and cultural realities in Ukraine that required a new use of names.

What was the significance of the revolt in the long-term process of Ukrainian nation-building? The question is as difficult as that process was complex. To have been an irreversible, decisive, and unequivocally formative event, the revolt would have had to create an enduring polity (like the Dutch), or a political nation with an elite that survived political failure (like the Polish *szlachta* of the nineteenth century), or the basis for a national culture that developed uninterrupted despite political disasters and loss of elites. These were the foundations that early modern societies could lay for modern nation-building. In these terms, the revolt, despite its great impact on early modern nation-building, did not directly form the modern Ukrainian nation.

Not only did the Cossack Hetmanate not become a fully independent state, but the office of hetman was abolished in 1764 and the polity's administrative institutions were dismantled in 1783. The area was transformed into Russian Imperial gubernias. The Imperial Army had already sacked and destroyed the Zaporozhian Sich in 1775. Hence, by the end of the eighteenth century no autonomous polity or even unified administrative entity remained.<sup>23</sup>

The revolt had given the Cossacks dominance over a large part of Ukraine. In the more stable eighteenth century, an elite group based on heredity as well as office had emerged from the Cossack officer ranks. By the early eighteenth century, the Cossack order showed signs of dissolution as its upper strata aspired to noble status and its lower strata were transformed into peasants or were frequently required to render labour services. The numerous Cossacks were no longer an effective or conscious political nation by the end of the eighteenth century. Rather, it was the upper stratum of the Cossacks that was the political class representing the autonomy and historical traditions of the Hetmanate. Although it resisted the abolition of the Hetmanate and treasured its distinctive traditions, it was too new as a political nation and too similar to the Russian elite in language and religion to long resist the blandishments of integration into the Russian Imperial *dvorianstvo*. When in the first half of the nineteenth century the Imperial government made clear that Ukrainian particularist or nationalist sentiments would be punished, even the last patriots of the elite abandoned their Ukrainian sentiments. The Hetmanate's elite did not prove to be a Polish *szlachta* flying the national flag against the autocracy.

Finally, for the reasons outlined earlier, no stable Ukrainian-language literary culture developed to serve as the basis for modern Ukrainian literature and language. The artistic and musical accomplishments of the

Hetmanate came to a dead end with the demise of the polity. In large measure, the intelligentsia it had produced helped create a Russian Imperial culture that inundated Ukrainian culture in the late eighteenth century. The Kiev Academy, the intellectual glory of seventeenth-century Ukraine, was to be outshone at the end of the eighteenth century by Moscow University and the Imperial Academy in St. Petersburg. The academy's conversion into an Orthodox church seminary in 1819 symbolized the subordination and provincialism of Ukraine's cultural and academic life. Even the extensive primary school system for which the Hetmanate was famous in the eighteenth century disintegrated by the early nineteenth century. Hence, a national awakening and new stimulus were necessary to form a vernacular literature and to advance a modern cultural model.<sup>24</sup>

This is not the place to investigate why these events at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries occurred. It is necessary, however, to state that the consequences of the revolt were not as unequivocal as they seemed. The uprising did play a major role in Ukrainian nation-building by forming and passing on a national tradition, even according to the three criteria listed above. We must also examine two other issues: the revolt's impact on the Ukrainian masses, and its significance as a symbol and force in national mythology.

Of the three elements that the revolt and Hetmanate could have contributed to Ukrainian nation-building, the political seems the most negative. Still, as long as the tsar, the other party to the Pereiaslav Agreement, ruled, the political issue was not quite dead. Catherine II hoped that once the hetmans were no more, their very name and age would be forgotten. It was not to be. Movements for Ukrainian autonomy harkened back to the Pereiaslav Agreement and charged the tsarist government with breaking its terms. The first manifesto for Ukrainian independence in Russian Ukraine, drafted in 1900, legitimized its cause on the grounds that the tsardom had not lived up to the agreement. Even discussions of Ukrainian-Russian political relations in the Soviet period—official, dissident, and émigré—inevitably revolved around Pereiaslav. In modern Ukrainian political life, descendants of hetmans' families (Ivan Skoropadsky and Dmytro Doroshenko) played major roles, and governments as well as political and military formations harkened back to Cossack models. Still, these aspects were primarily related to mythology and tradition, not to the immediate political consequences of the revolt or the formation of the Hetmanate.<sup>25</sup>

