

TREMORS IN THE SHATTERZONE OF EMPIRES

EASTERN GALICIA IN SUMMER 1941

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During the first days and weeks after the German attack on the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 a wave of violence against Jews swept those territories that had been occupied by the Soviet Union since September 1939 or summer 1940 and now were invaded by the German armed forces and its Romanian and Hungarian allies. The violence consisted mostly of mass executions by the German Security Police's infamous *Einsatzgruppen* and pogrom-like excesses by the local Christian population. Often both forms of violence were closely connected.¹

The anti-Jewish violence in the region sprung from both external and internal sources. Both sources of violence characterized the region as a borderland in the sense of a contested space where competing claims of states, nations, religions, and ideologies clashed with one another. Thus, the violent events of summer 1941 epitomize greater conflicts that arose from the relations of the powers in the region and from the fundamental political and socio-economic changes of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Local anti-Jewish violence was one expression of larger structural tensions that characterized the region.

This chapter will focus on Eastern Galicia. It does not aspire to a comprehensive presentation of all anti-Jewish violence or all pogroms, but is intended as an analysis of certain motifs and contexts and, therefore, refers to specific cases as exemplary.² As a starting point, we look at the central violent event in the region, i.e., in Lwów (L'viv). It was central not so much because of the scale of violence in Eastern Galicia's capital—although it was probably the place that saw the most victims of mass executions during the first weeks of the war in June and July—but more so because the aspirations, perceptions, expectations, and strategies of the different collective actors here became more clearly visible than in other places.³

Lwów

During the weeks before the German invasion a new wave of deportation and arrests had started in the territories that the Soviet Union had occupied since 1939 and 1940. In Eastern Galicia and Volhynia the arrests focused on people who were suspected of Ukrainian nationalism and of having links to the Ukrainian nationalist underground.⁴ Many more were arrested after the German attack. Just one or two days after the German attack the Soviet People's Commissar for Internal Affairs, Lavrentii Beria, seems to have given the order to execute all inmates of the prisons in Western Ukraine who had been imprisoned for "counter-revolutionary crimes as well as persons who caused damage on a large scale."⁵ The advance of the German armies in Western Ukraine—the Seventeenth Army, the First Tank Group, and the Sixth Army—after 22 June was comparatively slow because of the strong Soviet forces that were concentrated here. This gave the NKVD more time to complete this order than in other parts of the border regions. The number of murdered prison inmates in Lwów alone was more than 3,000.⁶ Altogether, probably 20,000–24,000 prison inmates were murdered in the territories of eastern Poland, two-thirds to three-quarters of them in Eastern Galicia.⁷ In contrast to earlier periods of the Soviet occupation of the region, the majority of prison inmates at the time of the German invasion were Ukrainian. Nevertheless, there were also many Poles and Jews among them.

The first units of the German army entered Lwów in the early morning of 30 June, without fighting except for some short exchanges of gunfire with departing Soviet units. Among them was the Ukrainian battalion with the codename *Nachtigall* (Nightingale) as part of the I. Battalion of the special command regiment Brandenburg 800. This unit had to occupy and secure important objects within the city. Among them were the prisons.⁸ *Nachtigall* had been staffed in cooperation with the radical Ukrainian nationalists of the OUN's (*Orhanizatsiia Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv*) self-styled "revolutionary" faction under the leadership of Stepan Bandera (usually referred to as OUN-B).⁹ It soon became evident that there were some German soldiers among the dead in the NKVD remand prison at Łackiego Street.¹⁰ Many corpses showed signs of torture and some apparently were also mutilated.¹¹ The information about the mass killings of prison inmates spread rapidly through the city (see also chapter 20).

The prisons were in the center of a pogrom that unfolded between 30 June and the afternoon of 2 July. Jews were forcibly brought to the prisons in large numbers by members of a Ukrainian militia (often identified by yellow and light blue badges) supported by civilians. They caught Jews on the streets or took them from apartments, beat and otherwise mistreated them, and drove them to the prisons, where the mistreatment continued. Before the entrances of the three major prisons in the city a crowd had assembled to beat the Jews being forced inside. Many were killed in the streets. Inside the prisons, Jews were forced to recover the corpses from cells, cellars, and from mass graves in a prison yard. They had to lay them in lines in order to allow for their identification and to prepare their burials.¹² However, many more Jews were brought to the prisons than were needed for the work. Only a portion of the corpses in the prisons were retrieved and laid out because in the hot summer climate many had reached such a stage of decomposition that not only identification but even retrieval was difficult or impossible.¹³

Mistreatment and murder of Jews continued in the prison yards. Here, mostly members of the militia and civilians, but also German soldiers and policemen, participated in the

violence. The Nachtigall unit that first occupied the prisons on the morning of 30 June seems to have been replaced during the afternoon by German Feldgendarmarie, though Battalion 800 seemed to have remained in command of the prisons.¹⁴ The violence in the prisons ended on the evening of 1 July. This suggests an approval of the violence on the part of the commanding officers of the German armed forces, who for a certain period clearly allowed it to continue. In fact, from 30 June onward large numbers of German troops and police forces visited the prisons because they were curious to see the Bolshevik atrocities. Some commanders even asked their troops to see for themselves the crimes of the “Jewish-communist gang” or led them personally into the prisons.¹⁵

By forcing Jews to go to the prisons, to confront the murdered inmates, to pull out the corpses from the cells or from mass graves and clean them, and to pull the corpse carts from the prisons to the cemeteries (instead of using horses),¹⁶ as well as by mocking, humiliating, and beating them, the people of Lwów used violence as a ritual to put the guilt for the Soviet crimes on the Jews and punish them.¹⁷ The actual perpetrators from the ranks of the NKVD had left Lwów already in the days before. But Jews in general were considered to be supporters and beneficiaries of the Soviet rule during the previous 21 months; even more damningly, they were seen as informers to the NKVD and creators and carriers of communism and Bolshevism in general. Eliyahu Yones relates how a Ukrainian-speaking man in German uniform, who he believes was a member of Nachtigall, spoke to him and other Jews who were pulling out corpses from the cellar of the Brygidki prison, pointing to the bodies: “Look, what you have done.”¹⁸

The Germans shared this view of the Jews. Yones reports that a German officer who visited the scene of the Soviet crimes together with some soldiers turned to the Jews and stated: “The whole world is bleeding because of you! Numerous soldiers are dying because the Jewry has wanted the war.”¹⁹ Mostly, German soldiers only watched (and took pictures of) the pogrom violence. But some soldiers also participated in the excesses, beat and shot at Jews who retrieved the bodies.²⁰

Jews were also mocked, forced to humiliating work, robbed, beaten, and killed in many other parts of the city. They were forced to crawl on hands and knees toward the prisons; they had to sing Russian songs while being marched there; they were made to clean broken glass from the streets with their bare hands.²¹ Near the Zamarstynów prison, Jews, primarily Jewesses, were stripped of their clothes and beaten.²² Mistreatments of a sexual character occurred also at other places in the city.²³

Amidst the pogrom, on the evening of 30 June Stepan Bandera’s deputy, Iaroslav Stets’ko, as a leader of the OUN-B, declared the “Renewal of the Ukrainian State” at a meeting of Ukrainians in the building of the Prosvita society at the market square where he also read an order from Bandera that appointed himself as the head of a provisional Ukrainian government. Stets’ko had just that day come to Lwów together with other leading OUN-B members.²⁴ Among their first activities was the organization of the local militia, based on existing underground structures.²⁵ A bill that announced the declaration of a Ukrainian state also called for an armed fight for it. It was signed by Ivan Klymiv in his capacity as OUN leader of the Ukrainian territories, and it declared: “People! Know! Moscow, Poland, the Hungarians and the Jewry—these are your enemies. Destroy them.”²⁶ A second leaflet, signed by Klymiv in his second capacity as “Chief Commander of the Ukrainian Revolutionary Army,” declared: “I am introducing mass (ethnic and national) responsibility for crimes against the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian army.”²⁷

The humiliations, mistreatments, and killings can be understood as rituals that established or reestablished, after the period of Soviet rule, the “right” and “just” order by punishing the Jews for an alleged transgression of accepted borders in relation to the Christian population, because they were seen as having been treated better than Christians by the Soviets, as well as being supporters and informers of the Soviets and the NKVD. The humiliation and violence not only punished them for transgressions, but also referred them back to the restricted social space that they had allegedly transgressed in the period of Soviet rule. The national triumph of liberation from Soviet suppression and the high expectations for the realization of the great aim of the Ukrainian national endeavor—excitement heightened even more by the ordeal of the Soviet mass murder of many Ukrainians in the prisons—became expressed in a “carnival of violence” that mocked and reversed the previous order and celebrated the new national one.²⁸

However, neither did the Ukrainian nationalists’ high expectations for the future come true nor did the violence against Jews end with the initial celebration of the victory over the Soviet enemy. There was some support for the Ukrainian national aims from the Wehrmacht, especially from its intelligence unit, called the *Abwehr*, and from the designated Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, Alfred Rosenberg (although he distrusted the OUN). But they represented only a minority opinion within the German power structure. During a meeting of high-ranking German officials on 16 July 1941 Hitler announced his decision that there would be no semi-independent states on the former Soviet territory, but the whole territory would remain under direct German rule. Eastern Galicia was attached to the General Government and the rest of the occupied Ukrainian territories under civil administration became part of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. This started a brutal policy of exploitation, suppression, and mass murder.²⁹

But in the end of June and the beginning of July, it was still an open question what the future German policy on the occupied Ukrainian territories would look like. Nevertheless, the Einsatzgruppen of the German Security Police from the beginning had clear instructions to avoid entering into any obligations toward the national movements in the newly occupied territories.³⁰ The bold step of Bandera and his followers led to a clear alienation between them and the Germans and to efforts by the Security Police to reduce their influence. On 5 July Bandera was arrested in Krakow and transported to Berlin, and on 9 July the same happened to Stets’ko and some other members of his government in Lwów.³¹ However, in the first days after 30 June the Security Police tried to avoid an open confrontation with the OUN-B because they did not want to lose the support of the Ukrainian militia in Lwów and other localities for their own “security” and “reprisal” operations.³²

On 2 July the violence on the streets of Lwów mostly stopped, but it was now replaced by organized arrests and mass executions by parts of Einsatzgruppe C. An advance unit of Einsatzkommando 4b had arrived in Lwów during the afternoon of 30 June; the bulk of the Einsatzgruppe joined them the next day.³³ On 29 June, the day before they began arriving, Reinhard Heydrich had sent his well-known order to the commanders of the Einsatzgruppen “not to constrain any self-cleaning attempts of anti-communist and anti-Jewish circles in the newly occupied territories. On the contrary, they should be initiated, but without any traces, intensified, if necessary, and channeled into the right direction.”³⁴

It seems likely that the Security Police encouraged the Ukrainian militia to intensify the violence against Jews. This may have occurred as early as the inception of violence in the afternoon of 30 June, or begun 1 July after the commander of Einsatzgruppe C, SS-Brigade-

führer Otto Rasch, and his staff arrived in the early morning. During that day the pogrom violence reached its greatest intensity.

