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**The Ottoman Black Sea frontier and the relations of the Porte
with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy,
1622-1628**

Ostapchuk, Victor, Ph.D.

Harvard University, 1989

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**300 N. Zeeb Rd.
Ann Arbor, MI 48106**

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
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presented by Victor Ostapchuk

candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and hereby
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Signature 

Typed name Omeljan Pritsak

Signature 

Typed name Edward L. Keenan

Signature 

Typed name Halil Inalcik

Date October 6, 1989

**The Ottoman Black Sea Frontier and the Relations of the Porte with the
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy, 1622-1628**

A thesis presented

by

Victor Ostapchuk

to

The Committee on Inner Asian and Altaic Studies

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

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ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the impact of the Zaporozhian and Don Cossacks, particularly their naval raids on the Black Sea, on the relations between the Ottoman Empire, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and Muscovy between the War of Xotyn' and the fall of Khan Mehmed Gerey and *Kalga Şahin Gerey*. In 1622, the Porte and the Commonwealth attempted to settle their differences that had led to the Xotyn' War, which proved impossible because neither side could control their border populations, that is, the Tatars and the Cossacks. Moreover, in 1623, the Bucak Tatar horde under Kantemir emerged from the war stronger than ever and as a heightened threat to the Commonwealth no less the Crimean Khanate. Meanwhile, by 1624, the Zaporozhian Cossacks, often in cooperation with the Don Cossacks, resumed raiding the Black Sea with an intensity at least as great as prior to the war. In 1624, the new rulers of the Crimea, Mehmed and Şahin Gerey, defeated an Ottoman force sent to unseat them by obtaining the support of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. After this incident, a mutual non-aggression and mutual defense agreement was reached between Şahin Gerey and the Zaporozhian leadership. This was a near alliance although it was only the Cossacks who aided their ally militarily, mostly on a mercenary basis. In 1625, Cossack naval raiding activity on the Black Sea reached its all-time height and there were even instances in which the Cossacks coordinated their raids with Crimean interests. After a Polish suppression of the Ukrainian Cossacks in 1625-1626, the Ottomans decided to take advantage of the consequent reduction in Cossack raids to strengthen their defenses of the Black Sea by constructing two new fortresses on the lower Dnieper. However, because of the difficulty to supply sufficient men and materiel for such a task, they had to forego this project. Instead, they set about reorganizing the finances of the lower Danubian basin in order to transfer tax revenues from it to the fortresses guarding the northern frontier.

For my father

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Preface

In the course of working on this dissertation, I have received assistance and encouragement from my teachers and friends. My thesis director, Professor Omeljan Pritsak, introduced me to Turcology, as well as to Ukrainian history from the international and multi-source perspective. For this and for his academic guidance and belief in me, I thank him. Professor Halil İnalçık of the University of Chicago, who originally inspired me to study Ottoman history during my undergraduate years, has been very generous, inviting me to attend his seminars on Ottoman diplomatics and paleography as well as sharing his experience as a historian. I also thank Professor Edward L. Keenan, who was my advisor in Russian history, for impressing upon me the importance of a critical attitude to the sources while at the same time leading me to new and original historical vistas.

Aside from my thesis advisors, there are several others who provided valuable academic guidance: Dr. Frank Sysyn on Polish-Lithuanian, as well as Ukrainian history, Dr. Şinasi Tekin and András Riedlmayer in Ottoman Turkish texts and documents.

The research abroad for this thesis was carried out in three stages. In 1982-1983, I worked in manuscript libraries in the USSR, in the summer of 1983, in archives of Turkey, and in 1985-1986, in archives and manuscript libraries in Poland. Of the many materials which I was able to consult in the archives and manuscript libraries in these countries those in the Başbakanlık Archives of Istanbul proved to be the most crucial in shaping this study and I would like to express my gratitude to that institution and its staff.

My research in the USSR was made possible by a Fulbright-Hayes fellowship and a grant from the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX). My research in Poland was also funded by IREX. The writing of this dissertation was supported by fellowships in Russian and Soviet studies from the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) (1987-1988), and for East European studies, also the SSRC and ACLS, as well as a fellowship from the Institute of Turkish Studies (1988-1989).

I would also like to express my gratitude to the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute for its stimulating and supportive environment. Special thanks to Marta Baziuk for assistance far above and beyond the call of duty.

Note on Transcription and Place Names

Ottoman phrases and texts are given in boldface type in a full transcription based on the modern Turkish alphabet. Ottoman terms are rendered in italics in a simplified transcription, that is, without the diacritics. However, the *'ayn* and *hamza* are retained in the simplified transcription. Full diacritics are used for the occurrences of the first bibliographic references to Ottoman works. Terms in East Slavic are transcribed according to the International System.


Terms which have become part of the English language (e.g., *hetman*, *pasha*, *firman*, and Islamic months) are not italicized. The English reference standard is *Webster's Third International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged*, Springfield, Mass.: Merriam-Webster, 1966

Passages cited in the Polish, French, and English are rendered in modern orthography. Occasionally, plurals of Ottoman or Turkish terms are given with the Turkish (-*ler/-lar*), rather than the English, plural suffix. Ottoman or Turkish terms in indefinite *izafet* construction are also given in the original form (e.g., *Özi beglerbegi* rather than *Özi beglerbeg*). Plurals of terms of Arabic origin are usually given in the Turkish rendering of the Arabic form (e.g., *mukata'at* and *evkaf*, rather than *mukata'as* and *vafks*). All Arabic plurals are cross-referenced to the singular form in the glossary.

Dates occurring in the sources according to the Muslim lunar calendar (*hicri*) are usually given first in the original form and then in their Gregorian calendar equivalent. When *hicri* years are given without the equivalent Gregorian date, they are usually preceded by A.H. (*Anno Hegirae*). Dates occurring in the sources according to the Julian calendar are given first in that form, and then followed by the contemporary Gregorian form. For the period of this study, the Julian calendar was ten days behind the Gregorian calendar.

Most place-names are rendered in their modern form according to the language of the given country. However some important or well-known place-names, especially those

in the Ottoman Empire, are given in their historical form (e.g., Azak for Azov, Özi for Očakiv, Akkerman for Bilhorod-Dnistrovs'kyj). In all such cases, on first occurrence, the modern form is given in parentheses.



PART I
THE RELATIONS OF THE PORTE
AND
THE NORTHERN COUNTRIES, 1622-1628

INTRODUCTION

From the second half of the fifteenth until nearly the end of the eighteenth century, the northern Black Sea region, from Bessarabia and Moldavia in the west to the Don and the Kuban' River basins in the east, was the frontier zone between the Ottoman Empire, on one side, and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Muscovite State, on the other. During this period, none of these powers had serious, long-term ambitions of taking full control of the northern Black Sea steppes, although at times, groupings within these empires attempted to bring about an active, expansionist Black Sea policy.

After the fall of Constantinople in 1453, the entry of the Ottomans into the Black Sea region (including the Sea of Azov) and the takeover of strategic fortresses on all its coasts (especially those on the northwestern and northern shores) led to virtually unchallenged Ottoman control of the sea until the end of the sixteenth century.¹ The Ottoman Porte, having strategic and economic control of the sea, had no interest in expanding north from the rim of the Black Sea and beyond. As for the northern powers, their ambitions in other directions, problems with neighbors and between themselves, and in the case of Muscovy in particular, internal problems (and the subsequent necessity of rebuilding from within), precluded systematic expansion to the shores of the Black Sea.

¹On Ottoman concerns in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that no power north of the Black Sea become powerful enough to challenge its dominion over the Black Sea, see Halil İnalcık, "The Origin of the Ottoman-Russian Rivalry and the Don-Volga Canal (1569)," *Annales de l'Université d'Ankara* 1 (1947): 47-110; on the Ottoman closing of the Black Sea see Halil İnalcık, "The Question of the Closing of the Black Sea Under the Ottomans," *Αρχαίου Ποντου*, Athens, 1979: 74-110.

However, there was another factor determining the posture of these empires toward the northern Black Sea frontier zone. Looking at the map of the southern, steppe Ukraine and adjoining territories, today a developed and populated region, it is easy to overlook what a barrier it was for all three powers, from the perspective of our sedentary and urbanized civilization. This region, known to the Slavs as “the Wild Field” (e.g., in Polish, *Dzikie Pola*), and to the Turkic peoples as “the Kipchak steppe” (*Deşt-i Kıpçak*), was from time immemorial a region that major sedentary powers, such as the Byzantine Empire or Kievan Rus’, could not conquer and settle, though there were periods in which they achieved some degree of control over it. There are two basic reasons why the steppe was so formidable: First, its physical characteristics—its vastness, harsh extremes of climate, and the difficulty of keeping large armies supplied there for any length of time, and second, its inhabitants—illusive nomadic peoples capable of combining into confederations with a military prowess that, together with their mobility and knowledge of the terrain, made them challenging opponents to their often militarily superior sedentary neighbors.

On entering the Black Sea in the fifteenth century, the Ottomans demonstrated an understanding of the nature of the northern Black Sea steppe. Having established a beachhead on the coast by taking key fortress strongholds, they did not even attempt conquest beyond. Instead, they established a suzerain-vassal relationship with the combined sedentary and nomadic Tatar state, the Crimean Khanate. The relationship, although not without its periodic and serious problems, afforded the Porte sufficient influence among the Crimean and Nogay Tatars north of the Crimea to manipulate the steppe region in its favor. This was achieved above all by establishing a mutually beneficial economic relationship with the Tatars. Soon after the Ottoman entry into the Black Sea, the Tatars, who previously engaged in sporadic raiding for slaves, began to mount perennial raids into the southern regions of Poland-Lithuania (mainly the Ukraine) and Muscovy to obtain captives for the large Ottoman slave market. This important development set the stage for the ensuing centuries. Once the Ottomans managed to be the

first not only to take control of the Black Sea but to establish a relationship with the inhabitants of the steppe region adjoining the sea, they in effect locked their northern neighbors out of the Black Sea region for several hundred years.

More than a century after their takeover of the Black Sea, the Ottomans faced a serious challenge, not from their mighty northern neighbors, Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy, but from their neighbors' steppe frontier subjects, the Ukrainian Zaporozhian Cossacks and the Russian Don Cossacks. Descending down the Dnieper and Don river basins by land and water, the Cossacks raided the northern possessions of the Ottoman Empire, at times causing serious problems on the northern coast throughout the sixteenth century. However, beginning with the last decade of the sixteenth century, the Cossacks began regularly to raid Ottoman settlements and fortresses, as well as commercial and military sea traffic, on all shores of the Black Sea. During the first half of the seventeenth century, the Cossacks repeatedly raided and even sacked many important cities (not to mention towns and villages), such as Akkerman, Kili, and Varna on the Rumeli coast, Sinop, Samsun, and Trabzon on the Anatolian coast, and even the suburbs of Istanbul in the Bosphorus. The prosperous "Ottoman lake" became a very dangerous region and its economy faced a serious threat. No longer could the Porte take the Black Sea for granted as a region for its exclusive exploitation.

The Cossack and Tatar raids had serious repercussions on the relations between the Porte and the northern countries. Each state tried to exert diplomatic pressure on the other to control its frontier subjects. And when one power claimed that the subjects of the other were responsible for an incursion, the response would often be that it was in fact the accuser's subjects who had provoked the incursion by one of their own. The real problem was that neither the Ottomans nor the Poles and Muscovites could consistently control their frontier populations. One reason for this situation was that the central powers were usually unwilling or unable to devote the necessary resources to move in and take control of their

unruly frontiersmen because of interests or problems on other fronts. The remoteness of the frontier zone made such attempts seem costly and impractical.

Another problem was that, in the case of the Porte and the Crown, they relied on the existence of the Tatars and Cossacks. The demand for slaves by the Ottoman market has already been mentioned. As for Poland-Lithuania, the Ukrainian Cossacks, as a musket-bearing infantry force, were a relatively inexpensive source of troops, and when the need arose, the Crown actively recruited them to participate in its foreign wars. However, when there was no longer a need for the services of the Cossacks, the Crown tried to demobilize them, not only refusing to pay them, but insisting that they leave the Cossack way of life and return to their previous station, which usually meant serfdom. Most Cossacks refused to return, however, and lived instead by robbery and pillage, particularly on lands of the Crown and the nobility.

During the first half of the seventeenth century, it seems to have been a universal phenomenon that once a peasant left the land and took up the profession of the musket, it was nearly impossible to force him to return to the land. During the same period, the Ottoman Empire faced a similar problem with its *segbans*, that is, peasants who in times of need were hired to serve as musket-bearing troops. Halil İnalcık has shown how the *segbans* formed mercenary-type companies, which in time of peace, rather than demobilizing and returning to the land, would maintain their organization, living off the land by plunder and expropriation, and challenging the central government and its army.² The same "mercenary syndrome" applied to the Ukrainian Cossacks, prior to the formation of the Hetmanate (1648). In the Ukraine, the refusal of Cossacks to leave their way of life also led to periodic revolts against the central government from the 1590s through the middle of the seventeenth century. In the 1570s, the Crown tried to compromise with

²Halil İnalcık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 6 (1980): 283-337, esp. pp. 288-311.

Cossack demands by recognizing a limited number of them as military servants of the state who would be on its payroll. Because the list was known as “the register,” these Cossacks became known as registered Cossacks. Originally the register had 300 names, then 1,000, and in the second decade of the seventeenth century, the number was raised to 6,000. However, these low figures mean that the vast majority of those who had adopted the Cossack way of life were beyond the register, and their status was illegal in the eyes of the state.

Population pressure appears to have been one of the basic underlying causes of the Cossack problem in the Commonwealth. During the first half of the seventeenth century, there was a great increase in the population of the Ukraine. This population increase, combined with increased demands on the serf populations by the landlords, resulted in a great number of serfs leaving the landlords’ estates and moving into the steppe to colonize or beyond the Dnieper rapids, that is, to the Zaporizhia.³ Subsistence living in the Zaporizhia, both through raids on the neighboring Tatars and on caravans, as well as through hunting, fishing, and beekeeping, was an old and viable mode of escaping the restrictions of the state.⁴ However, in the first half of the seventeenth century, the great population increase meant that living off the steppe was no longer a viable escape valve, for the steppe as it was being exploited then simply could not support so many new arrivals. Thus the increase in population pressure, combined with the attempts of the Crown to restrict the number of Cossacks, helps explain why there was such an increase in the number of Cossack raids on Tatar and Ottoman lands to the south in the first half of the seventeenth century.

³E.g., O. I. Baranovyč, *Ukraina nakanune osvoboditel'noj vojny serediny XVII v.*, Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1959, pp. 51-131.

⁴See Myxajlo Hruševs'kyj, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 7, Kiev, 1909; reprint ed., New York: Knyho-spilka, 1956, pp. 48-88.

The case of the Don Cossacks was somewhat different from that of the Zaporozhians. Although they were also largely fugitives from serfdom and oppression, in the first decades of the seventeenth century there was obviously no comparable population pressure in Muscovy. During this time, there were far fewer Don Cossacks than Zaporozhians,⁵ and, as will be seen, there was in fact an influx of Zaporozhians into the Don River basin. Without the population surge and because the Don Cossacks were on the whole much more isolated from Muscovy than were the Zaporozhians from the Commonwealth, the mercenary syndrome does not really apply to the Don Cossacks. Unlike the Zaporozhian Host, which was a highly organized military confraternity, the Don Cossacks were much more of a bandit-type of phenomenon. They were satisfied to rob or protect merchant caravans, raid the Nogays for livestock, and attack Ottoman shipping. These activities were also characteristic of the Zaporozhians, but unlike the Don Cossacks, the former, in the first half of the seventeenth century, had pretensions of being an order of knights or separate estate, and were involved in the politics of the Commonwealth, most significantly, in the religious-national movement of the Orthodox Ruthenians (Ukrainians and Belorussians). The "vistas for raiding" of the Don Cossacks were also much broader than those of the Zaporozhians. While for the latter the great attraction was the Black Sea, along with the Crimea and Moldavia, for the Don Cossacks, in addition to the Black Sea and the Crimea, there were the Sea of Azov and the Caspian Sea as well as the Great and Lesser Nogays and their horse herds. In an appendix compiled by Ju. P. Tušin listing Cossack raids of the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Caspian Sea in the seventeenth century, for the Black Sea there is a preponderance of Zaporozhian raids in the first three decades of the century, while in the fourth and fifth decades, the balance shifts to the favor of the Don

⁵I. F. Bykadarov, *Donskoe Vojsko v bor'be za vyxod v more (1546-1646 g.)*, Paris: Izdatel' A. E. Alimov, 1937, pp. 55-56.

Cossacks.⁶ Although given the state of the study of the Cossack naval raids, it is premature to make a hard and fast conclusion, from the evidence to be presented below, it appears that at least in the 1620s the Zaporozhians were much more active on the Black Sea than the Don Cossacks.

As a basic problem in the history of the Black Sea region, it would be appropriate to study the phenomenon of the Cossack raids for the entire period of Cossack ascendancy on the Black Sea, namely, from the last decade of the sixteenth to the middle of the seventeenth century.⁷ That, however, is a task too large to undertake here. Instead my objective is to treat in detail the better part of a decade in which Cossack activity on the Black Sea reached new heights and the new power and assertiveness of the Zaporozhians in particular coincided and resonated with an attempt by the rulers of the Crimea, Khan Mehmed Gerey and his brother, *kalga* Şahin Gerey, to wrest their polity from Ottoman control and forge a more independent path. Although during this period the Don Cossacks were not nearly as active on the sea as the Zaporozhians, they are also included in the survey of events. Particularly during the 1620s, the Zaporozhian and Don Cossacks often sailed together on raiding expeditions while in certain years, the former often used the Don River as a convenient base of operations. In the Ottoman sources, there is often no indication of which Cossacks executed a particular raid. Moreover, from the point of view of the Ottomans, the Cossacks comprised one problem even though at this time the Don and Zaporozhian Cossacks had very different attitudes toward their respective suzerain states.

⁶Ju. P. Tušin, *Russkoe moreplavanie na Kaspijskom, Azovskom i Černom morjax (XVII vek)*, Moscow: Izdatel'stvo «Nauka», Glavnaja redakcija vostočnoj literatury, 1978, pp. 162-70, esp. 162-66.

⁷After 1648 the Ukrainian Cossacks were no longer a factor on the Black Sea because in that year Hetman Xmel'nyc'kyj burned all the Cossack boats as a condition of his treaty with Khan Islam Gerey III (Omeljan Pritsak, "Das Erste Türkisch-Ukrainische Bündnis (1648)," *Oriens* 6 (1953): 266-98, esp. pp. 269-70).

Part I of this work is devoted to presentation of the problems of the Black Sea frontier, in particular, the Cossack raids in the context of relations between the Porte and the northern powers from 1622 to 1628. Chapter I treats the attempts by the Crown and Porte to reconcile their differences after the War of Xotyn', a conflict which failed to resolve any of the problems that brought it about. The issue of the Bucak Tatar horde and its effect on the relations between the Porte and Crown is introduced. Chapter II chronicles the coming to power of Mehmed and Şahin Gerey in 1623, and in 1624, their conflict with the Ottomans and the Bucak and their rapprochement with the Zaporozhian Cossacks. In Chapter III, the complex situation in the region is portrayed in the context of the new relationship between the Crimean Khanate and the Zaporozhians, the unprecedented height of Cossack activity in the Black Sea in 1625, and the suppression of the Cossacks by the Commonwealth and its aftermath in late 1625 and 1626. Chapter IV presents the Ottoman attempt to come to terms with the Cossack problem by strengthening their defenses of the Black Sea in 1627, and the new emergency the Ottomans faced in the region in 1628 caused by a renewal of conflict between Şahin Gerey and Kantemir, chief of the Bucak Tatars.

For an understanding of the impact of the Black Sea raids on the Ottoman state and economy, it is necessary to have some idea of what the Ottoman response to the raids was, both militarily and administrative. Until now, there have been no works on the subject of the Ottoman defense of the Black Sea against the Cossacks. Part II is devoted to such an inquiry based on Ottoman sources that have been little or not at all used in general, and never before used for a study of this topic. The main source is a register of orders or firmans (*defter-i ordu-i mühimme*, see below) issued by grand admiral vizier Hasan Pasha during two consecutive campaigns to the northern Black Sea, in 1627 and 1628. The firmans provide a different perspective on the events recounted in Chapter IV. That is, they give a detailed insider's view of the intricacies and difficulties of an Ottoman

commander's role on an expedition in the Black Sea designed to bolster the region's defense and reassert control in a portion of it. Another register examined in Chapter IV is of tax revenues assigned to pay for the salaries of fortress garrisons guarding the northern shore of the Black Sea. This Ottoman tax register has not hitherto been encountered in Ottoman studies. In addition, there is a muster register (*yoklama defteri*) listing provincial troops that reported for duty on Hasan Pasha's campaigns. Much of Part II is devoted to an analysis of these original sources. Without such an analysis, the contents of these sources would remain inaccessible and their significance unappreciated. Because our understanding of many Ottoman institutions in the seventeenth century is still rudimentary, the interpretation of some aspects of these sources will necessarily remain open to question.

The end of the sixteenth century saw a marked deterioration in the relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The sources of friction between the two states remained the same as before—the incursions of the Tatars and Cossacks and disagreements over the status of Moldavia. Peace and stability on the Black Sea frontier was a high priority for the Porte, since during this period it was involved in the most difficult wars it had ever faced—in Hungary, with the Habsburg Empire (1593-1606), and in the east, with the Safavids (1578-1590, 1603-1618). During this period, most of the trouble originated with the subjects of the Commonwealth, namely, from raids of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. Given the increasing toll the Cossack raids were taking in Ottoman lives and on the economy of the Black Sea, relations between the Porte and the Commonwealth could only deteriorate. But during this period, there were also frequent interventions in Moldavia by Polish as well as by Cossack forces, both with and without Warsaw's sanction. In general, there was a marked increase in the Commonwealth's influence in both Moldavia and Wallachia—the *voyvodas* were appointed and dismissed

according to the will of the Crown and at times were even obliged to pay tribute to the Crown.⁸

The massive participation by the Ukrainian Cossacks in Warsaw's adventures in Muscovy during the Time of Troubles had an eventual adverse effect on the relations between the Commonwealth and the Porte. Tens of thousands of Cossacks helped fill the demand for troops by joining the cause of the Crown. The attraction to the freebooting warrior existence was such that, despite casualties, the Cossack population swelled during the Troubles. At the end of the Commonwealth's intervention in 1613, the government acted as a typical client no longer in need of the services of his mercenary force, and attempted to demobilize the Cossacks. The government attempted to use military force to pacify the Cossack armies who were returning from Muscovy and plundering noble estates and other property in Belorussia and the Ukraine, albeit with the usual scant success. Faced with unemployment and repression, many Cossacks were left with no choice but to head south in search of a living at the cost of their Tatar, Moldavian, and above all, Turkish neighbors. Just as the campaigns in Muscovy began to wind down, a surge began in the raiding activity of the Ukrainian Cossacks that would reach unprecedented and indeed tremendous proportions. This was true even though during the Time of Troubles itself, the level of Cossack activity in the Black Sea had already reached an all-time high. Thus, the period after 1613 has been referred to as the "heroic age" of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. In the years leading up to the War of Xotyn' (1621) even the larger cities, such Kefe, Varna,

⁸This introductory discussion of Ottoman-Polish-Lithuanian relations, from the late sixteenth century through the war of Xotyn' (1621), is based on the following: N. Jorga, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, 3, Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes, 1910, pp. 358-76; D. Dorošenko and J. Rypka, "Polsko, Ukrajina, Krym a Vysoka Porta v první pol. XVII. stol.," *Časopis Národního muzea* 109 (1935) [Prague]: 19-49; C. Max Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism during the Reformation: Europe and the Caucasus*, New York/London: New York University Press/London University Press, 1972, pp. 104-244; A. A. Novosel'skiĭ, *Bor'ba Moskovskogo gosudarstva s tatarami v pervoj polovine XVII veka*, Moscow and Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1948, pp. 45-46, 98-104; Dorothy M. Vaughan, *Europe and the Turk: A Pattern of Alliances, 1350-1700*, Liverpool: At the University Press, 1954, 191-204; Henryk Wisner, "Dyplomatyka polska w latach 1572-1648," in *Historia dyplomacji polskiej*, 2: 1572-1795, ed. Zbigniew Wójcik, Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1982, pp. 70-87.

Trabzon, and Sinop, were sacked, and for the first time, Cossack flotillas appeared in the Bosphorus, the very threshold of the Sublime Porte.⁹

As if the Cossack depredations in Ottoman territories were not enough, at the same time, the interventions into Moldavia by Polish nobles also escalated. An unsuccessful Moldavian campaign in 1612 headed by Stefan Potocki, who had just returned from campaigning in Muscovy, was answered with a large and devastating Tatar raid into Podolia in 1613. In the following years, despite attempts by the Commonwealth to bridle their Cossacks and discourage *szlachta* intervention in Moldavia, a full-scale Ottoman military reaction seemed unavoidable. A common scenario: the Crown manages to placate the Porte, reassuring it that, in the case of the Cossacks, a strong hand would be applied to them. No sooner than the assurances have been proffered, news arrives (often while the Crown diplomat is still at the Porte), that a large Cossack raid has occurred somewhere in the Black Sea. (A similar situation had existed in the sixteenth century with regard to the Tatars, that is, Ottoman reassurances in Warsaw that unprovoked raids by the Crimean Tatars would definitely cease would often be followed by news of a new incursion). By the second half of the 1610s, the relations between the Porte and Crown deteriorated to open conflict. In 1617, armies were mobilized on both sides and brought face to face. Only last minute negotiations managed to avert the outbreak of open war. However, in 1620, a Polish army led by Crown hetman Żółkiewski entered Moldavia to defend its client, the Moldavian *voyvoda* Gratiani, who faced deposition by the Porte, only to be destroyed in a battle at Căcora (near Iași). This incursion, combined with unceasing Zaporozhian activity on the Black Sea, was the last straw. In the following year, Sultan 'Osman II mounted a full expedition against the Commonwealth, which he led personally. The result was the War of Xotyn' in which the Ottomans and the Crimean and Bucak Tatars faced the Crown army and the Ukrainian Cossacks. 'Osman's stated goal was to

⁹See Hruševs'kyj, *Istoriia*, 7, pp. 342 ff.

punish and destroy the Commonwealth for its unending provocations. After several weeks of intense fighting, neither side was clearly the victor and an armistice was reached. Although the war was a military standoff, the real losers were the Ottomans since they had mobilized a large force, suffered great losses but achieved nothing. Eventually this loss would lead to the fall of the young sultan who was the inspiration behind the campaigning. As for the Commonwealth, it was the Cossacks who played a crucial role in enabling the Crown to withstand the Ottoman onslaught.

In the last decade of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth centuries, relations between Muscovy and the Ottoman Empire improved. In the prior decade, the Ottomans, alarmed at the strengthened position of Muscovy in the northern Caucasus, their resubjugation of the Great Nogay horde, and intrigues in the affairs of the Crimean Khanate, began to revive their active policy of almost two decades prior and even made preparations for another expedition to take Astrakhan, this time proceeding across the steppes of the northern Caucasus. However, the situation was defused by a combination of peace overtures by Muscovite envoys sent to Istanbul and Ottoman loss of interest in further expansion in the Caucasus, the latter being satisfied to consolidate their gains in the region at the expense of the Safavids. In 1590, peace was concluded with Iran and in the following years (1592, 1594), as the Ottomans prepared for war in Hungary, peace with Muscovy was confirmed through a series of embassies.¹⁰

From the 1590s until the Time of Troubles, a *status quo* was maintained in the relations between the Porte and the Tsardom. In the early 1590s, Moscow spurned offers from both the west (Papacy, the Empire) and east (Iran) to participate in an anti-Ottoman

¹⁰This introductory discussion of Ottoman-Muscovite relations is based on N. A. Smirnov, *Rossija i Turcija v XVI-XVII vv.*, 1, Učenyje zapiski, 94, Moscow: Izdanie MGU, 1946, pp. 125-59; A. A. Novosel'skij's review article of Smirnov, *Rossija i Turcija* in *Voprosy istorii* 1948, no. 2: 131-38; Halil İnalçık, "The Origin of the Ottoman-Russian Rivalry and the Don-Volga Canal (1569)," *Annales de l'Université d'Ankara* 1 (1947): 47-110, esp. pp. 92-97; Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, pp. 9-104; W. E. D. Allen, *Problems of Turkish Power in the Sixteenth Century*, London: Central Asian Research Centre, 1963, pp. 34-38; Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism*, pp. 90-233.

league, considering them unrealistic and dangerous. Moreover, Moscow traditionally sought to have good relations with the Porte. Of the three powers in the region, Muscovy had the least interest in expanding toward the Black Sea. Its main priorities lay in other directions, namely the Baltic, the Volga, and Siberia. Particularly important was its luxury trade with Safavid Iran whose textiles, clothing, rugs, saddles, and other precious items were in great demand in the Muscovite court. Moscow took great pains to maintain its neutrality in the struggles between the Ottomans and the Safavids, avoiding at all costs situations that might provoke the Ottomans to, for example, make a move against Muscovy in the Caucasus which could cut off access to Iran. As far as the Ottomans were concerned, the Don Cossacks were a serious cause for concern. In the 1590s the Don Cossacks increased their raiding activity in the vicinity of Azak, affecting the Ottoman local trade and economy. To Ottoman protests in Moscow, the usual reply was that these Cossacks were criminals and vagabonds, disobedient to the tsar. Indeed, Moscow wanted to have nothing to do with the Don Cossacks, who only complicated its relations with the Porte. In fact, during Tsar Boris Godunov's years, Moscow pursued a harsh and repressive policy toward them.

Until the early seventeenth century, the Tatars were engaged on behalf of the Ottomans, with ample opportunities for raiding in Hungary, Moldavia, and even the Commonwealth. However, during the Time of Troubles, Muscovy's situation *vis-à-vis* the Tatars changed drastically. In 1607 the Commonwealth managed to draw the Khanate into attacking Muscovy as its own forces prepared to intervene on behalf of the second False Dimitrij. Throughout the Troubles, Muscovy was the target of annual Crimean and Nogay Tatar raiding activity, which played a definite role in the successes of the intervening armies of the Commonwealth. In fact, Muscovy saw no respite from Tatar raids until 1617, when deteriorating relations between the Porte and Crown brought a shift in the Tatar raids toward the Commonwealth. During the Troubles, there were no diplomatic missions, in either direction, between the Porte and Moscow.

In the late 1610s, relations between Muscovy and the Porte improved and the Commonwealth loomed increasingly as the common enemy. While the Ottomans were edging toward war with the Crown, Moscow saw an early opportunity to regain its territories lost to the Commonwealth in the previous years. In 1621, as 'Osman's army moved on the Commonwealth, an envoy, Toma Kantacuzin, was sent to Moscow to obtain a military alliance against Warsaw. In Moscow this proposal was very seriously considered and an assembly of the land (*zemskij sobor*) was even called to approve joining the Ottomans in their war with the Crown. However, the Xotyn' War ended, and Kantacuzin arrived in Moscow too late for Moscow to begin operations. And so the plan for an anti-Commonwealth alliance had to be set aside, although negotiations would continue in the following years.

With the accession of Tsar Mixail Fedorovič to the throne, Muscovite policy toward the Don Cossacks changed. Instead of persecuting and restricting them, they were again allowed to travel and trade in Muscovy and were even paid regular subsidies by the state consisting of food products, wine, textiles, and cash. However, this policy was not motivated by a newfound sympathy for the Don Cossacks, whose raids near Azak and on the Sea of Azov still elicited angry rebukes from Moscow. Rather it was a pragmatic move brought about by an admission that nothing could be done to stop the Don Cossack raids completely, but that by paying them annual subsidy, Moscow could induce them to make peace with Azak and the Tatars in its vicinity (the so-called *Azovskie ljudi*). At the very least, Moscow required that in return for these subsidies the Cossacks promise to escort Muscovite envoys to the Ottomans and to the Crimea to and from Azak and to above all refrain from any raiding while Muscovite envoys were on a diplomatic mission to the Porte or the Crimea.

The problems of the Cossack raids on the Black Sea, their effect on the relations between the Porte, Commonwealth, and, Muscovy, and the Ottoman defense of the region

in the first half of the seventeenth century have never been the subject of full treatments. However, in Ukrainian, Polish, and Russian historiography, there are a few excellent studies on the period which either touch upon or focus on the problem of the Cossacks and the relations of the northern powers to the Ottomans in the 1620s. Deserving first mention is the earliest modern historian who dealt with the problems of the Ukrainian Cossacks during the 1620s, Stefan Rudnyc'kyj. In two long articles, he provided a survey of the published sources as well as a critical analysis of the main problems facing Ukrainian Cossackdom during this decade, and its relationship with the Polish-Lithuanian Crown and neighboring countries.¹¹ Although some of his views are today outdated, these two ground-breaking articles provided part of the foundation for the relevant work of Myxajlo Hruševs'kyj, the dean of modern Ukrainian historiography. In the seventh and eighth volumes of his *History of the Ukraine-Rus'*, Hruševs'kyj gave a thorough and synthetic treatment of the Ukrainian Cossacks on the basis of the published sources and most of the relevant Polish manuscript material extant at his time in Lviv, Cracow, and St. Petersburg.¹² In his work, Ukrainian Cossackdom in the 1620s comes forth as a new player on the international scene, confident from its recent exploits in Muscovy during the Time of Troubles, in the Black Sea, and during the War of Xotyn', and eager to enter into various alliances with its neighbors, as well as to intervene in their affairs. It was Hruševs'kyj who first appreciated the international significance of the rapprochement, which he considered a full-fledged alliance, between the Zaporozhian Cossacks and the Crimean Khanate. He documented the Zaporozhian Cossack raids on the Black Sea as thoroughly as his sources allowed him (mainly the Polish sources, the published French ambassadorial reports, the English ambassadorial reports as available in excerpted

¹¹Stefan Rudnyc'kyj, "Kozacko-pol'ska vijna r. 1625," *Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva im. Ševčenka* 17 (1897): 1-42; ———, "Ukrajins'ki kozaky v 1625-30 rr.," *Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva im. Ševčenka* 31-32 (1899): 1-76.

¹²Myxajlo Hruševs'kyj, *Istoriya Ukrajiny-Rusy*, 7-8. Kiev, 1909-1922; reprint ed., New York: Knyho-Spilka, 1956.

published translations, and the selected sections relevant to Polish history in the Ottoman chronicle of Na'ima translated by Sękowski). From his chronicling of Cossack naval raiding activity, the degree to which they were capable of upsetting relations between the Crown and the Porte, and how the policies of the Crown often left them with no alternative but to "ply their trade on the sea" become evident. However, even Hruševs'kyj was limited in his ability to fully assess the degree to which the Cossacks threatened the Ottoman Empire because he was not concerned with the history of the Ottoman Empire *per se*.

After the Second World War, an important work by the Polish historian Bohdan Baranowski appeared on the relations of Poland and the Tatars from 1624-1629.¹³ This work provides an excellent account of the difficulties and opportunities the Commonwealth faced on its Ukrainian borderlands in connection with the political upheaval in the Crimea during the reign of Mehmed and Şahin Girey. Baranowski was the first to fully appreciate the significance of the rise of a new Tatar power in the Bucak (southern Bessarabia), headed by Kantemir. His development of the notion of two usually hostile "Tatardoms" is an important and original contribution to our understanding of the region's history. Baranowski not only covered much the same Polish source base as Rudnyc'kyj and Hruševs'kyj, but went further. He added some new Polish material, particularly from the Kórnik Library near Poznań, and more important, utilized some of the Ottoman and Tatar originals as well as official Crown translations held today in the Main Archive of Ancient Acts in Warsaw. Although Baranowski deals with Polish-Ottoman relations in the context of Polish-Tatar relations, his treatment of the Ukrainian Cossacks is limited to their connection to Mehmed and Şahin Girey, vigorous though it was, and the scope of his work does not include close examination of the Black Sea exploits of the Cossacks.

¹³Bohdan Baranowski, *Polska a Tatarszczyzna w latach 1624-1629*, Łódź: Łódzkie Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1948.

Although the Muscovite archives make up one of the richest bodies of source material on not only Muscovite-Ottoman relations and the Don Cossacks, but on the Crimean Khanate and the Nogays and on our topic as a whole, these archives are surprisingly underutilized by Russian and other historical scholarship. Because of the inaccessibility of and lack of relevant source publications from the Muscovite archives (see below), S. M. Solov'ev's *History of Russia from the Earliest Times* is still an important work on Muscovy and the Ottomans. Since the Second World War there are two monograph treatments, both important though of greatly unequal worth for our topic. The first, *Russia and Turkey in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, by N. A. Smirnov, is a useful contribution primarily for the author's use of some of the Muscovite archival material, including some of the surviving Ottoman documents, and his survey of an entire range of topics in Muscovite-Ottoman relations from the first diplomatic missions, to matters of trade, Crimean affairs, and the important role of Azak (Azov) as a target for the Don Cossacks.¹⁴ Smirnov provides in his introductory chapter an interesting and useful (and the only available) guide to the Ottoman material in the Muscovite archives. A good outline of the different types of Muscovite diplomatic documentation is also included. However, Smirnov's entire work is greatly marred by a pervading Turkophobic and Russocentric attitude that resulted in many misinterpretations and distortions.¹⁵ A contrast is provided by the monumental work of A. A. Novosel'skij, somewhat inaptly entitled *The Struggle of the Muscovite State with the Tatars in the First Half of the Seventeenth Century*.¹⁶ The main topics of the work are Muscovite-Crimean and Nogay Tatar relations, the raids of the Tatars on the southern borderlands of Russia, and the development of the Russian defense system. However, it is a mine of information on

¹⁴Smirnov, *Rossija i Turcija*.

¹⁵See Novosel'skij's review article in *Voprosy istorii* 1948, no. 2: 131-38.

¹⁶Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*.

matters connected to Muscovite-Ottomans relations (particularly on Muscovite and Ottoman diplomatic missions between Moscow and Istanbul), has an excellent survey of the role of the Don Cossacks in Muscovite-Crimean and to some extent on Muscovite Ottoman relations, and has some important material on the Ukrainian Cossacks and their relations with the Crimea in the 1620s as well. The value of Novosel'skij's work lies in his for the most part unbiased approach to his subject matter, although at times he falls back on traditional Russian and Soviet historical jargon applied to matters dealing with the Turks and Tatars.

There are no studies in Turkish historiography on the problem of the Black Sea frontier and the Cossack raids in the seventeenth century. However, Halil İnalçık has drawn attention to the great importance of the Cossack problem in seventeenth-century Ottoman history.¹⁷ In addition, the works of İnalçık on the Ottoman Black Sea in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries are of great significance for our understanding of the important role of the Black Sea for the Ottoman Empire and its economy, and consequently help us to better assess the impact of the raids in the seventeenth century.¹⁸ In recent years, important steps have been made in opening the Ottoman archives for the history of Eastern Europe, in particular, by French scholars under the leadership of Alexandre Bennigsen. With regard to the period of this study, the ground-breaking article on the Cossack naval raids by Mihnea Berindei¹⁹ and the publication of Tatar and Ottoman

¹⁷E.g., Halil İnalçık, "The Heyday and Decline of the Ottoman Empire," *The Cambridge History of Islam*, vol 1, London, 1970: 324-53, esp. 350-53; ———, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973, pp. 44, 105; ———, "Closing of the Black Sea," p. 110.

¹⁸İnalçık, "Closing of the Black Sea"; ———, *Sources on the Economic History of the Black Sea, 1: The Customs Register of Caffa, 1487-1490* (forthcoming).

¹⁹Mihnea Berindei, "La Porte ottomane face aux Cosaques zaporogues, 1600-1637," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 1 (1977): 273-307.

documents relating to the Crimean Khanate²⁰ should be singled out for their use of Turkish archival sources.

The extant and available source base for this study is large but uneven in its coverage of various events and phenomena. Official affairs such as diplomatic relations are better recorded than, for example, information relating to the frontier zone and its Cossack, Tatar, and other inhabitants. In the manuscript collections of Poland, there is a great wealth of material on the Black Sea frontier, as well as the Cossacks, Tatars, and the Ottomans. Many of these manuscripts are so-called *silvae rerum*, that is, manuscript books kept by nobles with entries on a broad variety of topics including personal letters and records, state decrees, interesting or important correspondence of third parties, works of literature, and so forth. However, the majority of the manuscript books that this author consulted were not strictly speaking *silvae rerum*, since their content is political and often includes official correspondence as well as other documents such as pay registers of troops, diaries of diets and dietines, relations of ambassadors, and so forth. The official correspondence includes letters to and from foreign states. Although these “political manuscript books” have not been the subject of a source study analysis, it appears that many of them originated in both the public chanceries of officials and private chanceries of noblemen. The amount of space devoted to Ottoman and Tatar affairs is striking. As a rule it can be said that nearly every such manuscript contains at least several copies of letters to or from the sultan, khan, and other officials. Aside from copies of diplomatic correspondence, there are many letters describing the situation on the frontier by commanders assigned to the region or noblemen with landholdings in or near the borderlands. Tracts describing the situation on the frontier and prescribing measures to be taken to alleviate the Tatar and Cossack problems contain interesting insights and information. Other important sources include the reports of spies

²⁰*Le Khanat de Crimée dans les Archives du Musée du Palais de Topkapı*. Eds. Alexandre Bennigsen, Pertev Naili Boratav, Dilek Desai, Chantal Lemerrier-Quelquej, Paris and The Hague: Mouton, 1978.

and *confessata* of captured informants. The frequency of these materials is testimony to both the importance of their contents and the interest in them in noble society. Although most of the manuscript books consulted have already been used by historians such as Hruševs'kyj and Baranowski, they did not exhaust them for information on the Black Sea frontier. For a list of Polish manuscripts consulted in this work see the bibliography.²¹

Although the Muscovite sources on Ottoman and Black Sea affairs, as stated above, are among the richest for our topic, they are also in the most neglected state as far as publications are concerned. Access to the materials of the Muscovite foreign office (*posol'skij prikaz*) has been very restricted, especially to foreign researchers, and the last major publications on Don Cossack, Crimean, and Turkish affairs (*Donskie, Krymskie, Tureckie dela*) were in the nineteenth century.²² Because of the sorry state of publication activity with regard to the Black Sea region, Novosel'skij's work takes on an even greater importance thanks to his use of citations from unpublished Muscovite archives. In effect, Novosel'skij's work has been used also as a source book. However, it is important to remember that, although one must be grateful that these sources were used and are presented in the form that they are (inadequate though that form may be) by a most

²¹The most important publications from these manuscript materials for this study are: *Žerela do istoriji Ukrajiny-Rusi*, 8: *Materijaly do istoriji ukrajins'koji kozaččyny*, 1: *Dokumenty po rik 1631* ed. Ivan Krypjakevyč, Lviv: Naukove Tovarystvo imeni Ševčenka, 1908; *Listy księcia Jerzego Zbaraskiego kasztelana krakowskiego z lat 1621-1632*, ed. August Sokołowski, in *Scriptores rerum polonicarum/Pisarze dziejów polskich*, 5 = *Archiwum Komisji historycznej*, 2, Cracow: Nakładem Akademii Umiejętności, 1880; *Documente privitoare la istoria Românilor*, ed. Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki, 4-1: 1600-1649, Bucharest: Sub auspiciile Ministeriului Cultelor și Instrucțiunii publice și ale Academiei Române, 1882; *Documente privitoare in istoria Românilor. Urmare la colecțiunea Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki*, supplement 2-2: 1601-1640, *documente culese din archive și biblioteci Polone*, ed. Ioan Bogdan, tr. I Skupieński, Bucharest: Sub auspiciile Ministeriului Cultelor și Instrucțiunii publice și ale Academiei Române, 1895.

²²*Donskie dela*, 1, ed. B. G. Družinin, St. Petersburg: Arheografičeskaja komisija, 1898 = *Russkaja istoričeskaja biblioteka*, 18; *Istoričeskoe opisanie zemli Vojska dōnskogo*, 1, Novočerkassk: Izdanie Vojskovogo statističeskogo komiteta, 1869 (this publication contains, aside from Don affairs, many excerpts from the Crimean and Turkish affairs); *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiej. Dokumenty v trëx tomax*, 1: 1620-1647, Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1953, reprints both materials already published as well as some new materials.

competent historian, one is still dependent on his selection of citations and therefore inevitably dependant to some degree on his biases and interpretation.

Of the Ottoman sources used here, the most significant are the documentary ones from the Başbakanlık Arşivi (Archive of the Prime Minister) in Istanbul. Unfortunately, this researcher was able to consult only one register of the *Mühimme defterleri* or “Registers of Important State Affairs.” However, the one that was consulted, *Mühimme defteri* 83, proved to be an important find for the study of the Ottoman defense of the Black Sea. It is a register of firmans issued by an Ottoman commander for two expeditions to the northern Black Sea, which have already been mentioned above. Details on this register are in Chapter V and some documents from it are in the appendix. Also used were several smaller registers connected to the same campaigns, which served to complement the information in *Mühimme defteri* 83. They are discussed in Chapters V and VI.

Diplomatic reports, especially those from Istanbul, are very good sources on affairs in the Black Sea, especially the Cossack raids. Outstanding among these are the reports of the English amabassador, Sir Thomas Roe. Highly intelligent and very much involved in Polish-Ottoman affairs, Roe managed to present a level of analysis as well as richness of content that outdid his contemporaries, such as French ambassador de Cezy.²³ A relatively new published source that has not yet been widely used on the Cossack naval raids are the dispatches of papal nuncios from Istanbul, Venice, Warsaw, and other places.²⁴

²³*The Negotiations of Sir Thomas Roe in His Embassy to the Ottoman Porte, from the Year 1621-1628 Inclusive . . .* London, 1740.

²⁴*Litterae Nuntiorum Apostolicorum historiae Ucrainae illustrantes (1550-1850)*, 3: 1609-1620, 4: 1609-1620, ed. Athanasius G. Welykyj, Rome: Basiliani, 1959-1960.

CHAPTER I

The Aftermath of the War of Xotyn', 1622-1623

On 9 October 1621 the hostilities at Xotyn' (Chocim) between the forces of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and those of the Ottoman Empire came to an end. It was agreed that a grand ambassador (*poseł wielki*) of the Commonwealth would travel to Istanbul to conclude a final peace and remain there as a resident ambassador (*agent* in the Polish sources) in accordance with the "practice of other Christian states." Thereupon the sultan would send his envoy to Warsaw to confirm the peace. Meanwhile, Stanisław Suliszewski was to travel immediately to the Porte while the sultan was to send his *çavuş* to the king. The armistice known as the "Xotyn' Pact" consisted of the following points:

1. The Dnieper is to be cleared of all Cossacks so that they can not go out onto the sea and raid the sultan's domains and they are to be punished for the slightest transgression against the sultan.
2. Neither the Moldavians nor the Tatars of Dobrudja, Akkerman, Bender, Kili, Özi (Očakiv), or of the Crimea are to raid the fortresses, towns, estates, properties, or people of the Commonwealth. The sultan is to forbid the Tatars from fording the Dnieper at Özi. If the Tatars bring any harm to the Commonwealth and do not provide compensation, the compensation is to be granted (by the sultan) and the khan is to be punished.
3. If, before boundaries are agreed upon, those who go into the steppe to fish or hunt should come into conflict, as is often the case, this is not to be the cause for breaking the peace between the king and the sultan. If the khan or his army are called upon to go on campaign with the sultan, they are to proceed along roads distant from the Commonwealth and undertake no raids, and any damages incurred are to be compensated according to agreed upon terms.

4. To better discern and establish the boundaries between the states of the sultan and king, people who are competent and knowledgeable about those places are to be appointed.
5. The Commonwealth will pay the Tatar khan the usual yearly pay which is to be delivered at Iași to the Moldavian *hospodar* who is to turn it over to the khan's men. According to the old custom, when called upon, the khan is to come with his army to the aid of the king.
6. Because many of the conflicts between the Porte and the Commonwealth were caused by the wrath and greed of some Moldavian *hospodars*, individuals well disposed and loyal to both sides are to be appointed to this office.
7. Upon the conclusion of the peace agreement, Xotyn' is to be returned to the Moldavian *hospodar* in the condition in which it was when it was taken over.
8. The king and sultan promise to be the friend of the others friend and enemy of his enemy and keep to the peace that was between their grandfathers and great grandfathers.¹

In the Ottoman chronicle tradition there is a brief entry giving a general and incomplete relation of the terms: Xotyn' is to be returned to the Moldavians, the Cossacks are to cease raiding the Ottoman dominion, and several prominent individuals were to be sent to the Porte as hostages so as to insure the payment of "presents" (*vergü*) to the sultan.²

¹For the Polish text of the treaty see *Pamiętniki o wyprawie chocimskiej r. 1621 Jana hrabi z Ostroroga, Prokopa Zbigniewskiego, Stanisława Lubomirskiego i Jakóba Sobieskiego*, ed. Żegota Pauli, Cracow: Nakładem i drukiem Józefa Czecha, 1853, pp. 33-36. For a modern edition, see the Russian translation in *Osmanskaja imperija v pervoj četverti XVII veka. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov*, eds. X. M. Ibragimbejli, N. C. Rašba, Moscow: Izdatel'stvo «Nauka», Glavnaja redakcija vostočnoj literatury, 1984, pp. 189-90. Among the several existing manuscript copies of this document the following were consulted: AGAD, AZ 3037, fol. 129-30; BCz 345, pp. 309-12; BK 983, fol. 128-29.

²Katib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, 2, Istanbul: Ceride-i Havâdis Matba'ası, 1287/1870-1871, p. 4; *Collectanea z dziejopisów tureckich* 1. Ed. J. J. S. Sękowski. Warsaw: Nakładem Zawadzkiego i Węckiego, 1824, p. 172. It should be noted that although the Polish translation by Sękowski is from Na'ima's chronicle, here citations of the chronicle of Katib Çelebi are given since the former is usually dependent on the latter for these years. In what follows, any substantive divergences between these two chronicles will be noted.

Differing interpretations of the promise to deliver gifts to the sultan would become a serious point of contention during the grand ambassador's negotiations at the Porte.³

The Embassy of Krzysztof Zbaraski to the Porte

For two and a half years after the disengagement of forces at Xotyn', the Ottoman Empire and Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth could not come to terms on a final peace treaty. To start with, there was a delay by the Commonwealth of nearly a year in sending an ambassador because of the serious disturbances in Istanbul following Sultan 'Osman's return from Xotyn'. It was not until 9 September 1622, nearly a year after the armistice, that Prince Krzysztof Zbaraski was appointed and set out for Istanbul.⁴ Zbaraski, was the Crown master of the horse (*koniuszy koronny*), and brother of Prince Jerzy Zbaraski, the castellan of Cracow. In size and splendor, Zbaraski's legation was one of the greatest that was ever assembled to the Porte.⁵ Upon the very arrival of Zbaraski's legation at Istanbul

³In the reports of Sir Thomas Roe, the English resident at the Porte, there is a slightly different version of these terms: Kantemir, the head of the Akkerman horde (see below) and Canbeg Gerey, the Crimean khan, were to withdraw their forces that were raiding the Commonwealth during the war; the Crown would make an annual yearly payment of 40,000 florins to the Tatars; the king was to maintain a resident at the Porte and send gifts comparable to those sent by other Christian states; the Tatars would stop all incursions if the Cossacks would do the same; to obtain the privilege of free trade in the empire for Polish merchants, 100,000 chequins in sables and bulgar leather; the treaty would not be valid until the sultan sent his *çavuş* to the king and the *sejm* approved the treaty (*The Negotiations of Sir Thomas Roe in His Embassy to the Ottoman Porte, from the Year 1621-1628 Inclusive* . . . London, 1740, p. 11).

⁴Janusz Wojtasik, "Uwagi księcia Krzysztofa Zbaraskiego, posła wielkiego do Turcji z 1622 r.—O państwie ottomańskim i jego siłach zbrojnych," *Studia i materiały do historii wojskowości* 8: 1 (1961): 321-46, esp. p. 326.

⁵According to Roe, Zbaraski's train consisted of 1,200 men (*Negotiations*, p. 115); according to Katib Çelebi, 700 mounted men (Katib, *Fezleke*, 2, p. 31; *Collectanea*, p. 176). Aside from the considerable amount of information in Roe's dispatches, there are two major relations of Zbaraski's embassy, one by Samuel Kuszewicz, the secretary to the mission, entitled *Poselstwo księcia Zbarawskiego do Turków w t. 1622* [The Embassy of Prince Zbaraski to the Turks in the year 1622], published in *Zbiór pamiątek historycznych o dawnej Polsce z rękopismów, tudzież dzieł w różnych językach o Polsce wydanych, oraz z listami oryginalnych królów i znakomitych ludzi w kraju naszym*, 2, ed. J. U. Niemcewicz, Leipzig: Breitkopf and Haertel, 1839, pp. 211-40. The other is by Krzysztof Zbaraski himself, entitled *Diariusz albo relacja X Jeo Mci Zbarawskiego koniuszego koronnego posła wielkiego do cesarza ottomańskiego w roku pańskim 1622* [The Diary or Relation of His Majesty's Prince Zbaraski, the crown master of the horse, the grand ambassador to the Ottoman Caesar in the year of the Lord 1622] published in Russian translation in *Osmanskaja imperija*, pp. 102-48. It has been published in the original Polish only once, in *Dziennik Wileński* [Vilnius], 1827, v. 3, *Historia i literatura*, pp. 3-27, 101-25, 237-73, 339-357 which is

in late October/early November 1622,⁶ relations with the grand vizier, Gürcü Mehmed Pasha, commenced on a very negative note. Part of the motive for sending such a large embassy was to impress and intimidate the Ottomans with the wealth and might of the Commonwealth⁷ and thereby gain a psychological advantage in the negotiations. Instead, the size of the embassy antagonized the Turks. According to Zbaraski's account, when his servant was sent ahead to announce the embassy's arrival, instead of being awarded a kaftan, as would have been the usual procedure, he was met with reproachful irony from the grand vizier, who asked what was the purpose of sending such an army: Did Zbaraski plan to conquer Constantinople or to rob the sultan's treasury?⁸ Moreover, the vizier claimed that as Zbaraski's retinue included an inordinate number of merchants, it thereby forfeited the exemption from customs duties usually extended to members of diplomatic missions and owed 50,000-60,000 thalers for the goods brought with them. It would take several days of haggling before the vizier finally agreed to let the train enter the capital on 11 November 1622⁹ without paying customs.¹⁰

At the time of Zbaraski's embassy to the Porte, the Ottoman capital was in a state of great disarray. Several months prior, in May 1622, a revolt by the janissaries resulted in

today a bibliographic rarity and was not seen by this author. The latter work became one of the most popular works in the seventeenth-century Commonwealth and even beyond and exists in many manuscript copies, although an original copy has not been located (here aside from the Russian translation only BCz 361, pp. 263-97 was consulted).

⁶Only the approximate date of Zbaraski's arrival to Istanbul is known, see de Cezy, dispatch of 13 November 1622 (*Historica Russiae monumenta/Akty istoričeskie otnosjaščiesja k Rossii*, 2, ed. A. I. Turgenov, St. Petersburg: Tipografija Eduarda Praca, 1842, p. 421).

⁷Cf. Kuszewicz, *Poselstwo*, p. 240.

⁸Zbaraski, *Diariusz*, p. 105. The latter part of the question with regard to the treasury is an ironic reference to the fact that according to the rules of diplomatic protocol of the time, the host was expected to maintain the visiting legation. Roe was of the opinion that Zbaraski was overdoing it a bit ("... he entered with a great [perhaps too much] train . . .") and (*Negotiations*, p. 115); this combined with his haughty attitude towards the Ottomans was one of the reasons his relations with them were so strained (cf. Kuszewicz, *Poselstwo*, p. 224).

⁹Wojtasik, "Uwagi . . . Zbaraskiego," p. 326.

¹⁰Zbaraski, *Diariusz*, p. 105-107.

the murder of Sultan 'Osman II, and the return to the throne of feeble-minded Mustafa. During Zbaraski's stay, intrigues from the court and unrest among the janissaries and other troops resulted in a change of grand vizier in the middle of the negotiations—the replacement of Gürcü Mehmed Pasha by Hüseyin Pasha. Exacerbating the difficult situation was the fact that because of false rumors, at several points Zbaraski's embassy itself was drawn into the intrigues of the capital. The source of trouble was the differing interpretation by the Ottoman and Polish sides of the promise made by the latter at Xotyn' to bring gifts to the sultan. The Ottoman side insisted that this meant that the Commonwealth had agreed to pay *haraç*, in other words, the annual tribute which subject princes such as the *hospodars* of Moldavia and Wallachia paid to the Porte. Of course for the Commonwealth, any action in any way implying tributary status was out of the question and thus Zbaraski insisted that the gifts that he brought for the sultan were merely part of normal diplomatic protocol. In the midst of the wrangle over this matter, a rumor spread among the janissaries, who were in a state of discontent because they had not received their latest quarterly wages, that Zbaraski had brought money for them. As a result the mission was in danger of attack and plunder at the hands of the janissaries. Because of the controversy over the payment of *harac*, the grand vizier would not allow Zbaraski his initial audience with the sultan. After many arguments, threats, and delays, the documents relating to the Xotyn' armistice were examined by both sides in common session and the vizier was forced to back down and allow an audience with sultan.¹¹

Both the French resident ambassador to the Porte, de Cezy, and the English resident ambassador, Roe, actively intervened on behalf of Zbaraski and the Commonwealth. Their support included financial aid and, above all, intercession before various Ottoman officials. On the basis of their dispatches as well as the observations of the Muscovite ambassadors who were in Istanbul at the same time (Kondyrev and

¹¹ Zbaraski, *Diariusz*, pp. 115-17.

Bormosov , see below), Novosel'skij points out how, by coming to the aid of Zbaraski, the French and English ambassadors promoted the traditional interests of their countries in the Black Sea. The strategic interest of both the French and English was that there be peace in the Black Sea which would serve to harm the position of their rival, the Habsburg Empire *vis à vis* the Ottomans—peace between the Porte and the Commonwealth meant that the former would be freer to engage their forces against the Empire and its allies in central Europe and the Mediterranean.¹² On the other hand, the Habsburgs were interested in continued turmoil for the Ottomans in the Black Sea, particularly in the diversion of their forces by the naval raids of the Cossacks.¹³ Throughout these years, Western diplomats residing at the Porte were keenly aware of the connection between developments in the Black Sea and those in the Mediterranean and central Europe, and therefore they followed closely and attempted to influence in their favor events in the Black Sea region.

The Raids of the Cossacks, 1622. Despite the various intrigues and misunderstandings that surrounded Zbaraski's embassy, it was clear to all parties that the main problems that needed to be resolved were related to the Black Sea frontier.¹⁴ To the Ottoman side this meant the naval raids by the Cossacks, and to a lesser extent, Cossack and *szlachta* intervention into the affairs of Moldavia. To the Commonwealth this meant the raids of the Tatars. Already by the spring of 1622 Zaporozhian Cossack incursions into the Black Sea and Tatars raids into Podolia and Pokuttja (Pokucia) made it clear to both sides that since the Xotyn' War the situation on the frontier was essentially unchanged.

¹²A. A. Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba Moskovskogo gosudarstva s tatarami v pervoj polovine XVII veka*, Moscow and Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1948, pp. 105-106.

¹³Although presently there are no available sources on Habsburg action to this end during the aftermath of Xotyn', below there will be such examples.

¹⁴Aside from this Zbaraski was to gain the release of nobles and gentry that fell into Ottoman hands since the debacle at Cecora (*Negotiations*, p. 19).

There was good reason to expect a major Zaporozhian Cossack presence in the Black Sea following Xotyn'. For the defense of the Commonwealth, the authorities had made every effort to mobilize the Zaporozhians, and as was the typical pattern in times of war, the ranks of the Cossacks swelled. Thus, at Xotyn' there were more than forty thousand Cossacks officially,¹⁵ more than ten times the legal limit set by the register (*rejestr*) of that time. Even taking into account Cossack casualties, which are recorded as have been at least 5,000,¹⁶ the war left the Crown with a great mass of Cossacks that it was not willing or even able to maintain. For their services in the war, the Cossacks demanded 100,000 *złoty*, while the government was willing to pay only 40,000 in principal and in fact was dragging its feet even with the delivery of the lesser sum because the treasury was nearly empty. Moreover, the authorities planned to return to the 3,000-Cossack register once they paid off the Cossack participants of the war. Given this situation, a truly a large presence of Zaporozhian Cossacks on the Black Sea in search of their "livelihood" could be expected in 1622. To deal with this situation, the government hoped to dispatch the Cossacks to service in Livonia against the Swedes, and in the winter of 1621-1622, a reported 20,000 Cossacks did indeed set out for the Baltic lands. However, because of the lack of funds and the fear that they would plunder the Belorussian countryside, only a thousand were taken on and the rest were sent back.¹⁷ The only remaining recourse was repression—as early as late October 1621 the authorities had drawn up instructions for a royal commission to deal with the Cossack problem and in particular pressure the Cossacks to forego their Black Sea raids. For example, should they fail to desist, the Cossack commission threatened to withhold the 40,000 *złoty* that the state

¹⁵Myxajlo Hruševs'kyj, *Istoriya Ukrajinj-Rusy*, 7, Kiev, 1909; reprint ed., New York: Knyho-spilka, 1956, pp. 472-73; Leszek Podhorodecki and Noj Raszba [Raśba], *Wojna chocimska 1621 roku*, Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1979, pp. 135-37.

¹⁶Podhorodecki and Raszba, *Wojna chocimska*, p. 136.

¹⁷Hruševs'kyj, *Istoriya*, 7, pp. 488-89.

had already agreed to pay them¹⁸ and even to go as far as mounting a military campaign against them.¹⁹

There are no sources that deal directly with the effectiveness of the Polish authorities in stopping the Cossacks from going out on to the Black Sea in 1622—whether, for example, many or any boats were burned, as was intended.²⁰ The Cossack commission was unable to suppress the Zaporozhians completely for lack of funds for a sufficient military force. However, it was apparently somewhat successful in intimidating them, for it seems that an unusually small number of raids were mounted from the Dnieper in 1622. But by no means did the Zaporozhians that year abstain from their “hunt on the sea.” Some chose to go at least temporarily to the Don River and thereby avoid conflict with the state. In late March or early April, Muscovite authorities noticed that bands of 15, 20, or 50 Zaporozhians had begun to arrive at the Don.²¹ The archives of the Muscovite *posol' skij prikaz* or foreign office record that at about this time 1,500 Don Cossacks went to sea along with 300 Zaporozhians. Once at sea, this expedition was joined by five Zaporozhian boats from the Dnieper.²² On 1 May, in the last days before the murder of Sultan ‘Osman II, the French ambassador de Cesy reported that Cossacks were in the Black Sea very close to the Bosphorus and had taken several ships. This drove the young sultan into such a rage that he threatened to decapitate the grand vizier and the *defterdar* if within the next day they did not send galleys to the Black Sea to pursue the Cossacks.²³

¹⁸Letter from Zygmunt III to the Zaporozhian Host, 15 March 1622, Warsaw (BR 2, pp. 1142-1144).

¹⁹Hruševs'kyj, *Istoriija*, 7, 491-92.

²⁰Hruševs'kyj, *Istoriija*, 7, p. 484.

²¹*Istoričeskoe opisanie zemli Vojska Donskogo*, 1, Novočerkassk: Izdanie Vojskovogo statističeskogo komiteta, 1869, p. 158.

²²*Istoričeskoe opisanie*, p. 161 (*Tureckie dela*).

²³*Historica Russiae*, p. 417.

On 8 May Jerzy Zbaraski reported to the king from Cracow that many Zaporozhians had slipped away to the Don and that soon they would surely irritate the Turks.²⁴ Exactly a month later Zbaraski, on the basis of two independent sources, reported to the king that five Zaporozhian Cossack boats had gone to sea (perhaps the five that had joined the Don Cossacks earlier) and taken one Turkish ship and that by now they had returned to their stations (*włości*).²⁵ A few days later, on 14 June, the Moldavian *voyvoda* wrote a letter from Iași (Ott. Yaş) that the Cossacks were causing great harm including the destruction of several towns in Anatolia.²⁶ Meanwhile on 18/28 June, on the Crimean coast, the Don Cossacks (possibly the same flotilla that included Zaporozhians) captured two ships at Kefe and then moved on to Balaklava where they took captives.²⁷ In late June or early July, 1,000 Don Cossacks and 300 Zaporozhians (500 Don Cossacks and 70 Zaporozhians in 30 boats in another version) attacked the city of Trabzon (Trebizond) and other settlements closer to the Bosphorus.²⁸ On 1/11 July, the English ambassador, Thomas Roe, recorded

²⁴*Listy księcia Jerzego Zbaraskiego kasztelana krakowskiego z lat 1621-1632*, ed. August Sokołowski, in *Scriptores rerum polonicarum/Pisarze dziejów polskich*, 5 = *Archiwum Komisji historycznej*, 2, Cracow: Nakładem Akademii Umiejętności, 1880, no. 27, p.54.

²⁵Zbaraski urges the king to order the Cossacks strictly to turn over these “thieves” (*łotry*), have them sent to Lviv and, if the Turks complain, have them executed before a *çavuş* (*Listy Zbaraskiego*, no. 28, p.56); also published by Krypjakevyč from the Teki Naruszewicza series of the Czartoryski Library where the author and place of issue of the document is not given (*Żerela do istoriji Ukrajiny-Rusi*, 8: *Materijaly do istoriji ukrajins’koi kozaččyny*, 1: *Dokumenty po rik 1631* ed. Ivan Krypjakevyč, Lviv: Naukove Tovarystvo imeni Ševčenko, 1908, no. 161, pp. 262-64). A letter from June by Zygmunt III to an unknown person confirms that the Turkish ship in question was indeed taken by the Zaporozhians (*Żerela*, 8, no. 165, pp. 266-67).

²⁶*Documente privitoare în istoria Românilor. Urmare la colecțiunea Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki*, supplement 2, volume 2: *1601-1640, documente culese din archive și biblioteci Polone*, ed. Ioan Bogdan, Tr. I Skupieński, Bucharest: Sub auspiciile Ministeriului Cultelor și Instrucțiunii publice și ale Academiei Române, 1895, no. 234, pp. 522-24.

²⁷*Istoričeskoe opisanie*, pp. 161-62 (*Krymskie dela*).

²⁸Soon after this, 200 Zaporozhians returned to the Don with great booty (*Istoričeskoe opisanie*, pp. 161, 162 [*Tureckie dela*]). The claim in the Muscovite reports of that year that the Cossacks captured and sacked Trabzon is not confirmed in the Ottoman sources. More likely is the version given in a *gramota* of the tsar to the Don Cossacks issued 10/20 March 1623 that 500 Don Cossacks and 70 Zaporozhians in 30 boats nearly took the city, burning its suburbs, seizing captives, ships and equipment, and merchants of the sultan (*Donskie dela*, 1, ed. B. G. Družinin, St. Petersburg: Arheografičeskaja kommissija, 1898

in Istanbul that the Cossacks “have taken many Turkish ships . . . have put Caffa (Kefe) in danger and given us at this port an alarm.” On the state of the capital’s defenses in the year after the Xotyn’ War he wrote, “They [the Turks] now prepare to send out a few frigates²⁹ against them, but with so much difficulty and so poorly furnished, that they scarce will serve to make a show. They have no munition in their magazines . . .”³⁰ De Cesy reported that a day later the Cossacks came in 30 boats within 15 leagues of the capital and took an Anatolian town called Caudria five leagues inland from the Black Sea. “Leaving their marks of destruction,” they took away more than a thousand captives in captured *kara mürsel* cargo ships.³¹ Probably referring to the same raiding party, on 12/22 July Roe mentioned that in the previous week the Cossacks were in the mouth of the Bosphorus.³²

In that summer of 1622 the Don Cossack presence on the Black Sea was certainly very large. On 12/22 July the Muscovite envoys, I. Kondyrev and T. Bormosov, along with the Ottoman envoy Toma Kantakuzin, while on their way to Istanbul, stopped at Monastyrskij Gorodok, one of the main bases of the Cossacks on the Don. They were surprised to find very few Cossacks in town and learned that indeed most of them were on campaign at sea and that a flotilla had gone out as recently as five days earlier. On the next

=*Russkaja istoričeskaja biblioteka*, 18, col. 219; also in *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiej. Dokumenty v trëx tomax*, 1: 1620-1647, Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk, 1953, no. 18, p. 42).

²⁹Probably *firkata* (see glossary).

³⁰Roe proceeds to tell a story of how the Turks sent to him for two barrels of powder which he refused to turn over, only to relent after his hosts took an English ship as hostage (*Negotiations*, p. 61).

³¹*Historica Russiae*, p. 420. The destruction of this town by burning is confirmed by Muscovite envoys Kondyrev and Bormosov who, because of a storm, were forced to land near there while on their way to the Porte in early October 1622. The disruption caused by the Cossack raids of that year is further attested to by the envoys who described the villages near Caudria as being completely empty, with their inhabitants hiding in the forests out of fear of the Cossacks (*Istoričeskoe opisanie*, pp. 170-71, [*Tureckie dela*])

³²*Negotiations*, pp. 64-65.

day, five more boats set off, passing right in front of the camp of the Ottoman envoy.³³ Because of the Cossack presence on the Black Sea, the joint Muscovite-Ottoman party of envoys did not immediately proceed for Ottoman territory, for fear of reprisals against the Muscovite members. They were still at Monastyrskij Gorodok two weeks later when on 20/30 July *ataman* Isaj Martem'janov returned from the sea with 800 Cossacks, having left behind a small detachment to guard the mouth of the Don. Soon after a messenger arrived with word that the flotilla of Turkish ships heading for Azak, which the Cossacks were expecting, had been sighted, and immediately the *ataman* and his troops boarded their boats and set off to intercept it. By 26 July/5 August Martem'janov and his men returned, having taken an Ottoman ship along with its three cannons, related equipment, and two smaller boats (*komjaga*, "dugout"). The Cossacks proudly passed directly by the camps of the Muscovite and Ottoman diplomats and divided their booty in full view.³⁴ Finally on 8/18 August the joint Don and Zaporozhian expedition that had gone out in the spring³⁵ returned, having raided many villages and hamlets in the "precincts of Constantinople" (*v Carygradskom uěždě*). However, only half of them returned, having been tricked during negotiations with an Ottoman flotilla—of the original 1,500 Cossacks no more than 700 and 25 boats returned.³⁶

³³*Istoričeskoe opisanie*, pp. 163-66 (*Tureckie dela*). The situation in fact bordered on the ridiculous—the Muscovite envoys had brought money, cloths, fur products, and food provisions and wine for the Cossacks but there were not enough Cossacks present to accept the payment.

³⁴*Istoričeskoe opisanie*, pp. 164-67 (*Tureckie dela*). In the following year the Don Cossacks were given a serious reprimand for linking up with the Zaporozhians and raiding the Black Sea; one of the accusations levied against them was dividing their booty in the presence of the Ottoman envoy (*Donskie dela*, 1, col. 222).

³⁵Here given as originally having 40 boats and 1150 men; from the context it is clear that only the Don Cossacks are included in these figures.

³⁶A day and a half's sail from the capital, they raided a Jewish village. Then they were met by sixteen galleys and the Ottoman side entered into negotiations with the Cossacks offering a high ransom for the captives. However the Turks purposely dragged out the negotiations for three days and made a surprise attack on the Cossacks, capturing half of them. The half that managed to escape brought back a number of captives (*Istoričeskoe opisanie*, pp. 166-68 [*Tureckie dela*]).

The Raids of the Tatars, 1622. The main Tatar raid into the Commonwealth in 1622 was carried out by the Bucak horde of Kantemir. Rather than being a response to the raids of the Cossacks, it was mounted after a razzia near Akkerman by an insubordinate raiding party of nobles and Cossacks—retainers of the Braclav (Bracław) *starosta*—who seized many horses belonging to Kantemir or his horde. In early June Kantemir's forces apparently struck in or near the Pokuttja (Pokucie) region.³⁷ On 14 June the Moldavian *voyvoda* wrote to Zygmunt III that several thousand Tatars had devastated several *powiats* along the Dnieper above Soroky.³⁸ The *voyvoda* informed the Polish king that he had notified the Ottoman governor in the region (probably of Bender) and that the governor had captured the leader of this expedition and was keeping him in the fortress of Akkerman.³⁹ In a letter from the king to an unknown person, it is clearly stated that the recent Tatar raids were provoked by the incursions of the frontier subjects of the Kam"janec' (Kamienec) and Braclav *starostas*.⁴⁰ The Ottoman chronicle version of these events is similar in its general features, although with some divergences: When about twenty thousand "Poles" (*Leh ta' ifesi*) raided Wallachia and Moldavia, the *voyvodas* asked Kantemir for aid. The latter routed the invaders and then proceeded to mount a large raid on Poland (*Leh vilayeti*) which yielded a "limitless number of captives (*esir*)."⁴¹

This major raid by Kantemir's forces put the Commonwealth on notice that the Bucak horde was a force to be reckoned with. In fact, it was Kantemir who benefitted the

³⁷J. Zbaraski to Zygmunt III, 8 VI 1622, Cracow (*Listy Zbaraskiego*, no. 28, p. 56).

³⁸According to a *Księga grodzka* ("castle record book") of Halyč, the regions of Sniatyn' (Śniatyn) and Dolyna (Dolina) were devastated (Bohdan Baranowski, *Polska a Tatarszczyzna w latach 1624-1629*, Łódź: Łódzkie Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1948, p. 21, n. 20).

³⁹*Documente Hurmuzaki*, suppl. 2, vol. 2, no. 234, pp. 522-24.

⁴⁰June 1622, Warsaw (*Żerela*, 8, no. 165, pp. 266-67).

⁴¹Katib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, p. 32; *Collectanea*, pp. 176-77.

most from the War of Xotyn'. During the war he had rendered the Ottomans invaluable service by his effective raids and forays behind enemy lines and in the hinterland. For this he was made governor-general (*beglerbegi*) of the key province of Özi,⁴² which included a sprawl of territories from the immediate vicinity of Özi and Kılburun at the mouth of the Dnieper to Akkerman at the mouth of the Dniester to as far south as Babadagi in the mouth of the Danube and further southwest up the Danube to Silistre and beyond). For an outsider, that is, someone who was not a *kul* or direct servant of the sultan, to be named governor-general was a great honor and unprecedented for this region. Kantemir's elevation should be contrasted with the fate of Crimean Khan Canbeg Gerey, who after the war was eventually dethroned by the Porte, in part for his mediocre performances at Xotyn' and in the last Iranian war.⁴³ With Kantemir's elevation, the separation of the Bucak horde from Crimean overlordship and, moreover, its status as a rival and counterbalance to the Khanate was achieved. This realignment of powers worked in favor of the Ottomans, who were ever fearful of disloyalty from the Chingisid Gerey dynasty. However, it spelled trouble for the Commonwealth, which already before the raid of 1622 had suffered Kantemir's depredations.⁴⁴ For the Crimea it brought an absolutely intolerable situation in which open conflict between the two powers was inevitable.

As for Tatar raids on Muscovy, with the ongoing Ottoman conflict with the Commonwealth, the Tsardom enjoyed a period of relative calm on its southern borderlands. Moreover the Ottomans made continual efforts to involve Moscow in a war with its western neighbor, well aware that the tsar longed to avenge the Polish-led depredations of the previous decade and would be eager to regain his lost territory.

⁴²Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, Moscow and Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1948, pp. 100-101.

⁴³Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 100.

⁴⁴For his depredations, Kantemir earned the epithet "Bloody Sword" in Polish and Ruthenian sources (P. Kuliś, "Ukrainskie kazaki i pany v dvadcatiletie pered buntom Bogdana Xmel'nickogo," *Russkoe obozrenie* 1895, no. 2: 610-32, esp. p. 612).