The issue of the continued significance of the political and social elite is more complex. The political nation of the Cossack elite did not maintain its corporate and political institutions and as a group did not

lead the Ukrainian national movement. It did, however, inspire it and provide it with cadres. The political literature aimed at maintaining the autonomy of the Hetmanate culminated in *Istoriia Rusov*. Written in the first decades of the nineteenth century and circulated among the "Little Russian" nobility, this political tract about Ukrainian history was one of the first statements of the modern Ukrainian national movement. As creators and consumers, the old elite began modern Ukrainian cultural life. Even after widespread support among its members had ebbed, nostalgia or aroused historical consciousness could cause a Countess Myloradovych to patronize a Ukrainian cultural organization in Austrian Galicia or a Doroshenko and Skoropadsky to lead a Ukrainian political movement.

Most important was the cultural link. *Istoriia Rusov* both marked the beginning of modern writing on historical themes and served as a "source" for the unwary who wrote Ukrainian history. Bohdan, the revolt, and the Hetmanate were its major themes. When, in 1798, an official of the old Hetmanate, Ivan Kotliarevsky, used the people's language in a travesty of the *Aeneid*, a common practice in eighteenth-century Europe, he turned Aeneas and his followers into Cossacks. Modern Ukrainian literature was thus written by and about representatives of Cossack Ukraine. Romantic poets, who were to solidify the new literature and literary language, turned to the chronicles and histories of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, to the *dumas* and historic songs, and to the dramatic events of Bohdan's revolt and the Hetmanate. Painters, architects, and musicians followed in their footsteps.<sup>26</sup>

Nationalism, rooted in German Romanticism, was something new. It was a movement that awakened Slovak, Slovene, and Kashub, and one that roused Magyars and Poles. In the nation-building process, the Ukrainians were ahead of the first three peoples, who had experienced few elements of a pre-modern national existence. In comparison with the latter two, however, they lacked the political-social continuity of the Magyars and the political-social-cultural continuity of the Poles. If the Ukrainians, like the Czechs, seem to fall between the two groups, it was because of the revolt and its consequences.

Comparisons are always oversimplifications, but to understand the significance of the revolt and the Hetmanate, one should also compare the Ukrainians with the Belarusians. There are, it is true, a number of factors that explain the greater dynamism of the Ukrainian national movement in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Ukrainians were more numerous and lived in a richer and more rapidly developing land. They had the advantage in some areas of a "national" church (the Uniate in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Galicia) and of Austrian



constitutionalism. Nevertheless, the more rapid development of the Ukrainian movement can be explained to a great degree by the fact that unlike the Belarusians, who lost their elite to polonization and Roman Catholicism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and remained a peasant people until the twentieth, the Ukrainians established a new native polity, elite, and national tradition in the seventeenth century. Well into the nineteenth century, the territories of the old Hetmanate remained a land where Ukrainians constituted an important group among the upper and urban classes.

Nation-building is often viewed as a top-down process in which the masses are the malleable clay. Without discussing the validity of that argument, one can see a major impact of the revolt on the shaping of the modern Ukrainian nation through its influence on the masses. The revolt substantially changed the area of Ukrainian settlement. Whether to escape war or the return of landlords and Polish rule, Ukrainians migrated eastward. Throughout the latter half of the seventeenth century, migrations went in various directions as people fled devastation or oppression, but on balance the movement was definitely to the east and south. It continued to follow the pre-revolt tendencies. Now, however, the Hetmanate served as a magnet for ambitious or committed Orthodox Ruthenians, thereby draining Western Ukraine and, at times, the Right Bank of these elements. Defeat and war measures drove settlers beyond the old Commonwealth-Muscovite border into Sloboda Ukraine. There they reformed Cossack units, which remained apart from the Hetmanate and whose institutions existed at the sufferance of the tsar. Still, their formation extended Ukrainian settlement and Ukrainian Cossack traditions to Kharkiv and beyond, where they finally met the Russian line of settlement.