Beginning possibly on 3 July, certainly on 4 July, the Ukrainian militia and members of Einsatzkommandos 5 and 6 started to arrest people who were suspected as communist supporters, but mostly Jews, and to assemble them on a sports field near the former NKVD headquarters in Pelczyńska Street that had been taken over by the Einsatzgruppe. Here 2,500-3,000 people were assembled.³⁵ Most of them were executed on 5 July in forests near Lwów.³⁶ The executions were declared to be a reprisal for the murder of the prison inmates in Lwów by the Soviets.³⁷

After the occupation of Lwów the Soviet atrocities became a prominent subject in German propaganda. When the first information about the piles of corpses in the Lwów prisons had reached the command of the Seventeenth Army it had asked to send journalists from national and international media to Lwów in order to use the scenes for propaganda purposes.³⁸ On 6 July Joseph Goebbels, the Reich's Propaganda Minister, noted in his diary about the impact of film material from Lwów: "The Führer wants us to start the big anti-bolshevik campaign now."³⁹ The German newsreel *Deutsche Wochenschau* presented material about the Soviet massacres through the whole of July and interpreted them as an example of the normal procedures of "Jewish-Bolshevik" rule.⁴⁰

However, mass executions of alleged "communists" and of Jews as "reprisal" for Soviet atrocities had already begun before the murdered inmates of the prisons in Lwów were found. They also took place at about the same time in other localities. The Einsatzkommando 6 had already shot 132 people, nearly all of them were Jews, on the evening of 30 June in Dobromil as reprisal for a Soviet massacre of prison inmates. Its commander, Erhard Kröger, received an order for this execution from the chief of the Einsatzgruppe C, Otto Rasch, and the Higher SS- and Police Leader Friedrich Jeckeln, who both were present in Dobromil.⁴¹ Jeckeln is known as a radical antisemite and as one of those high-ranking SS officers whose activities strongly contributed to the escalation of the murder of the Jewish population during the following months. He was the chief organizer of the large massacres in Kamenets' Podil's'kyi in mid-August and at Babyn Yar near Kyiv at the end of September 1941.⁴²

The Chief of Sonderkommando 4a, Standartenführer Paul Blobel, was a similar character. During the first days of the war he initiated large massacres. Between 28 and 30 of June, according to *The Einsatzgruppen Reports*, his unit shot a total of 317 people in Sokal: on 28 June 17 "Communist functionaries, agents and snipers"; on 29 June "117 active Communists and agents of the NKVD"; and on 30 June "183 Jewish Communists." Both in Dobromil and in Sokal the executed had been identified and arrested with the help of a local Ukrainian militia.⁴³ In the next city that Blobel's Sonderkommando reached, Łuck in Volhynia, a much larger number of people was shot. This execution was legitimized as a "reprisal" for the Soviet massacre of prison inmates. In Łuck, about 2,800 prison inmates had been killed. After Lwów, that was the largest Soviet massacre in the region.⁴⁴ The Sonderkommando reported that Ukrainian survivors of the massacre told them "the Jews again played a decisive part in the arrests and shooting." The Sonderkommando shot "300 Jews and 20 looters" who were considered to be responsible for arson and large-scale looting in the city on 30 June. Only on 2 July were the corpses of 10 murdered German POW found in the city. "As a reprisal," as the report of the Einsatzgruppen says, "for the murder of the German soldiers and the Ukrainians 1160 Jews were shot with support from a platoon of the Order Police and a platoon of the Infantry."⁴⁵

“ . . . Bolsheviks and Jews . . . ”

The view that Jews not only had been the main supporters and beneficiaries of Soviet rule in 1939-1941, but that Jews basically represented the core of Bolshevism and of the Soviet regime in general was prevalent within the higher ranks of the Nazi regime, including its police forces and many officers of the German armed forces. This view constituted a decisive factor in the development of the German course of action against the Jews during the first weeks of the war and paved the way for the policy of all-out murder that was adopted during August and September 1941. In the German view the Jews gained a fundamentally greater importance for the war against the Soviet Union than for previous wars. Despite all the excessive anti-Jewish violence that had also occurred during the campaign against Poland in 1939, during that war the Polish elites and not the Jews had been the focus of German “actions of pacification.” Klaus-Michael Mallman has grasped this difference well:

The war [with the Soviet Union] was about the destruction of the racially defined main enemy, the “Jewish Bolshevism.” The claimed identity [of Jewish race and Bolshevism] made possible a permanent reinterpretation and conversion of both sides. For that reason, the significance of the Jewish population had changed from the beginning. They were no longer a group, held in contempt, but they were now considered to be the carriers and creators, the biological substance of the Soviet system. Only through the fact that the two central images of enemies—the Jews and communism—mutually penetrated and reinforced was a dynamic development kindled that led to genocide.⁴⁶

Already from the beginning of the war Jews were regarded as actual or at least potential carriers of resistance and the liquidation of Jews was seen as a measure to increase security.⁴⁷

The instructions that the commanders of the Einsatzgruppen and its subunits, the so-called Einsatzkommandos and Sonderkommandos, received before the start of the war apparently did not clearly reflect the fact that among their main tasks would be the killing of Jews, let alone the extermination of the whole Jewish population, but remained largely within the framework that was set through agreements between the Security Police and the Wehrmacht.⁴⁸ This included the execution of Soviet state and party officials and “radical elements” within the population, but not a general liquidation of the Jewish population.⁴⁹ It was probably not till August 1941 that the Einsatzgruppen received orders that aimed at the total extermination of the Jewish population.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, there was a clear understanding from the beginning of the war that the enemies to be executed were “Bolsheviks and Jews,” as Heydrich said so explicitly in his letter to the chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen from 1 July: “It is obvious that the cleansing activities have to extend first of all to the Bolsheviks and Jews.”⁵¹

Before the war there was already a widespread expectation among German officials that spontaneous violent reckonings with the “Jewish-Bolshevik oppressors” would start after areas were liberated from Soviet rule. Apparently, they approved of them.⁵² This was especially true for the Security Police, because these reckonings were expected to work in the same direction as the main task of the Einsatzgruppen, i.e. to liquidate communist supporters.

In his letter of 29 June Heydrich refers to a meeting with the commanders of the Einsatzgruppen and their high-ranking officers on 17 June in Berlin where, as Heydrich implies, the question of pogroms had been discussed.⁵³ However, it seems that the task of actually

instigating the pogroms had not been stressed strongly enough or the instructions had not been sufficiently clear, for he later clarified this task in a separate letter.⁵⁴

If the instigation of pogroms appeared as a priority task of the Einsatzgruppen only during the first week after the German attack, then that would suggest a negative answer to the disputed question of whether there had been a clear prior agreement between the Germans and the OUN about the instigation of pogroms.

There was, however, detailed planning on the side of the OUN-B, finalized in an extensive document with the title "Fighting and Activity During the War," dated May 1941, about how to proceed when the German-Soviet war began, which its authors expected to see in the near future. The organization's initial aim for the beginning of the war was to start uprisings in the Soviet-occupied territories, to liberate as many territories as possible and to start with the organization of local administrations and local militias as soon as the Soviets left in order to support the claim to a Ukrainian state and demonstrate the Ukrainians' ability to establish it.⁵⁵

Attacks by Ukrainian underground forces on the Soviet army and police occurred in many places. Usually the Ukrainians themselves were not able to drive out the Soviets, but often they took over localities when the Soviets had left and before the Germans arrived.⁵⁶ Here members and supporters of the OUN-B played a central role.

Among the central tasks that the OUN-B guidelines assigned to the newly created administrations and militias was "to cleanse the territory from enemy forces."⁵⁷ This included Soviet forces, but the OUN-B also considered "Muscovites, Poles, and Jews as enemy minorities on Ukrainian territory."⁵⁸ The guidelines declared: "[. . .] at a time of chaos and confusion liquidation of undesirable Polish, Muscovite, and Jewish activists is permitted, especially supporters of Bolshevik-Muscovite imperialism."⁵⁹

However, a resolution of an OUN-B Congress in Krakow in April 1941 had warned against pogroms because "the anti-Jewish sentiment of the Ukrainian masses could be used by the Muscovite-Bolshevik government in order to distract the masses' attention from the real producer of evil," i.e. "Moscow." But at the same time the resolution stated: "The Jews in the USSR are the most devoted pillars of the governing Bolshevik regime and the avant-garde of the Muscovite imperialism in Ukraine. . . . The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists fights the Jews as pillars of the Muscovite-Bolshevik regime and, at the same time, explains to the masses of the people: Moscow—that is the main enemy."⁶⁰ This statement sometimes is referred to as proof that the OUN was not involved in the pogroms of summer 1941.⁶¹ However, together with the instructions for the initial phase of the war this statement seems rather to sketch the background of OUN perceptions and strategies that paved the way for the involvement of local militias and OUN supporters in anti-Jewish violence. It shows the strong influence of the perception of Jews as supporters and collaborators of "Muscovite-Bolshevik" rule in the OUN. And the "clean[sing] of the territory from the enemy" is precisely the goal which which most of the militias would have motivated their acts of violence against Jews.

