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ENGLISH-LANGUAGE HISTORIOGRAPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY ON THE PEREIASLAV AGREEMENT

Scholarly discussions of the Pereiaslav Agreement or Treaty and the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising have usually centered on national or political historiographic traditions: Ukrainian, Polish, and Russian; Soviet and Ukrainian "nationalist"; and the interchange amongst and within them. English-language scholarly literature on the Pereiaslav Agreement is very different, since it constitutes a disparate body of writings, some in translation and some in the original, that is united only by the language of publication. Its significance comes not so much from its contribution to the study of the question, which is, with a few notable exceptions, admittedly limited, but rather from the importance of English as an international language in the marketplace of ideas. The recent politicization of the 350th anniversary of the Pereiaslav Agreement by the March 2002 *ukaz* of Ukraine's president, so reminiscent of the Soviet use of the 300th anniversary in 1954 to propagate Soviet and Russian nationalist political goals and to combat dissenting historical views abroad, made English-language literature more significant, as Western scholars, diplomats, and media tried to fathom the controversy that resulted.

In the early twentieth-century, the English reader had access to few authoritative scholarly accounts of the Pereiaslav Agreement and the relations between Ukraine and Russia. German still functioned as the West's major scholarly language for study of Eastern and Central Europe, and the Western reader would have to resort to it to read Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi's piece occasioned by the Pereiaslav anniversary in 1904.² Of Hrushevs'kyi's work, only the popular *The Historical Evolution of the Ukrainian Problem* appeared in English during the

1. My friend and colleague, Professor Thomas Noonan, was vitally interested in how English-language literature portrayed Ukrainian-Russian relations. He voiced that interest eloquently on September 18, 1997 at a launch of the first volume of an English translation of Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi's *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy* (History of Ukraine-Rus'), which he saw as righting the balance available to a new generation of students and scholars. With his passing, Ukrainian studies have lost a firm advocate and a masterful practitioner.

2. M. Hruszewskyj, "Ein interessanter Jahrestag. Ein geschichtliche Rückblick," *Ruthenische Revue* 1 (1904): 11-16.

First World War.³ Readers could garner some information from the translations of the works of Russian historians. The publication of Vasilii Kliuchevskii's history of Russia between 1911 and 1931 made the short discussion by the major Russian scholar available.⁴ Expounding a negative view of the Cossacks and their relation to state and religion (including a condemnation of the moral character of the "Little Russian Cossacks"), Kliuchevskii emphasized the ambiguous nature of relations between Muscovy and Little Rus' and the complications Ukraine caused for Muscovite policy-making. He saw the agreement as fraught with mutual misunderstandings on both sides, with the Muscovites viewing it as part of their gathering of Russian lands, whereas the Cossack hetman, as "a true representative of Cossackdom," that is "a servant, ally, or betrayer of any one of its rulers-neighbors," saw it as undermining Muscovy's Swedish policy (p. 124). The reader finds no specific mention of the Pereiaslav Agreement or of its significance for Ukraine or the Russian state.⁵

More comprehensive discussions of the Pereiaslav Agreement were published just at the beginning of World War II. Most appeared because the Ukrainian question appeared as an international issue, and above all, because an autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine emerged from the break-up of Czechoslovakia and the Soviets' seized Western Ukraine from Poland. As a result, Western readers were now interested in Ukrainian history, and historians, translators, and groups representing divergent political views sought to get out their versions of Ukrainian history.

Two new publications were translations of histories of Ukraine by major Ukrainian historians. Dmytro Doroshenko's *Narys istorii Ukraïny* grew out of the courses he taught at the Ukrainian Free University in Prague, and the publication of his work in Warsaw in 1932-34 made the balanced text of this conservative historian available to a wider public. In the late 1930s, Doroshenko toured Western Canada, giving lectures to students of Ukrainian origin. This contact and the need of the large Ukrainian population in Canada for a history

3. Michaelo Hrushevsky, *The Historical Evolution of the Ukrainian Problem*, trans. George Ratfalovich (London, 1915).

4. V. O. Kluchevsky, *A History of Russia*, trans. C. J. Hogarth, 5 vols. (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, and New York: E. P. Dutton, 1911-31). A section on the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising and Russian-Ukrainian relations appears in vol. 3 (1913), 113-27.

5. See also the translation of Platonov's history: S. F. Platonov, *History of Russia*, trans. E. Aronsberg (New York: Macmillan, 1928), 201-4. Platonov did not display Kliuchevskii's antagonism toward the Cossacks and discussed 1654 as a "treaty of annexation," understood differently because the tsar regarded Ukraine as annexed territory, while the Cossacks saw it as an independent state. In the interwar years, the English reader could also have found a short mention of the new Marxist view in the translation of Pokrovskii's history: M. N. Pokrovsky, *Brief History of Russia*, trans. D. S. Mirsky (London: Martin Lawrence, 1933), 1: 90. In his view, Ukraine became a Muscovite possession because Muscovy cleverly took advantage of Khmel'nyts'kyi's search for allies.

in English both to present themselves to the outer world and to educate their own youth: stimulated the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League to publish an abridged translation of Doroshenko's Ukrainian text.⁶ Hanna Chykalenko-Keller translated the work, and an introduction was written by Professor G. W. Simpson of the University of Saskatchewan, who praised Doroshenko's career and his ability "to interpret Ukrainian history from the standpoint of Ukrainian nationalism." As editor of the volume, Simpson added an appendix on the Carpatho-Ukraine question and the Soviet annexation. He made his own views and those of the publishers clear by lamenting the "heavy fog of propaganda and censorship" that was controlling the fate of the Ukrainian people and expressing the hope that, as a result of the war, the right of nations to live their own life would be secured. He maintained that a proper solution of the Ukrainian national question must form part of any peace settlement in Europe (pp. 657-658). The reader of Doroshenko's work gained a careful account of the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising, the Pereiaslav Agreement, and subsequent negotiations, as well as of other historians' interpretations, including those of Doroshenko's mentor, Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi. The latter viewed the agreement as a military alliance, and Doroshenko asserted that Lypyns'kyi's interpretation closely represented Khmel'nyts'kyi's views and those of seventeenth-century Ukrainians.

