

The Ukrainian Question in R. H. Lord's Writings on the Paris Peace Conference of 1919

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I

In 1920 and 1921 three works appeared which, in Robert C. Binkley's words, "had the tone of official American history" of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919: a book written by Bernard Baruch, a volume by Charles H. Haskins and Robert H. Lord, and one edited by Edward M. House and Charles Seymour.¹ The last two works included chapters composed by Robert Howard Lord of Harvard University, author of a study on the second partition of Poland,² who served as "specialist for Poland and Russia" on The Inquiry.³ Subsequently, at the age of 34, Lord became chief of the Polish Division and a member of the Russian Division of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace at the Paris Conference. He also represented the United States on the Inter-Allied Mission to Poland, the Commission on Negotiation of an Armistice Between Poland and the Ukraine, and the Commission on Polish Affairs and its subcommissions for the study of Poland's eastern and western frontiers.⁴

¹ Robert C. Binkley, "Ten Years of Peace Conference History," *Journal of Modern History*, I (1929), 608. The three works were:

Bernard Baruch, *The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the Treaty* (New York, Harper, 1920);

Charles Homer Haskins and Robert Howard Lord, *Some Problems of the Peace Conference* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1920);

Edward Mandell House and Charles Seymour, eds., *What Really Happened at Paris: The Story of the Peace Conference, 1918-1919, by American Delegates* (New York, Scribner's, 1921).

² Robert Howard Lord, *The Second Partition of Poland: A Study in Diplomatic History* (Harvard Historical Studies, Vol. XXIII; Cambridge, Mass., 1915).

³ See Sidney Edward Mezes, "Preparations for Peace," in House and Seymour, p. 7.

The Inquiry was a body of experts organized in 1917 under the direction of Edward M. House for the purpose of collecting data and preparing reports for the American delegation to the Peace Conference.

⁴ For the composition and organization of the Paris Peace Conference and its various organs see *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919* (13 vols.; Washington, GPO, 1942-1947), III, 1-153.

In his work with *The Inquiry* and at the Peace Conference Lord dealt with many problems concerning the Ukraine directly or indirectly. His comments on these matters are thus of particular interest, and even more so if one recalls the following remark made by Edward M. House about the Paris Peace Conference:

The final decisions rested with others, but these decisions were largely based upon facts and opinions furnished by those who tell the story of *What Really Happened in Paris*.⁵

On the same subject, Sidney E. Mezes, chief of the Territorial Section of the American Peace Commission, wrote:

As it turned out, the staff of *The Inquiry* were concerned in Paris, as members of commissions, with delicate questions of policy, and it may be noted that the decisions which they had a part in negotiating were only in the rarest instances modified by the supreme council.⁶

Soon after his return from Paris, Robert H. Lord delivered a series of lectures, shortly thereafter published, on the new settlement in Eastern Europe.⁷ In an article which appeared in the volume edited by Edward M. House and Charles Seymour, Lord primarily analyzed the Polish territorial settlement of the Paris Conference; in a chapter on Poland printed in *Some Problems of the Peace Conference*, he discussed more extensively geographic, ethnic, historic, and other aspects of the Polish question as well. Lord's comments on Polish boundaries in the east, Poland's history, Polish claims to the ethnically non-Polish eastern provinces of pre-1772 Poland, the Polish-Ukrainian conflict in Galicia and the attempts made at Paris in 1919 to settle it, and similar matters, clearly reveal his attitude toward various problems having direct relation to the Ukraine.

⁵ House and Seymour, p. VII.

⁶ Sidney Edward Mezes, "Preparations for Peace," in House and Seymour, p. 8.

The part played by the commissions at Paris in 1919 was summarized by Clive Day, chief of the Balkan Division of the American Peace Commission, as follows: "They [i.e., the commissions] had no proper authority except that of recommendation. They had, in fact, immense influence on the outcome of the Conference." Clive Day, "The Atmosphere and Organization of the Peace Conference," in House and Seymour, p. 26.

⁷ Lord's lectures delivered at the Lowell Institute in January 1920 were published in the same year, together with the lectures delivered by Charles H. Haskins, in *Some Problems of the Peace Conference*; Lord's talk given at the Academy of Music in Philadelphia on December 17, 1920, was printed in 1921 in House and Seymour, *What Really Happened at Paris*.

2

Although the restoration of an independent Poland had become one of the war aims of the Allies long before the war ended, it was, according to Lord, very difficult to determine Poland's proper boundaries.⁸

Geographically, Poland was, in the opinion of the former chief of the Polish Division of the American Peace Commission, "one of the hardest countries in the world to define." On the one hand, he writes,

it is true that Polish geographers are accustomed to treat the whole region between the Baltic, the Carpathians, the Dvina, and the Dnieper . . . [as one geographic unit and] to argue that this entire area ought likewise to form a political unit—Poland.