It is clearly documented that Lithuanian nationalists had a strategy of using the German-Soviet war to drive out the Jews. Leaflets of the Front of Lithuanian Activists (LAF) from spring 1941 called on Lithuanians "to drive out the Jews along with the Red Russians" when the German-Soviet war started. It argued that the Jews had lost the right to live on Lithuanian soil "because of their repeated betrayals of the Lithuanian nation to its oppressors."⁶² Other leaflets expressed explicit threats of violence and murder and called upon the Jews to leave the country in order to avoid "unnecessary victims."⁶³

There are no documents from the OUN that would show a comparably explicit strategy. However, there are statements from the OUN's leading personnel expressing approval of the "German methods" for dealing with the Jews.⁶⁴ Antisemitic paranoia may, in fact, have been of lesser influence within the leading circles of the OUN than, for example, in an organization like the LAF. Clearly, it was less important than within the German leadership. For the OUN, Russia—"Muscovy" in their terminology—remained the most important enemy; the Jews were considered to be its supporters, but not its core. Nevertheless, the OUN's nationalist radicalism and the readiness to use highly violent means to achieve their national aims paved the way for anti-Jewish violence and for consent to the German killing operations.⁶⁵ The actual events clearly indicate that the OUN's rank-and-file members embarked on anti-Jewish violence on a large scale, and when they did so, they were far from ignoring the political program or the instructions of the leadership; on the contrary, they found encouragement in them.

The role and attitude of the third major organized actor besides the German Security Police and the Ukrainian nationalists, the Wehrmacht, is less clear. Did it support or disapprove of the pogrom strategy of the Einsatzgruppen? In Lwów the Wehrmacht did not interfere to end the violence, at least not for about 24-48 hours.

In addition, at many other places the pogroms took place in the immediate presence of Wehrmacht units that did not intervene. For example, in Borysław and Drohobycz south of Lwów, which were occupied by the German armed forces at about the same time, it was only after two or three days that the Wehrmacht stopped the violent pogroms that began in close connection to the discovery of murdered prison inmates. German soldiers were present during the pogroms, and, at least in Borysław, some of them actively participated.⁶⁶ Jewish survivors report about rumors that the Germans had a policy of allowing locals one or two days to settle accounts with Jews and communists.⁶⁷ However, it does not seem that explicit orders had been issued telling commanders to allow for pogroms. The attitude of the army units in localities where they apparently tolerated pogroms was mostly directed by the view of Jews as supporters of Soviet rule and as bearing responsibility for the Soviet atrocities. Thus, the violent outbreaks were basically considered to be a just and healthy phenomenon in a phase of transition from Soviet to German rule.

Nevertheless, the High Command of the Seventeenth Army and its commander, General Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel, in all likelihood knew about the pogrom strategy of the Einsatzgruppen and seem to have approved of it. Heydrich mentioned in his "Einsatzbefehl Nr. 2" of 1 July 1941 that it was based on a suggestion of Army High Command 17, headed by von Stülpnagel; the document said that Poles in the newly occupied territories could be expected "on the basis of their experiences, to be anti-Communist and also anti-Jewish." Therefore, Poles "need not to be included in the cleansing action [i.e., be executed], especially as they are of great importance as elements to initiate pogroms and for obtaining information."⁶⁸ In fact, the suggestion by von Stülpnagel that is referred to is not known. While it is sometimes interpreted as a call for pogroms, it may rather have been intended to prevent the Einsatzgruppen from undertaking large-scale executions among the Polish elite as they had after the German occupation of Polish territories in 1939.⁶⁹ Nevertheless, whatever the original content of "the suggestion" to Heydrich had been, it shows that the command of the Seventeenth Army were aware of the Einsatzgruppen's pogrom strategy. The timing of the suggestion may even indicate that it was in reaction to Heydrich's letter to the chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen of 29 June. In contrast to the executions among the Polish elites, von

Stülpnagel did not try to prevent the Einsatzgruppe from inciting pogroms. It is known also from other documents that von Stülpnagel shared the view of Jews as pillars of Bolshevism.⁷⁰ Heydrich sent copies of his letter of 1 July to the commanders of the Einsatzgruppen, to the High Command of the German Army (*Oberkommando des Heeres*), and to the three Army Group Commands.⁷¹

Pogroms

Besides Lwów, the pogroms with the largest number of victims were those in Złoczów and Tarnopol. The murder of several hundred Jews in Zborów belongs in the same context. The high number of victims in these cities resulted from a killing rampage by the Waffen-SS division “Wiking,” more specifically its regiment “Westland” and some supply units. Wiking was part of the combat troops and not of the police force and therefore had no assigned task in the police’s “security” and “cleansing” operations.⁷² It would be inappropriate to use the term “pogrom”—understood as an excessive, public, and to a certain degree spontaneous event with respect to participants and forms of violence—for the executions of the Einsatzgruppen. But the term does fit well in the cases of violence perpetrated by division Wiking in Złoczów, Zborów, Tarnopol, and perhaps also other places.

On the morning of 2 July the commander of the Westland regiment, Standartenführer Hilmar Wäckerle, was killed by a sniper, very likely a Soviet soldier, near the town of Slowita east of Lwów. This seems to have triggered the rampage. The unit had only crossed the border on 30 June and had not participated in major combat operations so far. The Wiking division had been newly created in November 1940, and among its men were a large number of volunteers from the Netherlands, Belgium, and the Scandinavian countries.⁷³ Those from the Netherlands and Belgium were in the Westland regiment. The death of their commander seems to have triggered large-scale revenge against the Jewish population.⁷⁴ On the morning of 3 July the Chief of the General Staff of the Seventeenth Army complained that since the day before the SS Wiking had been blocking the traffic on the road from Lwów to Złoczów: “In the meantime, individual members of the division go hunting Jews.”⁷⁵ According to a postwar testimony during the Nuremberg trials, an order had been read to the soldiers that stated that a Jew had shot Wäckerle and that henceforth they were allowed to shoot at Jews without warning.⁷⁶

Złoczów had already been occupied on 1 July by the 9th Tank Division. Several hundred murdered inmates had been found in the town’s prison.⁷⁷ A Ukrainian committee that formed that day in the city blamed the Jews for the murders and, according to Marco Carynyk’s finding, turned to the German authorities for permission to take revenge. On 2 July the Ukrainian militia posted announcements on the walls of the city stating that all Jews had to appear on the next morning at 8:00 AM in the marketplace and threatening those who did not appear with death. But already on that day the mistreatment, beating, robbery, and killing of Jews had begun. The Jews who assembled in the marketplace on the morning of 3 July were driven to the castle where the NKVD prison had been. Jews who tried to hide were taken out of their houses, heavily beaten, and also driven to the castle. They were beaten again at the entrances of the castle and then forced to take the corpses out of the mass graves, wash them, and put them in lines beside the castle. In all these acts of violence SS men and Ukrainians alike took part. Many Jews were beaten to death while working at the castle. But the greatest number were probably shot down by the SS with machine guns on the evening of 3 July

and on 4 July. Women and children were freed on the evening of 3 July after an officer of the 295th Infantry Division intervened on behalf of the town's German military commander. In the afternoon of 4 July the killings were finally stopped by the commander of the 295th Infantry Division. This commander, Otto Korfes, had been urged to intervene by his First Staff Officer Helmuth Groscurth, who displayed more moral sensibility and responsibility than most of the Wehrmacht officers.⁷⁸

Parts of SS Wiking were apparently also responsible for another major massacre during the first days of July that occurred in the town of Zborów. About Zborów the Einsatzgruppen report of 11 July stated: ". . . 600 Jews liquidated by the Waffen-SS as a retaliation measure for Soviet atrocities."⁷⁹ However, in Zborów itself only one murdered Ukrainian prisoner had been found buried in the yard of the local police station. According to reports of Jewish survivors 850 men were shot on the second day after the Germans occupied the town.⁸⁰

On 2 July, Tarnopol was captured by the Ninth Tank Division. On 3 July several hundred murdered inmates were found in the NKVD prison, among them ten German soldiers.⁸¹ Some attacks on Jews or their property occurred on the same day, but a major pogrom and executions started only on 4 July and continued for the next two or three days. Here again, both Ukrainians and men from SS Wiking played a major role. Jews were brought in large numbers to the prison, as well as other places in the city, and beaten to death or shot by the German forces. The excessive character of the pogrom violence is also shown by the fact that here soldiers, probably from SS Wiking, raped Jewish women.⁸²

It is not very clear what role the Sonderkommando 4b had during this pogrom. The unit probably arrived in Tarnopol on 4 July.⁸³ The operational reports of the Einsatzgruppen listed among Sonderkommando 4b's achievements for Tarnopol 127 executions as well as "liquidation of 600 Jews in the course of the persecutions of Jews as inspired by the Einsatzkommando."⁸⁴ Apparently, neither the SS Wiking men nor local Ukrainian forces needed much inspiration to attack Jews. On the contrary, the Ukrainian city administration seems to have deliberately tried to instigate the Germans to "reprisals" against Jews by stressing the role of Jews in the Soviet atrocities and especially the murder of German soldiers.⁸⁵

In other places public displays of violence were closely connected with the "cleansing operations" of the German Security Police. They were usually accomplished with the help of local administrations and militias who were needed to identify the "communists" and often also to assemble them. In various places the Jewish population, or a part of it, and usually also some non-Jewish alleged communists, were gathered on the market place, where beatings and mistreatment occurred that sometimes resulted in murder. Later a larger or smaller number from among them would be taken out of town and executed by a German Police unit.⁸⁶

In contrast to the army in German-occupied territories, where the police forces actively supported and instigated pogroms and the Wehrmacht in many places at least tolerated them, the Hungarian troops who occupied the southeastern part of Galicia from the beginning of July usually prevented pogroms, at least if they threatened to result in killings. This applies mostly only to the larger cities in the area⁸⁷; in smaller localities and in rural areas the Hungarians apparently did not exert very close control. Here, according to testimonies of Jewish survivors, several major acts of violence occurred that sometimes took on an exterminatory character. So, for example, in the town of Ottynia violence increased from day to day until on 6 and 7 July 138 Jews were killed in the town and neighboring villages. The following day Hungarian troops from Delatyn arrived who stopped the violence. They had been called in by local Poles who feared to become the next victims.⁸⁸