Although Doroshenko's text, even abridged and without historiographic and bibliographic materials, was more suited for a scholarly audience, Hrushevs'kyi's popular history had the greater fortune in its entree into the scholarly publishing world because it was published by a major academic press. Prepared for publication in association with the Ukrainian newspapers *Svoboda* and *The Ukrainian Weekly*, and the Ukrainian National Association, which supported its publication (Dr. Luka Myshuha, Omelian Revyuk, Wasyl Halich, and Stephen Sumeyko worked on the text), the English translation of the volume represented a major achievement by the Ukrainians in the United States who supported Ukrainian independence. Hrushevs'kyi's history was published in 1941 by the prestigious Yale University Press, and it contained an introduction by the Yale professor and noted Russian émigré scholar of Ukrainian background, George Vernadsky.⁷ The Hrushevs'kyi volume appeared after the Soviet-Nazi pact had discredited the pro-Communist left in North America, including its adherents in the Ukrainian community, and permitted the annexation of the

6. D. Doroshenko, *History of the Ukraine* trans. and abridged Hanna Chikalenko-Keller, ed. and introduced G.W. Simpson (Edmonton: Institute Press, 1939)

7. Michael Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine*, ed. O. J. Frederickson, preface by George Vernadsky, published for the Ukrainian National Association (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1941). On Vernadsky and the publication of this volume, see Charles Halperin, "Russia and the Steppe: George Vernadsky and Eurasianism," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 36 (1986): 161.

Western Ukrainian territories to Soviet Ukraine. Professor Vernadsky pointed out the significance of this event for the unity of the Ukrainian people in his preface, which is dated March 12, 1941. He wrote: "Whatever future developments may bring in their wake, the strong determination displayed by the Ukrainian people in their age-long struggle for the defense of their unity, their freedom, and their civilization is in itself an evidence of the tremendous vitality of the nation" (p. xiv). Professor O. J. Frederiksen, who edited the volume, wrote a concluding chapter on events after 1918. The volume, a translation of Hrushevs'kyi's early popular history, contains the historian's view of the Pereiaslav Agreement as establishing a Muscovite protectorate over Ukraine. It is not detailed or specific and does not characterize the relationship as one of vassalage, as Hrushevs'kyi did in his later scholarly works. In that sense, it was not a comprehensive representation of his own scholarship on these questions, which the historian presented exhaustively in the 1920s in his multi volume *Is-toriia Ukraïny - Rusy*.

Ukrainian scholarship was fortunate to have two volumes published by Yale University Press in 1941. The second was Professor Vernadsky's popular biography of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, which was written at what might be seen as the height of his Ukrainophile stage.⁸ Vernadsky had arrived in North America in the 1920s, and his one-volume *A History of Russia*, first published in 1929, became the most influential text on the subject written for a North American audience. Between 1929, when he published this volume, and the 1940s, when he assisted in publishing Hrushevs'kyi's one-volume history and cooperated with the Ukrainian National Association in publishing a popular biography on Khmel'nyts'kyi, Vernadsky had become more open to both the historical and contemporary existence of Ukrainians.⁹ In part this may have been a reaction to the Ukrainianization process in Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s and to the emer-

8. George Vernadsky, *Bohdan Hetman of Ukraine* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press [with; London: Oxford Univ. Press], 1941). The phrase "Published for the Ukrainian National Association" appears on the back of the title page.

9. Vernadsky's evolution toward pro-Ukrainian sympathies is evident in a comparison of the editions of his popular *A History of Russia* that were published between 1929 and 1961 by Yale University Press in New Haven. In the second edition, 1930, he asserted: "The Russian peasants became the serfs of Polish landlords; and in addition to social oppression, the Russian population, suffered religious persecution in view of the fact that the Orthodox church was regarded as an illegal organization after 1596" (p. 74). In the 1944 edition, the same sentence reads: "The Ukrainian peasants became the serfs of Polish landlords; and in addition to social oppression, the Ukrainian population suffered religious persecution in view of the fact that the Orthodox church was regarded as an illegal organization after 1596" (p. 83). In the 1930 edition: "The annexation of the Ukraine was a very important event in the political history of Russia" (p. 75). In 1944: "The union with Ukraine was a very important event in the political history of Russia" (p. 84). Another instance of "annexation" in the 1930 edition (p. 75) is replaced by "The extension of Moscow's control" in the 1944 edition (p. 84).

gence of the Ukrainian issue as an international question in the World War II period. However, only more thorough research on Vernadsky can fully reveal what motivated him.¹⁰ Indication of this change appears in his one-volume history, in which he somewhat adjusted his conception of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians as constituting one Russian people, though he continued to see them as a historical unity.¹¹

Although the edition of his one-volume history that appeared in the 1940s revealed a changed attitude toward Ukrainian affairs, it is in Vernadsky's biography of Khmel'nyts'kyi that his Ukrainophilism is fully expressed. In contrast to Hrushevs'kyi, who was very critical of Bohdan (if not in his popular history, then in his other writings and, above all, in his ten-volume history), Vernadsky was a great admirer of the hetman, comparing him to Wallenstein, Richelieu and Cromwell (p. 118). He wrote: "In a sense, Bohdan may be called the father of modern Ukraine. The Ukrainian revolution would certainly have come even without him, but it was owing to his skilful leadership that the various elements of the movement-political, social, national, religious-were welded together to create, or rather recreate, a Ukrainian nation. Although the state he built up did not last for more than a century, the very fact of its existence during this span of time gave tremendous impetus to Ukrainian national spirit" (p. 121). Vernadsky also believed that had Bohdan lived a decade longer a stable Ukraine would have emerged and the civil war and the encroachments of Moscow would have been avoided.