On the other hand, however,

it must be admitted that Russian scientists have demonstrated with equal ease that nearly all of the region in question is geographically a part of Russia; while the patriotic scholars of Kiev and Lemberg have proved that nature intended a great part of this same region to belong to neither Poland nor Russia, but to a *tertium quid* called the Ukraine.⁹

Lord concedes that it was easier to define the area of ethnic Poland. The region in which the majority of the population was Polish-speaking included "nearly the whole of the so-called 'Congress Kingdom' of Poland" and "the western part of Galicia."¹⁰ Lord adds, however, that there were also scattered Polish enclaves in eastern Galicia and in the provinces to the east of Congress Poland. According to him, the Russian nationality statistics for the provinces adjacent to the Congress Kingdom in the east were "so grossly inaccurate and fraudulent that we are left in great uncertainty as to the

⁸ Lord attributes the difficulties mainly to the wide dispersion of the Polish population, the divergence between Poland's historic boundaries and the contemporary ethnic ones, the alleged "lack of adequate data" on the ethnic makeup and political gravitation of the border populations, and the lack of natural frontiers. Haskins and Lord, p. 170.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 157-58.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 158. The northeastern and eastern border districts of Congress Poland were, according to the Imperial Russian census, inhabited predominantly by a non-Polish population: five out of seven districts of the Suwałki Province in the northeast of the Congress Kingdom were predominantly Lithuanian, while the eastern regions of the provinces of Siedlce and Lublin, which shortly before World

real ethnographic situation" there.¹¹ Lord assumes that there existed "a large debatable zone" of which it was "difficult to say" what the ethnic majority was, and that "at present, it is almost impossible to say with certainty just where ethnographic Poland leaves off."¹² He argues that "there is much reason to suppose, however, that if ever an honest census is taken here, the eastern limits of the Polish ethnographic area will be extended considerably beyond the boundaries of the Congress Kingdom."¹³

A similar view was expressed by Lord in response to a request for his comment on the frequent statement that the aims of the Polish government were imperialistic. The former chief of the Polish Division of the American Peace Commission replied that this charge was usually made "with regard to the claims of the Polish Government to certain territories on the east" and that in the main it was based on "inaccurate knowledge of the ethnographic situation." He agreed that, according to the pre-1914 Russian statistics, "a good deal of territory" claimed by Poland did not have a Polish majority, but added that "these statistics of the old Russian Government, like those of the Turks, were in large part simply fabricated for political reasons."¹⁴

War I were detached from Congress Poland and organized into the new province of Kholm, had majorities of Ukrainian (in the official language of the time, Little Russian) population. See *Pervaya vseobshchaya perepis' naseleniya Rossiiskoi Imperii, 1897*, issue 7: *Nalichnoe naselenie oboego pola po uezdnam, s ukazaniem chisla lits preobladayushchikh rodnym yazykov* (The First General Census of the Population of the Russian Empire, 1897, issue 7: Present Population of Both Sexes by Districts, with Indication of the Number of Persons According to Their Mother Tongues), 1905, pp. 28-30.

However, Lord maintains that it was possible to assume that Russia had renounced all claims to the Congress Kingdom, i.e., also to the border districts which had no ethnic Polish majorities, since in March 1917 the government of Prince Lvov had accepted the principle of an independent Polish state "including all regions with an indisputable Polish ethnic majority." Referring to the "Curzon line" which left to Poland not only the whole of the Kholm (Chełm) Province but also some additional portions of ethnically Ukrainian as well as Beloruthenian territories, he remarks: "Whatever lies to the west of it [i.e., the Curzon line] is indisputably [sic] Polish." Haskins and Lord, pp. 171-72.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 159. The data of the Imperial Russian nationality statistics contradicted Polish claims to the provinces east of the Congress Kingdom.

¹² House and Seymour, p. 84.

¹³ Haskins and Lord, p. 159.

¹⁴ House and Seymour, *op. cit.*, Appendix: Stenographic Notes of Questions Asked and Answers Given After the Lectures in the Academy of Music, Philadelphia, p. 452. To illustrate "how unreliable the Russian figures often are," Lord

This rather severe criticism of the Imperial Russian statistics hardly seems justified. Moreover, although he denounces the reliability of the pre-1914 Russian nationality statistics which did not support the Polish claims, Lord registers no complaint about the accuracy of the Austrian linguistic statistics which, because of their partisan compilation, did favor the Poles in Galicia.

Lord's comments on the history of Poland disclose his ardent admiration for the old Polish state of the pre-partition period. He thinks that historic Poland has been much condemned and much misunderstood, and argues that the time has come for a revision of the conventional judgments about the old Polish state. Lord idealizes that state as "the largest and most ambitious experiment with a republican form of government . . . since the days of the Romans," and as "the first experiment on a large scale with a federal republic down to the appearance of the United States." He describes Poland of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in which the nobility exercised an unlimited power over the masses of the serfs, as "the freest state in Europe, the state in which the greatest degree of constitutional, civic, and intellectual liberty prevailed." Lord attributes to the old Poland features peculiar to the United States: "Like the United States today, Poland was at that time the melting-pot of Europe, the haven for the poor and oppressed of all the neighboring

pointed to the case of the district of Vilna (Vilnius) which actually was exceptional rather than typical of the vast areas to the east of Congress Poland claimed by the Poles.

Lord's reasoning was almost identical a quarter of a century later when the question of Polish boundaries became once again an object of international negotiations. On February 8, 1945, at the time of the Yalta Conference, he read a paper entitled "The Russo-Polish Boundary Problem" at a meeting of the Massachusetts Historical Society. Subsequently this paper appeared in the *Proceedings* of the Society, Vol. 48 (covering the period from October 1944 through May 1947, and published in 1952), pp. 407-23, with a note stating that "it has been materially revised for printing, in view of the vastly changed situation existing in the autumn of 1946." In the paper Lord maintains that the Peace Conference of Paris "never attempted a definitive settlement of the eastern frontier" of Poland for two reasons, one of them being that, allegedly, "it was difficult to know how far to the east the 'lands of indisputably Polish population' might extend. The only official evidence on that subject was the old Tsarist census of 1897—as biased and unreliable a source as could well be imagined." Lord again argues that the Curzon line, although intended primarily to be an administrative measure, was a line that showed what "was indisputably Polish," and continues: "But it was admitted that they [i.e., the Poles] might have valid claims to much of the territory that lay east of that line . . ." (*Ibid.*, pp. 415-16).