Probably one of the worst acts took place in the region of Niezwisko near Obertyn. During one night in the first half of July “hooligan groups” of “Ukrainian fascists,” as one witness for these events, Markus Willbach, calls them, under the leadership of the local doctor Anatol’ Jurevych and the local Greek-Catholic priest Gavidnyk, brought together the Jews—men, women, and children—from Niezwisko and surrounding villages at the banks of the nearby Dniester river, tied their hands with barbed wire, and threw them into the river from a ferry at the village of Łuka.⁸⁹ Willbach relates that the “hooligans” from Niezwisko during the following days also tried to convince the Ukrainians of Obertyn and other towns and villages in the region to do or to allow them do the same with the Jews from these localities. But the determined opposition of local Ukrainian priests and other respected persons prevented similar murderous acts.⁹⁰

Jabłonica at the Czeremosz river in the mountainous Hutsul region south of Kosów was another place where an act of murder occurred that may have been intended to exterminate the local Jews. According to testimonies 74 people died there. As in Niezwisko the local priest may have had a major role in initiating the killing. According to one testimony the Jews were handcuffed with barbed wire and then thrown from a cliff into the canyon of the Czeremosz river, where they drowned. According to another one their bodies were thrown into the river after they had been killed. The pogromists wanted to continue their murderous work on the following day in the nearby village of Hriniawa, but the local Ukrainian peasants did not allow it. Nevertheless, villagers of Hriniawa later drove out the Jews and took their property.⁹¹ Looting, robbery, and other actions around property were typically connected with pogroms in many places. They may have had a special significance in rural areas because there villagers could not only rob goods and valuables, but also actually acquire the houses and land of killed or expelled Jews.

In Jabłonica and its environs the fact that the area had been briefly occupied by Romanian troops probably contributed to the violence. The large-scale pogrom violence in neighboring Northern Bukovina, in which the Romanian army was strongly involved, apparently encouraged violence on the Galician side of the border even in those regions where no Romanian troops appeared.⁹²

A number of killings also occurred in another part of the region neighboring with Northern Bukovina, around the cities of Borszczów and Tłuste, though in these cities itself anti-Jewish violence remained limited. In Borszczów the head of the local Ukrainian administration, Mykhailo Motyl’, apparently worked successfully to limit the violence, while in Tłuste the Greek-Catholic priest Izvols’kyi and other local Ukrainian dignitaries did not allow it.⁹³ One of the major pogroms in that region took place in the village of Ułaszkwowce on 7 July, shortly after the Soviet retreat. Here the pogrom began during a parish fair after an inciting sermon by the local priest. The events here are said to have instigated the violence in other villages.⁹⁴ However, another report relates that pogroms with many murders started in villages around Czortków with the occupation of that city by German troops on 6 July, and this was probably an encouragement for violence in Ułaszkwowce, which was located south of Czortków in the Hungarian zone.⁹⁵

Another mass murder, this one in the village of Laszkowice in the same region but north of Czortków and therefore in the German-occupied area, is related by Izak Orensztein. According to his testimony 60 Jewish families fell victim to this massacre of which he was an eye-witness: “Ukrainians armed with sickles, axes and knives threw themselves on to the Jews and killed them all.”⁹⁶

A relatively large number of highly violent pogroms seem to have taken place in the region south of Drohobycz and Borysław. Probably during the third week of July 1941 the Jewish Committee of Drohobycz compiled a list of incidents of murder in localities in that region that it sent to the local German Feldkommandantur.⁹⁷ For the town of Schodnica it mentioned 240 killed. A large number of killings there is also confirmed in other sources.⁹⁸ In addition, the Committee's list reported that in the villages of Majdan and Lastówki all Jews had been killed and that 50 people had been murdered in Rybnik. The Jewish youth of that village had been burned alive in a barn. In Nowy Kropiwnik and Stary Kropiwnik 40 had been killed. In the village of Bystrzyca the family of Leiser Koppel, about 30 people, had been slain, and the villagers of Dereżyce had driven all the Jews out of their locality.⁹⁹

It is difficult to assess how widespread such incidents in Eastern Galicia were at this time. Those mentioned here clearly are not the only ones. But the information on villages usually is very scarce and insufficient to reconstruct events in a more detailed way.

Conclusion

The spreading phenomenon of anti-Jewish violence in summer 1941 was a symptom of the fact that the region was a contested space between empires, ideologies, nations, and religions. The different conflicts focused during this short period in a specific way on the Jews. Jews were humiliated, robbed, beaten, and killed both by locals and by the German invaders because they were identified with Bolshevism and Soviet rule. This antisemitic stereotype of Jews as communists was not isolated from other antisemitic prejudices. The view that Jews had supported the Soviet occupation of the area, had participated in and benefited from the suppression and persecution of other national groups was a perception that was widespread among the local population as well as the local nationalist political activists and that was also shared by the Germans. In fact, the executions of the Einsatzgruppen and other German police units during the first weeks of the war usually were declared to be liquidations of communist functionaries or supporters or to be reprisals for the Soviet mass murder of prison inmates. In both categories the vast majority of the executed were male Jews between 15 and 60, considered to be the most dangerous group. Usually, they were taken from the better-educated strata that were seen as especially pro-communist. On the German side this perception of Jews was an important element that fueled and justified a further escalation of the murderous policy against Jews.

The discovery of the murdered prison inmates produced anger and hate that increased the pogrom violence, but it was not its only background, and there seems to be no doubt that there would still have been violence against Jews from local militias or civilians if prison inmates had not been murdered. The same applies for actions of the Einsatzgruppen against Jews. The large executions declared as "reprisals" in Lwów and Łuck might not have happened, but there was a firm belief among the Germans that the Jews were the "core" of Bolshevism and of Soviet rule, so mass executions as a means of liquidating "communists" were a task assigned to the Einsatzgruppen before there was any knowledge about the Soviet atrocities. Bogdan Musial argues that the Soviet atrocities contributed significantly to the radicalization of the German persecution of the Jews and the brutalization of German warfare.¹⁰⁰ However, it seems to be quite clear that the radicalization was hardly a consequence of Soviet crimes, but rather of the identification of "Bolshevists"

and “Jews.” That is the reason why the war against the Soviet Union also became a war of annihilation against the Jews.

Another highly controversial issue is what caused the rise of hostility toward Jews in the period of Soviet occupation 1939–1941. Was it truly the result of a pro-Soviet attitude among the Jews or more of antisemitic stereotypes among the gentile population? Findings for some parts of “Western Belarus” seem to suggest that Jews, at least after the initial months of the Soviet occupation, did not really have a disproportionate share in most segments of the Soviet administration.¹⁰¹ Jewish religious, political, economic, and cultural life was suppressed or forcefully transformed according to Soviet ideology, and not to a lesser degree than that of the other communities in the area. The widespread perception among the Christian population of broad Jewish collaboration and “treason” seems to have been, as the rituals of punishment analyzed above suggest, rather the result of the fact that the Soviet regime actually brought equality to Jews as individuals, albeit under the condition of a general lack of individual rights that characterized the Soviet citizen. Before the Soviet occupation Jews, though officially equal citizens, had faced many discriminatory practices. Under the Soviets, many of these practices were abolished, antisemitism became a punishable crime, and positions in public service became open to Jews that earlier had been denied to them. Many Jews, especially from the younger generation, took opportunities that arose when the Soviets removed the former, mostly Polish elites whom they mistrusted. So even a percentage of Jews in state offices proportional to their percentage in the general population meant a considerable shift, and could appear to the Christian population as an undue improvement of the social position of the Jews. The pogroms were rituals that were intended to reverse this unacceptable change, show the Jews their subordinate social position, and punish them for the transgression of its limits during the time of Soviet rule.

NOTES

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1. New insights into the complex events of summer 1941 in this region have resulted from the controversial discussion of Jan T. Gross’s study on the pogrom in the town of Jedwabne on 10 July 1941, that, however, focused on the mostly Polish region of Łomża and Białystok: Jan T. Gross, *Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); see Paweł Machcewicz, Krzysztof Persak, eds., *Wokół Jedwabnego, t. 1: Studia, t. 2: Dokumenty*, (Warsaw: IPN, 2002); and Andrzej Żbikowski, *U genezy Jedwabnego. Żydzi na kresach północno-wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej, wrzesień 1939–lipiec 1941* (Warsaw: Żydowski Instytut Historyczny, 2006). A revised version of the latter book’s chapter on summer 1941 has been published in English as Andrzej Żbikowski, “Pogroms in Northeastern Poland—Spontaneous Reactions and German Instigations” in *Shared History—Divided Memory: Jews and Others in Soviet-Occupied Poland, 1939–1941*, ed. Elazar Barkan, Elizabeth A. Cole, and Kai Struve (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag 2008), 315–54.

2. The most comprehensive, though not complete overview on pogrom violence in Eastern Galicia that we have so far can be found in Andrzej Żbikowski’s early attempt to present an overview of pogroms in Eastern Poland, Andrzej Żbikowski, “Lokalne pogromy Żydów w czerwcu i lipcu 1941 roku na wschodnich rubieżach II Rzeczypospolitej,” *Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego*

1992, nos. 2–3 (162–63): 3–18, esp. 12–18. The state of research for Eastern Galicia and Volhynia is discussed by Dieter Pohl in “Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Western Ukraine: A Research Agenda” in *Shared History—Divided Memory*, ed. Barkan, Cole, and Struve, 305–313. In a recent article Wendy Lower compared Western Ukraine with other regions and discussed various models of explanation for the violence: “Pogroms, Mob Violence, and Genocide in Western Ukraine, Summer 1941: Varied Histories, Explanations, and Comparisons,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 13 (2011): 217–46. See also A. Kruglov, “Pogromy v vostochnoi Galitsii letom 1941 g.: organizatory, uchastniki, masshtaby i posledstviya,” in *Vojna na unichtozhenie: Nasitskaia politika genotsida na territorii Vostochnoi Evropy: Materialy mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferencii*, ed. Aleksandr. R. Diukov (Moscow: Fond “Istoricheskaia pamiat,” 2010); and Vladimir Melamed, “Organized and Unsolicited Collaboration in the Holocaust: The Multifaceted Ukrainian Context,” *East European Jewish Affairs* 37 (2007): 217–48. This article refers primarily to the pogroms in Lwów and Borysław.