Vernadsky did not analyze the Pereiaslav Agreement, though he provided a translation of the eleven articles and the charter of April 6, 1654 as appendixes to the book. He referred to it as the "Union of Pereiaslav" and characterized

10. One can see elements of this evolution in his discussion of the question of the legitimacy of the Ukrainian language in his one-volume history. In the 1930 edition, Vernadsky stated that the literary languages of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus differed from each other in part as a result of artificially adopting technical and scientific terms different from the Russian ones. He asserted: "It is not yet clear whether the Ukrainian and White Russian peoples will use their languages as the sole vehicle for literary expression, or whether they will prefer to use the Russian literary language as they have done in the past;" however he appended a footnote noting that the two languages were officially adopted in their respective Soviet republics (p. 3). By 1944 he went as far as saying "However, both languages seem to have enlisted popular support" in the comparable section (p. 4).

11. In his 1930 edition, Vernadsky saw the Russian people as divided into three branches and asserted that in the early twentieth century only an insignificant part of the Russian people, those in Galicia and Bukovyna, remained outside the Russian Empire (pp. 3-4). By 1944, the section on the insignificant part of the Russian people had been dropped (p. 4) and in the fifth edition of 1961 the phrase on division became: "In time certain cultural and language differences grew up among the Eastern Slavs which resulted in their division into three major branches" (p. 3). Nevertheless, his one-volume history remained essentially a history of the Russians and Russian state, in which one searches in vain for even a mention of basic phenomena among Ukrainians in the nineteenth century (e.g., the existence of Taras Shevchenko, the Ems Ukaz), though there is somewhat more on earlier periods.

Khmelnitsky's relationship as one of "vassal obedience." Nonetheless, while portraying events from the Ukrainian point of view, above all, in recounting the relations of Khmelnitsky and Aleksei Mikhailovich in 1656-57, Vernadsky still cast the "union" of Ukraine and "Great Russia" in generally positive terms and Bohdan's Russian policy as sound. He argued that it was the internal strife among his successors that weakened them in conflicts with the tsar. He also lamented that this strife prevented the Ukrainians from utilizing potential allies among the Great Russians, especially the Don Cossacks, and maintained that had they done so "the course of history might have changed and a democratic union of Ukraine and Great Russia replaced the tsarist monarchy" (p. 123). He concluded the volume grasping for positive aspects of the Russian-Ukrainian relationship and finding them in two cases, the expansion to the south and the unity of the Ukrainian nation. In the first, he saw the cooperation of the two peoples in the defeat of the Tatars and Turks that opened up the Black Sea steppe for Ukrainian colonization, though he stretched his point by maintaining that even the suppression of the Zaporozhian Sich benefited Ukrainian colonization, in that remnants of the Sich settled in Kuban. Even more tortuous was his explanation of the benefits for Ukrainian unity brought by the Russian Empire's partition of Poland and the Soviet Union's annexation of western Ukrainian lands from Poland and Romania. He said that while the outcome of the war was unknown, there was hope that the Ukrainians would preserve their hard-won unity.

Vernadsky's emphasis on the world war then in progress in his discussion of Ukrainian issues paralleled that of the first history of Ukraine written in English, that of W.E.D. Allen, a specialist in Caucasian and Middle Eastern history, later revealed to be an agent of the MI5 who had infiltrated radical rightist organizations.¹² Although Allen had begun writing his history before the war, the salience of the Ukrainian question speeded its completion and publication by Cambridge University Press. On the one hand, the large volume represented the work of a scholar who had done extensive reading and included useful bibliographic notes and discussion of specific issues. On the other hand, it was history written from a pro-Russian, and anti-Ukrainian national viewpoint, a stance that was only deepened by the author's antagonism to the reemergence of the Ukrainian question during the war. Writing after the Soviet occupation of the Western Ukrainian territories and before the German attack on the Soviet Union, Allen asserted in his postscript entitled "Ukraine and Europe, 1939-40" that the Ukrainian question had been 'simplified' as a result of Hitler's under-

12. W. E. D. Allen, *The Ukraine: A History* (Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1940). On his intelligence work, see Alastair Hamilton, *The Appeal of Fascism: A Study of British Intellectuals and Fascism* (London: Blond, 1971), 264, 266, 268, 281 (I am grateful to Dr. Colin Heywood for this information).

standing with Stalin. He declared: "The fate of the Ukrainians becomes altogether a part of the obscure destiny of the nationalities at present under the rule of the Communist Government in Moscow. And the destiny of all these peoples must be a Russian destiny in the sense that the fluvial network of the Great Eurasian Plain is one geographical and economic whole out of which it is impracticable and would be unreal to attempt to carve separate and politically independent national units" (p. 387).

Allen saw the Pereiaslav Agreement as a historical event of the first importance, through which Muscovy became Russia. He believed it erased the division caused by the Mongols and facilitated the rebirth of Rus'. With access to the rivers of the Black Sea basin, the potential for Russian power increased greatly, as Muscovy ceased to be a Volga-based power. All of this occurred through an agreement that Allen saw as having been stumbled into by its participants. He maintained: "Never was a great event less planned and determined by men: geographical fact and unconscious needs of nameless masses imposed an empire of vast possibility on men who at first quite failed to comprehend the significance of what was happening." (p. 133). On Khmel'nyts'kyi himself, in addition to repeating the opinion of the early British specialist on Russian and Polish history, R. Nisbet Bain, who maintained that Khmel'nyts'kyi was capable of destroying but not creating (p. 106) and declaring that the hetman harbored no dream of Russian unity (p. 133), Allen asserted: "He was not in fact capable of directing the destinies of his country into any definite channel, not even into that of agreement with Moscow, although this had been his work and he remained true to the principle to the end of his life" (p. 145).