countries." In short, he pictures the old Polish state as "a unique exception among the rapacious and militaristic monarchies of that age," and as "a bulwark of liberty, republicanism and Western civilization" in Eastern Europe.¹⁵

The former chief of the Polish Division of the American Peace Commission acknowledges that the medieval Poland of the Piasts, which was limited to the ethnically Polish areas, "enjoyed better natural frontiers than it was ever later to possess."¹⁶ He emphasizes, however, that the contemporary average Pole thought of his country not in terms of the modest area of ethnic Poland but in terms of the whole wide expanse of pre-1772 historic Poland, and that it was the general desire of the Poles to save as much of that pre-1772 Poland as possible, and to restore, in part at least, the old Polish state on some twentieth-century basis.¹⁷ Lord expresses the view that it certainly does not advance us toward a solution of these questions, nor is it a sign of insight or fair-mindedness, to brand these ideas as due simply to "Polish imperialism" or "chauvinism" or "megalomania," . . . or to castigate the Poles for claiming a single mile of territory outside the area where . . . there is demonstrably a Polish-speaking majority. No nation with a thousand years of history behind it could be expected to rise to such heights of self-abnegation.¹⁸

The former chief of the Polish Division of the American Peace Commission registers with evident sympathy various arguments advanced by the Poles in support of their claims to the ethnically non-Polish eastern territories of pre-1772 Poland. He refers to these areas as the "ancient heritage" of the Poles, and speaks of the "debatable regions where the ethnographic situation and the wishes of the population are . . . doubtful."¹⁹

Lord admits the existence of the national movements among the peoples once subjected to Polish rule, but he is not consistent in his remarks about these movements. In one passage he writes that "strong national movements" have grown up among the Lithuanians and the Ukrainians; elsewhere he defines them as of "uncertain strength."²⁰

¹⁵ Haskins and Lord, pp. 166-68, 198.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 159.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 164, 168-69.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 169-70.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 168, 172, 196.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 168 and 196, respectively.

Twenty-five years later Lord commented on the growth of national movements

In analyzing the various aspects of the Polish territorial settlement, Lord considers the problem of Poland's eastern boundaries to the north of Galicia as simply a matter of delimitation between Poland and Russia, as if the Ukrainians and Beloruthenians were not involved.²¹

3

One of the questions discussed repeatedly at Paris in 1919 was the problem of Eastern Galicia which, according to Lloyd George, gave the Peace Conference "no end of trouble."²² As the chief of the Polish Division of the American Peace Commission and member of various commissions of the Paris Conference, Lord took an active part in those deliberations and played an important role in determining certain policies of the Peace Conference with regard to Eastern Galicia. Therefore, his remarks on this subject, which are much more extensive in scope than on any other question concerning the Ukraine, require a thorough examination.

In the article on Poland printed in the volume edited by Edward E. House and Charles Seymour, Lord reports on Eastern Galicia

among the Ukrainians, Beloruthenians, and Lithuanians in the late nineteenth century as follows: "Hampered in all three cases by the lack of any large educated or middle class, the national movements attained much success among the Lithuanians, fair success among the Ukrainians, but no great vigor among the poor and inert White Russians." *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, LXVIII, 415.

²¹ Lord uses such expressions as "there lies between Poland and Russia a large debatable zone," "it is almost impossible to say . . . where ethnographic Poland leaves off and ethnographic Russia begins," and "the claims Poland might have to territories east of this [i.e., Curzon] line . . . must . . . be left to future negotiations between Poland and Russia." See House and Seymour, pp. 83-84.

In his article on Poland in *Some Problems of the Peace Conference* Lord mentions that the provinces to the east of Congress Poland were inhabited by "numerous races . . . Poles, Lithuanians, White Russians, Jews, Ukrainians, etc.," and in another passage he describes these territories as the regions "where Polish, Russian, Lithuanian, and Ukrainian claims all come into collision," adding, however, that Polish claims to the areas east of the Curzon line "can only be settled by negotiations *between Poland and Russia*." Haskins and Lord, pp. 159, 172. (Italics mine. L. C. S.)

In his paper, "The Russo-Polish Boundary Problem," Lord uses almost exactly the same language: ". . . these [i.e., Polish] claims, it was hoped [at the Peace Conference of Paris], would later be settled by peaceful agreement between Poland and Russia . . ." *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, LXVIII, 416.

²² David Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties* (London, V. Gollancz, 1938), Vol. I, p. 342.

briefly and rather cautiously. He recalls that since the country was in dispute between the Poles and the Ukrainians, the Peace Conference was confronted with a complicated set of problems. He mentions that the Conference finally decided to put Eastern Galicia under Polish sovereignty, but as an autonomous unit, "with ample guarantees for the national rights of the three and one-half millions of Ukrainians, who form the majority of the population," and with provisions for a plebiscite to be held after twenty-five years. Having noted the unwillingness of the Poles to accept these conditions and the arguments advanced by the Poles to explain their refusal, Lord concludes his remarks with the statement that, while the Poles are actually in possession of Eastern Galicia, the ultimate fate of the area has not been settled.²³