Moscow for its part was content to maintain its neutrality and to rebuild internally and thus avoided going further than promising the Ottomans that it would not ally with Poland and encouraging the Crimean Tatars to direct their raids against the Commonwealth.⁴⁵ In 1620 and 1621, in connection with the state of war between the Ottomans and Poland-Lithuania, the Crimean Tatars as well as the Lesser Nogays and the Azovites were engaged in raids against the Commonwealth and there were almost no raids against Muscovy.⁴⁶ In 1622 the Muscovite *voevodas* in the southern precincts were caught off guard and raiding parties of Azovites, Lesser and Great Nogays, and Nogays of Divay's *ulus* succeeded in capturing a considerable number of captives. Later on, in the fall of that year, Muscovite envoys Kondyrev and Bormosov learned in Azak that these raids were privately mounted without the direct complicity of the Ottoman authorities or the chieftains of the various Nogay groups. The unauthorized raids were stimulated by the apparently great demand for slaves on the Azak market in that year, which was prompted by the arrival of an unusually high number of Turkish merchant ships.⁴⁷

In the same year a feud erupted between the Don Cossacks and the Azovites. In May 1622, at a meeting to exchange and ransom captives, the Azovites made a surprise attack on the Cossacks, according to reports of the Cossacks to Moscow. This led to reprisals and counter-reprisals which threatened the safety of the Muscovite diplomatic mission trying to make its way to the Porte past the Don Cossacks and Azak. To the repeated behest of the envoys that they make peace with the Azovites, the Cossacks replied that they could not until their retaliatory raiding parties (among which they included the

⁴⁵See Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, pp. 98-104.

⁴⁶Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, pp. 150, 152. Novosel'skij claims no raids were recorded for those years though according to the *Tureckie dela* from 1620, in the early part of the Azovites (*Azovskie ljudy*, Tatars and Turks living in the vicinity of Azak) destroyed a Don Cossack town for which the Don Cossacks retaliated by sending a joint expedition with the Zaporozhians to Rize and a land expedition against the Lesser Nogays. Both expeditions were unsuccessful (*Istoričeskoe opisanie*, pp. 156-57 [*Tureckie dela*]).

⁴⁷Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, pp. 150-152.

aforementioned Cossacks who were out at sea) had returned. When in August the last flotilla returned, the Cossacks did make peace with the Azovites and in late August escorted the envoys to Azak.⁴⁸ However, at Azak and during calls to port at Kefe and the Anatolian coast near the Bosphorus, Kondyrev and Bormosov underwent constant rebukes and threats by local Ottoman authorities for the raids of the Don Cossack that summer. The envoys time and again reiterated the standard reply that the people on the Don were criminals and fugitives from justice and that the tsar had little control over them. Moreover, they insisted that most of the raids that year were the work of the Zaporozhians.⁴⁹

The Embassy of Kondyrev and Bormosov at the Porte. Concurrent with the embassy at the Porte of Zbaraski was the diplomatic mission of Kondyrev and Bormosov. Their arrival at the Porte in October 1622, almost at the same time as Zbaraski, was viewed with great suspicion by the French and English ambassadors. De Cesy reported that its arrival was the result of intrigues by the Patriarch of Constantinople, Cyril Lukaris, the Dutch ambassador, Cornelius Hague, and some Ottoman notables who planned to form a league with the Muscovites against the Commonwealth. Roe saw the timing of the Muscovite mission as sure proof that it was designed to interfere with the upcoming peace negotiations. Both de Cesy and Roe viewed their arrival as a shift in the foreign policy of Muscovy, which contrary to the urgings of the Porte, had refused to attack the Commonwealth in 1621. In fact both believed that the Muscovites were offering the Ottomans a seven-year league against the Commonwealth.⁵⁰ Krzysztof Zbaraski himself, writing from Istanbul to his brother, Jerzy, stated that the Muscovite envoys were

⁴⁸*Istoričeskoe opisanie*, pp. 160-61, 165-9 (*Tureckie dela*).

⁴⁹*Istoričeskoe opisanie*, pp. 170-72, [*Tureckie dela*].

⁵⁰De Cesy, dispatch of 13 November 1622 (*Historica Russiae*, p. 421); Roe, dispatch of 30 November/10 December 1622 (*Negotiations*, p. 109).

attempting to convince the Porte to order the Crimean khan or Kantemir of the Bucak horde to launch raids against the Commonwealth.⁵¹

On the basis of the Muscovite sources, Novosel'skij demonstrates that Kondyrev and Bormosov were sent primarily to reciprocate Kantakuzin's mission to Moscow in the previous year and to maintain cordial relations with the Porte while avoiding being drawn into a conflict with the Commonwealth. In their instructions (*nakaz*) the Muscovite envoys were strictly ordered to maintain the line that the Muscovite authorities had followed during Kantakuzin's embassy to Moscow in the prior year, namely, that the tsar had concluded a fourteen-year peace with the Commonwealth at Deulino which, barring provocation from the other side, he would not break. And under no circumstances would he come to the aid of the Poles against the Ottomans. Novosel'skij claims that the neutral aims of the Muscovite mission is supported by the fact that the gifts they brought to the Porte were relatively modest. As things turned out, when the sultan granted the Muscovite envoys leave in early March 1623, he informed them that the Porte had reached a peace agreement with the Commonwealth and he even urged them to maintain good relations with their western neighbors.⁵²

The Bucak Horde and the Conclusion of Zbaraski's Embassy. Despite the innocuous nature of the concurrent Muscovite mission to the Porte and the support he received from the French and English ambassadors, Zbaraski's embassy dragged on until early 1623. The main reason for the slow progress was the inability of the two sides to reconcile their differences over the *status quo* on the Black Sea frontier and expend the resources necessary for the desired changes. Moreover, at the conclusion of Zbaraski's embassy the state of neither war nor peace did not pass. For the Commonwealth, Kantemir of the

⁵¹AZ 3037, fol. 132a (14 [?] February 1623).

⁵²Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, pp. 104-105.

Bucak horde was the primary impediment to more stable relations. The Crown required his removal not only because of his raids after Xotyn', but because it understood well the great threat that he represented to the security of the borderlands. The Bucak Tatars had an advantage over the Crimean Tatars with respect to raiding Poland-Lithuania. Besides being closer to the Commonwealth, they could easily pass through Moldavia and from there cross the Dniester River border, and strike deep into the Ukrainian and Polish lands of the Commonwealth with little warning. The Crimeans had first to cross the Dnieper at one of the few fords, where they were vulnerable to Zaporozhian ambush, and from there had a much longer and more perilous journey before they could reach more populated and prosperous territory. Zbaraski demonstrated this awareness in his treatise "Relation of the Rule of the Turkish Monarchy," written upon his return from the Porte:

. . . the *białogrodcy* ("Akkermanians") are very close . . . The Akkerman [horde] is led by Kantemir and for sure the Turks would not want to remove him for through him they have good insurance for [upholding] the present peace against the Cossacks. But they would not even be able to remove him in such turbulent [times] as long as he is powerful. That Kantemir has caused a great expanse of empty land to be inhabited by Nogay Tatars and has greatly strengthened that region. At first there were [only] 5 or 6 thousand of them, [now] there are surely twenty thousand. Now he has even begun to crawl into the the Moldavian land and if the provocations from the Cossacks continue then surely [the Turks] will let him settle right up to the Dniester.⁵³

Thus, the removal of Kantemir was Zbaraski's highest priority and almost always the first condition that he brought up in his audiences with the grand vizier. An adjunct to this was the removal of the Moldavian *voyvoda* Ștefan Tomșa who had allowed

⁵³*Relacja rządów monarchii tureckiej od księcia Krzysztofa Zbaraskiego, koniuszego koronnego, gdy był posłem wielkim do cesarza tureckiego sułtana Osmana, anno d-ni 1622* in Janusz Wojtasik, "Uwagi księcia Krzysztofa Zbaraskiego, posła wielkiego do Turcji z 1622 r.—O państwie ottomańskim i jego siłach zbrojnych," *Studia i materiały do historii wojskowości* 8:1 (1961): 321-46, esp. p. 345.

Kanternir's raiding forces to pass through his territory and who was perceived as being an enemy of the Commonwealth.⁵⁴ Grand Vizier Gürcü Mehmed Pasha, who seems to have developed a personal dislike for Zbaraski, refused to budge on this matter. The aforementioned Cossack raids of the summer of 1622 poisoned the atmosphere of Zbaraski's embassy from the beginning. Since he promised that the Cossacks would be controlled, he was fortunate to be at the Porte during the winter season when there was no activity on the Black Sea and therefore no risk of embarrassment and discredit by ongoing raids. In any event, little progress was made on achieving peace until Gürcü Mehmed Pasha was deposed in early February 1623.⁵⁵

Under the new vizier, Mere Hüseyin Pasha, who was apparently better disposed towards the Commonwealth,⁵⁶ the negotiations were completed within a month. However, on both sides there was a reluctance to deal in substance. Zbaraski notes that in his first audience with the new grand vizier, the latter asked that all the previous agreements with the Commonwealth be brought before him and stated that he was least of all interested in the Xotyn' Pact. At the *müşavere* or special council convened to approve the peace, Zbaraski pulled the old agreements between the Porte and Crown out of a sack and declared that he also wanted nothing new, only the sacred peace of olden times. In his presentation, the grand vizier asked that old affirmations of peace (*'ahdname*) issued by Süleyman the Magnificent and others be read out loud.⁵⁷ The peace agreements of Süleyman the Magnificent and Zygmunt August seem to have held a legendary significance for statesmen on both sides since the time they were entered into, in the late sixteenth century. Thus in

⁵⁴See Zbaraski, *Diariusz*, pp. 110, 112-13, 119-22, 129; Roe, dispatches of 14/24 December 1622 and 25 January/4 February 1623, (*Negotiations*, pp. 115, 120--22).

⁵⁵İsmail Hami Danişmend, *İzahlı osmanlı tarihi kronolojisi*, 3: M. 1574-1703, H. 987-1115, Istanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1972, p. 321.

⁵⁶E.g., Zbaraski recounts how Hüseyin inquired about certain Polish leaders and how he lamented the death of hetman Żółkiewski (Zbaraski, *Diariusz*, pp. 140-41).

⁵⁷Zbaraski, *Diariusz*, pp. 143-44.

later treaties between the two states, it was standard to make a reference to the “ideal” agreements between the Porte and the Crown drawn up in the age of these two rulers and even to repeat the same terms.⁵⁸ When it came time to draw up a document in the name of the sultan, the grand vizier insisted that more reference be made to the ‘*ahdnames*’ of Süleyman than the more recent one of Ahmed I.⁵⁹ And so, although at points the wording differs, there are almost no departures in the ‘*ahdname*’ issued to King Zygmunt III by Sultan Mustafa I from the recent treaty of Ahmed I or from the treaties of the “golden age” of Süleyman.⁶⁰ Comparing, for example, the text of the ‘*ahdname*’ issued by Mustafa in February 1623⁶¹ with two of those issued by Süleyman, in 1533⁶² and 1553⁶³, there are the following common points:

1. Insubordinate or rebellious subjects on either side are not to make any cross-border incursions. The 1623 document specifically mentions that there are to be no [Ukrainian] Cossacks on the sea, they are not to join up with Muscovite Cossacks, the Crown is not to blame the Cossack raids on the Muscovites, and any disobedient [Ukrainian] Cossacks are to be severely punished. In mentioning the subjects of the sultan that are barred from raiding this document singles out those Tatar groups under or with connections to Kantermir by naming them: Tatars of Dobruca, Akkerman, and Bender.

⁵⁸See the letters of peace by Ottoman sultans summarized in *Katalog dokumentów tureckich: Dokumenty do dziejów Polski i krajów ościennych w latach 1455-1672*, ed. Zygmunt Abrahamowicz, Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1959.

⁵⁹Zbaraski, *Diariusz*, pp. 146.

⁶⁰Roe, perceiving the reluctance of both sides to deal in substance even before Zbaraski’s mission, predicted that the peace would be made with reference to the old treaties rather than the current state of affairs; in exasperation he proclaimed, “all this is nothing, and so great a noise was never alleged with so little matter of substance” (dispatch of 25 July/4 August 1625, *Negotiations*, p. 68).

⁶¹AGAD, Dz. turecki, k 72, t 304, nr 557; *Katalog*, no. 256, pp. 246-49 (the second decade of Rabi II 1032/12-21 February 1623).

⁶²AGAD, Dz. turecki, k 68, t 34, nr 77; *Katalog*, no. , pp. 44-45.

⁶³AGAD, Dz. turecki, k 70, t 157, nr 302; *Katalog*, no. 138, pp. 138-39.

2. The Crimean khan is to receive annual “presents” (*upominki*) from the Commonwealth in return for keeping the peace. The 1623 document specifies that the gift is to be delivered to Iași from whence it is to be picked up by agents of the khan.
3. Any captives taken by either side are to be returned if they do not object.
4. Fugitives from either state are to be returned upon demand.
5. The traditional formula that each side is to be the friend of the other’s friend and enemy of the other’s enemy. The 1623 document specifies that if the Ottomans go to war against another country, including their vassal states of Moldavia, Wallachia, or Transylvania, the Crown should not support the enemy with troops or money.
6. Merchants are to be allowed to freely pass between both states once they have paid the traditional custom dues. The possessions of any merchants that die while abroad are not to be confiscated by the state, but preserved until the inheritors come forward. Debts between subjects of the two states are to be respected in both states. The 1623 document specifically mentions that merchants of the Commonwealth are allowed to go down the Dniester with their goods to the markets of Akkerman and that Armenians and other Christian subjects of the Commonwealth are not to travel on poorly-known roads so as to avoid regulation.
7. Envoys are to pass between the countries freely and unmolested.
8. Shepherds crossing into the territory of the Commonwealth with their herds are to announce themselves and pay pasture tax.
9. Horses of merchants visiting the Ottoman Empire are not to be levied for courier service (*ulak*) nor confiscated in time of war.

It so turned out that a new point in Mustafa’s *‘ahdname* which had not been approved by Zbaraski complicated the peace negotiations, and in fact, for a time invalidated his diplomatic efforts. In diplomacy in general, great weight is assigned to the wording of treaty documents, along with diplomatic ceremonies and titles. In more traditional states this concern with implications of titles and passages in diplomatic documents was even more extreme. It seems to have been a fairly standard practice to attempt to take advantage of lapses on the other side in order to introduce innovations or alterations in accepted

forms. If such a change passed unnoticed by the other side, then in the next diplomatic encounter there would already be a precedent for the given change.⁶⁴ Related above were the unpleasant experiences by Zbaraski because of an ambiguity that the Ottomans tried to take advantage of in the Xotyn' Pact with regard to payments to be made to the sultan. That is, for what the Poles understood as meaning "gift," the Turks used the word *harac*. Thanks to the carelessness of the Polish diplomats at Xotyn', when Zbaraski arrived in Istanbul, he had to spend much time repudiating the alleged obligation of the Commonwealth to pay tribute to the Porte.

Yet Zbaraski appears to have allowed himself to be outwitted by the other side. In his relation Zbaraski claimed that toward the end of his embassy he learned of rumors to the effect that the return of Gürcü Mehmed Pasha to the grand vizierate was imminent. Given the latter's past indisposition to him and Poles in general, Zbaraski felt that should he return to power, the treaty would probably have to be renegotiated from scratch. And so Zbaraski decided to leave the capital as soon as possible.⁶⁵ When he received the final version of the '*ahdname*, he trusted that everything in the document was exactly as it had been negotiated. He could not check the contents because he had already sent ahead of him all of his aides, including his interpreters. When he reached the other side of the Danube and found a translator he learned that the grand vizier had deceived him and inserted a section into the document to which he had not agreed, namely, that the Crown was not to aid in any way the Empire against Bethlen Gabor of Transylvania.⁶⁶ This section was completely

⁶⁴Cf. Halil İnalcık, "Power Relationships between Russia, the Crimea, and the Ottoman Empire as Reflected in Titulature," *Passé turco-tatar présent soviétique. Études offertes à Alexandre Bennigsen. Turco-Tatar Past Soviet Present. Studies Presented to Alexander Bennigsen*, Collection Turcica 6, Louvain and Paris: Éditions Peeters, Éditions de l'École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1986: 175-211.

⁶⁵*Osmanskaja imperija*, p. 147. Roe describes his departure as more of a "flight than a retreat" (dispatch of 5/15 April 1623, *Negotiations*, p. 142).

⁶⁶*Osmanskaja imperija*, pp. 147-48. Roe was rather irritated by the snafu and implied that by trusting the vizier and failing to make sure that the treaty was checked, Zbaraski had acted incompetently. (dispatch of 2/12 May 1623, *Negotiations*, p. 151). Besides the article about Bethlen Gabor, de Cezy reported that an

unacceptable to the Crown as it was considered as amounting to an infringement upon the Commonwealth's sovereignty.⁶⁷ Eventually, after an exchange of letters between, on one side, Zbaraski and the Crown, and on the other, the Porte, as well as through the intervention of Roe, the Ottomans backed down and agreed to remove the objectionable section from the treaty.⁶⁸ However, this of course required that another mission be dispatched to the Porte to receive the corrected version of the *'ahdname*, bringing with it, of course, the necessary gifts.⁶⁹ Such a mission would be undertaken later in that year by Krzysztof Serebkowicz, an experienced Armenian diplomat who had been a part of Zbaraski's embassy (see below).

The Raids of the Tatars and the Cossacks, 1623. In February 1623, while Zbaraski was still negotiating at the Porte, about 7,000 Tatars of Kantemir supported by 2,000 Moldavians mounted another raid on Pokuttja.⁷⁰ In May and June there were more serious incursions reaching the Peremyśl' (Przemyśl) region, including beyond the San River. Because of the unpreparedness of the Polish authorities, the Tatars succeeded in bringing back considerable number of captives.⁷¹ In August Stanisław Koniecpolski, the Crown

article requiring the Crown to make peace with Muscovy was also added (dispatch of 15 April 1623, *Historica Russiae*, p. 424). However this was only a rumor, perhaps triggered by the French ambassador's misgivings about the activity of the Muscovite ambassadors. In the original of the document as well as in Polish translations, there is no such reference to Muscovy (AGAD, Dz. turecki, k 72, t 304, nr 557; official Polish translation, BK 333, fol. 195a-200a).

⁶⁷Zygmunt III to Murad IV, 8 December 1623 (BK 333, fol. 193a-94a); Roe refers to the alteration as having offended the "honor and estate of Poland" (dispatch of 30 May/9 June 1623, *Negotiations*, p. 158).

⁶⁸The vizier blamed the alteration of the document on his chancellor (dispatch of 3/13 May 1623, *Negotiations*, p. 150).

⁶⁹De Cezy, dispatch of 14 May 1623 (*Historica Russiae*, p. 425)

⁷⁰Anonymous report ("Wiadomość o Tatarach"), 1 March 1623 (BCz 2246, pp. 27-28).

⁷¹Stanisław Żurkowski, *Żywot Tomasza Zamojskiego kanclerza w. kor.*, ed. Alexander Batowski, Lwów: W Drukarni Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich, 1860, pp. 87-91; Maurycy Horn, "Chronologia i zasięg najazdów tatarskich na ziemię Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w latach 1600-1647," *Studia i materiały do historii wojskowości* 8: 2 (1962): 3-71, esp. pp. 42-44; ———, *Skutki ekonomiczne najazdów tatarskich z lat 1605-1633 na Rus' Czerwoną*, Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich—Wydawnictwo, 1964, pp. 39-41, 65.

hetman, who had just returned from Turkish captivity, expected another raid by Kantemir's forces, which did not materialize.⁷²

An indicator of the size and strength of the Bucak horde is the fact that from April to July 1623 its forces were also engaged in raiding Muscovy. The Bucak forces, led by Kantemir's relative, Urak Mirza, joined Crimean forces who took advantage of a power struggle in the Crimea to raid in the Kursk region along the Muravskij trail. At the same time small bands of Great Nogays raided along the old Nogay trail between the Don and Volga Rivers north of Kozlev. Although, the 1623 Tatars raids on Muscovy were the most serious since 1618, they were mild in comparison with those of the previous period.⁷³

In spring 1623, despite Zbaraski's coming to terms with the Porte, the French resident reported that the Ottomans expected the Cossacks to return to the Black Sea that summer and by the middle of March were preparing a defensive flotilla of "frigates" (probably *firkata* or *şayka*—see glossary) on the Danube and along the Black Sea coast.⁷⁴ It is difficult to judge the magnitude of Cossack activity on the Black Sea that year. The sources from the Commonwealth are mostly silent on this matter. A letter dated 20 May 1623 sent from Kaniv by Myxajlo Doroženko, recently elected as hetman of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, to Tomasz Zamoyski, the *wojewoda* of Kiev, states that insubordinate Cossack bands had already gone out to sea.⁷⁵ According to an undated letter from that year to the king, Jerzy Zbaraski states that at first in June ("[about when the king] left for Prussia") he had word that 22 Zaporozhian boats went out but that eventually only

⁷²Konieczpolski to Tomasz Zamoyski, Kievan *wojewoda*, 6 August 1623 (AZ 341, p. 1).

⁷³Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, pp. 150, 152-54.

⁷⁴De Cesy, 19 March 1623 (*Historica Russiae*, p. 424).

⁷⁵AZ 306.

13 were active although they caused as much damage as a larger Cossack flotilla.⁷⁶ According to a dispatch by Roe from Istanbul dated 30 May/9 June, the Cossacks were in the Black Sea and had given “many alarms to the city” which caused the Ottomans to write three letters to Poland.⁷⁷ In the letter just cited, Zbaraski informed that, when these Cossacks returned with their booty, they again, now in 30 boats, set out for more. Meanwhile hetman Dorošenko led a raid by land against the Crimean Tatars, robbing their herds and flocks. Zbaraski suggested that, being unable to calm the Zaporozhians, the Cossack hetman mounted the expedition to relieve their disaffection due to lack of earned pay and the ill treatment suffered by the Orthodox.⁷⁸ This was perhaps the same raid that was mentioned by Serebkowicz, the current envoy of the Commonwealth to the Porte, as having struck at Perekop and brought great losses to the Tatars.⁷⁹ Possibly in connection with the same operation is the mention in the Muscovite sources that the Zaporozhians attacked the Tatars of Mehmed Gerey while they crossed the Dnieper on their way to the Bucak (see below).⁸⁰ The Muscovite sources indicate a raid carried out in the absence of the Crimean khan led by the Polish noble, Tyszkiewicz, which went beyond Perekop nearly as far as Bağçesaray. It was simultaneously reported that 40 Zaporozhian boats carried out a raid on the Crimean coast near Balaklava.⁸¹ In the account of his travels in the middle of the century, Evliya Çelebi mentioned in passing that at the time of Murad IV’s accession to the throne (early September 1623), the Dnieper Cossacks mounted a large raid

⁷⁶*Sbornik letopisej otnosjaščixsja k istorii Južnoj i Zapadnoj Rusi*, ed. V. Antonovyč, Kiev: Kommissija dla razroba drevnix aktov, 1888, pp. 252-53.

⁷⁷*Negotiations*, p. 158.

⁷⁸*Sbornik letopisej*, pp. 252-53.

⁷⁹LNB, Oss 201, p. 67.

⁸⁰Novosel’skij, *Bor’ba*, p. 110 (*Krymskie dela*).

⁸¹Novosel’skij, *Bor’ba*, p. 110 (*Krymskie dela*).

with 300 *čajkas* which prompted the sultan to fortify the entrance to the Bosphorus and to rebuild other key fortresses. There is no independent corroboration of this information. It is likely that Evliya's dating was approximate and that it should be understood as referring to one of the first year's of Murad's reign, most likely 1625 (see below).⁸²

In early summer when the Muscovite envoys Kondyrev and Bormosov arrived at Kefe on their return trip from the Porte, there was an alarm that the Don Cossacks were at sea and that an attack on the Crimea was imminent. Even before this, on 26 April, it was reported to Moscow that already in early spring about a hundred Zaporozhians that were staying on the Don had surreptitiously gone to sea.⁸³ Kondyrev and Bormosov, who were making a stopover in the Crimea on their return trip, were detained by the Tatars until the alarm passed without any Cossack attack. They then left for Kerč, where they learned that a flotilla of 30 Don Cossack boats was offshore in sight of the town, having already captured a Turkish boat (*komjaga* in the Muscovite source), killing half its crew, and capturing the other half. The envoys were again arrested and forced to negotiate with the Cossacks so that they would not harm the town. The Cossacks consented and sailed off beyond Kefe. There is no further information on the fate of this flotilla. However, when the envoys arrived in nearby Temrük, not far from the mouth of the Kuban River, they were again beset, this time by the local Čerkes population, who demanded that the envoys compensate them for the two thousand gold pieces that they had had to pay as ransom for a chieftain recently captured by the Cossacks. When the envoys arrived at Azak on 3 August they found a Cossack flotilla waiting at the mouth of the Don for some ships that were due

⁸²Evliya Çelebi, *Seyāḥnâme*, 5, Istanbul: «İkdām» Matba'ası, 1315/1897-1898, p. 183; ———— *Kniga putešestvija (Izvlačenijs iz sočinenija tureckogo putešestvennika XVII veka)*, tr. and ed. A. D. Želtjakov, A. S. Tveritnova et al., Moscow: Akademija nauk SSSR, Izdatel'stvo vostočnoj literatury, 1961, p. 114.

⁸³*Istoričeskoe opisanie*, p. 184 (*Tureckie dela*); also in *Vossoedinenie*, 1, no. 20, p. 44.

to arrive from Kefe. There again, the envoys were threatened by the local population and subjected to all sorts of indignities on account of the Cossacks.⁸⁴

From the events recounted in this chapter it is evident that by the middle of 1623, less than two year after the War of Xotyn' (which the Ottomans mounted in response to incessant Cossack raids on the Black Sea and to repeated Polish and Cossack interventions in Moldavia) the situation for Istanbul and Warsaw on the frontier had not only failed to improve, but had actually deteriorated. During Zbaraski's negotiations at the Porte it became clear that the main problem that pitted the two states against each other was not a clash of geopolitical goals, but the inability of both to control their frontier populations. In 1622, it became evident that the Bucak horde, led by Kantemir, was a new major threat to the Commonwealth's security, as serious as, if not more serious than, that of the Crimean Khanate. As for the Zaporozhian Cossacks, although they were somewhat restricted in their raiding activity in the year following Xotyn', even then, many of them managed to find opportunities to raid the Black Sea by moving east and launching raids from the Don River together with the Don Cossacks. By 1623, the raids by the Cossacks from both the Don and Dnieper river basins had reached, if not surpassed, the level of before Xotyn'. During the war, the ranks of the Ukrainian Cossacks swelled as a result of the Crown's call to arms of all possible forces. After the conflict, when the Cossacks were no longer needed, the Crown tried to force the unregistered Cossacks to leave the Cossack way of life and return to their previous status. Instead, these unregistered Cossacks (who made up the vast majority of Ukrainian Cossackdom) joined in the raiding of the Black Sea. Thus it can be said that the Xotyn' conflict not only did not help solve, but in fact, exacerbated the Cossack problem for the Ottomans as well as the Poles by enlarging the body of armed men with few opportunities besides brigandage on the Black Sea.

⁸⁴*Istoričeskoe opisanie*, pp. 173-76 (*Tureckie dela*).

CHAPTER II

The Cossacks and Rise of Mehmed and Şahin Gerey, 1623-1624

During 1623, in the midst of the normal pattern of incessant and often unpredictable Cossack and Tatar incursions, a change occurred in the Crimea that altered and complicated the international situation for both the surrounding powers as well for the inhabitants of the Black Sea frontier. In late April or early May, Canbeg Gerey was finally removed from the Crimean throne and replaced by Mehmed Gerey. A year later, in early May 1624, his brother Şahin Gerey joined him and became the *kalga* of the Khanate. These two princes—sons of Se'adet Gerey, grandsons of Khan Mehmed Gerey II (1577-1584), and great grandsons of the famous khan, Devlet Gerey (1551-1577)—already had reputations for ambition for power as well as for talent in politics and intrigue. As early as the first years of the century, they participated in an unsuccessful revolt against Khan Gazi Gerey II, "Bora ," (1588-1596, 1597-1607) led by *kalga* Selamet Gerey.¹ Upon the death of Gazi Gerey, the two brothers were named *kalga* and *nureddin*, respectively, under the new Khan Selamet Gerey (1608-1610). Before long, Mehmed and Şahin Gerey unsuccessfully attempted to wrest the khanship from Selamet Gerey and were forced to flee to Circassia.²

¹*Le Khanat de Crimée dans les Archives du Musée du Palais de Topkapı*, eds. Alexandre Bennigsen, Pertev Naili Boratav, Dilek Desai, Chantal Lemerrier-Quelquejay, Paris and The Hague: Mouton, 1978, p. 336.

²Abdullāh Rıdvān Paşazāde, *Tevārīh-i Deşt-i Kıpçak* in *La chronique des steppes kiptchak Tevārīh-i deşt-i Qipçaq du XVII^e siècle*, ed. Ananiasz Zajaczkowski, Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1966, pp. 39-40. The Circassians as a source of troops were often an important factor in Crimean power struggles.

When Selamet Gerey suddenly died, Mehmed and Şahin Gerey, with the support of the Circassians, crossed the Straits of Kerç, marched into the Crimean capital, Bağcesaray, and without Ottoman permission, named themselves khan and *kalga*. After an armed conflict, Canbeg Gerey, with support of the governor-general (*beglerbegi*) of Kefe and troops brought by Ottoman galleys, prevailed and was installed as khan.³ From 1610 until 1614, the struggle for the throne among these rivals continued. The two brothers based themselves in the Akkerman steppes and from there carried out raids for captives into the neighboring Ukrainian lands. Like typical Turkic *kazaks*, they used their military successes to gain charisma and thereby attract more and more followers, until they became a serious threat to the khan. A passage in the Ottoman chronicle of Na'ima conveys this:

Mehmed Gerey and his brother Şahin Gerey had their *yurd* in the steppe of Akkerman and lived close to the Rus' (Rūs, i.e., Ukrainians). With a group of Tatars under them, they continually made raids on the Rus' infidels and brought out captives (*esir*) and sold them, making in this way a living. Eventually because of the richness of their booty they gained [increasing] power and to their side came many Tatars desirous of raiding and plundering. And thus they gathered a great army. They attained such a level that even the Tatar khan's army was inclined to join them. Khan Canbeg Gerey became anxious. As for them, they paid no attention to him and kept bringing out captives from the Rus' and Slavs (Şaklab) and selling them at Akkerman. Khan Canbeg Gerey declared them as being in rebellion . . .⁴

By 1614, Khan Canbeg Gerey (1610-1623, 1628-1635) had finally defeated the two brothers. Mehmed Gerey fled to Istanbul where he asked for mercy and was eventually imprisoned first at Yedi Kule and later on the island of Rhodes. Şahin Gerey fled to

³Rıdvan Paşazade, *Tevarah-i Deşt*, pp. 42-54.

⁴Muṣṭafā Na'imā, *Ravzatü'l-hüseyn fi hulāşāti aḥbārī'l-hāfıqayn*, 2 [=Tarih], Istanbul: Maṭba'a-i 'Âmire, 1281-1283/1864-1866, pp. 326-27.

Safavid Iran where he was granted refuge at the court of Shah ‘Abbās. In Iran Şahin Gerey remained a constant threat to Canbeg Gerey’s throne, forcing the latter to remain in the Crimea rather than fulfill Ottoman orders to participate on various campaigns. In addition Şahin Gerey became an inveterate enemy of the Ottomans and even participated in wars against them on the side of the Safavids.⁵

Why did the Porte unseat Canbeg Gerey in favor of Mehmed Gerey? It was pointed out above that ever since Xotyn’, and even earlier, the Ottomans were unhappy with Canbeg Gerey’s performance and were planning to depose him. The English ambassador Roe related that the official reason was to strengthen the peace with the Commonwealth, and grand admiral (*kapudan paşa*) Halil even asked Roe to write to the Poles to explain that the change was made “only for the performance [i.e., compliance] of the treaty.” Although Roe admitted that this may have been one of the motivations, he was of the opinion that the grand vizier, Mere Hüseyin Pasha, had some more secret reason.⁶ During the unstable rule of Sultan Mustafa, the way was open to many intrigues including those of Mehmed and Şahin Gerey, who had never given up their campaign to regain the Khanate’s throne. That the reason for the change was more one of personal intrigue than policy is confirmed by the Ottoman and Tatar chronicles. They divulge that Mehmed Gerey and Mere Hüseyin spent time together in exile at Rhodes and became close friends. And so, almost immediately upon Hüseyin’s appointment to the grand vizierate, Mehmed Gerey was released from Rhodes and pronounced khan of the Crimea.⁷ On 9/19 May 1623 Mehmed

⁵A. A. Novosel’skij, *Bor’ba Moskovskogo gosudarstva s tatarami v pervoj polovine XVII veka*, Moscow and Leningrad: Izdatel’stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1948, p. 86.

⁶*The Negotiations of Sir Thomas Roe in His Embassy to the Ottoman Porte, from the Year 1621-1628 Inclusive*, London, 1740, pp. 149-50.

⁷Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, 2, Istanbul: Ceride-i Havâdiş Matba’ası, 1287/1870-1871, p. 56; Seyyid Muhammed Rızâ, *Es-seb’u’s-siyyâr fi ahbâri mulûki tatar*, in *Asseb’ o-ssejjar ili Sem’ planet soderža-čij istoriju krymskix xanov* . . ., ed. Kazembek, Kazan: Imperatorskij kazanskij universitet, 1832; see also V. D. Smirnov, *Krymskoe Xanstvo pod verxovenstvom Otomanskoj porty do načala XVIII veka*, St. Petersburg, 1887, pp. 479-80; that Hüseyin Pasha was responsible for bringing Mehmed Gerey out of exile is also attested to by Ridvan Paşazade, *Tevarih-i Deşt*, p. 57.

Gerey arrived at Kefe with an escort of twelve galleys carrying many of his followers as well as Ottoman troops, and by 15/25 May he entered Bagçesaray.⁸ Although some expected that Canbeg Gerey would not give up the Khanate without a fight,⁹ he obediently surrendered his throne and was exiled to Rhodes.

Mehmed and the Northern Countries, 1623. The accession of a new khan to the Crimean throne always brought uncertainties to the relations between the Khanate and the northern powers since the terms of peace were based on the personal agreement between the khan and the Polish or Muscovite ruler. Thus with the change of khan it was necessary to send a diplomatic mission to Bagçesaray in order to reconfirm the peace and the level of gifts (*upominki* in the Polish sources, *pominki* in the Muscovite).¹⁰ For Moscow, the accession of Mehmed Gerey in 1623 was an uncertain development not only because of the usual questions of what the diplomatic line of the new khan would be, but also because of the projected improvement in Ottoman-Polish relations following Zbaraski's mission. Once they made peace with the Commonwealth, the Ottomans would try to deter the Crimean Tatars from mounting raids against the Commonwealth, and so, the Tatars would most likely seek to mount raids against Muscovy.¹¹ Despite these uncertainties,¹² in the first year of his reign Mehmed Gerey did not alter Crimean policy toward Muscovy and no raids were mounted against it. In July, envoys Ja. Daškov and V. Volkov arrived in the

⁸Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 108 (*Krymskie dela*). Thirteen galleys according to *Negotiations*, p. 150.

⁹*Negotiations*, p. 150.

¹⁰Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 106.

¹¹Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, pp. 106-107.

¹²Actually when Mehmed Gerey was appointed, an incident occurred that did not bode well for Moscow. In April 1623, as Kondyerv and Bormosov were preparing to sail from Istanbul, newly appointed Mehmed Gerey threatened them and demanded that they give him sabres. Eventually he boarded their ship and demanded that the diplomats come before him. When the diplomats complained to the grand vizier, he dismissed the incident, commenting that Mehmed Gerey did this out of "simplicity" and that he must have been "drunk." (Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 107 [*Tureckie dela*]).

Crimea to bring the annual *pominki*, which were only slightly greater than those delivered in the previous year to Canbeg Gerey. Although initially the khan expressed some dissatisfaction with the gifts, he accepted them and proceeded to swear the *šert'* to the tsar.¹³

When Mehmed Gerey arrived in the Crimea in May 1623, an envoy of the Commonwealth, Krzysztof Krauzowski, was in Bagčesaray on a mission to the previous khan. The envoy's diary relates the dialogue of the new khan's presumably first audience with him.¹⁴ In this meeting, Mehmed Gerey displayed outright hostility, which suggested that he would continue Canbeg Gerey's anti-Polish line, even though he was aware that Zbaraski had just concluded a peace with the Porte. The dialogue began with an argument between Mehmed Gerey and Krauzowski regarding the *upominki*. The khan, calling them "tribute," expressed his unhappiness with the failure of the Commonwealth to deliver them in the past years and cited Muscovy as an example of a good neighbor that paid the annual tribute. The envoy objected to the *upominki* being referred to as tribute, stating that they were voluntary payments made out of a desire for good relations, and that Muscovy paid them only to ransom its many captives.

Here an important point needs to be made about the annual payments which the Khanate expected from both of its northern neighbors in exchange for refraining from raiding them. During these years, the Crown, with its treasury perennially in a state of near bankruptcy, resisted paying the *upominki*, and used every excuse to avoid paying them (much to the consternation of noble landlords in the Ukraine whose possessions were affected by the raids). And Zygmunt III, with his ambitions in the north, which included

¹³ Although they arrived in July, the khan did not receive them as he was just about to go on campaign (see below); they were finally received by the khan when he was back in the Crimea in November (Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, pp. 110-11).

¹⁴ BJ 166, fol. 78a-79b (*Žerela do istoriji Ukrajiny-Rusi*, 8: *Materijaly do istoriji ukrajins'koji kosaččyny*, 1: *Dokumenty po rik 1631* ed. Ivan Krypjakovyč, Lviv: Naukove Tovarystvo imeni Ševčenko, 1908, no. 174, pp. 276-81).

the Swedish throne, was against diverting much needed funds toward the humiliating payments to the Khanate. Thus, the Crimea was constantly making demands that *upominki* unpaid in previous years be brought up to date. Because of the Crown's reluctance, even in times of relatively good relations, the Tatars had an excuse to mount raids against the Commonwealth.¹⁵ During the same years, Moscow went to great measures to assure relative calm on its southern borderlands as it prepared for war with the Commonwealth. Therefore it made the annual payments to the Khanate (*pominki*) regularly. For this reason, Mehmed and Şahin Gerey themselves went to great efforts to make sure that no major raids were mounted on the territories of Muscovy (even though, as will be seen below, the *kalga* was hostile to Moscow and planned eventually to go to war against it in alliance with the Commonwealth).¹⁶

Krauzowski continued that, as far as the Tatars were concerned, there could be no comparison between Muscovy and the Commonwealth, considering how badly the former had treated its Tatar and Muslim subjects and how well the latter treated its Lithuanian Tatars.¹⁷ Krauzowski maintained that all in all, the Khanate had no justified grievance against the Crown. In addition, in accordance with the peace between the Crown and Porte, there was to supposed be peace between former and the Khanate. To this, Mehmed Gerey replied truthfully that the recent raid against the Commonwealth was launched before he arrived and was the work of Kantemir. He then promised to punish Kantemir without delay and to deport all the Tatars from the Akkerman steppes.¹⁸ Although by the end of the

¹⁵See Myxajlo Hruševs'kyj, *Istoriija Ukrajiny-Rusy*, 7, Kiev, 1909; reprint ed., New York: Knyho-spilka, 1956, pp. 540-41.

¹⁶Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, pp. 122-24.

¹⁷As an example of the respect with which the Commonwealth treated its Tatar subjects, Krauzowski pointed to the fact that two Lithuanian Tatars were standing beside him, presumably as his aides (BJ fol. ; BJ [*Žerela*, 8, p. 276] omits the the word "two").

¹⁸In the course of this audience, the khan also complained about the unceasing Cossack attacks on his lands and on Ottoman domains (*Žerela*, 8, p. 279).

audience both Mehmed Gerey and Krauzowski promised that their respective sides would do nothing to upset the newly established peace, Krauzowski's mission did not bring about a significant improvement in Crimean-Crown relations.¹⁹

The Crimean Khanate and the Bucak Horde

Mehmed Gerey's Expedition to the Bucak, 1623. Indeed Khan Mehmed Gerey III's first significant act was to mount an expedition against Kantemir and the Bucak horde. This was a logical action for a khan intent on reestablishing the primacy of the Crimean Khanate in the Black Sea steppes. However it was upon orders from the Porte that the new khan proceeded against Kantemir. As related above, the removal of Kantemir was a *sine qua non* for peace, which the diplomats of the Commonwealth pressed for relentlessly. Even before the end of Zbaraski's embassy to the Porte, the grand vizier sent a letter in which he threatened Kantemir that he would lose his head if he did not stay within his boundaries.²⁰ More recently, Serebkowicz's continued insistence that without Kantemir's dismissal there could be no peace, coupled with the fact that in 1623 Kantemir's forces were raiding the Commonwealth without provocation, had compelled the Porte to take measures against him. Probably what finally prompted the Ottomans into action was Serebkowicz's offer to send Cossacks against Kantemir. To paraphrase his words, although the sultan had a great army, Kantemir with his 30,000 Tatars should not be underestimated and, after all, the treaty stipulated that the king should be an enemy to the sultan's enemy.²¹ Roe confirmed that the Ottomans viewed the envoy's offer of fraternal

¹⁹Bohdan Baranowski, *Polska a Tatarszczyzna w latach 1624-1629*, Łódź: Łódzkie Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1948, pp. 24-25.

²⁰Zbaraski, *Diariusz albo relatia X Jęo Mci Zbarawskiego koniuszego koronnego posła wielkiego do cesarza ottomanskiego w roku panskim 1622*, in *Osmanskaja imperija v pervoj četverti XVII veka. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov*, eds. X. M. Ibragimbejli, N. C. Rašba, Moscow: Izdatel'stvo «Nauka», Glavnaja redakcija vostočnoj literatury, 1984, pp. 102-48, esp. p. 129.

²¹LNB, Oss 201, p. 66.

aid via Cossack intervention as a serious threat and that it forced them to move quickly against Kantemir.²²

Orders to act against Kantemir were issued in June, and in addition to Khan Mehmed Gerey, they were also addressed to the Moldavian and Wallachian *voyvodas*, and various Ottoman frontier governors.²³ However it was the khan who was given the primary responsibility for removing Kantemir. In all the sources it is clear that the reason given for Kantemir's deposition was his illegal raids on the Commonwealth.²⁴

Despite the initial success of the Commonwealth's resolute diplomacy, Ottoman policy on Kantemir continued to waver. At the end of August, on the eve of the accession of Murad IV, Mere Hüseyin Pasha was deposed from the grand vizierate and replaced by Kemankeş 'Ali Pasha.²⁵ In a dispatch from the beginning of October, Roe informed that it was decided to forgive Kantemir and to restore him to the post of governor-general of Özi.²⁶ Serebkowicz saw the danger of a reversal on Kantemir and persistently lobbied before the new grand vizier against him. At first, 'Ali Pasha promised to follow the policy of the previous vizier and sent Mehmed Gerey an order to continue the campaign against Kantemir.²⁷ There are no details of this campaign, although it was a protracted one, as the

²²*Negotiations*, p. 170. At another audience, Serebkowicz's offer was taken as an offense to the prestige of the sultan (LNB, Oss 201, p. 67).

²³LNB, Oss 201, p. 66 (Serebkowicz's relation). No texts of these orders are available, and all that is known about them stems from references in foreign sources. According to Krauzowski's diary, the *çavuş* from Istanbul bearing the orders to move against Kantemir arrived in Bağçasaray on 24 June 1623 (Žerela, 8, p. 279). When Daškov and Volkov arrived in July 1623, the khan was still in his capital but was about to leave. According to the reports of the Muscovite envoys, he finally did set out at the end of June (Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 110) although, according to Krauzowski, the Khan did not send advance troops against Kantemir until July 4. Roe mentions the sultan's order in his dispatch from 9/19 August 1623 (*Negotiations*, p. 169-70).

²⁴Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 110; *Negotiations*, p. 170; Žerela, 8, p. 277.

²⁵İsmail Hami Danişmend, *İzahlı osmanlı tarihi kronolojisi*, 3: M. 1574-1703, H. 987-1115, Istanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1972, p. 322.

²⁶Dispatch of 3/13 October 1623 (*Negotiations*, p. 181).

²⁷LNB, Oss 201, p. 68 (Serebkowicz's relation).

khan did not return to the Crimea until the middle or late fall.²⁸ When Mehmed Gerey wrote to the Porte that he had succeeded in taking Kantemir prisoner, the reply was that Kantemir was now reappointed to his old position and that he should be escorted back to Silistre. Serebkowicz explained this turnabout as the result of Kantemir's secretly sending bribes to the new grand vizier and other officials at the Porte. Upon learning of this secret order, Serebkowicz lodged a severe protest with 'Ali Pasha. At first the grand vizier refused to budge, saying that this was the will of the sultan, but when the envoy went to the *mufti*, *kadı* 'askers, and other pashas, a meeting (*müşavere*) was called in which it was decided to let Kantemir's deposition stand.²⁹

According to Muscovite sources, Mehmed Gerey forced Kantemir to migrate, along with his 30,000 Tatars, to the region of the river Moločni Vody (today Moločna) in the so-called Kipcak steppe (*Deşt-i Kıpçak*) north of the Sea of Azov.³⁰ In a letter to Tomasz Zamoyski, the Kiev *wojewoda*, Crown hetman Stanisław Koniecpolski wrote that he had learned from his spy that the khan had driven away from the Bucak all the Tatars that had been living near Akkerman for the past forty years, along with their belongings.³¹ As Serebkowicz was about to leave Istanbul, he noted that a letter arrived from the khan stating that Kantemir was his prisoner and that he had driven all the Bucak Tatars to the Crimea and burned their houses and huts (*domy i szalasze*).³² It is impossible to say for certain what portion of the Bucak horde was forced to migrate east—whether this included Tatars of Dobrudja, Kili, and Bender, besides those of the Bucak, and whether these Tatars were

²⁸According to Novosel'skij's sources, until September or the end of October Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 110 [*Krymskie dela*]). However there is a Polish copy of a letter of Mehmed Gerey sent to Zygmunt III from near Akkerman dated 27 or 28 November 1623 (BJ 102, pp. 577-78; BJ 109, fol. 16a-17b; BK 333, fol. 191a-93a).

²⁹LNB, Oss 201, pp. 69-70.

³⁰Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 110 (*Krymskie dela*).

³¹14 October 1623, AGAD, AZ 341, p. 3.

³²LNB, Oss 201, p. 71.

driven to the Crimea or the Kipchak steppes or to both regions. The satisfaction and optimism on this occasion expressed by Koniecpolski, one of the great colonizers of the Ukrainian borderlands of the Commonwealth,³³ suggests that a substantial portion of the Bucak horde must have been deported in the fall of 1623. However, future events would show that the notion of forced migration *en masse* was prompted by hyperbolic assurances by the Ottomans and wishful thinking by the Poles. What was really at issue was the displacement of enough important Bucak Tatar clan chiefs and their forces, along with their supreme chief Kantemir, to reduce significantly cross-border incursions. In the coming years, the effectiveness of forced migration of the Bucak Tatars in assuring peace on the frontier would be a function of the number and the importance of the deported chiefs and their clans.

The pacification of the Bucak horde and the resulting Polish optimism for better relations with the Crimea notwithstanding, there was no immediate improvement in Crimean-Polish relations. According to the Muscovite sources, during Mehmed Gerey's campaign in the Bucak he was visited by Polish envoys who tried to convince him to ally himself with the Crown and go to war against Muscovy, so that the Tatars could regain Kazan, Astrakhan, and Siberia, while the Poles would put Władysław on the Muscovite throne. The khan was unreceptive to these overtures, and instead demanded that the Crown deliver the outstanding *upominki* for the last seven years.³⁴ The story of this Polish mission, which one of Mehmed Gerey's men told to Daškov and Volkov, is not corroborated in the Polish sources, and there may have been some exaggeration in the portrayal of Mehmed Gerey as a friend of Muscovy. Nevertheless, whether or not there was any such diplomatic approach and rebuff during Mehmed Gerey's Bucak campaign,

³³AZ 341, p. 3.

³⁴Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 110 (*Krymskie dela*). In a letter of Mehmed Gerey to Zygmunt dated 27 or 28 November 1623, there is a demand for *upominki* for the last two, rather than seven, years (BJ 102, pp. 577-78; BJ 109, fol. 16a-17b; BK 333, fol. 191a-93a).

events occurred which did nothing to improve, and could have easily completely derailed, Crimean-Crown relations. These were Zaporozhian raids on the Crimea during Mehmed Gerey's absence, as well as attacks by other subjects of the Commonwealth, which have already been mentioned above—a land raid led by hetman Dorošenko, an attack on Mehmed Gerey's forces at a crossing of the Dnieper as they were on their way to the Bucak, a raid led by Tyszkiewicz, going nearly to Bagçesaray, and a naval raid near Balaklava. Novosel'skij is of the opinion that these raids not only deterred Mehmed Gerey from a rapprochement with the Commonwealth, but also triggered large raids by both Bucak and Crimean forces.³⁵ Indeed in a letter to king Zygmunt sent from the Bucak on 27 or 28 November 1623, Mehmed Gerey warned that if the Cossacks did not cease their depredations, and if their boats were not burned, he would have sufficient cause for breaking the peace. However, despite the fact that the matter of the Cossacks appears again at the end of the letter along with other protests and admonitions, the general tone of the letter is constructive—Krauzowski's embassy is referred to as a step toward peace and friendship, the campaign against Kantemir is stressed as an undertaking for bringing peace in the region, and the letter ends with the usual “friend of friend and enemy of enemy” formula.³⁶ Thus the evidence on whether the Tatar raids after Mehmed Gerey's campaign were in direct retaliation to those of the Cossacks is not clear-cut.

As for the raid from the Bucak, it was mounted by a reported 15,000 Tatars into Galicia in January and February 1624. It was carried out by two main parties: One, led by a son of Kantemir, struck in the neighborhood of Čortkiv (Czortków), and the other, led by a certain ‘Ali Pasha, struck near Jazlovec’ (Jazłowiec). Even though the group led by Kantemir's son was thwarted by Stefan Chmielecki and Jan Dzik, overall, the Tatars brought back a decent haul of captives and managed to destroy and plunder seventy villages

³⁵Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, pp. 110-11.

³⁶BJ 102, pp. 577-78; BJ 109, fol. 16a-17b; BK 333, fol. 191a-93a.

and six small towns.³⁷ Although it may have been exaggerated, the naming of a figure of 15,000 Tatars implies that even though Mehmed Gerey may have deported Kantemir and a significant portion of his horde, the Bucak and surrounding lands were by no means emptied of Tatars. It may have been the case that in the few months after the deportation, many of the Bucak Tatars managed to slip out from under Crimean control and return to their old places. On 20 March 1624, Zygmunt III wrote a letter to Murad IV in which he made just such a contention: "a number of Tatars have returned to the Akkerman and Bender [regions] so as to infest our kingdom in the spring when the ice melts."³⁸ The only information about the other raid is found in the Muscovite sources. It was supposedly led by the *nureddin* Devlet Gerey. Cossack boats were burned at a crossing of the Dnieper, and captives were brought back without any opposition.³⁹ If indeed this raid involved a high member of the Crimean ruling dynasty and Crimean forces, it would have been a serious breach in the relations between the Khanate and Commonwealth.

Yet despite the continuing instability on the frontier, the diplomats of the Commonwealth and of the Porte continued their efforts toward normalizing relations. By the end of 1623, Serebkowicz had obtained a corrected version of the sultan's *'ahdname* and was on his way back to Warsaw with an Ottoman envoy by the name of 'Abdi Çavuş. In early April 1624, Zygmunt III sent the Ottoman *çavuş* back to the Porte. With him went his new envoy, Krzysztof Kielczewski, who carried the Crown's confirmation (*rewersał*) of the *'ahdname* as well as the letter to Murad IV from 20 March just cited. The

³⁷Maurycy Horn, "Chronologia i zasięg najazdów tatarskich na ziemię Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w latach 1600-1647," *Studia i materiały do historii wojskowości* 8: 2 (1962): 3-71. esp. pp. 44-45 (*Księgi Grodzkie Halickie, Buskie, Lwowskie, Trembowelskie*); Aleksander, Czołowski, "Dwa dyaryusze najazdów tatarskich na Ruś w r. 1618 i 1624," *Kwartalnik historyczny* 6 (1892): 93-99; *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiej. Dokumenty v trëx tomax*, 1: 1620-1647, Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk, 1953, no. 21, pp. 45-46 (*Księgi Grodzkie Halickie*). Hruševs'kyj and Baranowski are apparently mistaken in ascribing this raid to Kantemir, who was at this time in the custody of Mehmed Gerey (Hruševs'kyj, *Istoriya*, 7, p. 517; Baranowski, *Polska a Tatarszczyzna*, p. 22).

³⁸AGAD, LL 30, fol. 10b-11a; BK 333, fol. 173a-75b; BJ 109, fol 29a-32a.

³⁹Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 110-11 (*Krymskie dela*).

rewersaŭ),⁴⁰ letter, and Kielczewski's instructions⁴¹ reflect Warsaw's dismay with the recent raid by the Bucak Tatars. At this juncture, there emerged a more intransigent line in the Commonwealth's diplomacy toward the Porte. In the past, the tendency was to promise to prevent the Cossacks from raiding in return for the Ottomans pledging the same with respect to the Tatars. In effect, a basic equivalency in the threats posed by the two frontier dwellers had been recognized. Now the Crown alleged that it could do nothing about the Cossack naval raids until the Ottomans first curbed the Tatar incursions. Two none too original reasons were given. First, because of the Tatar incursions, the population of the Cossacks had grown, "for when peasants who engaged in farming lost their children, wives, homes, and all their wealth, they had to head for Cossacks—the Tatars themselves forced them into vengeance." Second, the raiding Tatar armies did not allow the Crown's army to go after the Cossacks "to the nests from which [they] went out to sea . . ."; "... as was the case in the past, so too now . . . the army was sent against the Cossacks only to learn that the Tatars were raiding."⁴² In the event that Cossack raids occurred while Kielczewski was at the Porte, the envoy was instructed to insist that the Tatars caused many times more damage than the Cossacks since they came to the sea in forces of several hundred men whereas the Tatars raided in forces of several tens of thousands.⁴³ Of course as stated, the comparison was dubious, with the Cossack threat understated (100 men amounted to only two *čajkas* or so) and the Tatar threat overstated (the total number of Tatars on the frontier may have numbered in the tens of thousands;

⁴⁰AGAD, LL 30, fol. 30a-35b (1 April 1624). An excerpted version of the *rewersaŭ* relating to Moldavian affairs is in *Documente privitoare la istoria României culese din arhivele polone. Secolul al XVII-lea*, ed. Ilie Corfus, Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1983, no. 57, pp. 115-17.

⁴¹AGAD, LL 30, fol. 13a-15a; BK 333, fol. 168a-71a; BJ 109, 53b-56b. An excerpted version of the instruction relating to Moldavian affairs is in *Documente . . . XVII* (Corfus), no. 54, p. 113.

⁴²AGAD, LL 30, fol. 13b. See also BJ 109, fol 31b.

⁴³AGAD, LL 30, fol. 14b-15a.

rarely if ever were their raiding expeditions of such size).⁴⁴ As will become evident below, this shift in the Commonwealth's posture did not go unnoticed at the Porte.

The Ottoman Campaign to the Crimea of 1624

Mehmed Gerey appears to have been in the good graces of the Ottomans until they learned that the arrival of his brother Şahin Gerey from Iran and his appointment as *kalga* were imminent. More than a month before Şahin Gerey's arrival at the Crimea, it was already well-known in Istanbul that he was on his way—as early as 3/13 April 1624, Roe reported this in one of his dispatches.⁴⁵ Thus when Şahin Gerey arrived on 9/19 May,⁴⁶ the Porte had already decided to reinstall Canbeg Gerey on the Crimean throne, and was in the process of preparing a naval force to this end. Aside from Şahin's reputation, the fact that he was coming with the permission of Shah 'Abbas, and with an escort of *kızılbaş* troops (2,000, according to some Muscovite sources),⁴⁷ meant that Şahin Gerey, and because of him, also Mehmed Gerey, would not be tolerated as *kalga* and khan of the Crimea. There was a concerted effort on the part of Canbeg Gerey to intrigue against the two brothers—it was probably from him that rumors originated to the effect that Mehmed Gerey and Şahin Gerey were planning to take advantage of the disarray in the capital, capture Edirne, and ultimately topple and replace the Ottoman dynasty.⁴⁸

⁴⁴In 1623 Serebkowicz used the same argument at the Porte when confronted with the occurrence of a Cossack raid (LNB, Oss 201, p. 71).

⁴⁵*Negotiations*, p. 231.

⁴⁶Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 111 (*Krymskie dela*)

⁴⁷Rıdvan Paşazade, *Tevarah-i Dest*, p. 59; Katib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, 56; Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 111 (*Krymskie dela*); cf. a report of the Putivl' voevoda to Moscow which states that Şahin Gerey arrived after Easter in 1624 with only 70 retainers (*Materjaly*, p. 159).

⁴⁸Na'ima, *Tarih*, 2, p. 331.

On 21/31 May 1624,⁴⁹ a mere thirteen days after Şahin's arrival in the Crimea,⁵⁰ Canbeg Gerey and his brothers Devlet Gerey and 'Azamet Gerey landed at Kefe to be installed as khan, *kalga*, and *nureddin*, respectively. They were accompanied by a force of janissaries on twelve⁵¹ or thirteen⁵² galleys headed by İbrahim Pasha, the brother of the powerful Mustafa Aga, chief of the white eunuchs of the palace (*kapu agası*). According to Katib Çelebi, who gives a slightly different version, Canbeg Gerey was sent ahead with four galleys with vizier Hasan Pasha as commander (*serdar*) and with *kapuçı başı* Mustafa.⁵³ The rest of the fleet was left in Varna. When they arrived in Kefe, they found Mehmed and Şahin Gerey waiting outside Kefe with the Tatar army. Faced with this situation, they immediately sent a galley back to Istanbul asking for reinforcements.⁵⁴ On 15/25 May, Roe reported that ten more galleys were sent (either from Varna or the capital) to reinforce the original thirteen galleys sent to install Canbeg Gerey.⁵⁵

By the time the first Ottoman ships left for the Crimea, the Cossacks had already opened that year's raiding season. In April, 1,500 Don and Zaporozhian Cossacks went out from the Don River on 55 boats under the command of a certain Zaporozhian named Dem"jan. According to the Muscovite sources, this raid was in response to a raid, albeit an

⁴⁹Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 111 (*Krymskie dela*).

⁵⁰Letter of Şahin Gerey to Zygmunt III, 19 August 1624 (Seweryn Gołębiowski, "Şahin Giraj i Kozacy," *Biblioteka warszawska* 1852, no. 2: 1-27, esp. p. 17; Alexander Baran, "Şahin Girai of the Crimea and the Zaporozhian Cossacks," *Jubilee Collection of the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences*, Winnipeg: UVAN, 1976: 15-33, esp. p. 26).

⁵¹Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 111 (*Krymskie dela*).

⁵²Dispatch of 1/11 May 1624 (*Negotiations*, p. 236).

⁵³De Cesy confirms the presence of a *kapuçı başı*, but also mentions a *kadı* and *mufti*, dispatch of 1 September 1624 (*Historica Russiae monumenta/Akty istoričeskie otnosjaščiesja k Rossii*, 2, ed. A. I. Turgenev, St. Petersburg: Tipografija Eduarda Praca, 1842, p. 427).

⁵⁴Katib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, p. 56-57; *Negotiations*, p. 247. The aforementioned 31 May date of the Muscovite sources may have been the date not of the arrival of Canbeg but of the fleet commanded by İbrahim Paşa.

⁵⁵*Negotiations*, p. 241.

unsuccessful one, in December 1623 by the Azovites and headed by a certain Turk called Hasan Beg (Asanbej) on a Don Cossack town by the name of Manyč. In the “reprisal” raid, however, the Cossacks entered the Crimea from the Sea of Azov and sacked the town of Eski Krim (today Stryj Krym). Thereupon the Cossacks raided a number of *uluses* in the vicinity of Kerč. Then, when the Don Cossacks returned to the Don, the Zaporozhians returned to their original home on the Dnieper.⁵⁶ From the other side, 80 Zaporozhian boats entered the Black Sea from the Dnieper and seized a village near Kefe, killing many Tatars.⁵⁷ The presence of Cossacks proved also to be an impediment to the ships designated to sail to the aid of Ottoman Crimea. According to Roe, as soon as the first galleys entered the Black Sea, they met a small *kara mürsel* from which it was learned that there were 40 Cossack boats ahead of them. Upon hearing this, the janissaries on the galleys mutinied and forced the commander to retreat back into the Bosphorus until more men were supplied.⁵⁸ Word of the Cossack presence in the Black Sea also reached the capital from Kefe. On 1/11 May, Roe reported the following alarming and undoubtedly somewhat exaggerated news:

The city of Caffa having sent their mufti and other commissioners to inform the grand vizier that 400 boats of Cossacks are abroad, that they have done great spoils on the coast of Tartaria, and of this empire, and taken many ships laden with provisions for the port [i.e., Istanbul]; and 40,000 more armed and horsed, ready for some land attempt, which hath put all those

⁵⁶*Istoričeskoe opisanie zemli Vojska donskogo*, 1, Novočerkassk: Izdanie Vojskovogo Statističeskogo Komiteta, 1869, pp. 185-87 (*Krymskie dela*). On the return sail, the Don flotilla lost twelve boats in a storm.

⁵⁷De Cesy, dispatch of 12 May 1624 (*Historica Russiae*, p. 426). The French ambassador also reported that the Poles and Cossacks had an army large enough to enter the Crimea by land and enough well-armed boats to prevent anyone from escaping the Crimea, which allegedly caused a great sensation in Istanbul.

⁵⁸*Negotiations*, p. 242.

parts in great fear; [because of this the inhabitants of Kefe] have desired that present care and provision might be taken and ordered for their defense.⁵⁹

Indeed from the available accounts it is clear that the Ottomans, anxious to unseat Mehmed and Şahin Gerey as soon as possible, were hard-pressed to gather sufficient forces for the task. Earlier in the year, Bagdad had fallen to the Safavids, and a few months before, Abaza Pasha, the governor of Erzurum, had again revolted against the central government. Meanwhile, the grand vizier, Çerkes Mehmed Pasha, was preparing an expedition to eastern Anatolia.⁶⁰ At the same time, the main imperial fleet under the command of the newly appointed grand admiral Receb Pasha was preparing to set out for the Mediterranean. Upon receipt of the request for aid from the force sent to the Crimea, Receb Pasha and the imperial fleet were ordered to sail to Kefe.⁶¹ However, because of the troubles in the empire, the fleet was very weak that year: The grand admiral had few galleys to start with for his originally planned expedition in the Mediterranean, and at that point, hardly any of the oarsmen (*kürekçi*) or *levends* usually sent each year from Anatolia had arrived. These circumstances delayed Receb's departure for over a month.⁶²

On 1/11 May, about the same time that the grand admiral was ordered into the Black Sea, Roe reported that Bayram Pasha was ordered to prepare with haste to depart for the north by land within six days in order to defend against possible incursions by the Tatars, Cossacks, or even the Poles. It is possible his post, described as "general of the frontier begs of Wallachia upon the Danube [with] residence at Razgrad (Hezargrad) or Özi," was

⁵⁹*Negotiations*, p. 236.

⁶⁰Joseph Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, 5, Pest: C. A. Hartleben's Verlage, 1829, pp. 26-32.

⁶¹*Negotiations*, p. 236; Katib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, p. 57; a report by the papal nuncio in Venice also recounts that because of the large numbers of Cossacks on the Black Sea, the fleet was forced to abandon its mission to the Mediterranean and head for the Black Sea (dispatch of 29 June 1624, *Litterae Nuntiorum Apostolicorum historiae Ucrainae illustrantes (1550-1850)*, 4: 1609-1620, ed. Athanasius G. Welykyj, Rome: Basiliani, 1959, no. 1703, p. 127).

⁶²Roe, dispatch of 15/25 May 1624 (*Negotiations*, p. 242).

that of governor-general of Özi.⁶³ On 15/25 May, Roe reported that Bayram Pasha finally departed with 4,000 troops. He was to raise new forces on the way to prevent any action from the Cossacks, who were reportedly massed along the border in the exaggerated figure of 40,000.⁶⁴ In the following passage, Sir Thomas Roe gives an apt description of the Ottomans' predicament:

It appears then, that this empire is environed with many enemies, and more fears: they seldom or never willingly have had two actions in hand at once; yet in this extremity they have set out three armies; one under Biram bassa, for caution, upon the frontier of Poland and Tartaria; another to the Black Sea to make guard against the invasion of the Cossacks; a third, and the greatest for the opposition to the Persian; and they prepare two more, one for the Mediterranean; the other for [Betlen] Gabor . . .⁶⁵

According to the English ambassador, the desperate attempts of the Ottomans to buttress their military strength demonstrated "how the troubles of Tartary do affect this state." Resolute to impose his will upon the Crimea, the sultan sent orders to all the governors (*sancakbegi*) on the Danube and to the *voyvodas* of Moldavia and Wallachia to mobilize all of their troops to the aid of the outnumbered and in effect besieged Ottoman forces in the Crimea.⁶⁶

In the meantime, at Kefe, both sides avoided decisive action. Mehmed Gerey and his *begs* and *mirzas* moved back to Karasu, while Şahin Gerey with his followers and with the *nrreddin* besieged Canbeg Gerey in Kefe. Apparently, Mehmed Gerey hoped for a

⁶³*Negotiations*, pp. 236, 242; 23 May and with 3,000 troops according to de Cesy (dispatch of 26 May 1624, *Historica Russiae*, p. 426). Roe makes an interesting note on the military situation: Doubtless in connection with the mutinous state of the janissaries at this time, Bayram Pasha refused to have any of them "or others of these orders [i.e., *kapukulu*]," but rather wanted "segmen (*sekbân*) or hired soldiers."

⁶⁴Roe, dispatch of 15/25 1624 (*Negotiations*, p. 241).

⁶⁵Roe, dispatch of 15/25 1624 (*Negotiations*, p. 243).

⁶⁶Roe, dispatch of 12/22 1624 (*Negotiations*, p. 247).

peaceful resolution. For example, the Muscovite sources inform us that during this time the khan sent the sultan a son and 300 "Lithuanian" captives as a gesture of good will with the hope that he would change his mind.⁶⁷ During this period of waiting, the two sides skirmished (Roe reported about 2,000 slain on both sides). Initially, when Canbeg Gerey landed, he was met by a large force of the incumbent khan, and thus the commander of the Ottoman galleys had to land both the janissaries, whose number did not exceed 4,000 men, and the artillery.⁶⁸ Katib Çelebi relates that Canbeg installed himself in a suburb (*varoş*) of Kefe at the house of a certain 'Ali Kadi, having brought from the city some of its artillery.⁶⁹ Roe related that when it was realized at the Porte that a war could break out with the recalcitrant khan, an order was sent to Kefe to withdraw, but before it arrived, the first military encounters had occurred and it then became a point of the sultan's honor to install Canbeg Gerey.⁷⁰

Şahin Gerey was not only the main reason the Ottomans put themselves into a difficult situation in the Crimea, but was in fact, with his great ambition and political and military ability, the primary mover on the Tatar side. Although he was the *kalga* in name, *de facto*, he was the khan. His relationship with his brother Mehmed Gerey must have been close, and there is not the slightest indication that he considered doing away with his less talented brother in order to become khan himself. In Crimean politics, where dynastic strife was endemic, such behavior would not have been surprising. It is no wonder that in both Muscovite and Polish documents, Şahin Gerey is at times referred to as khan.⁷¹

⁶⁷Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 112.

⁶⁸*Negotiations*, p. 247.

⁶⁹Katib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, p. 57.

⁷⁰Roe, dispatch of 12/22 June 1624 (*Negotiations*, p. 247-48). Roe relates that on 11/21 June the sultan issued an order that Canbeg Gerey would be upheld and to this end the imperial divan met and resolved to send supplies and either the grand admiral or the *voyvodas* of Moldavia and Wallachia.

⁷¹Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 107.

The Muscovite sources, valuable for their information on Crimean internal affairs, portray Şahin Gerey as an extremely popular figure amongst the lower orders of the Khanate, whom he favored over the upper orders of the tribal aristocracy. Şahin was particularly harsh with his old enemies, those members of the Crimean elite who supported Canbeg Gerey. For his brutal reprisal against them he earned the title *Yavuz*, “the Grim.”⁷² Kirill Bajbirin, a Muscovite messenger who was in the Crimea in 1624, described how the khan and *kalga* dealt with notables suspected of disloyalty and whom the Ottomans could use against the two brothers: “The *kalga* thought of dividing [the upper classes] in two. The elders he sent to the regiment of the khan, while their children he took into his regiment. And he told all of them that they had better serve faithfully for if the father leaves, he will hang the son and if the son leaves, he will hang the father.”⁷³

By far the most original and brilliant move of Şahin Gerey was to obtain military support from an age-old enemy of the Crimean Khanate—namely, the Zaporozhian Cossacks. The decisive role of this combination in the confrontation with the Porte has been appreciated by previous historians, most notably by Hruševs’kyj and later by Novosel’skij.⁷⁴ The significance of the Zaporozhians will be elaborated upon as the events that unfolded are recounted. As for the origin of Şahin Gerey’s relations with the Cossacks, on this there are no explicit sources. Hruševs’kyj offers his hunch that the participation of the Zaporozhians on the side of Mehmed and Şahin Gerey must have been prepared in the spring of 1624, if not earlier.⁷⁵ If such was the case, it must have been done in great secrecy, since there is no hint of negotiations in the sources of Poland-

⁷² Abdü'l-gaffār, *‘Umdetü’l-tevârih*, ed. Necib ‘Âsım, Istanbul: 1343/1924-1925 (=Türk Târih Encümeni Mecmû‘ası no. 85, suppl. 2/, p. 118.

⁷³ Novosel’skij, *Bor’ba*, p. 111 (*Krymskie and Tureckie dela*).

⁷⁴ Hruševs’kyj, *Istorija*, 7, pp. 512 ff; Novosel’skij, *Bor’ba*, pp. 112-15.

⁷⁵ Hruševs’kyj, *Istorija*, 7, pp. 512 ff.

Lithuania, which would have been greatly alarmed at the potential harm Crimean-Cossack relations could have brought to the peace with the Ottoman Empire. Novosel'skiĭ implicitly rejects early contacts with the Cossacks by virtue of the fact that the Muscovite sources and some Cossack testimonies maintain that such contacts were solely the doing of Şahin Gerey, who arrived in the Crimea only in May 1624.⁷⁶ Other sources tend to support the supposition that Cossack aid was Şahin's idea. An Ottoman, Ridvan Paşazade, and an Italian, d'Ascoli—both contemporary inhabitants of the Crimea and perhaps even eyewitnesses to these events—give the impression that Şahin Gerey turned to the Cossacks when he realized he would be facing a substantial Ottoman force.⁷⁷

Aside from any traditional Cossack-Tatar contacts or any dealings that Şahin Gerey may have had during the first decade and a half of the seventeenth century when he was at various periods in the Crimea or on the steppes of Akkerman,⁷⁸ it is likely that during his exile in Iran he was exposed to the idea of cooperation and even alliance with the Zaporozhian Cossacks. It has been established on the basis of the letters of Pietro della Valle, the Italian traveller and agent of the Shah 'Abbas, as well as on the testimony of papal envoys, that during the Ottoman-Safavid war of 1617-1618, the shah was interested in enrolling on his side the Zaporozhians and even received a Cossack envoy to this end.⁷⁹

⁷⁶Novosel'skiĭ, *Bor'ba*, p. 114.

⁷⁷Ridvan Paşazade, *Tevarih-i Deşt*, p. 61; [Emiddio Dortelli d'Ascoli], "Opisanie Černogo morja i Tatarii sostavil dominikanec Emiddio Dortelli d'Ascoli, prefekt Kaffy, Tatarii i proč. 1634," ed. A. Berthier-Delagard, *Zapiski Odesskogo obščestva istorii i drevnostej* 24 (1902): 89-170, esp. 108.

⁷⁸Certainly as a Tatar warrior and raider he was aware of the military capabilities of the Cossacks, albeit as his adversaries.

⁷⁹Peace was concluded between the Safavids and Ottomans before the plan could be put into effect. On the plans to enroll the Zaporozhian Host in an anti-Ottoman league, see Jaroslav Daškevyč, "Ukrajins'ko-irans'ki perehovory naperedodni Xotyns'koji vijny," *Ukrajins'kyj istoryčnyj žurnal* 1972, no. 9: 124-31; [Pietro della Valle], *Kozac'ko-pers'ki vzajemyny v tvorax Pijetra della Valle*, ed. Oleksander Baran, Winnipeg: Nakladom Ukrajins'koji vil'noji akademiji nauk, 1985; *Litterae Nuntiorum*, 4, pp. 156-61; Oleksander Baran, "Şax Abbas Velykyj i zaporožci," *Ukrajins'kyj istoryk* 1977, no. 1-2: 50-54. Oleksander Baran's contention that it was Şahin Gerey who tried to convince the shah to hire 10,000 to 12,000 Cossacks is based on information gained by the papal nuncio in Warsaw from the Polish vice-chancellor, H. Firlej, to the effect that the shah's military advisor urged him to take on these Cossacks

However, the evidence that Şahin Gerey was privy to these plans is entirely circumstantial: although on the one hand, these plans were kept secret, on the other hand, Şahin was a court favorite of Shah 'Abbas.

Other circumstantial evidence has been used to suggest when the Zaporozhian Cossacks actually began cooperating with Mehmed and Şahin Gerey. Hruševs'kyj suggests the possibility that the raid near Kefe, recorded by the French ambassador to the Porte on 12 May 1624 (see above), was the first Zaporozhian expedition carried out on behalf of the two brothers.⁸⁰ In 1625 when the Zaporozhians were answering for their actions to a state commission (see below), they claimed that there was absolutely no previous agreement between them and two Gereids; that during a joint expedition on the Black Sea with the Don Cossacks, they were carried ashore by rough seas and, finding themselves in a tough predicament, could not refuse the request to enter into the service of Mehmed and Şahin Gerey. In other words, the relationship came about entirely by accident. Only later after the struggle with the Turks, when Şahin Gerey dismissed them with honor and gave them some Christian captives to take back with them, did friendship with the *kalga* develop. Hruševs'kyj discounts this version of events as being hardly plausible.⁸¹ Obviously this story may have been concocted to deflect the accusation made by the authorities in late 1625 that the Zaporozhians had engaged in contacts with foreign powers.

The available evidence suggests that prior to and during the events of the summer of 1624 in the Crimea, there was no formal treaty or agreement between Şahin Gerey and the

(dispatch of 23 March 1618, Warsaw, *Litterae Nuntiorum*, 3, no. 1224, p. 158). However, on the basis of vague references from chronicles Baran assumes that this unnamed military advisor was none other than Şahin Gerey (Baran, "Şax Abbas," pp. 51, 53; also Baran, "Shahin Girai," p. 17).

⁸⁰Hruševs'kyj, *Istoriia*, 7, p. 513. However, it is not clear that this raid was mounted specifically against Ottoman interests in the Crimea as in this relation, de Cesy states that the Cossacks killed many Tatars (*Historica Russiae*, p. 426).

⁸¹Hruševs'kyj, *Istoriia*, 7, p. 513. Baran's contention that Şahin Gerey enticed the Cossacks by freeing several hundred Cossack prisoners and offering them part of the booty in exchange for fighting on his side is not borne out in the document that he cites (Baran, "Shahin Girai," p. 17).