For Allen, the Pereiaslav Agreement constituted an unconditional union, an incorporation of Ukraine into the Russian state as a province that, because of its border status, had a peculiar military organization and certain privileges pertaining to regional and social order (that is some autonomy) (pp. 135, 141). He explicitly rejected the arguments of nineteenth-century historians that this was a personal union, and also the view of Hrushevs'kyi and, to a degree, Miakotin that Ukraine was a vassal state. He emphasized the purely class interests of the Cossack elite during the negotiations. Yet, based largely on Miakotin's research, Allen maintained that the social reality of Ukraine, above all, the social fluidity between Cossacks and peasants, was very different from the conceptions of the principals at Pereiaslav. He went on to assert that, after the Pereiaslav Agreement, Ukraine was in the process of becoming a separate, in essence practically independent state united to Muscovy by an "eternal alliance," and that its administration was in the hands of the Cossacks led by the hetman, even if this great difference from the image Khmelnytsky had conveyed at Pereiaslav became clear to the Muscovite diplomats only after the hetman's death (p. 141).

A more radical Russian interpretation of Ukrainian history appeared at the same time as Allen's study, namely, the English translation of a French work by Pierre Brégy and Serge Obolensky entitled *The Ukraine, a Russian Land*.¹³ The authors originally wrote the work as a response to the Ukrainian question's emergence as an international issue when the German division of Czechoslovakia made the rise of Carpatho-Ukraine possible. In the English edition, the Soviet annexation of Western Ukraine after the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact was presented as a move away from Soviet internationalism towards fulfilling Russia's historical mission of gathering the Russian lands. It was argued that Ukraine was merely a Russian land and that it should be part of the new democratic Russia that would somehow emerge from the war. The section on the Pereiaslav Agreement argued against any view that Ukraine constituted a political entity in the mid-seventeenth century and saw it instead as an integral part of the Russian state, a state of "All the Russians" (pp. 81-85).

When the post-World War II era began, then, the English reader could already turn to various interpretations of the Pereiaslav Agreement within the context of Ukrainian and Russian history. As the euphoria for "Uncle Joe" and the Soviet Union that characterized the wartime period changed into the realization that the Soviets were imposing totalitarian regimes on East Central Europe, parts of the West's public and scholarly communities became more attuned to discussions of Russian imperialism in Ukraine. The Cold War and the reaction to sputnik stimulated a tremendous growth of research on Russia and Eastern Europe at American universities and the creation of think tanks, including the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty complex in Munich financed by the U.S. Congress. At the same time, the influx of Ukrainian scholars into the United States and Canada, which included Ukrainian émigrés who had lived in Central Europe and refugees from the Soviet Union, introduced a number of specialists on early modern Ukrainian history to the English-speaking world.

The issue of the Pereiaslav Agreement came to the fore because of the Soviet authorities' decision to make its 300th anniversary the centerpiece of their political program for control of their inner empire. They sought to make the "reunion of Ukraine with Russia" of 1654 an event of epochal significance and a dogma in Soviet historiography. The tremendous public celebrations, the new publications, and the new catechism of Soviet historiography, the Central Committee of the Communist Party's *Theses on the 300th Anniversary of the Reunion of the Ukraine with Russia*, which appeared in English piqued interest in the event.¹⁴ The bombastic and overtly political nature of the Soviet interpre-

13. Pierre Brégy and Serge Obolensky, *The Ukraine, A Russian Land* (London: Selwyn & Blount, 1940).

14. The theses were published by Foreign Language Publishing House in Moscow in 1954. The major exposition in English of the Soviet interpretation was in the thematic volume of the

tation undermined its acceptance, even in circles favorable to traditional Russian nationalist views of Ukrainian history. It also sparked a mobilization of Ukrainian scholars and organizations in North America.

Between 1953 and 1955, a considerable number of translations of previously written and new works on the Pereiaslav Agreement were published. A special issue of the *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.* was devoted to the topic and included articles on various aspects of the agreement: on its juridical nature, by Viacheslav Prokopovych; on the treaty itself by Andrii Iakovliv; on the agreement's significance for the Russian state, by the Russian legal historian Boris Nol'de. It also included an extensive review by Iakovliv of the three-volume Soviet document publication that showed how little the sources supported Soviet interpretations.¹⁵ Another issue of the *Annals* published a fragment from Lypyns'kyi's *Ukraina na perelomi*.¹⁶ A special issue of *The Ukrainian Quarterly* contained articles by Andrii Iakovliv¹⁷ on the juridical character of the Pereiaslav Treaty, Oleksander Ohloblyn on the significance and international context of the agreement,¹⁸ and Borys Krupnyts'kyi on Khmel'nyts'kyi's politics and the treaty.¹⁹ The issue also had a number of articles on the baneful nature of the Ukrainian-Russian tie for Ukrainian church affairs, culture, political life, and economy.²⁰

In 1954, Oleksander Ohloblyn published the results of his research on the Pereiaslav Treaty in a booklet that appeared in Ukrainian and in English translation.²¹ The booklet discussed the causes, character, and subsequent appraisals

Ukrains'kaadians'ka entsyklopediia that was translated into English: M. P. Bazhan, ed. *Soviet Ukraine* (Kyiv: Editorial Office of the Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia, Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian S.S.R., 1969).