3. The violent events in Lwów have been discussed in the research literature more or less extensively for a long time, but have only recently been studied more thoroughly, John-Paul Himka, “The Lviv Pogrom of 1941: The Germans, Ukrainian Nationalists, and the Carnival Crowd,” *Canadian Slavonic Papers/Revue canadienne des slavistes* 53 (2011): 209–43. But neither Himka nor other researchers who discussed the pogrom and German mass executions in early July are certain about the number of victims. The Operational Situational Report No. 24 of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD on the activities of the Einsatzgruppen from 16 July 1941 reports for Einsatzgruppe C, apparently with respect to Lwów: “Approximately 7,000 Jews were rounded up and shot by the Security Police in retaliation for the inhuman atrocities,” cited in Yitzhad Arad, Shmuel Krakowski, and Shmuel Spector, eds., *The Einsatzgruppen Reports: Selection from the Dispatches of the Nazi Death Squads’ Campaign Against the Jews in Occupied Territories of the Soviet Union July 1941-January 1943* (New York: Holocaust Library, 1989), 31. However, Dieter Pohl believes that this number includes both the victims of pogroms and of the mass executions by Einsatzgruppe C, which occurred mostly on 5 July, with perhaps 2,500–3,000 executed. Dieter Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941–1944. Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1996), 69. Jakub Gerstenfeld-Maltiel reports in his memoirs that the Jewish burial society established (according to information of the later Lwów Judenrat) that about 2,000 Jews were killed in the first days of German occupation of Lwów. Jakub Gerstenfeld-Maltiel, *My Private War: One Man’s Struggle to Survive the Soviets and the Nazis* (London: Valentine Mitchell, 1993), 54. John-Paul Himka believes that the Judenrat might have underestimated the number of victims and that the German Security Police might have exaggerated it (Himka, “The Lviv Pogrom,” 221).

4. On the wave of arrests and deportations (with further literature), see Grzegorz Hryciuk, “Victims 1939–1941: The Soviet Repressions in Eastern Poland” in *Shared History—Divided Memory*, ed. Barkan, Cole, and Struve, 173–200, here 191–94.

5. Quoted in Ivan Bilas, *Represyvno-karal’na sistema v Ukraini 1917–1953*, vol. 1 (Kiev: Lybid 1994, 128f.); see also Marco Carynnyk, “The Palace on the Ikva—Dubne, September 18th, 1939 and June 24th, 1941” in *Shared History—Divided Memory*, ed. Barkan, Cole, and Struve, 263–301, here 280f.

6. Grzegorz Hryciuk estimates the number of murdered prison inmates in Lwów at 3,100–3,500. Grzegorz Hryciuk, *Polacy we Lwowie 1939–1944. Życie codzienne* (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 2000), 186–91. Oleh Romaniv and Inna Fedushchak estimate the number at 4,000 in *Zakhidnoukraińs’ka trahediia 1941, L’viv*, (New York: Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 2002), 56.

7. Krzysztof Popiński, “Ewakuacja więziń kresowych w czerwcu 1941r. na podstawie dokumentacji ‘Memorialu’ i Archiwum Wschodniego,” in *Zbrodnicza ewakuacja więziń i aresztów NKWD na Kresach Wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej w czerwcu-lipcu 1941 roku* (Warsaw: Główna Komisja Badania Zbrodni Przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu-Institut Pamięci Narodowej, 1997), 73–77; idem, “Zbrodnie sowieckie na kresach wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej czerwiec-lipiec 1941 r.,” http://www.electronicmuseum.ca/Poland-WW2/soviet_atrocities/soviet_atrocities_annex_1.html (accessed 23 January 2009). Bogdan Musiał believes that it could have been up to 30,000: “Konterrevolutionäre Elemente sind zu erschießen.” *Die Brutalisierung des deutsch-sowjetischen Krieges im Sommer 1941* (Berlin: Propyläen, 2001), 138. Romaniv and Fedushchak have collected evidence on

the killing of about 22,000 prisoners in Eastern Galicia and Volhynia and they consider their data incomplete: *Zakhidnoukrains'ka trahedija*, 63, see also the information on the prisons on 55–63.

8. Battalion 800, Kommandeur, Schlussmeldung über Einnahme Lemberg und vollzogene Objektsicherung, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (henceforth: BA-MA) Wf-03/34170.

9. On the OUN see also below. On Nachtigall and “Roland” see I. K. Patryliak, *Viis'kova diial'nist' OUN (B) u 1940–1942 rokach* (Kiev: Instytut istorii Ukraïny NAN Ukraïny, 2004), 253–321; Andrii Bolianovs'kyi, *Ukraïns'ki viis'kovi formuvannia v zbroinykh sylakh Nimechchyny (1939–1945)* (L'viv: L'vivs'kyi Nacional'nyi Universytet im. Ivana Franka, 2003), 40–86.

10. Three other murdered German soldiers were later found in the Soviet military hospital, “Schlussbericht über die in der Zeit vom 1.–10. Juli 1941 in Lemberg getroffenen Feststellungen, betreffend russische Greuelaten,” 16 July 1941, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle für Verletzungen des Völkerrechts, BA-MA RW 2/148, 375f.; see also Alfred M. de Zayas, *Die Wehrmachtuntersuchungsstelle. Deutsche Ermittlungen über alliierte Völkerrechtsverletzungen im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Berlin: Ullstein, 1987), 336–38 (published in English as *The Wehrmacht War Crimes Bureau, 1939–1945*, trans. Kai Struve [Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989]).

11. Hryciuk, *Polacy we Lwowie*, 190f.; Musial, “Konterrevolutionäre Elemente,” 262–69.

12. Himka: “The Lviv Pogrom,” 210–21. For the Zamarstynów prison see also Ivan Khymka [John-Paul Himka], “Dostovirnist' svidchennia: Relatsiia Ruzi Vagner pro L'vivs'kyi pohrom vlitku 1941,” *Holokost i suchasnist' 2* (4) 2008: 43–79; and the account of Zygmunt Tune, Wałbrzych, 12 March 1947, Archiwum Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego we Warszawie (henceforth: AŻIH) 301/2242, 1f. For the Brygidki prison see Eliyahu Yones, *Die Straße nach Lemberg. Zwangsarbeit und Widerstand in Ostgalizien 1941–1944* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1999), 21–24.

13. Because of the decomposition most of the corpses in the cellars of the Brygidky and Zamarstynów prisons were not retrieved, but the doors were bricked and only reopened in the beginning of 1942. De Zayas, *Die Wehrmachtuntersuchungsstelle*, 338.

14. Philipp Christian Wachs, *Der Fall Theodor Oberländer (1905–1998). Ein Lehrstück deutscher Geschichte* (Frankfurt: Campus, 2000), 82; Hannes Heer, “Einübung in den Holocaust: Lemberg Juni/Juli 1941,” *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 49 (2001): 409–427, here 419. In a letter to the German city command (Stadtkommandant) from 2 July 1941 the commander of Bataillon 800, Major Heinz, stated that his unit was still occupying three prisons in the city, Derzhavnyi arkhiv L'vivs'koï oblasti (DALO) R-31/1/1, 11.

15. See, for example, for the Third Battalion of the First Mountain Division, Hermann Frank Meyer, *Blutiges Edelweiß. Die 1. Gebirgs-Division im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Berlin: Links, 2008), 62. Brigadeführer Rasch, the head of Einsatzgruppe C, probably also gave a speech before a group of his men in the prison yards at Łackiego Street; see interrogation of Rudolf Hohenschildt, 12 December 1961, Bundesarchiv (henceforth: BArch) B 162/1570, 270.

16. The pulling of carts is not reported for Lwów, but for Sambor, see Musial, “Konterrevolutionäre Elemente,” 179.

17. Similar rituals took place also at other localities where murdered prison inmates had been found. On Drohobycz and Borysław see below.

18. BArch B 162/27345, 55.

19. *Ibid.*, 56.

20. See Heer, “Einübung in den Holocaust,” 423.

21. See Jan Rogowski, “Lwów pod znakiem swastyki. Pamiętnik z lat 1941–1942,” BOss. 16711/II, 188f.; Musial, “Konterrevolutionäre Elemente,” 175–78; Tadeusz Zaderecki, “Gdy swastyka Lwowem wladala . . . (Wycinek z dziejów okupacji hitlerowskiej),” *Yad Vashem Archives* (henceforth: YVA) O-6/367, 9–12 (published in Hebrew as “Bi-meshol tselav haqeres bi-Lvov: Churban haqehilla ha-yehudit be-enei mechabber polani,” Jerusalem 1982).

22. Photos from these scenes have been published many times. Perhaps among the first publications was Gerhard Schönberner, *Der gelbe Stern. Die Judenverfolgung in Europa 1933–1945* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1991 [1st ed. 1960]), 132f.; see now also Khymka, “Dostovirnist' svidchennia,” 53–60.

23. Zaderecki, *Gdy swastyka*, 11f.; Himka: “The Lviv Pogrom,” 213f.

24. See Frank Grelka, *Die ukrainische Nationalbewegung unter deutscher Besatzungsherrschaft 1918 und 1941/42* (Wiesbaden: Harassowitz, 2005), 251–70; see also the comprehensive collection of documents about these events in Orest Dziuaban, ed., *Ukraïns'ke derzhavotvorennia: akt 30 chervnia. Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv, L'viv* (Kiev: Piramida, 2001). Stets'ko's view can be found in Iaroslav Stets'ko, *30 chervnia 1941. Proholoshennia vidnovlennia derzhavnosti Ukraïny* (Toronto: Liga Vyzvolennia Ukraïny, 1967).