Cossacks. If there was some formal act, it is hard to imagine that such a momentous event would not have had some resonance in the sources, whether Ottoman, Polish, or Muscovite (an agreement that was reached later left traces in the sources, see below). From what is known of the Zaporozhians as a mercenary force, it seems most plausible that the initial force that participated on the side of Mehmed and Şahin Gerey was hired either for pay or by promise of booty. As far as specific references to compensation received by the Cossacks, the contemporary Crimean Ottoman chronicler Ridvan Paşazade stated that “the sheep and cattle of the Tatars were requisitioned for provisions of the Cossacks. The Tatars were completely disgusted by this—the burdens by the unruly Cossacks exhausted their strength.”⁸²

Sometime in the first half of 1624, a crucial event occurred which escaped notice in all the sources, namely, Kantemir returned back to the Bucak. The earliest hint that Kantemir escaped is found in a letter from Koniecpolski to T. Zamoyski, dated 11 May 1624, in which Kantemir is said to have a significant army in the Bucak and to be making plans to avenge the death of one of his sons, that is, making plans for a raid on the Commonwealth.⁸³ Thus it would seem that Kantemir had slipped out of the Crimea even before the break of the Ottomans with Mehmed and Şahin Gerey. It would have been surprising if, while still in full control of the Crimea, Mehmed Gerey had allowed him to leave the Crimea with his forces. Perhaps Kantemir escaped first, and later when the first encounters with the Ottomans occurred, his Tatars were able to migrate back. In any event, it did not take long for Kantemir to lead the Bucak Tatars on a raid against the Commonwealth: on 5 June, Kantemir himself crossed into Galicia near Stepanec’ (Stepanców) and for the next few days his detachments proceeded to plunder the Stryj,

⁸²Ridvan Paşazade, *Tevarah-i Deşt*, p. 61.

⁸³AZ 341, p. 7-8 (original).

Peremyśl (Przemyśl), Lviv and Sanok lands.⁸⁴ On 10 June, Kantemir wrote an abusive and threatening letter to Zygmunt III from near Peremyśl', which has been preserved in the original as well as in translation copy. Kantemir recalled how after Xotyn', the king made promises he had not kept to render gifts to the Porte (*hazine ve bac*, but not *harac*) and to restrain the Cossacks. If the king were to keep his promises, Kantemir claimed that he had the power to prevent the Tatars from raiding Poland, but if the Cossacks continued to sail out into the Black Sea, he promised to send out hundreds of thousands of the sultan's *kuls* all over Poland, as far as the Baltic Sea, even without the consent of the Porte.⁸⁵ However, on the return from Galicia, Koniecpolski routed Kantemir's forces near Martynow by the Dniester.⁸⁶

On 26 June/6 July 1624 grand admiral Receb finally set sail for the Crimea with sixteen galleys.⁸⁷ By this time Mehmed and Şahin Gerey's forces had grown into an overwhelming force⁸⁸ that had driven Canbeg Gerey onto the Ottoman galleys at Kefe.⁸⁹ When Receb Pasha arrived at Kefe (the date is not known), he chose at first to continue negotiations. The Ottoman chronicles report the contents of several letters between the two sides. Prior to Receb Pasha's arrival, an attempt was made to appeal to the Tatar Muslim

⁸⁴Horn, "Chronologia," pp. 43-47.

⁸⁵AGAD, Dz. turecki, k 73, t 309, nr 594; summary in *Katalog dokumentów tureckich: Dokumenty do dziejów Polski i krajów ościennych w latach 1455-1672*, ed. Zygmunt Abrahamowicz, Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1959, no. 263, pp. 255-56; *Pamiętniki o Koniecpolskich*. [Ed. Stanisław Przyłęcki. Lwów: np, nd], pp. 252-53.

⁸⁶For references to published sources on this battle see Baranowski, *Polska a Tatarszczyzna*, p. 22, n. 24. Roe relates that Kantemir lost two thirds of his forces here (dispatch of 24 July 1624, *Negotiations*, p. 265).

⁸⁷*Negotiations*, p. 255. The total size of the fleet at Kefe was about 30 galleys (de Cesy, dispatch of 21 July 1624, *Historica Russiae*, p. 426; Roe, dispatch of 21/31 August 1624, *Negotiations*, p. 268).

⁸⁸Roe speaks of 70,000 Tatar cavalry while Katib Çelebi merely mentions thousands of Nogays. The exaggerated figures aside, the Tatar force must have been large. (*Negotiations*, p. 255; Katib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, p. 57).

⁸⁹*Negotiations*, p. 255.

clergy. An order (*hükûm-i hümayun*) from the Porte came to Abu Bekr, *mufti* of the Tatars, and to other Crimean Tatar *'ulema*, urging them to convince the Tatars to oppose Şahin Gerey and obey grand admiral Receb.⁹⁰ Then Receb Pasha sent a series of politely-phrased letters to Mehmed and Şahin Gerey promising to give them, in exchange for surrendering and dissolving their army, a choice of governorship of the districts (*sancak*) of Hersek (Hercegovina) or Buda (Morea in Na'ima).⁹¹

In reply, Şahin Gerey sent an impassioned letter in which he complained that he had been in power only five to ten days when, because of gossip and rumors spread by some corrupt individuals, the order against him was promulgated.⁹² Next he listed some of the Tatar and Nogay chiefs and troops willing to join them: four or five Tatar *mirzas* with 2,000 to 3,000 troops, brothers of Kantemir with 5,000 troops from Akkerman, the *mirzas* of Yusuf Oğlu that had already arrived, and 'Ali Mirza and all the Nogay *mirzas* and other princes (*sultan-zades*) numbering up to 15,000 men (10,000 in Na'ima) who had already crossed the Straits of Kerch (*Taman Geçidi*) and were to arrive presently. In addition, Şahin Gerey announced that his side had ready plentiful cannon, and muskets. Finally Şahin Gerey made his own justification for rule in the Crimean Khanate, which included an appeal to Islamic principles: Because his forefathers took this land from the infidel and ruled it by their strength, the Ottomans had no right to come and take away what was his and his brother's hereditary right. If they did, the Crimea would be left to the infidels who would come and also destroy its mosques and *medreses*, as well as Kefe and

⁹⁰Katib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, p. 57; translated in Smirnov, *Krymskoe Xanstvo*, pp. 483-84.

⁹¹Katib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, p. 57; Na'ima, *Tarih*, 2, p. 332.

⁹²In a similar vein, the Muscovite sources report the words of the two brothers that they were fighting "because of the disgrace" rendered by the sultan who wanted to remove them from the Crimea "before they even had a chance to change their shirts." (Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 112 [*Krymskie dela*]); cf a similar statement in Şahin Gerey's letter to Zygmunt III (Gołęblowski, "Şahin Giraj," p. 17; Baran, "Şahin Girai," p. 26).

the other Ottoman fortresses in the Crimea.⁹³ To this Receb Pasha replied that prior petitions of Şahin Gerey had already been passed along to the padishah, that they were discussed at a *müşavere* of the *şeyhü'l-islam* and other 'ulema and viziers, and that he was being sent here to carry out their decision which was the final word in the matter.⁹⁴

These negotiations went on for several weeks along with minor encounters in the field.⁹⁵ Finally Receb Pasha and Canbeg Gerey sallied forth from Kefe with all of their forces for a showdown. There are two different versions of the encounter, although the outcome is the same. The simpler one, recorded under 2/12 August 1624 in the *statejnyj spisok* of Muscovite envoys Daškov and Volkov, is related by Novosel'skij. According to it, Canbeg Gerey with his princes, and the Ottoman commanders with 6,000 troops, went forth from Kefe and formed a wagon camp. Mehmed and Şahin Gerey, with all of their forces, including the Cossacks, stormed and broke the camp apart, destroying the Ottoman army and "pushing it into the sea." In this total defeat many Tatar notables on the side of Canbeg Gerey and some Ottoman commanders surrendered. All the artillery, consisting of 33 cannons, was also captured. Canbeg Gerey and Receb Pasha, together with the surviving Ottoman troops, fled on the galleys to Varna. Meanwhile, Kefe fell and was occupied by Şahin Gerey, while Mehmed Gerey returned to Bağcesaray. In Kefe, Şahin Gerey put a Tatar pasha in charge.⁹⁶

The second and more elaborate version is recorded in Katib Çelebi's *Fezleke*. According to it, when Receb Pasha finally decided to make a move, he first procured wagons because it was necessary to carry all the army's water in barrels. The main

⁹³Katib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, p. 57-58; Na'ima, *Tarih*, 2, pp. 332-33; Na'ima translated in Smirnov, *Krymskoe Xanstvo*, pp. 484-85.

⁹⁴Katib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, p. 58.

⁹⁵Although not for two months as the Ottoman chronicle claims (Katib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, p. 58). In one of these encounters, the grand admiral is said to have sent Canbeg Gerey ashore only to have him beaten back and injured (*Negotiations*, pp. 256-57).

⁹⁶Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, pp. 112-13 (*Krymskie dela*).

cannons were removed from the ships and ten falconets (*darbzen*) were taken from the fortress of Kefe and dragged along the way by the galley oarsmen (*kürekçi*). Canbeg Gerey urged the army on, promising that any day the Tatars would come over to his side and that it would be necessary to march only one or two days into the hinterland. After camping at the end of their third day's march, the army of Canbeg Gerey and Receb Pasha was beset by Mehmed and Şahin Gerey's forces, described by the chronicler as having "up to 100,000 Nogay Tatars, 800 musket-bearing (*nügeng-endaz*) Cossacks, and an additional 1,000 footsoldiers (*piyade*)."⁹ A firefight continued until nightfall. As the Ottoman forces dug into trenches, the opposing Tatars surrounded them, cutting off all exits. In the besieged camp a council of war was held, and it was decided that the only chance for survival was to have the commander in chief, grand admiral Receb, send robes of honor (*hil'at*) to Mehmed Gerey along with a letter admitting that they were wrong in opposing him and recognizing that indeed it was the will of the Tatars that he be khan. But before this could be done, Canbeg Gerey, fearing that he would be overturned, fled for Kefe with his retinue and brother Devlet Gerey. When the besieging forces noticed this, they followed in pursuit, whereupon the more than thousand galley slaves, in leg irons and harnessed to the cannons, also attempted to flee. These latter were easily picked off by the Tatars and thus the cannons and wagons remained where they had been parked, useless to the defending forces. Then a general flight ensued which led to a great slaughter of many infantry troops, including janissaries, *cebecis*, and *'azebs*, as well as a great looting of goods and armaments. The Tatars even seized the grand admiral's wagon with the expedition's treasury.

Hasan Pasha, the commander of the original fleet that had brought Canbeg Gerey to the Crimea, was killed. İbrahim Pasha, brother of Mustafa Aga, chief of the white eunuchs, was wounded in four places and died upon reaching Kefe. Those who made it to Kefe alive did not tarry there, but boarded the galleys. When on the next day the Tatars entered Kefe, Şahin Gerey went to the house of 'Ali Kadı and informed a merchant whom

he had brought there that there would be a three-day grace period during which the inhabitants of Kefe could board the ships of the fleet. This led to a great massing of refugees on the docks during the three days, while the town was filled with Tatars and Cossacks.

At this point, hoping to save Kefe, Receb Pasha sent a janissary *çorbacı* to parley with Şahin Gerey. During the negotiations, the *çorbacı* also visited Mehmed Gerey and at this point the chronicler gives a speech by the khan in which he relates his story, enumerating the wrongs inflicted upon him by the Ottomans. The points worthy of notice include Mehmed's purported view on proper dynastic succession in the Gerey dynasty and why Canbeg Gerey had no right to be khan: only the son of a khan could become khan and since Canbeg Gerey was merely the son of a *sultan*, that is, a prince (Mübarek Gerey), he could not become a khan as long as a khan's son was alive. After giving birth to Canbeg Gerey, his mother married an unnamed khan, and in his illness, this late khan illegally appointed Canbeg Gerey as heir-apparent (*veli 'ahd*). In addition, a bribe in favor of Canbeg Gerey of more than one hundred slaves had been sent to *ka'im makam* Gürcü Mehmed Pasha, through Dilaver Aga, the chief palace cook (*çaşnigir başı*). Furthermore, Mustafa Aga, the chief of the black eunuchs (*kızlar agası*), acted in favor of Canbeg Gerey's candidacy to the Crimean throne. Thus Canbeg Gerey was appointed khan instead of Mehmed Gerey. Mehmed Gerey confirms that it was, however, primarily Mere Hüseyin Pasha who delivered Canbeg Geray to the khanship in 1623: Upon Sultan Murad IV's accession, when Mustafa Aga was reinstated to the palace one of his first acts was to accept a bribe of 200,000 *guruş* from Canbeg Gerey and arrange through the padishah to have him named as the new khan.

As far as the actual negotiations went, the Ottoman side was willing to reconfirm Mehmed Gerey as khan and Şahin Gerey as *ka'ga* so long as they remained loyal to the house of 'Osman, returned all prisoners and guns, and withdrew their Tatars from Kefe. Otherwise, Receb Pasha threatened that the Ottomans would mount a full-fledged imperial

expedition against the brothers. Şahin Gerey, after consulting with the Tatar notables, accepted the Ottoman terms, kissed the imperial diploma of appointment (*berat*) and placed it on his head (as a sign of submission). He then freed 67 janissaries, 70 *cebecis*, and 30 'azebs, and within a week, evacuated his forces from the city. Thereupon the grand admiral returned to the mouth of the Bosphorus but was refused permission to come to port. Instead he was ordered to return to patrol duty on the Black Sea. After another month and a half at sea, he brought the fleet back into the naval arsenal in Istanbul. But he was met with no praise, and the chief ministers were displeased with his handling of the campaign.⁹⁷

The primary difference between the Muscovite version and the more elaborate Ottoman version is that in the first the decisive battle occurred outside Kefe near the sea whereas in the latter, it was several days' march away. Normally, the version of nearby diplomats would be favored over a possibly corrupted chronicle passage, even if the diplomats were not necessarily direct eyewitnesses. To be sure, Katib Çelebi's text must have some embellishments and inventions. However, the Muscovite version should be treated with some reservation. It is possible that, rather than a complete account, it was a paraphrase with several events telescoped into one. Unfortunately, a critical inquiry into the Muscovite source cannot be made, as it is unpublished and only summarized by Novosel'skij. As for the Ottoman version, some of its details are corroborated in other sources. The placing of Şahin Gerey in Kefe and Mehmed Gerey elsewhere at the end of the campaign is also in the Muscovite version (although the chronicle places Mehmed Gerey four or five hours away while the Muscovite version later places him in Bagçesaray). De Cesy's brief report on the decisive battle contains elements of both versions—on one hand, as in the Muscovite version, a battle in the field outside Kefe,

⁹⁷Katib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, pp. 59-61; Nearly the same story is in Na'ima of which Smirnov gives a translation (Smirnov, *Krymskoe Xanstvo*, pp. 485-90).

while on the other hand, as in the Ottoman version, the approach of night forcing a respite in the battle and the disastrous attempt of Receb Pasha's forces to flee. Here is the relevant passage by de Cesy:

. . . as soon as [Receb] Pasha entered the field he found himself charged upon from three sides so suddenly that if the night had not severed the combat, few of the Turks would have escaped the hands of the Tatars . . . the grand admiral and the two viziers resolved to withdraw in the night [but] the Tatars found out about this and were waiting for them on the road pretty close to the town where they killed more than 3,000 Turks and the two viziers Hibraim (İbrahim) and Asan (Hasan) . . .⁹⁸

If it could be assumed that the three-day march of the Ottomans and their loyal Crimean allies mentioned in the chronicle was an exaggeration and that the battle occurred in the vicinity of Kefe, the two versions would be basically compatible. As far as further details are concerned, both de Cesy and Roe confirmed the death of two viziers İbrahim Pasha and Hasan Pasha mentioned in the Ottoman version and add that their bodies were brought back on two galleys to Istanbul to a shocked populace. As to further losses, de Cesy mentioned 26 artillery pieces and 500 wagons captured by the Tatars, while Roe spoke of 28 captured pieces and 5,000 dead. In addition, de Cesy said that the standard of the padishah was captured but returned two hours later. Both reported that after the defeat the fleet with its admiral limped back to Varna, with de Cesy adding that the ships returned were very much undermanned.⁹⁹

In the Black Sea, throughout the summer and into the fall the Cossacks continued the pace of raiding that they had set earlier in the spring. Moreover, just as in 1623 when the Ottoman fleet was in Kefe installing Mehmed Gerey as khan, in 1624 the Cossacks took advantage of the fleet's return to the Crimea to pay the Bosphorus a visit. On 9/19

⁹⁸Dispatch of 1 September 1624 (*Historica Russiae*, p. 427).

⁹⁹*Historica Russiae*, pp. 427-28; *Negotiations*, p. 273.

July a fleet of 70 or 80 boats entered the Bosphorus, and in the absence of any adequate naval defense, plundered both of its shores at will. Roe's dispatch of the next day gave a vivid account of this raid worth quoting in full:

The ninth of this month, between 70 and 80 boats of the Cossacks with 50 men apiece, rowers and soldiers, watching the opportunity of the captan bassa's being engaged in Tartary, entered the Bosphorus about the break of day; where dividing themselves they sacked and burnt almost all the villages and houses of pleasure, on both sides of the river, as far as the castles (Rumeli Hisarı and Anadolu Hisarı) and within four miles of this city. The principal places were Baiukdery (Büyükdere) and Jenichoie (Yeniköy), and Stenia (İstiniye? [actually on the European side between the previous two]) on the Asia shore: where having made great and rich booty, they stayed until nine of the clock in the forenoon; and then all this city and suburbs having taken the alarm, the grand seignior (the sultan) came down to the water's side, the chaimacham (*ka'im makam*) to the water port. Halil bassa (the previous grand admiral) made himself general in this tumult and having not one galley ready for defence, they manned and armed all the ship-boats, barges, and other small wherries, to the number of 4 or 500, with such people as they could either get to row, or hope to fight; and dispatched all the horse and foot in the city, to the number of 10,000, to defend the coast from further spoil: never was seen a greater fear and confusion. Now we expected that these poor thieves would presently have retired; but they, seeing the Turk's boats making towards them, drew themselves together into the midst of the channel, nor far above the castles, and stayed firm upon their oars in battalion, in the form of a crescent, expecting the assault, the wind and the current being against them. Halil bassa caused some shot to be made afar off; but they answered not with one musket, but hovered from one shore to another, without any show of retreat. Hereupon the general, seeing their form and resolution, thought it not fit to assail them with such boats as he had, but esteemed it wisdom enough to keep them from further attempts, fearing if they had broken his fleet of boats, which was easily done, they would venture down to Constantinople, which was now empty of all defence. And thus these few boats, having first made great spoil, lay the whole day until the sunset, facing and braving the great

and fearful city of the world and all the force it could make, and departed with their booty, with all their colors spread, unfought with or almost unresisted.¹⁰⁰

Both the English and French ambassadors understood this raid to be the work of the Zaporozhians (although as often was the case in these years, it was possible, even probable, that Don Cossacks also partook in it)—Roe concluded that surely the peace treaty with Poland was broken by this raid, while de Cesy related the great irritation of the Turks at all foreign Christians in the capital, especially the Poles whom, as a result, the Ottomans wanted to intern.¹⁰¹

Two weeks later Roe reported that the Cossacks returned to the mouth of the Bosphorus, now with at least 150 boats, and with reserves lurking behind. They stayed on the coast for three days and burned Fener (Pharus) at the entrance to the Straits and two or three villages. Panic arose in Istanbul when it was learned that the Cossacks threatened to attack the arsenal, and all of the shore was placed under constant guard. Finally, somehow two galleys were manned by porters and laborers picked up in the streets and with about twenty boats were sent out to guard against the Cossacks who still remained at the entrance to the Bosphorus. But the Cossacks pulled back, having taken great booty and two or three *kara mürsels* which they had captured earlier.¹⁰² Katib Çelebi gives an entry entitled “The Attack of the Cossacks on Yeniköy” in which these last two Bosphorus raids are apparently telescoped into one event:

¹⁰⁰Dispatch of 10/20 July 1624 (*Negotiations*, pp. 257-58). The report of de Cesy has basically the same features: the sack of Yeniköy (Neocris), the destruction of houses of pleasure, the Cossacks remaining for six hours ravaging and pillaging without losing a single man, the lack of galleys in the port, the long time needed to arm boats against the Cossacks, the ride of the sultan along the shore, the firing upon the Cossacks. One discrepancy with Roe is that de Cesy states that the raid occurred “yesterday,” which would have made it on 20 July rather than 19 July (dispatch of 21 July 1624, *Historica Russiae*, p. 427). Hruševs’kyj, failing to note that the English were still on the old calendar, attributes Roe’s and de Cesy’s accounts to different raids—thus he mistakenly fixes the first raid on the Bosphorus to 9 rather than 19 July and ascribes de Cesy’s dispatch as relating to the second raid (see below) (Hruševs’kyj, *Istoriija*, 7, p. 515, n. 1).

¹⁰¹*Negotiations*, p. 258; De Cesy, dispatch of 4 August 1624 (*Historica Russiae*, p. 428).

¹⁰²Dispatch of 24 July/2 August 1624 (*Negotiations*, p. 265).

While the fleet was busy in Kefe, the Don Cossacks (*sic* [Ten *kazağı*]), finding the Black Sea empty on 4 Shawwal (20 July 1624), came as far as the Bosphorus fortress (*Bogaz hisarı*) and sacked Yeniköy, burning several shops and causing considerable damage. When news of this reached Istanbul, troops of the *bostancı* and *seghan başı* boarded some ships and as they were about to attack, the Cossack bandits without waiting a moment reentered the Black Sea and fled. Such a bold and daring raid on the Bosphorus by these infidels had never been heard of before this date.¹⁰³

In a letter to the Lithuanian field hetman, Krzysztof Radziwiłł, Metropolitan Jov Borec'kyj related that in the current year, “despite the will of the [Cossack] command (*starzych*) and the king,” the Zaporozhians went out to sea three times—in other words, he refers to the three major Zaporozhian expeditions of that year—the raid near Kefe by 80 boats in May, and the two in the Bosphorus in July. With regard to the third, he provided some detail: 150 boats set out, which, in his words, had never occurred before; at the mouth of the Dnieper they battled for several days with 25 “large galleys” and 300 boats (*uszkal*) each with between 30 and 50 men; having dealt with this Ottoman force, they went out to the sea with 102 boats and came to the Bosphorus, capturing substantial booty.¹⁰⁴ Hruševs'kyj suggests that the 25 galleys encountered at the mouth of the Dnieper were those of the grand admiral, which were on their way to Kefe.¹⁰⁵ The figure of 25 may have included some ships assigned to patrol those waters, or it may have been an exaggeration, since as was seen above, other sources indicate that Receb Pasha brought sixteen galleys with him.

¹⁰³Katib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, p. 61.

¹⁰⁴*Arxeografičeskij sbornik dokumentov odnosjaščixsja k istorii severozapadnoj Rusi.*, 7. Vilna, 1870, no. 55, pp. 81-83 (24 August 1624).

¹⁰⁵Hruševs'kyj, *Istorija*, 7, p. 514.

What especially disturbed the Porte was the confession extracted after the last raid from some captured Cossacks who had ventured too far inland. They admitted that they had been acting in agreement with the Crimean khan. On this news Roe commented, “. . . any intelligence between these two roving nations [i.e., the Cossacks and Tatars] . . . will prove very troublesome to this city and state.”¹⁰⁶ In fact, these raids served to further Mehmed and Şahin Geray’s cause, for with the threat to the capital, there was no question of continuing the struggle in the Crimea. Instead, already after the raid of 9 July, word was sent to recall Receb Pasha, who was blamed for leaving the city undefended.¹⁰⁷

Upon arriving at the Bosphorus, Receb Pasha and the fleet were not granted permission to enter the Straits. News had arrived from Varna that again 150 Cossack boats were heading for the Bosphorus. However upon this order, the fleet’s decimated troops, having lost many of their arms, ammunition, and artillery, mutinied against the grand admiral, forcing him to disembark from his ship. But when reinforcements by troops under *segban başı* Mehmed Aga arrived, the fleet was indeed sent back out into the Black Sea with Receb Pasha. However, nearly two weeks later, Roe reported that the fleet was again at the mouth of the Bosphorus and again in full mutiny against its commanders, refusing to go out on the Black Sea any more. The authorities appeased the troops on condition that they would stay at the mouth of the Bosphorus “until the winter weather shall drive the Cossacks in.”¹⁰⁸ On 18/28 September, the fleet returned to port only to learn that they had not waited long enough. On 1/11 October, Roe reported that again, about 150 Cossack “frigates” had appeared near the Bosphorus and “done much spoil upon the Grecian coast [i.e., European shore of the Bosphorus], in so much that all shores of the

¹⁰⁶Dispatch of 24 July/2 August 1624 (*Negotiations*, p. 265).

¹⁰⁷Dispatch of 24 July/2 August 1624 (*Negotiations*, p. 265).

¹⁰⁸Dispatches of 4/14 September and 18/28 September 1624 (*Negotiations*, p. 278). See also Katib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, p. 61.

Black Sea are left desolate.” Within twenty-four hours, 23 galleys were readied. But only after the janissaries were cajoled into participating by their officers and the deputy (*kethuda*?) of the *yeniçeri agası* did the fleet sail off into the Black Sea, even though “that sea be innavigable for galleys in this season.”¹⁰⁹ There is no information on the fate of these Cossack fleets reported after September 1624 nor even independent confirmation of their existence.

The Zaporozhian Cossack aid to Mehmed and Şahin Gerey in the form of naval diversions near the Bosphorus, whether intentional or unintentional, was of secondary importance compared to that rendered by the Zaporozhians brought into the Crimea. For example, Muscovite observers of the events in the Crimea ascribed a decisive role to the Zaporozhians in the victory at Kefe.¹¹⁰ According to de Cesy, the Cossack musketeers (*arquebusiers*) were very effective in the battle with Receb Pasha.¹¹¹ Ridvan Paşazade, a contemporary Ottoman inhabitant of Kefe, explained that Şahin Gerey turned to the Cossacks when he learned that Receb Pasha was on the way to the Crimea and felt that his Tatars would be unreliable in such a confrontation.¹¹² Perhaps the best testimony of the significance of the Cossacks are the words of Şahin Gerey himself. In his letter to Zygmunt III, from 5 Dhu'l-Qa'dah 1033/19 August 1624, which was after the defeat of the Ottoman force, Şahin explained, “we need Dnieper Cossacks . . . not because we do not have enough of our own army . . . thank God we have enough, but the Ottomans, they have not a few janissaries with harquebuses (*rusznica*), and against the harquebuses also a ‘harquebuse army’ is needed.”¹¹³ There is some disagreement in the sources as to the

¹⁰⁹*Negotiations*, p. 294.

¹¹⁰Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 111 (*Tureckie dela*).

¹¹¹Dispatch of 1 September 1624 (*Historica Russiae*, p. 427).

¹¹²Ridvan Paşazade, *Tevarah-i Deşt*, p. 61.

¹¹³Gołębiowski, “Şahin Giraj,” p. 20.

number of Zaporozhians in the service of Şahin Gerey in 1624. In his own letter he mentioned just 300,¹¹⁴ a figure that would seem to have been too low for the Cossacks to have had any significant effect. Certainly, Şahin Gerey had a motive to minimize the participation of the Cossacks in his report to the Poles since their intervention into affairs of a foreign power was a blatant instance of Cossack insubordination that threatened the peace between the Commonwealth and the Porte. The figures in the Ottoman chronicle are certainly more plausible—upwards of a thousand musket-bearing Cossacks (*tüfeng-endaz kazak*) in one passage and 800 in another.¹¹⁵ Roe gave the same figure as well.¹¹⁶ However, other sources have higher figures—about 2,000 *arquebusiers Kozaques* in de Cesy¹¹⁷ and 4,000 in d'Ascoli, which is either an exaggeration or confusion with the events of 1628 (see below).¹¹⁸ It should be noted that although Zaporozhian Cossacks predominated, some Don Cossacks, as well as Zaporozhians that were staying on the Don, were also present: in the report (*statejnyj spisok*) of *okolniči* Ismailov and *djak* Stepanov, it is written that 50 Don Cossacks and 60 Zaporozhians joined the *kalga* near Kefe.¹¹⁹

On the basis of the Muscovite sources, Novosel'skij observed a difference between Mehmed and Şahin Gerey in foreign policy, and in particular, in their attitude toward the Porte. The khan was against the Ottomans because they were resolved to dethrone him; if they would have allowed him to keep his throne (and he was willing to persist in the face of their opposition, hoping that they would give way in their resolve against them) he would

¹¹⁴Golebiowski, "Şahin Giraj," p. 18.

¹¹⁵Katib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, pp. 57, 58.

¹¹⁶Dispatch of 20 and 21/30 and 31 October 1624 (*Negotiations*, p. 292).

¹¹⁷Dispatch of 1 September 1627 (*Historica Russiae*, p. 427).

¹¹⁸d'Ascoli, "Opisanie," p. 108.

¹¹⁹*Istoričeskoe opisanie*, p. 186 (*Krymskie dela*).

have been willing to make peace with the Ottomans. He was even willing to make overtures and some of his actions were clearly aimed at demonstrating his loyalty to the Porte. On the other hand Şahin Gerey was an avowed enemy of the Ottomans and a devoted follower of Shah 'Abbas¹²⁰ who was his brother-in-law.¹²¹ The Ottoman sources even maintain that he became a Shi'ite during his exile in Iran.¹²² The Muscovite sources provide evidence of Şahin Gerey's continual ties with Iran and record statements to the effect that he would fight the sultan to the end.¹²³ The following actions of the two brothers demonstrate their differing attitudes to the Porte: As mentioned above, when Canbeg Gerey was brought back to the Crimea, Mehmed Gerey tried to appease the Ottomans by sending gifts and his son to Istanbul as a hostage. At this time it was Şahin Gerey who besieged Kefe while Mehmed Gerey held back at Karasu. Upon the Ottoman defeat, it was Şahin Gerey who entered Kefe while Mehmed Gerey withdrew to Bağcesaray. As Novosel'skij pointed out and as is clear in other evidence to be discussed below, this pattern continued throughout their careers. Yet, as Novosel'skij noted, even though the political agendas of the two were contrary and sometimes each worked to undermine the plans of the other, surprisingly, there was never an open break between them.¹²⁴

After grand admiral Receb reached the Bosphorus from Kefe, measures were taken to placate Mehmed and Şahin Gerey. Mehmed Gerey was sent confirmation of his khanship in the form of a sword and robe (for the *hil'at* ceremony) with the explanation

¹²⁰Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 115.

¹²¹*Materijaly dlja istorii vozsoedinenija Rusi*, 1: 1578-1630, ed. P. A. Kuliš, Moscow: Izdanie Tovariščestva «Obščestvennaja pol'za», 1877, p. 159.

¹²²Rıdvan Paşazade, *Tevarah-i Deşt*, p. 60, Na'ima, *Tarih*, 2, p. 329.

¹²³Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 112.

¹²⁴Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 115.

that Receb Pasha had acted beyond his orders in attacking the brothers. As a token of trust, Mehmed Gerey's hostage son was returned.¹²⁵ The Ottomans set no conditions on the brothers except that they return the rest of the captured Turks, the captured artillery, and the city of Kefe.¹²⁶ This seemingly conciliatory attitude on the part of the Ottomans did not fool Şahin Gerey. Although by the spring of 1625 the city and presumably also the prisoners (although the sources do not specify their fate) were turned over, about a month later Roe commented that instead of returning the artillery captured from the Ottomans, the Tatars carried it off to Bağçasaray along with all the cannons and munitions of the Kefe citadel.¹²⁷

It was in fact no secret that the Porte was only waiting for the opportune moment to move against Mehmed and Şahin Gerey. Through Tatar intermediaries the words of Murad IV himself reached Moscow to the effect that he could not agree to their presence in the Crimea because of the *kalga*'s ties to Shah 'Abbas.¹²⁸ To strengthen his position in the Crimea and prepare for inevitable renewal of the Ottoman attempt to unseat him and his brother, Şahin Gerey acted on the diplomatic front. On 5 Dhu'l-qa'dah 1033/19 August 1624, the *kalga* sent a letter to Zygmunt III proposing no less than an alliance against the Ottoman Empire, as well as the Muscovite State.¹²⁹ In this letter Şahin presented an

¹²⁵De Cesy, dispatch of 1 September 1624 (*Historica Russiae*, p. 428); Roe, dispatches of 21/31 August and 10/20 September 1624 (*Negotiations*, p. 273, 283).

¹²⁶Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 115.

¹²⁷Roe, dispatch of 20/30 September 1624 (*Negotiations*, p. 289).

¹²⁸Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 112 (*Krymskie dela*).

¹²⁹This important document has already been cited above, in connection with the chronology of the Ottoman expedition to the Crimea in 1624 and with regard to the importance of Cossack firearm-bearing infantry. The original has not survived and the document is available only in Polish and Latin translation. In the nineteenth century, Seweryn Gołębiowski published a Polish copy from an unknown manuscript (Gołębiowski, "Şahin Giraj i Kozacy"). A Latin version (Haus- Hof - und Saats Archiv [Vienna], Polonica 1624, fol. 13a-17b) has been published in Baran, "Şahin Giraj," pp. 19-30. Although a few of the readings are better in the Latin version and some passages in the Latin shed light on the meaning of the Polish translations, overall, the Polish version is better. In using the Gołębiowski editions here, several

idealized version of past relations of the Crimean Khanate and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in which the two states were allies whose armies acted as one, and people freely moved from one realm to the other without being harmed. Then the Ottomans put themselves between the Khanate and Commonwealth and turned them into enemies, hoping by their intrigues to destroy them both. To avoid certain destruction Şahin suggested that they unite in brotherhood and trust. To effect this alliance, the *kalga* requested the king, as a token of trust and brotherhood, send him Dnieper Cossacks so that, with this musket-armed force, he could handily deal with the Turks and their janissaries. He specified that he needed a thousand Zaporozhians in the coming winter and additional forces within fifteen days after Easter. In addition Şahin asked that in place of the traditional “gifts” (*upominki*), powder and lead be sent, explaining that there could be no better gift because powder and lead had been purchased from the Turks previously who now refused to ship it. As part of the proposed relationship between the Khanate and Commonwealth, Şahin proposed that in accordance with the old custom, all the land on the Crimean side of the Dnieper River (Left-Bank) up as far up as the source of the river Oveči Vody (Owczy Wody, “Sheep Waters”)¹³⁰ belong to the Khanate, while everything on the other side, up to the source of the river Boczuk (Bozuk?) and the Don, including their Muscovite sides, belong to the Commonwealth. Şahin promised to move all the Tatar forces near Akkerman to the Crimean side of the Dnieper, while he offered to the king that he send his army to occupy Akkerman, Bender (Tehinia), and Kili, should he so wish. The flocks and herds belonging to his own people he promised to pull back beyond the Dnieper while encouraging the king to let his people bring theirs up to the Dnieper. For he would restrain the Crimean and Nogay Tatars to such a degree that “not even a chicken will be taken from [the king’s] land.” Having dealt with the Turks, Şahin proposed to act

other copies of the Polish version have been consulted (AGAD, LL 30, fol. 15a-17b, BCz 361, pp. 307-10; LNB, Oss 201, pp. 79-85).

¹³⁰A left tributary of the Dnieper below Kins’ky Vody (*Slovnyk hidronimiv Ukrainy*, ed. A. P. Nepokupnyj, O. S. Stryžak, K. K. Cilujko, Kiev: «Naukova Dumka», 1979, p. 393).

jointly against the Muscovite tsar who, the *kalga* claims, recently sent an envoy to the Porte offering to conquer jointly first the Commonwealth and then the Crimea, and to turn over to the Turks both Astrakhan and Kazan. When they together defeated the tsar, the hereditary lands of the forefathers of the Crimean khans on the Volga, including Astrakhan and Kazan, would go to the khan, while provinces of Moscow would go to the king.¹³¹ In a separate note (*ceduła*), Şahin notified that along with this letter were some gifts from Shah ‘Abbas including a sword “with which to beat the Turks.” With these gifts was included a brief letter from the shah. Aside from highly recommending Şahin Gerey, whom it refers to as khan, the shah’s letter is basically one of greeting. However it serves as another piece of evidence that Şahin Gerey was agent and ally of the Safavids against the Ottomans.¹³²

Bohdan Baranowski discusses the prospects and pitfalls for the Commonwealth brought by Şahin Gerey’s proposals.¹³³ On one hand, there was a great temptation to take advantage of the strife between the Crimea and at best gain control of the northern seaboard of the Black Sea from the Crimea to Moldavia or at least to have a respite from Tatar raids for a few years. On the other hand things could go very wrong if the Ottomans went to war against the Commonwealth, especially since the latter was at the time threatened by Sweden. The trouble would be compounded if in the meantime the Khanate reconciled with the Porte and joined in an onslaught against the Commonwealth. While there were supporters of Şahin Gerey’s proposals, most notably Krzysztof Zbaraski, instead a careful noncommittal policy was followed. Thus the response of Zygmunt III, dated 21 October 1624, only promised to continue the friendly relations that existed between the two states since the time of Khans Gazi Gerey and Canbeg Gerey—no reference of any kind was

¹³¹In the Gołębiowski edition of this document, only the Volga going to the khan is mentioned here. The fuller version of this passage is in AGAD, LL 30, fol. 17a, BCz 361, p. and in Baran, “Shahin Giraj,” p. 24).

¹³²AGAD, Dział perski, k 80, nr 4 (Persian original); AGAD, LL 30, fol 18b-19a; LNB, Oss 201, pp. 87-88.

¹³³Baranowski, *Polska a Tatarszczyzna*, pp. 30-33.

made to the offers made by the *kalga*.¹³⁴ The king wrote a similarly bland response to Shah 'Abbas, confirming the Crown's friendship with Mehmed and Şahin Gerey.¹³⁵

Upon the king's indecisive response, Şahin Gerey made a bold diplomatic move by turning directly to the Zaporozhian Cossacks. Not daring to underestimate the danger from the Porte, Şahin acted in earnest by going in person to the Zaporozhians. In a report to Moscow, the Putivl' *voevoda* relates what he learned from Cossack envoys: "A week before Christmas [coming] from the Crimea, Şahin Gerey rode into the Zaporizhia region to the Cossacks. Accompanying him were a thousand Crimean warriors. There he concluded, according to a report of the Putivl' *voevoda* to Moscow, a truce (*peremir*" *ja*) with the Cossacks, "that neither side would go to war against the other, but rather that [the Cossacks] will go together with Şahin Gerey to wage war upon the Turkish land."¹³⁶ What follows is the text of the agreement according to the only known copy, which is in Polish:

I, Şahin Gerey, Crimean khan (*car* [*sic*]), give this our letter of oath to the Zaporozhian Cossacks: to the lord (*pan*) hetman, the *osauls*, the *atamans*, and all the host . . . we testify with this our letter and oath that neither from me nor from our people of the Crimean state any harm or damage shall be brought, and if someone were to cause some damage insubordinately, I will try them with their wives and children and relatives and turn over ten for every one [harmed]. And from them [the Cossacks], I also require the same, so that it may thus be done. So long as from them there is no damage, as long as I live, there will be none from us. To this I swear to Allah and to the prophet Muhammad—may I be removed from his regiment should I do otherwise. So long as there is none from them, there will be no wrath from us—to this we give the broad letter of oath to the lord hetman, the *osaul*, and the entire host. May you believe all of this, and for this we

¹³⁴AGAD, LL 30, fol. 17b-19a; LNB, Oss 201, pp. 85-87.

¹³⁵27 October 1624 (AGAD, LL 30, fol. 19a-19b; LNB, Oss 201, pp. 88-89).

¹³⁶*Materijaly* (Kuliš), p. 159 (*Malorossijskie dela*); also in *Vossoedinenie*, no. 24, p. 51.

give our broad letter of oath to God and the Prophet. If some enemy were to appear against the hetman, the *osauls*, the *atamans*, and all the host, I, Şahin Gerey, as soon as they notify me, with all my *beys*, and *mirzas* am to help them. And if an enemy were to appear against me, they, upon notification from me, are to help me in accordance with the letters of oath. Written on Karayteben by me, Şahin Gerey Sultan khan (*car*). The year 1624, day 24 December.¹³⁷

This is the earliest known written agreement between Ukrainian Cossacks and Crimean Tatars. For the first time, the Cossacks and Tatars made an abstract political agreement—a compact that was to apply to unforeseen future circumstances, rather than a pragmatic *ad hoc* agreement between, for example, patron and mercenary client. What is particularly significant is that it was made with the Zaporozhian Host and its leadership as a political entity and it was probably written down because the contracting parties were not mere warrior bands (unfortunately the identity of the Zaporozhian hetman is not known and Cossack documentation of this act is not extant). After all, aside from warring with one another, the Cossacks, both Ukrainian and Russian, had on and off cooperated with the Tatars in trade and minor military operations since their origin.¹³⁸

Did the agreement between Şahin Gerey and the Zaporozhian Cossacks mean that the two had entered into an alliance? From the wording of the agreement, the obvious answer is yes. In fact historians have considered the rapprochement between Şahin Gerey and the Zaporozhians to be a milestone as the first of several seventeenth-century Cossack-Tatar alliances that affected the balance of power in the region. Of course, the greatest of

¹³⁷From a manuscript book of the Kievan Caves Monastery, published in *Materijaly dlja istorii Zapadno-Russkoj cerkvi*, 1, Kiev: Tipografija T. T. Korčak-Novickogo, 1883 [=supplement to G. Golubev, *Kievskoj mitropolit Petr Mogila (Opyt istoričeskogo izsledovanija)*, 1, Kiev, 1883], p. 276 (the two deletions in the text were made by Golubev). This Polish copy appears in the manuscript book after a letter from Metropolitan Borec'kyj dated 12/22 January 1625. Hruševs'kyj gives Şahin Gerey's oath in Ukrainian translation and the exact reference to the manuscript (Hruševs'kyj, *Istoriija*, 7, p. 517).

¹³⁸See Günter Stökl, *Die Entstehung des Kosakentums*, Munich: Isar Verlag, 1953, pp. 143-77.

these was that of Hetman Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj with Khan Islam Gerey between 1648 and 1653, which altered the course of history in Eastern Europe. But were the Crimean Khanate and the Zaporozhian Host in a state of alliance after 1624? Certainly there is evidence that there was much cooperation between the Tatars and Cossacks even before the agreement. As was seen in this chapter, the Crimeans supported Cossack raiding parties and the Cossacks seem to have been timing their raids so as to aid the Crimeans in their struggle with the Ottomans. But could the concluded alliance withstand the region's complexities and vicissitudes? Was there a true alliance in operation in the following years or was the relationship more a pragmatic one, such as that between a patron and mercenary client? What were the attitudes of the participating parties toward their relationship? And in the case of the Cossacks, who were the participants in the said alliance? All these questions need to be asked in order to understand the events of the following years.

CHAPTER III

Crisis in the Black Sea, 1625-1626

At the time when Mehmed Gerey was negotiating a formal agreement with the Zaporozhian Cossacks in the winter of 1624-1625, another figure was traveling in the Zaporizhia with plans for no less than an international crusade against the Ottoman Empire. This man, Yahya, believed that he was the son of Sultan Mehmed III and the legitimate heir to the Ottoman throne.¹ According to his story, his mother, a crypto-Christian Greek named Helena, fled with him from the Anatolian town of Manisa (Magnesia) to the Morea in 1595 when Mehmed ascended to the throne. There, baptized as Alexander, he spent the rest of his childhood, raised in the Orthodox faith by Greek churchmen.² From 1608 until the end of his relatively long life, Sultan Yahya or as he was also known, Alexander Yahya or Alexander Ottomanicus, peregrinated over much of Europe in search of patrons and allies

¹The main source on Yahya's career in Western Europe is a large compilation based on two contemporary biographies, as well as on documents from various Italian archives: Vittorio Catualdi, *Sultan Jahya della casa imperiale ottoma a ed i suoi discendenti in Italia*, Trieste, 1889. The comments here on Yahya's career before arriving in Poland and the Ukraine in 1624 and after his stint in Eastern Europe are based on those given by Dorothy M. Vaughan, which are mainly based on Catualdi's sources (Dorothy M. Vaughan, *Europe and the Turk: A Pattern of Alliances, 1350-1700*, Liverpool: At the University Press, 1954, pp. 219-236). Pantelejmon Kuliš published extensive materials on his stay in the Ukraine and Russia from the archives of the Muscovite foreign office (*posol'skij prikaz*) (*Materijaly dlja istorii vozsoedinenija Rusi*, 1: 1578-1630, ed. P. A. Kuliš, Moscow: Izdanie Tovariščestva «Obščestvennaja pol'za», 1877, pp. 142-286). The latter materials include two autobiographies of Yahya: one a Muscovite *prikaz* translation of a Ruthenian translation from a Greek original, allegedly done by Metropolitan Borec'kyj and sent by him to Muscovy (pp. 163-68); the other as told by Yahya himself to *dvorjanin* Lodygin and *djak* Nečaev in Mcensk (pp. 193-218). Many other details about Yahya are revealed in the transcripts of his interrogation by Muscovite officials.

²See also *Materijaly* (Kuliš), pp. 219-220.

who would support him in his quest for the throne of Constantinople. Although it is unlikely that he was actually the son of Mehmed III (see below), the sources suggest that Yahya was a pious Christian genuinely concerned with the fate of the subject Christian population of the Ottoman Empire³; moreover, it seems that he sincerely believed in his purported lineage. During his travels he achieved various degrees of success in gaining the support of the Emperor, the grand duke of Tuscany in Florence, the grand duke of Naples, the king of Spain, de Nevers in Paris, Venice, the Vatican, and Holland. Between his visits to the courts of Europe, he supposedly made trips to his supporters in the Balkans and participated in uprisings against the Ottomans there, as well as in Syria with Fahre'd-Din and purportedly even in Erzurum with Abaza Pasha.

In 1624 Sultan Yahya arrived at the court of Emperor Ferdinand in Vienna where he was well-received. However, he was frustrated at Ferdinand's inability to enter into a new Turkish war, and just at that time he was approached by members of a mercenary company known as the Lisowczyki. The Lisowczyki, who were from the Commonwealth but banished from its territories in 1622, were at the time operating in Moravia in the service of the Emperor. A plan was conceived in which a select group of 8,000 Lisowczyki would join Yahya and attack the Ottoman Empire. However, it turned out to be unworkable. As there were ties between the Lisowczyki and the Ukrainian Cossacks, and in fact many Cossacks were in the Lisowczyk company, several Lisowczyk officers suggested to Yahya that he join the Zaporozhians, who were always interested in fighting the Ottomans.⁴ First he traveled with Wąsowicz, a Lisowczyk leader, and 50 of his comrades to his home near Lublin. After a stay of two months, Yahya set out with twelve Lisowczyki for Kiev, where he arrived 21/31 October 1624. In Kiev another Lisowczyk, prince Ivan Masal'skoj (originally from Muscovy), introduced Yahya to Metropolitan Jov Borec'kyj. From the

³Vaughan, *Europe and the Turk*, p. 221.

⁴Vaughan, *Europe and the Turk*, p. 227; *Materijaly* (Kuliš), pp. 167-68, 211-13.

two audiences that Borec'kyj gave to Yahya, the metropolitan was so impressed by his character and learning (including his knowledge of Greek, both ancient and modern, and Latin), that he referred to him as a godsend who would finally bring deliverance from the "Babylonian Turkish kingdom."⁵ On 29 October⁶ Borec'kyj escorted Yahya several miles out of Kiev where he entrusted him to his loyal servant, father Filip. In the town of Kryliv near the Dnieper (near the right bank, just north of Kremenčuk), Yahya was introduced to the Zaporozhian Cossacks. His reception was warm—several Cossacks even knew him from their service in the Lisowczyk company in Central Europe and vouched for him. Thereupon Yahya toured many of their towns, preaching his crusade, and the Zaporozhians supposedly honored him everywhere, promising to join him as soon as their troubles with the government and with Şahin Gerey settled down.⁷

It is not known whether Şahin Gerey came to the Zaporizhia knowing that Yahya was there and with the intent of coming into contact with him. Although the date of Yahya's arrival in the Zaporizhia is not known, it is clear that he was already there when Şahin appeared.⁸ It was from the Zaporizhia that Yahya wrote a letter to the *kalga*. Introducing himself as the son of an Ottoman sultan, he related the countries he had visited and the rulers he had met in his quest for the Ottoman throne. Yahya offered Şahin participation in his anti-Ottoman endeavor and invited him for talks. But Şahin declined, and instead sent an invitation that Yahya visit him. Yahya then was brought to the banks of the Dnieper by Cossack officers with an escort of 1,500 Zaporozhians while Şahin arrived at the opposite shore with his retinue. While the two stood on opposite sides of the

⁵*Materijaly* (Kuliš), pp. 162, 213.

⁶*Materijaly* (Kuliš), p. 168.

⁷*Materijaly* (Kuliš), p. 214.

⁸As stated above, Yahya reached Kryliv in early November 1624 while Şahin arrived in the Zaporizhia a week before (old style) Christmas, or 18/28 December 1624.

Dnieper, “only two gun shots away,” Şahin again sent a *mirza* inviting Yahya to come over for talks in his tent. Yahya’s reply was that he was willing to come but that the Cossacks were not letting him go. The Cossacks, in turn, with muskets in their hands and surrounding Yahya in four concentric circles, told the Tatars that they had orders to guard Yahya and could not let him go, but that Şahin Gerey was welcome to come over. And thus with each refusing or unable to go over to the other, a meeting never occurred. Later, Şahin Gerey secretly sent a messenger to Yahya reaffirming his willingness to join him against the Ottomans. According to Yahya’s later account of their near encounter, Şahin Gerey’s true motive in having a meeting was to capture Yahya and turn him over to the Ottomans for a high payoff.⁹

Despite the failure of Yahya and Şahin Gerey to meet, apparently an understanding was reached that the two would join forces in the upcoming war. Yahya’s supporters claimed that Şahin Gerey pledged “up to a hundred thousand troops.”¹⁰ Meanwhile the Zaporozhians agreed to provide 18,000 men in the coming spring. Yahya promised to pay six thalers a month to each horseman and four thalers a month to each foot soldier plus a bonus to the entire host of 30,000 Polish *złoty*. In addition, another 8,000 so-called “town Cossacks” (*horodovi kozaky* or *čerkasy* in the Muscovite documents) “living in Perejaslav, Kaniv, and other cities” were willing to participate, and to these Yahya promised 60,000 gold ducats that the grand duke of Tuscany was to send him.¹¹ Yahya

⁹The main source on the near encounter between Yahya and Şahin is the account of the former to the Muscovite authorities in 1625 (*Materijaly* [Kuliš], p. 214-15). In a letter of Borec’kyj cited above, it is stated that Yahya was not able to see Şahin even though the latter wanted to see him badly (*Materijaly dlja istorii Zapadno-Russkoj cerkvi*, 1, Kiev: Tipografija T. T. Korčak-Novickogo, 1883 [=supplement to G. Golubev, *Kievskoj mitropolit Petr Mogila (Opyt istoričeskogo izsledovanija)*, 1, Kiev, 1883/, p. 275).

¹⁰Yahya’s envoys in Moscow, 21/31 III 1625 (*Materijaly* [Kuliš], p. 171).

¹¹Yahya wrote twice to the grand duke in Florence from the Zaporizhia and supposedly this money was sent belatedly and deposited with Wolski in Cracow (*Materijaly* [Kuliš], pp. 215-16).

also claimed that 300 Don Cossacks currently in the Zaporizhia promised to join the Zaporozhians in a war against the Turks.¹²

In Yahya's eyes the moment was indeed an opportune one for an attack on the Ottoman Empire. Instability in the capital and problems on the eastern Anatolian frontier continued. At the same time, not only were the Ukrainian Cossacks and Crimean Tatars ready to serve him, but according to Yahya's envoys in Moscow, the king of Spain was willing to send 60 galleys full of troops, the grand duke of Florence promised to send 20,000 muskets and artillery, and "the Serbs, Wallachians, Vlachs, Albanians, and other nations with their people and funds" were willing to rise behind him.¹³ And in addition, there was a further opportunity to broaden this "anti-Ottoman coalition," thanks to the efforts of Metropolitan Jov Borec'kyj to increase contacts between the persecuted Ukrainian Orthodox clergy and Muscovy.

At the behest of Metropolitan Borec'kyj, Yahya's envoys, accompanied by thirteen Zaporozhians, amongst whom were envoys of *hetman* Kalenyk Andrijevyč, set out for Muscovy and on 7/17 February 1625 arrived in the Muscovite border town of Putivl'. Yahya's envoys were Marko Fedorovyč, a Macedonian follower of his, and a Zaporozhian Cossack whom the Muscovite sources call Ivaška Martynov. The leader of the Zaporozhian party was a Cossack named Ivan Hyra.¹⁴ In Putivl' Yahya's envoys presented the local *voevoda* with a short letter of introduction from Borec'kyj for "Alexander Ottoman" in which the metropolitan predicted an Orthodox crusade against the "Babylonian Turkish kingdom" and urged the Muscovites to participate in this endeavor.¹⁵

¹²Yahya's account in Muscovy in late 1625 (see below; *Materijaly* (Kuliš), p. 225).

¹³Yahya's envoys in Moscow, 21/31 III 1625 and Father Filip in Moscow, late 1625 (*Materijaly* [Kuliš], pp. 171, 228).

¹⁴*Materijaly* (Kuliš), pp. 157-61.

¹⁵*Materijaly* (Kuliš), pp. 161-62 (24 January/3 February 1625, written in Terextymyryv).

With this Borec'kyj sent an autobiography by Yahya which the metropolitan himself translated into Ruthenian from the Greek original written in Yahya's own hand.¹⁶ As for the Cossack envoys, the Muscovite sources record their relation to the Putivl' voevoda regarding recent events in the Ukraine. Worth noting are the following points: on the fourth day after leaving the Zaporizhia the Cossacks encountered on their path Crown envoys on the way to the Zaporozhian Host. The Crown envoys allegedly told the Cossack envoys that they were on their way to the Host to order it to prepare for a campaign against the Turks by sea and by land in the coming spring. This statement was obviously a case of disinformation by the Cossacks,¹⁷ perhaps made to encourage the Muscovites to join the war against the Ottomans. Also the Cossacks mentioned the arrival of Şahin Gerey from Iran in the previous year, his taking charge in the Crimea, his understanding with the Crown to stand together against the Turks (another exaggeration), his alliance with the Zaporozhians, and his setting out to take control of the Bucak horde (see below). After relating the persecutions of the Orthodox in Kiev and the disturbances that occurred after a Zaporozhian unit invited by Borec'kyj reopened sealed churches and killed the *wójt* of Kiev (see below), the envoys told of Yahya's arrival in the Ukraine and his attempt to enlist the Cossacks in his cause, his promise that within three months money for them would arrive from Florence, and his current whereabouts in the monastery at Terextymyryv where Borec'kyj had joined him.¹⁸

¹⁶*Materijaly* (Kuliš), pp. 163-68 (dated 22 October/1 November 1625, written at the St. Michael's monastery in Kiev).

¹⁷Hruševs'kyj finds such an order to be highly unlikely, unless the Cossacks were thus interpreting some Polish hint, prompted by the urgings of Şahin Gerey, that their support of him would not be objected to (Myxajlo Hruševs'kyj, *Istoriya Ukraïny-Rusy*, 7, Kiev, 1909; reprint ed., New York: Knyho-spilka, 1956, p. 528). Rudnyc'kyj points out that such an order was impossible since at the time the state was preparing an armed commission against the Cossacks largely on account of their recent raids (see below; Stefan Rudnyc'kyj, "Kozac'ko-pol's'ka vijna r. 1625," *Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva im. Ševčenka* 17 (1897): 1-42, esp. p. 5).

¹⁸*Materijaly* (Kuliš), pp. 157-61.

On 21 March 1625, Yahya's envoys were received in Moscow by officials of the tsar. There Yahya's own letter addressed to Tsar Mixail Fëdorovič was presented. The letter announced his intention to go in the upcoming spring by land and by sea with the Zaporozhian Host against the Turks in the "Greek land" where multitudes of Orthodox Bulgarians, Serbians, Albanians, and Greeks awaited him as their legitimate Emperor. As help was coming from Emperor Rudolf and the duke of Tuscany, so too it befitted the great Orthodox tsar to throw in his support as well.¹⁹ When questioned by officials at the *Kazënnnyj dvor*, the envoys stated that Yahya was about forty years old, a learned man who had traveled to many countries, and that he had obtained the military support of the Zaporozhians, Spain, Florence, and Şahin Gerey.²⁰

On 7/17 April 1625, Yahya's envoys were granted an audience with the tsar together with the Zaporozhian envoys. Whether anything of substance was said at the audience is not noted in the sources. However, the protocol of the reception reflected caution on the part of the Muscovite authorities—the envoys were brought to the tsar's hand without being announced. Three days later the envoys were summoned back to the *kazënnnyj dvor* for leave-taking. There the envoys were given a cordial but formalistic reply. The tsar wished Yahya good fortune and success in his venture but could not help him because currently Yahya was in the Lithuanian land (i.e., in the Commonwealth) with the Zaporozhian Cossacks who were subjects of the Polish king, who in turn, was an enemy of the tsar. Hence the king would not allow Muscovite troops to pass through his lands. The tsar could not even issue for Yahya a *gramota*. This was ostensibly because should the document fall into Polish hands, the king, currently at peace with the sultan, could have harmed Yahya for carrying out talks with the tsar with the purpose of going against the Turks. Then the envoys were presented with generous gifts for Yahya,

¹⁹*Materijaly* (Kuliš), pp. 169-70 (1/11 January 1625, from the Zaporizhia).

²⁰*Materijaly* (Kuliš), p. 171.

consisting of sables, fox skins, and golden velvet (*barxat*) worth 1,000 rubles, as well as some luxury textiles and money for themselves, and given leave to return to the Ukraine.²¹

Meanwhile, after staying in the Zaporizhia for 50 days, on 20 January 1625, Yahya went north to the region inhabited by the town Cossacks (Terextymyryv, Perejaslav, and Kaniv are mentioned in the sources) where he stayed until early May (St. Egor's—23 April OS).²² By this time, despite all the plans and apparent opportunities, it was becoming increasingly clear to Yahya that his crusading plans for 1625 would fall through. According to Yahya, the main problem was that many Cossacks went out on their own raids in the Black Sea and did not return in time for an organized campaign (see below).²³ Hruševs'kyj was of the opinion that the Cossacks were not fully satisfied with Yahya's offer and that that was why he wrote to Florence requesting an additional 60,000 gold ducats.²⁴ In addition to these factors, as the year progressed, the Ukrainian Cossacks were increasingly on the defensive before the Crown, as relations deteriorated over the status of the Cossacks as a military and social entity and over the state of the Orthodox church (see below). The sources are not very clear about Yahya's whereabouts or activities from February, when he was back in the Cossack towns, through the fall of 1625. It appears that sometime in May, he returned to the Zaporizhia where he was detained by the Cossacks until one of their apparently major fleets returned from the sea, which was around Epiphany (15/25 August 1625). At that time Yahya returned to the region north of the Zaporizhia and remained there until November.

²¹*Materijaly* (Kuliš), pp. 172-73.

²²*Materijaly* (Kuliš), p. 215. At the end of January Yahya stayed in the monastery at Terextymyryv (on the right bank of the Dnieper, upriver from Kaniv and not far from Perejaslav) which was under the authority of Boreckyj; the metropolitan himself paid a visit at the same time (*Materijaly* [Kuliš], pp. 160-62).

²³*Materijaly* (Kuliš), p. 216.

²⁴Hruševs'kyj, *Istoriya*, 7, p. 527.

Şahin Gerey's Campaign to the Bucak, 1625

Şahin Gerey, after his unsuccessful attempts to meet Yahya, set out from the Zaporizhia for the Bucak to mount a campaign against Kantemir. This occurred soon after the New Year.²⁵ For Mehmed and Şahin Gerey, the escape of Kantemir from their control and his return to the Bucak during their struggle with the Ottomans in the previous year reconstituted a serious threat to their security. Thus the renewed subjection of Kantemir's horde was a high priority for the brothers after their military success against the Ottomans. Already around the New Year, Şahin Gerey wrote to Zygmunt III that he was about to go with his army to the steppes of Akkerman to take strict control of Kantemir, his brothers, and other *mirzas*, and to expel from the Bucak all Tatars, forcing them to migrate to the Crimea.²⁶ On 26 November/6 December 1624, several weeks before Şahin Gerey set out for the Bucak, Roe reported that a Tatar army had entered the region of Akkerman. This was a vanguard force sent in advance of the *kalga*. In the capital, fears were renewed that the Crimeans intended to invade and take Edirne, although Roe for one was aware that the real mission of the intruders was against Kantemir.²⁷

Details on this campaign are very scant, and both the sources and secondary literature contain conflicting versions of its outcome. Na'ima recounts Şahin Gerey's penetration into Rumeli, his siege of the town of Baba Dağı, and his eventual defeat in a fierce and bloody battle on the Danube by the forces of Kantemir that included a combined force of Nogays and provincial Ottoman forces from Rumeli. Although Şahin's forces

²⁵Three days after Christmas (28 December 1624/7 January 7 1625) according to the aforementioned Cossack envoys in Putivl' (*Materijaly* [Kuliš], p. 159) and certainly before 12/22 January 1625 when Borec'kyj wrote a letter mentioning this event (*Materijaly* [Golubev], p. 275).

²⁶BO 200, fol. 359a-363a (11-20 Rabi' I 1034/22-31 December 1624).

²⁷*The Negotiations of Sir Thomas Roe in His Embassy to the Ottoman Porte, from the Year 1621-1628 Inclusive*, London, 1740, p. 315.

were annihilated, the *kalga* managed to escape in a boat.²⁸ Na'ima's version of events, repeated by Hammer and Zinkeisen, is accepted by Hruševs'kyj.²⁹ Baranowski, suspicious that later events were confused with those of early 1625, is skeptical of Na'ima's story and notes that had there been such a major defeat, there would have been some notice in the Polish sources. Moreover, he points to a Polish copy of a relation of the affairs of the Crimean Khanate to Commonwealth authorities by an envoy of Şahin Gerey in which it is implicit that it was Şahin Gerey who defeated Kantemir. However, Baranowski considers it difficult to decide which version is closer to the truth.³⁰

Novosel'skij, on the basis of the Muscovite sources, unequivocally states that the successful outcome of Şahin Gerey's expedition is the correct version of events. Adding to his sources the testimony of Polish and other sources leaves no doubt that it was indeed Şahin Gerey who was the victor in early 1625. There are no specifics on any possible military encounters between the forces of Şahin Gerey and Kantemir. What is known is that Şahin Gerey campaigned in the Akkerman steppe and in the Bender (Tehinia) region. According to the Muscovite sources, he actually occupied Akkerman but then withdrew upon hearing that Ottoman troops were on the way.³¹ However, in a confession (*confessata*), a Tatar captured by the Poles claimed that just as the Turks never allowed Kantemir to enter the citadels of Akkerman or Bender (Tehinia) so Şahin Gerey too was barred entry.³² Perhaps the lack of any mention of battles indicates that there were none

²⁸Muṣṭafā Na'imā, *Ravzatü'l-hüseyin fi ḥulāṣāti aḥbāri'l-ḥāfiḳayn*, 2 [=Tarih], Istanbul: Maṭba'a-i 'Āmire, 1281-1283/1864-1866, 2 pp. 340-41.

²⁹Joseph Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, 5, Pest: C. A. Hartleben's Verlag, 1829, 5, pp. 44-43; Johann Wilhelm Zinkeisen, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches in Europa*, Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes, 1856, 4, pp. 491-92; Hruševs'kyj, *Istorija*, 7, pp. 532-33.

³⁰Bohdan Baranowski, *Polska a Tatarszczyzna w latach 1624-1629*, Łódź: Łódzkie Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1948, p. 38.

³¹A. A. Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba Moskovskogo gosudarstva s tatarami v pervoj polovine XVII veka*, Moscow and Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1948, p. 114 (*Krymskie dela*).

³²BK 201, fol. 242a (after 6 February 1625).

and that Şahin Gerey's forces were so overwhelming that Kantemir and his Tatars chose to yield without a fight. A variety of sources (Cossack, Tatar, Ottoman) claim that Şahin Gerey deported the entire Bucak horde, including all of their flocks and herds and other possessions, beyond the Dnieper.³³ However, as was probably the case in the forced migration of the Bucak horde in late 1623, the indications in the sources as to the extent of the migration is exaggerated at least to some degree. While most of the sources state that the Bucak Tatars were sent to the Crimea, Şahin Gerey notified Koniecpolski that in deporting the entire Bucak horde, he sent some to the Crimea and others to the so-called *Dzikie Pola* ("Wild Fields"), that is, the steppes beyond the Dnieper and north of Perekop.³⁴ The Tatar *confessata* speaks of a two-stage deportation, with part of the Tatar *mirzas* and all of Kantemir's belongings and wives to the Crimea first and the rest, including Kantemir and 4,000 Nogays, remaining with Şahin Gerey until he returned to the Crimea.³⁵ Şahin Gerey's envoy to the Commonwealth places Kantemir and his Nogays as eventually nomadizing in the steppes outside of Perekop and describes a surprisingly good state of relations between the two: "Kantemir . . . often visits Şahin Gerey and takes

³³Two Zaporozhian Cossacks to Koniecpolski, February (?) 1625 (BK 201, fol. 248b); Mehmed Pasha, *ka'im makam*, to Zygmunt III, 11 March-8 April 1625 (BK O142-d); Mehmed Pasha, *ka'im makam*, to Crown chancellor, 11 March-8 April 1625 (BK O 142-d); J. Zbaraski to Zygmunt III, 22 September 1625 (*Listy księcia Jerzego Zbaraskiego kasztelana krakowskiego z lat 1621-1632*, ed. August Sokołowski, in *Scriptores rerum polonicarum/Pisarze dziejów polskich*, 5 = Archiwum Komisji historycznej, 2, Cracow: Nakładem Akademii umiejętności, 1880, no. 50, p. 97; *Osmanskaja imperija v pervoj četverti XVII veka. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov*, eds. X. M. Ibragimbejli, N. C. Rašba, Moscow: Izdatel'stvo «Nauka», Glavnaja redakcija vostočnoj literatury, 1984, p. 254). The Muscovite sources say that Şahin Gerey deported Kantemir and his brother Gulim Divay ("Diveev") and their *uluses* to the Crimea (Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 114 [*Krymskie dela*]).

³⁴BK 201, fol. 259 (late November [?] 1625).

³⁵According to the *confessata*, the first to go to the Crimea were Sultan Orak Mirza, Kutlu Shah ("Kotlusza") Mirza, Salman Shah Mirza, Veli Shah "Walisza" Mirza, Safa Gerey Sultan (son of a khan) and three sons of Kantemir, Sultan Mehmed Mirza, "Swin" Mirza, and "Tochtimir" Mirza; remaining with Şahin until he left the Bucak were Kantemir, "Azuthor" (?) Mirza, "Animir" (?) Mirza, İbrahim Mirza, "Kazibai" Mirza, "Mulah" (?) Mirza Tatarowie (BK 201, fol. 242a).

advice from him . . . Salmaza (?) Mirza nomadizes nearby Kantemir and goes to 'Kozłow' (Gözlev? [in the western Crimea on the Black Sea coast]) and also often visits Şahin."³⁶

Aside from his own Crimean Tatars, a force of Lesser Nogays and Zaporozhian Cossacks supported Şahin Gerey in his Bucak venture of early 1625. Although there is only one reference to the participation of the Lesser Nogays,³⁷ that of the Zaporozhians is attested to by various sides. The Muscovite sources inform that already in late 1624, Şahin Gerey sent substantial supplies (1,000 sheep, 300 cows, wine, bread) to the Zaporozhians and bid them to prepare to move against Kantemir.³⁸ This suggests that the *kalga* had an immediate purpose in going to the Zaporizhia aside from the wider plan to make a formal alliance with the Zaporozhian Cossacks so as to strengthen his position *vis à vis* the Ottomans and other possible foes. The already mentioned Tatar *confessata* said that there were 400 Cossacks with Şahin Gerey in the Bucak.³⁹ There exists an undated letter to Koniecpolski from two Zaporozhian Cossacks, Ivan Kubučka (Kubuczka) and Lavryn Žuk, who were with Şahin Gerey in the Bucak, informing that the latter was in full force in the plains of Akkerman, driving to the Crimea all the Nogays in the Bucak who harmed the Commonwealth.⁴⁰ Finally, two dispatches of the nuncio in Warsaw speak of 2,000 Zaporozhian Cossacks who had been in the service of Şahin Gerey earlier that year.⁴¹

Aside from subjecting and deporting the Bucak horde, there was a subplot in this campaign that serves as a good example of Şahin Gerey's opportunism and never-ending

³⁶BK 201, fol. 234.

³⁷Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 114 (*Krymskie dela*).

³⁸Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 114 (*Krymskie dela*).

³⁹BK 201, fol. 242a (after 6 February 1625).

⁴⁰BK 201, fol. 248b (undated, probably February 1625 or thereafter).

⁴¹Dispatches of 31 May and 13 June 1625 (*Litterae Nuntiorum Apostolicorum historiae Ucrainae illustrantes (1550-1850)*, 4: 1609-1620, ed. Athanasius G. Welykyj, Rome: Basiliani, 1959, nos. 1791, 1795, pp. 180, 182).

quest for intrigue. When he left the Zaporizhia he had with him a certain Bogdan, son of the late Moldavian *voyvoda* Ieremia Movila (1595-1600, 1600-1606).⁴² The further story of this Bogdan is found in the relation made to the Commonwealth authorities by Şahin Gerey's unnamed envoy mentioned above. This person, who it is implied was a pretender ("he called himself the son of Ieremia"), managed to convince Şahin Gerey that there was a treasure in a monastery in Suceava where his late father was buried. Şahin Gerey awarded him with a silver kaftan and assigned to him a certain Ca'fer Kadı and Ahmed Aga along with several dozen men. Şahin promised the claimant that if he brought him the treasure, then he would make him *voyvoda* of Moldavia. However, on the way to Suceava, the claimant fled and there is no further mention of his fate or Şahin Gerey's Moldavian plans.⁴³

Şahin Gerey and the International Relations of the Crimea, 1625

Regardless of whether Şahin Gerey had any hostile intent toward the Ottomans in his Bucak expedition of 1625, officially the Porte approved of his venture. It should be remembered that in the fall of 1623, the Porte had acceded to the demands of the Crown that Kantemir be removed from the position of Özi governor-general (*beglerbegi*) and so at this time as well, the Porte at least pretended before the Commonwealth that it was in full accord with Şahin's action in the Bucak. In a series of letters to the king, the Crown chancellor and the Crown *hetman*, *ka'im makam* Mehmed Pasha stated that the sultan had ordered the khan to resubject Kantemir and that the khan in turn ordered Şahin to go to Akkerman and Bender and deport the Bucak horde.⁴⁴ As is evident from their correspondence, Ottoman officials were eager to take credit in the Crown's eyes for the

⁴²*Materijaly* [Golubev], no. 41, p. 275 (Jov Borec'kyj to Josyf Bobryc'kyj, 12/22 January 1625).

⁴³BK 201, fol. 235a.

⁴⁴BK O 142-d (all dated , Djumada II 1034/11 III-8 IV 1625); also BCz 2246, p. 76, (to Zygmunt III, delivered to Warsaw *sejm* 3 March 1625).

suppression of the Bucak horde, thus demonstrating that they were doing everything possible to carry out the terms of the recently established peace and, at the same time, putting pressure on the Commonwealth to act more decisively against the Ukrainian Cossacks. The opportunism of the Porte in claiming that the Bucak expedition was carried out upon its order is apparent in a report by Roe: "There [at the Porte] is arrived an ambassador from the Tartar khan [who offered] service [to] his master, and excusing the entry of the Tartars into the frontier of the empire, as being done in the service of the grand seignior, only to fetch Cantemir Mirza and his followers out of Silistra, and to compel them to retire . . ." Roe also commented on the political capital gained *vis-à-vis* the Commonwealth in acting against the Bucak horde: ". . . to avoid and take away all occasion from the Poles to lament of the injuries done by them [i.e., by the Bucak Tatars], and thereby they also might take the like order for their Cossacks, and so the peace might be duly on both sides observed."⁴⁵

For his part, Mehmed Gerey also took credit in Warsaw for Şahin Gerey's actions in the Bucak, presenting them as acts of his own initiative.⁴⁶ As for Şahin Gerey's official posture before the Porte, Mehmed Deak Pasha revealed in one of his letters to the Crown that upon taking control of the Bucak horde, Şahin too sent envoys to notify the Porte of this action.⁴⁷ It is obvious that the brothers were mindful of avoiding any Ottoman reaction to Crimean operations in Rumeli, particularly considering the jitters in the capital about Tatar activity in Rumeli and the past rumors of a planned invasion of Edirne. There was likely something more behind the brothers' seemingly more conciliatory attitude toward the Porte.

⁴⁵Roe, dispatch of 12/22 March 1625 (*Negotiations*, p. 362).

⁴⁶Mehmed Gerey to Zygmunt III, presented at Warsaw *sejm* on 3 March 1625 (BCz 2246, pp. 73-77).

⁴⁷Mehmed Pasha to Zygmunt III, Djumada II 1034/11 March-8 April 1625 (BK O 142-d).

Baranowski sees a definite improvement in relations between the Khanate and the Porte at this time. According to him, although there are no direct Ottoman or Crimean sources explaining how such an improvement came about, it is reflected in the change in the tenor of the letters to the Crown from the end of 1624 or beginning of 1625. As was typical of normal, that is, bordering on hostile, Crimean-Crown relations, the letters contain demands for the regular and timely delivery of the annual *upominki* and exhortations of the king to be on good terms with the Porte. Mehmed Gerey even demanded that the Cossacks be suppressed and prevented from going out onto the Black Sea.⁴⁸ Baranowski is correct in sensing a change in attitude to the Crown in Mehmed's, and even in Şahin Gerey's, letters. The reasons for such a shift went beyond the inclination of Mehmed Gerey toward a reconciliation with the Porte as is evident above and the preference on the part of both brothers to "play it safe" during Şahin's Bucak venture. Given the Crown's cautious and noncommittal reaction in the previous October to the *kalga*'s overtures for a full alliance, a rapprochement with the Porte was desirable, if not imperative. However, as Baranowski himself points out, Şahin Gerey (unlike the khan) still mentioned in his letter his relationship with the Zaporozhian Cossacks.⁴⁹ Thus it is not entirely accurate to speak in terms of Crimean-Ottoman relations, and at that, of a warming in those relations. Rather, what occurred was another bifurcation in the Crimea's international relations that was the result of the two brothers' differing political orientations. If Mehmed Gerey had been willing to acquiesce to Şahin Gerey's alliance with the Polish Crown and Ukrainian Cossacks in the second half of 1624, certainly by the early 1625 he was earnestly, although probably not sincerely, mending his relations with the Porte. As for Şahin Gerey, his present loyal posture before the Porte was a complete sham. As always, he was playing off two, three, or more sides at the same time. Thus, not only did

⁴⁸Baranowski, *Polska a Tatarszczyzna*, pp. 38-39.

⁴⁹Baranowski, *Polska a Tatarszczyzna*, p. 39.

he mention in his letter his relationship with the Zaporozhians, but he also requested the king to allow an unspecified number of them to join him after their Easter. Moreover, in a letter to Crown *hetman* Koniecpolski from the same months, Şahin Gerey listed the Ottomans among the common enemies of the Khanate and Commonwealth. Although in this and in the aforementioned letter to the king, Şahin Gerey adopted a friendlier tone than did Mehmed Gerey, the return to a more traditional relationship with the Crown is evident in the *kalga*'s insistence on the Crown's payment of the traditional *upominki* in addition to the dispatch of Zaporozhian troops. By contrast, as evident above, in his first overture to the Crown in August 1624, he was willing to forego cash *upominki* entirely if only he would be sent powder and lead.⁵⁰

Despite any gestures that Şahin Gerey made to the Porte, by no means did the Ottomans now trust him, nor did he feel his position to be more secure in the Crimea. According to a Tatar *confessata*, Şahin Gerey made haste in returning to the Crimea at the end of the Bucak campaign, lest the Ottomans make a move for the Crimea by sea in his absence.⁵¹ Indeed, during the late spring of 1625, there were several Ottoman attempts to reconnoiter the Crimea and strengthen their position in Kefe. Roe told of a single galley arriving at Kefe to "discover the countenance of the Tartars," only to have its captain advised by the local Ottoman pasha not to come ashore. And so the galley returned to Istanbul with uncertain news. (Certainly the Ottomans still felt their position in the Crimea to be in jeopardy, as shortly thereafter, news, or more accurately, a rumor, arrived at the capital that the Tatars and Cossacks were making new plans to take Kefe).⁵² The Muscovite sources relate another Ottoman mission to the Crimea, also in the spring, in which a different scenario evolved. When new Ottoman forces arrived at Kefe, Mehmed

⁵⁰BK 201, fol. 240b-41a.