15. *Annals* 4, no. 3 (1955): Viacheslav Prokopovych, "The Problem of the Juridical Nature of Ukraine's Union with Russia," 917-80; A. Yakovliv, "Bohdan Khmelnytsky's Treaty with the Tsar of Muscovy," 904-16; and "The Reunion of Ukraine with Russia," 1002-34; Boris Nol'de, "Essays in Russian State Law," 873-903.

16. Vyacheslav Lypynsky, "The Ukraine at the Turning Point," *Annals* (Fall-Winter, 1953), 3, no. 2(8), 605-19.

17. Andrii Yakovliv, "The Juridical Character of the Pereiaslav Treaty," *Ukrainian Quarterly*, 10 (1954).

18. Oleksandr Ohloblyn, "The Pereiaslav Treaty and Eastern Europe," *ibid.*, 41-50.

19. Borys Krupnytsky, "The Treaty of Pereiaslav and the Political Orientation of Bohdan Khmelnytsky," *ibid.*, 32-40.

20. Nicholas D. Chubaty, "State and Church in Ukraine after 1654" (60-70); Sviatoslav Hordynsky "300 Years of Moscow's Cultural Policies" (71-84); Nicholas Czyrowski, "Economic aspects of the Ukrainian-Muscovite Treaty of 1654" (85-92); Nicholas Prychodko, "300 Years of Russian Dealings with Ukraine" (93-100).

21. *Ukrains'ko-moskovs'ka uhoda. 1654* (New York: Orhanizatsiia oborony chotorykh svobod Ukraïny-Ligy vyzvolennia Ukraïny, 1954); Alexander Ohloblyn, *Treaty of Pereiaslav 1654* trans. Bohdan Budurovych (Toronto-New York: Canadian League for Ukraine's Liberation, Organization for Defence of Four Freedoms for Ukraine, 1954).

of what Ohloblyn termed an alliance between two independent countries, one that began the "tragic complex of Ukrainian-Russian relations which transformed the ties of free alliance into the shackles of three centuries of servitude and enmity" (p. 76). Ohloblyn's work was particularly valuable to the English reader for its presentation of the views of Hrushevs'kyi, Lypyns'kyi, and Iakovliv, careful analysis of the Pereiaslav articles, and inclusion of translations of documents.

Therefore, at the time of the 300th anniversary of the Pereiaslav Agreement in 1954, some of the most important research by Ukrainian scholars who had worked in the interwar period in Europe or who had fled Soviet Ukraine was available to the English reader. Yet although the *Annals* was a respected scholarly journal and the more political *Ukrainian Quarterly* published some valuable scholarly articles in the 1950s, they did not have the diffusion among North American scholars that the mainline Slavic studies journals did. Also, the fact that Professor Ohloblyn's work was published by a non-academic press limited its reach to the scholarly community.

Still, these English-language publications provided the intellectual underpinning that accompanied the massive rallies and meetings against the Moscow-organized celebrations and Soviet attempts to rewrite history. These actions found considerable favor in the Western media, which clearly was struck by the transparent political propaganda of the Soviet interpretation. An editorial in *The New York Times* of December 20, 1953 stated that the Ukrainian people had no reason to celebrate their present state of oppression, "a condition far different from that which Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi envisaged when he negotiated with Czar Alexis three hundred years ago." The London *Economist* of January 28, 1954 derided Russian historians for trying to convince the world that Ukrainians had submitted voluntarily to Russian overlordship: "By emphasizing the 'brotherly ties' and presenting Russia as the savior and benefactor of Ukraine, an attempt is being made to strengthen the hand of the Russifiers who had been threatened by the spring tide after Stalin's death." In December 1954 a select committee of the United States Congress reported: "From the time when they [the Ukrainians] became entangled with the empire of Moscow by the Treaty of Pereiaslav in 1654, Moscow has resorted to all possible measures to deny their national existence as a people with their own distinct culture."²² Soviet manipulation of history was the subject of a separate publication by Andrii Moskalenko, which was translated by John Armstrong, then a young political scientist working on Ukrainian nationalism, and published in the series of

22. The three citations are quoted from C. Bickford O'Brien, *Muscovy and the Ukraine: From the Pereiaslav Agreement to the Truce of Andrusovo, 1654-1667* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1963), 2.

the New York Research Program on the USSR in 1955.²³ Another young political scientist, John Reshetar, who was of Ukrainian descent, wrote an incisive article on the significance of the Soviet celebrations.²⁴ Political discussions published in the *Ukrainian Quarterly's* special issue devoted to Pereiaslav included a critical analysis of the Soviet theses by Professor Clarence Manning of Columbia University.²⁵

The transparent political phrasing and simplistic formulation of the Soviet theses on fraternal longings for reunion by a entire Ukrainian people, the improbability of the portrayal of Khmel'nyts'kyi as a single-minded agent intent on bringing about that reunion, and the saccharine characterization of Russian-Ukrainian relations put Western scholars and public on guard in considering the official Soviet view. Yet the elements that reflected traditional Russian views on Ukrainians and the mid-seventeenth-century events resounded within Russophile circles, above all because that generation of historians of Russia was composed predominantly of Russian émigrés or their children and students. The post-World War II boom in Soviet and East European studies ensured that these historians had a wide audience. Published in those years were a number of histories of Russia that served as textbooks and informed a generation of university students about the Pereiaslav Agreement.

