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more of this readily available material. And finally, certain nineteenth-century accounts are uncritically used in order to reproduce dramatic stories of captivity and danger on an exotic colonial frontier, such as French governess Anna Drancy's account of the sacking of the Chavchavadze estate in Tsinondali in 1854.

Russian, Georgian, French, and English writers told different kinds of stories about the Caucasus, reminding us of Russia's general participation in the colonial experience as well as its distinctive multiethnic empire and frontier encounter with Islam. The religious dimension, in spite of Griffin's excellent subtitle, "a journey to the land between Christianity and Islam," is not sufficiently explored. Both Orthodox and Islamic worlds perceived the North Caucasus as a distant frontier in need of religious instruction and missionary support, although we know far more about the view from Moscow than from Mecca or Istanbul. The practices of imperial expansion and rule were shaped by a series of other contrasts related to the religious divide, with Chechens in particular distant from the world of urban culture and Imperial service accessible to Georgians and Armenians in Tbilisi. Griffin devotes a chapter to an Armenian officer in the service of the tsar, but his fruitless effort to query contemporary Armenians about their memory of Shamil suggests a lack of knowledge about this religious and Imperial history. Because Griffin's own interest in the region is part of a long history of foreign fascination with the Caucasus, he and his party might be more self-conscious about their own assumptions concerning what makes a region and a traveling experience of interest to contemporary English readers. Several travel episodes are designed to appeal to the expectations of this audience.

These criticisms aside, historians are likely to respond with respect and admiration for Griffin's ability to make history come alive for the educated reading public beyond academia. His belief in the importance of history is also a welcome contribution in a time when the threat of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism tends to eliminate any public attention to the historical background to our contemporary world.

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Miller, Alexei. *The Ukrainian Question: The Russian Empire and Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century*. Authorized translation by Olga Poato. Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2003. 259 pp. \$44.95. ISBN 963-9241-60-1.

Miller, A. I. "Ukrainskii vopros" v politike vlastei i russkom obshchestvennom mnenii (vtoraia polovina XIX v.). St. Petersburg: "Aleteiia," 2000. 267 pp.

The Ukrainian Question (UQ), according to the author "the first book on Russian-Ukrainian relations in the nineteenth century written in Russia after 1917" (*UQ*, p. 13), focuses on the second half of the nineteenth century, as is made clear in the title of the original Russian publication. That title provides a better description of the book than does the English one (*UQ*): the book is mainly concerned with official government policies dealing with the Ukrainian Question as well as Russian public opinion on that matter. Although Miller recognizes that various projects for Russian national identity existed, he concentrates on one, which he calls the "All-Russian Nation Project"—the idea that Great Russians, Belorussians, and Little Russians (as well as the "Ruthenes" in the Habsburg Monarchy) should form a single nation. In a long introductory chapter Miller places the Russian nation-building project and the Ukrainian question in a broad comparative framework. In order to explain the fate of the All-Russian nation project, Miller does not limit himself to a study of what the Russians said or did, but frequently draws on the story of how France built its nation, pointing out where the Russians failed to follow the French model. For this reason his book should draw the attention of scholars

of nationalism, and not only historians of Russia and Ukraine, who consider it an original and significant contribution.

A chapter dealing with Russia and “Ukrainophilism” in the first half of the century serves as an introduction to the proper subject, the Ukrainian Question during the reign of Alexander II. The two key events the author examines in detail are the Valuev Circular (1863), which imposed restrictions on Ukrainian-language publications, and the Ems Edict (1876), which banned publications in Ukrainian altogether (with some special exceptions).

Miller presents the views of Imperial officials in the capital and in the provinces, and shows that no unanimity existed in their views on how to treat the Ukrainian language and “Ukrainophilism.” Even though many of these officials were supporters and promoters of the All-Russian nation project, some of them considered expressions of specifically Little Russian sentiment to be compatible with the All-Russian idea. Others viewed even seemingly cultural activities to be politically subversive. Among the valuable features of this book is that it shows the wide spectrum of positions among the establishment with regard to the Ukrainian Question.

Miller also presents the views of the Russian public on the Ukrainian Question, drawing on newspaper and journal sources. His “main thesis” is that “Russian nationalism as a public sentiment, and the ‘official nationalism’ of the autocracy, are closely connected yet independent phenomena, sometimes going side by side, but no less often entering into conflict with each other” (*UQ*, p. 5). Miller states that “there was no real contact and cooperation between the autocracy and Russian society in the field of nation building in the nineteenth century” (*UQ*, p. 4). This may be true as a generalization; however, in the course of the nineteenth century and especially in the early twentieth century significant elements of the Russian public shared the official stand on Ukraine.