⁵¹BK 201, fol. 242a.

⁵²Roe, dispatch of 12/22 June 1625 (*Negotiations*, p. 410).

Gerey came out to them and honoring them, declared that he stood with and not against the sultan. Meanwhile, Şahin Gerey fled the Crimea with his *kızılbaş* retinue toward the vicinity of Özi where he summoned to his side forces of the Lesser Nogays. However, the Ottoman force acted with caution and, strengthening their authority and garrison in Kefe, departed without engaging either of the brothers.⁵³

The Raids of the Cossacks and the Battle of Kara Harman, 1625

In 1625 the Cossacks, especially the Zaporozhians, operated in virtual armadas on the Black Sea. Considering the magnitude of the Cossack presence, however, the available information on their raids is rather scarce. In February, the papal nuncio in Warsaw reported that not only had the Cossacks increased the number of their boats, but that their new ones were larger than usual.⁵⁴ After the disaster in the Crimea and the trouble on the Black Sea in the previous year, the Ottomans were under no illusions as to what would follow in the current year. Throughout the winter, the naval arsenal in Istanbul prepared for the fleet to sail into the Black Sea, resigned to leaving the Mediterranean undefended for a second year in a row.⁵⁵

The Crimean-Zaporozhian alliance heightened Ottoman vulnerability in the Black Sea. Already in the spring of 1625, according to Şahin Gerey's envoy to the Commonwealth, the *kalga* sent his envoy Begtimir to the Cossacks bidding them to go out to sea, promising to send men (as guides?) and money. This envoy stated that 120 boats did set out under Doroşenko, while 3,000 Zaporozhians remained in their *kuren*'s with a certain Zaxara as *hetman*.⁵⁶ According to the Muscovite sources, as early as March, the

⁵³Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, pp. 116-17 (*Krymskie dela*).

⁵⁴Dispatch of 9 February 1625 (*Litterae Nuntiorum*, 4, no. 1753, p. 159-60).

⁵⁵Roe, dispatch of 21 February 1625 (*Negotiations*, p. 357).

⁵⁶BK 201, fol. 234b.

Zaporozhians had sent out two large flotillas of 150 and 120 boats.⁵⁷ On 12/22 March, Roe wrote that the Cossacks had been spotted and were rumored to exceed 300 boats, news that resulted in a large movement of the residents of the Bosphorus into Istanbul.⁵⁸

By the first days of June, word reached Istanbul that a major raid had occurred at Trabzon. A large fleet (160 boats and 6,500 men, according to a nuncio in Boscencino; 250, according to the nuncio in Poland; 250 boats, according to de Cesy, and 300, according to Roe), destroyed the suburbs and attacked the neighboring coast, but the inner fortress of Trabzon survived.⁵⁹ In the Muscovite sources, a story is related which claims to explain why the entire city was not destroyed: Sometime in the spring, the Zaporozhians and Don Cossacks⁶⁰ set out to sea, but before crossing, decided to divide into separate parties and rendezvous on the Anatolian shore. When the Don Cossacks arrived first and found Trabzon within view, they decided to attack without waiting for their allies.⁶¹ After a battle which lasted for four days, they were able to take the outer city. However, even after the Zaporozhians arrived, the inner walls held up and the Cossacks were forced to retire after suffering serious casualties.⁶² According to the papal nuncio in Boscencino, the

⁵⁷Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 114 (*Krymskie dela*). Novosel'skij says that these two raids were undertaken to defend the Crimea from the Ottomans, but it is not clear whether this information is in his source or this is merely his own supposition.

⁵⁸*Negotiations*, pp. 362-63.

⁵⁹De Cezy, dispatch of 5 June 1625 (*Historica Russiae monumenta/Akty istoričeskie odnosjaščiesja k Rossii*, 2, ed. A. I. Turgenev, St. Petersburg: Tipografija Eduarda Praca, 1842, p. 430); Roe, dispatch of 12/22 June 1625 (*Negotiations*, p. 410).

⁶⁰Only the number of Don Cossacks, 2,030, is given, which would have meant about 40 *čajkas* (*Donskie dela*, 1, ed. B. G. Družinin, St. Petersburg: Arxeografičeskaja komisija, 1898 = *Russkaja istoričeskaja biblioteka*, 18, col. 219; also in *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiej. Dokumenty v trex tomax*, 1: 1620-1647, Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk, 1953, no. 18, col. 235).

⁶¹In the opinion of one author, out of greed (*Istoričeskoe opisanie zemli Vojska donskogo*, 1, Novočerkassk: Izdanie Vojskovogo statističeskogo komiteta, 1869, p. 187), and in that of another, so as not to lose the element of surprise (Ju. P. Tušin, *Russkoe moreplavanie na Kaspijskom, Azovskom i Černom morjax (XVII vek)*. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo «Nauka», Glavnaja redakcija vostočnoj literatury, 1978, p. 114).

⁶²*Donskie dela*, 1, col. 235; *Istoričeskoe opisanie*, pp. 187-88 (*Krymskie and Donskie dela*). After the withdrawal the Zaporozhians accused the Don Cossacks of violating their agreement to besiege the city

Cossacks raided three other fortified places besides Trabzon, killing many people and suffering heavy losses themselves (3,000 men including two commanders [*generale*] and eight boats with their crews sunk in a storm).⁶³ They captured three Turkish notables including a naval official (*prefetto di que mari*, perhaps a local *kapudan*?) who, in vain, offered the Cossacks a ransom of 300 enslaved Cossacks.⁶⁴

After sailing back across the sea, at least some of the Cossacks, rather than returning to their river homes, stopped over at the port of Gözleve (Jevpatorija) in southwestern Crimea, which was under the authority of the Crimean Khanate.⁶⁵ De Cezy and the papal nuncio in Venice confirmed that the Cossacks went to the Crimea after the Trabzon raid, and the papal nuncio stated that they moved their booty there. These latter two reports placed Cossacks—probably a different party returning from Trabzon—at Kefe, although it should be noted that around this time, the Ottomans strengthened their control of Kefe. In any event, these stopovers were seen as certain proof that the Zaporozhian Cossacks and Tatars were in alliance.⁶⁶ Later on in September, Jerzy Zbaraski, perhaps referring to this incident, wrote, “when a storm on the sea cast them about, they landed

together and so, a battle broke out between them resulting in the death of “one of the best Don *atamans*.” Thereafter the two sides separated and went their own ways. The papal nuncio also reported that the Cossacks did not take the citadel but nevertheless captured very rich booty (dispatch from Venice, 12 July 1625, *Litterae Nuntiorum*, 4, no. 1804, pp. 187-88).

⁶³In a Polish copy of a letter from Mehmed Diak Pasha to Koniecpolski, the same figure of 3,000 Cossacks slain at Trabzon is given. In this letter it is stated that the Cossacks unsuccessfully attacked Samsun before going to Trabzon; after three days there they moved on to attack a place called “Oliwar” where they were also unsuccessful and suffered heavy losses (again 3,000 claimed by Mehmed Pasha); finally they burned some empty galleys and withdrew. Another letter, by *kaymakam* Gürcü Mehmed Pasha, states that there were 205 Zaporozhian and Don *čajkas* involved in these raids and that they lost less than a thousand men at Sinop. (Hruševs'kyj, *Istoriija*, 7, p. 536, n. 1).

⁶⁴Dispatch of 11 July 1625 (*Litterae Nuntiorum*, 4, no. 1801, p. 186-87). An envoy of Şahin Gerye to the Commonwealth also mentions the Cossak raid on Trabzon (“this year the Cossacks slaughtered Trabzon,” BK 201, fol. 235a).

⁶⁵BK 201, fol. 235a.

⁶⁶The nuncio as well as de Cezy placed the Cossacks in Kefe, which would have been unlikely as by this time the city was back in Ottoman control (dispatch of 12 July 1625, *Litterae Nuntiorum*, 4, no. 1804, p. 187-88; De Cezy, dispatch of 5 June 1625, *Historica Russiae*, pp. 429-30).

near one of his [the khan's] towns which lies on the sea, and they were given provisions and their boats were fixed upon his order."⁶⁷ Şahin Gerey's envoy to the Commonwealth provided further evidence of the solidarity between the Zaporozhians and Şahin, as well as of a rift between Şahin and his brother, Khan Mehmed Gerey, regarding relations with the Ottomans: "[after the raid on Trabzon] Şahin Gerey ordered his barber-surgeon (*balwierz*) to care for some of the heavily wounded officers (*starszyny*) and [regular] Cossacks. When the khan learned this, he wrote to him that he should send them to Istanbul. Having read this, [Şahin] tore up the card in front of the [khan's (?)] envoy."⁶⁸

The evidence of a functioning alliance between the Zaporozhian Cossacks and Şahin Gerey increased the anxiety of both the Porte and the Poles. Roe related that a galley was sent to Kefe to feel out the attitude of the khan, but upon its arrival, the governor of Kefe advised its captain not to even set foot in the city. Instead of clarifying the situation in the Khanate, a rumor began to circulate that the Tatars and Cossacks had designs on Kefe, which Roe in this context called "the chief seat and port of the Euxine." It was at about this time that the grand admiral (*kapudan pasa*) set sail for the Black Sea, having with him besides the ships of the naval arsenal, "all the galleys of the Archipelago," that is, the so-called *beg* ships (*beg gemileri*, see glossary s.v. *beg gemisi*), altogether, Roe suggested, numbering 60 ships⁶⁹ of all types.⁷⁰ In his letter to the king, Zbaraski notes with alarm the continued relations of the Zaporozhians with Şahin Gerey:

⁶⁷*Listy Zbaraskiego*, no. 50, p. 97 (22 September 1625, from Pilic); also in *Sbornik letopisej*, p. 254.

⁶⁸BK 201, fol. 235a.

⁶⁹According to Katib Çelebi, Receb Pasha's fleet consisted of 43 galleys and galliots (Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, 2, Istanbul: Ceride-i Havâdis Matba'ası, 1287/1870-1871, p. 52).

⁷⁰Dispatch of 12/22 June 1622 (*Negotiations*, p. 410). The rumors in Istanbul had been even more ominous according to Roe. It was said that had the winter not been so mild and the Danube not frozen over, the Tatars would have taken advantage of the season when the Ottoman forces were largely demobilized by coming up to very the gates of the city.

. . . [Şahin Gerey] could in no way desert [the Cossacks], not because of agreement which he has with them, for such faith is not worth much on either side, but because of his own needs which forces him to keep to the agreement with them, for he has [at his side] the ever-hostile Turks who he cannot trust and for this there is no better aid than [the Cossacks] to thus inspire fear in the Turks . . . The Commonwealth has come to the state that these its servants (the Cossacks) have such a chief ally who will of necessity defend them. I take this danger more seriously than Gustav [Adolphus] and all others . . .⁷¹

In the second half of July or in early August of 1625, the Zaporozhians encountered Ottoman forces near Özi. Earlier in the month when the fleet entered Varna, a bloody clash between the janissaries of the fleet and the *cebecis* garrisoned in the city had occurred in which at one point all the janissaries left the ships to join the fray, leaving the ships defenseless before possible Cossack attack.⁷² When thereafter a mutiny of the janissaries further delayed the fleet, grand admiral Receb sent a fleet of 180 boats ("frigates," i.e., *firkatas*) ahead under the command of a certain Saksakı ("Sacksachi") Pasha to guard the mouth of the Dnieper. Upon arriving at Özi and finding all quiet, Saksakı went ashore, as it was the first day of the *bayram* after Ramadan ("the Biram day," 7 July). During the feast the Cossacks made a surprise attack and destroyed his fleet, killing many of his men and nearly capturing him.⁷³ According to a letter by Zbaraski, the Cossacks not only killed many Turks and destroyed many of their boats (*czajky*, i.e., *şayqas*), but also captured

⁷¹22 September 1625, from Pilic (*Listy Zbaraskiego*, no. 50, p. 97; also in *Sbornik letopisej*, pp. 254-55).

⁷²Dispatch of 14 July 1625 (*Negotiations*, pp. 419-20). Katib Çelebi gives a brief mention of this incident, but his date, *'Id-i adha* (10 Dhu'l-Hijja/13 September 1625) is unacceptable; perhaps he meant the *'Id-i fur* which in 1034 A. H. fell in July, which correlates with Roe's dispatch (Katib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, p. 72).

⁷³Dispatch of 30 July 1625 (*Negotiations*, p. 426).

artillery pieces and thereafter proceeded to storm the Özi fortress complex itself. However, their assault was unsuccessful and cost the Cossacks one or two thousand lives.⁷⁴

Learning of the trouble at Özi, Receb Pasha and the main fleet sailed with all speed for the mouth of the Dnieper but upon arrival found no sign of the Cossacks. According to Roe, Receb Pasha proceeded on to Kefe only to receive word from the governor-general of Özi that, on the night after he left, the Cossacks had entered the Black Sea and headed toward the Bosphorus.⁷⁵ According to Katib Çelebi, Receb Pasha was persuaded by the residents of Özi to guard the mouth of the Dnieper by which the Cossacks would undoubtedly pass on their return trip; after a period of defending the “Özi Straits,” he set out for the Bosphorus out of fear that the Cossacks would strike there.⁷⁶ What followed was a great naval battle with the Cossacks which made a greater impression on the sources than any before or after. There are two main independent accounts which are for the most part in agreement, namely, that preserved in the Ottoman chronicle tradition, and that of Thomas Roe.⁷⁷ In addition, some important details are given by de Cesy and d’Ascoli.⁷⁸

Near Kara Harman (today Vadu, at the southern end of the Danubian delta), the fleet caught up with the Cossacks just as the morning rose. Because the sea was extremely calm and because the galley oarsmen were exhausted from the pursuit, the ships of the fleet had spread out along the way—of 43 ships, only 21 were with the grand admiral. Of

⁷⁴22 September 1625 (*Listy Zbaraskiego*, no. 50, p. 96).

⁷⁵Dispatch of 30 July/9 August 1625 (*Negotiations*, p. 426-27).

⁷⁶However the information in Roe makes it impossible for Receb Paşa to have stayed at Özi for a month and a half as is stated by the chronicle (Katib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, pp. 72-73).

⁷⁷Katib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, pp. 72-74 and *Tuhfet*, pp. 110-11; Na’ima, *Tarih*, 2, pp. 356-60; *Collectanea*, pp. 178-82; Hammer, *Geschichte*, 5, pp. 50-52; *Negotiations*, p. 427 (dispatch of 30 July/9 August 1625).

⁷⁸Dispatches of 13 July and 5 October 1625 (*Historica Russiae*, p. 430); [Emiddio Dortelli d’Ascoli], “Opisanie Černogo morja i Tatarii sostavil dominikanec Emiddio Dortelli d’Ascoli, prefekt Kaffy, Tatarii i proč. 1634,” ed. A. Berthier-Delagard, *Zapiski Odesskogo obščestva istorii i drevnostej* 24 (1902), p. 98.

these, nine were janissary ships.⁷⁹ The Cossack fleet had 350 or more *čajkas* (with 50 musketeers per boat, according to the chronicle and 40 to 80 musketeers, according to Roe). The Ottoman chronicle states that the Cossacks were emboldened by the calm waters since “in windy weather a hundred *čajkas* cannot battle a single galley, whereas in calm weather a single *čajka* can do battle with a galley,” and thus they attacked Receb Pasha’s fleet. According to both accounts, the battle was furious to the utmost. The Cossack fleet engulfed its enemy, with several *čajkas* surrounding each galley. The *čajkas* and galleys were so mingled that the Ottomans could not lend mutual support or use their artillery without harming their own ships. The Cossacks boarded the ships and engaged the Turks in hand-to-hand combat. Because the sterns of the galleys were armed with cannons (*darbzen*) and had musket-armed troops, the Cossacks preferred to board the ships from the front and sides. They especially went after the *baštarda* of the grand admiral, distinguished by the three lanterns that hung from its stern. Boarding its deck, they fought their way toward the rear, reaching as far as the middle or main mast. From the rear they broke off the rudder (which was refastened “by four Christian slaves,” according to Roe) and cut the ship’s rigging.⁸⁰ To add to the problems of the grand admiral’s *baštarda*, the chronicle reports that all of its oarsmen were Cossack slaves (*kazak forsa* in *Fezleke*) who quit rowing when the battle began, and according to Na‘ima, would have joined the battle on the side of their compatriots had they not been bound by chains. Other commander’s ships did not fare much better. The chronicle mentions the ship of Hacı Mehmed (“Memi,” the *tersane kethuda*, or the deputy of the grand admiral) as nearly lost and that of Uzun (“Long”) Piyale as attacked by a great number of Cossacks. The casualties on both sides were high (Roe claimed that the janissaries were almost entirely

⁷⁹In the Ottoman fleet different troops were carried on separate ships; hence the sources refer to *yeniçeri gemileri*, *cebeci gemileri*, etc.

⁸⁰D’Ascoli claims that the Cossacks actually took control of the stern part of the *kapudan*’s ship.

demolished). The chronicle does mention some Ottoman successes in the first part of the battle—the sinking of some of the Cossack *čajkas* around the grand admiral's *baştarda* by using its cannons, Piyale's ability to overcome his attackers who vastly outnumbered him (for his bravery, after the battle he was named as the new *tersane kethudası*)⁸¹; the effective performance of the janissaries on the ship of Katib Mahmud Efendi, and the unequaled swiftness of Can 'Alim-zade Aga's ship and the performance of its musket-bearing troops. But according to all the sources, the Cossacks increasingly took the upper hand, and annihilation of the entire fleet was imminent.

Suddenly a strong north wind arose, raising the sea and filling the sails of the galleys. This brought a complete turnabout in the battle—the Cossacks were forced to retreat to their boats, many of which capsized under the waves. With the wind separating the galleys from the *čajkas*, the former were able to turn their artillery against the latter. The Ottoman chronicle tradition, Roe, de Cesy, and d'Ascoli⁸² all testify that the Ottoman fleet was on the verge of annihilation. But instead of an incredible Cossack victory, according to the chronicles, out of 350 *čajkas*, 30 with great difficulty fled to the shore and the rest filled with water. However, despite the flooding, the boats managed to stay above water, which Na'ima explains by the bunches of reeds the Cossacks had tied to their *čajkas*, and they continued to fight through the evening.⁸³ The *čajkas* that did not sink and those Cossacks who did not drown, 170 and 781, respectively, were captured and registered. According to Roe, the losses of the Cossacks were 30 *čajkas* and 600 or 700

⁸¹On Piyale's distinguished career see Victor Ostapchuk, "Five Documents from the Topkapı Palace Archive on the Ottoman Defense of the Black Sea against the Cossacks (1639)" in *Raiyyet Rüşumû: Essays Presented to Halil İnalcık on his Seventieth Birthday by his Colleagues and Students*, Cambridge, Mass., 1987 = *Journal of Turkish Studies* 11 (1987): 49-104.

⁸²According to d'Ascoli, this was the opinion of eyewitnesses to the event.

⁸³Na'ima, *Tarih*, 2, pp. 359.

men captured while de Cesy places the losses at a very low 200 or 300 men for each side.⁸⁴

The Ottoman chronicle calls the encounter at Kara Harman the greatest naval battle ever fought with the Cossacks and tells of Receb Pasha's return to the Porte with great honor and his presentation of the captured *çajkas* and Cossacks. Roe also mentioned the great triumph of the grand admiral at Istanbul as he brought back 270 Cossacks and was received as if he were a second Pompei. Aside from the lower figures for the number of boats and men lost by the Cossacks in Roe and de Cesy, there are other indications that the chronicle exaggerates the degree of the Ottoman victory.⁸⁵ De Cesy simply stated that the grand admiral did not gain as great an advantage over the Cossacks as he advertised at the Porte and was only saved by the north wind. In fact, according to the French ambassador, when the wind began to die down in the evening, the Cossacks were ready to give chase to the Ottoman fleet. That the danger from the Cossacks was still present is clear in Roe where Receb Pasha appeals to the capital for reinforcements and supplies and in response to which all available troops including retirees (*emeriti milites*), seven galleys, and supplies were sent to guard the Bosphorus at Kavak (Canachi) and to the fleet.⁸⁶ After relating Receb Pasha's triumph, Roe gave the following assessment of the encounter:

Non de victoria, sed de non victo triumphavit. They esteem this sea-fight next to that of Lepanto, and nobler for the escape: for doubtless, if the wind had not risen too great for the frigates [i.e., *çajkas*], which were in number

⁸⁴The letter of K. Zbaraski to the king from 22 September cited above states that together the storm and the galleys destroyed several tens of Zaporozhian boats (*Listy Zbaraskiego*, no. 50, p. 97).

⁸⁵For another example of the difference in figures, whereas the Ottoman chronicle says that there were 20 to 30 *çaykas* for each galley, Roe gives a figure of three or four for each galley (dispatch of 30 July 1625, *Negotiations*, p. 427).

⁸⁶Dispatches of 10/20 and 11/21 August 1625 (*Negotiations*, pp. 427, 431).

above 400, the whole fleet had been in danger to have been towed northwards.⁸⁷

The opinion that the claims of the Ottoman chronicle were exaggerated is expressed by other authors as well.⁸⁸ Nevertheless, it is confirmed by both the chronicles and Roe⁸⁹ that the Ottoman fleet lost only four galleys, and not in the battle, but afterward in a storm at Balçık.⁹⁰

Despite their disaster at Kara Harman, the Zaporozhians still managed to attack Kili and Akkerman on the way back.⁹¹ In fact, according to reports of the papal nuncios, the Cossacks continued to be active on the Black Sea throughout the summer of 1625.

⁸⁷Dispatch of 9/19 September 1625 (*Negotiations*, p. 439).

⁸⁸Hruševs'kyj, *Istoriya*, 7, p. 536; Zinkeisen, *Geschichte*, p. 497; Berthier-Delagard in his commentary to d'Ascoli (d'Ascoli, "Opisanie," pp. 147-48); Tušin, *Moreplavanie*, p. 115.

⁸⁹Dispatch of 9/19 August 1625 (*Negotiations*, p. 431)..

⁹⁰Various reports of papal nuncios refer to a great battle in 1625 which they considered to have been a Cossack victory (dispatches of 17 [Naistatt], 24 [Naistatt], 27 September [Venice] and 4 October 1625 [Rome], *Litterae Nuntiorum*, no. 1813, pp. 191-92; no. 1814, p. 192; 1815, p. 192-93; no. 1818, p. 94). The most detailed report, from Naistatt dated 1 October, relays reports from agents of the emperor in Sofia and Istanbul. First it tells of an encounter between "Sedar [i. e., *serdar*] Sciakracksy Bassa" (probably the same as Saksaki ["Sacksachi"] Pasha above) who was in charge of a fleet of 260 boats which was almost completely wiped out by the Cossacks near Őzi ("Osia"). Three days latter 16 galleys (in the other reports mentioned above a figure of 40 for the number of Ottoman galleys is given) were attacked by the Cossacks and, in a battle which took place from sunrise to sunset, the Cossacks boarded the galleys and especially went after the galley of the *kapudan paša* in which they destroyed the sails and rudder. They would have done the same to the other ships had not a great storm come up. While the galleys were severely damaged "with no more that 20 persons surviving on each one," the Cossacks suffered light damages and after the battle were reinforced with 120 more boats so that with a fleet of 500 boats, they were preparing to attack Istanbul. Despite the somewhat different outcome of the second battle, the features of this report seem unmistakably to be those of the battle of Saksaki Pasha near Őzi related above and that of the battle at Kara Harman. However, in light of the reports by de Cesy and Roe, the first ones of which were from 12 July and 30 July/9 August, respectively, the dates given in this Italian report for the actual battles, 6 and 9 August, seem to be erroneous.

⁹¹*Listy Zbaraskiego*, no. 50, p. 97 (they "burned the Kili town" according to Zbaraski); Hruševs'kyj, *Istoriya*, 7, p. 536, n. 1 (letter of Mehmed Deak Pasha to Koniecpolski). Although both of these sources consider the attack on Kili to have been perpetrated by Cossacks from the fleet returning from Kara Harman, from what is now known about the widespread operations of separate parties of Cossacks it cannot be ruled out that this raid was carried out by another flotilla or that the Kara Harman Cossacks were reinforced on their return trip (see Ostapchuk, "Five Documents").

Unfortunately, most of these references are without specifics and it is usually impossible to determine the date of the reported news.⁹²

The Polish Campaign against the Cossacks of 1625 and its Aftermath

In the second half of 1625, Warsaw finally moved against the Ukrainian Cossacks with a commission headed by the Crown *hetman* Koniecpolski and backed up by the Crown army as well as by private armies of various magnates and nobles. In Chapter I, it was seen that already in late 1621, after Cossack service at Xotyn' had ended and it had become evident that the non-registered Cossacks would not obediently demobilize and leave the Cossack estate, a commission to deal with the Cossack problem was planned and in the first half of 1622, it was already functioning. However, in that year as in the following, a lack of funds in the state treasury, which provoked a confederation of unpaid Crown troops into being, meant that a reckoning with Cossacks had to be put off another year. In 1624 those troops which the Crown could afford to pay for were engaged against the large raid from the Bucak. Meanwhile, in the years since Xotyn', the Cossacks had not only become immune from the government's attempts to restrict their activities, but they had also grown into a force that began to act on the international scene, independently and boldly as never before. With every year, their presence on the Black Sea burgeoned. As to the Crimea, not only had they assisted it militarily, but they concluded a formal treaty and were continuing to coordinate their Black Sea adventures with Şahin Girey's interests. At the same time, in conjunction with the Orthodox hierarchy, they were carrying on relations with the tsar, in hope of financial and religious support.⁹³

⁹²Typical references are "the Cossacks continue to depredate the Ottoman regions" (dispatches from Venice, 9 August 1625, *Litterae Nuntiorum*, nos. 1807, 1808, p. 189), "the Cossacks have made new raids on the Black Sea" (dispatches from Venice, 12 July and 30 August 1625, *Litterae Nuntiorum*, nos. 1803, 1809, 1810, pp. 187, 189-90).

⁹³The basic work on the Polish-Cossack war of 1625 and its aftermath is still Rudnyc'kyj, "Kozac'ko-pol's'ka vijna." See also the important section in Hruševs'kyj, *Istorija*, 7, pp. 537-61 and Baranowski, *Polska a Tatarszczyzna*, pp. 40-43.

By the summer of 1625, as the Zaporozhians were operating in unprecedented numbers in the Black Sea, the Crown decided that a decisive move had to be made lest the Ottomans make peace with the Safavids and again declare war on Poland-Lithuania. The situation was in fact dangerous for the Commonwealth, since at this time a new war with Sweden was brewing, and it was anticipated that in the following year, it would be necessary to move the Crown army out of the Ukraine to the Baltic. While the literature points to the general danger of an Ottoman war or a renewal of major Tatar raids, it was Şahin Gerey's successful campaign against Kantemir in early 1625 that was crucial in determining the timing of *hetman* Koniecpolski's move against the Cossacks. Since 1624, the Crown had demanded that before it could act to stop its Cossacks from raiding the Black Sea, the Bucak horde first had to be reduced to obedience. Now, thanks to the decisive action of Şahin Gerey (albeit undertaken to strengthen the Crimean Khanate's position in the steppe outside the Crimea rather than to help improve Ottoman-Crown relations), the Bucak horde was bridled. Soon after Şahin's campaign, letters began to arrive to the king, the Crown chancellor, and the Crown hetman from the Özi governor-general Mehmed Deak Pasha stating that the Ottoman part of the bargain had been kept to, and now it was up to the Crown to fulfill its part.⁹⁴ And among the leaders of the Commonwealth, there was full recognition that indeed their turn had come. Although raiding parties from among those Tatars remaining in the Bucak, as well as the Crimean Tatars, were present on the frontiers, the summer of 1625 brought no major incursions, whether from the Bucak or the Crimea.⁹⁵ Thus, on the eve of the campaign against the Cossacks, Jerzy Zbaraski wrote to Zygmunt III, "the Turks have no small point on their side in that they made good on [their side of] the pact between us, for this year they

⁹⁴Jumada II [1034]/11 March-8 April [1625] (BK O 142-d, no pagination).

⁹⁵The presence of Koniecpolski on the frontier undoubtedly played a role in discouraging Tatar raids (also, see below; Baranowski, *Polska a Tatarszczyzna*, pp. 39-40).

brought down the Bucak along with Kantemir and all his Tatars who, praise be to God, did not visit us, and so, [the Turks] will cast before us the fact that we, and not them, are guilty of violating the peace.”⁹⁶

The Polish authorities viewed the Cossack-Crimean relationship as a significant obstacle in suppressing the Cossacks. Just as the Cossacks had come to the aid of the rebellious khan and *kalga* in 1624 against their suzerain the Porte, so it was feared that the opposite would happen if the Cossacks were threatened by their suzerains, or even worse, the alliance would solidify and a league headed by the Cossacks and Tatars would form against the Commonwealth. Consequently, before moving against the Cossacks, Koniecpolski acted to neutralize the Cossack-Tatar alliance. During that summer, Şahin Gerey had been among Tatar raiding parties prowling the Commonwealth’s frontiers.⁹⁷ The sources do not provide an explanation for his activities; perhaps he was planning to enter Podolia because of the Crown’s failure to deliver *upominki* in the last years. Or worse yet for the Crown, perhaps he was preparing to intervene on the side of the Cossacks should they be attacked by the Crown’s forces. At this point Koniecpolski, who was standing with his army between the Čornyj and Kučmans’kyj trails (the two major paths used by the Tatars to reach Podolia and Moldavia, respectively),⁹⁸ acted decisively not by attacking Şahin Gerey, but by buying him off. Sometime in August, the hetman contacted both the *kalga* and Khan Mehmed Gerey in the Crimea, notifying them that the *upominki* for the last two years were waiting in Kamjanec’-Podil’skyj. Because of the critical importance that his bid be accepted, the hetman had his own people deliver these payments directly to Bagçesaray, rather than bringing them halfway, as was the normal

⁹⁶J. Zbaraski to Zygmunt III, 22 September 1625, from Pilic (*Listy Zbaraskiego*, no. 50, p. 97).

⁹⁷*Materijaly* (Kuliš), pp. 266-67.

⁹⁸According to the diary of Koniecpolski’s expedition against the Cossacks, he stood there between 5 July and 13 September 1625 (*Zbiór pamiętników historycznych o dawnej Polsce z rękopismów, tudzież dzieł w różnych językach o Polsce wydanych, oraz z listami oryginalnych królów i znakomitych ludzi w kraju naszym*, 6, 1st edition, ed. J. U. Niemcewicz, Lwów: Ossolineum, 1833, p. 143).

practice. In addition, he promised that from then on, the Commonwealth would again deliver the payments regularly, that is, on an annual basis. And so Şahin Gerey withdrew to the Crimea, leaving the Cossacks with no chance for Crimean support.⁹⁹ Unfortunately, there is nothing in the sources about the repercussions of Şahin Gerey's withdrawal among the Cossacks, neither positive nor negative, nor on how he viewed his acceptance of the *upominki* (of course he considered them his due). In the literature, Koniecpolski is considered to have dissolved the Cossack-Tatar alliance.¹⁰⁰ Certainly this was a possibility. The Cossack officers who were involved in the agreement drawn up at the end of 1624 may have felt betrayed, that is, if they were still in power. However, if those Cossacks, particularly the rank and file, who fought with Şahin Gerey against the Ottomans in 1624 or against Kantemir in early 1625 treated their relationship with the *kalga* as a mercenary one, there would have been no obligations incumbent upon the *kalga* after the given operation, provided he compensated the Cossacks for their services (in the case of the first operation, they were indeed well-compensated, as shown above). Neither side would have felt that Şahin Gerey owed them anything more. In light of the lack of evidence on Cossack attitudes in late 1625 and thereafter to the agreement made with Şahin Gerey in late 1624, it is safest to state that for the time being, any possible Cossack-Tatar alliance was not in effect.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹*Materijaly* (Kuliš), pp. 268-69; Rudnyc'kyj, "Kozacko-pol'ska vijna," pp. 13-14; Hruševs'kyj, *Istorija*, 7, 539-40; Baranowski, *Polska a Tatarszczyzna*, pp. 41-42.

¹⁰⁰Rudnyc'kyj, "Kozacko-pol'ska vijna," p. 14; Hruševs'kyj, *Istorija*, 7, 539-40.

¹⁰¹Baranowski is more measured in his judgment, stating that the Tatars remained neutral (Baranowski, *Polska a Tatarszczyzna*, p. 41). Novosel'skij claims that the Cossack-Tatar alliance must have still been in effect, even after Şahin Gerey's failure to help the Cossacks, since during the following negotiations between Koniecpolski and the Cossacks, they were required to break their alliance with the Tatars (Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 117, n. 71). However, the source which Novosel'skij has in mind concerns only the complaint of the Crown against the Cossacks for their past transgressions, and not necessarily the actual situation after Şahin Gerey's withdrawal. The source in question is the Cossack commission's declaration against the Cossacks in which among their past wrongs is included their carrying on relations with foreign powers and elements such as Muscovy, Şahin Gerey, the Patriarch of Jerusalem, and Yahya and other "imposters" (*Zbiór pamiętników*, 6, p. 179).

With Şahin Gerey and the Tatars neutralized, Koniecpolski was free to move against the Cossacks. During his approach toward and manoeuvres against them, which took several weeks, negotiations were carried out in hopes that a peaceful resolution could be reached. Also the Cossacks were biding their time until more forces arrived from the Zaporizhia. Finally at the end of October, in a battle near Kurukiv Lake (near Kremenčuk) in which neither side won a convincing victory, the Cossacks outnumbered and in an inferior position were forced to give in and accept the conditions laid upon them by the Crown commission. Above, it was seen that the unprecedented level of Zaporozhian Cossack raiding activity on the Black Sea, particularly in 1625, was one of the main reasons the Crown was forced to move against them in the fall of that year. However, the large Cossack presence in the Black Sea in the summer of 1625 (a fleet of 300 *čajkas* meant 15,000 Cossacks), their heavy losses in the battle of Kara Harman, and the fact that not all the surviving Cossacks (and in all likelihood, new expeditions were mounted in the fall) were back in time to aid their brethren contributed to the Cossack defeat at Kurukiv.¹⁰²

During the negotiations before and after the battle, the Cossack response to the demand that they give up their Black Sea raiding activity is telling. In principle, they were ready to revoke this activity entirely if only their pay from the Crown would increase. The Cossacks said they were even prepared to burn their boats, but the Crown had to, in exchange, open up some avenues for their subsistence within the Commonwealth. The contents of these negotiations provide good evidence that indeed the great mass of Cossacks who were unregistered, that is, not on the Crown's payroll, had few options but to descend to the Black Sea in order to subsist.¹⁰³

The main terms at Kurukiv were harsh for the Cossacks. These included a strict enforcement of the 6,000-man Cossack register—all Cossacks beyond the register, that is,

¹⁰²Hruševs'kyj, *Istorija*, 7, p. 537.

¹⁰³On the negotiations see Hruševs'kyj, *Istorija*, 7, pp. 547-52, 556-61.

the *vypysčyky*, were to leave the Cossack estate and return to their previous station, which for most meant serfdom; all expeditions to the Black Sea were to be forgone and the boats were to be burned; and the Crown would have the final say in the choice of Cossack hetman. The new hetman approved by the Crown, Myxajlo Dorošenko, was given the difficult and delicate task of actually executing the Kurukiv terms. That fall, into the first half of 1626, Dorošenko toured the Zaporizhia determining who was eligible for the register and who was not, as well as systematically burning the Cossack boats. The fact that he was able to accomplish his mission to the satisfaction of the Crown while maintaining his authority among the Cossacks is testimony to his skill as a politician.¹⁰⁴

In 1626, perhaps under the influence of the events of the previous summer, a larger than ever Cossack presence on the Black Sea was expected by the Ottomans.¹⁰⁵ Instead, to the great surprise of the Crown, in February, a large Tatar raiding army entered Galicia led by Kantemir.¹⁰⁶ Şahin Gerey did not participate in the raid, but rather, maintained diplomatic contact with the Crown, informing it that the raid was ordered by the Porte. He reportedly even tried to blame the latter by sending to Warsaw an alleged firman of the sultan ordering the raid. Until now, Kantemir had been under Mehmed and Şahin Gerey's control and, unfortunately, there are no indications as to how the relationship between the Nogay chief and the Crimea changed at this time. Nor is the reaction to this raid of the Porte *vis à vis* the Khanate and Kantemir apparent. Before the Commonwealth, however, the Ottomans firmly denied any complicity in this raid. Crown forces, along with the registered Cossacks, intercepted many of the Tatars on their return so that in the end, the raid was not very successful.

¹⁰⁴Myxajlo Hruševs'kyj, *Istoriya Ukrajin-Rusy*, 8, Kiev, 1922; reprint ed., New York: Knyho-spilka, 1956, pp. 19 ff.

¹⁰⁵The comments here are based on discussion and sources cited in Hruševs'kyj, *Istoriya*, 8, pp. 24-32.

¹⁰⁶Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 117, esp. n. 75 (*Krymskie dela*). Previously, without the benefit of the Muscovite sources, this raid was considered the work of Mehmed Gerey, which did not make sense considering the aims of both the Khanate and the Porte at the time (cf. Hruševs'kyj, *Istoriya*, 8, pp. 24-25).

As for the Cossacks, the Crown also expected them to be back on the Black Sea, particularly the “unregistgered” *vypysčyky*. To this effect, Dorošenko was sent on an additional tour of the Zaporizhia to burn boats and establish a loyal Cossack garrison in the Sich. However, a part of the *vypysčyky* did manage to make it out to the sea. In the spring, 60 *čajkas* encountered the Ottoman fleet, which was guarding the vicinity outside the Bosphorus, but were defeated. (In earlier times an incursion by 60 *čajkas* would have been considered a major Cossack raid.) Meanwhile, there were other smaller expeditions in other regions of the Black Sea. One worth noting is a combined Zaporozhian and Don Cossack expedition mounted from the Don by 400 Cossacks on eight boats which successfully raided the vicinity of Trabzon.¹⁰⁷ It is very likely that, as in 1622 when the Zaporozhians were strictly forbidden by the Cossack commission to go to the Black Sea, so too in this year, Zaporozhians, particularly *vypysčyky*, fled to the Don to continue their “trade” there. In any event, the combination of the costly battle at Kara Harman in 1625, the defeat at Kurukiv, and the Crown’s determined efforts to take control of the Zaporizhia and destroy the boats meant that in 1626, the Zaporozhian Cossack presence on the Black Sea was at a significantly lower level than the previous few years.

In September 1626, another large Tatar raid, supposedly led by *nureddin* ‘Azamet Gerey, took place. There was sizable participation by Kantemir’s Nogays, although Kantemir himself did not participate. It is also known that neither Mehmed nor Şahin Gerey took part. This time the raid was directed at the Right Bank Ukraine, in the region of Bila Cerkva. The timing of the raid was an opportune one for the Tatars, since the main Crown forces had recently departed the Ukraine for the Baltic where a new war with Sweden was brewing. Although the raid caused serious damages and dislocation, Crown forces led by Stefan Chmielecki, together with the registered Cossacks led by Dorošenko, defeated the main Tatar force near Bila Cerkva. Again it is not clear who was responsible

¹⁰⁷Hruševs’kyj, *Istorija*, 8, pp. 26-27.

for ordering the raid. Baranowski's argument that Şahin Gerey may have ordered it in an attempt to demonstrate to the Porte that he was not acting in collusion with the Crown is not convincing.¹⁰⁸ Although the sources do not allow a definite explanation for the renewed Tatar raiding activity on the borderlands of the Commonwealth in 1626, one possibility is that there was too much population pressure on the Crimean Tatar economy. It should be recalled that in 1625, Şahin Gerey forced a large portion of the Bucak horde to migrate to the Crimea and neighboring steppe. Thus there must have been a swell in the Crimean and neighboring population. Meanwhile, as was pointed out in Chapter II, raids on Muscovy were severely restricted by Mehmed and Şahin Gerey because of Moscow's assiduousness in paying the *pominki*. The Commonwealth, on the other hand, still owed the Khanate several years of unpaid *upominki*. This circumstance, in combination with population pressure, perhaps caused the raids of 1626. The occurrence of raids at precisely a time when the Cossacks were subdued was again a symptom of the inability and an example of the frustration of the central powers in attempting to control their peripheries. Just as in 1625, when the Crown was unable to keep its Cossacks from deluging the Black Sea even though the Porte had succeeded in subduing the Bucak horde, so in 1625, when the Crown finally did succeed in bringing the Cossacks under control, the Porte could not hold back its Tatars.

¹⁰⁸Baranowski, *Polska a Tatarszczyzna*, p. 61-65.

CHAPTER IV

Hasan Pasha's Campaigns to the Northern Black Sea and the Fall of Mehmed and Şahin Gerey, 1627-1628

The Campaign of Hasan Pasha to Özi, 1627

In December 1626, the Venetian *bailo* in Istanbul reported that the Ottomans were preparing a fleet, to be led by the grand admiral (*kapudan paşa*), whose mission was to be the building of a new fortress to defend against the Cossacks. In January 1627, it was reported that the *voyvodas* of Moldavia and Wallachia had received orders to assist in this expedition and that Şahin Gerey was also ordered to participate.¹ At the same time, the French ambassador, de Cezy, reported that the construction site would be in the estuary of the Dnieper.² Reports of preparations for a large expedition continued to come out of Istanbul in the following months.

This campaign is noted in the main Ottoman chronicle tradition. According to it, the initiative for the expedition came from the Crimean Khanate, as follows: sometime in 1626, Mehmed Gerey sent his master of the horse (*mirahur*), Zu'l-fikar Aga, to the Porte with a letter proposing that if the Ottomans would construct a new fortress on the Dnieper

¹Mihnea Berindei, "La Porte ottomane face aux Cosaques zaporogues, 1600-1637," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 1 (1977): 273-307, esp. p. 296.

²De Cezy, dispatch of 28 January 1627 (*Historica Russiae monumenta/Akty istoričeskie otnosjaščiesja k Rossii*, 2, ed. A. I. Turgenev, St. Petersburg: Tipografija Eduarda Praca, 1842, p. 432); see also papal nuncio dispatch from Istanbul, 12 March 1627, (*Litterae Nuntiorum Apostolicorum historiae Ucrainae illustrantes (1550-1850)*, 4: 1609-1620, ed. Athanasius G. Welykyj, Rome: Basillani, 1959, no. 1940, p. 266).

on the ruins of an old fortress (built in the time of Sultan Süleyman, according to Na'ima, or of Selim II, according to Fezleke) at a river crossing called Togan Geçidi³ through which Cossack *čajkas* freely passed, he would build another fortress on the other side of the river. According to the chronicle, this proposal was accepted by the Porte, which ordered grand admiral Hasan, who was a vizier, to set out with the fleet and begin construction by the *Ruz-i Hızr* on 3 May (*sic*—actually this was the traditional date on which the fleet left the capital for the naval campaigning season). In addition, the Wallachian and Moldavian *voyvodas* were ordered to proceed to the construction site, while Mehmed Gerey was sent a ceremonial sword and robes (*hil'at*) and ordered to the site as well.⁴ The authenticity of the information in the chronicle account, including its details, is supported by a firman of the sultan issued to Mehmed Gerey, ordering him to build the given fortress (the firman was published in Feridun Beg's collection of Ottoman documents).⁵

The story of the Crimean proposal is supported by the contemporary diplomatic reports from Istanbul.⁶ The English ambassador, Sir Thomas Roe, deduced that the proposal was Mehmed Gerey's clever response to an Ottoman plan to order him to lead his forces to eastern Anatolia to participate in the struggle with Iran.⁷ For Mehmed Gerey, departure from the Crimea on a distant campaign would have left him vulnerable to

³Togan Geçidi, "Falcon Ford"; the name of this ford in the Polish sources is Sokoli Brod (e.g., AGAD, LL 30, fol. 387a), which has the same meaning as the Ottoman; the site of the fortress was to be on the right bank of the Dnieper just above the mouth of the Inhulec' and opposite the island of Tavan.

⁴Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, 2, Istanbul: Ceride-i Havâdiş Matba'ası, 1287/1870-1871, p. 91-92; Muştafâ Na'imâ, *Ravzatü'l-hüseyn fî hulâşâti aḥbârî'l-ḥâfîkayn*, 2 [= *Târîḥ*, Istanbul: Matba'a-i 'Âmire, 1281-1283/1864-1866, pp. 398-99.

⁵A similarity of composition suggests that the chronicle account was composed using a copy of this firman (Feridün Beg, *Münşe'âtü's-Selâtin*, 2, Istanbul, 1275/1858-1859, pp. 126-29).

⁶A Venetian report mentioned the khan's master of the horse coming to the Porte (Joseph Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, 5, Pest: C. A. Hartleben's Verlag, 1829, p. 70).

⁷Roe, dispatch of 12/22 June 1626 (*The Negotiations of Sir Thomas Roe in His Embassy to the Ottoman Porte, from the Year 1621-1628 Inclusive* . . . London, 1740, p. 569).

deposition in his absence. For Şahin Gerey, such a mission would have been out of the question, for not only would it have left him vulnerable to elimination from power in the Crimea, but it would also have meant going to war against his long-time patron and in-law, Shah 'Abbas (see Chapter II).

The notion that the expedition to Özi in 1627 was mainly the result of Crimean, and in fact, Şahin Gerey's, intrigue has found acceptance in most of the literature.⁸ However, there is no doubt that the Ottomans had sufficient reasons of their own for such an undertaking. The relative calm on the Black Sea in 1626 after the Polish-Cossack war of the previous fall and measures by the victorious Crown to restrict Cossack activity (see Chapter III) did not lull the Porte into believing that the Cossack depredations experienced in previous years were a thing of the past. Moreover, the Tatar raids of 1626 and the angry reaction of the Crown, which included a threat to sponsor a massive reprisal raid by the Cossacks, was an indication that sooner or later, more Cossack raids were inevitable. The Ottomans, therefore, decided to take advantage of the respite from the Cossacks to strengthen the defenses of the region. In 1626 a new fortress was constructed at Büyük Dere on the Bosphorus which, as was seen in Chapters I-III, was ravaged between 1623 and 1625.⁹ By fall 1626, the upcoming campaign season must have seemed a good opportunity to seriously bolster the defense of the Black Sea. There was a pause in the war with Iran, although the main Ottoman army was still stationed in eastern Anatolia.¹⁰ Meanwhile, the Crown hetman, Stanisław Koniecpolski, had gone with the Crown's main

⁸Myxajlo Hruševs'kyj, *Istoriya Ukrajin-Rusy*, 8, Kiev, 1922; reprint ed., New York: Knyho-Spilka, 1956; Bohdan Baranowski, *Polska a Tatarszczyzna w latach 1624-1629*, Łódź: Łódzkie Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1948, pp. 66-67.

⁹Hammer, *Geschichte*, 5, p. 71; Stefan Rudnyc'kyj, "Ukrajins'ki kozaky v 1625-30 rr.," *Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva im. Ševčenko* 31-32 (1899): 1-76, esp. 20.

¹⁰Ismail Hami Danişmend, *İzahlı osmanlı tarihi kronolojisi*, 3: M. 1574-1703, H. 987-1115, Istanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1972, pp. 335-36.

army to the Baltic to fight Sweden.¹¹ In addition, a substantial force of Cossacks, mostly *vypysčyky* or Cossacks not allowed into the register, were being enlisted for the Baltic war. This lent hope to the Ottomans that, as long as these Cossacks were away, raiding activity on the Black Sea would remain at a lower level.¹²

Initially there were signs that a truly large Ottoman force was to be massed at the mouth of the Dnieper. According to de Cezy, the imperial divan's original decision was to send 50 galleys from Istanbul and 500 boats from the Danube. The Venetian *bailo* indicated that Moldavian and Wallachian forces sent by land were to be 5,000 men each.¹³ These Rumanian forces were called upon to help defend the construction site lest the Cossacks attempt to obliterate the new impediment to their entry into the Black Sea.¹⁴ The Crimean Tatar force was, also according to the Venetian *bailo*, to be a large one.¹⁵

As the traditional time of the fleet's annual departure approached (late April or early May), it became clear that there were problems in assembling the intended force. There is no information on the proceedings in the imperial naval arsenal in Istanbul, whether delays were caused, for example, by problems with the repair, construction or the outfitting of the ships, by shortages of materials, or by tardiness in the arrival of oarsmen from the provinces. Neither is there any information on the preparations of the troops and laborers to be carried by the ships. At one point the nuncio in Venice transmitted news which

¹¹Thus, the papal nuncio at the Porte reported that the expedition was being mounted to take advantage of the war between the Commonwealth and Sweden (dispatch of 12 March 1627, Istanbul, *Litterae Nuntiorum*, no. 1940, p. 266).

¹²Rudnyc'kyj, "Ukrajins'ki kozaky v 1625-30," p. 26. Rudnyc'kyj acknowledges that even without the Crimean offer to help build fortresses, the Ottomans had plenty of reasons on their own.

¹³De Cezy, dispatch of 28 January 1627, (*Historica Russiae*, p. 432); Zorzi Giustinian, dispatch of 28 January 1627, Istanbul (*Documente privitoare la istoria Românilor*, ed. Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki, 4-1: 1600-1649, Bucharest: Sub auspiciile Ministeriului Cultelor și Instrucțiunii publice și ale Academiei Române, 1882, no. 372, p. 417).

¹⁴Baranowski, *Polska a Tatarszczyzna*, pp. 67-68. Such an attack was considered almost a certainty.

¹⁵Of course his figure of 40,000 Tatars was highly exaggerated (Zorzi Giustinian, dispatch of 28 January 1627, Istanbul, *Documente* [Hurmuzaki], 4-1, no. 372, p. 417).

suggests that there were problems in preparing the fleet. According to the report, the fleet destined to sail for the Black Sea would have no more than twenty or twenty-five galleys,¹⁶ which would have meant a naval expedition nearly half the size of the traditional imperial fleet of 40 ships. Meanwhile, at the end of April it was reported from Istanbul that on the twenty-sixth of that month, the galley of a certain Mehmed Pasha departed from the city together with some galliots (*galiotte*, i.e., the Ottoman *kalyata*) to sail toward Kefe in order to gather information (*per pigliar lingua*, i.e., by capturing informants) and repel a force of 70 Cossack *čajkas* that had supposedly gone out to impede the progress of the fleet and was near Varna.¹⁷ This was probably the same Mehmed Pasha whom the Ottoman chronicle mentions as the man considered most capable of overseeing the necessary preparations at the site and who was therefore appointed as the new governor-general (*beglerbegi*) of Özi.¹⁸ As for the Cossacks, despite the hope of the Porte that their presence on the Black Sea would decrease in 1627, rumors in the capital's diplomatic community persisted all spring that the Zaporozhians in particular would cause some mischief in order to prevent the construction of the fortresses.¹⁹ There is, however, no confirmation in the Polish sources or in the correspondence between the Porte and the Crown of any such Cossack actions that spring.

Sometime at the end of May, grand admiral Hasan Pasha led his fleet into the Bosphorus. Diplomatic reports issued after the actual departure from the arsenal almost unanimously referred to 50 galleys, while Ottoman correspondence to Warsaw boasted of an even larger naval force. In addition, there were two galleons laden with hardware.

¹⁶Nuncio dispatch of 10 April 1627, Venice (*Litterae Nuntiorum*, 4, no. 1944, p. 268).

¹⁷Nuncio dispatch of 30 April 1627, Istanbul (*Litterae Nuntiorum*, 4, no. 1951, p. 271-72).

¹⁸Katib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, p. 92.

¹⁹De Cezy, dispatch of 30 April 1627, (*Historica Russiae*, p. 432); nuncio dispatches of 20 April, Provato; 8 May, Venice; 22 May, Venice (*Litterae Nuntiorum*, 4, no. 1946, p. 269; no. 1952, p. 272; no. 1954, p. 273).

Later on it would be reported on the Polish side that Hasan Pasha arrived in Özi with 46 ships.²⁰ Therefore, despite earlier indications that the fleet might not be so large, in the end, Hasan Pasha did manage to outfit a rather large fleet. However, judging by the problems that the Ottoman fleet had had in recent years in manning its ships with oarsmen and warriors²¹ and by the weakness of Hasan Pasha's forces during his upcoming mission at Özi (see below), it seems that this fleet of about 50 ships must have been seriously undermanned.

By 6 June 1627, the fleet was in the harbor of Kavak, the last major port on the Bosphorus before entering the Black Sea. From this date it would take five weeks to reach Özi.²² In this era, the progress of large fleets with many men was slow because of the need for frequent stops for food and water, and in the case of Hasan Pasha's expedition, there was much business, both campaign- and noncampaign-related, to attend to on the way (see Chapter V). According to Hasan Pasha's firman register (*mühimme-i ordu*), from Kavak until Balcık, he was occupied with the mobilization of provincial forces that were to travel to Özi by land. Besides timariot *sipahis*, these included elite groups with various non-military functions such as *müteferrikas*, *çavuşes*, and scribes from various Rumelian districts (*sancak*). The districts to which most of the firmans were directed were Silistre (Silistria), Vidin, and Nigboli (Nikopol). From the very first firman, issued from Kavak, it is clear that there were problems with the mobilization of these provincial forces, despite previous orders from the Porte for them to mobilize for the defense of the Özi frontier and the fortress construction at Togan Geçidi. Despite the fact that the fleet had

²⁰M. Przerębski, Sieradz castellan, to Zygmunt III, Warsaw, 5 August 1627, (BJ 211, 479a-80b).

²¹Roe often referred to the problems in manning and outfitting the ships of the fleet in the 1620s (*Negotiations*, pp. 27, 61, 76, 150, 223).

²²MD, 83, no. 51.

already set out, the provincial forces had not even begun to mobilize.²³ At the next two port calls, at Varna and Balcık, the situation was not appreciably different. On 19 June 1627, thirteen days since the fleet was in Kavak, Hasan Pasha sailed from Baıcık for Kili, issuing firmans with strict orders to the *kadıs* in the districts targeted for mobilization to make sure the troops and functionaries were mobilized and mustered and that those men who refused be stripped of their salaries and positions and replaced with new men. If these orders were not executed, the positions of the *kadıs* themselves would be jeopardized.²⁴ A presentation and analysis of the mobilization firmans and a discussion of the various troop types is in Chapter V (see **Table 1** there for a summary of the mobilization firmans issued in 1627).

From around 26 June to approximately 9 July 1627, Hasan Pasha paused at the outlet of the northernmost branch of the Danubian delta known as the Kili Straits (**Kili boğazı**; Kili lies 40 km inland), and in the harbor of Akkerman, in the estuary of the Dniester River. Of the twelve firmans issued during this time, half were related to the campaign. Five were concerned with arranging and transporting necessities for the construction at Togan Geçidi—timber and additional hardware for the construction and food supplies for the men involved in the construction and its defense.²⁵ One firman mobilized additional troops, *beşlüs* from İsmail, for the construction work at Togan Geçidi and the defense of the area.²⁶ Chapter V provides a presentation and analysis of these firmans. Those firmans not directly related to the campaign covered matters such as unsanitary and unsafe conditions at the Kili fortress, disorder in its garrison, problems with

²³MD 83, no. 2.

²⁴MD 83, nos. 3, 26, 27, 28.

²⁵MD 83, nos. 29, 40, 47, 48, 49.

²⁶MD 83, no. 44.

Tatars living near Kili, and a conflict between Christian and Muslim *re'aya* over their respective taxation burdens (see Chapter VII).²⁷

The Commonwealth initially reacted to the news of Hasan Pasha's campaign with caution. In March 1627, while the fleet was still being prepared in the arsenal, hetman Koniecpolski, in reply to a message from King Zygmunt III, made the following observation from his camp near the Baltic Sea:

That fortress which the Turks want to build opposite Özi (*na przeciwko Oczakowu*) will not harm in any way your royal majesty's state, and neither will it help them much, for at that place the water is so wide that there is no cannon capable of defending it [i.e., preventing passage]. However, if they want to lay stone somewhere closer to us, on the narrower Dnieper, I would not want your royal majesty to have such a neighbor in such proximity, just so that he can impede the Zaporozhian Cossacks with greater ease.

Then Koniecpolski demurred, stating that it should be hoped that the Ottomans would be satisfied with the king's suppression of the Cossacks (a reference to the Kurukiv terms imposed on the Cossacks in late 1625) and forego the construction of those fortresses. In the end he added, making light of the entire matter, "and if [the Turks] are concerned with the Don Cossacks, then surely they have obtained poor maps for themselves, for they do not know that [these Cossacks] go not by the Dnieper, but by the Don."²⁸

However, as the fleet in Istanbul neared readiness, caution gave way to alarm. With the main Crown army occupied in the Baltic and the willingness of even the registered Cossacks to act in its defense not assured (following the repressions of the previous year), the Commonwealth was in a vulnerable position. With the main Ottoman army camped in eastern Anatolia, there was no serious possibility of an Ottoman attack against Poland-Lithuania. However, the great danger was that the Ottomans would significantly increase

²⁷MD 83, nos. 41, 42, 43, 45, 46.

²⁸Koniecpolski to Zygmunt III, 19 March 1627, Czcw, original (BJ 211, fol. 103a-104b).

their military presence in the northern Black Sea. In particular, if by moving inland they built and manned new fortresses in the frontier zone near or within the “no man’s land,” there was a potential for an upset in the age-old balance of power in the region. The reaction by the Commonwealth in the coming summer would show that this possibility was not taken lightly.

The man Koniecpolski left behind in charge of the defense of the Ukraine was Stefan Chmielecki, the colonel (*pułkownik*) of the Crown army and the hero of the rout of the Tatars at Bila Cerkva in the previous year. In addition to his skill as a frontier warrior, he was known for having good relations with the Cossacks.²⁹ Bohdan Baranowski, on the basis of the Polish sources, provides a good portrayal of his role in the confrontation and negotiations with the Ottomans in 1627. Upon receiving news of the Ottoman plans, Chmielecki gathered his meager forces, which consisted mostly of local gentry (according to a register, no more than 2,000 men), and moved with them into the steppe, where he set up camp to await further developments. In the middle of April, a proposal was made from Warsaw that hetman Myxajlo Dorošenko be encouraged to lead a Cossack strike at the Crimean and the Ottoman forces, once the latter had gathered at Özi. Chmielecki, however, vetoed this idea, fearing that his own forces would be greatly outnumbered by those of the Ottomans and Tatars, should they mount a reprisal. He preferred to operate by diplomatic means rather than by force. And so sometime in May, he dispatched his envoy to Silistre on the Danube, the usual seat of the Özi governor-general, with instructions to press the Ottomans to renounce their planned expedition. However, the mission brought no concrete results.³⁰

²⁹See Baranowski, *Polska a Tatarszczyzna*, pp. 53 ff.

³⁰Baranowski, *Polska a Tatarszczyzna*, pp. 68-69. Although according to the Polish sources, Chmielecki received an answer from Mehmed Pasha, the new Özi *beglerbegi*, it is not clear whether this letter was from him or merely in his name, as at the time he was on his way to Özi or Kefe.

The sources do not give much concrete information on the developments on the Commonwealth side of the frontier from mid-May until mid-July. Sometime in the middle of July, Chmielecki received a letter from a vassal of the sultan, the Moldavian *voyvoda* Miron Bernawski, with an offer of assistance in the mounting crisis. On his way to Özi, Bernawski had halted with his army at Bender. The letter, dated 4 July 1627, opens expressing surprise that until now he had not received any reply to a letter he had written earlier to the king nor had he received any word from Chmielecki. But the *voyvoda*, revealing his awareness of the fact that the Crown was not at all pleased with the planned fortress construction, promised that once he had arrived at Özi (which was to be within twelve days) and had met with Hasan Pasha, he would learn the true intentions of the sultan and immediately pass the information to the Crown. For the meantime, he advised the Poles to insist that the Ottomans reaffirm the “pacts of Sultan Süleyman and of other sultans of the Ottoman house,” while he for his part would do what he could to lessen the resolve of the Turks.³¹

The offer by Bernawski to mediate, in effect, between the two sides was the beginning of an exchange of correspondence that would continue throughout the campaign. In a letter to the king ten days later, Bernawski cleverly stated that he himself did not want or have any need to go on the campaign but nevertheless was going in order to help bring peace between the two sides through his intercession.³² This statement is a warning that the *voyvoda* was not acting in complete sincerity with the Crown, for as seen above, the Porte had ordered him to participate in the Özi campaign. Of course, Bernawski had no interest in becoming involved in a military encounter with the Commonwealth on the side of the Ottomans. At one point Jerzy Zbaraski wrote to the king that he could well

³¹Bernawski to Chmielecki, 4 July 1627, Bender, original (*Documente privitoare în istoria Românilor. Urmare la colecțiunea Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki*, supplement 2-2: 1601-1640, *documente culese din arhive și biblioteci Polone*, ed. Ioan Bogdan, tr. I Skupieński, Bucharest: Sub auspiciile Ministeriului Cultelor și Instrucțiunii publice și ale Academiei Române, 1895, no. 244, p. 539).

³²Bernawski to Zygmunt III, 17 July 1627, Özi, (*Documente Hurmuzaki*, 2-2, no. 246, p. 542).

understand the position of Bernawski, for “the poor devil is concerned about his skin and is looking to earn favor before the pasha so as to be sure about his life, as now he is in the hands of the Turk.”³³ However, the question arises, was the Moldavian *voyvoda* acting in his own interest, or was he also acting in the interest, and even at the behest, of the Ottomans?

On 17 July 1627, Bernawski dispatched a letter to Maximilian Przerębski, castellan of Sieradz, in which he clearly exaggerated the strength of the Ottoman forces at Özi, claiming that the grand admiral had arrived with 70 galleys, 250 Rumelian *şaykas* from the Danube, 300 additional *şaykas* from the Aegean Sea, and several *begs* “with good forces.”³⁴ Meanwhile, he reported, Mehmed Gerey was about to cross the Dnieper at Özi and go up the left bank with the Ottoman forces. The only explanation for this misleading report is that the *voyvoda* was intentionally presenting the Crown with a threatening situation. It was in his interest to present a strong Ottoman force at Özi so as to dissuade Chmielecki and the Ukrainian Cossacks (that is, both Zaporozhians and registered Cossacks from the frontier towns) from making a preemptive strike and to convince them that the best way to proceed was through negotiations. With the main army of the Crown at war with Sweden and major reinforcements unavailable, Chmielecki would have been particularly reluctant to take any action with his modest force.³⁵ And with Warsaw’s main forces in the north, Bernawski, by misrepresenting the strength of the Ottoman forces, did not risk provoking an immediate full-scale military reaction by the Crown. As far as the *voyvoda* was concerned, should Chmielecki send a strike force or attack with all his forces, believing that the Ottoman forces at Özi were very weak, he, Bernawski, would

³³J. Zbarazski to Zygmunt III, 8 August 1627, original (BJ 211, fol. 485a-86b).

³⁴Bernawski to Przerębski, 17 July 1627 (*Documente Hurmuzaki*, 2-2, no. 248, p. 545).

³⁵Of course such a tactic had validity because Bernawski knew that Hasan Pasha’s mission was defensive, not aggressive, in purpose, something that Chmielecki and the Crown were not willing to take for granted. Although Chmielecki may not have been willing to attack the full Ottoman force assembled at Özi, there was certainly the danger that he would have attacked the lesser force that was to move up to Togan Geçidi.

have to either do battle with the attacking forces or risk compromising himself before the Ottomans. It was a situation in which he had little to gain (at most, recognition for his loyalty to the Porte) and much to lose.

At the same time, Bernawski was acting in the interest of Hasan Pasha, although it is not clear whether intentionally so. For as the latter's forces were much smaller than planned for the given task, he was in danger that the other side, knowing the true state of his forces, would seek to take advantage of his vulnerability. Moreover, as early as early July Chmielecki made a stand with his weak forces—a display of nerve that may have given the Ottomans reason to believe that the Polish frontier commander would be willing to act on the offense as well. When leaving Bender, some of the regular Ottoman provincial forces from Rumeli along with the Moldavians and Wallachians attempted to proceed from Bender to Özi in a more direct line and thereby avoid some bad river crossings and go above the deeper waters. Chmielecki, fearing that they might pass too close to the territory of the Commonwealth, posted his forces near enough to their path so that they changed their route and passed closer to the sea to avoid any chance of an encounter.³⁶

Upon receiving the letter from the Moldavian *voyvoda*, Chmielecki decided that it was time to send his own envoy, Baltazar Witkowski, to Hasan Pasha. In a letter to the king at this time, he informed him that “knowing how slippery those people are [i.e., the *voyvoda* and the Turks] . . . Witkowski will better be able to see from up close the readiness of the pagans and understand their further goals . . .”³⁷ The main points in the instructions given to Witkowski by Chmielecki were 1) to learn everything possible about the planned fortresses on the Dnieper; 2) to tell Hasan Pasha that the Crown was surprised that he was planning to build new fortresses “on the border” and that it was against

³⁶Chmielecki to Zygmunt III, 23 July 1627, (*Documente Hurmuzaki*, 2-2, no. 252, pp. 552-53).

³⁷Chmielecki to Zygmunt III, (*Documente Hurmuzaki*, 2-2, no. 252, pp. 552-53).

previous agreements; 3) to tell him that this plan had caused a great uproar not only among the Cossacks but also the people of the frontier land (*Ukraina*), who had sworn that “they would rather lose their heads” than allow the construction of such fortresses, and that upon even the mere rumor that construction has commenced, the Cossacks and all of the Ukraine would rise up and descend upon the site, both by land and by the Dnieper, which would surely bring an end to peace; 4) to find out about the army of Mehmed and Şahin Gerey, whether they had come to the Dnieper yet, and of their plans concerning the fortress construction; and 5) if the subject of the *upominki* due to the Tatars was to come up, to counter by mentioning the Tatar raids of the previous year.³⁸

Hasan Pasha and the fleet had arrived at Özi between 9 July, when it was still in Akkerman, and 12 July, when the first firman issued from Özi was recorded.³⁹ Bernawski and the Moldavian forces met up with the grand admiral on 15 July (there is no information on the Wallachian force). It is striking that during the first weeks at Özi, there is no mention in the sources of fortress construction at Togan Geçidi. For this period, there is only one entry in the firman register relating to construction materials—an order to the *kadi* of Akkerman that some timber previously deposited at Akkerman be sent to Özi⁴⁰—but no specifics as to its planned use. The silence of all sources on any possible activity at Togan Geçidi in the second half of July indicates that no ground was broken at the site. Although there is no reference in the firman register to the planned fortress on either side of the Dnieper, the Ottoman chronicle reports that on the Crimean side, a river flowing into the Dnieper needed to be filled in before construction could begin and for this reason, the Kefe

³⁸*Žerela do istoriji Ukrajiny-Rusi*, 8: *Materijaly do istoriji ukrajins'koji kozaččyny*, 1: *Dokumenty po rik 1631*, ed. Ivan Krypjakevyč, Lviv: Naukove Tovarystvo im. Ševčenka, 1908, no. 194, pp. 310-12).

³⁹MD 83, nos. 50, 51.

⁴⁰MD 83, no. 5 (23 July 1627).

governor-general was ordered to proceed to the site with suitably equipped laborers.⁴¹ However, there is no further reference to this project in the Ottoman sources. The Polish sources report that indeed at this time Şahin Gerey started constructing a fortress on the Dniæper. However, it was not opposite Togan Geçidi, where the Ottomans had planned, but rather at Aslan Kerman (also known as Islam Kerman; Aslangrad in the Polish sources), which was a dozen or so kilometers upriver, opposite the northeastern part of the island of Tavan (rather than at its southern end). In fact, according to a contemporary anonymous Polish relation of the reign of Mehmed and Şahin Gerey, "Mehemd Gerey and Şahin, having the order from the Porte, gathered sufficient troops, artisans, common folk, and wagons, went and built a little fortress (*zameczek*) on their own side [of the Dnieper], on a site that suited their whim, and not where the sultan and pasha wanted it."⁴²

Two firmans issued by Hasan Pasha during the first two weeks of his stay at Özi yet again ordering the mobilization of provincial troops confirm the suspicion raised by the firmans issued on the first leg of his expedition, namely, that there would be serious difficulties with the Rumelian timariot forces. The two strident firmans, full of complaints and accusations, relate that while Hasan Pasha had already been at Özi with the Moldavian and Wallachian *voyvodas* for more than two weeks, none of the troops repeatedly called to mobilize from the districts of Silistre, Nigboli, Vidin, Çirmen, Vize, and Kırk Kilise had appeared.⁴³ These are the last mobilization firmans issued by Hasan Pasha at Özi in 1627. A muster register of those Rumelian forces that did eventually come to Özi reveals that their number was only 1,582, with only 1,169 troops, the rest being various types of aides

⁴¹Katib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, p. 92.

⁴²"Relatia o nieprzyjaźni między Dżanibeg Girajem i Muhammed Girajem i Szahin Girajem, Carami Prekopskiemi" in *Ukrainne sprawy. Przyczynek do dziejów polskich, tatarskich i tureckich, XVII. wieku*, ed. Stanisław Przyłęcki, Lwów: W Drukarni Piotra Pillera, 1842, p. 6.

⁴³MD 83, nos. 55 (15 July 1627); note the discrepancy between the fact that it could not have been more three days since Hasan Pasha arrived and when he made the statement in the firman that it was fifteen days since he arrived at Özi and still no provincial troops had arrived), 6 (21-24 July 1627). See also Chapter V.

(*müteferrikas*, *çavuşes*, scribes).⁴⁴ Throughout the firmans on the mobilization of the Rumelian provincial forces occurs a formula to the effect that “many soldiers and capable men are needed for fortress construction and for the defense of the Özi frontier.” By August, authorities in the Crown had learned the true strength of Hasan Pasha’s forces at Özi. Jerzy Zbaraski, in a letter to the king, disclosed that he had two servants at Özi, one in the service of the Moldavian *voyvoda*, and the other in the service of the Wallachian *voyvoda*. From them he learned that “the Turk came here with a weak force of not more than 5,000 and of those that did come they were very shoddy (*lichi*).”⁴⁵ Unfortunately, it is not clear if this figure meant only Hasan Pasha’s troops or the entire force that came, including the Rumanian troops (it is assumed that the regular Özi garrison was not included in this figure). Przerębski, also writing to the king, gave a figure of 6,000.⁴⁶

The failure of these troops to appear promptly and in respectable numbers, perhaps in combination with problems with the military force on board the fleet and with the accompanying Rumanian *voyvodas*, would have meant that Hasan Pasha would not have the soldiery needed to defend the construction at Togan Geçidi and perhaps even lacked sufficient labor for the actual task. That he indeed abandoned the project by the end of July would come out at the negotiations at Özi between the grand admiral and the agents of the Crown.

Witkowski’s mission to Hasan Pasha occurred sometime in the last third of July.⁴⁷ Vivid details of his negotiations with Hasan Pasha are available in several relations and

⁴⁴TT 751 (see partial text and translation in appendix, see also Chapter V, esp. Table 3 for the exact breakdown of types of timariots).

⁴⁵Jerzy Zbaraski to Zygmunt III, Warsaw, 8 August 1627, original (BJ 211, fol. 485a-86b).

⁴⁶Przerębski to Zygmunt III, Warsaw, 5 August 1627, (BJ 211, 479a-80b).

⁴⁷On 23 July, Chmielecki wrote to the king in a letter already cited that he was sending Witkowski (*Documente Hurmuzaki*, 2-2, no. 252, pp. 552-53); though the actual report is dated 29 July 1627, Witkowski himself stated in the report that he was granted leave by the pasha two days later, i.e., on 31 July (see following n.); by 5 August 1627 a document relating various points of it appeared (BJ 211, fol. 483a-84b; AGAD, LL 30 491a-92a).

letters, both published and unpublished. The discussions between the envoy and grand admiral, at which Moldavian *voyvoda* Bernawski was also present, touched on many interesting problems of the frontier, both relating to its *realia* and the Crown's and Porte's varying concepts of the frontier and notion of a border. Until now, the material on these discussions has not been fully analyzed, even though much of it has been published.⁴⁸ Unfortunately, the record is biased in one direction because there is only Polish and no Ottoman documentation of these discussions. Nevertheless, these materials deserve a full analysis elsewhere, if only to understand more accurately the position of the Crown. Here only the main points will be brought out.⁴⁹

The first issue in the negotiations between Witkowski and Hasan Pasha was the location of the planned Ottoman fortress in relation to the boundary between the two states. Hasan Pasha claimed that the site was still on traditional Ottoman territory, as evidenced by the presence of some Muslim grave markers in the vicinity. As to the legal basis of Ottoman claims, the grand admiral claimed that the boundaries were old, had recently been confirmed and fixed in writing by the grand ambassador of the king (i.e., Zbaraski in 1623), and were well known by both sides. Had he truly said this, he could have been correct only with regard to the Dniester as a mutually agreed border between Ottoman Moldavia and the Commonwealth. In fact, neither in the treaties of Süleyman nor in later times is the subject of the border directly addressed. There are merely statements to the effect that the Ottomans and Poles were not to allow any raids across the Dniester, and that people crossing the river in either direction for purposes of trade or nomads crossing into the Commonwealth for pasture were to announce themselves and pay the customary fees. Whether the Dniester was the border even in its lowest reaches (at Bender) was left open to

⁴⁸Żerela, 8, no. 195, pp. 312-16.

⁴⁹Baranowski gives a precis of Witkowski's mission (Baranowski, *Polska a Tatarszczyzna*, p. 71).

conflicting interpretation. Nor is there any indication of the status of the steppes above Özi and of the Dnieper itself.⁵⁰

The next issue was the fortress that Şahin Gerey had begun to construct on the left bank of the Dnieper. Hasan Pasha supposedly stated that the *kalga* was constructing this fortress without permission. Although the Ottomans had ordered Şahin Gerey to construct a fortress, as was seen above, there is sufficient evidence that Mehmed or perhaps Şahin Gerey had made a proposal to build such a fortress as early as 1626. Technically speaking, the grand admiral was speaking the truth, since, as we have seen above, the sources indicate that Şahin Gerey ignored the Ottoman plans and started working on a fortress at a site of his own choosing, slightly up-river from the site designated by the Ottomans. In any event, it made sense to avoid the issue, which is exactly what Hasan did, steering the conversation to the problem of Cossack incursions and suggesting that if the Crown was truly sincere about stopping Cossack raids, it should also erect some fortresses of its own to keep the Cossacks out of the Zaporizhia. This led to a long discussion of whether it was the Cossacks or the Tatars who were primarily responsible for provoking the retaliatory raids. At one point, Hasan Pasha claimed that one of the reasons the Özi fortress complex needed repair was better to regulate Tatar crossings of the Dnieper there and thereby make it more difficult to move large forces to raid the Commonwealth as well as Moldavia and Wallachia.

⁵⁰*Katalog dokumentów tureckich: Dokumenty do dziejów Polski i krajów ościennych w latach 1455-1672*, ed. Zygmunt Abrahamowicz, Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1959, no. 30, pp. 44-45 (Sultan Süleyman, 1533); *Katalog*, no. 138, pp. 138-39 (Sultan Süleyman, 1553); AGAD, Dz. turecki, k 72, t 304, nr 557 (*Katalog*, no. 256, pp. 246-49, the second decade of Rabi' II 1032/12-21 February 1623). During the discussion of this point, Hasan Pasha made a proposal that was apparently a new addition to Ottoman desiderata regarding the regulation of the frontier, namely, that he wanted to have a fortress built on the confluence of the Czapczak and the Buh Rivers to prevent Cossack incursions. If the Crown were not willing to destroy the town of Raškiv (Raszkow) along with nine other towns, it should have strict watch and command over the insubordinate (*swawolny*) people who live there so that no raids on Turkish or Moldavian lands be made. For some reason, no response by Witkowski to this proposition is recorded. Cf. the firman drawn up upon the order of Hasan Pasha, but never issued, during his campaign in the following year in which a similar project was envisioned, namely, to construct some forts (*palanka*) near Çubriça (somewhere in the Akkerman district [*kadılık*], MD 83, no. 140).