Among the first of these was Michael Florinsky's two-volume *Russia: A History and An Interpretation*, which appeared in 1953.²⁶ The son of the Kyiv Russian nationalist Timofei Florinskii, Michael Florinsky continued the tradition in Russian historiography that saw Ukrainians as merely Russians. Florinsky saw the Cossacks, at best, as mercenaries, at worst, brigands to whom nothing was sacred; in his view, these characteristics certainly disqualified them for the role of champions of Orthodoxy or of national unification under Moscow, although that role was forced upon them. He derided Khmel'nyts'kyi as an adventurer and soldier of fortune and questioned whether the Cossack Hetman deserved the statue in Kyiv or the "aura of national hero, defender of Orthodoxy, and empire builder that surrounds his name in the writings of patriotically-minded Russian historians" (vol. 1, p. 262). Florinsky saw the Pereiaslav Agreement as the incorporation of Ukraine into the Russian state, and he paid little attention to the event's significance for Russia's political or cultural life.

23. Andrii Mosalenko, *Khmel'nyts'kyi and the Treaty of Pereiaslav in Soviet Historiography*, trans. John Armstrong (New York: New York Research Program on the USSR, 1955).

24. John J. Reshetar, "The Significance of the Soviet Tercentenary of the Pereiaslav Treaty," in the special issue of the *Annals* 4 no. 3 (1955): 981-94.

25. Clarence Manning, "The Kremlin's New Theses on Ukraine," *Ukrainian Quarterly* 10, no. 1 (Winter 1954): 22-32.

26. Michael T. Florinsky, *Russia: A History and An Interpretation in Two Volumes* (New York: Macmillan, 1953).

A decade later, a textbook that was to become the standard in the field was published. Its author was Professor Nicholas Riasanovsky of the University of California, Berkeley, whose father was the famous Eurasianist, Valentin Riasanovsky.²⁷ In his *History of Russia*, Riasanovsky included events that occurred in Belarusian and Ukrainian territories after the fall of Kyivan Rus' and was much more open than Florinsky to discussion of the existence of Ukrainians, using that name to apply to them in the seventeenth century. He was also more positive in his evaluation of the Cossacks and Khmel'nyts'kyi than Florinsky was (pp. 154, 199). While he saw 1654 as an unconditional Ukrainian acceptance of Moscow's authority, Riasanovsky pointed out that the Ukrainians had good cause to complain about their later treatment. He also emphasized the importance of Ukrainians in Muscovy's Westernization and viewed 1654 as having great significance in the transformation of the Russian state.

The most important contribution to the study of the Pereiaslav Agreement and to disseminating information on Ukrainian history was made by George Vernadsky's *A History of Russia*, which appeared between 1943 and 1969.²⁸ In undertaking his multi-volume history, Vernadsky tried to compose it as an "All-Russian" history, with substantial attention to what he called "West Russia." Therefore in a certain sense he was trying to fulfill what Hrushevs'kyi had called a theoretical possibility by writing a history of the East Slavs that paid attention to all three nations, though Vernadsky presented the East Slavs as Russians who later divided into eastern and western and then emerged as three peoples.²⁹ But, with this perspective in mind, one can still see the considerable service Vernadsky performed in informing the Western public about Ukrainian history based especially on Hrushevs'kyi's multi-volume history as well as on the writings of Doroshenko, Volodymyr Holobuts'kyi, Ohloblyn, and other Ukrainian historians.³⁰ Vernadsky's description of the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising, which he called "the Ukrainian Revolution," was a balanced account ending in the Pereiaslav Agreement. In the section on these events (pt. 1, chap. 4), instances of "West Russia" and "West Russians" are few; "Ukraine" and "Ukrainians" appear instead. He characterized the Pereiaslav Agreement as a "union," using the latter term to replace the word "annexation" he used in the 1940s. His discussion of the Pereiaslav and Moscow negotiations based on documentary sources is thorough, as is his description of the articles them-

27. Nicholas Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963).

28. George Vernadsky, *A History of Russia*, 5 vols. (New Haven-London: Yale Univ. Press, 1943-69).

29. Mychaylo Hrushevs'kyi, "The Traditional Scheme of 'Russian' History and the Problem of a Rational Organization of the History of the Eastern Slavs," *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.* 2, no. 4(6) (Winter, 1952): 363.

30. George Vernadsky, *A History of Russia*, vol. 5, *The Tsardom of Moscow 1547-1682*, 2 pts. (New Haven-London: Yale Univ. Press, 1969).

selves. They contain no Russian nationalist phraseology such as a "regathering of Russian lands" or Soviet terms like "reunion." He did not give a final verdict on the nature of the Ukrainian-Russian relationship, but instead merely noted various historians' views (those of Nol'de, Hrushevs'kyi, Lev Okinshevych, and Lypyns'kyi). Subsequently he referred to Ukraine after 1654 as a "state" (pt. 2, p. 482) and the uprising a "national revolution" (pt. 2 p. 496). He carefully examined the political stance of various groups in Ukraine and the disaffection of Khmel'nyts'kyi and the Cossack officer class (*starshyna*) with Moscow.

Vernadsky emphasized the cardinal significance of the Pereiaslav Agreement for Russia as the foundation of the Tsardom of Muscovy's transformation into the Russian Empire (pt. 1, p. 481). More than any other history of Russia in English, Vernadsky's work saw the agreement as producing a new political and cultural entity, as he made clear in entitling a chapter "The Tsardom of all the Great, Little, and White Russias, 1654-67" (pt. 2 chap. 5). His emphasis on what he saw as a Ukrainian-Russian union was evident in the subsection, "The Tsar and the Hetman, 1645-57," (pt. 2, chap. 5, sect. 2), in which he reiterated the high evaluation of the hetman he had made in his earlier popular biography.