The revolt gave the masses of the Ukrainian population a chance to better their lot and to take part in historical events. It is extremely difficult to assess popular memory. Legends, historical songs, and *dumas* deal with the Cossacks and frequently reflect the Khmelnytsky revolt, though not all are favourable to the leader and the consequences of his policies. Well into the eighteenth century, peasants claimed that their personal freedom was based on the Cossack sword. If Ukraine became a treasure-house for nineteenth-century Romantics, it was because heroic traditions about the Cossack age survived among the population at large. If the *dumas* inspired the Romantic poets, their works, in turn, evoked a response among even illiterate peasants, for, similar in form and theme, they could be intoned like the minstrels' performances. Of course, in the nineteenth century, the two-way process of collecting folklore and influencing folklore was well advanced, but the vividness and recentness

of the Khmelnytsky revolt ensured that a mass consciousness with its own interpretation of the events could exist.

The most important impact on Ukrainian nation-building was to come from subsequent interpretations of the revolt and their formation of the national mythology. The intellectuals of the Cossack Hetmanate used the revolt to legitimize their political and social order. As the direct descendants of the revolt, these officers and nobles sought to emphasize its national and religious aspects and the struggle to "regain" privileges. Those who have argued that nineteenth-century Ukrainian historians first tried to give the revolt national overtones and portray Khmelnytsky as a national leader have not given careful reading to Hrabianka (1709), Velychko (1720) or the play "The Liberation of Ukraine from Polish Servitude by the Lord Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky" (1728). Setting quibbles about the differing nature of "early modern" and "modern" national consciousness aside, it was the national interpretation of the revolt in these texts that profoundly influenced the early nineteenth-century Ukrainian historians and poets.<sup>27</sup>

The subsequent interpretation of the revolt is, in essence, the history of Ukrainian national and political thought. For all the subsequent disputes about the wisdom of the Pereiaslav Agreement, the policies of Bohdan, and the maturity of national and political thought, one is hard pressed to find a Ukrainian intellectual (except the later Panteleimon Kulish) who saw the revolt as negative. To do so would be to reject a central event of Ukrainian history, comparable to the Christianization of 988 or the national revival of the early nineteenth century. In addition, the revolt and the Cossack period reaffirm the Ukrainian self-image as a democratic if anarchic people in contrast to the aristocratic, oligarchic Poles and the autocratic, servile Muscovites. From the "Books of the Genesis of the Ukrainian People" to the present, Ukrainians have seen their tradition as enshrining the struggle for freedom embodied by the Cossacks and the Great Revolt.

The revolt has also stood at the centre of national conflicts in Eastern Europe. In Russian-Ukrainian relations, interpretations of the Pereiaslav Agreement and its enactment have been fought over and debated from the seventeenth century to the present. In the 1970s, when a group of Ukrainian dissidents arrived in Moscow to establish cooperation with Russian dissidents, their hosts questioned them about the Pereiaslav Agreement. In the dominant Polish tradition, the Khmelnytsky revolt is the first in a long series of attacks on and underminings of the Polish cause and "Western civilization" by the Ukrainians. Sienkiewicz's "Cowboys and Indians" treatment of the revolt turned it into the base line from which many Poles survey all Ukrainian relations. In much of

Jewish writing, the revolt is placed in the first stage of Ukrainian anti-Semitism. The centuries of subsequent Jewish existence between Ukrainians and their rulers convinced many Jews that Ukrainian revolts and national strivings were dangerous for them. In all three cases, the Ukrainians' own interpretations of the events of 1648 affect their attitudes toward the three peoples. In any event, modern national relations in this part of Eastern Europe begin with the Khmelnytsky revolt.<sup>28</sup>

In examining the continuity or discontinuity of Ukrainian history, the revolt and the Cossack Hetmanate provide the link between medieval Rus' and the Ukrainian national revival of the nineteenth century.<sup>29</sup> They also links the intellectual and religious revival of sixteenth- and early-seventeenth-century Ukraine with the modern revival. Modern Ukrainians were formed by two great events. The Union of Brest provoked the controversies and polemics in religious life that stimulated Ukrainians to self-awareness and definition. The Khmelnytsky uprising created a new social and political order. The social scientist may prefer the safe year of 1800 as the beginning point of modern Ukrainian nation-building and nationalism. The specialist in early modern Europe can see that modern Ukrainian nation-building and national consciousness have their roots in the hundred years before the uprising, and that the uprising advanced the process of forming the Ukrainian nation.