Lord's attitude toward the question of Eastern Galicia is fully revealed in *Some Problems of the Peace Conference* where he discusses the problem at considerable length. Analyzing the dissolution of Austria-Hungary in 1918, the former chief of the Polish Division of the American Peace Commission points out that "power passed to the National Councils improvised by the Czecho-Slovaks, the Yugo-Slavs, the Poles, the Ukrainians, the Roumanians, the Magyars, and . . . the German Austrians."²⁴ Thus, when the Peace Conference met at Paris, the territories of the Dual Monarchy

had already been partitioned, in rough, provisional fashion . . . among eight states corresponding to the eight principal nationalities of that Empire. Five of these states were reckoned at Paris as Allies—Italy, Rumania, Yugo-Slavia, Czecho-Slovakia, and Poland; two of them—Hungary and German Austria—ranked as enemies; while as to the Galician Ukrainians, Paris could never quite make up its mind whether to count them as friends, enemies, or neutrals.²⁵

As a result of the spontaneous dissolution of Austria-Hungary, the Peace Conference did not have to concern itself with the question of whether to preserve the existence of the Dual Monarchy; the only main issues which remained to be settled at Paris were, according to Lord, the establishment of a peace with the enemy states of German Austria and Hungary, and of "a definitive division of the Hapsburg

²³ House and Seymour, p. 83.

²⁴ Robert Howard Lord, "Austria," in Haskins and Lord, p. 209.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 210.

inheritance that would be just, practical, and conducive to the peace and security of Europe."²⁶

The Polish territorial settlement of 1919 is regarded by Lord as "an honest application of the principles laid down in the Fourteen Points."²⁷ Nevertheless, he concedes that the fate of Eastern Galicia was settled "*vi et armis*, without the Conference and at times to the lively displeasure of the Conference," and that in spite of this the Allied and Associated Powers eventually sanctioned the Polish occupation of the country and intended to place Eastern Galicia under the sovereignty of Poland.²⁸ This action of the Peace Conference, he continues, "has been denounced as a craven surrender in the face of a *fait accompli*, a betrayal of principle, the sacrifice of three and a half million Ukrainians to the ravenous Polish imperialists."²⁹ Lord defends, however, the settlement. Having disposed in three sentences of all the other possible solutions, he asserts that "the only practical solution" was to entrust the Poles with the occupation and administration of the disputed country.³⁰

This emphasis on expediency in determining the future of Eastern Galicia contrasts sharply with Lord's insistence upon the principle of self-determination in the case of the Polish-German territorial settlement. Reviewing the work of the Paris Peace Conference on the boundary line between Poland and Germany, he remarks: "One may rejoice in the fact that, in spite of the risks involved, the Peace Conference had the courage to carry through a Polish-German settlement based on principle and not upon expediency or selfish convenience."³¹

To be sure, Lord stresses the point that Poland is to be entrusted with the administration of Eastern Galicia only subject to certain guarantees for the Ukrainian population of the country. Yet, writing about Gdańsk (Danzig), he himself questions the efficiency of any such guarantees.³²

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Robert Howard Lord, "Poland," in Haskins and Lord, p. 171.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 192. It is not without interest to note here that in his comments on the Polish claims to the ethnically non-Polish areas of pre-1772 Poland, Lord assures that "no one in Poland . . . proposes to compel the other races which have developed pronounced nationalist movements to unite with Poland against their will." *Ibid.*, p. 168.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 195.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 188.

³² "Whatever may be one's hopes as to the League of Nations, in the present

In his brief notes on the history of Eastern Galicia, Lord mentions that the country was originally settled by the Ruthenians, "a branch of that Little Russian race for which the general name Ukrainian is now coming into use." He adds that "after belonging to various Ruthenian principalities in the early middle ages, Eastern Galicia was conquered by Poland in 1340" and that "the conquest of the principality of Halicz in 1340 marked the beginning of Polish encroachments upon the Ukrainian nationality."³³ Subsequently, until 1772, the country belonged to Poland, and Lord uses this as one of his arguments for entrusting the Poles with the occupation and administration of Eastern Galicia.³⁴ He does not apply, however, similar reasoning in cases of other territorial problems, such as that of Upper Silesia, a region which was lost by Poland in the first half of the fourteenth century and which for four hundred years belonged to the empires of the Habsburgs and the Hohenzollerns. **On the contrary**, Lord used all his influence as the American member of the Commission on Polish Affairs of the Paris Peace Conference and its Subcommission for the Study of Western Frontiers of Poland to achieve the outright cession of Upper Silesia to Poland.³⁵

Another factor brought forward by Lord in favor of placing Eastern Galicia under the sovereignty of Poland is that the Poles were actually in possession of the country.³⁶ But this argument of expediency is not extended by him to those Polish territories of Prussia which, at the time of the drafting of the German peace treaty, were in the actual possession of Germany.

Lord does not dispute the fact that the Poles constituted only a minority in Eastern Galicia; he puts the number of the Poles at 27% of the total population of the country.³⁷ At the same time he endeav-

state of the League it is scarcely fair to ask a nation to stake its most vital interests upon the efficiency of such a guarantee" [i.e., a guarantee by the League of Nations]. Haskins and Lord, p. 183.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 189 and 160.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 195.

³⁵ See Stenographic Report of Meeting Between President Wilson, The Peace Commissioners, and Technical Advisers of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, Held at Hotel Crillon, Paris, on June 3, 1919, in Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1922), Vol. III, pp. 482 ff.