Miller has less to say about the development of the Ukrainian Nation project, though he notes a very interesting and important difference between the framework in which Ukrainian nation-builders were forming their vision of Ukraine and that in which Russians projected the future of Russia: “Some nationalisms, including the Ukrainian, borrowed their models from the Central European peoples, primarily the Czechs and Poles, while Russian nationalism mostly sought its models in Western Europe, which is easily explained by the differences in their goals” (*UQ*, p. 3). However, Miller does not properly situate the place of the Polish role in the Ukrainian-Russian relationship. He states that “the formation of identities on the territory of present-day Ukraine was happening in the field of the centuries-long competition between the Polish Commonwealth, Muscovy and the Ottoman Empire, and later between the Romanov Empire and the Polish nobility” (*UQ*, pp. 10–11). But the key fact about the situation after the partitions of Poland was not the competition between the Romanov empire and the Polish *nobility* but the competition of the Romanov empire and Russian nation-builders of all varieties on the one hand, and the Polish nation and Polish society that had survived the end of the Commonwealth and was actively engaged in building a modern Polish nation on the other. Ukrainians were subject to Polish nation-building efforts not only in Galicia but also in the Kingdom of Poland under tsarist rule. (It is enough to mention the case of the Uniates in the Chelm region, many of whom opted for Latin Catholicism, which in practice meant Polonism, while being subjected to forced Russification.) Belorussians and Lithuanians were also becoming polonized during the nineteenth century while being subjects of the Russian Empire. Ukrainian nationalists, therefore, while indeed imitating the more advanced Poles and Czechs, found themselves in conflict with the Polish national project just as much with the Russian idea.

As we mentioned above, Miller relies heavily on material from the history of Western Europe, especially the French case, in his description and analysis of the Russian-Ukrainian encounter. However, excessive reliance on the French analogies in their application to the

Russian story results in a certain historical imbalance in his presentation of Russia in the second half of the nineteenth and early years of the twentieth century. The Polish factor in the Ukrainian-Russia encounter makes it absolutely clear why comparisons of Ukraine with Languedoc or any other region of France that ended up becoming French are historically questionable. Some of the most astute observers of the conditions in Russia's western borderlands understood that in order for Russia to win over the local populations, Russia had to establish its own *political* supremacy over the Poles by developing modern *political institutions*. Valuev made this point in a memorandum to the tsar sometime after the 1863 Polish Uprising. The nation-builders in Paris did not have to deal with a nationalism that represented a more advanced case than their own French project and served as a role model for others who did not want to become French. (Which town in France occupied a place corresponding to that of Warsaw in nineteenth-century Russia?)

In his conclusions, Miller acknowledges that the All-Russian nation project failed and that the Ukrainian national project won, not so much because it was stronger by nature but because the Russians did not take advantage of the brief "window of opportunity" they had, when they failed to use schools, the army, and local government in order to turn Little Russians into nationally conscious Russians. In explaining the Russian failure to make Ukrainians Russian, Miller fails to properly assess something more fundamental. While elsewhere Marxism became easily nationalized as a German, Czech, or Polish phenomenon, revolutionary Marxism in Russia functioned as an antinational force. When it took power in 1917, it did so in the name of an international proletarian revolution and not that of a new Russian nation. Miller concludes that "the extremely grave political crisis in Russia in the first decades of the twentieth century and its consequences put to rest, among other things, the All-Russian nation-building project" (*UQ*, p. 257). Among those "other things" the Bolsheviks "put to rest" was also the Russian liberal, democratic nation-building project, which had envisioned a Russia modeled on the United States. The Bolshevik takeover brought with it the destruction of Russia as a nation.

Miller's account of Russian developments would be more impressive if it did not concentrate so much on the All-Russia model and correspondingly did not neglect the project to define the Russian nation as synonymous with the Great Russians. He mentions in passing, but does not elaborate, that both Herzen and Chernyshevsky considered Russians to be Great Russians and that accordingly they recognized Ukrainians as a separate nation. But they were not alone. Considering his role in history, one would have appreciated a comment or reflection on the idea of the Russian nation advanced by V. I. Lenin in an article titled "On the National Pride of the Great Russians (sic)," which he published in 1914. In it Lenin condemned the oppression of Poland and Ukraine and called for the creation of a "free and democratic Great Russia." That work deserves the attention of students of both Russian nationalism and Soviet nationalities policies. Long before he came up in 1922 with the idea of a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Lenin was prepared to accept a diminished Russia as a necessary step in the advancement of the international proletarian cause. While his goal was to transcend all nationalisms, Lenin was the only significant Russian politician who recognized, at least in principle, that Ukraine as a nation was an equal of Russia.

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