Vernadsky did not bother even to mention Soviet interpretations of the Pereiaslav Agreement, but two monographs published at about the time of his history addressed Soviet assertions directly. C. Bickford O'Brien published a study of Ukrainian-Russian relations from Pereiaslav to Andrusovo.³¹ Mentioning the confrontation of Soviet and Ukrainian émigré views of the Pereiaslav Agreement, O'Brien sought to elucidate the post-Pereiaslav relations. He discussed the various interpretation of the agreement, citing liberally from works by Ukrainian émigré scholars that had appeared in English. He saw Russian-Ukrainian relations as fraught with conflict because from their beginning the two parties involved had different goals and views. He maintained: "The Ukraine was determined to exchange one protector for another on its road to independence; the Muscovite regime saw an opportunity to advance its frontier southward" (p. 26). He described this relationship from the Muscovite standpoint as Ukraine becoming an integral part of Russia. He described it from the position of Khmel'nyts'kyi and the *starshyna* as a "military expedient in the struggle against Poland which would strengthen Ukraine's position and enable the Ukraine, if it so desired, to end the political union with Muscovy," though other segments of Ukrainian society saw it as more binding. One major problem he observed was that the "something akin to nationalist sentiment" that had been stirred in Khmel'nyts'kyi's time "was not easily eradicated after his death" (p. 44). While he valued Khmel'nyts'kyi highly and relied heavily on

31. C. Bickford O'Brien, *Muscovy and the Ukraine: From the Pereiaslav Agreement to the Truce of Andrusovo, 1654-1667* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1963).

Vernadsky's biography of Khmel'nyts'kyi for his work, O'Brien was less positive about the hetman's handling of relations with Muscovy. Nonetheless, he saw the hetman as devoted to Ukraine's interests and a national symbol because of ideas about Ukrainian independence clustered around his name. These evaluations served as the basis for his detailed analysis of the next decade in Russian-Ukrainian relations.

O'Brien's monograph showed with what little seriousness Soviet views of the Pereiaslav Agreement were taken in the West. By 1974, the English reader also had evidence of their rejection within the Soviet Union itself. Mykhailo Braichevs'kyi's critique of the Party theses on the Pereiaslav Council and Agreement and rejection of the term "reunion," a work that originally circulated in Ukraine as *samvydav*, was published in Ukrainian, in the West, in 1972 and in English translation two years later.³² His exposure of the imposition of Russian imperialist visions on Soviet historiography gave evidence of the resistance by Ukrainian scholars in the Soviet Union to the contrived Party theses, and he called for a return to the earlier Soviet models of Leninism, which viewed the Pereiaslav Agreement from a class, rather than a Russian nationalist or statist point of view.³³

The circumstance around the Pereiaslav Agreement were treated in the general work on Cossacks by Philip Longworth.³⁴ He melded his discussion of the Ukrainian Cossacks into a general history of Russian Cossacks, for which he was criticized by Ivan Lysiak Rudnytsky.³⁵ His recounting of the history of the Khmelnytsky Uprising concluded with an appraisal of Bohdan as serving Cossack interests, even though his "great revolution" came too late because the alien social structure of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had already divided Cossackdom socially so that it could not return to what Longworth saw as its pure roots.³⁶ Still Longworth praised him for holding the disparate Cossack interests together, maintaining that "it was due to him that the year 1648 showed the Ukrainian Cossacks united, determined to die rather than accept alien authority." (p. 123) Just as Longworth was little interested in the broader implications of the uprising for Ukraine, he wrote little on the significance of

32. Mykhailo I. Braichevskyi, *Annexation or Reunification: Critical Notes on One Conception*, trans. George P. Kulchycky (Munich: Ukrainisches Institut für Bildungspolitik, 1974).

33. See Serhii Plokhyy, "The Ghosts of Pereiaslav: Russo-Ukrainian Historical Debates in the Post-Soviet Era," *Europe-Asia Studies* 53, no. 3 (May 2001): 489-505.

34. Philip Longworth, *The Cossacks* (London: Constable, 1969).

35. Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "A Study of Cossack History," *Slavic Review* 31, no. 4 (Dec. 1972): 870-75.

36. Longworth's desire to see the pure Cossack trend leads him to suggest that the Ukrainian Cossacks rejected the title for their leader of "hetman" as alien, rather than having to aspire to it against Polish insistence that he would merely be a "starszy." He also postulated some need for a *modus vivendi* between Khmel'nyts'kyi and a purported "Sich ottoman."

the Pereiaslav Agreement, except for a footnote on historiography (pp. 354-55, n. 20). In contrast, the translation of Lev Okinshevych's lecture script of a course in constitutional law at the Ukrainian Free University on the political structures and society of the Hetmanate provided a comprehensive discussion of the Pereiaslav Agreement and its consequences.³⁷ The book by a scholar who had contributed so much to the social and political history of the Hetmanate while writing in Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s represented a summation of his findings on seventeenth and eighteenth-century Ukraine. In juridical terms, he saw the agreement as an alliance and treaty that brought Ukraine into a vassal status.

Information on the whole gamut of literature on the Pereiaslav Agreement and to a degree on the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising came with the publication of John Basarab's historiographical study in 1982.³⁸ The volume is introduced by the excellent essay by Ivan L. Rudnytsky "Pereiaslav: History and Myth," which contains an interesting comparison of the similarities between the Russian émigré nationalist Vasilii Shulgin's writings in the 1930s on the Pereiaslav Agreement and on the Soviet doctrine of "reunion" in the 1950s. Basarab provided a summary of the events of the seventeenth century and a discussion of the controversy of the documents controversy and the various juridical interpretations of the Pereiaslav Agreement. He then included chapters on interpretations in the Cossack chronicles and early historians, a chapter on eleven selected modern historians (Mykhailo Maksymovych, Mykola Kostomarov, Volodymyr Antonovych, Petr Butskinskii, Ludwik Kubala, Venedikt Miakotin, Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi, Stepan Tomashiv's'kyi, Myron Korduba, and George Vernadsky) and one on Soviet historians' interpretations (Mikhail Pokrovskii and Matvii Iavors'kyi).