³⁶ Haskins and Lord, p. 195.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 189. The Austrian linguistic statistics for Galicia were so inaccurate that, in order to obtain a more correct picture of the real ethnic situation in the country, both the Ukrainian and the Polish geographers preferred to base their

ors to enhance the importance of the Polish minority, resorting even to such inaccurate statements as "there are *several large rural districts* of Polish-speaking majority" in Eastern Galicia, and using rather questionable statistics to prove that socially and intellectually there is "a striking contrast" between the Ukrainians and the Poles of the country.³⁸

The figures Lord gives as the percentages of Ukrainians and Poles employed in agriculture, commerce and industry, and the liberal professions, are not the official Austrian figures for Galicia, but those derived for Eastern Galicia indirectly and rather arbitrarily by E. Romer, a Polish author.³⁹ Romer's calculations were published during the Ukrainian-Polish war of 1918-1919 in an article designed to prove the alleged racial superiority of the Poles over the Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia.⁴⁰ Romer's figures appeared, slightly modified, a few months later in a Polish pamphlet prepared for propaganda purposes at the Paris Peace Conference.⁴¹ In that form Lord accepted them at their face value. In fact, Romer's calculations gave a considerably distorted picture of the then existing situation. Even twenty years later, the percentage of Poles in Eastern Galicia engaged in agriculture was much higher, and their percentages in commerce

calculations on the more reliable Austrian statistics of faiths. See, e.g., Stephen Rudnitsky, *Ukraine, the Land and Its People: An Introduction to Its Geography* (New York, 1918), p. 131, and St. Pawłowski, "Stosunki narodowościowe w Galicyi wschodniej" (The Ethnic Relations in Eastern Galicia), in *W obronie Galicyi wschodniej* (In Defense of Eastern Galicia) (Lviv, 1919), p. 68.

According to the last pre-1914 Austrian census of 1910, the Roman Catholics comprised 25% of the total population of Eastern Galicia. Since the Poles of Eastern Galicia were usually Roman Catholic and the Ukrainians Greek Catholic, this figure was often taken to represent the percentage of the Poles in the country (although actually not all the Roman Catholics were Poles). The Poles formed an even smaller percentage of the total population if one leaves out of consideration the areas bordering on Western Galicia, to the west of the Syan (San) River, which were ethnically Polish and were not claimed by the Ukrainians.

³⁸ Haskins and Lord, p. 189. (Italics mine. L. C. S.)

³⁹ For the official Austrian figures for Galicia based on the census of 1910, see K. K. Statistische Zentralkommission, *Österreichische Statistik*, Neue Folge, 3. Band: *Berufsstatistik nach den Ergebnissen der Volkszählung vom 31. Dezember 1910*, 10 Heft: Galizien und Bukowina (Vienna, 1916), pp. 222, 225.

⁴⁰ Eugeniusz Romer, "Struktura społeczna i kultura materyalna Polaków i Rusinów w Galicyi Wschodniej" (The Social Structure and the Material Culture of the Poles and the Ruthenians in Eastern Galicia), in *W obronie Galicyi wschodniej* (Lviv, 1919), and as a reprint.

⁴¹ See W. Lutosławski and E. Romer, *The Ruthenian Question in Galicia* (Paris, June 1919), p. 28.

and industry as well as in the liberal professions much lower than were Romer's corresponding figures for 1910, as is shown by calculations made on the basis of the Polish census of 1931.⁴²

OCCUPATION OF THE POLISH POPULATION OF GALICIA
(per cent)

		1910	1931
	Austrian Census ^a	According to E. Romer and R. H. Lord ^b	According to V. Kubijovyč ^c
Agriculture	72.3	44	69.9
Commerce and Industry	17.8	39	16.8
Liberal Professions and Others	9.9	17	13.3

^a Based on the figures given for the Roman Catholic population of Galicia.

^b Derived for the Roman Catholic population of Eastern Galicia.

^c Based on the Polish census; derived for Eastern Galicia.

According to the Austrian census of 1910, 283.7 out of 1000 persons in Galicia in the age group over 10 years listed as Poles could neither read nor write; an additional 77.2 could only read.⁴³ In their pamphlet published in Paris Lutosławski and Romer arbitrarily reduced the figure of illiterate Poles to 263 out of 1000 persons.⁴⁴ Lord asserts, however, that only 23% of the Poles were illiterate.⁴⁵

In general, the discrepancies between the percentages of the Ukrainians and Poles employed in agriculture, commerce and industry, and

⁴² See V. Kubijovyč and H. Selehen, "Chyslo i budova lyudnosti Ukrayiny" (The Size and Structure of the Population of the Ukraine), in *Entsyklopediya ukrayino-znavstva* (Munich-New York, 1949), Vol. I, p. 138. Cf. the English edition of this work entitled *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia* (University of Toronto Press, 1963), Vol. I, p. 175, table X.

⁴³ See K. K. Statistische Zentralkommission, *Österreichische Statistik*, Neue Folge, I. Band: *Die Ergebnisse der Volkszählung vom 31. Dezember 1910*, 3. Heft: Die Alters- und Familienstandsgliederung und Aufenthaltsdauer (Vienna, 1914), pp. 94-95.

Of 4,670,167 persons in Galicia listed as Poles in the 1910 Austrian linguistic statistics, 808,327 were Jews. *Ibid.*, Neue Folge, I. Band, 2. Heft: Die Bevölkerung nach der Gebürtigkeit, Religion und Umgangssprache in Verbindung mit dem Geschlechte, nach dem Bildungsgrade und Familienstande; die körperlichen Gebrechen; die soziale Gliederung der Haushaltungen, pp. 54-55. The percentage of illiteracy among the Galician Poles alone, without including the Jews, was actually higher.

⁴⁴ Lutosławski and Romer, *The Ruthenian Question*, p. 30.

⁴⁵ Haskins and Lord, p. 190.

the liberal professions, and between the corresponding percentages of illiteracy were considerably smaller than the figures given by Lord imply.