25. The Einsatzgruppen Report of 2 July said: "Some elements of the Bandera-group under the direction of Stechko [!] and Ravlik [!] have organized a militia force and a municipal office [. . .]," *The Einsatzgruppen Reports*, 3f. Ivan Ravlyk ("Ravlik" was a misspelling) belonged to the group of OUN members that came to Lwów together with Stets'ko. He is considered to be one of the organizers of the militia. At the end of 1941 he was arrested by the Gestapo in Lwów and died in 1942 in prison after long torture. On the organization of the militia on 30 June, see also Khymka, "Dostovirnist' svichennia," 64 n27.

26. Dziuaban, ed., *Ukraïns'ke derzhavotvorennia*, 126–29, here 129. However, in the original printings this line in contrast to many others was not produced in bold type or larger letters, see the copies in Central'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchykh orhaniv vlyady ta upravlinnia Ukraïny 3833/1/63, 9a, 10, 12.

27. *Ibid.*, 131. The Hungarians had attracted the Ukrainian nationalists' hatred because they had destroyed the Ukrainian state-building attempt in Carpatho-Ukraine by occupying that region in March 1939.

28. Siegfried Gasparaitis interpreted the parallel event of the pogrom in the Lithuanian capital Kaunas after 23 June 1941, which also took place simultaneously with the formation of a new Lithuanian government, as a "performance of a national resuscitation" after the suffering under the Soviet occupation. Siegfried Gasparaitis, "Verrättern wird nur dann vergeben, wenn sie wirklich beweisen können, dass sie mindestens einen Juden liquidiert haben." *Die Front Litauischer Aktivisten* (LAF) und die antisowjetischen Aufstände 1941," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 49 (2001): 886–904, here 901. For an interpretation of the pogroms of summer 1941 in Lithuania and eastern Poland as a "punishment" of the Jews for Soviet rule see also Roger D. Petersen, *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 95–136; and Kai Struve, "Rites of Violence? The Pogroms of Summer 1941," *Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry* 24 (2011): 257–74. On this aspect of the violence see also Himka: "The Lviv Pogrom," 235–38, who, however, tends to restrict this aspect of the violence maybe too strongly to the "crowd" in contrast to the Ukrainian militia.

29. See, on the German occupation of the Ukrainian territories, Karel Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2004); on the example of the Zhytomyr region, Wendy Lower, *Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005).

30. See Heydrich's first written order to the commanders of the Einsatzgruppen from 29 June where he also asked them to initiate pogroms, Peter Klein, ed., *Die Einsatzgruppen in der besetzten Sowjetunion 1941/42. Die Tätigkeits- und Lageberichte des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD* (Berlin: Edition Hentrich, 1997), 319.

31. Grelka, *Die ukrainische Nationalbewegung*, 259–61.

32. The Operational Situation Report USSR No. 10 of 2 July said about the situation in Lwów: "The Einsatzgruppe has created a Ukrainian political city administration as a counter-balance against the Bandera group" (my own translation from Ereignismeldung UdSSR Nr. 10 des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, 2 July 1941, BArch 58/214, 53; in a somewhat awkward translation also in *The Einsatzgruppen Reports*, 3).

33. *The Einsatzgruppen Reports*, 3, and Operational Report no. 9, 1 July 1941, 46.

34. Klein ed., *Die Einsatzgruppen*, 319.

35. Affidavit of Erwin Schultz, 26 May 1947, NO-3644, in *Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10*, Vol. 4 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949–1953), 135f.; Leon Weliczker Wells, *The Janowska Road*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum 1999), 45–54.

36. According to the Operational Situation Report No. 11 from 3 July 1941 Einsatzkommando 6 already on 2 July reported the execution of 133 Jews, *The Einsatzgruppen Reports*, 5. How-

ever, this may have referred to an execution in Dobromil on 30 June. The activity report of the Intelligence officer (Ic) in the staff of the Seventeenth Army stated under 5 July: "Einsatzkommando 6 (Standartenführer Dr. Kroeger) in Lwów, NKVD headquarter, reports: more than 400 Jews have been shot as reprisal for murdered Ukrainians. 200 more will follow," BA-MA, RH 20-17/769. See also the diary of Felix Landau, a member of an Einsatzgruppen unit sent from Krakow, in Ernst Klee et al.: "Schöne Zeiten." *Judenmord aus der Sicht der Täter und Gaffer*, 4th ed., (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1989), 89f. Landau reports that his unit had been summoned already in the morning of 3 July for an execution of 500 Jews, but later he says that the execution did not take place.

37. See Affidavit by Erwin Schultz, 137; many testimonies about the executions can be found also in the judicial investigations against members of Einsatzkommandos 5 and 6; see, for example, BArch B 162/1570–1573, 5224, 5226, 5227, 5343, 5344, 20190, 20200.

38. The journalists reached Lwów in the evening of 2 July; see AOK 17, Tätigkeitsberichte Ic/AO, Beilage Nr. 1 zum KTB Nr. 1, 15.1.-12.12.41, BA-MA 20-17/768, entries for 1 and 2 July 1941; see also Heer, "Einübung in den Holocaust," 417.

39. Joseph Goebbels, *Tagebücher*, vol. 4, ed. Ralf Georg Reuth (Munich: Piper, 1992), 1622.

40. On how the German propaganda used the massacres see also Bianca Pietrow-Ennker, "Die Sowjetunion in der Propaganda des Dritten Reiches: Das Beispiel der Wochenschau," *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* 2 (1989): 79-120, here 94–96; Musial, "Konterrevolutionäre Elemente," 200-209; Bernd Boll, "Zloczow, Juli 1941: Die Wehrmacht und der Beginn des Holocaust in Galizien," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 50 (2002): 899-917, here 916 (published in English as: "Złoczów, July 1941: The Wehrmacht and the Beginning of the Holocaust in Galicia; From a Criticism of Photographs to a Revision of the Past" in *Crimes of War: Guilt and Denial in the Twentieth Century*, ed. O. Bartov, A. Grossman, and M. Nolan [New York: New Press, 2002], 61-99).

41. *The Einsatzgruppen Reports*, 31. See the "Judgment of Landgericht Tübingen," 31 July 1969, against Erhard Kröger and Andreas von Koskull, in *Justiz und NS-Verbrechen. Sammlung deutscher Strafurteile wegen nationalsozialistischer Tötungsverbrechen*, vol. 32 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2004), 704–734, here 714–16.

42. On Jeckeln see Richard Breitman, "Friedrich Jeckeln—Spezialist für die 'Endlösung' im Osten" in *Die SS—Elite unter dem Totenkopf. 30 Lebensläufe*, ed. Ronald Smelser et al. (Paderborn, Germany: Schöningh, 2000), 267-75.

43. *The Einsatzgruppen Reports*, 31. See also the ruling of Landgericht Darmstadt against Kuno Callsen et al., 29 November 1941, in *Justiz und NS-Verbrechen* 31, 7-275, here 56.

44. This number is mentioned in the Einsatzgruppen report no. 24, 16 July 1941, *The Einsatzgruppen Reports*, 32. Romaniv and Fedushchak mention 2,754 murdered prison inmates in *Zakhidnoukrains'ka trahediia*, 61f.

45. Ereignismeldung UdSSR Nr. 11, 16 July 1941, 192. The translation in *The Einsatzgruppen Reports* 32 wrongly ascribes the execution to Ukrainians.

46. Klaus-Michael Mallmann, "Die Türöffner der 'Endlösung.' Zur Genesis des Genozids" in *Die Gestapo im Zweiten Weltkrieg. 'Heimatfront' und besetztes Europa*, ed. by Gerhard Paul and Klaus-Michael Mallmann (Darmstadt, Germany: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2000), 437–63, here 443f. About the war with Poland in 1939, see Alexander B. Rossino, *Hitler Strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg, Ideology, and Atrocity* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003); and Jochen Böhrer, *Auftakt zum Vernichtungskrieg. Die Wehrmacht in Polen 1939* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2006).

47. See also Jürgen Matthäus, "Controlled Escalation: Himmler's Men in the Summer of 1941 and the Holocaust in the Occupied Soviet Territories," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 21(2) (2007): 218–42.

48. Jürgen Förster, "Das Unternehmen, Barbarossa' als Eroberungs- und Vernichtungskrieg" in *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Bd. 4: Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion* (Stuttgart: DVA, 1983), 413–47.

49. Such a definition of the tasks of the Einsatzgruppen is reflected in a letter that Heydrich sent to the Higher SS and Police Leader in the East on 2 July 1941; see Klein, ed., *Die Einsatzgruppen*, 320.

50. The question of which orders the Einsatzgruppen received before 22 June 1941 and if and when a "general killing order" had been issued has been the subject of a long controversy; the most

extensive discussion is found in Ralf Ogorreck, *Die Einsatzgruppen und die "Genesis der Endlösung"* (Berlin: Metropol, 1996).

51. Klein, ed.: *Die Einsatzgruppen*, 320f. The text of this order is included also in the Einsatzgruppen report of 2 July, see *The Einsatzgruppen Reports*, 2f.

52. During a multidepartmental meeting on planning for propaganda on 29 May 1941, Georg Leibbrandt, a future high-ranking official of the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, presented "political guidelines for propaganda" that stated: ". . . it is probably advisable to leave to the population itself to settle its accounts with the Jewish-Bolshevik oppressors initially, and then after gathering more detailed knowledge to deal with the remaining oppressors," quoted in Karlis Kangeris, "Die nationalsozialistischen Pläne und Propagandamaßnahmen im Generalbezirk Lettland 1941-1942" in *Collaboration and Resistance During the Holocaust: Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bern et. al.*, ed. David Gaunt, Paul A. Levine, Laura Palosuo (Bern: Peter Lang, 2004), 161-86, here 169.