Basarab also discussed Ivan Krypiakievych's pre-Soviet and Soviet writings, the historical production during the celebrations in 1954, and the attempts of Ukrainian reformers to move away from the Soviet straitjacket about the Pereiaslav Agreement in the 1960s, including dissident voices. The volume's eight appendixes containing translations of major documents, including Vyhovs'kyi's manifesto on the reason for his break with Moscow and the Communist Party theses. At times, Basarab found it hard to focus specifically on the historians' interpretations of the Pereiaslav Agreement and dealt with their views on the significance of the Khmelnytsky Uprising and characterizations of Khmelnytsky. The publication of Basarab's book presented the English reader with an

37. Leo Okinshevych, *Ukrainian Society and Government, 1648-1781* (Munich: Ukrainian Free Univ., 1978) (=Series: Monographs 27). The author did the translation himself.

38. John Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1982).

authoritative compendium of the various views and interpretations of the Pereiaslav Agreement.³⁹

In the last two decades, the agreement of Pereiaslav has been dealt with in monographic studies on the Khmelnytsky era and the Hetmanate. Frank Sysyn examined the impact of the agreement in a number of studies on the Khmelnytsky era and Ukrainian historiography.⁴⁰ Zenon Kohut placed it as the starting point for his study of the Cossack Hetmanate and the abolition of its autonomy.⁴¹ Serhii Plokhy carefully examined the religious aspects of the Pereiaslav Agreement.⁴² He also placed it as the beginning of his study of the reflection of Ukrainian political culture in icons of the Hetmanate.⁴³ The German specialist of early modern Russia, Hans-Joachim Torke wrote a seminal study on Ukrainian-Russian relations in the seventeenth century that both emphasized their problematic nature and their great significance for the transformation of Muscovy.⁴⁴ Two new histories of Ukraine by Orest Subtelny and Paul Robert Magocsi placed the Pereiaslav Agreement in the broader context of Ukrainian history and catalogued the various interpretations of the agreement.⁴⁵

The first edition of Orest Subtelny's history appeared just as *glasnost*' was undermining the Soviet interpretation of the Pereiaslav Agreement. While the Soviet view had never had great acceptance outside the USSR, it had shaped much of the historical writing on the topic in that historians felt obliged to dis-

39. For a discussion of Basarab's book, see Frank E. Sysyn, "Recent Western Works on the Ukrainian Cossacks," *Slavonic and East European Review*, 64, 1 (January, 1986): 100-16.

40. Frank E. Sysyn, "The Khmelnytsky Uprising and Ukrainian Nation-Building," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 17, no. 1-2 (Summer-Winter 1992): 141-70; "The Changing Image of the Hetman," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 46, no. 4 (1998): 531-45; "The Cultural, Social and Political Context of Ukrainian History-Writing in the Seventeenth Century," in Giovanna Brogi Bercoff, ed., *Dall'Opus Oratorium alla Ricerca Documentaria: La storiografia polacca, ucraina e russa fra il XVI e il XVIII Secolo* (Rome, 1986 = *Europa Orientalis*, Vol. V.), 285-310; "Concepts of Nationhood in Ukrainian History Writing 1620-1690," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 10, no. 3-4 (Dec. 1986): 393-423.

41. Zenon E. Kohut, *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate, 1760s-1830s* (Cambridge, MA: Ukrainian Research Institute, distributed by Harvard Univ. Press, 1988).

42. See Serhii Plokhy, *The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine* (Oxford-New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2001), espec. ch. 8.

43. Serhii Plokhy, *Tsars and Cossacks: A Study in Iconography* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute distributed by Harvard Univ. Press, 2002).

44. Hans-Joachim Torke, "The Unloved Alliance: Political Relations between Muscovy and Ukraine in the Seventeenth Century," in Peter J. Potichnyj, Marc Raeff, Jaroslaw Pelenski, and Gleb Zekulin, eds. *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1992), 39-66.

45. Orest Subtelny's *Ukraine: A History* (Toronto-Buffalo-London: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1988) has since been published in two additional editions (1994, 2000) and Paul Robert Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine* (Toronto-Buffalo-London: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1996).

cuss that view, if only to combat it. After Ukrainian independence, the relative importance of the output of scholars writing outside of Ukraine declined, since Ukrainian scholars were now able to read and write freely. This does not mean that no major contributions will be made in the English-language literature as Serhii Plokhy's recent monograph demonstrates. It does, however, mean that while through most of the twentieth century the English-language historiography was of importance for examining topics and upholding viewpoints forbidden in the Soviet Union, in the future it will chiefly be of significance because it will reach an international community of scholars and a public that does not know Slavic languages. That public now has the opportunity even to examine the full views of Ukraine's greatest historian. Volumes 7 and 8 of Hrushevskyi's *History of Ukraine-Rus'* have been published, with volume 9, part 1 to appear in 2005, and volume 9, part 2 to follow.⁴⁶ The availability of Hrushevskyi's work in English will be all the more significant because the Ukrainian government's marking of the 350th anniversary of Pereiaslav stimulated a new search for authoritative scholarship on the event. It is indeed fortunate that the twentieth century left behind a considerable legacy of literature in English that can provide information and various interpretations of that controversial event in Ukrainian and Russian history.

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46. Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine Rus'*: Volume 7: *The Cossack Age to 1625*, trans. Bohdan Strumiński, eds. Serhii Plokhy and Frank E. Sysyn with the assistance of Uliana Pasiecznyk (Edmonton-Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1999), and Volume 8: *The Cossack Age, 1626-1650*, trans. Maria Daria Olynyk, ed. Frank E. Sysyn with the assistance of Myroslav Yurkevich (Edmonton-Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2002).