Finally, after retelling a discussion on the wisdom of adhering to the “old pacts of Süleyman,” Witkowski’s relation turns to a portrayal of the “sincere and positive” role played by the Moldavian *voyvoda* Bernawski by his supposedly persuading Hasan Pasha that to build a new fortress on the Dnieper would be folly. The *voyvoda* reportedly argued to the grand admiral that much blood would be spilt, and that great harm could befall the Ottoman house. Further, he maintained, that even having built the fortress, “it would not stand for long, for the Cossacks would hasten to demolish it.”⁵¹

On 29 July 1627, two days before Witkowski left Özi, a galley arrived from Istanbul with two kaftans for Hasan Pasha from the sultan himself. The Polish envoy viewed the *hil’at* ceremony, during which “72 galleys” performed a cannon salute, and he interpreted it as not only a sign of favor, but an indication that the grand admiral had the full confidence of the Porte to come to terms with the Crown.⁵² Whether this was the correct interpretation and whether it was indeed Bernawski who convinced Hasan Pasha to abandon the construction of a new fortress at Togan Geçidi cannot be said for certain. As far as Togan Geçidi was concerned, as was seen above, Hasan certainly did not act as if he were about to move up the Dnieper to commence with the project, in all likelihood because of the shortage of troops and hands. What is of particular significance is that on 25 July 1627, during Witkowski’s mission, or perhaps just before, Hasan Pasha issued his first firman ordering that *mukata’at*, (see glossary) of the Danubian region be assigned to the salaries of the garrisons of the Özi, Bender, Akkerman, Kili, and other fortresses.⁵³ Two weeks later, he issued the first firman proclaiming the assignment, for an indefinite period, of Danubian *mukata’at* for the salaries of the Özi province’s (*eyalet*) main fortress garrisons. That is, Hasan Pasha proclaimed these *mukata’at* as *ocaklıks* in order to

⁵¹Žerela, 8, p. 316.

⁵²Žerela, 8, p. 316.

⁵³MD 83, no. 7.

provide a sound financial basis for the manning of these garrisons. In the following weeks, Hasan Pasha issued repeated firmans directing this transfer process. The application of this basic yet little understood Ottoman financial mechanism, and the firmans issued in connection with it, will be the subject of a separate inquiry in Chapter VI, where there will also be a discussion of the reorganization of the regional financial system that Hasan Pasha effected by creating a new Özi financial district (*defterdarlık*) out of the older Danubian one.

In fact, during the negotiations, Hasan Pasha apparently revealed to the Crown envoy that he had redefined his entire mission to Özi. During the discussion of how to control the Tatars, Hasan Pasha is said to have mentioned that for better control and to keep an eye on Şahin Gerey and the movement of the Tatars over the river fords, it would be a good idea for the pasha of Silistre to reside in Özi.⁵⁴ Later on, in the middle of September, the Polish sources record that when Hasan Pasha would depart for the winter, Mehmed Baltacı Pasha, the Özi governor-general, would indeed remain in Özi rather than return to his usual seat in Silistre.⁵⁵ Finally, in a letter to Chmielecki, Hasan Pasha, obviously somewhat misrepresenting the past, announced that from the very beginning his mission had been to come with his armada and army to repair the Özi fortress, provide it with people, and properly supply it with the view of bringing peace, "so that traders from both sides could pass to and fro as in olden times." Having done this, the grand admiral promised that not a single Cossack boat nor any of the faithless Bucak Tatars would be able to bring harm to their neighbors.⁵⁶ In Chapter VI, some financial documentation is brought to bear on further measures that Hasan Pasha undertook to assure the proper

⁵⁴Žerela, 8, p. 314. Although the governor-general of the province of Özi was referred to as the Özi *beglerbegi*, Özi, because of its location, was not considered an attractive seat of the province and it was the custom for the Özi *beglerbegi* to reside in the prosperous Danubian town of Silistre. This is one of the reasons the Özi *beglerbegi* was also referred to as the governor or pasha of Silistre.

⁵⁵Žerela, 8, no. 196, p. 319.

⁵⁶BJ 211, fol. 470a-71a.

manning of the Özi fortress complex and to provide the financial incentive and basis for the Özi governor-general to stay in this forlorn and dangerous location.

It is also possible that the galley from the Porte delivered orders from the imperial divan, or even from the sultan in the form of a *hatt-i humayun*, bidding Hasan Pasha to reorganize the defense of the Özi province and provide it with a sound financial basis. Perhaps the galley gave the Porte's approval to an earlier proposition by Hasan Pasha. In as far as is known, the Crown authorities did not take any serious notice of this redefined mission of Hasan Pasha. However, for the defense of the Black Sea against the Cossacks and Ottoman control of the northern seaboard in general, it was potentially a more significant step than the placement of a new fortress in the lower Dnieper, which had caused the Crown such apprehension.

In the first half of September, Chmielecki sent another envoy, Aleksander Chocimirski, to Hasan Pasha for further discussions on frontier matters.⁵⁷ The matters discussed included again the pacts of Süleyman and the more recent one of Murad IV. When Chocimirski refused even to discuss altering them, Hasan Pasha insisted that the Crown send a grand ambassador to the Porte as soon as possible. To this, the envoy refused to make any commitment on the grounds that he did not have the authorization. Next came the subject of the Tatars and how to insure against their raids. Little came of this discussion, with the exception of the proposal that the Moldavian *voyvoda* act as mediator between the Khanate and the Commonwealth. A discussion of the fortress at Aslan Kerman, which the Tatars had started to build, followed. On this point, Chocimirski was adamant that its construction would bring not peace, but the very opposite. He claimed that the Tatars were constructing it to assure a close and well-protected passage

⁵⁷ *Żerela*, 8, no. 196, p. 316-19. Baranowski gives a precis of Chocimirski's mission (Baranowski, *Polska a Tatarszczyzna*, p. 71-2).

over the Dnieper into Crown lands. The Cossacks in their stations (*włośc*) would be the first affected and would never tolerate such a threat.

The envoy's characterization of the situation on the frontier was right on the mark: "Whatever these two monarchs (the sultan and king) build for peace and eternal friendship today, tomorrow those other two (Cossacks and Tatars) will render into dust."⁵⁸ Here was the crux of the matter—the two great powers could have the best of intentions, but it seemed that no matter what measures they took, they could not bring under control their respective peripheries. Instead it appeared that the latter could at will sabotage relations between the two states, as if it were the peripheries and not the center that held control. However there is another point implicit in Chocimirski's stance. With regard to the construction of fortresses in the frontier zone of the Dnieper River, the Ottomans and Tatars were in a very strong strategic position which amounted to a double-losing proposition for the Crown and the Cossacks: By creating fortress strongholds on a crossroads of the Cossack highway to the Black Sea *and* a major Tatar pathway into the Commonwealth's Ukrainian lands, the Ottomans and Tatars could conceivably shut off the former and open wide the latter, thereby achieving an upset in the balance of power between the Cossacks and Tatars.

Hasan Pasha insisted that his purpose was not at all hostile, but defensive. Moreover he stated that he had sufficient funds to build a fortress opposite, for example, Aslan Kerman during that very season. However, in the interest of peace and thanks to the persuasions of the Moldavian *voyvoda*, he had agreed not only to abandon his own fortress on the right bank, but had ordered the Tatars to pull back from their construction. Hasan Pasha let it be known to Chocimirski that the Tatars had no choice but to terminate their project because they could not bear the costs themselves. They had asked the grand

⁵⁸ *Żerela*, 8, p. 318.

admiral to send ships to the site, presumably to aid in supply and transport, but his categorical refusal meant that their undertaking had come to a halt.

After Chocimirski's mission, the crisis seemed defused and direct negotiations came to an end. Until the end of the campaign, Bernawski maintained contact with Chmielecki and Warsaw, continuing his mediatory role. In the end, the assessment of his services on the side of the Crown was mixed. To some, as evident in the two relations of Witkowski and Chocimirski, he was the hero who had found a way to defuse the crisis, with the interests of the Commonwealth in mind. Yet to others he had played a false role, pretending to act for the Crown, but actually acting as an instrument of the Ottomans. Thus an anonymous reporter on the negotiations of Witkowski was convinced that he had seen through the perfidious *voyvoda* when he read his letter about the great strength of the Ottoman force, both on land and on sea, as well as the might of his own army. This observer, seeing how the *voyvoda* was placing himself as the mediator between the Crown and the Porte, expressed doubt as to his sincerity and was convinced that his real aim was rather to serve "the Turk" with the harm of the king in mind. With this assessment, the anonymous reporter cautioned Chmielecki to be on guard for attempts at manipulation by the *voyvoda*.⁵⁹

After the negotiations with Chocimirski, Hasan Pasha remained in Özi for another month and a half. Although he renounced construction of a new fortress at Togan Geçidi, during the remainder of his stay he used the available forces and materials to perform some repairs on and additions to the Özi fortress complex. Unfortunately, there are hardly any details on this activity. There is only a reference in a firman from near the end of the fleet's stay at Özi to a newly constructed cannon tower and *palanka*.⁶⁰ As will be seen below, in

⁵⁹BJ 211, fol. 483a-84b; AGAD LL 30, fol 491a-92a.

⁶⁰MD 83, no. 77 (see Chapter V).

the following year, Hasan Pasha would issue orders that repairs commenced at Özi in 1627 be completed.

During the remainder of Hasan Pasha's stay at Özi, as evidenced by the firmans issued by him, he was preoccupied with the reorganization of the finances of the Danubian *defterdarlık*, which was now redesignated as the Özi *defterdarlığı* (however, the firmans continued to use the old designations *Tuna defterdarlığı* and *Tuna aklamı* [finance bureau or district] alongside the new one). This flurry of activity continued even after Hasan Pasha and the fleet left Özi in the middle of September to return to Istanbul. Going again by way of the Rumelian coast, Hasan apparently sailed directly for the Kili Straits, where he stopped for at least ten days (21 September-1 October 1627). Aside from financing, Hasan Pasha was concerned with punishing troops who had deserted during the campaign and rectifying various abuses in the provinces (see Chapter VII).

As far as the defense of the frontier was concerned, one of the important matters to attend to was the state of the Danubian boat flotilla used in the defense of the Black Sea coast. Apparently there were shortcomings in the flotilla mobilized in 1627, for in July/August as well as at the very end of the campaign, Hasan Pasha issued several firmans ordering that local officials in the Danubian basin see to it that *şaykas* manned with warriors be outfitted by specific locales. In issuing these orders, Hasan Pasha was making sure that there would be a proper organizational and financial basis for this flotilla in the following campaign season.⁶¹

For the entire campaign at Özi, there is no concrete evidence of Cossack activity on the Black Sea. In September 1627, Toma Kantakuzin, the Ottoman envoy to Moscow, informed the Patriarch Filaret in Moscow that the Don Cossacks together with the Zaporozhians had been active on the sea, including in the vicinity of Istanbul, where they

⁶¹MD 83, nos. 15, 110 (this entry represented at least eight separate firmans).

“took many towns, villages, and hamlets, burying them and killing their inhabitants.”⁶² However, as there had been a hiatus in Ottoman-Muscovite relations between 1623 and 1627, it is not clear whether this complaint concerned the current or the previous several years. It appears, however, that at least the Zaporozhian Cossacks chose not to enter the sea in any large capacity until Hasan Pasha withdrew. Thereafter, in the fall, a Zaporozhian fleet of 60 boats did go out to sea. There is no information as to where it struck, but according to an angry letter from the sultan to the king, it caused considerable damage to “merchants and common folk” until it was intercepted by the imperial fleet. In the ensuing encounter, fifteen to twenty Cossack boats were taken while the rest fled and, according to the letter, continued their raiding activity.⁶³ On the basis of this information, it appears that this Cossack fleet headed for the lower coast of Rumeli where it encountered Hasan Pasha’s returning fleet.

As for the new fortress at Aslan Kerman, for the moment it remained standing. As became apparent from the Zaporozhian expedition in the fall of 1627, it did not seriously impede their passage to the sea. As will become evident below, at the very start of the following campaign season the Cossacks dealt with it as they saw fit, as had been expected in the Commonwealth as well as among diplomats at the Porte.

Hasan Pasha, the Cossacks and the Fall of Mehmed and Şahin Gerey, 1628-1629

At the end of 1627 the political situation that had arisen on the northern Black Sea frontier with the ascent of Mehmed and Şahin Gerey began to unravel. The beginning of the end for Mehmed and Şahin Gerey’s rule in the Crimean Khanate was the rekindling of the feud between Şahin Gerey and Kantemir. The origin of the new phase of their struggle was in

⁶²*Donskie dela*, 1, ed. B. G. Družinin, St. Petersburg: Arxeografičeskaja kommisija, 1898=*Russkaja istoričeskaja biblioteka*, 18, col. 271-74.

⁶³Murad IV to Zygmunt III, [fall 1627] (*Documente Hurmuzaki*, 2-2, no. 261, p. 579); see also Hruševs’kyj, *Istoriija*, 8, p. 38-39.

fact a blood feud that broke out in the winter of 1627-1628. Khan Mehmed Gerey was on an expedition against Circassians disloyal to the Crimean Khanate, when Salman Shah Mirza, a cousin of Kantemir who was with the Crimean force, killed a certain Circassian loyal to Mehmed Gerey. This murder was perpetrated allegedly because five years earlier, the unnamed Circassian had killed Salman's father. The Circassian happened to be a son-in-law of Mehmed Gerey, which meant that retribution for the murder by the khan was unavoidable. And so Salman Shah fled from the khan with his Nogays.⁶⁴ The khan immediately notified his brother Şahin Gerey, who was in the Crimea, to detain Kantemir. However, Kantemir managed to escape with a few hundred of his retainers, although much of his family and their families and other *mirzas* loyal to him were captured by Şahin and cruelly executed.

Recognizing the danger that the return of Kantemir to the Bucak meant to the strategic position of the Crimea, Şahin Gerey set out with his forces for the Bucak at the end of February 1628. According to a letter of the Moldavian *voyvoda* Bernawski, Şahin Gerey crossed the Dniester in the first week of April with 6,000 men of only his own and the khan's retinue, not daring to have with him other Tatars, Circassians, or any other potentially unreliable elements.⁶⁵ After sacking a locale near Akkerman, the *kalga* pushed on toward the Danube, where Kantemir was with his forces. The Crimean forces went past Kili and İsmail, and pushed toward Babadagi on the southern end of the Danubian delta. While Şahin Gerey's army was encamped on the shore of the Danube in a state of readiness, the forces of Kantemir attacked. The Bucak chief had amassed a large force (30,000, according to Na'ima) which aside from Tatars from the Bucak and Dobruca also included recruits from the local population around Silistre, who felt threatened by the

⁶⁴Baranowski, *Polska a Tatarszczyzna*, pp. 75-76; A. A. Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba Moskovskogo gosudarstva s tatarami v pervoj polovine XVII veka*, Moscow and Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1948, pp. 118-19

⁶⁵Bernawski to M. Przerębski, Sieradz castellan, Iași, 8 April 1628 (*Ukraine sprawy*, p. 22).

invading Crimean Tatars. In addition, according to Na'ima's chronicle, local Ottoman forces also supported Kantemir's force. There on the shore of the Danube a great battle occurred in which Kantemir and his allies won a resounding victory. Şahin Gerey's decimated forces were scattered while the *kalga* himself had to flee for his life with a few of his retainers.⁶⁶

After the battle on the Danube, Kantemir sent an envoy to the Porte appealing for the deposition of Mehmed and Şahin Gerey and the appointment of Canbeg Gerey, the former khan expelled by the two brothers in 1623. The Ottomans, leaving aside the humiliation that they suffered at the hands of the two brothers in 1624, had plenty of new reasons to wish to remove them from power. As recently as Hasan Pasha's expedition in the previous year, Şahin Gerey had helped undo Hasan Pasha's plans by deliberately building his fortress on a different site than had been decided. While both brothers had proved unwilling to lead their armies to eastern Anatolia, Canbeg Gerey had been making offers to serve in the East should the Ottomans return him to the Crimean throne.⁶⁷

In the meantime, Kantemir set out for the Crimea to follow through with his success.⁶⁸ While Şahin Gerey entered the Crimea on 23 April, six days later Kantemir, with a large force including many Crimean Tatars who were dissatisfied with Mehmed and

⁶⁶Muṣṭafā Na'imā, *Ravzatü'l-hüseyin fî hulâsâti aḥbârî'l-hâfîkayn*, 2 [=Tarih], Istanbul: Maṭba'a-i 'Âmirî, 1281-1283/1864-1866, pp. 340-41. The anonymous Polish relation of Mehmed and Şahin Gerey's reign cited above confirms many of the details in Na'ima including the participation of Ottoman forces in the battle (see *Ukrainne sprawy*, pp. 6-7). Mehmed and Na'ima's account is misplaced *s.a.* 1033/1624 between the entries for the Ottoman-Crimean war of 1624 and the Cossack attack on Yeni Köy. This event is not recorded in Katib Çelebi's *Fezleke*.

⁶⁷Baranowski, *Polska a Tatarszczyzna*, pp. 77; Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 119.

⁶⁸The main sources on these events are relations and correspondence from a Crown chancery copy book from 1626-1628, formerly held in the Ossolineum in Lviv and today in the Biblioteka Ossolińskich in Wrocław (ms. 209). These materials were entered into the copy book under the heading "Ukrainny sprawy (Frontier affairs)." In 1842 these materials were published by Stanisław Przyłęcki under the same title. Hruševs'kyj's and Baranowski's accounts of these events are primarily based on these materials. Here the account of these event relies on them, with reference, when necessary, to the actual Polish materials, as well as to new information from the Muscovite sources (*Krymskie dela*) made available by Novosel'skij and to the Ottoman and other archival sources.

Şahin Gerey's tyrannical rule, followed on his heels.⁶⁹ With Şahin and Mehmed Gerey and their remaining supporters in Bağçasaray, Kantemir laid siege to the Crimean capital. It seemed that the two brothers were about to meet their doom. However, again as in 1624, at the moment of truth, Şahin managed to reverse his desperate situation by obtaining the support of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. At some point the *kalga* sent several loyal *mirzas* as envoys to the Zaporozhian Sich asking for aid. It is not clear whether this was before or after he was besieged in the capital. In any event, because there was very little time if the brothers were to be saved, hetman Myxajlo Doroşenko, without consulting the Crown, gathered his available forces, which were only 4,000 Cossacks, and taking along artillery, hastened for the Crimea.⁷⁰

Hruševs'kyj states that Şahin Gerey's envoys reminded the Zaporozhians about their old oath of alliance and promised a high payment.⁷¹ However, in the sources he cites there is no mention of an oath, only of money. According to an anonymous report, "the Cossacks were enlisted by Şahin Gerey through Bulhar Mirza only by a verbal promise, that is, the Mirza promised them a great pay from Şahin Gerey if only they went to the Crimea."⁷² In fact, there is no explicit evidence that the oath of alliance of 1624 came into play, and as was pointed out above, it is clear looking back at some of the intervening events, that the Cossacks had ample reason to consider any alliance broken. The latest such instance was Şahin Gerey's visible role in the project to construct new fortresses on the Dnieper. Baranowski is convinced that because of the intervening events, there was no question of any alliance being in effect at the time when Şahin Gerey appealed to the

⁶⁹Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 120 (*Krymskie dela*).

⁷⁰*Ukrainne sprawy*, pp. 27, 50. According to the report of Muscovite envoys Tarbeev and Basov, who were in the Crimea at the time, there were 6,000 (Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 120 [*Krymskie dela*]).

⁷¹Hruševs'kyj, *Istoriija*, 8, p. 42.

⁷²*Ukrainne sprawy*, p. 50.

Cossacks.⁷³ On the other hand, as has been pointed out above, Şahin was a consummate politician not to be underestimated and capable of presenting and justifying his actions in exactly the light necessary to assuage any doubts of his past or present sincerity. In his favor was precisely the ambiguity of many of his actions such as the construction of the fortress at Aslan Kerman. On the other hand, Dorošenko was no mean politician himself, with proven skills demonstrated in 1625 and 1626, when he was able to weave a course between the demands of the victorious Crown and the disaffections of the defeated Cossacks. It is very possible that, given this wonderful opportunity to intervene in the affairs of the Khanate, he chose to interpret past events in the most propitious light, which meant acting as if he actually felt bound by an agreement to protect his ally.

As far as the threatening fortress at Aslan Kerman was concerned, it was no longer a factor. Earlier in the year, just as the Tatar world was thrown into new turmoil by Şahin Gerey and Kantemir, the hetman himself set out for the fortress with a Cossack force.⁷⁴ According to a letter from the Zaporozhians to Zygmunt, Aslan Kerman could have held out for a long time, as it had been well-manned and stocked by the Ottoman fleet.⁷⁵ However, owing to "skill and bravery," the Cossacks took the fortress, leveled it, and returned to the Sich with several dozen captured cannons.⁷⁶

Whether or not the alliance was invoked, the Cossacks were willing to join the embattled *kalga* for the promise of high pay just as in 1624, as would any mercenary army. As Baranowski points out, the Cossacks must have remembered that those who rescued Şahin four years prior were highly rewarded.⁷⁷ In fact, as was seen in Chapter II, not only

⁷³Baranowski, *Polska a Tatarszczyzna*, p. 79.

⁷⁴Hruševs'kyj, *Istorija*, 8, p. 41.

⁷⁵Cf. Hruševs'kyj, *Istorija*, 8, p. 41 where it is stated that the fortress was taken easily.

⁷⁶Zaporozhian Cossacks to Zygmunt III, 28 July 1628 (*Ukrainne sprawy*, pp. 26-27).

⁷⁷Baranowski, *Polska a Tatarszczyzna*, p. 79.

had they been well-compensated by payment from Şahin and with spoils from the Crimean countryside, they had also taken booty from the defeated Ottoman force and the city of Kefe.

The Cossacks were fortunate that Kantemir underestimated them, thinking that only a band was coming rather than a force (albeit a modest one), led by the hetman. And so they were able to make it past Perekop with little difficulty.⁷⁸ Once in the Crimea, the Zaporozhians were several times engaged by Kantemir's troops and were forced to move toward Bagçesaray in wagon-camp formation. Kantemir's forces could not stop the Cossacks, and after an embattled six-day march through the Crimean steppe, they finally reached Bagçesaray.⁷⁹ However, during one of the battles on the way, their leader, Dorošenko, as well as an earlier hetman, Olyfer, fell to enemy bullets.⁸⁰ The fact that the hetman was the victim of gunfire is in itself significant. According to the anonymous Polish relation of Mehmed and Şahin Girey's reign:

There, while nearing Bagçesaray, Myxajlo Dorošenko was killed by the *segbans* (*seymen* in the Polish) of whom there were 500. They who had been [in service] guarding the Danube came in a ship, with a certain pasha, from Akkerman to Balaklava and going straight over the mountains and through the forests to Bagçesaray to join Kantemir's army.⁸¹

Thus, just as Şahin Girey obtained musket-armed infantry in the form of the Cossacks, so too Kantemir came by an analogous, albeit smaller, force, namely, the Ottoman *segbans* (see glossary).

⁷⁸*Ukrainne sprawy*, p. 50.

⁷⁹*Ukrainne sprawy*, p. 27.

⁸⁰*Ukrainne sprawy*, p. 51.

⁸¹*Ukrainne sprawy*, p. 6.

As Hruševs'kyj points out, the death of their talented and capable leader was a great loss to the Cossacks, and they later pointed to it as one of the reasons their expedition fell short of success.⁸² The Cossacks chose a new hetman on the spot by the name of "Mojrzenica" and entered the city, where they were immediately awarded with five gold coins (*złoty*) each from money that had been delivered recently to Bagçasaray by Muscovite envoys as *pominki*.⁸³ Then together with the Cossacks, Şahin Gerey, whose forces at the time the Cossack's arrived were said to number only a few hundred, broke out of Kantemir's blockade into the open field. By this time, because of the arrival of the Cossacks, the tide began to turn as Tatars began to leave the Bucak chief for the other camp.⁸⁴ Kantemir's camp was stormed and occupied by the Cossacks, and he and his forces were forced to flee toward Kefe.⁸⁵

Şahin Gerey and the Cossacks made their way to Kefe in pursuit of Kantemir. Outside Kefe, Kantemir decided to make a stand and so another battle was fought. However, he was again defeated, this time decisively, and forced to take refuge in the city.⁸⁶ However, the Cossack casualties were not slight—one source gives a thousand Cossack dead. To encourage and reward those who survived, Şahin Gerey promised that he would deliver, according to the same source, "one hundred thousand thalers and a herd of several hundred (horses?)."⁸⁷ With this further payment, the Cossacks agreed to stay on and set siege to this major Ottoman port. According to an entry from Hasan Pasha's

⁸²Hruševs'kyj, *Istorija*, 8, p. 43.

⁸³*Ukrainne sprawy*, p. 27.

⁸⁴Baranowski, *Polska a Tatarszczyzna*, p. 82.

⁸⁵*Ukrainne sprawy*, p. 51.

⁸⁶Hruševs'kyj, *Istorija*, 8, p. 44.

⁸⁷*Ukrainne sprawy*, p. 51.

firman register, "the Cossack bandits came upon the Kefe fortress, set up a wagon-camp (ṭābūr) and surrounded [the fortress] . . . in siege."⁸⁸

The siege lasted three to four weeks.⁸⁹ During the siege, Kefe underwent considerable hardship, though the approach from the sea was apparently not cut off since Kantemir, fearing that he would be turned over to Şahin Gerey by the city's beleaguered residents, spent the nights on a galley at sea. It was rumored that the city was not taken thanks only to the restraint of Mehmed Gerey, who feared that if the city fell and a slaughter of the population ensued, he would have no chance for rehabilitation at the Porte.⁹⁰

On the last day of June 1628, the Ottoman fleet sailed into the harbor of Kefe after crossing the Black Sea from Sinop. As in the previous year, it was led by vizier and grand admiral Hasan, who was again the commander in chief of all Ottoman forces in the Black Sea region, both on land and sea.⁹¹ At the same time, an army from Rumeli under vizier Ken'an Pasha was making its way to the northern Black Sea by land.⁹² In the winter and spring of 1628, the Ottomans had planned to send the grand admiral with the main part of the fleet to the Mediterranean Sea, where it was badly needed because of corsair activity

⁸⁸MD 83, no. 123.

⁸⁹Surely not three months, and probably not as long as a month and a half, as Baranowski and Hruševs'kyj, respectively, contend (Baranowski, *Polska a Tatarszczyzna*, p. 83; Hruševs'kyj, *Istorija*, 8, p. 44). Unfortunately the previous concrete date concerning the events in the Crimea is 29 April 1628 when Kantemir entered the Crimea. At least several days, if not weeks, must have elapsed from the this date until he laid siege to Bağçasaray and the Cossacks arrived in the Crimea. Taking into account the succeeding events leading up to the siege of Kefe, namely, the six-day march of the Cossacks from Perekop to Bağçasaray, the ensuing battles there, the move of the belligerent parties to Kefe, and the battle there, three to four weeks, the figure suggested by the Ottoman document, appears as the most likely duration of the siege.

⁹⁰Hruševs'kyj, *Istorija*, 8, p. 44.

⁹¹MD 83, no. 119.

⁹²Ken'an Pasha to Zygmunt III, [September 1628], İsmail, original (AGAD, Dz. turecki, k 73, t320, nr 581; *Katalog*, no. 273, pp. 264-65).

there, and only a smaller flotilla to the Black Sea.⁹³ There is no doubt that it was the breakout of the conflict between Şahin Geray and Kantemir and the former's invasion of regular Ottoman territory, combined with the latter's appeal to the Porte, that prompted the Ottomans into action. In Hasan Pasha's firman register, the first entry from 1628 is registered under 1 Ramadan 1037/5 May 1628. This firman, issued by Hasan Pasha while he was still in the capital, was sent in separate versions addressed to the Özi governor-general, the governors (*sancakbegi*) and *kadıs* of ten districts (*sancak*) in the Danubian basin belonging to the province of Özi, as well as to the Moldavian and Wallachian *voyvodas*.⁹⁴ Revealing the recency and urgency of the Hasan Pasha's changed assignment is the heading for this section of the firman register which states that the firmans that follow are issued with the aim of "*rapidly* mobilizing the appointed district (*sancak*) armies."⁹⁵ The other mobilization firman issued while still in Istanbul was to the governor of Budun (Buda), vizier Murtaza Pasha, who was to mobilize with the troops of five districts in his province.⁹⁶ Both the Özi and Budun forces were ordered to travel not to the Crimea, but to Özi, and defend the frontier there as well as help finish the repairs of the previous year at the Özi fortress complex (on these mobilization firmans, see Chapter V). Apparently the Ottomans were concerned about the possibility of attacks on Özi, while the main Black Sea force was engaged in the Crimea or that a large Cossack fleet might pass out of the Dnieper to aid the Cossacks at Kefe from the sea side or attack the fleet.

During the leg of the trip from the Bosphorus to Amasra, Hasan Pasha issued further mobilization firmans to the Özi governor-general and other Rumelian commanders

⁹³Roe, dispatch of 22 March/1 April 1627 (*Negotiations*, p. 782). Roe reported that there were many disorders in the Mediterranean—the waters outside major Ottoman ports were swarming with pirates and the coasts of Sicily and Naples were not only secure before the Ottomans, but their own privateers had been striking the Ottoman coasts of Albanis and the Morea.

⁹⁴MD 83, nos. 79 and 86 (= one firman).

⁹⁵MD 83, no. 78.

⁹⁶MD 83, no. 87.

berating them for having not yet moved with their armies, even though the fleet had already set out, and a firman relating to the supply of tar for the Istanbul arsenal (the fleet was in the Şili harbor on 9 Shawwal 1037/12 June 1628 and in Amasra on 15 Shawwal 1037/123 June 1628).⁹⁷ After pausing at the harbor of Amasra, Hasan Pasha sailed on for Sinop where he called into port (the firman register records his presence there on 20 and 21 Shawwal 1037/23 and 24 June 1628). The firmans he issued at Sinop included one concerning the repair of broken cannons in the fortress and its defenses from seaside against the Cossacks, one to expedite the construction of two new galleys in the port's naval arsenal, and one to the Özi governor general and the Akkerman *kadı* arranging for two ships to bring grain from Akkerman to Kefe for the gathering troops there.⁹⁸

Upon arriving at Kefe, Hasan Pasha's first order was to the *kadı*s of Kefe, Sudak, and Taman, proclaiming Mehmed and Şahin Gerey deposed and calling the general population to rise in arms against them (*nefir-i 'amm*, see Chapter V).⁹⁹ The next firman was addressed to the Nogay begs and *mirzas* subject to the Crimean Khanate calling them to abandon Mehmed and Şahin Gerey, and with all of their clans and tribes to come to the side of the newly proclaimed khan, Canbeg Gerey.¹⁰⁰ Next in the firman register, under the date 28 Shawwal 1037/1 July 1628, are two firmans, one addressed to Mehmed and the other to Şahin Gerey. Graciously worded, they inform the brothers that because of "some unavoidable considerations" it was necessary to appoint Canbeg Gerey as khan and Devlet Gerey as *kalga* and order the brothers to peacefully cede the throne to them and "cut all ties

⁹⁷MD, 83, nos. 89, 80, 81, 83.

⁹⁸MD 83, nos. 114, 118.

⁹⁹MD 83, no. 119 (27 Shawwal 1037/30 June 1628, Kefe).

¹⁰⁰MD 83, no. 120.

with the Crimea.”¹⁰¹ However, these firmans were not sent out because there was no longer any need, according to a note above the first firman.

The Ottoman documents indicate that although Şahin and Mehmed Gerey and the Cossacks did not immediately upon the arrival of the Ottoman fleet end their siege, it nevertheless did not last long.¹⁰² According to the firmans, while on 1 July (the fleet's second day at Kefe) the brothers were still besieging Kefe together with their allies, by 5 July, the siege had been lifted and the besiegers had left.¹⁰³ According to the last firman, the Cossacks were unwilling or unable to give battle to the Ottoman force and withdrew. While Mehmed Gerey fled into “the impenetrable mountains,” Şahin Gerey went with the Cossack wagon-camp, “choosing unbelief and error.” According to the Polish sources, although under constant attack by the forces of the new *kalga* Devlet Gerey, the Cossacks, with Şahin Gerey in their wagon-camp, successfully made their way out of the Crimea and were back in the Zaporizhia by the middle of July.¹⁰⁴ While the same sources relate that the Zaporozhians brought back as trophies Polish cannons that had been captured by Kantemir in the battle of Cecora in 1620, the Ottoman sources claim that when the Cossacks abandoned Kefe,¹⁰⁵ they left behind cannons, tents, banners (*bayrak*) and baggage.¹⁰⁶ What is clear from both the Polish and Ottoman sources is that the Nogays and other Tatars who defected from Mehmed and Şahin Gerey to Canbeg Gerey and the Ottomans played a decisive role in the final outcome of the siege of Kefe. Indeed, perhaps

¹⁰¹MD 83, nos. 121, 122.

¹⁰²The Polish sources only suggest that the siege did not last long after the fleet's arrival (see Hruševs'kyj, *Istorija*, 8, p. 44).

¹⁰³MD 83, no. 123.

¹⁰⁴Hruševs'kyj, *Istorija*, 8, p. 44.

¹⁰⁵Hruševs'kyj, *Istorija*, 8, p. 45.

¹⁰⁶MD 83, no. 123.

the first decrees proclaimed by Hasan Pasha at Kefe, aimed at the Crimean populace and the Nogays, enabled the Ottomans to prevail without having to do battle with the Cossacks.¹⁰⁷

From the firman informing of the Cossack withdrawal from Kefe it is clear that Hasan Pasha did not consider the danger in the region to have passed. In this firman, Hasan Pasha strictly ordered the newly appointed Özi governor-general, İbrahim, who was the Özi *defterdarı* in the previous year, to make sure that when the troops mobilized to come to Özi and Akkerman arrive, they were not to say “we have done our service and there is no longer a need for us to stay,” and return home. To this effect no leaves were to be granted and all the forces were to be massed ready for defensive duty and await the arrival of the grand admiral with the fleet.¹⁰⁸ Clearly, the danger of some Cossack action at Özi or entry by a large fleet of *čajkas* was considered real, at least at that point in the campaigning. However, after this order, no further firmans relating to mobilization of troops are recorded in Hasan Pasha’s firman register. In 1628 the turnout of the provincial timariots (570) was about a third of that of the previous year although it is difficult to compare the figures from the two campaigns because of the difference in missions and circumstances.

Having ordered the Özi governor-general to hold fast with his forces at Özi, Hasan Pasha turned in earnest to the task he had begun in the previous year’s campaign at Özi, that is, putting into order and reorganizing the finances of the region with the aim of providing a sounder financial basis for the region’s fortress defenses. Within a few days of the withdrawal of the Cossacks, Hasan Pasha issued his first firmans for that season concerning financial matters. The very first one was to the Özi governor-general, ordering that a *mukata’a* revenue be indefinitely assigned for the Özi fortress garrison (i.e.,

¹⁰⁷Hruševs’kyj, *Istorija*, 8, p. 44.

¹⁰⁸MD 83, no. 123.

assigned as an *ocaklık*, see Chapter VI). At the same time he issued many orders intended to rectify various abuses in the taxation system, as well as to punish smugglers, cheaters, criminals, and so forth (see also Chapter VII). He also issued orders to rectify various abuses in the provinces and to punish provincial troops who had deserted (see also Chapter V).

Although by July 1628 Canbeg Gerey was back in power in the Crimea, his and the Ottoman's problems with Şahin Gerey and the Cossacks were not over.¹⁰⁹ Unfortunately, there are no further available Ottoman documentary sources on Mehmed and Şahin Gerey.¹¹⁰ But in addition to the Polish sources used by Hruševs'kyj and Baranowski, some important new Muscovite material is presented by Novosel'kyj. Here only a summary of the end of the careers of Mehmed and Şahin Gerey in the Crimea will be given.

In the fall Şahin Gerey, who was staying somewhere in the Zaporizhia near the Sich, was planning an expedition to the Crimea to regain his throne. During this time his supporters were carrying on a partisan war against Canbeg Gerey and Kantemir in the steppes outside of Perekop. In the meantime, the Cossacks sent several expeditions to the Black Sea but because of high winds could not progress farther than the environs of Özi and the shores of the Crimea. There are no specifics on these raids. As for Şahin Gerey's plans, apparently there was not too much enthusiasm among the Cossacks. Only in late November, when the former *kalga* was able to promise to pay them sufficiently ("ten gold pieces and a sheepskin coat" per man) as well as to turn over the Nogay lands to them after

¹⁰⁹The discussion of attempts by Mehmed and Şahin Gerey to regain their throne is based on a relation published in Seweryn Gołębiowski, "Şahin Giraj i Kozacy," *Biblioteka warszawska* 1852, no. 2: 1-27, esp. pp. 21-28. See also Hruševs'kyj, *Istorija*, 8, pp. 45-56.

¹¹⁰Ottoman and Tatar chronicles do not add anything significant to the aftermath of Mehmed and Şahin Gerey's expulsion from the Crimea. See Katib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, 2, pp. 102-103; V. D. Smirnov, *Krymskoe Xanstvo pod verxovenstvom Otomanskoj porty do načala XVIII veka*, St. Petersburg, 1887, pp. 495-99; Abdullāh Rıdvan Paşazāde, *Tevārih-i Deşt-i Kıpçak in La chronique des steppes kiptchak* *Tevārih-i deşt-i Qipçaq du XVII^e siècle*, ed. Ananiasz Zajaczkowski, Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1966, pp. 61-62.

their victory was he able to convince the Zaporozhians to participate. By this time, Şahin Gerey had managed to find supporters in the Crown (headed by Chmielecki) who, with the knowledge of the king, privately urged the Cossacks to go with Şahin, while officially berating them for their adventure in the past summer. It was decided to see whether there was some chance that Şahin Gerey could regain the Crimea and become a vassal of the Crown. If complicity in such an attempt could be concealed before the Porte, at worst the Crown would profit from continued anarchy in the Crimea. And so to Ottoman and Crimean inquiries as to the whereabouts of Şahin Gerey, the Crown pleaded ignorance.

However, the attempt to regain the Crimea was doomed almost from its very beginning. In the first half of November, 6,000 Zaporozhians, led by a new hetman, Hryc'ko Čornyj, and 8,000 Tatars, mostly Lesser Nogays led by Şahin Gerey, set out for the Crimea. The force rendezvoused on the Dnieper with Mehmed Gerey, who had been among the Lesser Nogays near Azak. Already on the first leg of the journey, some Cossacks displayed dissatisfaction with their new hetman (who had been appointed by the Crown without sufficient consultation with the rank and file) and expressed an unwillingness to be led by him. After a council was called, the dissenters were convinced to follow him, but this was already a sign that he did not have the necessary authority to command a disciplined force. In the middle of November, as the Cossacks and Tatars were approaching Perekop hoping to enter the Crimea by surprise, advance scouts reported a large herd of horses, which belonged to Kantemir and the Nogays, grazing nearby. Instead of continuing with the march, the majority decided to take the herd first. The operation was successful, but with it an alarm was sent to the Crimea and before the end of the next day Canbeg and Devlet Gerey arrived in Perekop to defend the Crimea with all their forces. Having learned this, the sentiment arose among the Cossacks that there was no reason to go on and that they should turn back since their own force was too small to risk entering the Crimea. And after all, they had already gained sufficient booty by taking the large herd. In the meantime, Canbeg Gerey's forces began forays on the Cossack and

Tatar camp. In light of this situation, neither the hetman nor Şahin Gerey could convince the Cossacks to go on toward Perekop. Instead, they decided to turn back before it was too late. Even so, the Cossacks and their Tatar allies were forced to give battle to the attacking forces of Canbeg Gerey, who in the meantime had been joined by Kantemir. Managing to survive repeated assaults, they slowly made their way back to the Dnieper. By the time they reached Aslan Kerman, the enemy ceased its attacks and they were able to rest and divide the captured herd of horses. Although Şahin Gerey was forced to retreat with the Cossacks, he continued his partisan war with Canbeg Gerey and Kantemir even after the expedition. He was encouraged by the continued support offered to him by the Lesser Nogays. Leaving Mehmed Gerey in the steppe with these Nogays, Şahin Gerey again withdrew to the Zaporizhia.

In April 1629, the two brothers made another attempt to regain the Crimea, again with the help of the naval forces of the Zaporozhian as well as the Don Cossacks.¹¹¹ As in late 1628, an approach of Perekop was made by Şahin and Mehmed Gerey with the Lesser Nogays and Zaporozhians. This time the Zaporozhian force was much larger than in the previous fall. However, it consisted mostly of non-registered Cossacks, although regular Cossack officers did participate.¹¹² A combined force of Don and Zaporozhian Cossacks set out from the Don and entered the Crimea near Kerč and sacked Karasu. Another flotilla, of Zaporozhians, struck from the side of the Black Sea and sacked Mangub. Despite this promising plan, the land forces were again unsuccessful near Perekop because of a dire lack of water and defection by the Nogays in the face of the large force amassed by Canbeg Gerey and Kantemir. Meanwhile, the attacks from the sea apparently were not followed through by a push into the Crimea, but instead degenerated into mere raids for

¹¹¹On this attempt to regain the Crimea see Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba*, p. 136-37 and the brief relation in Gołębiowski, "Şahin Giraj," 8, pp. 26-27. See also Hruševs'kyj, *Istorija*, 8, pp. 60-63.

¹¹²Hruševs'kyj, *Istorija*, 8, p. 63.

booty. After this unsuccessful attempt, Mehmed Gerey, accused of dealing with the enemy, was murdered by the Zaporozhians. As for Şahin Gerey, he decided not to take any chances and fled to the Don region and from there to Iran.

At this point it is not clear to what degree and for how long Hasan Pasha's measures to buttress the Black Sea defenses were successful. But by 1629, the situation in the northern Black Sea seemed no different than it had been prior to the ascent of Mehmed and Şahin Gerey. The new khan was hostile toward the Commonwealth and launched large raids against it. Meanwhile, the Zaporozhians resumed their depredations on the Black Sea, which brought a renewal of complaints and demands from the Porte. And the Don Cossacks continued their attacks in the Sea of Azov and against the Crimea, as well as in the Black Sea, often together with the Zaporozhians, while Moscow condemned them for their acts and disavowed any responsibility before the Porte. After all the efforts on each side to control their frontiers, the same litany of complaints, denials, and promises continued as before.

PART II

THE EXPEDITIONS OF HASAN PASHA (1627 AND 1628): A CASE STUDY OF THE OTTOMAN DEFENSE OF THE BLACK SEA

CHAPTER V

The Mobilization of Men and Matériel

To gain knowledge and better understanding of the Ottoman defense of the Black Sea, it is useful to have a more concrete and detailed picture of its day-to-day workings. The starting point for this investigation are materials in the Archive of the Prime Ministry (*Başbakanlık Arşivi*) of Istanbul relating to Hasan Pasha's expeditions to Özi (Oçakiv) and the Crimea in 1627 and 1628, respectively. The story of these expeditions aimed at strengthening the fortress defenses of the Black Sea and reasserting Ottoman control over the Crimean Khanate has been told in Chapter IV where some of the main documentary sources were referred to. The most significant source is volume 83 of the *Başbakanlık Arşivi*'s *Mühimme defterleri*. This volume, part of the *Mühimme* series, is not actually a *mühimme* register. Although the appearance of the text is no different from a typical *mühimme defteri* of the time, aside from a short section (see below), the firmans registered in it (originally entered in chronological order)¹ were issued not by the imperial divan (*divan-i hümayun*), but rather, by the supreme commander of an expedition from the field of operations, that is, by grand admiral (*kapudan paşa*) vizier Hasan. They are addressed to various high and low officials and commanders located in near and distant regions in Rumeli or on the shores of the Black and Azov Seas. Most common are

¹In a rebinding of the register, the order of some of the pages was disturbed and hence, some of the documents are out of chronological order. Because the numeration of the documents was made after this or some later rebinding, it also does not completely correspond to the original order of the documents.

governor-generals and governors (*beglerbegis* and *sancakbegis*), district heads (*kadıs*), and finance department chiefs (*defterdars*).

The firmans in Hasan Pasha's firman register vary in content. Of the 135 firmans, about a third cover matters not directly connected, or at best, indirectly connected to the campaign. The other two thirds cover matters directly pertaining to the operations of the 1627 and 1628 campaigns. These firmans can be divided into three groups according to their subject matter—mobilization, transport and supplies, and taxation and finances. In addition, there are a number of miscellaneous firmans relating to the actual business of the campaigns, covering diverse matters such as construction, promotions, and diplomacy.

None of the firmans relating to the actual business of the campaigns are orders concerned with directing the actual operations in the field. The one reference to battlefield military operations (to the combined Tatar-Cossack siege of Kefe in June-July 1628 in a firman ordering the governor-general of Özi to make sure that troops assembled at Özi and Akkerman were not dismissed prematurely) is marginal to the document's contents—the information serves only as background and the firman contains no specific orders on the conduct of battle.² There are no references to any construction work at the planned site of Togan Geçidi (in Chapter IV it was seen that the this fortress was never commenced). There is only one specific reference to the construction and repair activity at Özi in 1627—identical firmans praising the Moldavian and Wallachian *voyvodas* for their loyal service mention a newly constructed (or reconstructed) fortress, cannon tower (*hışârbeçe*), and *palanka*.³

²MD 83, no. 123 (see Chapter IV).

³MD 83, no. 77.

Troops and Mobilization

Mobilization firmans. A substantial portion of the firmans in Hasan Pasha's firman register relate to the mobilization of provincial forces in both 1627 and 1628.⁴ For neither campaign is there a single firman in the firman register proclaiming a general mobilization of the provincial forces and the forces of the Porte (*kapıkulu*). Nor is there a single firman for the mobilization of only the provincial forces, timariot (*timar*-holding) or others. Instead, the mobilization was announced through decrees to individual governors and *kadıs* of provinces slated for mobilization. In fact, the only part of the register in which initial mobilization orders could have been registered is the part that was written in the capital, that is, the brief regular *mühimme*-type section from 1628 in the middle of the volume (before the orders issued during the campaign of 1628). In fact, the title of this section states that the firmans in it were issued for the purpose of rapidly mobilizing the troops of the districts that were assigned for Hasan Pasha's campaigns.

In the section recording firmans issued in Istanbul in 1628, there is one basic firman, separate copies of which were sent addressed to governors and *kadıs* in different districts. The full version given in the firman register, which can be considered a template for the other versions, is addressed to İbrahim, governor-general of Özi and governor (*mutasarrıf*) of the district (*sancak*) of Silistre. It calls for the mobilization of all the forces in that district for the completion of the repair of several "deficient places" at the Özi fortress complex.⁵ The other addressees listed at the end of this documents for other firmans of the same content were to the governors (either governor or temporary governors [*mutasarrıfs* by *arpalık*]) of Nigboli, Vidin, Alaca Hisar, Çirmen, Vülçetrin, Dukagin, İskenderiyye, Prizrin, Kırk Kilise, Köstendil, to the Köstendil *alay begi*, the *voyvoda* of

⁴26 of the 135 firmans in MD 83 relate to mobilization.

⁵ Özi *kal'esinüñ kuşur kalan yerlerin itmâma irişdürülüp* (MD 83, no. 79, see also no. 86). Probably the repairs to be completed were those being carried out by Hasan Pasha in the previous year.

Moldavia, the *voyvoda* of Wallachia and the *kadıs* in these provinces.⁶ This set of firmans called up the following types of provincial forces: timariots, from regular *timar*- and *ze'amet*-holders and their *cebelü* retainues to the higher ranking *timar*-holding *müteferrikas*, *çavuşes*, and scribes.⁷ The various roles of the different timariots and other provincial troops will be discussed below.

From the sources in Chapter IV we know that in 1627 the Crimean khan and *kalga* were also ordered to participate in the planned fortress construction on the Dnieper, but in Hasan Pasha's firman register there are no orders to them or reference to their participation. In 1628, aside from bringing regular troops for the struggle with Mehmed and Şahin Gerey Hasan Pasha made an effort to enlist the aid of available tribal forces, the local population, for aid against the rebellious brothers. As the fleet arrived in Kefe in late June 1628, he sent a firman to this effect to the Nogay *begs* and *mirzas*.⁸ In another firman Hasan Pasha resorts to a measure known as *nefir-i 'amm* or "general call to arms" that was increasingly used by the Ottomans in the seventeenth century to mobilize the *re'aya* in times of great urgency.⁹ The firman addressed to the *kadıs* of Kefe, Sudak, and Taman orders that they proclaim a *nefir-i 'amm* to all the *re'aya* in their *kazas*. Worth noting is the incentive given to the *re'aya* for their cooperation: in exchange for the *re'aya*'s mobilizing all of the *cizye* and *'avarız* taxes owed by them for *hicri* year 1037 would be cancelled.¹⁰ There is no information on the execution of the *nefir-i 'amm*.

⁶This firman entry was written on two sheets which were separated during a later binding of the register. Its conclusion together with the thirteen *bir suret*-type notes is to be found in MD 83, no. 86.

⁷In this work, "timariot" refers to *timar*- and *ze'amet*-holders; "regular timariot" is used to distinguish those *timar*- and *ze'amet*-holders who performed military service as cavalry from those who held *timar* or *ze'amets* as salaries, stipends, and rewards—*erbab-i timar* and *zu'ama*, as opposed to *timar* or *ze'amet*-holding *müteferrikas*, *çavuşes*, etc.

⁸MD 83, no. 120 (see Chapter IV).

⁹On *nefir-i 'amm* see Halil İnalcık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 6 (1980): 283-337, esp. pp. 304-11.

¹⁰MD 83, no. 119.

Although a decree by the sultan proclaiming a mobilization is not known to exist, the set of initial individual orders to the specific local authorities from 1628 refer to the initiation of the given mobilization and campaign: “the *emr-i şerif* has been issued in the matter [of this mobilization] upon the *hatt-i hümayun* that is joined to felicity.” In other words, the initial command assigning Hasan Pasha to this expedition and ordering and empowering him to undertake the necessary mobilization was in the form of a personal order written in the hand of the sultan (*hatt-i hümayun* or *hatt-i şerif*). As will become evident below, the sultan’s *hatt-i hümayun* also initiated and authorized actions in other areas.

In the two firman register-proper sections of the *Mühimme defteri* 83 drawn up during the campaigns of 1627 and 1628, there are several firmans similar in structure and content to the series of initial firmans issued in Istanbul in 1628. However, these orders were issued by Hasan Pasha after he had already entered the Black Sea and learned that previous firmans were not being heeded or were being carried out with great delays. Most often they are also addressed to governors or *kadıs*. Therefore alongside what seem to be standard mobilization formulas such as, “from one to a thousand [*akça*-valued timars] and from a thousand [*akça*-valued timars] to a hundred thousand [*akça*-valued *ze’amets*], bring the army to your side” and “may the army appointed to the mentioned service become cognizant of this *emr-i şerif* and from the day this *emr-i şerif* arrives may every single one of them leave their homes with their arms and necessities and their equipment for battle and war and with capable *cebelüs*,” these firmans have formulas such as “we have already sent numerous decrees,” “let there be no further delays and procrastinations,” “let there be no further excuses and prevarications,” and “gather the forces in your *sancak* with all speed as decreed and proceed to Özi going at a rate of two days march in one day.” In addition to the exhortations, there are warnings and threats directed at both the addressees responsible for effecting the mobilization as well as the actual troops. For example, “those that do not come to the assigned places of muster (*yoklama*) with their *berats* will lose their *dirliks*

and you will lose your rank and be punished.” The firmans of 1628 add a further warning that the troops should not be tardy as in the previous year. **Table 1** and **2** provide a summary of the mobilization firmans in *Mühimme defteri* 83 for 1627 and 1628, respectively.

Table 1. Mobilization firmans of 1627 in MD 83

date	place	addressee	content
firman			
6 June no. 2	Kavak	<i>kadıs</i> in Nigbolı, Silistre, Kırk Kilise <i>sancaks</i>	timariot (<i>gedüklü</i> and <i>gedüksüz</i>) <i>müteferrikas</i> , scribes all of the Sublime Porte (<i>der-gah-i mu'alla</i>), regular timariots in <i>kazas</i> of these <i>sancaks</i> have not reported for duty at Togan Geçidi, despite repeated orders; to be mobilized without delay
16 June no. 3	Varna	<i>kadıs</i> in Nigbolı, Silistre, Vidin <i>sancaks</i>	<i>agas</i> , <i>kethudas</i> , <i>oda başıs</i> , 'azebs, timariots, salaried troops (' <i>ulufelu</i>) in <i>kazas</i> of these <i>sancaks</i> to be sent for defense of Özi and Togan Geçidi without delay
19 June no. 26	Balcık	'Osman, <i>gedüklü müteferrika</i> of the Sublime Porte assigned to defense of Özi	timariot (<i>gedüklü</i> and <i>gedüksüz</i>) <i>müteferrikas</i> , scribes of imperial divan and treasury, sons of <i>çavuşes</i> and scribes, <i>katip şagirds</i> , all of the Sublime Porte, <i>topcıs</i> , <i>cebecis</i> , fortress troops (<i>kıla neferatı</i>), dismissed (<i>ma'zul</i>) and applying (<i>eli emirlü</i>) timariots, <i>akıncıs</i> et al. troops, merchants, <i>cerehors</i> in Silistre, Nigbolı, Vidin <i>sancaks</i> to be mobilized and sent to Özi and Togan Geçidi without delay
— [Balcık] no. 27		<i>kadıs</i> in Nigbolı, Silistre, Vidin <i>sancaks</i>	timariot <i>müteferrikas</i> , <i>çavuşes</i> , scribes of imperial divan, regular timariots in <i>kazas</i> of these <i>sancaks</i> previously several times ordered to Özi and Togan Geçidi but have not heeded call; to be mobilized without delay
— [Balcık] no. 28		<i>kadıs</i> in Nigbolı, Silistre, Vidin <i>sancaks</i>	most of <i>cebecis</i> of the Sublime Porte that are assigned to Özi and Togan Geçidi reside in <i>kazas</i> of these <i>sancaks</i> ; though Hasan Pasha and fleet already sailed and on way to Özi, theses <i>cebecis</i> have not yet heeded call; to be mobilized without delay
— [Kılı] no. 44		İsmail <i>kadı</i>	<i>beşlüs</i> and their <i>agas</i> of İsmail fortress to be mobilized without delay and sent to Özi and Togan Geçidi quickly
15 July no. 55	Özi	Hüseyin, <i>kapuçı başı</i> of the Porte assigned to mobilizing troops	the <i>sancakbegis</i> and timariot (<i>gedüklü</i> and <i>gedüksüz</i>) <i>müteferrikas</i> , <i>çavuşes</i> , scribes, sons of <i>çavuşes</i> , <i>katip şagirdis</i> , all of the Sublime Porte, regular timariots, dismissed (<i>ma'zul</i>) and applying (<i>eli emirlü</i>) timariots, <i>cebelü tatars</i> and <i>akıncıs</i> , <i>cebecis</i> et al troops in Silistre, Nigbolı, Vidin, Kırk Kilise, Çirmen, Vize <i>sancaks</i> have several times been strictly ordered to join Hasan Paşa at Özi but as yet none have even mobilized even though it is 15 days since Hasan Pasha arrived and been met there by the Özi <i>beglerbegi</i> , Moldavian and Wallachian <i>voyvodas</i> ; if these forces are not at Özi by 23 July <i>dirlıks</i> will be revoked and harsh punishments will be meted out.
[21-24 July] no. 6	Özi	Nigbolı, Vidin, Çirmen, Kırk Kilise <i>sancakbegis</i>	20 days since Hasan Pasha entered Özi these <i>sancakbegis</i> and their troops have not yet arrived; march double time or else punishments

Table 2. Mobilization firmans of 1628 in MD 83

date	place	addressee	content
firman			
5 May nos. 79,86	Istanbul	İbrahim, Özi <i>beglerbegi</i> and Silistre <i>sancak mutasarrıfı</i> ; Mehmed, Nigbolı <i>sancak mutasarrıfı</i> ; Mehmed, Vidin <i>sancakbegi</i> ; Alaca Hisar <i>sancakbegi</i> ; Çirmen <i>sancakbegi</i> ; Vülçetrin <i>sancakbegi</i> ; Dukagin <i>sancakbegi</i> ; Köstendil <i>sancakbegi</i> ; Köstendil <i>alay begi</i> ; İskenderiyye <i>sancakbegi</i> ; Prizrin <i>sancakbegi</i> ; Moldavia <i>voyvoda</i> ; Wallachia <i>voyvoda</i> ; Mehmed, Kırk Kilise <i>sancak mutasarrıfı</i> ; <i>kadı</i> s in these <i>sancaks</i>	timariot <i>müteferrikas</i> , <i>çavuşes</i> , scribes of imperial divan and treasury, sons of <i>çavuşes</i> and <i>müteferrikas</i> , <i>katip şagirds</i> , all of the Sublime Porte, <i>alay begs</i> , regular timariots are all to arrive at muster places with <i>berats</i> and proceed to Özi with full equipment, supplies and <i>cebelü</i> retinues; not to be late like last year, but rather to arrive before Hasan Pasha
12 June no. 89	Şili	Mehmed, Nigbolı <i>sancak mutasarrıfı</i> ; other assigned <i>sancakbegis</i> ; <i>kadı</i> s in assigned <i>sancaks</i>	timariot <i>müteferrikas</i> , <i>çavuşes</i> , scribes, sons of <i>çavuşes</i> and scribes, <i>katib şagirdis</i> , <i>alay begs</i> , regular timariots were already sent orders several times, but have not yet mobilized; to be mobilized and sent to Özi without delay
—	Istanbul no. 81	<i>kethuda yeris</i> in Silistre <i>sancak</i>	<i>sipahis</i> [of the Sublime Porte] to be mobilized and brought to the Özi <i>beglerbegi</i> for service at Özi

The types of troops listed in the mobilization firmans include timariots, various salaried troops (*kapukulu* and non-*kapukulu*), and other groups. Most of these firmans have a similar formulaic list naming the types of troops to be called up. Most common are firmans mentioning only timariots.¹¹ Less common are those mentioning both timariots and salaried¹² or those mentioning only salaried troops.¹³ Below is one example of a firman with an extensive listings of troops to be mobilized:

. . . my imperial court's *ze'amet*- and *timar*-holding, *gedüklü* and *gedüksüz müteferrikas* and *çavuşes* and the imperial divan's and imperial registry (*defter-i hakani*) [office's] scribes and the sons of *çavuşes*¹⁴ and the sons of *çavuşes* and the sons of scribes and the scribal apprentices (*katib şagirdi*) [and the regular *ze'amet*- and *timar*-holders]¹⁵ and the *topcis* and *cebecis* and the fortress garrison-troops and the dismissed (*ma'zul*) and applying (*eli emirlü*) and the *akıncıs* and other military groups and, from every *kaza*, their [i.e., the timariot's] assigned merchants and *cerehors* . . .¹⁶

In the relevant firmans, the various types—timariots, salaried, and others—are listed in the same order.¹⁷ Within the first group, the timariots—*müterrikas*, *çavuşes*, scribes,¹⁸ sons

¹¹MD 83, nos. 2, 27, 55, 86, 89.

¹²MD 83, nos. 3, 26.

¹³MD 83, nos. 28, 81. Of course there are many firmans mentioning the fortress garrisons (*kıla' neferati*) that are not strictly mobilization orders (see below).

¹⁴Also "sons of *müteferrikas*" in MD 83, no. 89.

¹⁵The reference to the regular timariots is included in the slightly abbreviated repetition of this formula in the second part of this timar. In other firmans *alay begs* are mentioned before the timariot regulars.

¹⁶MD 83, no. 2, 26 (see appendix; cf. MD 83, no. 55).

¹⁷Perhaps the timariots are listed first because their mobilization was the primary responsibility of the governors to whom they were addressed. Certainly they did not command a higher prestige than the *kapukulu* although the latter are always listed after them.

¹⁸In MD 83, no. 55 *çavuş* was written before scribe (*katib*), then crossed and rewritten above and after scribe.

of *çavuşes*, sons of scribes, scribal apprentices, *alay begis* and regular timariots (*ze'amet-* and *timar*-holding *sipahis*)—are also listed in the same order. Within the timariot group, the order of mention seems to be approximately one of descending prestige.¹⁹ As for the salaried troops, they are mentioned too seldom for there to be a significant pattern.

There is no information as to the reason for the delays in mobilization (or even for non-response by some provincial troops to the orders). Without good figures for similar campaigns, it is difficult to say for sure whether the ultimate turnout was normal or low, although from figures that are available (see below), it can certainly be said that in some districts only a small portion of their potential number reported. Perhaps the problems with tardiness and truancy were symptomatic of the general decline of the *timar* system in the seventeenth century. However it should be noted that the fact that the state insisted on the mobilization of timariots implies that there was a role for them in such expeditions. At the least they would have been useful as auxiliaries (for example, as guards of fortresses and settlements or at the construction sites). Perhaps their “apathy” was connected with the fact that in such defensive campaigns in which conquest did not occur, there was apparently no promise of booty.

Aside from truancy, however, several firmans address the problem of desertion. One reveals that some troops from Bender and Akkerman began to send back cattle, supplies and equipment, and were themselves beginning to return home even though they had not obtained permits excusing them from duty (*icazet tezkeresi*). Hasan Pasha ordered that the cattle and possessions that were being sent back be confiscated, that the names of the guilty parties be reported to the Porte, and that no *icazet tezkeresi* be issued.²⁰ In two other firmans, the desertion by all six *farisan* of Vidin who attended the

¹⁹Note, however, that in the muster register to be discussed below the *çavuşes* and scribes are in reverse order.

²⁰MD 83, no. 20.

campaign was the cause for an order to confiscate their wages for the first nine months for the current year (A.H. 1036).²¹ On the basis of these few firmans it is impossible to say how widespread the problem of desertion was.

Of course the timariots were not the complete force sent to Özi. The firmans mention that Hasan Pasha's fleet was bringing janissaries, *cebecis*, and *sipahis*²² and that he had at his disposal the armies of the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. Unfortunately there are no figures on these forces. The only reference to the size of the fleet is in a letter sent in the summer of 1628 to the crown *hetman*, Stanisław Koniecpolski, in which Hasan Pasha states that his fleet has more than one hundred galleys (*kadirga*), *kalyatas*, and *firkatas*.²³ A fleet of such a size would have included a sizable force in the thousands or even tens of thousands of men (see glossary s.v. *kadirga* and *kalyata* for the typical number of troops carried by them).

Yoklama defterleri. A register containing two muster rolls (*yoklama defteri*) with detailed figures on the numbers of *timar*- and *ze'amet*-holders that were mobilized in 1627 and 1628 exists in the Başbakanlık Archive.²⁴ The register consists of a separate section for each year. At the beginning of each section is a title describing its contents. Thereafter follows a summary of the numbers of each troop type. Then there are detailed entries for each participant, again grouped under type. The entries include the participant's name, the type of troop he belonged to, and the district or districts in which his *timar* lands were located (noted above the name in a different hand). Besides this there is other data recorded in these entries about which, unfortunately, only partial notes could be made. It was not

²¹MD 83, nos. 63, 99.

²²I.e., *sipahis* from the maritime provinces under the grand admiral.

²³AGAD, Dz. turecki, k 72, t. 315, nr. 575.

²⁴TT 751.

possible to decipher many of the place names that were noted above the entries—presumably they were the names of the home village or town of the given timariot. Also in each entry there is either one or two figures in the tens or hundreds of thousands, with the second figure always being greater than the first; when there are two figures, the word *yekun* meaning “total” is written above the second one. Presumably these figures refer to the *akça* value of the given participant’s *timar* or *ze’amet*, with the first giving the base value of the *dirlik* and the second the value after various raises (*terakki*). There are separate sections in the register for the regiments (*cema’at*) of the *müteferrikas*, scribes, and *çavuşes*, as well as a section for a *cema’a* of *müteferrika*, scribe, and *çavuş* sons (*müteferrika-zade*, *katib-zade*, *çavuş-zade*). The regular timariots are grouped according to their district (*liva*).

Despite the basic importance of the *yoklama defteri* in the mobilization process and hence, for proper operation of the *timar* system, it has hardly been treated in the literature and there is no full publication of a *yoklama defteri*.²⁵ Although the complete muster registers for Hasan Pasha’s campaigns of 1627 and 1628 are not presently available, a partial transcription and translation of this register is in the appendix.

Tables 3 and 4 give the breakdown of troops who reported for muster in 1627 and 1628. The total numbers of reporting timariots, 1,582 in 1627 and 574 in 1628, are perhaps misleading since they do not include the accompanying *cebelüs*, that is, the armed retainers which timariots were obliged to bring along on campaign. According to ‘Ayni ‘Ali’s description of the *timar* system, in Rumeli, the timariot had to bring with him one fully armed retainer or *cebelü* for every 3,000 *akça* of his *timar* and for every 5,000 *akça* of his *zeamet*.²⁶ With the complete data from this register it would be possible to

²⁵V. P. Mutafčieva, “Proveročnye spiski (joklama defterleri) 1014-1016 gg. kak istočnik po obščestvenno-ekonomičeskoj istorii Osmanskoj imperii XVII v.,” *Vostočnye istočniki po istorii narodov Jugo-vostočnoj i Central’noj Evropy*, v. 2, ed. A. S. Tveritinova, Moscow, 1969: 212-17.

²⁶‘Ayn-i ‘Ali efendi, *Qavān-in-i āl-i ‘oṣmān der hülāṣa-i mezāmīn-i defter-i divān*, Istanbul, 1979 [=reprint of 1280/1863 edition], p. 39.

estimate the actual number of troops the recorded participants brought along based on *akça* values of their *timars*. It is interesting that there were relatively many timariots from the districts of Silistre, Nigboli, and Vidin and that it was to these districts that the most mobilization-related firmans in the firman register are addressed. Perhaps the authorities concentrated on the provinces that they knew would be most responsive to the mobilization.

Table 3. Summary of 1627 *yoklama* register (TT 751, pp. 1-2)

type or origin of troops	number of troops	
regiment (<i>cema'at</i>) of <i>müteferrikas</i> and scribes	97	
	20 gedüklü	77 gedüksüz
regiment of <i>çavuşes</i>	179	
	21 gedüklü	150 (?) gedüksüz
regiment of <i>müteferrika</i> and <i>çavuş</i> sons and of scribal apprentices (<i>şagirds</i>)	111	
regiment of <i>müteferrikas</i> and <i>çavuşes</i> and other appointed to the campaign by an <i>emr-i şerif</i>	26	
Silistre <i>sancak</i>	263	
Nigboli <i>sancak</i>	257	
Vidin <i>sancak</i>	189	
Çirmen <i>sancak</i>	92	
Vize <i>sancak</i>	29	
Kırk Kilise <i>sancak</i>	13	
İzvornik <i>sancak</i>	215	
regiment of <i>topcı</i>	21	
regiment of dismissed <i>sipahis</i> (<i>ma'zul</i>)	12	
regiment of <i>akıncıs</i>	41	
regiment of some <i>kesan</i> (?) who were brought as <i>cebelüs</i>	37	
total	1582	

Table 4. Summary of 1628 *yoklama* register (TT 751, pp. 45-58)

type or origin of troops present at Özl	number of troops
regiment (<i>cema'at</i>) of <i>müteferrikas</i> of the Sublime Porte	16
regiment of scribes of the imperial <i>divan</i>	10
regiment of <i>çavuşes</i> of the Sublime Porte	39
regiment of sons of <i>çavuşes</i>	30
regiment of sons of <i>müteferrikas</i>	3
Silistre <i>sancak</i>	211
Vidin <i>sancak</i>	10
Prizrin <i>sancak</i>	1
Vülçetrin <i>sancak</i>	1
Vize <i>sancak</i>	1
Çirmen <i>sancak</i>	34
İskenderiyye <i>sancak</i>	3
İzvornik <i>sancak</i>	206
Nigboli <i>sancak</i>	9
total	574
above-listed troops who served with Hasan Pasha in the Crimea	
regiment of <i>müteferrikas</i>	16
regiment of scribes of the imperial <i>divan</i>	9
regiment of <i>çavuşes</i> of the Sublime Porte and of sons of <i>çavuşes</i>	27
regiment of <i>ze'amet</i> and <i>timar</i> holders	45
subtotal	97

A muster register (*yoklama*) of Rumelian timariots who reported and travelled to the northern Black Sea in 1628 records only 570 timariots, of which 98 were aides-de-camp.²⁷ The register also lists separately 97 timariots, from among the total 570, who served in the Crimea with Hasan Pasha.²⁸ There is no information on the number of

²⁷TT 751, pp. 45.

²⁸TT 751, p. 57-58. There is no further on how these timariots were transported to the Crimea in time to support Hasan Pasha. Perhaps they were brought by ship from Akkerman.

Moldavian and Wallachian troops that were present or on the activities of their *voyvodas* during the 1628 campaign. From the figures in the muster register it is clear that in 1628 the timariot situation apparently did not improve, although it is difficult to compare the figures from the two years because of the different missions and the different lengths to which the state went to mobilize the troops in the two years.

In both 1627 and 1628, about a quarter of the names recorded in the *yoklama defterleri* were not regular timariot troops, but rather *müteferrikas*, scribes (*katib*), *çavuşes*, and their sons. Like the regular timariots, the *müteferrikas*, scribes, and *çavuşes* are listed in two separate groups, *gedüklü* and *gedüksüz*. In many Ottoman institutions in general, whether they be *timars*, fortress garrisons, or even crafts guilds, *gedüklü* refers to a holder one of a limited number of permanent positions (*gedük*) that was confirmed by a *berat*. *Gedüksüz* were those without such a position, who were in line for a *gedük* to open up either through the death or demotion of the holder of *gedüklü*. As is well-known, one of the symptoms of the decline of the *timar* was the tendency of granting *timars* for non-military purposes to *müteferrikas*, *çavuşes*, scribes and various favorites of the court as a reward, salary, stipend, or pension.²⁹

What were the functions of the non-military groups? In the sources on Hasan Pasha's campaigns there are no explicit references to the functions they may have performed. The *müteferrikas*, being an elite and highly paid formation of the outer palace service or *birun*, traditionally performed various functions in the sultan's immediate retinue, and during campaigns they were always to be at his side, although they had no combat role. *Müteferrikas* were distinguished into two types according to the manner in which they were paid—*'ulufelü*, that is, those who received salaries, and *timar-* or *zeamet*-holders. Only the latter type are mentioned in Hasan Pasha's campaign. Aside

²⁹Halil, İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973, p. 116.

from the sultan, some high officials, such as viziers, had *müteferrikas* in their service and perhaps they were at the side of Hasan Pasha as well. Also in the literature there is little evidence concerning the concrete functions of *müteferrikas* during campaigns.³⁰ It seems that aside from direct service to the sultan or a high official, they were used in special missions. For example, *müteferrikas* were employed on diplomatic missions.³¹ Thus, a letter from Murad IV to Zygmunt III, concerning the events in the Black Sea in 1628, was delivered to Warsaw by a *müteferrika* Hüseyin.³² The *yoklama defteri* for the 1627 campaign lists several *müteferrikas* who served as scribes.³³

Çavuşes, also of the *birun* or outer palace service, were ranked below *müteferrikas*, a fact reflected in the order in which they are mentioned in the firmans and *yoklama defterleri*. *Çavuşes* served both in the palace and on various missions on the outside, usually being to act as marshals, that is, execute orders of the Porte. During receptions of foreign diplomats, *çavuşes* escorted envoys to the sultan's presence. Frequently they were sent to foreign lands as envoys. In campaigns they protected order and maintained discipline in the army. One of their most important functions was to deliver and execute orders in the provinces.³⁴

Scribes were indispensable in carrying out the administrative tasks during Ottoman campaigns. The practice was to bring many documents and registers along in connection with foreseen and unforeseen financial, diplomatic, and other matters. Thus a sizeable

³⁰On *müteferrikas* see, M. Tayyib Gökbilgen, "Müteferrika," *İA*, 8: 853-56; H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the Near East*, v. 1: *Islamic Society in the Eighteenth Century*, pt. 1, London: Oxford University Press, 1950, pp. 87-88, 362; İ Metin Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550-1650*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1983, pp. 33, 39.

³¹Gökbilgen, "Müteferrika," p. 856.

³²AGAD, Dz. turecki k 73, t. 317, nr. 577;

³³E.g., a certain Mehmed and Huseyn, *katibs* of the imperial registry (*defter-i hakani*), are also *müteferrikas* of the Sublime Porte (TT 753, p. 3; for further examples, p. 4; see appendix).

³⁴M. Fuad Köprülü, "Çavuş," *İA*, v. 3: 362-69.

contingent of scribes and their apprentice-assistants (*şagird*) were needed for keeping the books and writing out firmans, reports, and memoranda.³⁵ That the firmans registered in the firman register are written in nearly a dozen different hands is evidence of the employ of a corps of scribes during the campaigns (see appendix). In the *yoklama defterleri*, the scribes are labelled as either of the imperial divan ('*an kâtibân-ı dîvân-ı hümâyûn*) or of the imperial registry ('*an kâtibân-ı defter-ı hâkânî*).

From the above examples indicate that the non-military provincial *timar*-holders performed some important functions, from executing orders to writing them out. Their functions can best be classified as those of aides-de-camp, or simply aides.

Winter Quarters. After the 1627 campaign the situation on the Özi frontier remained tense and unstable (see Chapter II). In order to protect the vicinity of Özi, where the fortress repairs were not yet complete, in the beginning of October 1627 Hasan Pasha issued four firmans upon the authority of the sultan's *hatt-ı şerif*, assigning timariot forces in addition to the regular garrison troops to stay in the region over the winter.³⁶ In the firman written out in full, Mehmed Pasha, the governor-general of Özi, is ordered to spend the winter at Özi with the garrison troops (referred to as *yarar adamlar*, "capable men") and timariots under him.³⁷ The basic firman specifies that all the given timariots, in the number in which they had reported for muster, were to winter in Özi and that not a single leave was to be issued. While Mehmed Pasha is enjoined to make, with his forces, all efforts to defend the vicinity of Özi from all enemies, he is also warned that nothing be done that would

³⁵See Rhoads Murphey, "The Functioning of the Ottoman Army under Murad IV (1623-1639/1032-1049)," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1979, pp. 65-69.

³⁶MD 83, no. 109 (firman with three *bir suret*-notes).

³⁷Referring to them only as *livâ'-ı mezbûrî zu'amâ ve erbâb-ı tîmârî*, the document does not make clear which *liva* or *livas* the given timariots were from. Perhaps *livâ'-ı mezbûr* was understood to be Silistre since this was the traditional seat of the Özi governor-general; in addition, in this campaign, with 263 reporting *timar*- and *ze'amet*-holders, Silistre was the province contributing the most timariots (see Table 3).

endanger peace with neighbors (the Commonwealth). The other three firmans of the same content (indicated by notes below the above-mentioned firman) were to the governor of Nigboli ordering him to winter quarters at Akkerman, the governor of Vidin to winter quarters at Bender, and the governor of Çirmen to winter quarters at Kili. These governors were probably chosen because their provinces were among those contributing the most of the overall timariot force in the 1627 campaign (263 from Silistre, 257 from Nigboli, 189 from Vidin, 92 from Çirmen, see **Table 3**). It was probably no coincidence that, proceeding from the winter quarters closest to the frontier at Özi to the farthest from it at Kili, the assignments from among these governors were made in order of descending number of available timariots.