53. Klein, *The Einsatzgruppen*, 319.

54. Alexander Rossino assumes that Heydrich's order of 29 June 1941 originated from a meeting of Heinrich Himmler with several high-ranking SS and Police leaders held on 28 June in eastern Prussia where Himmler seem to have criticized the fact that there had not been pogroms in the neighboring region of Białystok as there had been in Lithuania. In fact, the course of events in Kaunas, where a large pogrom apparently had intensified under the influence of the Chief of Einsatzgruppe A Franz Walter Stahlecker, may have been instructive for Heydrich's letter, see Alexander B. Rossino, "Polish 'Neighbours' and German Invaders: Anti-Jewish Violence in the Białystok District during the Opening Weeks of Operation Barbarossa," *Polin* 16 (2003): 431-51, here 443.

55. "Borot'ba i diial'nist' OUN pid chas viiny" in *OUN v 1941 rotsi*, ed. O. Veselova et al (Kiev: Instytut istorii Ukraïny NAN Ukraïny, 2006), vol. 1, 58-176; also in Patryliak, *Viis'kova diial'nist'*, 426-596. On the intentions and activities of the OUN-B in the summer of 1941 see also Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe: "The 'Ukrainian National Revolution of 1941': Discourse and Practice of a Fascist Movement," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 12 (2011): 83-114.

56. On the OUN-B's planning for the initial phase of the war and for military activities behind the Soviet army, see Patryliak, *Viis'kova diial'nist'*, 96-207. Patryliak tends to stress the significance of the military activities of the OUN.

57. Veselova et al., eds., *OUN v 1941 roci*, vol. 1, 69.

58. *Ibid.*, 103f.

59. *Ibid.*, 93. On the OUN's attitude toward Jews see Marco Carynnyk, "Foes of Our Rebirth: Ukrainian Nationalist Discussions about Jews, 1929-1947," *Nationalities Papers* 39 (2011): 315-52; on spring and summer 1941, *ibid.*, 328-32; see also Karel C. Berkhoff and Marco Carynnyk, "The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Its Attitude toward Germans and Jews: Iaroslav Stets'ko's 1941 Zhyttiepys," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 23(3-4) (1999): 149-84, here 153.

60. Veselova et al., eds., *OUN v 1941 rotsi*, vol. 1, 43.

61. See, for example, Volodymyr V'iatrovyč, "Stavlennia OUN do ievreïv. Formuvannia pozycii na tli katastrofy, L'viv: Vydavnytstvo," Mss. (2006), 54-60; and the critical review by Taras Kurylo and Ivan Khymka [John-Paul Himka], "Iak OUN stavylasia do ievreïv? Rozdumy nad knyzhkoiu Volodymyra V'iatrovyča," *Ukraïna moderna* 13(2) (2008): 252-65.

62. Michael MacQueen, "The Context of Mass Destruction: Agents and Prerequisites of the Holocaust in Lithuania," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 12(1) (1998): 27-48, here 34; see also idem, "Massvernichtung im Kontext: Täter und Voraussetzungen des Holocaust in Litauen," in *Judenmord in Litauen. Studien und Dokumente*, ed. by Wolfgang Benz and Marion Neiss (Berlin: Metropol, 1999), 15-34, here 23.

63. MacQueen, "The Context of Mass Destruction," 29-32.

64. Berkhoff and Carynnyk, "The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists," 152 and *passim*. See also Stepan Lenkavskyi in a discussion of the Council of Seniors of policies of the future Ukrainian state in mid-July 1941 in Lwów: "With regard to the Jews we will adopt all methods that will contribute to their destruction," in *Ukraïns'ke derzhavotvorennia*, ed. Dziuban, 190.

65. The conviction deeply rooted in the OUN that violence was legitimate, necessary, and the only way of achieving the national aims included also the expectation that the members of the OUN should be prepared to sacrifice their own lives for the national cause. This is expressed in the often

repeated phrase “Prevail in the battle for the Ukrainian state or die!” But the readiness to sacrifice one’s own life included also a readiness to take ruthlessly that of the perceived enemy among not only other national groups but also among fellow Ukrainians who were considered to be “traitors.”

66. Gina Wieser, 31 May 1945, AŽIH 301/176, 1.

67. See for Borysław, for example, Ana Antler, 12 September 1945; for Drohobycz Zofia Cukier, 1 June 1946; both in AŽIH 301/2569, 1. A Polish witness reports that a German “general” allowed for the violence (which he, however, interprets as directed only against “communists”) describing the scenes of the pogrom in great detail. Alfred Jasiński, “Borysławska apokalipsa,” *Karta* no. 4 (1991): 98–114, here 112. Another source from Borysław reports that the allowance was given by the Gestapo, but the pogrom was ended by the Ortskommandantur of the Wehrmacht, see Salomon Rosenberg, 29 November 1947, AŽIH 301/3119.

68. Klein ed., *Die Einsatzgruppen*, 320f. Heydrich’s order was also included in the Operational Situation Report no. 10 of 2 July 1941, see *The Einsatzgruppen Reports*, 2.

69. In fact, a special Einsatzkommando, usually referred to as Einsatzkommando z.b.V. (for special tasks), executed on 4 July and later dates 25 Polish professors from universities in Lwów along with some of their family members, altogether 45 persons; see Dieter Schenk, *Der Lemberger Professorenmord und der Holocaust in Ostgalizien* (Bonn: Dietz, 2007).

70. Christian Streit, “Angehörige des militärischen Widerstandes und der Genozid an den Juden im Südabschnitt der Ostfront” in *NS-Verbrechen und der militärische Widerstand gegen Hitler*, ed. Gerd R. Ueberschär (Darmstadt: Primus, 2000), 90–103, esp. 93f. For an apologia for Stülpnagel, who belonged to the military opposition and was sentenced to death and hanged after the failed coup of 20 July 1944, see Barbara Koehn, *Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel. Offizier und Widerstandskämpfer: eine Verteidigung* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2008).

71. See BA-MA WF-03/9121, Bl. 106f.; see also Pohl, *Die Herrschaft der Wehrmacht*, 156f.

72. As for Lwów, it is difficult to establish a clear and certain number of victims for these cities. The numbers in German sources are usually only estimates based on limited information. The numbers that are mentioned in reports of Jewish survivors in most cases reflect estimates and rumors that existed among Jews in the different localities. Because of the traumatic character of the event they may have become exaggerated, but sometimes they also may be fragmentary or remembered inexactly. In any case, for Złoczów Jewish survivors mention 2,000–3,000 victims or more, while a report of the Einsatzgruppe mentions 300–500 Jews who had been arrested and shot by the militia “by order of the Wehrmacht” (see *The Einsatzgruppen Reports*, 33). In fact, most of the shootings had been carried out by units of Division Wiking. This number clearly seems to be too low; see for a discussion of the numbers Boll, “Złoczow,” 909. For Tarnopol, Jewish survivors mostly mention 5,000 victims or more. However, Salomon Hirschberg mentions a number of about 4,000 and gives a concrete source for his estimate: the Ukrainian public health authority in the city had established this number according to data received from the victims’ families (Salomon Hirschberg, 20 July 1948, AŽIH 301/3774). If these numbers for Złoczów and Tarnopol are true then the number of victims of pogrom violence here would be probably larger than in Lwów. However, here the share of them slain and shot by members of the German armed forces was much larger than in Lwów. *The Einsatzgruppen Reports* contain various information on Tarnopol that sums up the number of victims of pogrom violence and executions at no fewer than 900, but maybe several hundred more, see *The Einsatzgruppen Reports*, 12, 19, 32f., 39.

73. There seems to be no critical research on this unit. See instead the presentation of their history from the veterans’ point of view in Peter Straßner, *Europäische Freiwillige. Die Geschichte der 5. SS-Panzerdivision Wiking* (Osnabrück, Germany: Munin, 1977); and the popular Rupert Butler, *SS-Wiking: The History of the Fifth SS Division 1941–45* (Staplehurst, U.K.: Spellmount, 2002).

74. See for this background of the bloody trail that SS Wiking left behind in Eastern Galicia Marco Carynnyk, “Zolochiv movchyt,” *Krytyka* 2005 no. 10 (96): 14–17, here 14. The battle log of the 2nd Battalion of Westland says for 2 July 1941: “At 11.00 the battalion receives the message that SS-Standartenführer Wäckerle had been shot by snipers. Burial takes place in manor Slowida [!]. 5th company guard of honour. At 14.00 7th company is put on to the village in retaliation where the snipers had hidden,” *Kriegstagebuch II./SS Rgt. “Westland,” 1.4.1941–25.5.1942*. The battle log was originally preserved in BA-MA RS 3-5/7, but in February 2009 the file had disappeared. A copy of some pages, including that cited above, can be found in BA-MA N 756/144a (collection Vopersal).

A bound photocopy of the whole battle log, presumably produced by veterans of the regiment, was acquired by the author as a second-hand book at the end of February 2009. In Słowita 36 Jews were shot after long ordeals, see Carynnyk, “Zolochiv movchyt’,” 14f.

75. BA-MA, RH 20-17/46, quoted in Heer, “Einübung in den Holocaust,” 424.

76. Carynnyk, “Zolochiv movchyt’,” 14. The sniper had not been caught, but it is very likely that it was a Soviet soldier. The Soviet tactic of having sharpshooters target officers caught the Germans by surprise and resulted in relatively high numbers of casualties among officers in the beginning of the war. Sometimes the snipers also hid and let German troops pass before they opened fire on a target that they considered worthy and then disappeared. Also, many dispersed Soviet soldiers or small Red Army units had remained behind the German front lines and occasionally attacked German units.

77. The sources mention between 649 and 752 victims; Carynnyk, “Zolochiv movchyt’”; see also Boll, “Zloczow,” 904.

78. Boll, “Zloczow,” 903–908. On Groscurth see Helmuth Groscurth, *Tagebücher eines Abwehr-offiziers: 1938–1940. Mit weiteren Dokumenten zur Militäropposition gegen Hitler* (Stuttgart: DVA, 1970). Groscurth was part of the military opposition against the Nazi regime and also intervened unsuccessfully against the murder of 90 Jewish children by Sonderkommando 4a at Bielaia Tserkov on 20 August 1941, see *ibid.*, 534–42.