## Notes

1. The literature on nations and nationalism is vast. For this discussion, the most important works are Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, 2d ed. (New York, 1967); Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford, 1986); John Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1982); Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States* (London, 1977), and Orest Ranum, ed., *National Consciousness, History, and Political Culture in Early Modern Europe* (Baltimore, Md., 1975).
2. On the role of the *patria* in early modern Europe, see J. H. Elliott, "Revolution and Continuity in Early Modern Europe," *Past and Present*, 42 (February 1969), pp. 35-56.
3. Józef Chlebowczyk, *Small and Young Nations in Europe: Nation-Forming Processes in Ethnic Borderlands in East Central Europe* (Wrocław, etc., 1980).
4. On nations in early modern Eastern Europe, see Ivo Banac and Frank Sysyn, eds., *Concepts of Nationhood in Early Modern Eastern Europe* (Cambridge, Mass., 1986) = *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 10, no. 3-4 (December 1986).
5. For a discussion of Bohemia and the Czechs in the early modern Habsburg state, see R. G. W. Evans, *The Making of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1550-1700* (Oxford, 1979).

6. On the early modern revolts, see Roger Merriman, *Six Contemporaneous Revolutions* (Oxford, 1938), and Robert Forster and Jack P. Greene, eds., *Preconditions of Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Baltimore, 1970).
7. See Pieter Geyl, *The Revolt of the Netherlands (1555-1609)* (London, 1932), and J. W. Smit, "The Netherlands Revolution," in Forster and Greene, eds., *Preconditions of Revolution*, pp. 18-54.
8. On the Iberian revolts, see the essay by J. H. Elliott in Forster and Green, eds., *Preconditions of Revolution*.
9. See J. H. Elliott, *Revolt of the Catalans* (Cambridge, 1963).
10. See Frank E. Sysyn, "Ukrainian-Polish Relations in the Seventeenth Century: The Role of National Consciousness and National Conflict in the Khmelnytsky Movement," in Peter J. Potichnyj, ed., *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present* (Edmonton, 1980), pp. 58-82; and Teresa Chynczewska-Hennel, *Świadomość narodowa kozaczyzny i szlachty ukraińskiej w XVII wieku* (Warsaw, 1988).
11. For an opposing view, see I. I. Lappo, *Ideia edinstva russkogo naroda v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rusi v epokhu prisoedineniia Malorossii k Moskovskomu gosudarstvu* (Prague, 1929).
12. On Khmelnytsky's political goals and historical views, see I. P. Krypiakivych, "Sotsialno-politychni pohliady Bohdana Khmelnytskoho," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1957, no. 1, pp. 94-105; F. P. Shevchenko, "Istorychne mynule v otsyntsi B. Khmelnytskoho," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1970, no. 12, pp. 126-32; and Stephen Velychenko, "The Influence of Historical, Political, and Social Ideas on the Politics of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi and the Cossack Officers between 1648 and 1657" (Ph.D. diss., London School of Economics, 1980).
13. See Frank E. Sysyn, "Seventeenth-Century Views on the Causes of the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising: An Examination of the 'Discourse on the Present Cossack or Peasant War,'" *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 5, no. 4 (December 1980), pp. 430-66.
14. Frank E. Sysyn, *Between Poland and the Ukraine: The Dilemma of Adam Kysil, 1600-1653* (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), p. 213.
15. For the panegyric, see Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 9 (reprinted New York, 1957), pp. 1523-26.
16. On terminological discussion, see A. Solovev, "Velikaia, Malaia i Belaia Rus'," *Voprosy istorii*, 1947, no. 7, pp. 24-30; Mykhailo Hrushevsky, "Velyka, Mala i Bila Rus'," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1991, no. 2, pp. 77-85; Hans Rothe, "What is the Meaning of 'Rossijski' and 'Rossija' in the Polish and Russian Conception of State in the 17th Century?" *Ricerche Slavistiche*, 37 (1990), pp. 111-22. On the issue of the differentiation of the Ukrainian and Belarusian nations, see the bibliography "Discussions on the Origins of the Ukrainian Nation," in Myron Korduba, *La littérature historique soviétique-ukrainienne: Compte-rendu 1917-1931*, reprint of the Warsaw 1930 edition, Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies, 10 (Munich, 1972), pp. xxxiv-xxxvi.
17. On this relationship, see Hans-Joachim Torke, "The Unloved Alliance: Political Relations between Muscovy and Ukraine in the Seventeenth