The Şayka Fleet. Aside from supplying troops, the Danubian region was responsible for maintaining a fleet of *şaykas* which, according to the firman register, played an important role in the defense of Özi, as well as of the Danube. A firman to the *kadı* of Vidin from late July or early August 1627 orders that, as was the practice in the past, the *kapudan* of Vidin be empowered to obtain without delay the participation of the fortress guards (*mustahfız*) of the fortresses of Vidin, Filoridin, and Ercar (?).³⁸ In the beginning of October 1627, a series of seven firmans was issued concerning the outfitting of *şaykas* by various Danubian locales.³⁹ In preparation for operations in the next campaign season, the addressees were ordered before *nev ruz* (Persian new year, 22 March) of 1628 to outfit a requisite number of *şaykas*, including providing them with oarsmen (*kürekçi*) and soldiers (*cengci*). The *kapudan* of Hirsova was appointed the commandant (*baş ve bog*) of this fleet and all mobilized *şaykas* were to report to him. Each of the following were responsible for fitting out one such *şayka* before: the *kapudan* if Feth-i İslam, the ‘*azeb*

³⁸ ارجار (?); MD 83, no. 15.

³⁹ MD 83, no. 110 (one firman and seven *bir suret* [“one copy (to)”] notes).

garrison of Feth-i İslam, *kapudan* of Vidin, the *azeb* garrison of Vidin, the '*azeb* garrison of Rahova, the *re'aya* in the *kaza* of Nigboli who were immune from taxation (*mu'af*),⁴⁰ the *mu'af re'aya* of the *kaza* of Ruscuk, the (*mu'af?*) *re'aya* of the *kaza* of Hırsova, the (*mu'af?*) *re'aya* of the *kazas* of Tulca and İsakçı. From what is known about the capacity of the Danubian *şayka*, this fleet of nine boats must have amounted to about 200 to 450 troops.⁴¹ The keelless *şayka* was very important for military, as well as transport, operations on rivers and in shallow coastal waters. Thus in these firmans it is stressed that the timely mobilization of the *şaykas* was of utmost importance for the defense of Özi.

Garrison Composition. Although the sources for Hasan Pasha's campaigns make frequent reference to garrison troops (*neferat*) of the fortresses in the *eyalet* of Özi, especially in regard the financing of their wages (see below), there is little specific information on the composition of these garrisons. Occasionally there is a reference to specific types of troops, for example, in the form of an order to the commander (*aga*) of a particular type in a garrison. The unpublished catalogue for the Başbakanlık Arşivi's *Maliyeden müdevver* financial registers lists many pay-registers for fortresses in the Black Sea region. From brief descriptions of the registers given in the catalogue, as well as from some published surveys of some of these registers, it is possible to form a general idea of the types of troops stationed in the fortresses of this region.⁴² Unfortunately, in the literature not enough has been brought to light on the military and other functions of even common troop types such as *cebecis* and '*azebs* and from the available definitions and descriptions

⁴⁰On taxation immunities granted to groups of *re'aya* in exchange for certain services see Cengiz Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda derbend teşkilâtı*, İstanbul: 1967 and idem, "Gemicilik," *Türkiyat Mecmuası* 15 (1968): 157-69.

⁴¹İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı devletinin merkez ve bahriye teşkilâtı*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1948, p. 458.

⁴²Alan W. Fisher, "Azov in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* n.s. 21 (1973): 161-74; idem "Ottoman Sources for a Study of Kefe Vilayet: The *Maliyeden Müdevver* Fond in the Başbakanlık Arşivi in İstanbul," *Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique* 19 (1978): 191-205.

it is usually impossible to make full and clear distinctions between various types. From what is known about Ottoman fortress garrisons in general, including those in Rumeli and the Black Sea region, the troops included both *kapıkulı* ("slaves of the Porte") and non-*kapıkulı*. All three main types of the *kapıkulı* troops—janissaries, *cebecis*, and *topcus*—were usually present. Of the non-*kapıkulı* troops, the main types were *'azebs*,⁴³ *beşlüs*,⁴⁴ and *farisan*.⁴⁵ A register of *ocaklıks* (see below) includes figures for the number of troops garrisoned in the fortresses of the *eyalet* of Özi, which are given in Table 5.

Table 5. Distribution of garrison troops in the *eyalet* of Özi

fortress(es)	troops	percentage of total
Özi complex	1,567	47.2
Bender	511	15.4
Akkerman and Yanık	512	15.4
Kili	314	9.5
İbrail	148	4.5
Ruscuk	20	0.6
Nigbolı	53	1.6
Culunık (?)	16	0.5
Rahova	102	3.1
Tulça New Fortress	63	1.9
<i>farisan</i> in service of Tuna treasury	15	0.5
total	3,321	100

The figures in Table 5 provide a view of the distribution of the garrison troops among the given fortresses of the *eyalet* of Özi. In the column labeled "troops" it can be seen that the great majority (78 percent of the troops were in the fortresses closest to the

⁴³MD 83, nos. 3, 8, 24, 41, 110, 126.

⁴⁴MD 83, nos. 3, 8, 17, 18, 24, 41, 44.

⁴⁵MD 83, 96, 99.

northern frontier, namely, the Özi fortress complex and Kıl Burun, Akkerman and Yanık (on the opposite shore of the Dniester liman), and Bender. Özi and Kıl Burun had the lion's share, with nearly half (47 percent) of the total deployments. In addition, the garrison-size distribution was greatly skewed toward Özi: the next largest garrisons, those of Bender and of Akkerman and Yanık (each with 15 percent of the total) were each a third the size of Özi and Kıl Burun, while the rest of the fortresses each amount to under 10 percent.

Supplies and Transport

As evident from Chapter I, aside from the Crimea, the northern coast of the Black Sea was underpopulated and its resources underdeveloped. Thus military and construction operations there required not only the import of manpower but also of foodstuffs for the men and materials and tools for the construction. To obtain these necessities Hasan Pasha resorted to requisition from and impost on the more settled and developed regions of Rumeli, from Akkerman to various settlements on the Danube. The first two firmans on this topic recorded in the firman register were issued on 13 Shawwal 1036/20 June 1627 when Hasan Pasha was en route to Kili from Mankaliya or already at Kili. The first of them ordered the *kadı* and the *mütesellim* of Akkerman to take over all merchant ships in their ports, empty them of their goods, load onto them timber (*karesti*) and other supplies (*mühimmat*) that had been prepared for the fortress construction that was to take place at Togan Geçidi (on the right bank of the Dnieper just above the mouth of the Inhulec' and opposite the island of Tavan), and immediately dispatch them to Özi.⁴⁶ Any grain and barley unloaded from these ships was not to be sold or given to anyone but preserved at Akkerman until it could be transported to Özi. Any delay or negligence, or any protection of a ship owner from this action on the part of the *kadı* or *mütesellim* would result in their

⁴⁶MD 83, no. 29.

dismissal from their posts and their punishment. In the second firman, addressed to the *kadis* of Kili and İbrail, also timber that had been prepared in their ports, along with *peksimid* or dried biscuit that was baked in their *kazas*, was to be loaded onto ships that were to be taken over in a similar fashion.⁴⁷ In both firmans it is stated that the ships were to be rented. *Navlun*, derived from the Greek, is a term denoting rent paid for a ship.⁴⁸ The following statement in the second firman stresses this point: "the mentioned supplies [are to be transported] with a large *nevlun* [payment]; this is not a forced obligation."

As in other construction projects in the northern Black Sea, Moldavia was called upon to provide supplies and equipment (*mühimmat*) for the construction at Özi.⁴⁹ There is only one indirect reference to this—a firman from mid-October 1627 mentions that a tax or levy (*teklif*) was imposed upon the inhabitants of Moldavia (**Bogdanlu**) in order to obtain *mühimmat* for the construction work at Özi.⁵⁰

Another firman, addressed to the *dizdar* of the Kili fortress, provides specific information on hardware needed for the construction and repair work. This firman, dated 14 Shawwal 1036/28 June 1627,⁵¹ orders the dispatch to Togan Geçidi of the following munitions (obviously for moving earth by mining) and tools stored in the arsenal (*cebehane*) of the Kili fortress: 10 *kantars* of black powder (*barut-i siyah*), 5 *kantars* of cotton fuses (*rişte-i penbah*), 223 pick axes (*kazma*), 3 metal shovels (*kürek-i ahen*), 2 iron claw hammers (*çattal çekiç*), and 10 *kösekis* (?). However, a significant amount of

⁴⁷MD 83, no. 40.

⁴⁸From Ναύλον according to Şemsü'd-din Sâmi, *Qāmūs-i tükri*, Istanbul: «İkdam» Matba'sı, 1317/1899-1900, 1452-1453.

⁴⁹E.g., see Victor Ostapchuk, "Five Documents from the Topkapı Palace Archive on the Ottoman Defense of the Black Sea against the Cossacks (1639)" in *Raiyyet Rüşümü: Essays Presented to Halil İnalçık on his Seventieth Birthday by his Colleagues and Students*, Cambridge, Mass., 1987 = *Journal of Turkish Studies* 11 (1987): 49-104, esp. p. 57.

⁵⁰MD 83, no. 73.

⁵¹MD 83, no. 47.

hardware was brought along with the fleet. According to a report by the papal nuncio in Istanbul, the Hasan Pasha's fleet included "two ships full of nails and other hardware for the construction at the mouth of the Dnieper."⁵²

Once in Akkerman, on 24 Shawwal 1036/8 July 1627 Hasan Pasha issued several more orders concerned with timber. The *kadı* and the *mütesellim* of Akkerman were to transport timber (brought to Akkerman by the Moldavian *voyvoda*) to a place called Budak Çelebi Kışlağı "by way of *imeci* (*imeci tariki-le*)" *re'aya* in his *kaza*.⁵³ In another firman, the janissary commander (*serdar*) of Akkerman and a certain Hasan, official (*zābıt*) of *evkaf* established by Sultan Selim II (*Sulṭān Selīm evkāfı*; in Akkerman ?), were ordered to engage (also "by way of *imeci*") the *re'aya* of these *evkaf* to aid the *re'aya* mentioned in the previous firman in transporting the Moldavian timber to the aforementioned place (called Budak Çelebi Kışlası in this document).⁵⁴ *imeci* or *imece* denotes a community's cooperative labor undertaken for the community's common good. The dictionaries and an article on *imece* by H. Eren treat it as a voluntary communal act.⁵⁵ The legal status of *imece* remains to be illuminated. However, in its use in the context of Hasan Pasha's firmans there is obviously an understanding of *imece* as compulsory labor, since the *re'aya* are to be ordered to fulfill the required labor.

Although in the last two firmans it is stated that the timber brought to Akkerman by the Moldavian *voyvoda* was intended for the construction of a new fortress near Özi, it is unclear why Hasan Pasha ordered that it be transported to Budak Çelebi Kışlağı or Budak

⁵²*Litterae Nuntiorum*, 4, no. 1958, p. 275.

⁵³MD 83, no. 48.

⁵⁴MD 83, no. 49.

⁵⁵James W. Redhouse, et al., *Redhouse yeni Türkçe-İngilizce sözlüğü*, Istanbul: Redhouse Press, 1968, p. 533; *XIII. yüzyıldan beri Türkiye Türkçesiyle yazılmış kitaplardan toplanan tanıklariyle tarama sözlüğü*, v. 1-8. Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayını, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1963-1977, p. 2070; H. Eren, "Traditions of Collective Mutual Aid in Anatolia: *İmece*," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 6 (1980): 107-14 is primarily a discussion of the etymology of this word.

Çelebi Kışlası. Since *kışlak* denotes a sheltered winter quarters for animals, nomads, or troops and *kışla* denotes a barracks or a sheltered winter quarters for animals,⁵⁶ perhaps the timber was being transported to this place for storage over the winter. However, in another firman, issued on 10 Dhu'l-Qa'da 1036/23 July 1627 at Özi, again to the *kadı* and the *mütesellim* of Akkerman, timber from another source is ordered to be sent to Özi.⁵⁷ The firman speaks of good timber that had been cut by the Mehmed Pasha, the Özi governor-general, for construction of a fort or fortress at a place called Tatar Pınarı. However, some individuals made off with this timber now very much needed for repairs at Özi without leaving a bill (*bilâ temessük*) certifying its removal from where it had been deposited at Akkerman. The addressees were ordered to check (*yokla-*) the timber that had originally been brought to Akkerman and in whosoever's possession they found it—whether the culprits were *sipahis* or janissaries (or other *kapukulu*)—they were to repossess it for the state and send it to Özi. Anyone interfering in the repossession of this state-owned timber (*miri karest*) was to be reported to the Porte.

Toward the end of the 1627 campaign Hasan Pasha issued two firmans on materials and supplies needed in connection with the return trip to Istanbul. In a firman to the *kadis* of Kili, Akkerman, and the *kadı* of an unnamed *kaza*, Hasan Pasha ordered that all *miri* timber located in their *kazas* be transported by way of *imece* to the straits of Kili (Kili *Bogazı*) on ships or barges called *nasads*.⁵⁸ This timber was needed at the imperial naval arsenal in Istanbul (*tersane-i 'amire*) and was to be loaded onto the returning ships of the imperial fleet and delivered to the arsenal in Istanbul.⁵⁹ Not long before the fleet's arrival

⁵⁶Redhouse, *Türkçe-İngilizce*, p. 658.

⁵⁷MD 83, no. 5.

⁵⁸According to Fekete there were two types of *nasads*, large barges used for local transport on the Danube and larger ships used for long-distance shipping (Lajos Fekete, *Die Siyâqat-Schrift in der Türkischen Finanzverwaltung*, v. 1, Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1955, p. 226-27 n. 5).

⁵⁹MD 83, no. 25. Obviously the timber would be used in ship repair and construction during the winter.

at the Kili straits, Hasan Pasha issued a firman to the *kadis* of İsakcı, İbrail, Maçın, and İsmail, and to two other unnamed *kazas*, ordering them to have *miri* wheat from their *kazas* brought to Kili by the *re'aya* by way of *imece*.⁶⁰ Intended for the imperial fleet, this wheat was to be ready by the time the fleet arrived in Kili.

For the campaign of 1628 there is only one firman pertaining to supplies in the firman register. Written on 20 Shawwal 1037/23 June 1628 from Sinop, where Hasan Pasha and the fleet stopped on the way to the Crimea, it is addressed to the governor-general of Özi and the *kadı* of Akkerman.⁶¹ Because there was a shortage of grain provisions (*zahîre*) in the vicinity of Kefe and because much grain would be needed for the many troops that would be arriving there with the imperial fleet, Hasan Pasha ordered that two ships from Akkerman be loaded with flour, barley, and other grain provisions. Judging by the statement, "through buying and selling, the army's shortage of grain will be remedied and the owners [of the provisions] would gain full profit,"⁶² it appears that the requested provisions were not taken from state storehouses, but rather, purchased on the Akkerman market.

In both the mobilization- and matériel-related orders in Hasan Pasha's firman register, a pattern emerges concerning the nature of the northern Black Sea frontier and the role of Rumeli, and in particular, the Danubian basin, in the defense of that frontier. Just as most of the territory in the province of Özi consisted of districts in the Danubian valley, so also the troops and supplies for its upkeep and defense needed to be mobilized from this rich region. These firmans underline the fact that the northern seaboard of the Black Sea, particularly the region around Özi, was underpopulated and underdeveloped and could not

⁶⁰MD 83, no. 94.

⁶¹MD 83, no. 116.

⁶². . . bey' u şlrâ eyleyüp 'asker-i zafer-me'aşırılme def'-i müzâyıka ve şâhiblerine külli intifâ'-i hâşıl ola.

rely on its own meager resources to man and supply its defense. The mobilization firmans certainly suggest a breakdown in the *timar*-system during this period, but perhaps they are more indicative of how undesirable service on this frontier was and how difficult it was in general to find willing men to man the desolate and dangerous defense on this frontier.

CHAPTER VI

Taxation and Finances

The largest category and, in fact, the most significant material in the firman register (*mühimme-i ordu*) from Hasan Pasha's campaigns relates to taxation and finances. Of the 135 different firmans in *Mühimme defteri* 83, sixty-five belong to this category and about half of these bear directly on Ottoman military operations in the Black Sea in 1627 and 1628. The other half, not directly concerned with the business of the campaigns, were issued with the purpose of eliminating abuses and restoring order to and imposing regularity on the provincial administration.

The primary concern behind these firmans that relate directly to the campaigns was the wages of troops involved in the defense of the Black Sea frontier. The firman register amply demonstrates that the main sources of cash for these wages were *mukata'at* of the lower Danubian basin. A *mukata'a* (pl. *mukata'at*, lit. "section," from the Arabic roots *q t '* denoting the action of cutting, cutting off, separating out) was a revenue source that was under the direct control of the state treasury as opposed to a *timar*—a revenue ceded to a public functionary in exchange for some sort of service, usually military—or a *vakf*—a revenue held in mortmain for pious or charitable purposes. In the classical period of the Ottoman state (fifteenth and sixteenth centuries), a *mukata'a* was usually farmed or auctioned out, through a system called *iltizam*, to a *mültezim* or *'amil*, that is, a tax-

farmer.¹ The tax-farmer was usually a private individual who contracted, typically for three years, to deliver regular installments to the state. Such an individual usually had to have enough financial assets to make an initial cash down-payment. In return for paying the contracted installments, the tax-farmer was allowed to keep all the revenues accruing from the given *mukata'a* above the sum that he had contracted to deliver. The tax farm was subject to government regulation by various officials, including the *emin*, an agent charged with checking the accounts of a *mültezim*, and the *nazır* or inspector who periodically oversaw the operation. The *mukata'a*, *timar*, and *vakf* were the main instruments for realizing revenue in the Ottoman financial system, with the first two applying to the state and the latter primarily to religious and charitable institutions. Although the *mukata'a* was one of the most important Ottoman financial mechanisms and it in itself can be referred to as an institution, it has been insufficiently studied, particularly for the seventeenth century. Thus there are varying opinions in the literature as to what the actual functions of the *'amil*/*mültezim*, *emin*, and *nazır* were and how they evolved and changed over the centuries. As will become evident in the following discussion, by the seventeenth century the distinctions between the three major *mukata'a* functionaries and officials had blurred, with the *emin* primarily playing the role of the tax-farmer, that is being the holder of the *iltizam* contract on a *mukata'a* or *mukata'at*.

By the first half of the seventeenth century, there was a decline in the *timar*-system and of the timariot cavalry that was mainly the result of the rise of firearms, a situation which heightened the importance of salaried infantry and various specialized troops. This meant a rise in the importance of the *mukata'a* for financing operations such as the ones undertaken by Hasan Pasha in the Black Sea. In addition, the importance of fortresses in Ottoman frontier defense underlined the need for cash revenues for the upkeep of

¹Thus, in the literature *mukata'a* is often translated as "tax farm." Usually this is not a misleading rendition, but technically the term referred to the object of a tax farm, i.e., the revenue that was farmed out. However, a *mukata'a* was not always farmed out, e.g., *mukata'a* held on the basis of *emane* (*ber vech-i emanet*, see below).

garrisons. This was particularly the case in the northern Black Sea region where the *timar*-system was not widely applied.²

The Havale and the Ocaklık

The documents in *Mühimme defteri* 83 concerned with problems of financing wages of Özi frontier forces provide a good picture of how funds deriving from *mukata'a* were actually applied. Crucial to the funding of wages was a mechanism by which *mukata'a* revenues were transferred to an intended recipient. This mechanism involved assigning a *mukata'a* to a particular recipient as an *ocaklık*. The terms *ocak*³ and *ocaklık*⁴ have a long record in the history of Ottoman institutions. In Ottoman provincial administration, *ocaklık*, often used interchangeably with *yurdluk*, "domain" (liberally, "that belonging to the *yurt* or native land, home pasture"),⁵ referred to the basis on which the rule of certain eastern Anatolian provinces was granted to tribal chieftains who had aided the Ottomans in their conquest of the region and remained loyal to them. Such provinces were held hereditarily and the *timar* system was not applied in them. Rather, in exchange for fielding

²According to Evliya Çelebi, there were no *timars* in the region around the town of Özi (Evliya Çelebi, *Seyâhâtnâme*, v. 5, Istanbul: «İkdâm» Matba'sı, 1315/1897-1898, p. 180; idem, *Kniga putešestvija (Izvlačenija iz sočinjenja tureckogo putešestvennika XVII veka)*, tr. and ed. A. D. Želtjakov, A. S. Tveritunova et al., Moscow: Akademija nauk SSSR, Izdatel'stvo vostočnoj literatury, 1961, p. 111. On the absence of the *timar*-system in the Crimea see Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, Mihnea Berindei, Gilles Veinstein, "La Crimée ottomane et l'institution du «timâr»," *Annali dell'Istituto orientale di Napoli* n.s. 29 (1979): 523-62, 14 pl.

³*Ocak* denoting "hearth, group, dynasty" in Turkish (from which it entered other languages with the same meaning, e.g., Russian *očag*) also referred to a group of men who formed some sort of a military unit. For example, in early Ottoman times *ocak* denoted a unit of twenty-four nomads, one of whom would be called upon to go on campaign (Rudi Paul Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia*, Bloomington, Indiana: Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 1983, p. 56). In later times, *ocak* referred to the various *kapıkulu* military corps as a whole, such as the *cebecis*, *topçus*, and, of course, the most renowned *ocak* of all, the janissary corps (*yenîçeri ocagı*). In fact, the janissary corps was commonly referred to as simply the *ocak* (see İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı devleti teşkilâtından kapukulu ocakları*, v. 1, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1943).

⁴*Ocaklık* literally denotes "hearth place, fireplace" (Redhouse, *Türkçe-İngilizce*, p. 897); *ocak* with the suffix *-lık* literally means "that which belongs to the hearth."

⁵E.g., 'Aynı 'Alî, *Kavānin*, pp. 27 ff.

a fixed number of troops, all revenues belonged to the tribal chief.⁶ Although the *mukata'at* assigned as *ocaklık* may have been thus named because of certain structural similarities to the *ocaklık*-type province, the former is a completely separate concept.⁷

For an understanding of the *ocaklık* system, the financial transaction known as *havale* must first be introduced. The best treatment of this financial term is by Halil İnalcık who has called it, along with the *mukata'a*, the basis of the financial system in the Ottoman as well as other Islamic states.⁸ A *havale* transaction was the transfer of a certain *mukata'a* revenue to a specific party. The term also referred to the sum affected by the *havale* transaction as well as to the document (*hükm*) ordering the transfer of the given sum. To obtain a revenue assigned by *havale*, the bearer of the *havale*-order would present the document to, for example, a tax-farmer; in effect, the order served as a kind of draft on a specific *mukata'a*. Upon yielding the cash amount indicated in the *havale*, the tax-farmer would receive from a *kadı* a *hüccet* or receipt containing relevant information concerning the *havale* transaction. This *hüccet* would be submitted when the next installment from the given *mukata'a* was paid by the tax-farmer to account for the shortfall in the installment rendered by the *havale* draft. According to İnalcık, the basic reasons for the use of the *havale* were considerations of speed and efficiency, as well as security.⁹ Clearly it was faster and more efficient to transfer funds that were in specie directly from their revenue sources than to deliver them first to the central, or even to a provincial,

⁶Inalcık, *Ottoman Empire*, pp. 105-107.

⁷Murphey, pointing to the similarity of the conditions attached to both types of *ocaklıks* and even the use of the same phrases in their respective documentation, sees them as basically the same institution (Murphey, "Ottoman Army," pp. 187-88).

⁸The following discussion of *havale* follows Halil İnalcık, "Ḥawāla," *El*², 3, fasc. 45-46 (1966): 283-85; see also Frede Løkkegaard, *Islamic Taxation in the Classic Period: With Special Reference to Circumstances in Iraq*. Copenhagen: Branner and Korch, 1950, pp. 63-64.

⁹Inalcık, "Ḥawāla," pp. 283, 284.

treasury. And the less the coins travelled, the less chance of loss through robbery, embezzlement, or accident.

An *ocaklık* was a *mukata'a* revenue assigned to a certain party for an indefinite period, that is, until it was reassigned or revoked.¹⁰ In effect, an *ocaklık*-transfer was an extended *havale* while a *havale* was a single draft on a *mukata'a*. In other words, a *mukata'a* that had been assigned as an *ocaklık* was a continuing *havale* or draft on a *mukata'a*. The assignee of both a *havale* and an *ocaklık* could be a person or a group, such as an institution, office, or fortress garrison. İnalcık gives three main types of *havale* assignees: salaried military forces in the provinces, officials in charge of making purchases for public works in the provinces or for the palace, and *kuls* of the sultan sent to collect a sum for the state treasury.¹¹ On the basis of the evidence provided below, it seems that in the case of the *ocaklık*, the assignee was usually a group or institution.

In the following are some examples of the *ocaklık* assignation of funds: In his treatise on Ottoman administration, Kara Mustafa Pasha stated that upon being named grand admiral (*kapudan paşa*) in 1635, he "assigned sufficient funds as *ocaklık* to the imperial naval arsenal so that the arsenal could outfit forty ships [annually](*ocaqlık bağladı*, lit. "tied up [funds] as *ocaklık*")."¹² In a 1636 memorandum to Sultan Murad IV on tax farm revenues of Anatolia and portions of Syria published by Rhoades Murphey, it was recorded that the revenue of the *mukata'a* for alum works (*şabhane*) of a place named Gediz near Kütahya, worth 316,666 *akça*, was assigned as an *ocaklık* for the naval arsenal.¹³ In the same source other *mukata'at* that were assigned as *ocaklık* are so

¹⁰See Murphey, "Ottoman Army," pp. 180 ff.

¹¹İnalcık, "Hawāla," p. 284.

¹²Faik Reşit Unat, "Sadrazam Kemankes Kara Mustafa Paşa İâyihası," *Tarih vesikaları* 1 (1942): 443-80, esp. p. 455.

¹³*Regional Structure in the Ottoman Economy: A Sultanlic Memorandum of 1636 A.D. Concerning the Sources and Uses of the Tax-Farm Revenues of Anatolia and the Coastal and Northern Portions of Syria*, ed. Rhoads Murphey, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1987, pp. 134-35. Uzunçarşılı claims that

indicated with a note above their entries. In most cases the assignee is an entire fortress garrison,¹⁴ although occasionally a type of soldiery based in a given fortress.¹⁵ In a later source, an Ottoman budget from 1079-1080/1669-1670, a list of assignees of *ocaklıks* ranges from fortress garrisons to the imperial naval arsenal and from the imperial court to the imperial kitchens (*matbah-i 'amire*).¹⁶

In the campaigns of 1627 and 1628 the *havale* was used to finance, at least partially, the wages of troops brought by the imperial feet, such as janissaries, *cebecis*, and *sipahis*, while the *ocaklık* was used to finance the wages of troops stationed on the Özi frontier. The great majority of the firmans in Hasan Pasha's firman register on campaign finances have to do with the application of the *ocaklık* system. At present there is only a rudimentary understanding of this system, its rules, the range of its application, and its evolution. A closer examination of the data on the *ocaklık* system in the sources will provide a key to understanding the financing of the Ottoman defense of the Black Sea and perhaps other frontiers as well.

Although no explicit sources are available, common sense dictates that the basic reason for the existence of the *ocaklık* system was the same as that for the *havale*, namely, the desire for speed and efficiency. In an age of pre-modern communications in a vast state such as the Ottoman Empire, it simply did not make sense to transport cash revenues from some far-flung territory to the central treasury only to ship them to another territory in the same region or even to the same territory. It was more efficient to transfer such funds

materials located in various places that were needed by the fleet, such as lumber, pitch, and sail cloth, were assigned as *ocaklıks* for the arsenal (Uzunçarşılı, *Merkez*, pp. 448-49).

¹⁴E.g., *Mar'aş k'al'esi neferâtınun ocaklığıdır*, "ocaklık of the garrison of the Maraş fortress" (*Regional Structure*, p. 14; for further examples see pp. 14-15, 72-77, 98-107).

¹⁵E.g., *Trabzon k'al'esi beşlünün mevâcibleri ocaklığındandır*, "one of the *ocaklıks* for the wages of the *beşlûs* of the Trabzon fortress" and *Âmid 'azeblerinin ocaklığıdır*, "ocaklık of the 'azebis of Amid" (*Regional Structure*, pp. 42-43, 78-79; for further examples see pp. 26-27, 44-45, 74-75, 110-11).

¹⁶Ömer Lûtfi Barkan, "1079-1080 (1669-1670) mâlî yılına ait bir osmanlı bütçesi ve ek'leri," *İstanbul Üniveristesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 17 (1956): 225-303, esp. pp. 253-60.

laterally and preferably directly from the source of revenue to the place of expenditure. Moreover, it seems that the *ocaklık* system became widely applied by the first half of the seventeenth century, by which time a general shift in the source of funding for distant military ventures occurred. Murphey has demonstrated that, whereas in the sixteenth century the larger portion of the funding of fortress defenses on distant frontiers was shouldered by the central treasury, in the seventeenth century this burden was covered mostly by provincial *mukata'at* by means of the *ocaklık* system.¹⁷ According to Murphey, such a shift in the source of funding was necessitated by the fact that by this period, the number of *kapukulu* and *timar*-holding *mustafızan* (fortress guards) was insufficient for the demand and thus the proportion of other troops that were not paid out of central treasury funds, such as *gönüllüyan* and *'azebs*, increased. The primary reasons behind this shift were developments in fortification technology and siege craft that required larger and larger garrisons, particularly in light of Ottoman expansion on the eastern Anatolian frontier.¹⁸

The Assignment of Mukata'at as Ocaklıks

In Hasan Pasha's two campaigns, *mukata'a* revenues of the lower Danubian valley were assigned or reassigned (depending on whether or not a given *mukata'a* was already an *ocaklık*) to the troops on the Özi frontier. The firmans relating to *ocaklıks* are addressed to, on one hand, officials and private individuals involved in matters of finance and taxation—the Tuna or Özi *defterdar*, *emins*, and *nazırs* involved in the affected *mukata'at*, and on the other, officials in the political establishment—governor-generals (*beglerbegi*), governors (*sancakbegi*), and *kadırs*. The locales in the lower Danube region most often affected by the firmans included, for example, the districts (*sancak*) of Hirsova,

¹⁷Murphey, "Ottoman Army," pp. 171-87.

¹⁸Murphey, "Ottoman Army," pp. 181-84.

İbrail, İsakci, Kili, Nigboli, Ruscuk, and Silistre, as well as *kazas* in these districts. Typically such a firman informs or reminds the addressee or addressees that a particular *mukata'a* or all or some *mukata'at* in an entire *kaza* or district have “become *ocaklık*” (*ocaklık ol-*) or “been assigned as *ocaklık*” (*ocaklık ta'yin olun-*) for the wages of troops variously indicated as being on the Özi frontier (*serhadd*), in the province of Özi (*eyalet*), or in the fortress complex of Özi.¹⁹ All of the *mukata'at* assigned as *ocaklıks* are qualified in the sources as belonging to the Danubian region (*Tuna etrafı*) or to the Tuna financial department bureau (*Tuna aklām*, see glossary s.v. *kalem*), that is, the Tuna *defterdarlık*. The specific types of *mukata'at* involved, ranging from those consisting of customs duties to those consisting of inheritance taxes, will be discussed below.

The first task in the process of setting up *mukata'at* as *ocaklıks* was to see to it that the *mukata'at* slated for *ocaklık*-status were in order and functioning properly. Thus, Hasan Pasha's firmans state that he was appointed as commander in chief (*serdar*) of the land and naval forces in order to “review” (*tahrir*), “correct” (*tashih*), and “improve” (*islāh*) the *mukata'at* in the Tuna *aklam* and that this is one of the most important aspects of his mission.²⁰ Furthermore the firmans strictly order *kadis* to extend all efforts so the officials (usually *emins*) in charge of *mukata'at* assigned as *ocaklıks* for Özi deliver in full the due tax revenues.²¹ To achieve optimal functioning of the *mukata'at* that were to become *ocaklıks*, Hasan Pasha did not rely merely on orders to relevant government and

¹⁹In the given contexts, it appears that usually when the assignee is given as the “Özi fortress,” in fact the entire *eyalet* is the actual referent.

²⁰ E.g., *Tuna etrafında olan mukata'at ıslāhı u tashihı mühimmâtdan ol-*. . . , “one of the most important duties is to correct and rectify the *mukata'at* in the Tuna region” (MD 83, no. 7); see also MD 83, nos. 9, 21, 59 (in the last firman *tashih u tahrir* is mentioned in regard to *hass*, as well as to the *mukata'a* revenues), 100 (here the Tuna *defterdar* is explicitly instructed to make sure that, unlike during the term of the previous *iltizam*-holder of the given *mukata'at*, there be no shortfalls in the collection of revenue from these *mukata'at* now being assigned as *ocaklıks*), 105.

²¹MD 83, nos. 108, 148.

mukata'a officials. Rather, to accomplish his crucial mission, the grand admiral vizier actively intervened in the affairs of these *mukata'at*. The firmans repeatedly mention the need for Hasan Pasha and his agents to take control (*ķabz*, "seizing" and *ķabt*, "gaining possession of") of the *mukata'at* that were to be assigned as *ocaklıks*. Undoubtedly because of the importance and immediacy of the military mission at hand, Hasan Pasha was vigilant and unrelenting about defiance toward, interference in, or sabotage of the *ocaklık*-transfer process by local officials or functionaries with connections to affected *mukata'at*. In theory, it should not have made any difference to an *emin* in charge of a *mukata'a* to whom he paid his installments, whether it was the treasury, some local institution, or a frontier garrison. But presumably a corrupt or incompetent *emin* would not favor a situation in which the state was extremely keen on the proper functioning of the *mukata'at* and the prompt and full submission of due installments.

To achieve control Hasan Pasha took an active role in the affairs of these *mukata'at*. To this end, he ordered concerned parties to appear before him for an audit, even if that meant travelling hundreds of kilometers. In the first firman dealing with *mukata'at* Hasan Pasha ordered the Tuna *defterdar* to gather the *emins* and scribes (*katibs*) connected to those Tuna *mukata'at* that were to be checked, along with the currently available *mukata'a* cash and all account registers (*muhasebe* and *müfredat defterleri*) from their terms of office. Together with the *emins*, scribes, registers, and cash, the *defterdar* was to go to him at Özi with all speed so that the *mukata'a* affairs could be looked into (*aķvāl-ı muķāķa'ātı görmek*).²² Similarly, two other firmans sent from Özi on 31 July 1627 order the *kadı*s of Nigboli and Silistre to make sure that the former *emins* and scribes of *mukata'at* in the Nigboli and Silistre *kazas* were escorted to the Tuna *defterdar* along with all the accounting registers for the time of their *mukata'a*

²²MD 83, no. 7.

tenure, and that they all make the trip to Özi as soon as possible.²³ A few days later, a firman ordered the *kadı* of Nigboli to gather also the new *emin*, and along with the aforementioned officials, board a galley for Özi without further delay. This document, which is the first mention of the assignment of *ocaklıks*, states that the presence of the Nigboli *kadı* at Özi is indispensable for the review and discussion of the *mukata'at* since besides being "honest and pious," he is a complete expert in and indisputable in his knowledge of the affairs of the *mukata'at* of the *kaza* of Nigboli."²⁴

If an audit revealed that an *emin* had mismanaged a *mukata'a*, he was dismissed. Thus the firman to the *kadıs* of the Nigboli and Silistre mentioned above ordered that because the *emins* failed to appear for an audit they were to be removed from office and replaced by, in the case of Nigboli, an unspecified official of the Sublime Porte (*der gah-i mu'alla*), and in the case of Silistre, another official of the Sublime Porte, a *kapukulu sipahi* named Hasan.²⁵ A firman, dated 11 August 1627 and sent from Özi to the *kadıs* of Nigboli, Rahova, and Zıştovi, ordered the removal of two teams of Jewish *emins* who had fallen into conflict over the same *mukata'at* and announced that an unnamed agent of Hasan Pasha was on his way to take charge of their *mukata'at*.²⁶ The dismissed *emins* were to be escorted to Hasan Pasha at Özi along with any money they had collected.²⁷

²³MD 83, nos. 9, 9/1. Although the assignment of *ocaklıks* is not mentioned yet, in this firman and in the previously mentioned firman it is stated respectively that, the improvement and correction of the functioning of *mukata'at* located in the Tuna *aklam* is one of the most important matters, and that Hasan Pasha is appointed to improve and correct the Tuna *mukata'at* (MD 83, no. 7, no 9)

²⁴MD 83, no. 14. A firman from 1628, unconnected to *ocaklıks*, orders the governor-general of Kefe and *kadı* of Gözleve to have their men escort the *emin* of Gözleve—who was 600,000 *akça* in debt to the state treasury—together with his assistants and account books (*muhasebe*) all the way to Istanbul for an audit (MD 83, no. 129).

²⁵MD 83, nos. 9, 9/1.

²⁶On Jews as Ottoman tax-farmers see Haim Gerber, "Jewish Tax-Farmers in the Ottoman Empire in the 16th and 17th Centuries in *Raiyyet Rüşumû: Essays Presented to Halil İnalcık on his Seventieth Birthday by his Colleagues and Students*. Cambridge, Mass., 1986 = *Journal of Turkish Studies* 10 (1986): 143-54.

²⁷MD 83, no. 16.

Toward the end of August 1627, a series of firmans to the *kadıs* of the İsakçı, İbrail, Tulca, Maçın, Hırsova, Kili, and Akkerman *kazas* were drawn up with the aim of removing a certain Ahmed from *nazır*-ship over a whole series of *mukata'at* and replacing him with agents of Hasan Pasha or with *kuls* of the Porte.²⁸ These agents or *kuls* were to be installed not as tax-farmers on the basis of *iltizam* contracts (*ber vech-i iltizām*), but rather, as salaried officials (*ber vech-i emānet*). The holding of *mukata'a* on *emanet* basis has not been studied, but presumably an official in charge of a *mukata'a* by *emanet* was a government employee and was paid a daily wage (*yevmiye*) for his services relating to the *mukata'a*.²⁹ This was, of course, in contrast to the more lucrative situation of the holder of a *mukata'a* by *iltizam*, who was allowed to keep all funds collected above the fixed sum that he had contracted to deliver to the state. The question that comes to mind is, would it not have been more lucrative for the state to install its *kuls* into all *mukata'at* on the *emanet* basis, rather than allowing private individuals to hold *mukata'a* by *iltizam* and reap substantial profits above the sums that they had contracted to deliver to the state? A plausible answer is that tax-farming was a business that required know-how, experience, capital, and, undoubtedly, connections. Below it will become evident from firmans in the firman register that the *emanet*-type tenure of *mukata'at* was a temporary measure used in urgent situations such as that of Hasan Pasha's campaigns. The firmans ordering that agents of Hasan Pasha be allowed to take over *mukata'at* controlled by *nazır* Ahmed suggest this, by stating that "it is necessary that [the given *mukata'at*] be held by *emanet* until an applicant appears and takes the oath [for an *iltizam*-contract on the *mukata'at*]."³⁰

²⁸MD 83, nos. 60, 61, 61/1, 61/2.

²⁹Káldy-Nagy, however, is of the opinion that the holder of the *mukata'a* tenure by *emanet* was on commission, which presumably means that the official would have been paid a percentage of the take (Gyula Káldy-Nagy, "Tureckie reestrovye knigi mukāta'a kak istoričeskie istočniki," *Vostočnye istočniki po istorii narodov Jugo-vostočnoj i centra'noj Evropy*, ed. A. S. Tveritinova. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo «Nauka»-Glavnaja redakcija vostočnoj literatury, 1964: 76-90, p. 77).

³⁰. . . bir tálíb zühür idüp der 'uhde olınmıya degın ber vech-i emānet zıbt itdürilmek lâzım gelmek. . . (MD 83, no. 60; also no. 61).

A closer look into the case of *nazır* Ahmed provides some insight into Hasan Pasha's interventions and manipulations into the *mukata'at* affairs of the Danubian region. The relevant firmans make no explicit statement why Ahmed was to be removed from his position as *nazır* over many *mukata'at*. Certainly dissatisfaction with his performance may have been the reason. It is significant that, strictly speaking, Ahmed was not being dismissed. Rather, once his *tahvils* or tenures of appointment over separate sets of *mukata'at* expired, they were not to be renewed.³¹ The firmans stated that because these *mukata'at* were to be assigned as *ocaklıks*, it was necessary to give contracts to new tax-farmers in his place.³² One possibility was that the state, always willing to transfer *mukata'at* to higher bidders (even in the middle of a tax-farmer's term),³³ may have decided that it could gain a higher return if it put his extensive *mukata'a* holdings up for auction. In fact, a substantial portion of Ahmed's *mukata'at* were slated for transfer not to Hasan Pasha's agents, but to a team consisting of a *sipahi-zade* Mehmed, an 'Ali, and two Moldavian or Greek *zimmi re'aya* inhabitants of İbrail.³⁴ They were to be sworn into a joint (*ber vech-i iştirāk*) *iltizam* contract for unspecified *mukata'at* held by Ahmed in İsakçı, Tulca, Maçın, Kili, Akkerman, İbrail, and Hırsova.

The firmans of Hasan Pasha make it clear that, because of the *ocaklık* transfer process and his role as its executor, all *tahvils* of affected *mukata'at* would be under his scrutiny and their holders would be subject to dismissal or non-renewal of their *tahvils*. A motive in the initial decision not to renew Ahmed's *tahvil* may have been an effort to

³¹His *tahvil* for the *mukata'at* of the customs duties of Kili and Akkerman and the public and private *beytül-mal* of Akkerman expired on 25 Jumada II 1036/12 March 1627 (MD 83, nos. 61, 69); for the *mukata'at* of the customs and other revenues of İsakçı, Tulca, Maçın and their dependencies on 1 August (Agustos) by the Julian calendar or 29 Dhu'l-Qa'dah 1036/11 August 1627 (MD 83, nos. 60, 68); for unspecified *mukata'at* in İsakçı, Tulca, Maçın, Kili, Akkerman, İbrail, Hırsova sometime before the beginning of the new year 1037 AH (12 September 1627) (MD 83, nos. 61/1, 61/2, 67).

³²MD 83, nos. 60, 61, 67.

³³E.g., Káldy-Nagy, "Mukāta'a," pp. 77.

³⁴Κοσταντίν veled-i Batışta and Κοσταντίν veled-i Mizokos (MD 83, no. 67).

prevent him from becoming too powerful and entrenched as the controller of extensive revenue sources of an entire region (in the discussion of his *mukata'at* holdings below it will be seen that indeed Ahmed had very substantial *mukata'a* holdings spanning the lower Danubian basin). However, despite initial plans, from an “*ocaklık* register” (see below) it is evident that by the start of the new *hicri* year of 1037 Ahmed (identified in this register as “*nazır* Ahmed Beg, former governor [*mir liva*] of Akkerman”)³⁵ was allowed to regain those holdings that had been turned over to Hasan Pasha’s agents, as well as retain the other holdings that were to have been turned over to the team of tax-farmers mentioned above.³⁶ Similarly, in the case of the aforementioned competing Jewish tax-farmers, about a month after their dismissal and after their replacement by Hasan Pasha’s agent, one of them named Arslan was given a new *iltizam*-contract and reinstated as *emin*.³⁷

The firmans make it clear that in reinstating these officials Hasan Pasha was exercising his prerogative with regard to *mukata'a* affairs. Thus it was “through Hasan Pasha’s opinion and action (*rey u ma'rifeti ile*)” that Ahmed and Arslan were reinstated.³⁸ In another firman to Tuna *defterdar* İbrahim, Hasan Pasha’s role and prerogative in this connection is made clear: “. . . you are to act as vizier Hasan Pasha . . . , who has been appointed to check [the *mukata'at* that are to be assigned as *ocaklıks*], sees

³⁵It is quite clear that this *nazır* Ahmed is the same *nazır* Ahmed in *Mühimmed defteri* 83 since the register states that he was the previous *nazır* of the same *mukata'at* mentioned in connection with the Ahmed in the firman register (TT 748, fol. 3a).

³⁶In fact, there are notes above three of the firmans indicating that they were never sent out (MD 83, no. 67--the firman concerning the unspecified *mukata'at* in İsakcı, Tulca, Maçın, Kili, Akkerman, İbrail, Hırsova that were to go to the team mentioned above and MD 83, nos 68, 69--firmans relating to other *mukata'at* of the İsakcı, Tulca, Maçın and Akkerman). With regard to his reappointment, in the firman register there is only a firman to the *kadı* of İsakcı, stating that Ahmed is to receive a new appointment (*tahvil*) for the *mukata'a* of the customs duties of İsakcı beginning on the first day of 1037 AH (MD 83, no. 93). The lack of further firmans relating to the other *mukata'at* to which he was reappointed can only be explained by the possibility that some pages are missing from *Mühimmed defteri* 83 or that the same firman was sent to other *kadı*s but the scribe recording it in the register omitted the *bir suret*-type note (see appendix).

³⁷TT 748, fol. 4a; MD 83, no. 92.

³⁸MD 83, nos. 92, 93.

as being prudent and suitable with regard to the granting [of *iltizam*] contracts to those who come forth.”³⁹

Another example provides some insight into the reinstatement of Ahmed and Arslan. In the following year, on 10 July 1628, soon after arriving in the Crimea from Sinop, Hasan Pasha issued a firman stating that Solak Mustafa, the *nazır* of the Kefe *mukata'a*, has been ordered by an *emr-i şerif* of the *maliye* to travel to the Porte for an audit (*muhasebe*) with his scribe and the detailed registers (*müfredat defterleri*) covering the one and a half years of his tenure and that a certain *sipahi* named Mehmed was to take over in his place on the basis of *emanet*. However because of some unspecified impediments, Solak Mustafa was unable to travel to Istanbul and instead he obliged himself to dispatch with all speed 200 *kantars* of clarified butter (*yag*) for the imperial kitchen (*matbah-i 'amire*). Because of this promise, Hasan Pasha ordered that Solak Mustafa send his *müfredat defterleri* to the Porte for the audit along with the butter, and that in the meantime, pending the outcome of the audit, he share (*ber vech-i iştirāk*) control over his *mukata'at* with the *sipahi* Mehmed who was to serve as he had been appointed, that is, on the basis of *emanet*.⁴⁰ Nine days latter Hasan Pasha announced that the newly appointed Mehmed was not competent, had already caused a loss to the *mukata'a* revenue, and that his activity was very harmful to state finances (*miri*), while Solak Mustafa was competent to the utmost in the collection of state revenues, as well as in the supply of butter for the imperial kitchen. As a result, the state funds collected during the activity (*mübaşiret*) of Mehmed were to be seized by the governor-general and the *kadı* of Kefe and turned over to the state through Solak Mustafa.⁴¹ Apparently the Kefe *nazır*'s competence, as well as his willingness to provide what was essentially a bribe, led to a

³⁹MD 33, no. 100.

⁴⁰MD 83, no. 135.

⁴¹MD 83, no. 124.

reversal of the decision to remove him from his post. Perhaps also in the above-mentioned case of Ahmed, the team of *emins* slated to take over part of his *mukata'a* holdings had no hope of measuring up to his competence and experience—a competence and experience demonstrated by his extensive previous holdings, as well as his eventual reinstatement as *nazır* over the majority of the *mukata'at* assigned as *ocaklıks* in 1627.⁴² Similarly, the appointment of Arslan as *emin* of two large *mukata'at* suggests the state's confidence in him as a competent manager of an important segment of revenue.⁴³ Again, the usefulness to the state of *nazırs* or *emins* such as Solak Mustafa, Ahmed, and Arslan suggests the inadequacy of the agents that had been installed in their place on the *emanet* basis. Of course, in all three cases, it cannot be ruled out that influence and connections played a role in the ultimate decision to retain their services.

Among the problems that Hasan Pasha had to contend with in setting up the *mukata'at* for *ocaklık* status were conflicts over the control of *mukata'at* and interference into their operations by outsiders. Above, reference was made to a conflict over the same *mukata'at* between two teams of Jewish *emins*. The Tuna *defterdar* of the time, Mustafa, had installed Arslan and Baruh as *emins* of the *mukata'at* of the ports (*iskele*, “landing places, docks”) of Nigboli, Zıştovi, Rahova just when these *mukata'at* were to be assigned as *ocaklıks*. Meanwhile, an unnamed *çavuş* had installed Saltyar, Harun, and Arlsan, son of Yasef, as *emins* of the same *mukata'at* and, upon their request, obtained an *emr-i şerif*, or imperial rescript, from the Porte confirming their investiture. Pursuing their claim, the second party proceeded to “break up” the *ocaklık* and bring complete disorder to the collection of these *mukata'a* revenues. As was related above, both teams were dismissed and sent to Hasan Pasha with any funds that they had collected.⁴⁴ Another

⁴²Eight out of the fourteen conglomerate *mukata'at* in the *ocaklık* register (see below).

⁴³TT 748, fol. 4a.

⁴⁴MD 83, no. 16.

firman relating to *mukata'at* of Nigboli and Ruscuk informs the *kadıs* of Nigboli and Ruscuk that Arlsan is to be supported as *emin* of *mukata'at* in Nigboli and Ruscuk against his Jewish rivals.⁴⁵ Here again, the rival *emins*, making false reports against Arslan, obtained an *emr-i şerif* from the Porte sanctioning their actions. That is why Hasan Pasha warned the *kadıs* of Nigboli and Ruscuk to be wary of claimants coming forth with *evamir-i şerife* obtained at the Porte and to take away any documents (*temessük*) presented by such rivals, place them in a sack (*kise*), and dispatch them back to the Porte.

Such interference into *mukata'a* affairs was also perpetrated by state officials. When Hasan Pasha was at Kili on his way back to the capital in the fall of 1627, he learned that some *kadıs* were acting as *müfettişes*, or *mukata'a*-inspectors, on their own, without being appointed, while others had obtained *divan tezkeresis* from *defterdars* appointing them as *müfettişes*. In fact, *müfettişlik* was a common and legitimate role of *kadıs* (see glossary s.v. *müfettiş*). However, here their intent was to interfere with the *mukata'at* assigned as *ocaklıks* and embezzle their funds. Some of them already succeeded in disrupting the *ocaklık mukata'at* and caused a loss in state revenues. To end this interference Hasan Pasha ordered *Tuna* defterdar İbrahim to remove from office these *kadıs* and hereafter issue no further permits for *mütettişlik* to other such *kadıs*.⁴⁶ In all these cases of interference into *mukata'a* affairs, private and public individuals took advantage of the size and complexity of the vast Ottoman state apparatus, with its central and provincial jurisdictions. Because of this situation, throughout the firmans there are warnings against issuance of orders of certificates permitting actions contrary to current policy and undertakings. In attempting to set up priorities, officials were reminded that the orders to set up *ocaklıks* had primacy over all other orders since the former were initiated

⁴⁵MD 83, no. 92.

⁴⁶MD 83, no. 103.

by *hatt-i hümayun* or *hatt-i şerif*—orders written by the sultan's own hand.⁴⁷ Just as with some of the mobilization firmans discussed earlier in this chapter, these firmans invoked the absolute authority of the padishah by referring to the sultan's *hutut-i şerife*.

A further indicator of the top priority imparted to the *ocaklıks* by the state was its insistence that with the assignment of a *mukata'a* as *ocaklık*, any debts by an *emin* to private individuals were not to interfere with the payment of his current installments. In order to obtain a tax-farm or to keep up with the regular payments to the state, it was a common practice by tax officials to borrow money from private individuals. The inability of a tax official to pay back his creditors often led to complications that impeded the functioning of a *mukata'a*. One of the dangers occurred when a tax-farmer's term of tenure (*tahvil*) over a *mukata'a* came to an end or was terminated by the intervention of the state but his creditors insisted that they were owed not by him but by the *mukata'a* itself and would consequently attempt to collect on their debts from the new tax-farmer, which of course reduced the revenue of the *mukata'a* and disrupted its workings. According to Hasan Pasha's firman register, in 1628 such a situation occurred in Gözlev and in Kefe, although not in connection with *mukata'at* assigned as *ocaklıks*. The creditors invoked precisely the principle that it was the state, or at least the *mukata'a*, and not the former *emin* that was in debt to them: "We lent our money to the state *mukata'a*, so whoever becomes [the new] *emin* of the *mukata'a*, we will recover our money from him."⁴⁸ In his firmans Hasan Pasha denied this principle, stating that such creditors had no right to collect their debts from "new state revenues" (*māl-i cedit-i miri*), that is, the revenues collected by the new *emin*, and that they should not present *evamir-i şerife* obtained from the finance department (*maliye*).⁴⁹ Although according to the firman register this problem did

⁴⁷Eg., MD 83, no. 92; also no. 90.

⁴⁸MD 83, no. 126.

⁴⁹MD 83, nos. 126, 130.

not come up with *mukata'at* assigned as *ocaklıks*, it is recognized as a danger in a firman to Tuna *defterdar* İbrahim. There the principle in regard to debts owed by former *emins* is extended to the previous debts and obligations of new *emins* in the following declaration: "relations with all other parties of *emins* of *mukata'at*, the revenues of which were assigned to the wages of the Özi frontier troops, are not to continue . . . the audits for their debts from previous years are to be processed by the Özi treasury [according to the well established procedures] as they are by the Budun (Buda), Bosna (Bosnia), and other frontier treasuries . . ."50

The Ocaklık in Ottoman Accounting. The notion of immunity to outside interference applied not only to the activity of the officials in charge of the *ocaklık mukata'at*, but also to the *ocaklıks* in the context of the Ottoman accounting system. An *ocaklık* was considered to have been removed from and independent of other fiscal categories (*aklam*). The firmans refer to the process of assigning a *mukata'a* as an *ocaklık* as a "separating" or "removing" a given *mukata'a* from its usual accounting category and forming its own category. Consider the following excerpts:

. . . as considered suitable for the wages of the troops on the Özi frontier, a sufficient amount of revenue is being separated out (*tefrik*) from the *hass* revenues and becomes an *ocaklık*.51

[because] the *mukata'at* of the public and private *beytü'l-mal* and their dependencies in İsakci and Tulca and Maçın and İbrail and Kili and Akkerman and Silistre and Nigboli and Balcık and Ruscuk and İvraca and Varna and Ahyolı and in these *livas*, all part of the Danubian fiscal accounts

⁵⁰MD 83, no. 112.

⁵¹Özi serhaddi neferatı mevâcibleri münâsib görülen emvâl-i hâşşadan kifâyet mîqdârı mâl tefrik olunup ocaklık olınmağın (MD 83, no.98).

(*aklam*) . . . are being assigned as *ocaklıks* for the wages of the troops in the *eyalet* of Özi, they are being separated out . . .⁵²

. . . the *cizye* and *yava cizye* of the *re'aya* have been being separated out (*ifraz*) and added and annexed (*zamm u ilhak*) to the fiscal categories (*aklam*) assigned as *ocaklık* for the troops of the Özi fortress and [henceforth] do not allow anyone from outside to interfere.⁵³

The separateness and inviolability of the accounts of the *ocaklık mukata'a* can be considered a crucial and almost an essential condition, without which the *ocaklık*-system could not function. A document cited by Murphey, concerning *mukata'at* assigned as *ocaklıks* for the Egri fortress in Hungary, expresses this idea using the phrase **mefrüzü'l-kalem ve maktû'ül-kadem**, "separated from accounts and cut off [from trespass] of the foot":

Not a single one of these mentioned *mukata'at* nor the *cizye* of Feth-i İslam are to be separated out and assigned to another . . . and they are to be separated from [other] accounts and inviolable to trespass.⁵⁴

Conflicting Ocaklık and Havale Assignments. Despite the imperative that the *ocaklık* funds be inviolable, the state itself, apparently inadvertently, at times violated it . This could occur when *havales* were issued to pay for wages of forces brought with the fleet, as well as of some janissaries stationed in fortresses. The *havales* mentioned in the firman register were issued at the Porte by *sebeb-i tahrir*-type orders (*hükm*) of the central finance

⁵²Tuna aklâmında vâkı' İsaçlı ve Tulca ve Maçın ve İbrayıl ve Kılı ve Aşkermân ve Silistre ve Nigbolı ve Balcık ve Ruscuğ ve İvraca ve Varna ve Ahyolı ve elviye-i mezbûrede vâkı' beytül-mâl-i 'amme ve hâşşa ve tevâblı' muķâta'aları Özi eyâleti neferâtınun mevâcibleri-çün ocaklık ta'yîn olunup muķâta'ât-ı mezbûre. . . tefriķ olunup. . . (MD 83, no. 98).

⁵³MD 83, no. 59 (for text see appendix).

⁵⁴From an entry of a register of orders issued by the finance department (*maliye ahkam defterleri*) from 1656, cited in Murphey, "Ottoman Army," pp. 483-84, see also his glossary s.v. "mefruz'ul-kalem ve maktû'ul-kadem," p. 316.

department. Because of apparent insufficient coordination between the *Maliye* department in Istanbul and Hasan Pasha in the field, the *havales* were often issued to be drawn on *mukata'at* that were to become or were already *ocaklıks*. In such situations Hasan Pasha had to find a compromise and take measures to prevent such conflicts in the future.

For example, in 1627 Hasan Pasha stated in a firman issued from Özi to the *kadı* and the *müfettiş* of Ahyolı, that a *sebeb-i tahrir hükmü*, that is, a *havale*, based on an *emr-i şerif*, has been issued for half a million *akça* to be drawn on revenues of the Ahyolı saltworks (*memleha*) *mukata'at* in order to cover the wages of the *efrenc* troops with the fleet. But meanwhile Hasan Pasha, setting up *mukata'at* of the Tuna region as *ocaklıks*, had assigned the same Ahyolı saltworks *mukata'at* as *ocaklıks* for the wages of the Özi forces. To resolve these conflicting orders, Hasan Pasha informed the *kadı* that the half million assignation to the fleet should be carried out but that all remaining revenues from these *mukata'at* were to become *ocaklıks* for the Özi forces and that hereafter no one was to interfere with these funds—even if someone arrived from the Porte with an order (*emr*) requisitioning money, he was to receive not “a single *akça* nor a single grain, as the given *mukata'a* has been assigned as *ocaklık* for Özi in its entirety.”⁵⁵

On 31 August or 1 September 1627, when Hasan Pasha and the fleet were on their way back to Istanbul, he ordered an unnamed official to make sure that one million *akça* from an unnamed Ahyolı *mukata'a* (presumably from the saltworks) that was to be transferred by *havale* through a *sebeb-i tahrir* decree to the *efrenc sipahis* and *cebecis* that were with the imperial fleet be ready by the time Hasan Pasha and the imperial fleet arrive.⁵⁶ In this order there is no mention of any conflict with the *ocaklıks* for Özi.

⁵⁵MD 83, no. 21.

⁵⁶MD 83, no. 66.

Presumably by this time a decision had been reached, either by Hasan Pasha or by the Porte, that in this particular case the wages for troops with the fleet took precedence.⁵⁷

During the following year's campaign, conflicts between *havale* drafts and *ocaklık* assignments continued. In late July or early August 1628, a letter to Hasan Pasha from the current Tuna *defterdar*, İbrahim, stated that repeated *hükm-i şerifs* had previously been issued ordering that no one else was to receive a single *akça* from the *mukata'at* assigned as *ocaklık* for the troops of the *eyalet* of Özi, and that recently such an order was issued referring to a *hatt-i hümayun* to this effect that was written on the register of these *ocaklıks*.⁵⁸ However, the *defterdar* pointed out that presently a *havale*-order for the wages of the janissaries defending Akkerman had been issued and this will make it necessary to break up some *ocaklıks*. Hasan Pasha responded to this report by stating that it was against the imperial wish that any *ocaklıks* be broken up at present and that until there was a *hatt-i hümayun* announcing the dissolution of the *ocaklıks*, not a single *akça* was to be diverted. Otherwise there would be as shortfall in the funds for the wages of the Özi frontier forces.⁵⁹ By the second half of August 1628, İbrahim again reported to Hasan Pasha that some *sebeb-i tahrir hükms* were issued for the *havale*-transfer of funds to the wages of *sipahis* who came with the fleet and other unspecified troops and that this made it impossible to pay the wages of the Özi frontier troops. As a solution, he suggested that Hasan Pasha should issue a decree that, the Tuna *defterdar*, on behalf of the *maliye*, must issue *emr-i şerifs* ordering that these *havales* instead be drawn on other revenues in the Tuna *aklam*, including the *harac*, *bedel-i mekari*, and *'avarız*. In other words, he was suggesting that the *havales* be drawn on revenues that were not assigned as *ocaklıks*.

⁵⁷Unless of course different Ahyolı *mukata'at* were involved.

⁵⁸This is no doubt a direct reference to the *ocaklık* register (TT 748) that will be discussed below which has exactly such a *hatt-i hümayun*.

⁵⁹MD 83, no. 132.

Hasan Pasha ratified this action.⁶⁰ Finally, Hasan Pasha ordered the *kadis* in the districts of Nigboli and Silistre to make available for *havales* for wages of the janissaries and *sipahis* of the fleet, and issued, presumably inadvertently, to be drawn on the *mukata'at* assigned as *ocaklıks* for Özi, the *bedel* funds collected for the state (*miri*) in their *kazas* from dismissed (*ma'zul*) *sipahis* and *eli emirlüs* who did not attend the campaign. The *kadis* were warned that they would be held responsible and punished if any money from the Özi *ocaklıks* was diverted by these *havales*.⁶¹

The only *havale* mentioned in the firman register that did not conflict with the Özi *ocaklıks* is in the very first firman on troop wage finances in the register which was issued before the *ocaklık*-assignment process began (for the chronology of the assignment of *ocaklıks* see below). Sent from Özi on 16 July 1627 to Alexander, the *voyvoda* of Wallachia, this firman states that a *sebeb-i tahrir*-decree had been sent from the Porte ordering that 2.5 million *akça* of the annual Wallachian *cizye* collection be applied by *havale* to the wages of the janissaries with the imperial fleet. While of this sum, one million had already been remitted, the *voyvoda* is ordered to send to Hasan Pasha, without any delays, the remaining 1.5 million of the *cizye* funds along with another million previously borrowed by him from the *iç hazine*.⁶² In late September/early October Hasan Pasha sent his *kapıcı başı* Siyavuş to the Wallachian *voyvoda* with a firman ordering that 2.2 million *akça* assigned to the fleet's janissaries still outstanding was to be paid at once.⁶³ Altogether the *havales* from 1627 mentioned in the firman register that were issued for *kapıkulı* and other troops with the fleet amounted to a total of 4 million *akças*

⁶⁰MD 83, no. 144 (firman to İbrahim), 147 (firman to İbrahim and *kadis* of districts of Nigboli, Vidin, and Silistre).

⁶¹MD 83, no. 150.

⁶²MD 83, no. 56.

⁶³MD 83, no. 97. Note that in this second order the million *akça* owed to the inner treasury was added to the 1.5 million of the *cizye* funds transferred by *havale*. Thus since the first order, the *voyvoda* had delivered another 300,000 *akça*.

(see Table 6).⁶⁴ As will become evident later, this was a significant sum as it was equal to about forty percent of the amount that was applied by *ocaklık* to the Özi fortress garrisons.

Table 6. *Havales* for *kapıkulu* and other troops with the fleet in 1627 (in million *akças*)

amount	revenues drawn on	assignees
2.5	Wallachian <i>cizye</i>	janissaries
0.5	Ahyolı saltworks <i>mukata'a</i>	<i>efrenc sipahis</i>
1.0	Ahyolı saltworks <i>mukata'a</i>	<i>efrenc sipahis, cebecis</i>

One of the last firmans of the 1628 campaign, issued at or after Kili, concerns troop wages that were neither *ocaklık*-, nor, apparently, *havale*-based. Addressed to the *kadı*s of İsakçı, Maçın, and Tulca, it orders them to expedite the collection of the '*avarız*' in their *kazas* for the year A.H. 1037.⁶⁵ This money was to go to the wages of the janissaries of Akkerman who were in very difficult straits because of a shortfall in the payment of their wages. It is interesting that the firman states that this difficult situation arose because until then, no word had arrived from the Porte ordering the collection of these '*avarız*' revenues. To collect it, the *kadı*s are informed that a *divan tezkeresi* with a seal (*mühr*) has been issued by the Tuna *defterdar*. For some reason these '*avarız*' revenues were not collected (perhaps because of negligence or to some misunderstanding) and so, Hasan Pasha had to employ an emergency stopgap measure and intervene through the office of the Tuna *defterdar*.

The Chronology of Ocaklık Assignment. On the basis of the firman register alone, the chronology of the process of assigning *ocaklık mukata'a* seems problematical at first. In both 1627 and 1628, the first firmans in Hasan Pasha's firman register relating to the assignment of *mukata'at* as *ocaklıks* are from about the midpoint of the campaign season, in late and mid-July, respectively, and they continue until early October 1627 and mid-

⁶⁴2.5 million from the Wallachian *cizye* (MD 83, no 56);

⁶⁵MD 83, no. 149.

August 1628. However from the information in Chapter IV it is clear that Hasan Pasha turned to the reorganization of the finances for the fortress garrisons only after it became clear that it would not be possible to build the new fortress at Togan Geçidi. At about this time (29 July 1627) a galley arrived from the sultan. It is very possible that this galley brought orders from him, perhaps in the form of the sultan's *hatt-i şerif*, commanding him to assign *ocaklıks* for the garrisons. It should be noted that the title paragraph of the *ocaklık* register (see below) clearly states that Hasan Pasha was empowered by the sultan's *hatt-i şerif* to review the *mukata'at* of the Danubian fiscal region (*Tuna defterdarlık*) and assign them as *ocaklıks* as of 1 Muharram 1037/12 September 1627

It is only from mid-August 1627 that the first firmans mentioning *ocaklıks* are recorded. The first is from between 8 and 11 August and the second is from 11 August.⁶⁶ The first firman relating to *ocaklıks* that mentions the imperial rescript of the sultan (*hatt-i hümayun*) is from some time in September 1627.⁶⁷ All this supports the notion that Hasan Pasha must have been in contact with the Porte during these expeditions and received general directives, or perhaps even specific orders, although there is no detailed information on the content of such communications.⁶⁸ From other sources it is known that communication from a place like Özi, whether by land or sea courier, could be extremely rapid.⁶⁹

Was there any other reason to undertake the assignment of *ocaklıks* so late in the season beside the abandonment of the original mission to build a new fortress? One possible reason is that Hasan Pasha, upon arriving at Özi, learned that the forces there and

⁶⁶MD 83, nos 14, 16.

⁶⁷MD 83, no. 90 (of course it is possible that this *hatt-i hümayun* reached Hasan Pasha in August when he issued the firmans first mentioning *ocaklıks*).

⁶⁸It is well known that commanders of such expeditions regularly sent reports (*'arz-i hal*) to the Porte (e.g., see Ostapchuk, "Five Documents").

⁶⁹E.g., in 1639 a report sent to the Porte by Piyale Pasha in Özi was delivered in four or five days, according to notations on this document (Ostapchuk, "Five Documents," n. 101).

in other fortresses in the *eyalet* were underpaid and weak. Another factor may have been the danger of intervention by the Commonwealth or the Zaporozhian Cossacks against the construction of the fortress at Togan Geçidi which these northern neighbors regarded as a threat to their security (see Chapter IV). However there was clearly another factor which must have influenced the timing. Most of the activity relating to *ocaklıks* occurred toward the end of the lunar year A.H. 1036 and lasted through about the first half of Muharram 1037, that is, the first month of the new lunar moon. In fact, during this period, 22 of the 27 firmans on *mukata'a* or *ocaklık* affairs were entered into the firman register for the 1627 campaign. It is significant that the *ocaklık* register was being drawn up this very time (it was completed by, or at least officially dated on 1 Muharram 1037/12 September 1627). In the seventeenth century, wages were paid in quarterly installments according to a lunar fiscal calendar, beginning on the first of Muharram and ending on the last of Dhu'l-Qa'dah.⁷⁰ Although there is no reference to or information on the quarterly schedule of payments, it seems that an important factor in the timing of Hasan Pasha's firmans on the *ocaklık* was the need to set up the funds for maintaining the Özi frontier garrisons for the year 1037/12 September 1627-30 August 1628. It is significant that perhaps the most important firman on the *ocaklık* in the 1628 campaign, in which new annual totals of *ocaklık*-derived wages for the Özi fortress were set for the new lunar year 1038, was issued about two weeks before the start of 1038.⁷¹

⁷⁰Halil Sahillioğlu, "Sıvış Year Crises in the Ottoman Empire," *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to the Present Day*, ed. M. A. Cook, London: Oxford University Press, 1970: 230-52.

⁷¹MD, no. 139 (see below and appendix). Although in 1628 there were less than half as many firmans on *mukata'a* and *ocaklıks* relating to the campaign, a pattern similar to that of 1627 occurred: the first recorded firman on *ocaklıks* was from nearly two weeks after Hasan Pasha arrived at Kefe, his primary destination in that year, and most of the activity on *ocaklıks* was also near the end of the lunar year.

The Register of Ocaklıks

There is another source on the *ocaklık*-system besides Hasan Pasha's firman register, namely, the *ocaklık* register already referred to several times. This important source contains concrete figures on the funds assigned to the fortresses defending the Black Sea during Hasan Pasha's campaigns and provides the structure of these finances. This document may indeed best be classified as a *defteri-i ocaklık* register (*ocaklık* register) and this is in fact the title given at the beginning of the main text:

Register of *ocaklıks* for fortresses in the Özi *eyalet* [assigned] from among the *mukata'at* of Tuna which are in accordance with the condition of the treasury (*şart-i hazine*) and the condition of the fortresses (*şart-i kila'*); [*mukata'at*] which . . . vizier and *kapudan* [*paşa*] Hasan Pasha . . . with the *hatt-i hümayun* that is tied to felicity had newly surveyed and inspected and which he assigned. [And with this, a register of] the annual salaries of the above-mentioned [fortresses. Valid] from 1 Muharram the blessed in the year one thousand thirty seven (12 September 1627).⁷²

Although another such register has not yet been published or found in the archives, its uniform structure and well-developed and systematic composition suggest that it was a type and not a unicum. On the page preceding the main text there is a full-page black ink *tugra* of Sultan Murad IV. On the page with the *tugra*, on one of the middle pages, and at the very end of the register is the seal (*mühür*) of an İbrahim, no doubt the same İbrahim in the firman register who was Tuna *defterdar* at the time. At the end of the register, just above the final *mühür*, is the official dating of the register: "drawn up (*tahrîren*) on 1 Muharram of the year one thousand thirty seven" (12 September 1627). This is perhaps the true date when the final version of the register or the official completed but for sure it is the official date of the document, that is, when the *ocaklıks* listed in it took effect. Just

⁷²TT 748, fol. 2b; for a description, text and translation of the entire register see appendix.

below the date are three *defterdar*-type signatures (*kuyruklu imza*),⁷³ and judging by them, the register was prepared by three finance department officers, including Tuna *defterdar* İbrahim. Above the leading entry of the main text is a *hatt-i hümayun* in the rough and unpracticed hand characteristic of Ottoman sultans: “This register is to be acted upon and hereafter it is not to be altered or changed.” This note is surrounded by a filigree-type decoration framed in gold ink, that is, a so-called *çerçeve* which was used to fill the space around *hatt-i hümayuns* so that they could not be altered or added to easily. The register has two main parts: first, a one-page list of the assignees of the *ocaklıks* set up by Hasan Pasha for the defense of the Özi frontier, including the amounts they were to receive, and second, a more than four-page list of the *mukata‘at* and other miscellaneous forms of revenue (see below) which formed these *ocaklıks* with indications of the persons in charge of them and details of their finances.

The Şart-i Hazine and Şart-i Kıla‘. Before presenting and analyzing the data in the *ocaklık* register, it is necessary to introduce a concept that is featured throughout the register. In nearly every entry of the register—both those for revenues and those for expenditures—there is a breakdown of the *akça* amount into a *şart-ı hazine* (“condition or stipulation of the treasury”) and a *şart-ı kıla‘* (“condition or stipulation of fortresses”). In the few available sources in which they occur, these terms are used without any explicit elucidation of their meaning. Because of this and because they have hardly been touched upon in the *mukata‘a* literature, there are many problematic points. For many of them only a hypothetical interpretation is possible. However without a grasp of the *şart-i hazine* and *şart-i kıla‘*, the workings of the *ocaklık*-system would be less than fully comprehensible. At this point the terms will only be introduced. After the available data has been presented, further considerations will be given.

⁷³On *kuyruklu imzas* see Velkov, “Başdefterdar”.

In *iltizam* contracts in general, the word *şart* by itself, or the plural *şürut*, refer to the condition or conditions under which a given *mukata'a* was farmed out to a tax-farmer. First of all this meant the amount which the tax-farmer contracted to deliver to the treasury, but in addition it may also have included the schedule of payments and other crucial information such as the amount of the surety (*kefil*) and its guarantor.⁷⁴ In Hasan Pasha's firman register, the terms *şart-i hazine* and *şart-i kıla'* occur in only one firman.⁷⁵ Addressed to Tuna *defterdar* İbrahim, it is concerned with an audit (*muhasabe*) of the activity of Ahmed (who was already discussed above) in his function as *nazır* of İsakçı, Tulca, and their dependencies. In this context the revenue arrears of Ahmed are referred to as owed in accordance with the *şürut-i hazine* and *şürut-i kıla'* (*şürüt-i hazineden ve şürüt-i kıladan zimmetine lâzım gelen mâlî*). There is a more revealing use of this term in a firman from the time of Murad III (1594) relating to a *havale* for the wages of a group of *martoloses* in the district of Semendere. It orders that the given *havale* sum be drawn on the funds that have been designated as *şart-i kıla'*, and that under no circumstances are any funds to be drawn from the *şart-i hazine*:

... it is to be drawn by *havale* from the money that is *şürüt-i kıla'* which [was paid] in installments (*kıst*) for the *mukata'a* of the Vidin port and its dependencies during the term (*tahvil*) of tax-farmers; I have ordered that [6,920] *akças* are to be given from the money that is *şart-i kıla'* and by no means are they (the *akças*) to be given from the *şart-i hazine*.⁷⁶

Another example is in an order to the governor-general and the *defterdar* of Diyarbakir in which a certain official was awarded a district as *arpalık* for meritorious service (1633):

⁷⁴On *şart name*, a document specifying the conditions of an *iltizam*, see Cohen, *Palestine*, p. 191-92.

⁷⁵MD 83, no. 108 (see appendix for text and translation).

⁷⁶... Vidin iskelesi ve tevâbi'i mukâta'ası kışından mültezimler. . . tahvilinden şürüt-i kıla' olan akçadan havâle idüp buyurdum ki. . . [6,920] akçayı şart-i kıla' olan akçadan virüp zinhâr şart-i hazineden virmiyesiz. . . (BBA, Ali Emiri tasnifi, Murad II, no. 178). I thank András Riedlmayer for bringing this document to my attention.

. . . the district of Hisn Keyf is assigned to him starting on this eleventh day of Sha‘ban of this [year] 1043 with [a salary of] 3,300 *guruş* of *şart-i hazine* state funds (*mal-i miri*) . . . in accordance with the *emr-i şerif* given to his hand by the *divan-i hümayun*, the 3,300 *guruş şart-i hazine* of the aforementioned *mukata‘a* (the Hisn Keyf *hasses* which are subject to the Diyarbakir *kalem*) are put into his control and he is to collect the revenues (*mahsulat*) arising from them, and no one from the outside is to interfere . . .⁷⁷

From these examples it is clear that *mukata‘at* revenues were divided into two shares, a “treasury share” and a “fortress share.” The reason for such a partition and the rationale for, as will be seen, setting various proportions between the *şart-i hazine* and *şart-i kila‘* in the different *mukata‘at* is not clear. Going only by the denotations of the terms *hazine* and *kila‘* it can be guessed that *şart-i hazine* originated as a designation for funds that were destined for the coffers of the *hazine*, or treasury, while *şart-i kila‘* was used for funds that remained outside the sphere of the treasury and, remaining in the provinces, were deposited for safekeeping in fortresses (*kila‘*). It can further be surmised that while *mukata‘at* funds designated *şart-i hazine* were under normal circumstances sent to the central treasury or one of its provincial branches, funds designated *şart-i kila‘* were intended to cover local costs such as wages of provincial fortress garrisons of other provincial troops, as is the case in the document just cited.