79. *The Einsatzgruppen Reports*, 19.

80. Maria Cukier, 27 June 1947, AŽIH 301/2520; see also Sonia Zeiger, no date, AŽIH 301, 1643. See also the entry on Zborów in Pinkas Hakehillot, *Entsiklopedyah shel ha-yishuvim ha-Yehudiyim le-min hivasdam ve-ad le-ahar Sho’at Milhemet ha-’olam ha-sheniyah: Polin*, vol. 2, ed. Danuta Dabrowska, Abraham Wein, and Aharon Weiss (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1980), 202–205. It mentions more than 1,000 victims. One memoir describes how Jews before they were murdered were led in a kind of procession through the city being mistreated and mocked. According to this memoir one local Jewish notable had been nailed to a board in a kind of imitation of Christian symbolism; see Solomon Berger, *The Jewish Commonwealth of Zborow* (New York: Regsol, 1967), 84f. Several memoirs with more details are found in Eliyahu Zilberman, ed., *Sefer Zikaron Leqehilat Zborov* (Haifa, Israel: Irgun Yots’e Zborov veva-sevivah be-Yisra’el, [1971]).

81. *The Einsatzgruppen Reports*, 39f. According to Soviet sources 574 prison inmates had been executed in Tarnopol; witnesses mention 1,000 and more victims; see Musial, “Konterrevolutionäre Elemente,” 128; Romaniv and Fedushchak, *Zakhidnoukraïns’ka trahediia*, 63.

82. Anna Terkel and Sara Frydman mention that the perpetrators had the sign of skull and crossbones on their uniforms; see Anna Terkel, n.d., AŽIH 301/367, and Sara Frydman, 12 May 1948, AŽIH 301/3551. This applied to SS units as well as the personnel of the tank divisions. The SS had it on its caps, the tank troops on their collar tabs.

83. The Einsatzgruppen report of 5 July mentions Tarnopol as position of Sonderkommando 4b, *The Einsatzgruppen Reports*, 8; see also BArch B 162/18184.

84. *The Einsatzgruppen Reports*, 19; see also 39. Among the 127 executions that *The Einsatzgruppen Reports* mentions were probably about 100 members of the leading circles of the Jews in Tarnopol who had been identified under the pretext of preparing a list of possible members of a Judenrat in Tarnopol and were executed on 7 July; see Salomon Hirschberg, 20 July 1948, AŽIH 301/3774, 4f.; Klara Katz, 26 November 1946, AŽIH 301/2165.

85. See the documents on Tarnopol presented in Musial, “Konterrevolutionäre Elemente,” 236–41.

86. See, for example, about Rudki Leib Tell, 1945, AŽIH 301/527, 1; about Sokal Moses Brüh, 28 April 1945, AŽIH 301/4971; Maria Ostermann, 16 November 1945, AŽIH 301/1167. In Busk, on the second day after the Germans had entered the town the Gestapo rounded up the Jewish men and also some women in the market place and kept them there, beating and threatening them, until the evening, when they were released. After some days about 30 people, listed by the Ukrainians, were arrested as communist supporters and killed by the Gestapo in a nearby forest. Maria Steinberg, 1945, AŽIH 301/477, 1; see also Izrael Hecht, AŽIH 301/1704. In Jaworów, the Ukrainian militia compiled a list of Jews who allegedly collaborated with the Soviets. Twelve were arrested and about five days after the Germans had occupied the city on 25 June they were executed in a nearby forest by Gestapo. Izrael (Ignacy) Manber, 12 July 1946, AŽIH 301/1912, 5. Sometimes these “cleansing

operations” occurred rather late. In Sasów, for example, such a selection of “communists” from the assembled Jews took place perhaps only at the end of July, after Jews had already been mistreated and killed by Germans and Ukrainians as public spectacles in the first half of July. See Herman Weigler, 26 June 1948, AŻIH 301/3701. In Brody Jews had been forced to do humiliating work and had been mistreated immediately after the Germans occupied the city; several days later, probably on 11 July, the Jewish intelligentsia was assembled, brought out of the city, and shot by the Gestapo—Kalman Harnik, n.d., AŻIH 301/1777.

87. Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung*, 65f.; see also, for example, on Mielnica, Mechel Kassirer, 4 August 1947, AŻIH 301/2540, 1; on Kołomyja, Anna Moritz, 20 June 1946, AŻIH 301/2579. Another memoir from Kołomyja ascribes the prevention of large-scale killings during a pogrom to the Ukrainian mayor: Szaje and Róża Feder, 27 January 1946, AŻIH 301/1398. On Horodenka see Tomasz Miedziński, interviewed by Anka Grupińska, December 2003–February 2004, <http://www.centropa.org/index.php?nID=30&x=PXVuZGVmaW51ZDsgc2VhcmNoVHlwZT1CaW9EZXRhaWw7IHNIYXJjaFZhbHVlPTIyODsgc2VhcmNoU2tpcD0w> (accessed February 2009).

88. Tzvi Schnitzer, “Hedim Migej Tsalma vet. Hoshana Rabba—‘Ha’aqtsya Harishona,” in D. Noy, M. Schutzman, eds., *Sefer zikaron le-kehillat Kolomey ve ha-sevivah* (Tel Aviv: Irgun yots’e Kolomyah v’eha-sevivah ba-’arets uba-tefutsot, 1972), 325–31.

89. See the memoirs of Markus Willbach, AŻIH 302/105, 22–24; excerpts have been published as Markus Willbach, “Skupiska żydowskie w Obertynie podczas II wojny światowej,” *Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego* 1960, no. 35: 106–128; see also T. Lipiński (Teofil Jetel), 20 March 1961, AŻIH 301/5775; Szaje and Róża Feder, 27 January 1946, AŻIH 301/1398, 4; Izak Plat and Sabina Charasz, AŻIH 301/1434, 3; Tomasz Miedziński, interviewed by Anka Grupińska, December 2003–February 2004, <http://www.centropa.org/index.php?nID=30&x=PXVuZGVmaW51ZDsgc2VhcmNoVHlwZT1CaW9EZXRhaWw7IHNIYXJjaFZhbHVlPTIyODsgc2VhcmNoU2tpcD0w> (accessed February 2009). There are some discrepancies among the witnesses’ accounts about the date of the murder. Willbach and Miedziński date it on the first days of July, while T. Lipiński in his quite detailed account gives 13 July.

90. Willbach, AŻIH 302/102, 24f.

91. See the anonymous memoir “Das Schicksal des Grenzstreifens Jablonitz bis Snyatyn in den Kriegsjahren 1941 bis 1944,” Yad Vashem Archives, O-33/172, 1f.; Schoszne Gertner (J. Gärtner), n.d., AŻIH 301/134, 3 (an English translation of an excerpt from Gertner’s Hebrew-language memoirs is available on www.yadvashem.org); Dawid Likwornik, October 1946, AŻIH 301/2153, 1; Szaje and Róża Feder, AŻIH 301/1398, 4; Schnitzer, “Hedim Migej Tsalma vet,” 330f. According to Schnitzer’s report many Jews were killed in the neighboring villages also.

92. On the pogroms in neighboring Northern Bukovina and the role of the Romanian armed forces see the excellent study by Vladimir Solonari: “Patterns of Violence: The Local Population and the Mass Murder of Jews in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, July–August 1941,” *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 8 (2007): 749–87.

93. On Borszczów see Bernard Kremer, 31 July 1948, AŻIH 301/3770, 1; on Tłuste, Maria Königsberg (Kenigsberg), 17 January 1948, AŻIH 301/3281, and 15 March 1948, AŻIH 301/3491, 1.

94. Hilary Kenigsberg, 28 March 1948, AŻIH 301/3337. In Ułaszkwice perhaps 68 people were killed; see the entry on that town in Pinkas Hakehillot, *Polin*, vol. 2, 54f. Another testimony estimates the number of victims in the villages in that region at 1,500, see Jehuda and Eliaz Albin, 2 May 1945, AŻIH 301/4976.

95. Fischel Winter, AŻIH 301/835, 2.

96. Izak Orensztajn, 22 May 1947, AŻIH 301/2440, 1. See also Tzvi Fenster, “Megillat Hasho’ah,” in M. A. Tenenblatt, ed., *Sefer ozieran ve-ha-seviva* (Jerusalem: Hotsa’at Entsiklopedyah shel galuyot, [1959]), 289–364, here 290f. Fenster mentions 68 victims for Laszkowice.

97. The document has no date, but bears the remark “Z.d.A. (Juden)” [To the files (Jews)] with initials and the date of 22 July 1941; see “Zusammenstellung der Vorfälle, betreffend die jüdische Bevölkerung in der Umgebung von Drohobycz,” DALO R-1928/1/4, 10–12 (a copy is in U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives—henceforth: USHMM—Acc. 1995.A.1086, reel 31).

98. On Schnodnica see various reports by Fay Walker, *My Memories, 1939–1945*, USHM-MA RG-02.050, part 2, 2–3; the somewhat dramatized memoirs, Fay Walker and Leo Rosen, with Caren S. Neile, *Hidden: A Sister and Brother in Nazi Poland* (Madison: University of Wisconsin

Press, 2002); and under the name Fela Walka or Walke, given in a letter from 4 October 1947 to H. Ajchenbaumowa, AŽIH 301/2931, 2. See also Jakob Steinberg, testimony 6 May 1945, AŽIH 301/4920, 1.

99. On 7 July a subunit of the Einsatzkommando z.b.V. arrived in Drohobycz and probably participated the same day in an execution in the village of Pohorodce. Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung*, 70. Because the exact dates of the killings in the other villages and more details about them have not been established, it cannot be excluded that this Einsatzkommando inspired at least some of them. Also other German Police units came through this region shortly after the German troops.

100. Musial, "Konterrevolutionäre Elemente," esp. 284–95.

101. See on the controversies on 1939–1941 Kai Struve, "Geschichte und Gedächtnis—Polen und Juden unter sowjetischer Herrschaft 1939–1941," *Jahrbuch des Simon-Dubnow-Instituts* 7 (2008): 495–530.