- Century," in Peter J. Potichnyj, Marc Raeff, Jaroslaw Pelenski, and Gleb N. Žekulin, eds., *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter* (Edmonton, 1992), pp. 39-68.
18. Full Russian and French translations exist. The comments on Ukraine are collected in the Polish translation by Maria Kowalska, *Ukraina w połowie XVII wieku w relacji arabskiego podróżnika Pawła, syna Makarego z Aleppo* (Warsaw, 1986).
19. For a summary of church affairs in this period, which includes citation of the major and scholarly works, see Natalia Carynnyk-Sinclair, *Die Unterstellung der Kiever Metropole unter das Moskauer Patriarchat* (Munich, 1970). On the significance of Orthodoxy in Russian-Ukrainian relations, see Hedwig Fleischhacker, "Der politische Antrieb der Moskauischen Kirchenreform," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 2 (1937), pp. 224-33.
20. On history-writing, see Frank E. Sysyn, "Concepts of Nationhood in Ukrainian History-Writing, 1620-1690," in Banac and Sysyn, eds., *Concepts of Nationhood*, pp. 393-423.
21. For a discussion of cultural change, see P. M. Zholtovsky, *Ukrainskyi zhyvopys XVII-XVIII st.* (Kiev, 1978), and my article, "The Cultural, Social and Political Context of Ukrainian History-Writing: 1620-1690," *Europa Orientalis* 5 (1986), pp. 285-310.
22. On names, see the literature in fn. 16, above. Also see Omeljan Pritsak and John S. Reshetar, Jr., "The Ukraine and the Dialectics of Nation-Building," in Donald W. Treadgold, ed., *The Development of the USSR: An Exchange of Views* (Seattle, 1964), pp. 248-49, 255-59; and Jaroslaw Isajewytsch, "Die mittelalterlichen Wurzeln der ukrainischen Nation," in Guido Hausmann and Andreas Kappeler, eds., *Ukraine: Gegenwart und Geschichte eines neuen Staates* (Baden-Baden, 1993), pp. 35-48.
23. On this topic and on social structure, see Zenon Kohut, *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate, 1760s-1830s* (Cambridge, Mass., 1988).
24. On the integration of the Ukrainian political and cultural elite, see David Saunders, *The Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture, 1750-1850* (Edmonton, 1985).
25. On the enduring political significance of the Pereiaslav Agreement, see Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "Pereiaslav—History and Myth," introduction to John Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study* (Edmonton, 1982), pp. xi-xxiii.
26. On the lines between old and new Ukrainian culture, see George Luckyj, *Between Gogol' and Ševčenko* (Munich, 1971).
27. On the significance of the Cossack chronicles, see my article, "The Cossack Chronicles and the Development of Modern Ukrainian Culture and Identity," in Frank E. Sysyn, ed., *Adelphotos: A Tribute to Omeljan Pritsak by his Students* (Cambridge, Mass., 1991) = *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 14, pp. 593-607.
28. For interpretations of the revolt, see Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654*.

29. On the role of the Hetmanate in the formation of Ukrainian national consciousness, see Zenon Kohut, "The Development of a Little Russian Identity and Ukrainian Nationbuilding," in Banac and Sysyn, eds., *Concepts of Nationhood*, pp. 559-76.