That there was a division of *mukata‘a* revenues into those to be deposited in the treasury and those to be spent in the provinces is reflected in the organization of some sections of the 1636 register, published by Murphey, on assignation of *mukata‘at* revenue in Anatolia and Northern Syria that has already been referred to. In the listing of the *mukata‘a* revenues of the *eyalet* of Diyarbakır there is one section giving all *mukata‘a* revenues designated for the Diyarbakır treasury under the heading *māl-ı mukāṭa‘āt-i*

⁷⁷Murphey, “Ottoman Army,” p. 490 (from *Maliyeden müdevver defterleri*).

hazine-i Diyarbakır, “revenue from *mukata’at* of the *treasury* of Diyarbakır.” The rest of the Diyarbakır *mukata’a* revenues were assigned as *ocaklıks* for the fortresses in the Diyarbakır *eyalet* and are listed under the heading **māl-i muḳāṭa’āt-i ocaklıḳha-i ḳilā’ der eyālet-i Diyarbakır**, “revenue from *mukata’at* [for] *ocaklıks* of fortresses in the *eyalet* of Diyarbakır.”⁷⁸ A similar dichotomy is present in the listing of the *mukata’a* revenues of the *eyalet* of Erzurum: **māl-i muḳāṭa’āt ve cizye-i gebran-i eyālet-i Erzurum tābi’-i hazine-i mezbūre**, “revenue from *mukata’at* and from *cizye-i gebran* of the *eyalet* of Erzurum, subject to the aforementioned (Erzurum) *treasury*” and **māl-i meṣrūṭāt-i ocaklıḳha-i ḳilā’-i serḥadd der eyālet-i mezbūre**, “revenues stipulated for the *ocaklıks* of the fortresses of the frontier in the aforementioned *eyalet* (of Erzurum)” (emphases added).⁷⁹ In the recapitulation at the end of the register, the sum total of the revenues listed in the document are subdivided into two categories, those assigned to the treasury and those assigned as wages to fortress garrisons.⁸⁰ But while there is such a partition of the *mukata’a* revenues in this register, the terms *ṣart-i hazine* and *ṣart-i ḳilā’* do not occur in it anywhere. In fact there is a basic difference between the partition of the *mukata’a* revenues in the 1636 register and in the sources from Hasan Pasha’s campaigns. In the former, revenues of *entire mukata’at* are assigned either to the treasury or to the provinces, while in the latter, revenues *within a mukata’a* are partitioned into *ṣart-i hazine* and *ṣart-i ḳilā’* shares.⁸¹ A further basic difference in the latter case is that, at least in the year A.H.1037/1627-1628, *mukata’at*

⁷⁸*Regional Structure*, pp. 56-57, 72-73.

⁷⁹*Regional Structure*, pp. 96-99.

⁸⁰*Regional Structure*, pp. 210-11.

⁸¹However, in the case of some of these *mukata’a* the entire revenue was designated under the *ṣart-i hazine* only (see below).

labeled *şart-i hazine*, contrary to the surmise in the previous paragraph, were also delivered to provincial garrisons rather than the treasury. This fact will be dealt with later.

It has been assumed that the *şart-i hazine* and *şart-i kila'* were collected separately. In a brief surmise, Murphey suggests that revenues from a *mukata'a* assigned as *ocaklık* were paid in "two separate installments individually stipulated in the *iltizam* contract, namely, the *şart-i kila'* (garrison installment) and the *şart-i hazine* (treasury installment)"; one of the duties of the *nazırs* was to see to it that these installments were paid out as allocated.⁸² Although no specific sources are referred to in making this statement, evidence in a register of *ocaklıks* relating to Hasan Pasha's campaigns, which will be discussed below, suggests that these *şurut* were indeed collected as separate installments. However, as will become evident below, the fact that the *şart-i hazine* and *şart-i kila'* may have been collected as separate installments is only one aspect and not the central feature of the *şart-i hazine/şart-i kila'* phenomenon.

The Arrangement of the Defter-i Ocaklık. The *ocaklık* register was drawn up with the ultimate concern of paying troop wages which, as was stated earlier, were paid in quarterly installments according to the lunar calendar. Accordingly it was prepared at the end of 1036 in preparation for the coming year of 1037. On 1 Muharram 1037/12 September 1527, the register went into effect, that is, when the *mukata'at* listed in it were officially assigned as *ocaklıks* for the Özi fortresses, but before their funds were actually delivered to them. In other words, the *ocaklık* register is a prospective, rather than retrospective, document—a type of budget for future rather than summary of past expenditures. As stated above, the part of the *ocaklık* register giving expenditures, that is, the assignees of the *ocaklıks*, precedes the part giving the income sources and corresponding figures, that is, the *mukata'at* and their revenues. It is interesting that in the retrospective Ottoman

⁸²Murphey, "Ottoman Army," pp. 270-71.

account registers of inflow and outflow of state treasury funds (of the type *icmal-i varidat ve mesarif-i hizane-i 'amire*), the order is reversed—the incomes are given first and expenditures second.⁸³ Perhaps in the *ocaklık* register the expenditures are listed first because of a greater interest in the ultimate goal of the *ocaklık* assignment process, namely the salaries and wages of those serving on the frontier. Moreover, it is plausible that the expenditures were drawn up first because they were indeed established first, while the funds needed to cover them, that is, the listed *mukata'at*, were sought out and arranged in the register to match up to them thereafter. After all, it is likely that the garrison troops (whose numbers are given in the first section) were already in place. Hence the repeated statements firmans of the need to arrange funds for the Özi frontier troops implies that these troops were already in place. And there is never a mention of the need to recruit new garrison troops for the Özi *eyalet* fortresses. In any event, the *ocaklık* register is clearly a clean, final copy⁸⁴; the register must have been prepared on the basis of other registers, and perhaps many other registers, including *mukata'a defterleri* and *mevacib defterleri*. Despite the order of the two parts of the register, the discussion here will first cover the more detailed and complicated second part listing the *mukata'at* and their revenues.

The Ocaklık Revenue Sources. The *mukata'a* and other revenues assigned by the *ocaklık* transfer process to the Özi frontier are divided into sixteen entries. Listed first are fourteen large *mukata'at* followed by two entries for some *cizye* revenues.⁸⁵ The structure and features of the entries for the *mukata'at* will be discussed first. The first part of each entry, which begins with *mukāṭa'a-i . . .* (*mukata'a* of . . .), gives the taxes it was

⁸³Barkan, "1079-1080 (1669-1670) bütçesi"; Murphey, "Ottoman Army," pp. 457-79 (budgets for 1036-1037/ 1627, 1037-1038/ 1628, 1039-1040/1630-1631).

⁸⁴Only on the page preceding the *tugra* are there some notations that appear to have been added at some point after the initial writing of the register. Throughout the main body of the register there are no words crossed out or obviously written in.

⁸⁵One of the *mukata'at* entries also includes *cizye* revenues (TT 748, fol 4b).

made up of, thus defining the given *mukata'a*. These large *mukata'at* consisted of smaller *mukata'at* from one or more towns or locales. In other words at some point the smaller *mukata'at* had been clumped together to form these larger, composite or conglomerate *mukata'at*. When there is risk of confusion between the smaller “component-*mukata'at*” and these larger “composite-*mukata'at*” that make up the main entries in the *ocaklık* register, the latter will be referred to as “main *mukata'at*.” Most often the entry for a main *mukata'a* starts with the mention of the *mukata'a* of one or more ports (*iskele*), that is their customs duties (*gümrük*). The ports for which *mukata'at* are included in the register are Akkerman, Balcık, Kili, Hırsova, İbrail, İsakçı, Kadı Köyi, Kara Harman, Köstence, Maçın , Mankalıya, Nigboli, Rahova, Ruscuk, Silistre, Tutrakan, Tulca, and Zıştovi. The Ottoman Empire was divided into a number of large customs zones, and duties were levied on goods passing into or out of these zones.⁸⁶ The Danube River was a boundary between two or more such zones—to the south, regular Ottoman provinces of Rumeli and to the north, Wallachia and the Bucak. Unfortunately, at present, little is known about the boundaries of these zones. After the *mukata'at* for port customs duties, the *mukata'at* listed most often within the main *mukata'at* entries are the *pencik* or the “one-fifth tax” on slaves, the public and private *beytü'l-mal* (*beytü'l-māl-i 'ämme ve hāşşa*) or revenues collected from the estates of deceased private individuals and government officials, respectively, and the *zarar-i kassabiyye* or a tax imposed to cover extra expenses for the meat supply of the *janissaries*. Revenues occurring less often are from the tax on state saltworks (*milh-i miri*), tax on candle works (*şem' hane*), *mefkud* and *kaçkun*, *cürm* and *cinayet*, *badihava*, *cizye-i yava*, and *resm-i kantariyye* (see glossary). Often included in the *mukata'at* of these revenues are so-called “dependencies” (*tevabi'*). These were revenues, often in neighboring towns or villages,

⁸⁶On the Ottoman customs system see Halil İnalçık, *Caffa Customs Register* (forthcoming); also see *Rechnungsbücher*.

that had been attached to a given *mukata'a* and were included in the accounting of the main tax revenues in the *mukata'a* because, for example, they were the same type of revenue, were generated in the same vicinity, or because of some other expediency. Fifteen of the sixteen main entries in the *ocaklık* register, including the two *cizye* entries, are listed in the first column of **Table 7** (omitted from the table is the entry for the *mukata'a* of the *iskele* of Özi and Kıl Burun which, the authorities decided, was not to become an *ocaklık*, see below).

Table 7. *Mukata'at* assigned as *ocaklık* by Hasan Pasha in 1037/1627-1628 (in *akças*)

<i>mukata'at</i> under <i>nezaret</i> of Ahmed Beg	gross annual revenue		annual	net annual revenue	
	<i>hazine</i>	<i>kıla'</i>	stipends	<i>hazine</i>	<i>kıla'</i>
İsakcı, Tulca, Maçın ports (<i>iskele</i>)*	1,638,322		142,280 ^a	1,486,042	
	784,161	854,161		631,881	854,161
	48%	52%		43%	57%
Akkerman port, <i>pençik</i> *	1,577,777		113,760	1,464,017	
	777,777	800,000		664,017	800,000
	49%	51%		45%	55%
Kili port, <i>pençik, talyans</i> *	2,053,333 ^b		445,480	1,607,853	
	533,333	1,550,000		397,853	1,210,000
	26%	74%		25%	75%
İbrail port*	1,214,377		47,520	1,166,857	
	500,000	714,377		452,480	714,377
	41%	59%		39%	61%
Akkerman, Kili <i>beytül-mal</i>	166,666		0	166,666	
	166,666	0		166,666	0
	100%	0%		100%	0%
Akkerman, Kili <i>zarar-i kassabiyye</i>	51,722		0	51,722	
	51,722	0		51,722	0
	100%	0%		100%	0%
İsakcı, Tulca, Maçın, Hırsova <i>zarar-i kassabiyye</i>	88,888		0	88,888	
	88,888	0		88,888	0
	100%	0%		100%	0%
subtotals	6,791,085 ^c		[727,440] ^d	6,032,046 ^e	
	2,872,547 ^f	3,578,538 ^g		2,435,007 ^h	3,578,538
	43%	57%		40%	60%

*Plus the unspecified "dependencies" (*tevabi'*) connected to this *mukata'a*.

^aThe difference between the listed income and expenditure (first and third column) is actually 152,280. This is probably the correct figure since it is also the difference between the two *şart-i hazine* figures (from which all of the expenses were paid). These total annual stipend figures were arrived at by adding the wages listed for each group (e.g., *müteka'idan*, *mürtezika*, etc., for a breakdown according to the various stipendiary groups see Table 8).

^bThe sum of the given *şart-i hazine* and *şart-i kıla'* shares is actually 2,083,333. Because in the first subtotal of the register (see below), the *şart-i hazine* shares also add up to 30,000 less than this figure, probably the correct *şart-i hazine* share here is 503,333.

^cThis sum amounts to 59% of the total gross revenue (see below) of the *mukata'at* assigned as *ocaklık*.

^dThe stipendiary expenses associated with the *mukata'at* contracted to Ahmed Beg amounted to 11% of the gross revenue of those *mukata'at*. In this and other tables below, figures in brackets are not actually in the text but are implicit or have been calculated on the basis of other figures.

^eThis sum amounts to 61% of the total net revenue of the *mukata'at* assigned as *ocaklık*. Subtracting the total for the second column from the hypothetical total of the first column gives 6,063,645. Totaling the sums of the third column gives 6,032,045. The sum of the total *şart-i hazine* and *şart-i kıla'* shares is 6,013,545. However, the sum of the hypothetical *şart-i hazine* share (2,453,507) and the *şart-i kıla'* share is 6,032,045 in agreement with the first operation in this note, which suggests that this is the correct total.

^fThe actual sum of the listed *şart-i hazine* shares is 2,902,547. However, the given figure is probably correct; this figure reflects the extra 30,000 mistakenly given in the Kili *şart-i hazine* share.

^gThe actual sum of the listed *şart-i kıla'* shares is 3,918,538 which is probably correct since it is consistent with the given and actual total of 6,791,085.

^hThe actual sum of the *şart-i hazine* shares is 2,453,507, which is probably correct (see n. e).

Table 7 (continued)

<i>mukata'at</i> contracted to other officials	gross annual revenue <i>hazine</i> <i>kıla'</i>	annual stipends	net annual revenue <i>hazine</i> <i>kıla'</i>
Silistre, Hırsova, Kadı Köyl ports, their <i>zarar-i kassabiyye</i> , state saltworks, <i>pençik</i> *	1,000,000 1,000,000 0 100% 0%	147,600	852,400 852,400 0 100% 0%
Nigbolı, Rahova, Zıstovi ports, their <i>zarar-i kassabiyye</i> , <i>pençik</i> , public <i>beytül-mal</i> in vicinity of these ports, state saltworks	1,492,337 1,392,337 100,000 93% 7%	172,000	1,320,337 1,220,337 100,000 92% 8%
Ruscuk, Tutrakan ports, their <i>pençik</i> , state saltworks	580,303 320,303 260,000 55% 45%	134,640	445,603 ^a 185,663 260,000 42% 58%
Nigbolı, Silistre, Cum'a Bazarı, Ala Kilise, Baba Dağı, Hırsova <i>sancaks' beytül-mal</i> , <i>gayib</i> , <i>mefkud</i> , <i>kaçkun</i> , <i>cürm</i> and <i>cinayet</i> , <i>cizye-i yava</i> in aforementioned <i>kazas</i> ; Şumni, Tulca <i>resm-i kantariye</i> ; Silistre <i>pençik</i> , <i>şem' hane</i> ; Greek, Armenian, Wallachian, Moldavian <i>cizye-i yava</i>	486,500 [486,500] [0] 100% 0%	192,600	293,900 [293,900] [0] 100% 0%
Balcık, Köstence, Kara Harman, Mankaliya ports; Mesih Pasha, Eski İstanbulluk <i>havass-i</i> <i>hümayun</i> ; <i>beytül-mal</i> , <i>yava</i> , <i>kaçkun</i> , <i>şem' hane</i> , <i>cürm</i> and <i>cinayet</i> , <i>cizye-i yava</i> in aforementioned <i>kazas</i>	707,000 [707,000] [0] 100% 0%	207,000	500,000 [500,000] [0] 100% 0%
<i>havass</i> of the town of Ruscuk*	100,000 [100,000] [0] 100% 0%	[0]	100,000 [100,000] [0] 100% 0%
<i>ziyade cizye</i> from <i>evkaf</i> of villages of Mihal 'Alı Beg in town of Plevna*	64,000 [64,000] [0] 100% 0%	[0]	64,000 [64,000] [0] 100% 0%
Ibrail province (<i>vilayet</i>) <i>cizye-i</i> <i>gebran</i> ; <i>cizye-i yava</i> in Ibrail <i>kaza</i>	330,000 [330,000] [0] 100% 0%	[0]	330,000 [330,000] [0] 100% 0%
[subtotals]	[4,760,140] ^b [4,400,140] [360,000] 92% 8%	[853,840] ^c	[3,906,240] ^d [3,546,300] [360,000] 91% 9%
totals	11,551,225 ^e 7,272,687 4,278,538 ^f 63% 37%	1,612,880	9,938,345 5,999,807 3,938,538 60% 40%

^aThe sum of the *hazine* and *kıla'* shares is 445,663. This figure is probably correct since it is corroborated by subtracting the net *hazine* share from the gross *hazine* share.

^bThis sum amounts to 41% of the total gross revenue of the *mukata'at* assigned as *ocaklık*.

^cThe stipendiary expenses associated with the *mukata'at* contracted to others than Ahmed Beg was 18% of the gross revenue of those *mukata'at*.

^dThis sum amounts to 39% of the total net revenue of the *mukata'at* assigned as *ocaklık*. The sum of the figures for the *hazine* and *kıla'* shares given in brackets below (arrived at by calculation) is 3,906,300.

^eThe sum of the total *hazine* and *kıla'* shares is 11,551,222.

^fThe actual sum of the given *kıla'* shares is 3,938,538, which is 340,000 less than the given sum. However, this is the margin by which the *kıla'* shares in the first part of this table are short. This confirms that the 340,000 deficit is due to an error and that the sum given here is correct.

Immediately below the definition of a main *mukata'a* follows the annual amount due, in *akças*, as stipulated in the *iltizam* contract (*ber müceb-i şart-i iltizam*) for that *mukata'a*. The amounts for these *mukata'at* range from as low as about 50,000 to as high as over 2 million *akças*, with the mean being 770,082 and the total being 11,551,225 *akças*. These amounts for each entry are given in top-middle figures of the second column of Table 7, under the heading "gross annual revenue." Appended to these figures, are two sub-entries giving the breakdown of this annual amount into *hazine* and *kıla'* shares (*ber şart-i hazine* and *ber şart-i kıla'*). The figures of these sub-entries are also given in the second column of Table 7, below the gross annual revenue of a given *mukata'a*. In all but one instance the *şart-i hazine* and *şart-i kıla'* shares add up to the given amount due for each *mukata'a*.⁸⁷ In about two thirds of the *mukata'at* the entire amount due is drawn from the *şart-i hazine*, in which case there are in the register no sub-entries giving the *şart-i hazine* and *şart-i kıla'* breakdowns.⁸⁸ In the various main *mukata'a* the proportions between the *şart-i hazine* and the *şart-i kıla'* vary from about 1:3 to 1:1 to 9:1, with the overall average proportions between *şart-i hazine* and the *şart-i kıla'* (including those *mukata'at* which were wholly subject to the *şart-i hazine*) about 63 percent *şart-i hazine* to 37 percent *şart-i kıla'* (see Table 7 for the proportions of these *şart-i hazine* and *şart-i kıla'* figures given in the form of percentages).

The Mukata'a stipendiaries. After the definition of a given *mukata'a* and its financial conditions there follow several entries written side by side with figures that were obviously deducted from the amount of revenue due from that *mukata'a* (this operation is indicated

⁸⁷There is a minor discrepancy of 30,000 *akça* in the Kili *mukata'a*, see Table 6, n. b.

⁸⁸In about half of these, the fact that the entire amount due was subject to the *şart-i hazine* only is noted explicitly with the phrase *ber müceb-i şart-i iltizâm hem şart-i hazine*, "in accordance with the stipulation of the *iltizam* all [of which is part of the] to the stipulation [i.e., share] of the treasury." In the rest of these entries, there is no reference to the *şart-i hazine* or *şart-i kıla'* but calculations involving the final totals given at the end of the register, which include a breakdown for the *şart-i hazine* and *şart-i kıla'*, make it clear that they belonged to the former.

by the word *minhā*, “from them,” that is written above these side-by-side entries) before the revenues were turned over to the Özi frontier forces as *ocaklıks*. These entries are mostly for wages (*mevacib*) of various groups whose payroll was covered by the *mukata‘at*. Many of these payees were in effect pensioners (see below). On one hand, to include both the wage-earning officials and the pensioners into one category, and on the other, to distinguish the corresponding category of expenditures for their wages from the category of expenditures for the wages expended on the Özi frontier forces, the former expenditures will be called stipends and their recipients, stipendiaries. The total expenditures for these stipendiaries from each main *mukata‘a* in the *ocaklık* register is given in the third column of Table 7, under the heading “annual stipends.”

Each stipend entry gives both the aggregate daily (*yevmiye*) and the aggregate yearly stipend. There were two groups whose daily and yearly stipends are listed in separate entries in the register. Listed first are so-called “servants of the given *mukata‘a*” (*ḥademe-i muḳāṭa‘a-i mezbūre*), that is persons hired to perform lower level tasks such as collecting taxes and running local accounts. Altogether this group was slated to receive wages of 344,600 *akças* in A.H. 1037. Then come various retired (*müteka‘id*) soldiers—*sipahis* and *cebecis*—and *du‘a-guyan* (prayer reciters, see glossary). The wages of the *müteka‘idan* were in effect pensions. Listed along with these are a group known as *mürtezikas*, whose wages derived from the *evkaf* founded for imperial mosques. *Mürtezikas* included imams, muezzins, and mosque caretakers (*kayyum*),⁸⁹ although in this register they are only referred to as *mürtezika-i cevāmi‘-i şerife* (“*mürtezika* of imperial mosques”). Altogether the *müteka‘idan* and *mürtezikas* were to receive an annual 928,280 *akças*.⁹⁰ Aside from the two main groups of regular

⁸⁹Murphey, “Ottoman Army,” pp. 199 ff.

⁹⁰This is the figure given in a total for the *müteka‘id* and *mürtezikas* at the end of the register; however, adding all the separate entries yields a figure of 888,200 *akça*, which is about 4 percent less than the given figure.

stipendiaries of the given *mukata'at*, three miscellaneous outlays are listed that were to be deducted before the *ocaklık* funds could be applied. The largest was 340,000 *akças* for unspecified expenses (*mesarif*) associated with the Kili *talyans* ("fishing-net stations," see glossary).⁹¹ The main *mukata'a* from which this expense was to be deducted was the *mukata'a* of the port of Kili, its *pençik*, and the Kili *talyans*.⁹² The next largest miscellaneous outlay was 24,480 *akças* for the annual wages for a group of eight "*farisan*—servants (*hadem*) of the port of [Akkerman]".⁹³ Unfortunately there is no information on the duties of these *farisan* and why they were connected to the Tuna *defterdarlık*. The final miscellaneous outlay is an annual 10,000 *akças* for supplies for state-owned *şaykas* (*mühimmat-i şayka-i miri*).⁹⁴ The groups whose wages were covered by the *mukata'at* in the *ocaklık* register and their aggregate daily and yearly wages are given in Table 8.

⁹¹ Perhaps expenses were for fishermen working at the *talyans*; however, note that only the aggregate yearly wage and no *yevmiye* is given.

⁹²TT 748, fol. 3a.

⁹³TT 748, fol. 3a.

⁹⁴TT 748, fol. 4a.

Table 8. *Mukata'a* stipends according to type and location (in *akças*)

type of <i>mukata'a</i> stipend general location	aggregate daily wages	aggregate yearly wages
<i>mukata'a</i> employees (<i>hademe</i>)		
İsakçı, Tulca, Maçın	180	54,800
Akkerman	80	28,800
Kili	75	27,000
İbrail	80	28,800
Silistre, Hırsova, Kadı Köyl	100	36,000
Nigbolı, Rahova, Zıştovi	150	54,000
Ruscuk, Tutrakan	60	21,600
Nigbolı, Silistre, Cuma Bazarı, Ala Kilise, Baba Dağı, Hırsova	100	36,000
Balcık, Köstence, Kara Harman, Mankaliya	160	57,600
subtotal		344,600 ^a
retired <i>sipahis</i> and <i>cebecis</i> ; <i>mürtezikas</i> ; <i>duaguan</i>		
İsakçı, Tulca, Maçın	243	87,480
Akkerman, Bender	168	60,480
Kili	158	56,880
Kili	60	21,600
İbrail	53	18,720
Silistre, Hırsova, Kadı Köyl	310	111,600
Nigbolı, Rahova, Zıştovi	300	108,000
Ruscuk, Tutrakan	314	113,040
Nigbolı, Silistre, Cuma Bazarı, Ala Kilise, Baba Dağı, Hırsova	435	156,600
Balcık, Köstence, Kara Harman, Mankaliya	415	149,400
subtotal		883,800 ^b
<i>italyan</i> fishermen		
Kili	---	340,000
<i>farisan</i> (8 men)		
Akkerman	68	24,480
equipment and supplies for state <i>şaykas</i>		
Nigbolı, Rahova, Zıştovi	---	10,000
total		1,602,880

^aThe same total is given at the end of the register (fol. 5a) for the total aggregate yearly wages of the *mukata'a* employees.

^bAt the end of the register there is a total of 928,280 for the aggregate yearly wages of the retired *sipahis* and *cebecis*, *mürtezikas*, *duagus* plus the funds for the *şayka* supplies and presumably also the salaries of the 8 *farisan* at Akkerman.

At the end of the register there are three entries giving totals for three categories of outlays to the stipendiaries and miscellaneous expenses: 344,600 *akças* for the *mukata'a* employees; 928,280 for the *müteka'id sipahis*, *cebecis*, *mürtezikas* (883,800 for the *mürtezikas*), the costs for equipping the state-owned *şaykas* (10,000), and the eight *farisan* of Akkerman (24,480)⁹⁵; and 340,000 for the *italyan* employees. Altogether these three entries add up to 1,612,880. In four of the *mukata'at*, as well as in the two *cizye* entries toward the end of the *ocaklık* register, there is no record of any expenses associated with attached officials and servitors. In those instances the entries basically consist of only an indication of the type or types of revenue and their annual amount.

The stipendiary payments equalled 14.0 percent of the total gross annual revenue recorded in the *ocaklık* register, and more significantly, 15.0 percent of those *mukata'at* revenues from which they were drawn. Although stipends were a drain on direly needed funds in A.H. 1037 for the defense of Özi, their registration in the *ocaklık* register indicates that they were to be honored. However, there is evidence that the state sought ways to limit them by cutting off unworthy stipendiaries. A firman to the *kadıs* in the districts of Nigboli, Silistre, and Vidin and another to the Tuna *defterdar* ordered that all *mürtezikas*, *müteka'id sipahis*, janissaries, and *cebecis*, *du'a-guyan* who draw their stipends from the *mukata'at* that are assigned as *ocaklıks* for the Özi frontier are to have their *berats* checked with the registers at the Porte.⁹⁶ Those who complied (and presumably whose *berats* were genuine and valid) were to be issued certificates (*temessük*) or indicating that they had undergone the inspection. Anyone who failed to present such a certificate to the relevant authority come time of stipend payment was to be refused his payment. The firman to the Tuna *defterdar* specifically instructs the addressee, in the case of any irregularity, or even a suspicious-looking segment in a *berat*, to act in the way most

⁹⁵Actually the last three figures add up to 918,280.

⁹⁶MD 83, nos. 104, 105.

beneficial to the *miri*, in other words, by no means to give such a stipendiary the benefit of the doubt.⁹⁷ Here it should be pointed out that the need to account for the stipendiary expenses before diverting funds to the *ocaklık* assignees is another way in which the assignation of *ocaklık* funds differed from the assignation of funds by *havale*. Aside from being a one-time assignation of a specific fund, the execution of a *havale* did not entail the complicated process of first deducting these regular expenses.

While the word *minhā*, “from them,” is written above the entries for the stipend expenses to indicate that the stipend figures are subtracted from the gross revenue figures written above them, below these entries is the word *ileyh*, “to it,” indicating that what follows is the result of this subtraction. These remaining figures following *ileyh* represent net revenues of the *mukata‘at* that were to be go to the objects of the *ocaklıks*. In other words, the net annual revenues given for each main *mukata‘a* (and the two *cizye* entries as well) represent the actual amounts of the *ocaklıks*. These amounts are listed in the top-middle of each row in the fourth column of **Table 7**, under the heading “net annual revenue.”

Like the original gross revenue, this net revenue is followed by two sub-entries giving the *şart-i hazine* and *şart-i kıla‘* breakdown (also given in the fourth column of **Table 7**). That the *şart-i hazine/şart-i kıla‘* partition was maintained in the *ocaklık* register’s listing of the net annual revenue available for expenditure as *ocaklık* is an important feature of this partition. Its implications will be returned to in the discussion of the *ocaklık* assignees below. **Table 7** allows a comparison to be made between the proportions of the *şart-i hazine* and *şart-i kıla‘* shares in the gross revenues and in the net revenues. In the respective columns for gross and net revenues, below the *şart-i hazine*

⁹⁷In the same firman there is also a general order to crack down on all timariots or holders of taxation immunities (*mu‘af*) who failed to provide their obligated state services. In a slightly different situation in which *ocaklıks* were not the issue, Hasan Pasha orders the Kefe governor-general and *kadı* not to renew the *berats* of those fortress guards (*mustahfızan*), *müteka‘ids*, and other stipendiaries (*ehl-i vazife*) who harassed the new *nazır* of Kefe for debts owed to them by the previous *nazır* (MD 83, nos. 127).

and *şart-i kıla'* figures, the relative proportions are given in percentages. In those entries with stipend expenses, the change in proportion of the *şart-i hazine* and *şart-i kıla'* shares was of course due to a different proportion drawn from the *şart-i hazine* and *şart-i kıla'* shares for the stipends. In all but one instance, the entire stipend expense was drawn from the *şart-i hazine* and not the *şart-i kıla'* share. Only in the case of the *mukata'a* of the port, *pençik*, and *talyans* of Kili were funds drawn from both shares, with a majority of 72 percent from the *şart-i kıla'* share. The *şart-i kıla'* contribution to the stipendiary expenses of this *mukata'a*, arrived at by subtracting the net *şart-i kıla'* from the gross *şart-i kıla'* share, was 340,000. This is exactly the amount given in one of the four entries for stipend expenses of this *mukata'a*, namely, for the wages of the *talyan* workers. In fact, in this entry, the disbursement of funds from the *şart-i kıla'* share is noted: "before this, [the *talyan* expense was given] from the *şart-i hazine* and now it is given from the *şart-i kıla'*."⁹⁸ Thus it appears that for some reason an exception was made contrary to the policy (of that year only?) of using the funds of the *şart-i hazine* share to cover the stipendiary expenses. Table 9 lists the main *mukata'a* entries, the total stipendiary expenses of each⁹⁹ and the calculated absolute and relative contributions of the *şart-i hazine* and *şart-i kıla'* shares.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸TT 748, fol. 3a.

⁹⁹Determined by subtracting the net revenue from the gross revenue and double-checked by adding the specific stipend amounts indicated in the *ocaklık* register for a particular group or other recipient (in parentheses); discrepancies are noted.

¹⁰⁰Also as determined by subtracting the net shares from the gross shares.

Table 9. Stipends according to *mukata'a*t and their *şart-i hazine*- and *şart-i kila'*-shares (in *akças*)

<i>mukata'a</i>	stipendaries	total stipends	
		<i>hazine</i>	<i>kila'</i>
İsakçı, Tulca, Maçın ports*	• <i>hadem-i mukata'a</i> (54,800) • <i>müteka'id sipahis, mürtezikas, du'a-guyan</i> (87,480)	152,280 ^a 152,280 100%	0 0%
Akkerman port, <i>pençik</i> *	• <i>hadem-i mukataa</i> (28,800) • <i>mürtezikas, müteka'idan, du'a-guyan</i> (60,480) •8 <i>farisan</i> (24,480)	113,760 113,760 100%	0 0%
Killi port, <i>pençik, talyans</i> *	• <i>hadem-i mukata'a</i> (27,000) • <i>mürtezikas, müteka'idan, du'a-guyan</i> (56,880) •other <i>mürtezikas</i> (21,600) • <i>talyan workers</i> (340,000)	475,480 ^b 135,480 28%	340,000 ^c 72%
Ibrail port*	• <i>hadem-i mukata'a</i> (28,800) • <i>mürtezikas, müteka'idan</i> (18,720)	47,520 47,520 100%	0 0%
Silistre, Hırsova, Kadı Köyi ports, their <i>zarar-i kassabiyye</i> , state saltworks, <i>pençik</i> *	• <i>hadem-i mukata'a</i> (36,000) • <i>müteka'id sipahis, du'a-guyan, mürtezikas</i> (111,600)	147,600 147,600 100%	0 0%
Nigbolli, Rahova, Zıştovi ports, their <i>zarar-i kassabiyye, pençik, beytü'l-mal</i> in vicinity of these ports, state saltworks	• <i>hadem-i mukata'a</i> (54,000) • <i>müteka'id sipahis and cebecis, mürtezikas, du'a-guyan</i> (108,000) •supplies for state <i>şaykas</i> (10,000)	172,000 172,000 100%	0 0%
Ruscuk, Tutrakan ports, their <i>pençik</i> , state saltworks	• <i>hadem-i mukata'a</i> (21,600) • <i>müteka'id sipahis and cebecis, du'a-guyan, mürtezikas</i> (113,040)	134,640 134,640 100%	0 0%
Nigbolli, Silistre, Cuma Bazarı, Ala Kilise, Baba Dağı, Hırsova <i>sancaks'</i> <i>beytü'l-mal</i> , <i>gayib, mefkud, kaçkun, cürm and cinayet, cizye-i yava</i> in aforementioned <i>kazas</i> ; Şumni, Tulca <i>resm-i kantariyye</i> ; Silistre <i>pençik, şem' hane</i> ; Greek, Armenian, Wallachian, Moldavian <i>cizye-i yava</i>	• <i>hadem-i mukata'a</i> (36,000) • <i>müteka'id sipahis and cebecis, du'a-guyan, mürtezikas</i> (156,600)	192,600 192,600 100%	0 0%
Balcık, Köstence, Kara Harman, Mankaliya ports; Mesih Pasha, Eski İstanbulluk <i>havass-i hümayun; beytü'l-mal, yava, kaçkun, şem' hane, cürm and cinayet, cizye-i yava</i> in aforementioned <i>kazas</i>	• <i>hadem-i mukata'a</i> (57,600) • <i>müteka'id sipahis and cebecis, du'a-guyan, mürtezikas</i> (149,400)	207,000 207,000 100%	0 0%
total		1,642,880 1,302,880 79%	340,000 21%

*Plus the unspecified "dependencies" (*tevabi'*) connected to this *mukata'a*.

^aAdding the aggregate wages given in this entry of the register gives 142,280. However, 152,280 is obtained by subtracting the net revenues from the gross revenues (1,638,322-1,486,042); this figure is corroborated by subtracting the initial and final *şart-i hazine* figures (784,161-631,881, see first row in Table 7). This latter figure is being used so as to determine the relative contribution to the stipends from the *şart-i hazine* and *şart-i kila'* shares.

^bAdding the aggregate wages given in this entry of the register gives 445,480.

^cAccording to a note in this entry, previously this payment was made from the *şart-i hazine* share and now an order had been issued that it be made from the *şart-i kila'* share.

Is the fact that with one exception, all the stipends were paid out of the *şart-i hazine* funds significant? Was this the normal procedure or did the pattern differ from year to year? For example, were the stipends in some years instead paid out of the *şart-i kıla'* funds and in others, out of a combination of both *şart-i hazine* and *şart-i kıla'*? Why, after all, were the stipends in this year paid out of *şart-i hazine* funds? Does this signify some basic difference between the *şart-i hazine* and *şart-i kıla'*? Here, as with the question of the reason for the *şart-i hazine/şart-i kıla'* partition, without more sources (and, in particular, sources for other years), these key questions cannot be answered.

The Özi and Kıl Burun Mukata'a. The above discussion of the logic, structure, and contents of the *ocaklık* register applies to all but one of the main *mukata'at* listed in the register. Not treated was the *mukata'a* of the ports of Özi and Kıl Burun because at the time the *ocaklık* register was drawn, it was not assigned as an *ocaklık* and hence its revenues were not included in the totals at the end of the register. The entry for this *mukata'a* explains why: This *mukata'a*, which used to be given out by *iltizam* for an annual 164,666 *akça*, was now included in the *hass* of the governor-general of Özi in accordance with an *emr-i serif* issued by Hasan Pasha. Below this is a paragraph recapitulating the circumstances of this *mukata'a* in recent years. Briefly, the revenues of the *mukata'a* had been shared originally by the Özi governor and the state (*miri*), with the former receiving the *ihtisab*, *bac*, and *bazari* dues, and the latter receiving the Özi customs duties. However, because this arrangement proved unworkable and because, the Özi governor did not even reside in Özi, the state took control of the entire *mukata'a*, which in turn resulted in a decline in collected revenue to 75,000 *akça* for two years. Therefore it was decided to turn the entire *mukata'a* over to the Özi governor-general, Mehmed Pasha, who had proved to be an able administrator, and it was preferred that this policy be continued with his successors. In a marginal note written in a different hand and dated more than five months after the register (15 Sha'ban 1037/20 April 1628), it is stated that

Mehmed Pasha was removed from his post and that Hasan Pasha had issued an *emr-i şerif* ordering that the revenues that had been “*ocaklık* for the Özi governor-general” be applied toward the repairs at Özi and toward the costs of other fortresses (the amount available at the time was 146,600 *akça*).¹⁰¹ Unfortunately, neither the text of the register nor the marginal note indicate what the revenues of the Özi and Kıl Burun *mukata‘a* were at the time Hasan Pasha declared them *ocaklık*. In any event, the story of this *mukata‘a* gives a good example of the state manipulation of the flow of *mukata‘at* funds in search for desired and presumably optimal arrangement and of Hasan Pasha’s strong prerogative to decide, as vizier and therefore a bearer of the Porte’s authority, such an arrangement and execute his decision.

Officials in Charge of Mukata‘at Assigned as Ocaklıks for the Özi Frontier. The definitions of the main *mukata‘at* indicate the official or the tax-farmer entrusted with the collection of the *mukata‘at* revenues. In fact, these *mukata‘at* are arranged in the register according to the persons in charge of them. Table 10 gives the data on the *mukata‘at* as it relates to these persons.

The first seven *mukata‘at* were contracted (*der ‘uhde-i . . .*, “under the oath of . . .”) to *nazır* Ahmed Beg, the previous governor of Akkerman, who has already been discussed in connection with his dismissal and eventual reinstatement to *nezaret* over his *mukata‘at* in 1627. The extent and worth of the *mukata‘at* under his responsibility were so great that they formed a separate section of the register, beginning with a special heading that states that the supervision (*nezaret*, “*nazır*-ship”) over the docks of İsakcı, Tulca, Maçın, Akkerman, Kili, İbrail, and their *pençik* (that is, the supervision over their *mukata‘at*) was contracted to *nazır* Ahmed starting with the first day of A.H. 1037¹⁰² and

¹⁰¹TT 748, fol. 3b.

¹⁰²TT 748, fol. 3a.

ending with an entry giving totals for his seven main *mukata'at*.¹⁰³ According to the totals, Ahmed Beg was responsible for the collection of about 6.79 million *akça* or 59 percent of the total gross revenue of the *mukata'at* to be assigned as *ocaklık*, and about 6.03 million *akça* or 61 percent of the total net revenue, that is, the actual amount of the *ocaklıks*.

¹⁰³See TT 748 in appendix; for a synopsis of these *mukata'at* see the first seven rows of Table 7.

Table 10. Officials in charge of *mukata'at* assigned as *ocaklıks* for the Özi frontier (in *akças*).

official	<i>mukata'at</i>	gross annual revenue	stipend expenses	net annual revenue
Ahmed Beg, <i>nazır</i> (previous <i>mir liva</i> of Akkerman)	•ports (<i>iskele</i>) of İsakçı, Tulca, Maçın, Akkerman, Kili, İbrail*; • <i>pençik</i> of Akkerman, Kili*; Kili <i>talyans</i> *; • <i>beytül-mal</i> of Akkerman, Kili • <i>zarar-i kassabiyye</i> of Akkerman, Kili, İsakçı, Tulca, Maçın, Hırsova	6,791,085	727,440	6,032,046
Kasım Beg, (<i>emin</i> by <i>iltizam</i> (previous <i>mirliva</i> of Kıl Burun)	•ports, <i>zarar-i kassabiyye</i> , state saltworks, <i>pençik</i> * of Silistre, Hırsova, Kadı Köyi,	1,000,000	147,600	852,400
Arslan Yahudi, <i>emin</i> (previous <i>emin</i> of the <i>mültezims</i> of Nigbolı)	•ports, state saltworks, <i>pençik</i> of Nigbolı, Rahova, Zıştovi, Ruscuk, Tutrakan; • <i>zarar-i kassabiyye</i> , <i>beytül-mal</i> of Nigbolı, Rahova, Zıştovi	2,072,640	306,640	1,766,000
İbrahim Beg (son of a <i>sipahi</i>) <i>emin</i>	•Nigbolı, Silistre, Cum'a Bazarı, Ala Kilise, Baba Dağı, Hırsova <i>sancaks'</i> <i>beytül-mal</i> , <i>gayib</i> , <i>mefkud</i> , <i>kaçkun</i> , <i>cürm</i> and <i>cinayet</i> , <i>cizye-i yavagan</i> in aforementioned <i>kazas</i> ; •Şumni, Tulca <i>resm-i kantariye</i> ; •Silistre <i>pençik</i> , <i>şem' hane</i> ; •Greek, Armenian, Wallachian, Moldavian <i>cizye-i yava</i>	486,500	192,600	293,900
Huda Virdi Çavuş, <i>emin</i>	•ports of Balcık, Köstence, Kara Harman, Mankalıya; • <i>havass-i hümayun</i> of Mesih Pasha, Eski İstanbulluk; • <i>beytül-mal</i> , <i>yava</i> , <i>kaçkun</i> , <i>şem' hane</i> , <i>cürm</i> ve <i>cinayet</i> , • <i>cizye-i yava</i> in <i>kazas</i> of above-mentioned locales	707,000	207,000	500,000
revenues not collected by <i>iltizam</i>	• <i>havass</i> of the town of Ruscuk*; • <i>ziyade cizye</i> of <i>evkaf</i> of villages of Mihal 'Alı Beg in town of Plevna* • <i>cizye-i gebran</i> of İbrail <i>vilayet cizye-i yava</i> in İbrail <i>kaza</i>	494,000	—	494,000

Of the remaining six main *mukata'at* listed in the *ocaklık* register, five were contracted to four different officials. The *mukata'a* for the ports of Silistre, Hırsova, Kadı Köyi, and for other revenues were contracted by *iltizam* to *emin* Kasım Beg, the previous *mir liva* of Kıl Burun.¹⁰⁴ The *mukata'a* of the ports of Nigbolı, Rahova, Zıştovi and

*Plus the unspecified dependencies (*tevabi'*) connected to this *mukata'a*.

¹⁰⁴See TT 748 in appendix for the description of his and the following *mukata'at*; see second part of Table 7 for a synopsis.

other revenues, as well as the *mukata'a* of the ports of Ruscuk and other revenues, were contracted to *emin* Arslan Yahudi (the “Jew”), a resident of Nigboli,¹⁰⁵ who was also previously *emin* of the same *mukata'at*.¹⁰⁶ Hasan Pasha’s strong support of Arslan Yahudi in several firmans suggests that he was considered a capable *mukata'a* functionary who would be an asset in the process of arranging *ocaklık* funds for the Özi frontier. The next *mukata'a* in the *ocaklık* register—for the *beytü'l-mal*, *gayib*, *mefkud*, *yava*, *kaçkun*, *cürm*, and *cinayet*, and other dues in Nigboli, Silistre, Cum'a Bazari, Ala Kilise, Baba Dağı, and Hırsova (including the dependencies of these *mukata'at*)—was contracted to *emin* İbrahim Beg, who had previously been *emin* of the same *mukata'a*.¹⁰⁷ Finally, the *mukata'a* for the ports of Balcık, Köstence, Kara Harman, Mangaliya, and other revenues was contracted to *emin* Hoda Viridi Çavuş, who also had previously been *emin* of the same *mukata'a*.¹⁰⁸ For the last listed main *mukata'a* for the *hass* of the town of Ruscuk (*nefs-i Ruscuk*) and its dependencies, no tax-farmer is indicated.

The Ocaklık Assignees. Now that the part of the *ocaklık* register relating to the *mukata'at* that became *ocaklıks* has been analyzed, it is possible to turn to the beginning of the main text of the *defter* (fol. 2b), which covers the beneficiaries of the *ocaklıks*, that is, the assignees of the *ocaklık* funds. Listed first are the annual salaries (*salyane*) of apparently

¹⁰⁵This is clearly the same Arslan discussed above who was displaced from *emin*-ship of the *mukata'at* of the ports of Nigboli, Rahova, and Zıştovi and their dependencies by a rival group of Jewish tax-farm officials.

¹⁰⁶*Emin-i mültezim* in TT 748, fol. 4a. Further on in the register, in reference to Ahmed and other tax-farm officials, the wording is *emin-i mültezim-i sabık* or simply *emin-i sabık* which in the given contexts mean that the given officials were formerly *emins* of the given *mukata'at* and were now being reappointed to them. In support of this interpretation of *emin-i sabık* note the following: A certain İbrahim, the official in charge of the next *mukata'a* in the *ocaklık* register, is also referred to as *emin-i sabık* while in a firman dated just after the *ocaklık* register, namely on 18 Muharram 1037/29 September 1627, the same İbrahim is indeed referred to as *emin* of the same *mukata'a* (MD 83, no. 95). Note that in the case of Arslan, his official date of reappointment, the first of the new year 1037, coincided with the official date of composition of the *ocaklık* register (MD 83, no. 92 and TT 748, fol 5a).

¹⁰⁷TT 748, fol. 4b.

¹⁰⁸TT 748, fol. 4b.

the three most important local officials in the province of Özi, namely, the governor-general (*mir miran*) of Özi, the *defterdar* of the “Özi treasury (*hazine*),” and the governor (*mir liva*) of Kıl Burun, who was also charged with the post of *kapudan* of Özi. Their respective *salyanes* for 1037 were 400,000, 300,000, and 100,000 *akça* (see **Table 11**). Then there are ten entries for fortresses in the *eyalet* of Özi, with the entry for the Özi fortress complex and the fortress of Kıl Burun fortress across the mouth of the Dnieper at the head. After these there is an entry for the small *cema‘at* of *farisan* attached to the Tuna treasury referred to earlier. Each entry includes a troop total, the aggregate daily wages (*yevmiye*), and the aggregate yearly wages (*mevacib*). These figures are given in the second, third, and fourth columns of **Table 12**. At the end of this page there is a sum (*yekun*) of these expenditures plus the total *salyane* for the top three Özi officials (see last lines of **Table 12**).

Table 11. Salaries (*salyane*) covered by *ocaklıks* assigned for 1037/1627-1628

Özi high officials	<i>salyane</i> (<i>akças</i>)	<i>mukata'a</i> share
Özi <i>beglerbegi</i>	400,000	<i>hazine</i>
Özi <i>defterdar</i>	300,000	<i>hazine</i>
Kıl Burun <i>sancakbegi</i> and <i>kapudan</i>	100,000	<i>hazine</i>
total	800,000	

Table 12. Wages (*mevacib*) covered by *ocaklıks* assigned for 1037/1627-1628

fortress(es)	troops	aggregate daily wages	aggregate annual wages (<i>akças</i>)	<i>mukata'a</i> share
Özi (Old Fortress, New Fortress, New Palanka, New Hasan Pasha Fortress and Kıl Burun	1,567	14,637	5,053,996	<i>hazine</i>
Bender	511	3,307 ^a	1,288,350	<i>kıla'</i>
Akkerman and Yanık <i>palanka</i>	512	3,399	1,175,762	<i>kıla'</i>
Kili	314	2,218 ^b	814,656	<i>kıla'</i>
İbrail	148	840	291,164	<i>kıla'</i>
Ruscuk	20	80	28,320	<i>kıla'</i>
Nigbolı	53	289	111,058	<i>kıla'</i>
Culunik (?)	16	85	29,990	<i>kıla'</i>
Rahova	102	563	200,810	<i>kıla'</i>
Tulca New Fortress	63	319	112,926	<i>hazine</i>
Corps of <i>farisan</i> serving the Tuna treasury	15	97	33,174	<i>hazine</i>
totals	3,321	25,834^c	9,140,206	
totals for salaries (<i>salyane</i>) and wages (<i>mevacib</i>)			9,930,206^d	<i>hazine</i> 60% <i>kıla'</i> 40%

^a3,265 according to two subtotals (1,271 and 1,994) given below this entry (see appendix).

^b2213 according to two subtotals (1,575 and 743) given below this entry (see appendix).

^c25,787 using the figures in the previous two notes.

^dThere is a mistake in the addition; the sum should be 9,940,206 (see the previous note). The difference between the total wage expenditures here and the total income after *mukata'a* expenses of 9,938,345 (see Table 7) is 8,139.

^eThe difference between this total *şart-i hazine* expenditure and the total *şart-i hazine* income of 5,999,807 (see Table 7) is 289.

^fThere is a mistake in the addition; the sum of all the *şart-i kıla'* entries is 3,940,110. The difference between this total *şart-i kıla'* expenditure and the total *kıla* income of 3,938,538 (see Table 7) is 8,428.

The first thing to note is that the total of the *ocaklık* expenditures listed on this page of the register, 9,930,206 *akça*, is approximately the same as these *ocaklık*'s net annual revenue of 9,938,345 *akça* (see bottom lines of **Tables 13** and 7). The difference of 8,139 *akça* is negligible (less than 0.01 percent of either the income or the expenditures) and can be ascribed to arithmetic error. However, note that **Table 13** is based on the official sums given in the register, which, as was made evident above, are not entirely consistent with hypothetical sums arrived at by adding the actual entries. While it was seen above that the total net revenue figure given in the register seems to be accurate, the given annual salary and wage figure is ten thousand *akça* less than that obtained by adding up the separate entries for the fortresses (a difference of 0.1 percent).¹⁰⁹ With a total salary and wage expenditure of 9,940,206 *akça*, there is a slight deficit of 1,861 *akça* (also less than 0.01 percent of either the income or the expenditures). Thus, although a surplus would be expected in the *ocaklık*-transfer process, the discrepancies of the figures serve as a warning against making hard and fast conclusions regarding this specific matter, while their negligible size assures that the result is basically reliable.

Table 13. Net revenue income and salary and wage expenditures of 1037/1627-1628 *ocaklık* funds

	net annual revenue		annual salaries and wages		difference (<i>akça</i>)
	<i>akça</i>	% of total	<i>akça</i>	% of total	
<i>hazine</i> share	5,999,807	60.4	6,000,096	60.4	-289
<i>kıla'</i> share	3,938,538	39.6	3,930,110	39.6	8,428
total	9,938,345	100.0	9,930,206	100.0	8,139

The Şart-i Hazine and Şart-i Kıla' before and after the Assignment of Ocaklıks. From **Table 13** it is clear that, as they are recorded in the *ocaklık* register, the proportions between the *şart-i hazine* and *şart-i kıla'* in the funds assigned as *ocaklıks* (net annual revenue) and the funds expended for the annual salaries and wages in the Özi frontier are

¹⁰⁹This discrepancy stems from a discrepancy between the given and hypothetical total *şart-i kıla'* shares of the expenditures (see **Table 12**).

the same at 60 percent to 40 percent, respectively.¹¹⁰ This fact reveals an important property of the *şart-i hazine* and *şart-i kıla'* partition of *mukata'a* funds. Above in **Table 7**, it was seen that the *şart-i hazine/şart-i kıla'* designation on *mukata'a* funds was maintained after the stipend amounts were subtracted. From the figures in **Table 7** it could be clearly seen that, for example, a drop in the size of the *şart-i hazine* share of a given *mukata'a* revenue could be accounted for exactly by the amount diverted to that *mukata'a*'s stipendiaries. That part of the *şart-i hazine* share could not have been transferred to the *şart-i kıla'* share or to some other designation.

From **Table 13** it can be seen that the same *şart-i hazine/şart-i kıla'* partition of funds was maintained one step further. Funds that were *şart-i hazine* when they were assigned as *ocaklık* and collected minus the stipend expenses remained *şart-i hazine* when they were expended on the *ocaklık* assignees. The same holds for *şart-i kıla'* funds. In other words there was no transfer of funds from the *şart-i hazine* shares to the *şart-i kıla'* shares and *vice versa* between the time the given revenue was assigned as *ocaklık*, collected, and paid out to the *ocaklık* assignees. Considering the present understanding of the *şart-i hazine* and *şart-i kıla'* that the funds in the *hazine* and *kıla'* shares were not reallocated but remained fixed, it is not an obvious point. And so, a *şart-i hazine* fund delivered not to the central treasury, but rather, to a fortress garrison was not necessarily redesignated *şart-i kıla'*. This maintenance of the same designation suggests that the *şart-i hazine* and *şart-i kıla'* partition was not a mere accounting device but connected with the actual collection of the funds. It also implies, as Murphey has suggested (see above), that the *şart-i hazine* and *şart-i kıla'* funds were collected as separate installments.

For a given salary (*salyane*) or for the wages (*mevacib*) of a given fortress the funds assigned were either entirely *şart-i hazine* or entirely *şart-i kıla'* funds. This is of course in contrast to the *mukata'at*, six out of fifteen of which consisted of both *şart-i*

¹¹⁰Within 0.05 percentage points.

hazine or *şart-i kıla'* funds. Why was there no combination of *şart-i hazine* or *şart-i kıla'* funds in the expenditures? It would seem that there would have been some significant reason other than simplification of account-keeping, but again, without a wider source base, this question cannot be answered.

Another pattern worth noting is that not only were the larger *şart-i hazine* funds applied to a greater portion of the salary and wage expenditures, but they were also applied to the most important (from the point of view of rank of office or of efficacy for the Özi frontier defense) recipients of the *ocaklıks*, the three top officials in the *eyalet* of Özi and the Özi fortress complex and Kıl Burun (see **Tables 11 and 12**). With the exception of the Tulca New Fortress and the Tuna treasury *farisan*, which also received only *şart-i hazine* funds (a total of 146,100 *akça*, or 2.4 percent of the total *şart-i hazine* expenditure), the rest of the fortresses, from Bender through Rahova (which were more to the rear of the frontier and hence presumably less important to its defense), were paid solely out of *şart-i kıla'* funds.

With the present dearth of documentation of the *şart-i hazine* and *şart-i kıla'* (e.g., *şartnames*, *iltizam berats*) it is hardly possible to determine conclusively the purpose of this partition of *mukata'a* funds. It seems that before the assignment of *ocaklıks* for the Özi frontier forces, the given *mukata'at* (and probably also *mukata'at* not involved in the *ocaklık*-transfer of funds) were already partitioned into the *şart-i hazine* and *şart-i kıla'* shares.¹¹¹ What the rationale was for making a particular portion of a *mukata'a* *şart-i hazine* and another portion *şart-i kıla'* is unclear. With the data in the *ocaklık* register it is safe to conjecture only on the logic of the *şart-i hazine/şart-i kıla'* partition during the *ocaklık* assignment process. Above, it was surmised on the basis of the meanings of *hazine* and *kıla'* and on expressions in the register from 1636 relating to *ocaklıks* (in

¹¹¹It is also not known if and when the proportions of the *şurut-i hazine* and *şurut-i kıla'* of the gross revenue were altered. If they were altered it might have happened when a new *iltizam* contract was drawn up for the given *mukata'a*.

which these words occur), that those funds subject to the *hazine* were intended for the central treasury or one of its provincial branches headed by a *defterdar*, while those funds subject to the *şart-i kıla'* were intended for the provinces and perhaps stored in fortresses, whence the word *kıla'*. In the *ocaklık* register the situation is of course different since all of the *mukata'a* funds, even those designated as *şart-i hazine*, went to the provinces. As for the funds subject to the *şart-i kıla'*, it of course made sense that in 1627 they went to the frontier, since in that year funds were needed on the periphery rather than at the center. However, it can be further surmised that, because more funds were needed on the periphery than were available from the total *şart-i kıla'* shares alone, *şart-i hazine* shares of those *mukata'at* (and also some *mukata'a* that were entirely *şart-i hazine*) were assigned as *ocaklıks* for the Özi frontier (minus of course the stipendiary expenses).

In theory, it should not have made any difference whether the stipendiary expenses were drawn from the *şart-i hazine* or the *şart-i kıla'* share since in either case, the remainder that would become part of the *ocaklık* fund would be the same. Again, presumably, since the *şart-i kıla'* share funds would be applied to garrisons in a normal year anyway, so too in this year they remained with the same assignation. And so only the *şart-i hazine* share remained to be drawn upon for the stipend expenses.¹¹² Perhaps the decision to draw the stipends off of the *şart-i hazine* funds was connected with the availability of these funds, for, example, with the possibly varying schedules of collection of the *hazine* and *kıla'* installments (as stated above, the latter could have automatically gone to the fortresses). Or perhaps, the *hazine* funds were chosen because they were more regularly collected. (This scenario of course assumes that the payment of the stipends was a higher priority than the delivery of the *ocaklıks*). In any event, following this logic it can

¹¹²Another line of speculation goes as follows: Perhaps the preference in this case to draw upon the *şart-i hazine* share for the stipend expenses was determined by considerations of expediency. For example, depending on whether the stipends or the frontier forces were a higher priority, the *şart-i hazine* share could have been the preferred source for the former expenses because its funds were more available or less available. Or perhaps it was a matter of timing, that is, the schedule of payment of the *şart-i hazine* funds by the tax collectors.

be suggested that in situations of less urgency on the frontier, the state would have taken an opposite approach and insisted that stipends were paid out of the *şart-i kila'* funds and the *şart-i hazine* funds (and even the remaining *şart-i kila'* funds) be diverted to, for example, some need in the capital. Another example in which the state had a definite preference as to which portion of a *mukata'a* revenue an expense should be covered has already been cited in the document relating to a *havale* order for the wages of *martaloses* in the district of Semendere, in which it is strictly ordered that the *havale* be drawn from *şart-i kila'* and not *şart-i hazine* funds (see above).

The Delivery of Ocaklık Funds. As stated above, the *ocaklık* register drawn up under Hasan Pasha was a type of budget for planned expenditure for A.H. 1037. During the course of that year, only a few changes were noted on it—the addition of the Özi and Kıl Burun *mukata'a* to the *ocaklıks*¹¹³ and some other modifications that were written on a blank page in the front of the register.¹¹⁴ However, in both the register and the firmans, there is little concrete evidence on the actual execution of the *ocaklık*-transfer process. There is nothing that would give some indication of the schedule of payments—whether, for example, the year's *ocaklık* funds were delivered in one lump sum, or, as would seem more likely, in quarterly amounts, which is how garrison troops were normally paid. There is little on who actually collected the funds and who delivered them and whether those two were the same or different officials.

The firmans above have shown that when Hasan Pasha announced the assignment of *mukata'at* as *ocaklıks*, officials connected with the given *mukata'at*, from the Tuna *defterdar* to the various *emins*, were strictly ordered to make sure these *mukata'at* were in good working order. In addition the *defterdar* and some *emins* and even a *kadı* were

¹¹³TT 748, fol. 3b.

¹¹⁴TT 748, fol. 1b.

commanded to travel to Özi with registers and revenues. It is unclear whether this was the usual procedure or an emergency measure. What is clear is that there were definitely problems in carrying out the *ocaklık*-transfer of funds. As seen earlier, problems of interference and non-compliance by various officials at the location of the *mukata'at* resulted in Hasan Pasha's sending in his own agents. Although the firmans from 1627 are not sufficiently specific, it is likely that these agents were sent not only to take control of problem *mukata'at* but also to deliver the actual funds to their assignees. Murphey has given several examples of the state bypassing uncooperative *mukata'a* officials and assigning the delivery and even the collection of *ocaklıks* to the assignees themselves, which in his examples were garrisons. This seems to have been the practice when the revenue source and the assignee were in relatively close proximity. But in such arrangements there were also problems. For example, in one case, the state was forced to remove the garrison tax-collectors because they repeatedly abused the *re'aya* and to place the collection responsibility into the hands of a *müteferrika*. When longer distances were involved, Murphey states that *emins* would be appointed, which again included the risk that all or none of the funds would reach the assignees.¹¹⁵ Thus, leaving aside the collection of the *ocaklık* funds, as far as their delivery was concerned, it was executed by three different types of officials: the relevant *mukata'at* official (usually an *emin*), officials sent from the assignee (such as trusted garrison members), and special officials assigned by the state (e.g., *müteferrika*, *kapıcı başı*, *sipahi-zade*¹¹⁶ et al.).

One very important document from the end of A.H. 1037 reveals some details on the execution of that year's *ocaklık*-transfers. This document, a firman from Hasan Pasha

¹¹⁵Murphey, "Ottoman Army," pp. 200-203. In the last example Murphey refers to a document in which an *emin* was assigned to take over the collection of the *ocaklık* funds. It is not clear whether this was the *emin* of those *mukata'at*, a new *emin* for them, or a special official assigned to the task of collecting and delivering rather than a *mukata'a emin* (*emin*, meaning "commissioner," was applied to several different officials throughout the Ottoman bureaucracy).

¹¹⁶MD 83, no. 98.

to the Özi *defterdar*, was written in the second half of July or the first half of August 1628.¹¹⁷ In the opening lines of the *narratio* it is revealed that when Hasan Pasha arrived at Özi, commanders from the garrisons¹¹⁸ came to him to complain of serious shortfalls in the delivery of the *ocaklık* funds assigned to them. According to the *agas*, “of the *mukata’at* assigned as *ocaklıks*, some of their revenues had already been collected beforehand, while others, even with the passage of some time, still remained uncollected. And so there was not enough to cover all of our salaries and we were unjustly wronged.” Then, according to the firman, they proposed a solution: “All of the fortresses’ wages and *ocaklıks* should be separated and assigned one by one.” The firman goes on to list the four Özi fortresses and Kıl Burun, giving the *mukata’at* (including the amounts) assigned as *ocaklıks* for them. Thereafter the procedure for their collection and delivery is spelled out: “*Havales*¹¹⁹ and *nazırs* from among the select men from the four aforementioned fortress garrisons are to set out to the aforementioned *mukata’at* . . . the deserved wages of the aforementioned garrisons are to be paid out of *ocaklıks* assigned to each company.”

These passages confirm that the A.H. 1037 *mukata’a* revenues registered in the *ocaklık* register were not transferred to the assigned fortresses in full. Although the document gives no figure for the shortfall, it was obviously not insignificant nor was it necessarily near total. Taking into consideration the testimony of this firman and the difficulties with the functioning of many of the *mukata’at* attested to in other firmans (see above), there is little doubt that the shortfall was mainly due to the insubordination of the local *emins*. The solution for the following year of 1038 is more complicated and far-reaching than it may appear at first glance. While representatives of the fortress garrisons

¹¹⁷MD, no. 139 (this document has already been referred to in connection with the chronology of *ocaklık* assignment).

¹¹⁸The document says “all (*cümle*) the *neferat ağaları*” came to Hasan Pasha, but it is unclear whether these were from Özi and its vicinity or from the entire *eyalet*.

¹¹⁹Here *havale* in the sense of the person assigned to collect a drafted sum.

were to be sent to retrieve the assigned *ocaklık* funds, it is interesting that these men are referred to as *havales* and *nazırs*. The first term is not surprising—it means that the responsibility for the actual delivery of the funds to the fortresses was to be transferred from the local *mukata'a* officials to the recipients. (It should however be noted that the use of *havaie* here underlines the close relation between the *havale*- and the *ocaklık*-transfer of funds that was suggested above). The second term implies something more, namely, that supervisors *from the fortresses* were also to arrive and oversee the actual collection of *mukata'a* revenues. In fact it appears that these *nazırs*, along with the *havales*, were to be involved in the actual collection, judging by the phrase “. . . *Havales* and *nazırs* . . . are to set out to the aforementioned *mukata'at* [while] through [the Özi *defterdar*'s] action and with your *tezkeres* they are to be brought under oath as *emins* (*ümenāya der 'uhde olunmak*) and the majority of the aforementioned *mukata'at* are to be taken hold of by [the *defterdar*] . . .” That garrison officials were to become directly involved in revenue collection is confirmed in the firman's *dispositio*: “. . . *havales* and *nazırs* of the [fortresses] are to collect (*tahsil*) the wages of each [of their] fortresses from the assigned *ocaklıks* . . .”

The remedies applied in Hasan Pasha's firman are complicated and far-reaching for further reasons and in fact shed light on a problem that has not yet been addressed. Throughout the firman register there is the standard formula “*mukata'at* assigned as *ocaklık* for Özi or for the Özi frontier.” When looking at the *ocaklık* figures in the “net annual revenue” column and comparing them with the effectively equivalent figures in the “annual salaries and wages” column of **Table 13** (see above), the question arises, how were the separate (net) *mukata'a* revenues listed in **Table 7** matched up with the annual salary figures for the three top Özi officials and annual wage figures and for the Özi *eyalet* fortresses summarized in **Tables 11** and **12**, respectively? Were specific *mukata'a* assigned to specific beneficiaries? Or even, given the fact that the *şart-i hazine* and *şart-i kıla'* funds were kept separate and probably collected at different times, were specific *şart-*

i hazine and *şart-i kıla'* shares assigned to specific beneficiaries? Of course, for an affirmative answer to these questions there need not have been a strict one-to-one matching—several *mukata'a* could have gone to one beneficiary. The key question is, were any *şart-i hazine* or *şart-i kıla'* funds divided between one or more beneficiaries?

These are of course fundamental questions concerning the organization and execution of the *ocaklık*-transfer of funds. According to Hasan Pasha's firman to the Özi *defterdar*, there was no particular matching of *mukata'a* or *mukata'a* share to fortress garrison in 1627.¹²⁰ In order to be sure, considerable algebraic manipulations of the net *şart-i hazine* and *şart-i kıla'* figures **Table 7** were completed to ascertain whether it was possible to match those figures with those of the beneficiaries in **Tables 11** and **12** without splitting any of the *hazine* and *kıla'*-share figures. After an exhaustive check of the possibilities, it became evident that it was impossible to distribute and combine the net revenue figures without splitting some of them. The unavoidable conclusion is that *ocaklıks* did not proceed directly from revenue source to beneficiary. Instead they, or at least part of them, were at some point lumped together before distribution among the beneficiaries. The likely candidate for this task is the Tuna *defterdar*, which calls to mind one of the first firmans relating to transfer of *mukata'a* revenues to Özi, in which the Tuna *defterdar* was ordered to gather available *mukata'a* funds and proceed to Özi.¹²¹ Of course, such a process was more indirect than a one-to-one *ocaklık* transfer and lacked the advantages of speed and efficiency. Here it should be pointed out that under such an indirect arrangement of lumping and redistributing funds, the maintenance of the distinction between *şart-i hazine* and *şart-i kıla'* funds seems all the more curious.

¹²⁰That is why there is the phrase *her ka'ânufi mevâcibî ve ocaklık ayrılıb başka başka ta'yîn olunmak* in regard to the altered execution of the *ocaklık* transfer in 1038 (MD 83, no. 139).

¹²¹MD 83, no. 7, also no. 14 (discussed above).

As stated earlier, Hasan Pasha's firman to the Özi *defterdar* gives a breakdown of the amounts received by the separate fortresses at Özi and Kıl Burun and names of *mukata'at* from which funds were specifically assigned to these fortresses. The figures in this document are summarized in **Table 14**.

Table 14. *Ocaklıks* assigned to the Özi fortress complex and Kıl Burun according to a firman from July-August 1928 (MD 83, no. 139; in *akças*)

fortress	assigned <i>ocaklıks</i>	annual wages (<i>mevacib</i> , in <i>akças</i>)
Old Fortress	Silistre and Ruscuk <i>mukata'at</i>	1,037,504
New Palanka	İsakçı <i>mukata'at</i> and dependencies, İbrail <i>cizye</i>	2,183,712
[New] Fortress	Nigbolli <i>mukata'at</i> and dependencies	1,049,544
New Fortress of Hasan Pasha and Kıl Burun	Balcık <i>mukata'a</i> , <i>hass</i> of town of Ruscuk, <i>ziyade</i> of the registered <i>cizye</i> , <i>beytül-mal</i> of Silistre, Prevadi and other dependencies	7,045,448
total		[11,316,208]

Unfortunately, this firman gives data for only the Özi and Kıl Burun and not for the other fortresses receiving *ocaklık* funds. If there was a *ocaklık* register for A.H. 1038, presumably the specific *mukata'a* amounts given in this firman would match up with the specific net annual revenues of the same *mukata'at* listed in such a register, that is, if there truly was a matching of the separate *ocaklıks* and beneficiaries as was prescribed by Hasan Pasha.

What **Table 14** shows that is of particular interest is that between 1037 and 1038 the *ocaklık* assignments for Özi and Kıl Burun more than doubled, from 5,053,996 to 11,316,208 *akça*. Leaving aside for now the implications for the frontier and the defensive requirements in 1628, this change shows that *ocaklıks* could be changed from year to year, even drastically. That they were changed is rather an obvious point. A more profound one is with what frequency were they changed? Every year, or every couple of years? Of course it had to depend on the changing situations on the various frontiers, as well as in the center. Without more sources, only idle speculation is possible. There is, however, a very

revealing note made in passing in one of Hasan Pasha's firmans (from the early fall of 1627) to the effect that the year before the *mukata'a* of Nigboli and Ruscuk were assigned as *ocaklıks* to the *eyalets* of Budun, Bosna, and "other frontier *eyalets*," but this year they were "separated out" (*tefriķ*) and assigned as *ocaklıks* to the Özi frontier garrisons.¹²² This brief reference gives an important glimpse of the great versatility of the *ocaklık*-system.

The Gradient of Troop-Wage Expenditures. Above, in the discussion of the distribution of the garrison troops, it was seen that the fortresses closest to the northern frontier (Özi fortress complex, Kıl Burun, Akkerman, Yanık) contained more than three-quarters of all the garrison troops covered by the *ocaklık* register and that troops garrisoned in Özi and Kıl Burun alone amounted to nearly half of the total deployments. Besides the distribution of the *ocaklık* revenues among the garrisons and the distribution of the garrison troops among fortresses, the *ocaklık* register also provides a view of the troops' daily wages (*yevmiye*). Table 15, repeating the figures for the garrison-troop numbers (second column) given in Table 5, gives the figures and percentages for the average *per diem* wage and the annual wages. In regard to the average *per diem* wage expenditure, the figures display a similar trend to that in the distribution of the garrison troops, that is, the *per diem* was higher in the fortresses closer to the frontier. In other words, these fortresses had troops that were slightly more highly paid and/or their mix of troops was of higher-ranking, and therefore higher-paid type of troops (see third column in Table 15). The combination of these two trends in the troop and the wage distribution meant that altogether the three fortresses closest to the frontier, Özi and Kıl Burun, Bender, and Akkerman, commanded 82.3 percent of the *ocaklık* funds assigned to the *eyalet*, while Özi and Kıl Burun alone received 55.3 percent (see last column in Table 15).

¹²²MD 83, no. 90.

Table 15. Distribution of the garrison troops and wages in the *eyalet* of Özi in 1037/1627-1628

fortress	troops		average <i>yevmiye</i>		annual wages	
	men	% of total	<i>akça</i>	% of Özi <i>yev.</i>	<i>akça</i>	% of total
Özi and Kıl Burun	1,567	47.2	9.34	100	5,053,996	55.3
Bender	511	15.4	6.47	69	1,288,350	14.1
Akkerman and Yanık	512	15.4	6.64	71	1,175,762	12.9
Kılı	314	9.5	7.06	76	814,656	8.9
İbrail	148	4.5	5.68	61	291,164	3.2
Ruscuk	20	0.6	4.00	43	28,320	0.3
Nigbolı	53	1.6	5.45	58	111,058	1.2
Culunik (?)	16	0.5	5.31	57	29,990	0.3
Rahova	102	3.1	5.52	59	200,810	2.2
Tulca New Fortress	63	1.9	5.06	54	112,926	1.2
<i>farisan</i> of Tuna treasury	15	0.5	6.47	69	33,174	0.4
total	3,321	100	— ^a	—	9,140,206	100

To appreciate the relative size of the funds expended for the fortresses of the *eyalet* of Özi, it is useful to compare them with expenditures as listed in other contemporary registers. Because of significant fluctuations in the value of Ottoman currency in the period under discussion,¹²³ it is important to use for comparison sources as close as possible in date to the ones used here. In Murphey's dissertation, there is a wealth of financial data for the first half of the seventeenth century. Especially important is a series of account books (*muhasabe*) covering the incomes and expenses of the imperial treasury for 1627 (Rabi II 1036-Rabi II 1037) and 1628 (Rabi II 1037-Rabi II 1038), that is, contemporary to Hasan Pasha's campaigns.¹²⁴ Of course, the finances of Hasan Pasha's campaigns were not

^aThe average *yevmiye* is 6.09; excluding the *farisan*, the average is 6.05; the average of the interior, non-frontier fortresses (İbrail through Tulca) is 5.17.

¹²³E.g., see Halil Sahillioğlu, "XVII. asrın ilk yarısında İstanbul'da tedaviledeki sikkelerin râici," *Belgerler* 1 (1964): 227-33.

¹²⁴Murphey, "Ottoman Army," pp. 250-51 (tables); 457-69 (appendix).

included in them since as *ocaklıks*, they were by definition separated (*mevruzü'l-kalem ve maktu'ül-kadem*) from the accounts of the central treasury. **Table 16** gives some annual figures of troop wages in the account books of 1627 and 1628.

Table 16. Sample annual aggregate wages (*mevacib*) in 1627 and 1628
troops

	wages (million <i>akças</i>)
1627	
janissaries	58.6
<i>cebecis</i>	2.5
<i>topcis</i>	1.0
unspecified fortress garrisons (presumably in Eastern Anatolia)	3.5
1628	
janissaries	67.8
<i>cebecis</i>	3.2
<i>topcis</i>	1.5
some fortress garrisons on the Erzurum, Ahisha and Kars frontier and in Mosul, Erbil, Ardahan and others	4.2

From these contemporary figures it is evident that the ten million *akças* assigned as *ocaklık* for the fortresses of the *eyalet* of Özi and the five million assigned to Özi itself were not insignificant sums considering the size of the empire and the fact that at the time there were active hostilities on the eastern Anatolian frontier. The same can be said even in the context of the total annual wages of the troops on campaign in the east, 181.3 million *akça* in 1627 and 219.6 million *akça* in 1628. Of course it must be remembered that the ten million does not include the wages of the *kapıkulu* and other forces brought with Hasan Pasha's fleet or the forces of Wallachia and Moldavia (approximately another five million by *havale*, see Table 6).

In principle, the assignment of tax revenues from one part of the empire for the benefit of another was a simple notion. However, as the firmans of Hasan Pasha show, both the execution and financial intricacies of the *ocaklık*-transfer process were no simple matter. First Hasan Pasha had to deal with resistance and perhaps even incompetence on the level

of the local *mukata'at* who were slated for *ocaklık* status. The next problem was the various stipends drawn on the *mukata'at* by religious functionaries and retirees. While Hasan Pasha's role in the *ocaklık* assignation process demonstrates the great power, and even prerogative, invested in a commander in chief of an Ottoman expedition, even he was not free to move in and assign at will the funds he wished for his objective. Prior conditions placed on the *mukata'at* funds had to be honored, provided the stipendists had valid patents to back up their status. Although the Danubian region was a prosperous one which is why it was slated for *ocaklık* assignation, an interesting question is, how did the transfer of funds out of it affect that region's economy. Another problem was the coordination of Hasan Pasha's actions with other financial operations ordered in other parts of the empire. The firman register gives several examples of one-time drafts or *havales* being issued at the Porte that conflicted with the *ocaklıks* that he assigned. Aside from the various difficulties in executing the assignment and transfer of funds, there were certain rather complicated bookkeeping practices and considerations which were respected and maintained, as the discussion of the *şart-i hazine* and *şart-i kula'* showed.