Without disclosing the circumstances to which the Polish minority owed its privileged position in Eastern Galicia, Lord concludes that the Poles were "socially, economically, and intellectually the strongest element in the country, although in numbers they [were] considerably inferior to their rivals."⁴⁶ He advances this conclusion as another argument in support of the Polish occupation and administration of Eastern Galicia.⁴⁷ However, Lord takes quite a different attitude toward the German minority in the Prussian provinces inhabited by Polish majorities. In the latter case, he makes no effort to compare the percentages of Germans and Poles employed in agriculture, commerce and industry, and the liberal professions, and draws no conclusion as to which nationality was socially, economically, and intellectually more developed.⁴⁸ Instead, he argues rather bluntly that "a large number of these Germans have, so to speak, no right to be there," and that "there is little reason to grieve very much over the prospect of seeing this more or less parasitical population faced with the alternative of submitting to the rule of the majority among which they live or else of returning to where they came from."⁴⁹ Lord makes no such references to the Polish minority in Eastern Galicia, although in his outline of the history of Poland he himself calls attention to the Polish colonization and Polonization of the ethnically non-Polish eastern territories of the old Polish state.⁵⁰

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As to the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia, Lord acknowledges the fact that they make up the majority of the population in the country.⁵¹

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 195.

⁴⁸ Such a comparison would have been rather unfavorable to the Poles.

⁴⁹ Haskins and Lord, pp. 174, 175.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 163.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 193. In his writings about the Paris Peace Conference Lord sometimes refers to the Galician Ukrainians as Ukrainians, but for the most part he calls them Ruthenians. He sets their number at 59% of the total population of Eastern Galicia (Haskins and Lord, p. 189). According to the Austrian statistics of faiths, regarded by both Ukrainian and Polish scholars as reflecting the actual ethnic situation in Eastern Galicia more accurately than the Austrian linguistic statistics (*see* footnote 37), the Greek Catholics, i.e., the Ukrainians, comprised 62%

He agrees with the proposition that the majority ought to rule but contends that "it was very difficult to apply this principle in this particular case." Lord argues that the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia were divided in what he first terms "two distinct national movements" and later refers to as "two Ruthenian parties," one striving for an independent Ukraine, the other favoring union with Russia. "If one might judge from the relative strength of the two Ruthenian parties as they existed before the war," he continues, "the party which wanted an independent Ukrainian state might be a majority among the Ruthenians, but was only a minority in the total population."⁵²

First of all, Lord uses an expression which may erroneously imply that there was only one Ukrainian party in Galicia striving for an independent Ukrainian state. Actually independence was the goal of all three major Ukrainian parties in Galicia: the National Democrats, the Radicals, and the Social Democrats. In the 1907 election to the Austrian parliament, these three parties won 22 seats in Galicia, and the so-called Russophiles received only 5 seats. In the next election to the Austrian parliament, held in 1911, the number of the deputies representing the three Ukrainian parties mentioned increased to 24, while the number of the Russophile deputies decreased to two; in the elections to the Galician diet in 1913, the Russophiles received only one seat as compared to 30 won by the Ukrainian parties whose program provided for an independent Ukrainian state as their ultimate goal.⁵³ Thus the steadily declining Russophile movement virtually ceased to be a significant factor among the Ukrainians in

of the total population of Eastern Galicia on the eve of World War I. Cf. Stephen Rudnitsky, *Ukraine*, p. 131; St. Pawłowski, "Stosunki narodowościowe," in *W obronie Galicyi wschodniej*, pp. 61, 74. Since some Galician Ukrainians, however, were Roman Catholic, even this figure (62%) is rather a low estimate. The percentage of Ukrainians was higher if one excluded those areas of Eastern Galicia to the west of the Syan River which were ethnically Polish and were not claimed by the Ukrainians.

⁵² Haskins and Lord, p. 193.

⁵³ For the comparison of the number of deputies elected by various Galician parties to the Austrian parliament in 1907 and 1911, see K. K. Statistische Zentral-kommission, *Österreichische Statistik*, Neue Folge, VII. Band, 1. Heft: Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen in den im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreichen und Ländern im Jahre 1911 (Vienna, 1913), p. 12. The figures for the elections to the Galician diet in 1913 are taken from K. Levytsky, "Halychyna 1772-1918" (Galicia 1772-1918), in *Ukrayins'ka zahal'na entsyklopediya* (Ukrainian General Encyclopedia) (3 vols.; Lviv, 1930-35), III, 650.

Galicia before the First World War. Since the Ukrainians comprised at that time almost two thirds of all the inhabitants of Eastern Galicia, it is obvious that even without a relatively small and progressively shrinking Russophile fraction, they still formed a majority in the total population of the country. Finally, it is to be mentioned that the Ukrainian Russophiles were, after all, as opposed to the Polish rule over Eastern Galicia as were all the other Ukrainian parties in the country.

In an effort to strengthen Polish claims to Eastern Galicia, Lord questions the ability of the Galician Ukrainians to govern the country. He dismisses the Ukrainian peasants as "ignorant and inarticulate," and presents the Ukrainian intellectuals as incapable of running the government.⁵⁴ Instead of drawing attention to the enormous and rapid political, intellectual, and economic progress made by the Ukrainians of Galicia in the decades preceding the outbreak of the war in 1914, Lord prefers to picture them as "the poorest, most ignorant and most backward of all the races of Austria."⁵⁵ And yet, he makes no attempt to expose the causes of what was undoubtedly an unsatisfactory situation. Lord mentions that under the Austrian rule "the Poles have continued to be the dominant nation" in Galicia,⁵⁶ but he does not point out that it was because of the obstruction by the Polish majority in the Galician diet that the Ukrainians could not have an adequate number of high schools, or that it was because of the powerful Polish opposition at Vienna that all the efforts of the Ukrainians to obtain a university of their own were frustrated.

Expressing doubt as to whether the Ukrainians of Galicia were capable of governing the country, Lord argues for placing Eastern Galicia under the rule of the Poles. However, he himself writes elsewhere in his article about the capabilities of the Poles as follows:

... it must be admitted that in the past the Poles have shown themselves deficient in organizing and administrative ability, in economic enterprise, in

⁵⁴ Haskins and Lord, pp. 193-94.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 191. This statement is, in fact, not quite accurate. If one takes into consideration, for instance, the question of illiteracy, the most illiterate of all the nationalities of Austria were, according to the last pre-1914 Austrian census, the Serbo-Croats. See K. K. Statistische Zentralkommission, *Österreichische Statistik*, Neue Folge, I. Band: *Die Ergebnisse der Volkszählung vom 31. Dezember 1910*, 3. Heft: Die Alters- und Familienstandsgliederung und Aufenthaltsdauer (Vienna, 1914), p. 22*, Übersicht 18: Bildungsgrad nach Alter und Umgangssprache ohne Unterscheidung des Geschlechts.

⁵⁶ Haskins and Lord, p. 189.

cohesion, solidarity, and discipline. A century and more of servitude to foreigners has not been the best of schooling for orderly and efficient self-government, nor has it permitted the nation to keep altogether abreast of the West in intellectual and economic progress.⁵⁷

Lord asserts that for centuries the Ukrainian-Polish relations in Galicia were, on the whole, "relatively satisfactory and amicable" until the growing national movement among the Ukrainians assumed a marked anti-Polish tendency and led to "the rather bitter racial feud that has raged in Eastern Galicia in the past thirty years" (i.e., from about 1890).⁵⁸ In other words, the relations were what Lord terms "satisfactory" as long as the Ukrainians did not challenge the political and economic supremacy of the Polish minority of the country. The former chief of the Polish Division of the American Peace Commission says nothing about the stubborn resistance of the Polish bureaucracy and landlords to any change which might have affected their privileged political and economic status in Eastern Galicia. Instead, he ascribes the continuous intensification of the Ukrainian-Polish conflict in Galicia to the "insidious activities of the Austrian government, which lost no opportunity to stir up the two races against each other, aiding now one and than the other in accordance with the traditional Austrian maxim, 'divide and rule,'" as well as to the alleged interference of the German government.⁵⁹ Echoing one of the favorite themes of the Polish anti-Ukrainian propoganda at the Paris Peace Conference, Lord maintains that, in the conflict with the Poles, the Ukrainians of Galicia were "accustomed to look to Berlin and Vienna for aid and direction."⁶⁰

Lord argues that "nearly all the many Allied officers who were sent in to study the situation were unanimous in the opinion" that the government of West Ukraine had been "a sorry failure," adding that the Peace Conference's aim of assuring war-racked Eastern Galicia a speedy return to orderly government and stable conditions could not be effected "by handing back the country to the local Ukrainian politicians, who had tried and failed."⁶¹ Actually, many Allied officials sent to Poland either were pro-Polish or based their

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 198.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 190-91.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 192.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 194.

information about the conditions in Eastern Galicia almost exclusively on Polish sources which could hardly be regarded as impartial. Observers who tried to examine the situation without relying on one-sided sources reached quite a different conclusion. For instance, the chief United States representative on the Inter-Allied Mission to Poland, Major General F. J. Kernan, reported, on the basis of his on-the-spot investigation, in April 1919 to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace:

The distinct impression I brought away from Eastern Galicia was that the Ukrainians were exceedingly anxious for a truce, and that their leaders were intelligent men by no means Bolshevik and sincerely desirous of building up a great Ukrainian Republic. General Pavlenko⁶² was quite frank and stated that the Russian Soviet forces were pressing the Ukrainians on the East and that his government was anxious to secure a truce on the Polish side in order to bring as strong a Ukrainian force as possible into action against the Russian Soviets. Besides my own observations, I talked with quite a number of disinterested observers who had been travelling through The Ukraine quite recently and as a result I am convinced that the present Ukrainian Government and the Ukrainians in the mass are by no means Bolshevik . . . The Ukrainians are wholly isolated from Europe and they have, I believe, been misrepresented in a large degree to the world, it being the policy of their enemies to denounce them as bandits and Bolsheviks. Reiterated statements of this kind have their effect, however groundless they may be.⁶³

Another American, Major Lawrence Martin of the General Staff of the United States Army, who had travelled through Eastern Galicia and Volhynia prior to the Polish offensive in mid-May 1919, stressed in his report that the Ukrainian government under Petlura was competent and effectual, that the Poles and Jews in Galicia were well treated by Ukrainians, and concluded: "[I] regard Petlura in Volhynia and Holubowitz in Galicia with their ministers as capable of organizing the country satisfactorily."⁶⁴

⁶² At that time Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Galician Army.

⁶³ See Confidential Report of Major General F. J. Kernan for the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, Paris, 11 April 1919, in Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*, III, 220-21.

⁶⁴ *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Russia, 1919* (Washington, GPO, 1937), p. 778.

The references are to Symon Petlura, Head of the Directory of the Ukrainian Republic, and to Dr. Sydir Holubovych, President of the Council of State Secretaries (i.e., Prime Minister) of the Republic of West Ukraine.

According to Lord, the Republic of West Ukraine was set up by "one Ruthenian party."⁶⁵ In fact, the West Ukrainian Republic was proclaimed by the Ukrainian National Council which included representatives of various parties;⁶⁶ the first State Secretariat (Cabinet) of the Republic of West Ukraine was a coalition government composed of members of the Ukrainian National Democratic, Radical, Christian Social, and Social Democratic parties.⁶⁷

Finally, in order to justify his policy, Lord argues, disregarding all the evidence to the contrary, that "the majority of the population—Poles, Jews, and Ruthenians alike—were relieved when . . . the Polish troops came in" and that the Polish occupation allegedly "seemed to meet with the rather general approval of the inhabitants" of the country.⁶⁸

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It remains to be added that Lord had ample opportunity to get acquainted with the Ukrainian point of view on various matters. As the chief of the Polish Division of the American Peace Commission, he had easy access to all the publications submitted by the Ukrainian delegation to the Peace Conference and its individual organs. In the "Bibliographical Note" attached to his article on Poland in *Some Problems of the Peace Conference*, Lord himself mentions such Ukrainian works as T. Savtchenko's *L'Ukraine et la question ukrainienne* (Paris, 1918), M. Lozynsky's *Les "Droits" de la Pologne sur la Galicie* (Lausanne, 1917), and E. Levitsky's *La Guerre polono-ukrai-*

⁶⁵ Haskins and Lord, p. 192.

⁶⁶ See Dr. M. Lozynsky, *Halychyna v rr. 1918–1920* (Galicia in the Years 1918–1920) (*Études et documents relatifs à l'histoire de la révolution ukrainienne de 1917–1920*, Vol. V; Vienna, Institut Sociologique Ukrainien, 1922), pp. 29ff.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 43–44.

⁶⁸ Haskins and Lord, pp. 194, 195.

Actually, after the occupation of the capital of Galicia by Polish troops the Jewish population of the city suffered a two-day pogrom in reprisal for the neutrality observed by the Jewish community during the Ukrainian-Polish battle for the city. See Jozef Bendow, *Der Lemberger Judenpogrom November 1918–Jänner 1919* (Vienna-Bрно, 1919), and Max Blokzyl, *Poland, Galicia and the Persecutions of the Jews at Lemberg* (1919).

For details concerning the reign of terror and the persecution of the Ukrainian population of Eastern Galicia following the Polish occupation, see *The Book of the Bloody Cruelties: Returns Concerning the Invasion of the Poles into the Ukrainian Territory of Galicia in 1918–19* (Vienna, 1919), an official publication of the government of the West Ukrainian Republic. The Ukrainian edition of this publication appeared under the title *Krivava knyha* (2 vols.; Vienna, 1919–21).

nienne en Galicie (Bern, 1919).⁶⁹ Moreover, during the Paris Conference Lord maintained contact with Ukrainians; it was he who arranged a meeting in June 1919 between the representatives of the Ukrainian delegation and the U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing.⁷⁰

In a study on Woodrow Wilson and the rebirth of Poland, published in 1953, Louis L. Gerson notes that "immediately after the cessation of hostilities, Poland, in order to forestall the decisions of the Peace Conference, began to conquer neighboring territories without regard to the wishes of other nationalities."⁷¹ After a careful examination the author comes to the conclusion that "two powerful factors encouraged Poland's early aggression"—the French policy and "the hold which the Poles had on the American delegation" at Paris.⁷² The analysis of Lord's writings illustrates the pro-Polish policy of the chief of the Polish Division of the American Peace Commission at the Peace Conference of 1919.

It is not surprising that James T. Shotwell, chief of the History Division of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, regarded Lord as "a partisan of Poland,"⁷³ and that David Hunter Miller, the legal adviser of the United States delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, remarked in his diary on Monday, May 5, 1919: "Mr. Lord came in and I talked with him a little about Poland and found him very pro-Polish. His general idea seems to be to do nothing in the way of protecting minorities."⁷⁴ Lord's comments discussed in this article indicate that he was one of those to whom Lloyd George referred as "fanatical pro-Poles" among the American Polish experts at the Paris Peace Conference whose "judgment in any dispute in which Poland was concerned was vitiated by an invincible partisanship."⁷⁵

⁶⁹ Haskins and Lord, pp. 199-200.

⁷⁰ For details see Arnold D. Margolin, *From a Political Diary: Russia, the Ukraine, and America, 1905-1945* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1946), p. 48.

⁷¹ Louis L. Gerson, *Woodrow Wilson and the Rebirth of Poland, 1914-1920: A Study in the Influence on American Policy of Minority Groups of Foreign Origin* (Yale Historical Publications, Miscellany 58; New Haven, Yale University Press, 1953), p. 113.

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 119-20.

⁷³ James T. Shotwell, *At the Paris Peace Conference* (New York, Macmillan, 1937), p. 305.

⁷⁴ David Hunter Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris with Documents* (21 vols.; New York, privately printed, 1924), I, 289.

⁷⁵ David Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, II, 991.

The policy recommended and promoted by Lord aimed at forcible incorporation into Poland of the predominantly Ukrainian Eastern Galicia and other ethnically non-Polish territories in the east, without regard to the wishes of the majority of the population. This policy was detrimental to the Ukrainian cause, but at the same time it did not contribute to the stability of the new Polish state. Nor did it prove to be successful. Lord himself was destined to see the end of Polish rule over Eastern Galicia and all the other ethnically non-Polish territories east of the Curzon line.⁷⁶

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⁷⁶ Lord strongly opposed the new Polish territorial settlement of 1945. In his paper, "The Russo-Polish Boundary Problem," he expressed his view on the question of the eastern frontier of Poland as follows: "...because it seems to me that the Polish arguments in the case [reference is made to the territories east of the Curzon line which were occupied by Poland after World War I and ceded by Poland after World War II] are, in general, much stronger, my own feeling is that Poland ought to have been restored to the whole of her prewar territory." *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, LXVIII, 421.