The pattern that the material in the previous chapter suggested, namely, that the defense of the Black Sea frontier was dependent on the manpower and material of the Danubian valley, is borne out in this chapter as well with regards to finances. The demands placed on the Danubian population are a telling indication of the economic impact of the Cossack problem—not only did the Cossack threat levy a cost on a region of the empire, but a region that was not even directly affected by the Cossack raids (since usually the Cossacks did not venture far up the Danube River) had to bear part of the costs.

The sources cited in Chapter IV show that in 1627 and 1628, Hasan Pasha was trying to establish more than just a sounder financial basis for the Özi frontier fortress garrisons. In fact he intended to effect a broader reorganization of the finances of the region by abolishing the Tuna *defterdarlık* and establishing a new financial district, namely the Özi *defterdarlık*. Without more sources, it is difficult to decide what this meant, for it

seems that the same *mukata'at* that were in the former Tuna district were now part of the new Özi one. Although there is no information as to whether this new district lasted, its creation is in any event another sign that the Porte was trying to make administrative changes so as to upgrade the status of the Özi frontier. This change seems analogous to the creation of the Özi province (*beglerbeglik*) at the end of the sixteenth century, which was also in response to the Cossack threat.¹²⁵ In addition, as was seen in the Polish sources in Chapter IV, Hasan Pasha was also trying to arrange the necessary funds to assure that the Özi governor-general resided permanently in Özi rather than in the traditional seat of Silistre. As was seen above, in the register of *ocaklıks* it is indicated that Hasan Pasha issued an order that the Özi *mukata'at* be turned over to the Özi governor-general so that he could be required to live at Özi.¹²⁶ However, apparently this reform was not successful for in April 1628, according to a marginal note, when Mehemed Pasha was dismissed from the governor-generalship of Özi, those funds were assigned as *ocaklıks* for the Özi fortress complex.

¹²⁵Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973, p. 105.

¹²⁶TT 748, fol. 3b.

CHAPTER VII

The Commander as Administrator: The Noncampaign Affairs of Hasan Pasha

Approximately one-third of the firmans in the firman register (*mühimme-i ordu*) that were not directly connected to the objectives of Hasan Pasha's campaigns pertain mainly to local problems. Many of these firmans were issued in response to reports from local officials or petitions from concerned parties. However, some of these firmans were directed at improving or rectifying defensive capabilities and seem to have been issued on the initiative of Hasan Pasha or the Porte. Such a high proportion of firmans on affairs not directly connected to the business of the campaign is significant. An inquiry into these other affairs is crucial for a fuller understanding and appreciation of the tasks and problems of an Ottoman commander.

Of the entries in the firman register on military affairs, only a few are not directly connected to the campaign. A firman from the end of July 1627 to the *kadı* and the *mütesellim* of the governor of Kili deplores the piling of mounds of refuse near the fortress walls by the inhabitants of the suburbs (*varoş*). Because it was imperative that the trenches and grounds near the walls be kept clean, Hasan Pasha ordered that the *re'aya* of the suburbs be mobilized by way of *imece* to remove the refuse heaps and that henceforth dumping near the walls be prohibited.¹ In late June 1628 a series of firmans were issued on defense-related matters during the fleet's call to port at Sinop on its way to Kefe. One

¹MD 83, no. 45.

matter addressed in the firmans was the collection of arrears on '*avarız* and other taxes in the districts (*sancak*) of Kastamonı and Kangrı that were to be applied to the construction of two new galleys in the port (*iskele*) of Sinop.² The other matter addressed was the dire necessity of repairing cracked and broken cannons in light of the Cossacks' frequent and close sailings past the Sinop fortress. A firman from July 1628 addresses the problem of the dilapidation at the old fortress at Bahıklagu in Ottoman Crimea. In the past the *re'aya* from several neighboring villages had been immune (*mu'af u müsellem*) from the '*avarız* and other *tekalif-i 'örfiyye*, in exchange for performing repairs on the fortress. However, when some officials began disregarding the immunities and levied these taxes, they stopped performing their services, which resulted in the deterioration of the fortress. For this reason the firman reaffirms these immunities and forbids their violation.³ A firman from July-August 1628 to the *voyvoda* of Moldavia orders the repair without delay of a number of state-owned muskets (*miri tüfeng*) lacking stocks in the fortress of Bender.⁴ Finally there are several firmans commending officials or allies for their service or loyalty to the Porte that can be classified among the firmans relating to non-campaign military affairs.⁵

Hasan Pasha's intervention into local affairs not directly connected to military affairs mostly involved redressing grievances, stopping abuses, and restoring or imposing

²MD 83, nos. 114, 117.

³MD 83, no. 136.

⁴MD 83, no. 138.

⁵Above, mention was made of firmans to the Moldavian and Wallachian *voyvodas* commending them for their service in the construction project at Özi in 1627, and in fact reconfirming them as *voyvodas* of their respective provinces (MD 83, no. 77). While at Özi in July 1627, Hasan Pasha commended two Nogay *mirzas* from near Azak, Kasay Mirza and 'Ali Mirza for their loyalty and unspecified services to the Porte and in recognition, granted them ceremonial robes (*hıl'at*) (MD 83, no. 54). In late July 1628 during his stop at Sinop, Hasan Pasha commended a certain Hasan for his capable service as governor of Gönje (on the eastern Anatolian shore of the Black Sea) including in the defense of the district and repair and renewal of the Gönje fortress (MD 83, no. 115). In mid-August 1628 Hasan Pasha commended Salih, governor of Kıl Burun and *kapudan* of Özi, for his excellent service in the defense of the Özi frontier, including in the construction work at Özi in the previous year and in helping Kantemir enter the Crimea during the struggle with Mehmed and Şahin Gerey, and raised his annual salary from 100,000 to 140,000 *akça* (MD 83, no. 143).

order in the relations between various sectors of the provincial society. The problems that appear most often in the register are those connected with tax-paying peasant subjects, or *re'aya* in Rumeli. The most common problems stemmed from the migration of peasants from their lands in search of better conditions, especially to ease their taxation burdens. For example, at the beginning of August 1627, some firmans were issued concerning Wallachian *re'aya* who had migrated south across the Danube into regular Ottoman lands and joined large farms or *çiftlik*s set up by *müteferrikas*, *sipahis*, and janissaries.⁶ Other firmans were concerned with individuals from south of the Danube who had crossed into Wallachia and had illegally set up *çiftlik*s to which Wallachian *re'aya* would migrate. In both cases the Wallachian *voyvoda* was unable to collect the *harac/cizye* and other taxes from these *re'aya*. For this reason, Hasan Pasha ordered that such *re'aya* be returned to their places of origin. The concern with revenue decline was of course not unconnected to the concerns of the current campaign. Although there is no mention of the *havales* issued to cover wages of janissaries with the fleet that were to be drawn on the Wallachian *cizye* receipts, clearly such migrations by the peasantry threatened to reduce the funds slated for such transfer (see above). In one firman concerning a levy or tax (*teklif*) for supplies and equipment (*mühimmat*) for the fortress-construction work at Özi, a direct connection is made between migration of the *re'aya* and the current expedition. This firman from mid-October 1627, addressed to the *kadı* and the *mütesellim* of Bender, states that Moldavian *re'aya* living close to the border with the province of Bender had fled and settled in villages in Bender solely with the purpose of escaping these impositions and orders that they be returned to their villages in Moldavia.⁷ Other firmans ordering return of *re'aya* who had

⁶MD 83, nos. 10, 11, 18.

⁷MD 83, no. 73.

migrated speak only in general terms of the loss to the treasury that such migrations have caused, or of the desolation and ruin that occurred in the settlements abandoned by them.⁸

Aside from reversing migrations of the *re'aya*, Hasan Pasha also had to act against peasants who sought to escape their *re'aya*-status by joining fortress garrisons. *Zimmi re'aya* had become *beşlūs* and *'azebs* in the Kili fortress and in the İbrail fortress.⁹ Here also Hasan Pasha's concern was the resulting loss in *cizye* and other revenues. There are several firmans addressing problems of the *re'aya* not affecting the immediate interests of the state that Hasan Pasha nevertheless had to resolve, such as abuses against *re'aya* by other groups,¹⁰ a conflict between the *zimmi* and Muslim *re'aya*,¹¹ and exploitation through heavy taxation.¹²

Two dealings of Hasan Pasha with the *re'aya* are of particular interest because of their connection to Cossack raids. In early October 1627, during the sail back to the capital, Hasan Pasha while at Kili issued a firman to the *kadı* of Varna lowering the estimation of the number of households (*hane*) liable for the *cizye*. The impetus for the changed estimate was a grievance by the *zimmi re'aya* of Varna that although 480 *hane* were registered in the *defter*, some greedy officials had estimated their settlement at 770 taxable *hane* and registered this amount in the *defter*. However, "several years ago, the

⁸MD 83, nos. 22 (migration by *re'aya* of some villages belonging to *evkaf* has brought ruin to the *evkaf*), 76 (*evkaf re'aya* moved to villages under the Moldavian administration but failed to pay the tithe or other taxes), 141 (migration of *re'aya* from *havass* of Çubriça [see below] to Moldavia caused desolation in their old places and a loss to the treasury), 145. One firman orders that nomadic Tatars (*yurtmān tatari*) who had lived near Kili but for some reason migrated away be forced to return (MD 83, no. 46).

⁹MD 83, nos. 41, 24.

¹⁰MD 83, no. 75 (townsfolk and villagers from İbrail and İsmail settled in Moldavian villages and abused the Moldavian *re'aya*); MD 83, no. 4 (Wallachian *re'aya* robbed by bandits from neighboring provinces at the time when the *voyvoda* and his army were at Özi).

¹¹MD 83 no. 43 (concerning the relative service burdens of the *zimmi* and Muslim *re'aya* in the Kili *talyans*).

¹²MD 83, nos. 23, 72, 111. Also there is a firman confirming tax exemptions granted to Tatars living in the suburbs (*varoş*) of Kili in exchange for undisclosed service on the frontier that had been violated by certain Ottoman officials in Bender (MD 83, no. 42).

Cossack brigands had sacked and plundered the aforementioned town (Varna) and killed or injured many of [its inhabitants] so that only 400 individuals survive, and of these, many are impoverished and they have not the means with which to pay [the *cizye*] for so many *hane*.”¹³ According to Hasan Pasha’s firman, this matter was looked into by none other than Yahya, the famous Ottoman *şeyhülislam* and *mufti* of Istanbul, who decided that the *cizye* assessment should indeed be lowered. Although the *maliye* did lower the *hane*-number to 600, some *cizye* collectors and the Tuna *defterdar* continued to insist on a higher figure. Hasan Pasha decided in favor of the *re’aya*, mentioning the numerous services they had rendered in repairing the Varna fortress and, in addition, their obligating themselves to pay a tax of 12,000 *akça* annually that would go toward the repairs. Although it is possible that the *re’aya* exaggerated their losses in order to lower their tax burden, that Yahya Efendi, the *maliye*, and Hasan Pasha basically accepted their story after an investigation suggests that indeed the non-Muslim *re’aya* of Varna had suffered considerably from the Cossack raid.

The other firman on the *re’aya* in the context of the Cossack raids is addressed to the *kadı* of Akkerman in the first half of August 1628. For some reason it was not sent out¹⁴ but regardless of its cancellation, it remains a source on an actual situation: The *re’aya* of a locale of the *kaza* of Akkerman request permission to build with their own funds (*kendü mälları*) a *palanka* for defense against Tatars who had moved into the vicinity and against Cossacks who “because their fortresses were in the vicinity” frequently and without warning raided and plundered the *re’aya*. The firman granted permission for construction of such a *palanka*, provided that it was constructed at the cost of the peasants and that no services or taxes (*teklif*) were levied upon other *re’aya* for this purpose. On the basis of this example alone it is not possible to say whether such defense projects,

¹³MD 83, no. 113.

¹⁴MD 83, no. 140. Written across the document is the word *virülmemiş*, “not given.”

initiated, organized, and paid for by the *re'aya*, were a common feature of the defense against the Cossacks. Also, this document suggests that the Cossacks had foreposts in or near Ottoman territory from which they launched raids, although it is unclear whether this information can be taken literally or whether it is an exaggeration and merely refers to the Zaporozhian Cossack settlements in the Zaporizhia.

There are a number of firmans in which Hasan Pasha deals with disorder in the provinces resulting from insubordination or illegal and even criminal conduct by officials or private individuals: a certain corrupt Wallachian, who in Moldavia carried on unspecified unauthorized transactions with an official from a foreign land (*harbi memleket*), was to be dismissed from his post by the Moldavian *voyvoda*¹⁵; ten Wallachians were to turn over all goods and monies they had embezzled from the estate of the *voyvoda*'s late father¹⁶; the estate of an heirless deceased *sipahi* in Prevadi that had been illegally seized was to be turned over to the state treasury¹⁷; the men of the household of a certain janissary responsible for stealing some horses, goats, and equipment belonging to the Tuna *defterdar* İbrahim and to another janissary were to be arrested¹⁸; action was to be taken against persons responsible for plundering a *çiftlik* that had been held by a late official of the former khan Mehmed Gerey while the *çiftlik* was to revert to control of the state¹⁹; four Tatar *agas* wanted for questioning in an unspecified matter were to be found and incarcerated in the Akkerman fortress until Hasan Pasha's arrival there²⁰; proceedings were to be undertaken against a certain official in the region of Amasra who had illegally made

¹⁵MD 83, no. 70.

¹⁶MD 83, no. 71.

¹⁷MD 83, no. 101.

¹⁸MD 83, no. 84.

¹⁹MD 83, no. 152.

²⁰MD 83, no. 131.

certain extraordinary levies on the *re'aya*, on behalf of the imperial naval arsenal²¹; a person who had usurped the position of *dizdar* of the fortress of Çernovi (south of Ruscuk), which was in ruins and without a garrison, was to be removed and the *timar* that had come with the *dizdar* office was to be subsumed into the imperial *hass* estates.²² In addition, a number of firmans were issued in response to problems of trade and commerce.²³

By virtue of the traditional ties between the Porte and the Crimean Khanate, as well as the nature of the Hasan Pasha missions (especially in 1628 when the basic mission was to intervene in the internal affairs of the Khanate), it is not surprising that he intervened in some administrative and economic matters of the khans. There are several firmans concerned with the *hass* of Çubrica near Akkerman, which had been assigned to the khan.²⁴ Because of the disorder that had resulted from the struggle between Şahin Gerey and Kantemir²⁵ the *çiftliks* in the khan's Çubrica *hass* fell into ruin—Tatars outside of it raided it, taxes were not collected, cattle and possessions were looted, and many of its *re'aya* fled to Moldavia. To remedy the situation, Hasan Pasha put one of his *kapuci*

²¹MD 83, no. 83.

²²MD 83, no. 107.

²³Merchant in Wallachia refusing to pay the *bac* sales tax (MD 83, no. 57); allegedly out of fear of the infidel (i.e., the Cossacks), ships of Kerş and Taman avoid going to Azak, in recent years Nogays have been bringing goods such as horses, cattle, slaves, and especially clarified butter to the vicinity of Temrük and setting up unauthorized markets from which these goods were loaded directly onto ships bound for Istanbul, bypassing the Kefe customs and bringing a loss to the treasury; all such goods were to be routed through Kefe (MD 83, no. 125); salt was being sold outside of state storehouses (*miri anbar*) Silistre, Hırsova, Baba, Prevadi, Şumnı, Eski Cum'a, and Ala Kilisa contrary to the *iltizam* conditions for the salt *mukata'a*, bringing a loss to the treasury (MD 83, no. 144a); the use of unapproved measures was causing the treasury a loss in revenues (MD 83, nos. 146, 151).

²⁴The assignment of Ottoman *hass* lands was one of the Porte's means of subsidizing the khan (see Alan W. Fisher, "Les rapports entre l'Empire ottoman et la Crimée. L'aspect financier." *Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique* 13 (1972): 368-81, esp. p. 374).

²⁵See Chapter II.

başı in charge²⁶ and ordered the *re'aya* to return from Moldavia.²⁷ At the same time Hasan Pasha ordered the *kadı*s located on the road from Özi to Istanbul to provide food, fodder, and money, as well as escorts for any of Kantemir's sons or dependents who were on their way to the Porte in search of refuge.²⁸ While on the return trip after unseating khan Mehmed Gerey, Hasan Pasha alighted on a certain caravanserai (*han*) near Iași (Yaş) that had been the khan's, and after claiming it as his own property, ordered that it revert to the control of the Moldavian *voyvoda*.²⁹

The wide range of affairs that were the responsibility of a commander in chief (*serdar*) of an Ottoman expedition (as well as of his staff, which remains anonymous in these sources) are testimony to the complexity of such an assignment. The material in Hasan Pasha's firman register indicates that the duties and responsibilities of a *serdar* were as much, if not more, administrative than military. The firman register from 1627 and 1628 provides multifarious examples of the great authority and power invested in a *serdar* such as grand admiral vizier Hasan Pasha. Indeed, by intervening with absolute prerogative into many spheres of Ottoman state order in the provinces, Hasan Pasha acted as an unequivocal surrogate of the sultan. Thus, as was the practice of Ottoman viziers, firmans issued by him were fashioned in the diplomatic formulas of the sultan himself and, in fact, were written in the name of the sultan, using the first person.

Literature connected with Ottoman campaigns often stresses their disruptive and burdensome effect on life in the provinces. Certainly, Hasan Pasha's impositions of

²⁶MD 83, no. 50. About a month later, Hasan Pasha issued a firman summoning this same *kapuçı başı* to the court of the *kadı* of Akkerman because it had been divulged that he himself had abused the *re'aya* there (MD 83, no. 19).

²⁷MD 83, no. 141.

²⁸MD 83, no.13.

²⁹MD 83, no. 142.

special services and tax levies on some of the *re'aya* does not contradict such a picture. However, the great power invested in a commander such as Hasan Pasha, together with the fact that, a significant portion of his activity was devoted to local affairs unconnected to his campaign, at least brought some reimposition of order and the rectification of abuses in the provinces.

CONCLUSION

After the War of Xotyn' both the Porte and the Crown attempted to gain control of their respective frontiers to prevent a return to the conditions before the war. However, within a year, the Zaporozhians were raiding the Black Sea, together with the Don Cossacks, with unprecedented fury, while in the Bucak, a Tatar horde led by Kantemir emerged as a new threat to the Commonwealth. By 1624, the situation had become further complicated by the accession to the Crimean throne of Mehmed and Şahin Gerey, who were hostile to the Porte. Şahin Gerey, who took the initiative in Crimean foreign affairs during these years, had strong connections with Shah 'Abbas and even had long-term plans to change the alignment of powers in the region by forming an axis from the Commonwealth all the way to Iran that would act against the Ottoman Empire on one side and Muscovy on the other. In the meantime, Muscovy and the Porte continued to have cordial relations and make plans for an eventual alliance against the Commonwealth.

For the Crimea, the existence of a strong Bucak horde was a serious threat to its position in the northern Black Sea steppes, a situation from which the Ottomans could profit, playing one Tatar entity off the other. However, the Ottomans could not afford to allow the strong Bucak counterweight to the Crimea to remain because of pressure from the Commonwealth. During Zbaraski's embassy to the Porte after Xotyn', the reduction of Kantemir's Tatars was presented as a *sine qua non* for peace. And so the Ottomans allowed Mehmed Gerey to bring Kantemir and the main clans of the Bucak horde to the Crimea in late 1623. In the succeeding years, Kantemir would several times escape

Crimean control, only to be forced back under it. It is ironic that Mehmed and Şahin Gerey, enemies of the Porte, by controlling Kantemir, were helping to fulfill the conditions of peace between the Porte and Crown.

The Ottomans seem to have underestimated the political talents and resourcefulness of Şahin Gerey when they decided in 1624 to depose him and his brother Mehmed Gerey. The force that came to the Crimea turned out to be insufficient to subdue the two brothers, for it did not expect that Şahin Gerey would arrange to have at his disposal a musket-armed force capable of facing the janissaries, namely, the Zaporozhian Cossacks. And so the Ottomans were defeated and Şahin Gerey and Mehmed Gerey remained in the Crimea. These Cossacks who served Şahin Gerey in 1624 were taken on by him as mercenaries. However, by the end of the year, Şahin Gerey came to the Zaporizhia and concluded an agreement with the hetman and officers who acted in the name of the entire Cossack Host. With this began a relationship of great potential in the international arena to which historians have assigned much significance as the first functioning Cossack-Tatar alliance.

Meanwhile, in the following year, 1625, the Zaporozhians had their largest presence ever in the Black Sea. Sources from all sides speak of a fleet of 300 boats. In the years since Xotyn', in large part because the Commonwealth could not support the Cossack masses it had mobilized for the war, raiding increased, as it was the only option available to an unemployed mercenary army. At this time, thanks to the ascendancy of Şahin Gerey, the Bucak Tatars were kept in check, and as a result, the Ottomans began to complain that while they had fulfilled their half of the bargain, the Commonwealth had not done its half, having failed to suppress the Cossacks. In part because of the great Cossack presence on the Black Sea in 1625, the Crown was forced to move against them and was successful in defeating them and imposing its harsh terms. As for the Cossack -Tatar alliance, at this time as throughout his career, Şahin Gerey did not come to the aid of the Cossacks. For him it was too risky to oppose the Crown which figured so prominently in his long-term plans. By 1626, the Cossack raids had subsided, but in the meantime, new

Tatar raids began (though apparently not sponsored by Şahin Gerey). Thus the Crown and the Porte continued to be unable to control their peripheries at the same time.

In 1627, the Ottomans, hoping to take advantage of the respite in Cossack raiding, mounted an expedition to the mouth of the Dnieper to build, together with the Crimean Tatars, a new fortress on the Dnieper above Özi. While the expedition was unable to fulfill its goal for lack of sufficient forces, the commander, Hasan Pasha, set about reorganizing the financial basis of the fortress defenses of the northern Black Sea. During this expedition, negotiations were carried out between Hasan Pasha and representatives of the Crown in which it became clear that the two sides had conflicting notions of the border in the steppes above Özi. The expedition also demonstrated how difficult it was to gain a foothold in the steppe zone both because of the immediate region's lack of manpower and matériel and because of the hostility of the opposing neighbor.

In 1628, a full struggle broke out between Şahin Gerey and Kantemir. This time the Ottomans decided to eliminate Şahin Gerey with a proper force, and Hasan Pasha was again sent to the Black Sea. As in the last occasion when he had to face the Ottoman army, Şahin Gerey again called upon the Cossacks. As in 1624, he obtained the cooperation of the Cossack rank and file, appealing to them as mercenaries. However, it is possible that the old agreement from 1624 was invoked since the Cossack hetman and officers participated. In any event, the expedition was in the end a failure because of the superiority of the assembled Ottoman force. Mehmed and Şahin Gerey were dethroned, and two attempts to regain the Crimea with Cossack help failed. By 1629, the situation on the frontier was again much the same as it had been in 1622, with the Tatars and Cossacks unrestrained.

Until now, our notion of the workings of the Ottoman defense of the Black Sea has been practically nonexistent. The documents from Hasan Pasha's firman register and related materials from 1627 and 1628 provide a unique view of Ottoman Black Sea campaigns and the problems their commanders faced. An original result of the study of

these materials is the demonstration of the importance of the wealth and resources of the lower Danubian basin for the defense of the northern Black Sea in terms of the frontier's need for manpower, matériel, and money. The *ocaklık*-system, a mechanism by which revenues in the Danubian basin were transferred to the Black Sea frontier, was basic for financing the salaries of its fortresses. The implicit manner with which the firmans refer to the assignment of *ocaklıks* and the organization of the *ocaklık* register suggest that at that time there was indeed a well-developed system of transferring tax revenues from one region to another. Having established some of the basic features of this system, the next task is to investigate how such a system operated in other years. Particularly important is to learn how the *ocaklık*-system operated in more typical years in which major expeditions from the capital were not mounted and in which local forces, in particular the fortress garrisons, had to shoulder the defensive burden alone. While the materials from 1627 and 1628 give a very detailed picture of the Ottoman defense of the Black Sea in years in which a campaign was mounted, further research in the Ottoman archives is necessary before we can begin to understand the manning and finances of the frontier fortresses in non-campaign years. Such research will allow a fuller picture of the Ottoman defense of the Black Sea to emerge.

APPENDIX

Ottoman Documentary Sources

MD 83, no. 108

text

sabıkâ beglerbegisi olub hâlâ Tuna defterdarı olan İbrâhîm dâme ıkbâluhuya hüküm ki Isakcı ve Tulca ve tevâbi'i nâzırı olan Ahmed nâzırın zimmetine lâzım gelen mâlûn muhâsebesi görülmek ıktizâ itmegin min ba'd muhâsebe târihinden muqaddem olan temessûkâtı ve evâmîr-i şerîfesi mahsûb olunmayub muhâsebe gördüğü sene mâlinden olan temessûkâtın mahsûb idûb ve şûrût-i hâzineden ve şûrût-i kılâ'dan zimmetine lâzım gelen mâlî der zimmet çıkub ve Bender ve Aşkermân ve Kili kal'elerinin güzeşte 'ulûfelerinden ve mevcûdlerinin 'ulûfeleri mezbûr zimmetine lâzım gelen mâlden sâlyâne olmak için sudde-i se'âdetüme 'arz itmek emr idûb buyurdum ki

vuşûl buldukda bu bâbda şâdir olan emr-i şerîfüm mücib'ace 'amel idûb dağı nâzır-i mezbûrın zimmetine lâzım gelen mâlûn muhâsebesini görülmek ıktizâ itmegin min ba'd muhâsebe târihinden muqaddem olan temessûkâtı ve evâmîr-i şerîfesin mahsûb itmeyüb muhâsebe gördüğü sene mâlinden olan temessûkâtın mahsûb idûb ve şûrût-i hâzine ve kılâ'dan zimmetine lâzım gelen mâlî der zimmet çıkub be Bender ve Aşkermân ve Kili kal'elerinin güzeşte 'ulûfelerinden ve mevcûd olanlarının 'ulûfeleri mezbûr zimmetine lâzım gelen mâlden sâlyâne olmak için sudde-i se'âdetüme 'arz eyliyesin şöyle billesin

translation

Order to İbrahim--may his success endure!--previously the beglerbegi, presently the Tuna *defterdar*:
An audit of the revenues that are in the arrears of *nazır* Ahmed, the *nazır* of Isakcı and Tulca and their dependencies is required. Because of this, you are ordered, in the hereafter, not to enter into your accounts the *temessûks* and imperial orders (*evamir-i şerife*) that are from before the date of the audit (*muhasebe*). [Rather] you are to apply the *temessûks* relating to the revenues of the year which is [covered] in the audit [to that year] and to calculate the [remaining] arrears owed according to the "treasury" conditions (*şûrut-i hazine*) and the "fortress" conditions (*şûrut-i kila*). And you are to submit a report to the sublime Porte

concerning the yearly payment (*salyane*) of the past wages for the Bender, Akkerman and Kili fortresses from the revenues owed by the aforementioned and for the [other(?)] present [troops]. Thus I have commanded.

So when [this firman] arrives act according to the Imperial order that has been issued in this matter. Do not count in the hereafter the *temessüks* and Imperial orders that are from before the date of the audit. [Rather,] apply the *temessüks* relating to the revenues of the year which is [covered] in the audit [to that year] and to calculate the [remaining] arrears owed according to the "treasury" and "fortress" conditions. And submit a report to the Sublime Porte concerning the yearly payment (*salyane*) of the past wages for the Bender, Akkerman and Kili fortresses from the revenues owed by the aforementioned and for the [other(?)] present [troops]. Thus you are to know.

TT 748. Register of *ocaklık* assigned to the fortresses of the province of Özi, 1 Muharram 1037/12
September 1627

text

fol. 1b¹

mukāṭa'a-i

beytül-māl-i 'amme ve hâşş ve yava ve kaçkun ve cürm u cinâyet ve bâdihavâ ve
tevâbi'hâ berây-i firû *ocaklık*-i neferât-i Özi ta'yîn şud der 'uhde-i a'yân-i mezbûre
fî sene

509833

ferû nihâde şud

ileyh

fî sene

fî sene

309833

200000

zîkr olınan beş-yük tokuz bîn sekiz yüz otuz üç akça olmak üzere *ocaklık* ta'yîn
olunub zabt iderler ki üç yük tokuz bîn sekiz yüz otuz üç akçasın firû nihâde
itdûrmışlardır

'[an] mahşûl-i

ṭalyân '[an] cânib-i voyvoda-i Eflak dâde

fî sene

100000

Eflak begi tarafından zabt olunup

Yergögi kal'esi meremmâtı için

virûlmüşdür

mukāṭa'a-i

şem' hâne-i livâ'-i Silistre ki re'âyâ ref' kerde bâ fermân

fî sene

30000

re'âyâdan ref' olunmuşdur

fol. 2a

şâh Murâd bîn Ahmed han el-muzaffer dâ'imâ (*tuğra*)

fol. 2b

bu defter mucibince 'aml olunub
mîn ba'd tebdil ve tağayyûr olunmıya

hüve

defter-i

ocaklık-i kılâ'-i eyalet-i Özi '[an] *mukāṭa'ât*-i Tuna ber şart-i hazine ve şart-i kılâ' ki
hazret-i vezir-i 'âlî-mikdâr kapudan Hasan Paşa edâme'llâhu te'âlâ iclâlihu bâ hatt-i
hümâyûn-i se'âdet makrûn müceddeden tahrir ve taşih ve ta'yîn kerde ma'a sâlyânehâ-i
mezkûrîn '[an] gurre-i muharremi'l-harâm sene seb' ve şeşsîn ve elf

sâlyâne-i

sâlyâne-i

sâlyâne-i

mîr-mîrân-i Özi

defterdâr-i hazine-i m[ezbûre]

mîrlivâ'-i Kıl Burun ma'a

fî sene

fî sene

kapudanlık-i Özi

400000

300000

fî sene

100000

¹The entries on this page were written with a broader stroke quill and are the writing is larger than the rest of the text, excluding the *tuğra*; it is reasonable to assume that they are an addendum and the true beginning of the register is on fol. 2a.

be-ka'l'e-i 'atîk-i nefis-i Özi ve ka'l'e-i cedid-i Özi ve palanğa-i cedid-i m[ezbür] ve
ka'l'e-i cedid-i Hasan paşa ki müceddeden binâ kerde ve ka'l'e-i Kıl Burun ber müceb-i
defter-i taşhîh ki be âsitâne-i se'adet teslim şüde ve şüreteş der ka'l'e-i Özi vaz' kerde
ve mevâcibâtes ber şart-i hazine-i mukâta'ât-i mezburâ dâde fermüde

neferen 1567 fi yevm 14637 el-mukarrer fi sene-i kâmile 5053996

fi 885
yevm 4011
fi 855
yevm 10626

ka'l'e-i
Bender ber şart-i kılâ'-i
mukâta'ât-i m[ezbür]
neferen 511

fi yevm 3307 el-mukarrer fi sene-i kâmile 1288350
fi 885 fi 855
yevm 1271 yevm 1994

ka'l'e-i
Akermân ve palanğa-i Yanık
ber şart-i kılâ'
neferen 512

fi yevm 3399 el-mukarrer fi sene-i kâmile 1175762
fi 885 fi 855
yevm 1192 yevm 2207

ka'l'e-i
Kılı ber şart-i kılâ'
neferen 314

fi yevm 2218 el-mukarrer fi sene-i kâmile 814656
fi 885 fi 855
yevm 1575 yevm 743

ka'l'e-i
İbrâyl ber şart-i kılâ'
neferen 148

fi yevm 840 el-mukarrer fi sene-i kâmile 291164
fi 885 fi 855
yevm 407 yevm 433

ka'l'e-i
Ruscuk ber şart-i kılâ'
neferen 20

fi yevm 80 el-mukarrer fi sene-i kâmile 28320
fi 885
yevm

ka'l'e-i
Nigbolî ber şart-i kılâ'
neferen 53

fi yevm 289 el-mukarrer fi sene-i kâmile 111058
fi 885 fi 855
yevm 185 yevm 104

ka'l'e-i
حلونيك ber şart-i kılâ'
neferen 16

fi yevm 85 el-mukarrer fi sene-i kâmile 29990
fi 885

ka'l'e-i
Rahova ber şart-i kılâ'
neferen 102

fi yevm 563 el-mukarrer fi sene-i kâmile 200810

kal'e-i
cedid-i Tulca ber şart-i hazine

neferen
63

fi yevm 319 el-mukarrer
fi sene-i kamilе 112926
fi 885

cemā'at-i
fārisān '[an] hadem-i hazine-i Tuna
ber şart-i hazine

neferen
15

fi yevm 97 el-mukarrer
fi sene-i kamilе 33174

mekün-i
mevācib ve sālyānehā ber şart-i hazine u şart-i kılā'
9930206

ber şart-i
hazine
fi sene
3930110

ber şart-i
kılā'
fi sene
6000096

fol. 3a

mukāṭa'āt

ocaqlık-i mezkürin ki be-cihet-i sālyānehā ve mevācib-i neferāt-i kılā'-i mezküre ber
cānib-i hāzret-i vezir-i müşārün ileyh ta'yin şüde el-vāḳı' fi gürre-i muḥarremi'l-ḥarām
sene seb' ve şeleşin ve elf

nezāret-i

iskele-i İsaḳcı ve Tulca ve Maçın ve Aḳkermān ve Kılı ve İbrāyil ma'a pençik-i
usārā'-i iskelehā-i mezbüre der 'uhde-i nāzır Ahmed beg mır livā'-i Aḳkermān sābık
nāzır-i mukāṭa'āt-i mezküre '[an]'t-tāriḫi'l-mezbür

mukāṭa'a-i

iskele-i İsaḳcı ve Tulca ve Maçın ve tevābi'ihā tābi'-i nezāret-i mezbüre der 'uhde-i
nāzır Ahmed beg el-mezbür

ber müceb-i
şart-i iltizām
fi sene
1638322

ber şart-i
hazine
fi sene
784161

ber şart-i
kılā'
fi sene
854161

minhā

be-cihet-i
mevācib-i hademe-i
mukāṭa'a-i mezbüre ber müceb-i
'ādet-i qadim
fi yevm 180 fi sene-i kamilе 54800

be-cihet-i
mevācib-i mütēkā'idān-i
sipāh ve vazife-i mürtezika ve du'ā-
güyān
fi yevm 243 fi sene-i kamilе 87480

ileyh
1486042

ber şart-i
hazine
fi sene
631881

ber şart-i
kılā'
fi sene
854161

muķāṭa'a-i

iskele-i Akkermān ve havāṣ-i muķāṭa'a-i mezbüre-i pençik-i usārā' ve tevābī'ihā tābī'-i neẓāret-i m[ezbüre] der 'uhde-i Ahmed beg el-mezbür '[an]t-tārīḫi'l-merķūm

ber müceb-i

şart-i iltizām

fī sene

1577777

ber şart-i

hazine

fī sene

777777

ber şart-i

ķilā'

fī sene

800000

minhā

be-ciĥet-i

mevācib-i ĥadem-i

muķāṭa'a-i mezbüre ber

müceb-i 'ādet-i qadīm

fī yevm fī sene-i

kāmīle

80

28800

be-ciĥet-i

vāzife-i mürtezika-i

cevāmī'-i Akkermān ve Bender ĥadem-i iskele-i mezbür

ve mütেকā'idān u du'ā-güyān neferen fī yevm fī sene-i

ve ġayriĥ

fī yevm

fī sene-i

8

68

kāmīle

24480

kāmīle

60480

168

ileyh

1464017

ber şart-i

hazine

fī sene

664017

ber şart-i

ķilā'

fī sene

800000

muķāṭa'a-i

iskele-i Kili ve pençik-i usārā ve ṭalyanhā-i muķāṭa'a-i mezbüre ve tevābī'ihā tābī'-i neẓāret-i mezbüre der 'uhde-i Ahmed beg el-mezbüre '[an]t-tārīḫi'l-mezbür

ber müceb-i

şart-i iltizām

fī sene

2053333

ber şart-i

hazine

fī sene

533333

ber şart-i

ķilā'

fī sene

1550000

minhā

be-ciĥet-i

mevācib-i

ĥadem-i muķāṭa'a-i

mezbüre ber müceb-i

'ādet-i qadīm

fī yevm

fī sene-i

75

kāmīle

27000

be-ciĥet-i

vāzife-i mürtezika-i

cevāmī' ve ba'z-i

mütেকā'idān ve du'ā-

güyān-i sāyire

fī yevm

fī sene

158

56880

be-ciĥet-i

yevmiye-i ba'z-i

mürtezika ki '[an]

gedük-i ķal'e iĥdāṣ

kerde ve iskele dāde

fermüde

fī yevm

fī sene-i

60

kāmīle

21600

be-ciĥet-i

meşārif-i ṭalyanhā

pīş ez in ber şart-i

hazine dāde ve ĥālā

ber şart-i ķilā' dāde

fermüde

fī sene-i

kāmīle

340000

ileyh

1607853

ber şart-i

hazine

fī sene

397853

ber şart-i

ķilā'

fī sene

1210000

fol. 3b

mukāṭa'a-i

iskele-i İbrāyıl ma'a tevābi'ihā tābl'-i nezāret-i mezbūre '[ani]t-tārihi'-l-mezbūr

ber müceb-i

şart-i iltizām

fi sene

1214377

ber şart-i

hazine

fi sene

500000

ber şart-i

kılâ'

fi sene

714377

minhâ

be-ciHet-i

mevâcib-i qadim-i huddâm-i mukāṭa'a-i

mezbūre ber müceb-i 'âdet-i qadim

fi yevm

fi sene-i kâmile

80

28800

be-ciHet-i

vazife-i mürtezika-i câmi'-i

İbrāyıl ma'a mütekâ'id-i m[ezbûrin]

fi yevm

fi sene-i kâmile

53

18720

ileyh

1166857

ber şart-i

hazine

fi sene

452480

ber şart-i

kılâ'

fi sene

714377

mukāṭa'a-i

beytül-mâl-i 'âm u hâşşa-i kazâ-i Kili

ve Akkermân tâbl'-i nezāret-i mezbūre

'[ani]t-tārihi'-l-mezbūr

ber müceb-i

şart-i iltizām hem şart-i hazine

fi sene

166666

mukāṭa'a-i

zarar-i kaşşābiyye-i iskelehâ-i

Kili ve Akkermân tâbl'-i nezāret-i

mezbūre '[ani]t-tārihi'-l-mezbūr

ber müceb-i

şart-i iltizām hem şart-i hazine

fi sene

51722

mukāṭa'a-i

zarar-i kaşşābiyye-i iskele-i İsakçı ve Tulca

ve Maçın ve Hırsova ma'a tevābi'ihâ

tābl'-i nezāret '[ani]t-tārihi'-l-mezbūr

ber müceb-i

şart-i iltizām hem şart-i hazine

fi sene

88888

cem' 'an

mâl-i nezāret-i mezbūre '[an] şart-i hazine u şart-i kılâ'

ber müceb-i

şart-i iltizām

fi sene

6791085

ber şart-i

hazine

fi sene

2872537

ber şart-i

kılâ'

fi sene

3578538

minhâ
 '[an] māl-i nezâret-i mezbûre b'adû'l-meşârif muqarrere ber mücib-i
 'âdet-i kadîm kisâlyânehâ ve mevâcib-i kılâ'-i mezkûre
 6032046

ber şart-ı	ber şart-ı
hazine	kılâ'
fi sene	fi sene
2435007	3578538

muqâta'a-i

iskele-i Özi ve Kıl Burun tâbi'-i nezâret-i mezbûre fi sene 164666² akça iltizâm kerde ve hâliyâ be mirmirân-i Özi hâş dâde şûde ber müceb-i emr-i şerif '[an] cânib-i hazret-i vezir müşârûn ileyh

Marginal note: zikr olınan iskelenüñ mahşûl-i gümrûki ve sayır rûsûmâtı Özi beglerbegisine ojaqlıq olub anjaq Mehmed paşaya ta'yin olınmışdı hâliyâ Mehmed paşa kalkmak ile mahşûl-i mezbûr Özi meremetleriniñ mühimmâtlarına ve sayire qal'eleridüñ mühimmâtlarına ta'yin olınub qapudan paşa hazretleri tarafından emr-i şerif yazılmışdur fi 13 ş[a'bân] sene 1037 fi sene 146600

muqarrir-i vilâyet Özi kal'esin tahrir eyledükde ihtisâb ve resm-i bâc ı bâzârî mirlivâya mahşûl kayd idüb ve gümrük-i emti'a ve resm-i iskele-i geçüd-i Özi miriye kayd idüb iştirâken zabt müte'assır olduğundan mâ'adâ muqâta'a-i mezbûre bi hâşıl olub ma'a hâzâ mirlivâ Özide oturmamağla cümlesi miri için zabt olunurken iki senede ancak yetmiş bin akça hâşıl olub mirmirân kulları Özide oturmak iktizâ itmekle kendüye mahşûl kayd olınan kendüye zabt idürlmek lâzım gelüb ol-takdirce miriye şey'-i kalil kalub ve bi'l-fi'l mirmirân olan Mehmed paşa kulları kapısı mükemmel uğur-i hümayûna gayret çeker kulları olmağla kendüye hâşş olmaq üzere emr-i şerif virilüb bundan soñra mirmirân olanlara emr-i şerif ile virilürse febihâ ve illâ defterdâr kulları iltizâma virmek üzere mahalline şerh virildi

fol. 4a

muqâta'a-i

iskele-i Silistre ve iskele-i Hırsova ve Kâdi Köyi ve zarar-i kaşşâbiyye-i iskelehâ-i mezbûre ve milh-i miri ki 20000 akçasının³ '[an] cânib-i Eflak âvarand ve resm-i pençik-i iskele-i mezbûre ma'a tevâbi'ihâ der 'uhde-i Kâsım beg mirlivâ-i Kıl Burun-i sâbık emîn ber vech-i iltizâm

ber müceb-i
 şart-ı iltizâm hem şart-ı hazine
 fi sene
 1000000
 minhâ

be-cihet-i

mevâcib-kadim-i huddâm-i muqâta'a-i

mezbûre ber müceb-i 'âdet-i kadim

fi yevm fi sene-i kâmile

100

36000

be-cihet-i

mevâcib-i müteka'idân-i sipâh

ve du'â-güyan ve murtezika-i ba'z-i cevâmî'

fi yevm

fi sene-i kâmile

310

111600

ileyh

852400

²In siyakat.

³In siyakat.

muḳāṭa'a-i

iskeleḥā-i Nigbolı ve Rahova ve Zıstovı ma'a pençik ve zarar-ı kaşşābiyye-i iskeleḥā-i mezbūre ve beytū'l-māl-i 'amme u ḥāşşa der nezd-i iskele-i m[ezbūre] ve milḥ-i miri 40000 akçasınıu⁴ '[an] cānib-i Eflak āvarand der 'uhde-i Arslan yāhūdī emīn-i mültezim-i sābık '[an] sākinān-i Nigbolı

ber müceb-i

şart-ı iltizām ḡayr ez fūrā nihāde

muḥaraba-i kıkān ve ziyāde-i şart-ı kılā' ber vech-i münāşafa

fī sene

1492337

ber şart-ı

hazine

fī sene

1392337

ber şart-ı

kılā'

fī sene

100000

minhā

be-ciḥet-i

mevācib-i ḥadem-i

muḳāṭa'a-i mezbūre ve

meşārif-i muḳarrere ber

müceb-i 'ādet-i ḳadīm

fī yevm fī sene-i

kāmīle

150

54000

be-ciḥet-i

mevācib-i müteḳā'idān-i

sipāh ve cebeciyan ve ḡayruh

ve mürtezika-i ba'z-i cevāmī'

ve du'ā-güyan-i sāyire

fī yevm fī sene-i

kāmīle

300

108000

ileyh

1320337

ber şart-ı

hazine

fī sene

1220337

ber şart-ı

kılā'

fī sene

100000

muḳāṭa'a-i

iskele-i Ruscuḳ ve iskele-i Tutrakan ma'a pençik-i iskele-i m[ezbūre] ve milḥ-i miri ke 'an cānib-i Eflak 10000 [akça]sınıu āvarand der 'uhde-i Arslan yāhūdī emīn-i mültezim-i sābık

ber müceb-i

şart-ı iltizām

fī sene

580303

ber şart-ı

hazine

fī sene

320303

ber şart-ı

kılā'

fī sene

260000

minhā

be-ciḥet-i

mevācib-i ḳadīm-i ḥadem-i muḳāṭa'a-i

mezbūre ve meşārif ber müceb-i 'ādet-i

ḳadīm ve muḥāsebāt-i ḳādī

fī yevm fī sene-i kāmīle

60

21600

be-ciḥet-i

mevācib-i müteḳā'idān-i sipāh

ve cebeciyan ve du'ā-güyan ve ba'z-i

mürtezika-i cevāmī'-i şerife

fī yevm fī sene-i kāmīle

314

113040

ileyh

445603

ber şart-ı

hazine

fī sene

185663

ber şart-ı

kılā'

fī sene

260000

⁴In siyakat.

fol. 4b

muḳāṭa'a-i

beytül-māl-i 'ämme u ḥaṣṣa ve māl-i gāyib ve māl-i mefkūd ve yava ve kaçkun ve cürm u cināyet ve ṣem' ḥāne ma'a tevābi'ihā der livā'-i Nigbolı ve Silistre ve Cum'a Bāzārı ve Ālā Kılısa ve Baba Tağı ve Hırsova ve resm-i kaṭāriye-i Şumni ve Tulca ve pençik-i usārā ve ṣem' ḥāne-i Silistre ve cizye-i kefere-i yava-i Rum ve Ermeni ve Eflak ve Boğdan der taht-i iltizām-i ḥod ve karye-i ارشندلی Derbent der ḳazā-i Pravadi ve سومويد ve Novasil ve tevābi'-i ḳurā'-i m[ezbüre] der 'uhde-i İbrāhīm beg 'an ebnā'-i sipāhiyān emīn-i sābık

ber müceb-i

şart-i iltizām hem şart-i hazine

fi sene

486500

minhā

be-ciḥet-i

mevācib-i ḥadem-i muḳāṭa'-i

mezbüre ber müceb-i 'ādet-i kadim

fi yevm

fi sene-i kāmile

100

36000

be-ciḥet-i

mevācib-i müteḳā'idān-i sipāh

ve cebeciyan ve du'ā-güyan-i sayire

ve mürtezika-i ba'z-i cevāmi'-i şerife

fi yevm

fi sene-i kāmile

435

156600

ileyh

293900

muḳāṭa'a-i

iskele-i Balcık ve iskele-i Köstence ve Kara Harman ve Manḳaliye ve ḥaṣṣhā-i baḳıyye-i ḥavāṣṣ-i Mesih Paşa ve Eski İstanbulluk ve beytül-māl-i 'ämme ve ḥaṣṣa ve yava ve kaçkun ve ṣem' ḥāne ve cürm u cināyet ve cizye-i yavagān-i ḳaza-i mezkürin der 'uhde-i Ḥodā Virdi Çavuş emīn-i sābık '[an] muḥarremü'l-ḥarām sene seb' ve şeleş in ve elf

ber müceb-i

şart-i iltizām

fi sene

707000

minhā

be-ciḥet-i

mevācib-i ḥadem-i muḳāṭa'-i mezbüre

ma'a maşārif muḳarrere ber müceb-i 'ādet-i

kadim

fi yevm

fi sene-i kāmile

160

57600

be-ciḥet-i

mevācib-i müteḳā'idān-i sipāh ve

cebeciyan ve gayruh mürtezika-i ba'z-i

cevāmi'-i şerife ve du'ā-güyan-i sayire

fi yevm

fi sene-i kāmile

415

149400

ileyh

500000

muḳāṭa'a-i

ḥaṣṣ-i nefsi-i Ruscuḳ ma'a tevābi'ihā '[an]

evvel-i nevrüz el-vāḳi' fi⁵ recebül-

müreccib sene 1037

fi sene

hem şart-i hazine

100000

ziyāde-i

cizye-i evḳāf-i ḳurā'-i Miḥal 'Ali Beg

der nefsi-i Pilevna ma'a tevābi'ihā

vācib '[an] ḡurre-i [ramazā]n sene 1037

ilā gāyet-i ş[a'bān] sene 1038

ḥāne

cizye

400

64000

fi

160

⁵In the original there is a blank space here.

cizye-i
 gebrân-i vilâyet-i İbrâyl ma'a cizye-i yavagân-i kofere-i
 kazâ'-i mezbûre ki '[an] nezâret-i İsağcı ifrâz şûde ve
 ber vech-i makûtü' ma'a aşı-i cizye ve gullamiye-i aşı-i
 cizye-i gebrân-i Özi mahsûb şûde fermûde bâ fermân-i
 hazret-i vezir-i müşârûn ileyh vâcib '[an] gurre-i [ramazân]
 sene [10]36 ilâ gâyet-i ş[a'bân] sene 1037
 fi sene
 makûtü'an '[an] yed-i ahâli-i kura'-i m[ezbûre]
 330000

el-mecmû'
 fûrûht-i mukâta'ât-i mezkûrîn ve cizye-i mezbûrîn
 fi sene
 11551225

ber şart-i	ber şart-i
hazine	kila'
fi sene	fi sene
7272687	4278535

fol. 5a

	minhâ	
be-cihet-i	be-cihet-i	be-cihet-i
mevâcib-i kadim ve	mevâcib-i mütekkâ'idân-i	mevâcib-i talyanhâ-i
meşârif-i mukarrere-i	sipâh ve cebeciyân ve	Kili ber şart-i kila' dâde
mukâta'ât-i mezbûre	mürtezika-i cevâmi'-i şerife	fermûde
fi sene	ma'a meşârif-i şayka-i Nigbolu	fi sene
344600	fi sene	340000
	928280	
	şahh ileyh	
	fi sene	
	9938345	
	ber şart-i	ber şart-i
	hazine	kila'
	5999807	3938538
	el-kasr	
	ber şart-i hazine	ber şart-i kila'
	289	8428

tahrîren fi gurre-i muharremü'l-i-harâm sene seb' ve şelaşin ve elf⁶

⁶Below this date there are three *kuyuruklı imzas* and a seal (*mühr*) of İbrahim, Tuna *defterdar*.

translation

fol. 1b⁷*Mukata'a* of

the public and private *beytül-mal* and the *yava* and the *kaçkun* and the *cürm* and *cinayet* and *badihava* ve their dependencies assigned for the *ocaklık* of the troops of Özi [and] contracted to the mentioned notables [i.e., the officials in charge of the *mukata'a*! in the main body of the text below].

	in a year	
	509,833	
ferî nihâde şud		ileyh
in a year		in a year
309,833		200,000

The mentioned five *yüks* [i.e., 5 x 100,000] and nine thousand eight hundred thirty three *akça*, assigned as *ocaklık*, they [i.e., the *emins*?] took hold of and they deducted three *yüks* and nine thousand eighty three *akça*.

From the revenues of

of the *italyan* given over by the Wallacian *voyvoda* '[an] cātib-i voyvoda-i Eflak dāde

in a year
100,000.

Taken hold of by the Wallacian beg.
Given to the repairs of the Yergögi fortress.

Mukata'a ofthe *şem hane* of the *liva* of Silistre which the *reaya* abolished with [the confirmation of] a firman.

in a year
30,000

abolished [as a tax obligation] of the *reaya*

fol. 2a

The shah Murad, son of the khan Ahmed, always the victorious! (*tugra*)

fol. 2b

This register is to be acted upon and hereafter it is not to be altered or changed (*hatt-i hümayun*).

Register of

ocaklıks for fortresses in the Özi *eyalet* [assigned] from among the *mukata'at* of Tuna which are in accordance with the condition of the treasury (*şart-i hazine*) and the condition of the fortresses (*şart-i kila*); [*mukata'at*] which the lofty vizier and *kapudan* [*paşa*] Hasan Pasha—may the exalted God prolong his greatness!—with the *hatt-i hümayun* that is tied to felicity had newly surveyed and inspected and which he assigned. [And with this, a register of] the annual salaries of the abovementioned [fortresses. Valid] from 1 Muharram the blessed in the year one thousand thirty seven (12 September 1627).

ocaklıks of the fortresses of the *eyalet* of Özi from among the *mukata'at* of Tuna in accordance with the condition of the treasury (*şart-i hazine*) and the condition of the fortresses (*şart-i kila*), which vizier Hasan Pasha—may the exalted God prolong his greatness!--with the *hatt-i hümayun* that is tied to felicity, had newly surveyed and inspected and assigned, and of annual salaries of the abovementioned [fortresses. Valid] from 1 Muharram the blessed in the year one thousand thirty seven (12 September 1627).

annual salary (<i>salyane</i>) of	annual salary of	annual salary of
the <i>mirmiran</i> of Özi	the <i>defterdar</i> of the said treasury	the <i>mirliva</i> of Kıl Burun and
in a year	in a year	[holder] of the <i>kapudanlık</i> of Özi
400,000	300,000	in a year
		100,000

⁷See n. 1.

To the old fortress of the town of Özi and the new fortress of the Özi and the new *palanka* and of the aforementioned [i.e., Özi] and the new fortress of Hasan Pasha which is newly built and the fortress of Kıl Burun in accordance with the correct register which has been submitted to the threshold of felicity [i.e., the Porte] and a copy of which is deposited in the fortress of Özi and the wages [recorded] in it have been ordered to be given from the *şart-i hazine* of the aforementioned *mukata'at*.

men	in a day	the fixed [wages]
1,567	14,637	in a full year
	in	5,053,996
	885	
	day	
	4,011	10,626

fortress of
Bender--from the mentioned *şart-i hazine*

	troops	
	511	
in a day		el-mukarrer
3307		in a full year
in	in	1,288,350
885	855	
day	day	
1,271	1,994	

fortress of
Akkerman and the Yanık palanka--
from the *şart-i kula'*

	troops	
	512	
in a day		el-mukarrer
3399		in a full year
in	in	1,175,762
885	855	
day	day	
1,192	2,207	

fortress of
Kili--from the *şart-i kula'*

	troops	
	314	
in a day		el-mukarrer
2,218		in a full year
fi	fi	814,656
885	855	
day	day	
1575	743	

fortress of
İbrail--from the *şart-i kula'*

	troops	
	148	
in a day		el-mukarrer
840		in a full year
in	in	291,164
885	855	
day	day	
407	433	

fortress of
Ruscuk--from the *şart-i kula'*

	troops	
	20	
in a day		el-mukarrer
80		in a full year
in		28,320
885		
day		

fortress of
Nigbolli--from the *şart-i kula'*

	troops	
	53	
in a day		el-mukarrer
289		in a full year
in	in	111,058
885	855	
day	day	
185	104	

fortress of
حلونيك--from the *şart-i kula'*

	troops	
	16	
in a day		el-mukarrer
85		in a full year
in		29,990
885		

fortress of
Rahova--from the *şart-i kula'*

	troops	
	102	
in a day		el-mukarrer
563		in a full year
		200,810

new fortress of
Tulca--from the *şart-i hazine*

	troops 63	
in a day		el-mukarrer
319		in a full year
	in	112,926
	885	

cemaat of
farisan, servants of the treasury of Tuna--
from the *şart-i hazine*

	troops 15	
in a day		el-mukarrer
97		in a full year
		33,174

sum of
the wages and annual salaries--from the *şart-i hazine* and from the *şart-i kula'*
9930206

from the <i>şart-i</i> <i>hazine</i>	from the <i>şart-i</i> <i>kula'</i>
in a year	in a year
3,930,110	6,000,096

fol. 2b

Mukata'at:

The listed *ocaklıks*, which are for the salaries (*salyaneha ve mevacic*) of the troops of the aforementioned fortresses, have been assigned by his excellence, the above mentioned vizier [and] they go into effect on the first of the sacred month of Muharram in the year one thousand thirty seven.

The supervision (*nezaret*) over the docks of İsakcı, Tulca, Maçın, Akkerman, Kili and İbrail together with the *pençik* of enslaved captives (*esir*) for the aforementioned docks is under contract to *nazır* Ahmed Beg, the previous *mir liva* of Akkerman; [he] is the *nazır* of the aforementioned *mukata'as* as of the aforementioned date.

fol. 2b

Mukata'a of

the port (*iskele*) of İsakcı and Tulca and Maçın and their dependancies, subject to the aforementioned *nezaret* in the contract of the aforementioned *nazır* Ahmed Beg.

in accordance with the
condition of the *iltizam*
in a year
1,638,322

from the <i>şart-i</i> <i>hazine</i>	from the <i>şart-i</i> <i>kula'</i>
in a year	in a year
784,161	854,161

[subtract] from the above

for the wages of the <i>hadem</i> of the aforementioned <i>mukata'a</i> in accordance with ancient custom		for the wages of the retired <i>sipahi</i> and pensions of the <i>mürtezika</i> and <i>duaguyan</i>	
in a day	in a full year	in a day	in a full year
180	54,800	243	87,480

[remaining] to the above
1,486,042

from the <i>şart-i</i> <i>hazine</i>	from the <i>şart-i</i> <i>kula'</i>
in a year	in a year
631,881	854,161

Mukata'a of

the port of Akkerman and havas of the aforementioned *mukata'a* of the *pençik* upon captives and their dependencies subject to the abovementioned *nezaret* in the contract of the aforementioned Ahmed Beg from the above-written date.

		in accordance with <i>şart-i iltizam</i> in a year 1,577,777			
		from the <i>şart-i</i> <i>hazine</i> in a year 777,777		from the <i>şart-i</i> <i>kıla'</i> in a year 800,000	
		[subtract] from the above			
for the wages of the <i>hadem</i> of the aforementioned <i>mukata'a</i> in accordance with the above ancient custom		for pensions of the <i>mürtezika</i> of mosques of Akkerman and Bender and of the <i>mütekaid</i> s and <i>duaguyan</i> and others		for the wages of the <i>farisan-i</i> <i>hadem</i> of aforementioned port troops	
in a day 80	in a full year 28,800	in a day 168	in a full year 60,480	in a day 8	in a com- plete year 24,480
		[remaining] to the above 1,464,017			
		from the <i>şart-i</i> <i>hazine</i> in a year 664,017		from the <i>şart-i</i> <i>kıla'</i> in a year 800,000	

Mukata'a of

the port of Kill and *pençik* upon captives and *talyans* of the aforementioned *mukata'a* and their dependencies subject to the abovementioned *nezaret* in the contract of the aforementioned Ahmed Beg from the above-written date.

		in accordance with <i>şart-i iltizam</i> in a year 2,053,333			
		from the <i>şart-i</i> <i>hazine</i> in a year 533,333		from the <i>şart-i</i> <i>kıla'</i> in a year 1,550,000	
		[subtract] from the above			
for the wages of the <i>hadem</i> of the aforemen- tioned <i>mukata'a</i> in accordance with the ancient custom		for the pensions <i>mütrezikas</i> of mosques and some other <i>duaguyan</i>		for the daily wages of some <i>mürtezikas</i> who were [established] upon <i>gedüks</i> of the fortress and ordered to be attached to the port	for the salaries of the <i>talyan</i> fishermen who prior to this were subject to the <i>şart-i hazine</i> and now are ordered to be subject to the <i>şart-i kıla'</i>
in a day 75	in a full year 27,000	in a day 158	in a full year 56,880	in a day 60	in a full year 21,600
		[remaining] to the above 1,607,853			
		from the <i>şart-i</i> <i>hazine</i> in a year 397,853		from the <i>şart-i</i> <i>kıla'</i> in a year 1,210,000	340,000

fol. 3b

Mukata'a ofthe port of İbrail with its dependencies, subject to the aforementioned *nezaret* from the aforementioned date

in accordance with a

şart-i iltizam

in a year

1,214,377

from the *şart-i**hazine*

in a year

500,000

from the *şart-i**kıla'*

in a year

714,377

[subtract] from the above

for

the wages of the old *hadem* of the afore-
mentioned *mukata'a* in accordance with ancient custom

in a day

80

in a full year

28,800

for

pension of *mürtezikas* of the mosque of
İbrail with that of the aforementioned *mütekaid*

in a day

53

in a full year

18,720

[remaining] to the above

1166857

from the *şart-i**hazine*

in a year

452,480

from the *şart-i**kıla'*

in a year

714,377

Mukata'a ofpublic and private *beytül-mal* of the *kaza* of Kill
and Akkermân, subject to the *nezaret* of the afore-
mentioned from the aforementioned date

in accordance with the

şart-i iltizam, [which is] all *şart-i hazine*

in a year

166,666

Mukata'a of*zarar-i kasabiyye* of the ports of
Kill and Akkermân, subject to the
nezaret of the aforementioned from the
aforementioned date

in accordance with the

şart-i iltizam, [which is] all *şart-i hazine*

in a year

51,722

Mukata'a of*zarar-i kasabiyye* of the port of İsakçı and Tulca
and Maçın and Hırsova with their dependencies
subject to the *nezaret* of the aforementioned
from the aforementioned date

in accordance with the

şart-i iltizam, [which is] all *şart-i hazine*

in a year

88,888

Altogether from the
revenues of the *nezaret* of the aforementioned from the *şart-i hazine* and *şart-i kıla'*

in accordance with the

şart-i iltizam

in a year

6,791,085

from the *şart-i**hazine*

in a year

2,872,537

from the *şart-i**kıla'*

in a year

3,578,538

[subtract] from the above

of the revenues of the *nezaret* of the aforementioned after [payment] of the fixed wages in
accordance with ancient custom, [remainder is for] the salaries and wages of the aforementioned fortresses

6,032,046

from the <i>şart-i</i> <i>hazine</i>	from the <i>şart-i</i> <i>kıla'</i>
in a year	in a year
2,435,007	3,578,538

Mukata'a of the port of Özi and Kıl Burun, [had previously been] made a 164,666 *akça*-a-year *iltizam* subject to the *nazır*-ship of the aforementioned [Ahmed]. Now it has been given as a *hass* to the *mir miran* of Özi in accordance with an *emr-i şerif* issued by the aforesaid vizier [Hasan Pasha].

Marginal note: The collection of the *gümrük* and other taxes of the mentioned port has been an *ocaklık* for the Özi *beglerbegi*, that is, it was assigned to Mehmed Pasha. But now, with the removal of Mehmed Pasha, an *emr-i şerif* has been written by his majesty's [slave], the *kapudan paşa*, on 15 Shab'an in the year 1037 [20 April 1628] assigning the abovementioned revenue to the supplies for the Özi repairs and to the supplies of other fortresses. [Revenue] in a year, 146,600.

When the provincial surveyor (*muharrir-i vilayet*) registered the Özi fortress [complex] he registered the *ihtisab* [tax] and the *resm-i bac* and *bazari* to be collected by the [Özi] *mir liva* and registered the *gümrük* on goods and the port tax of the Özi ford to [be collected by] the state. However, because it was difficult [for these dues] to be jointly held, thereafter the abovementioned *mukata'a* became unprofitable. To add to this, the *mir liva* did not [even] reside in Özi. Therefore all of it [i.e., the *mukata'a*] was taken over for the state. However, in two years it only gave a revenue of seventy five thousand *akça*. [So,] his majesty's slave, the [Özi] *mir miran* was required to reside in Özi and because of this it was necessary to bind [the entire *mukata'a*] to him. With that situation, little [revenue] remained for the state but because the current *mir miran*, his majesty's slave, Mehmed Pasha [and] his household are zealous slaves in carrying out perfect imperial service, [the *mukata'a*] has been given to him by an *emr-i şerif*. Henceforth, if [the *mukata'a*] is given to those who are *mir mirans*, so much the better. And if not, upon being given as an *iltizam* by his majesty's slave, the *defterdar*, will have explained in its place [in the register].

fol. 4a

Mukata'a of

the port of Silistre and the port of Hırsova and Kadı Köyi and *zarar-i kassabiyye* of the aforementioned ports and state saltworks which yield 20,000 *akça*⁸ which is brought by Wallachians and *pençik* of the aforementioned ports with their dependencies in the contract of Kasım Beg, previous *mir liva* of Kıl Burun [and now] *emin* by *iltizam*

		in accordance with the	
		<i>şart-i iltizam</i> , [which is] all <i>şart-i hazine</i>	
		in a year	
		1,000,000	
		[subtract] from the above	
for traditional wages of servants of the aforementioned <i>mukata'a</i> in accordance with ancient custom		for	
		the wages of <i>sipahi mütekaidan</i> and <i>duaguyan</i> and <i>mürtezika</i> of some mosques	
in a day	in a full year	in a day	in a full year of
100	36,000	310	111,600
		[remaining] to the above	
		852,400	

⁸In *siyakat*.

Mukata'a of

the ports of Nigbolı and Rahova and Zıřtovi with *pençik* and *zarar-i kassabiyye* of the aforementioned ports and public and private *beytül-mal* in the aforementioned port and the state salt works [which amounts to] 40,000 *akças*⁹ given by the Wallachians; in the contract of Arslan Yahudı previous *emin* of the *mültezims* of the dwellers of Nigbolı

			in accordance with	
			<i>řart-i iltizam</i> <i>gayr ez fūrū nihāde</i>	
			<i>muharaba</i> (?) of <i>kikan</i> (?) and <i>ziyade</i> of the <i>řart-i kıla'</i> on the basis of half and half (?) [münāřafa	
			in a year	
			1,492,337	
			from the <i>řart-i</i>	from the <i>řart-i</i>
			<i>hazine</i>	<i>kıla'</i>
			in a year	in a year
			1,392,337	100,000
			[subtract] from the above	
for				
wages of the hadem of the				
aforementioned <i>mukata'a</i> and				
regular expenses according to				
ancient custom				
in a day	in a full year			
150	54,000			
for				
wages of the <i>mültekaid</i>				
<i>sipahis</i> and <i>cebecis</i> and others				
and <i>mürtezika</i> of some mosques				
and other <i>duaguyan</i>				
in a day	in a full year			
300	108,000			
			[remaining] to the above	
			1,320,337	
			from the <i>řart-i</i>	from the <i>řart-i</i>
			<i>hazine</i>	<i>kıla'</i>
			in a year	in a year
			1,220,337	100,000

Mukata'a of

the port of Ruscuk and the the port of Tutrakan with *pençik* of the aforementioned port and state salt works for which 10,000 [*akças*] were brought by the Wallachians; in the contract of Arslan Yahudı [who was also] previous *emin* of the *mültezims*.

			in accordance with	
			<i>řart-i iltizam</i>	
			in a year	
			580,303	
			from the <i>řart-i</i>	from the <i>řart-i</i>
			<i>hazine</i>	<i>kıla'</i>
			in a year	in a year
			320,303	260,000
			[subtract] from the above	
for				
the wages of the old servants of the aforementioned				
<i>mukata'a</i> and expenses in accordance with ancient				
custom and <i>kadı's</i> accounts				
in a day	in a full year			
60	21,600			
			for	
			the wages of the <i>mültekaid sipahis</i>	
			and <i>cebecis</i> and <i>duaguyan</i> and some	
			<i>mürtezikas</i> of holy mosques	
in a day	in a full year		in a day	in a full year
			314	113,040
			[remaining] to the above	
			445,603	
			from the <i>řart-i</i>	from the <i>řart-i</i>
			<i>hazine</i>	<i>kıla'</i>
			in a year	in a year
			185,663	260,000

⁹In *siyakat*.

fol. 4b

Mukata'a of

public and private *beytül-mal* and of *gayib* and *mefkud* revenues and *yava* and *kaçkun* and *cürm* and *cinayet* and *şem hane* with their dependencies in the *livas* of Nigbolu and Silistre and Cuma Bazarı and Ala Kilisa and Baba Dağı and Hırsova and *resm-i kantariye* of Şumni and Tulca and *pençik* upon captives and *şem hane* of Silistre and *yava cizye* for Greek and Armenian and Wallachian and Moldavian infidels under the *iltizam-ı* *hüd* and *karıye* of اورشلی Derbent in the *kaza* of Pravadi and سوموید and Novasil and dependencies of aforementioned villages in the contract of İbrahim Beg of the *sipahi* sons, [who was also] the previous *emin*.

in accordance with
şart-i iltizam, [which is] all *şart-i hazine*
 in a year
 486,500

[subtract] from the above

for
 the wages of the servants of the aforementioned
mukata'a in accordance with ancient custom
 in a day in a full year
 100 36,000

for
 the wages of the *mütekaid sipahis*
 and *cebecis* and other *duaguyan*
 and *mürtezikas* of some holy mosques
 in a day in a full year
 435 156,600

[remaining] to the above
 293,900

Mukata'a of

the port of Balcık and the port of Köstence and Kara Harman and Manqaliye and *havass* of arrears of the *havass* of Mesih Pasha and of Eski İstanbulluk and the public and private *beytül-mal* and *yava* and *kaçkun* and *şem' hane* and *cürm* and *cinayet* and *yava cizye* of the aforementioned *kazas*--in the contract of Hoda Virdi Çavuş, [also] previous *emin*; from the first of Muharram in the year [one thousand and] thirty seven;

in accordance with
şart-i iltizam
 in a year
 707,000

[subtract] from the above

for
 the wages of the servants of the aforementioned
mukata'a with the regular expenses in accordance
 with ancient custom
 in a day in a full year
 160 57,600

for
 the wages of the *sipahi mütekaid*s and
cebecis and other *mürtezika* of some
 holy mosques and other *duaguyan*
 in a day in a full year
 415 149,400

[remaining] to the above
 500,000

Mukata'a of

hass of the town of Ruscuk with its dependencies
 first of the new year (*nevruz*) which falls on¹⁰ of
 Receb the venerable in the year 1037

in a year
 all *şart-i hazine*
 100,000

Ziyade

cizye of *evkaf* of the villages of of Mihal Ali
 Beg in the town of Pilevna with their
 dependencies due from the first of Ramadan in the
 year 1037 until the last of Şa'ban in the year 1038

households (*hane*) *cizye*
 400 64,000
 at
 160

¹⁰In the original there is a blank space here.

Cizye-i

gebran of the *vilayet* of İbrail with *yava-i cizye* of the infidels of the aforementioned *kaza* which has been removed from the *nezaret* of İsakçı and [became payable] as a lump sum (*maktu'*) including the base (*asl*) of *cizye* and the *gullamiye* of [this] *cizye-i gebran* of Özi; this was ordered by the firman of his excellency, the aforementioned vizier to be due from the first of [Ramaza]n in the year [10]36 until the last of Ş[a'ban] in the year 1037

in a year

by lump sum from the hands of the people of the aforementioned village
330,000.

The sum total

[value of the] auctioning off of the abovementioned *mukata'at* and aforementioned *cizye*

in a year

11,551,225

upon the *şart-i*

hazine

in a year

7,272,687

upon the *şart-i*

kıla'

in a year

4,278,535

fol. 5a

[subtract] from the above

for

the wages of the aged [i.e., retired] and regular expenses of the aforementioned *mukata'at*
in a year
344,600

for

the wages of the *sipahi mütekaid*s and *cebecis* and the *mürtezikas* of the holy mosques with the expenses of the *şaykas* of Nigbolu
in a year
928,280

for

the wages of the *talyan* fishermen of Kili ordered to be given from the *şart-i kıla'*
in a year
340,000

it is correct (*sahh*): [remaining] to the above

in a year

9,938,345

upon the *şart-i*

hazine

5,999,807

el-kesir

upon the *şart-i hazine*

289

upon the *şart-i*

kıla'

3,938,538

upon the *şart-i kıla'*

8,428

written on the first of Muharram the blessed in the year one thousand thirty seven (12 September 1627).¹¹

¹¹Below this date there are three signatures (*kuyuruklı imza*) and a seal (*mühr*) of İbrahim, Tuna *defterdar*.

TT 751. Muster registers (*yoklama defteri*) of timariots mobilized for campaigns in Özi and Kefe in 1036 and 1037/1627 and 1628.

partial text:

p. 1

defter hâne-i 'âmirede hıfz
olinmaktadır 12 [Ramazân] sene
[10]37¹²

biri otuz altı senesinde vezir-i âşaf-ray kapudan Hasan paşa hazretleri Özi muhâfazasına
be kal'e binasına ta'yin olunub me'mûr olan elviyede ze'âmet ve timârı olub hizmetde
mevcûd bulunan gedüklü ve gedüksüz müteferrika ve kütüb ve çavuş ve oğulları ve
kâtib şagirdleri ve sayir zu'amâ ve erbâb-ı timârüñ yoklaması defteridür

p. 2

cemâ'at-ı
müteferrikagân ve kütüb
yekün
neferen
97
gedüklü 20 gedüksüz 77

cemâ'at-ı
müteferrika ve çavuş-zâdegân
ve şagirdân-ı kütüb
yekün
neferen
111
yüz on bir neferdür

livâ'-ı
Silistre
yekün
263
iki yüz altmış üç neferdür

livâ'-ı
Vidin
yekün
189
yüz seksen tokuz neferdür

livâ'-ı
Vize
yekün
29
yigirmi tokuz neferdür

cemâ'at-ı
çavuşân
yekün
neferen
179
gedüklü 21 gedüksüz 150

cemâ'at-ı
müteferrika ve çavuş ve gayrı ki
bâ evâmir-i şerife memûr şudand
yekün
neferen
26
yigirmi altı neferdür

livâ'-ı
Nigbolı
yekün
258
iki yüz ellî yedi neferdür

livâ'-ı
Çirmen
yekün
92
toksan iki neferdür

livâ'-ı
Kırk Kilise
yekün
13
on üç neferdür

¹²A note in another hand, written at an angle to the following heading.

livā'-i
İzvornık
yekün
215
iki yüz on beş neferdür

cemā'at-i
Tulca
yekün
21
yigirmi bir neferdür

cemā'at-i
ma'zülân
yekün
12
on iki neferdür

cemā'at-i
akıncıyân
yekün
41
kırk bir neferdür

cemā'at-i
ba'z-i kesân ki cebelü dâde end

cem'an
neferen
1582
biri beş yüz seksen iki neferdür
biri beş yüz seksen iki nefer yoklanmışdur

p. 3

cemā'at-i
müteferrikalardur ve kâtibler

Nigbolî ve Silistre ve Tirhala
ve Teke ve Hamit¹³
müteferrika Huseyn veled-i hazret-i vezir Hasan paşa kapudan
دادسم tâbl'-i Nigbolî
ve gayrih
93694
kânûn üzere jebelûlerin işdürmişdür

Nigbolî ve Silistre
müteferrika Bekir veled-i hazret-i vezir-i müşârın ileyh
میر ادمامس tâbl'-i توناق
ve gayrih
49320 (?)
yekün
50000
kânûn üzere jebelûlerin işdürmişdür

Hırsova ve Paşa
ve Silistre ve gayrih
kâtib مدری re'isü'l-küttâm
sâbikâ ... (?)
... tâbl'-i ... tâbl'-i
ve gayrih
73000

¹³Such a list of place-names is occurs above nearly every entry; it is written in *divani* at an angle to the entry in a different hand.

Nigbolî ve Vîdî ve Tîrhalâ
Süleymân âga ber müteferriḳagân-î der gâh-î 'âlî
تأبى نى نى Nigbolî
ve gayrih
80464

Ḳoca اىالسا
Meḥmed âga ber müteferriḳagân-î sābîḳ
...an Meḥmed paşa el-merḥûm
مالدوى تأبى نى
ve gayrih
20000

Nigbolî ve Mentese (?)
'Omar (?) müteferriḳa '[an] müteferriḳân-î der gâh
... Cum'a tābî'-î ...
ve gayrih
48000

Mora be Harman ve Köstendil
Sînân müteferriḳa '[an] der gâh
... tābî'-î ...
ve gayrih
10000 (?)

Meḥmed müteferriḳa '[an] der gâh-î 'âlî
... tābî'-î ...
... ve gayrih
46229
yekûn

... ve Köstendil ve ...
Rıdvan müteferriḳa '[an] der gâh-î 'âlî
تأبى نى حوى كى
ve gayrih
80000
yekûn
100000

ايدى سقى و حتملى
kātib Meḥmed '[an] kātibân-î defter-î ḥāḳānî
ve müteferriḳa-î der gâh-î 'âlî
Ḥācî Meḥmed (?) د موسى Oğlî
اى ماد تأبى نى
ve gayrih
57999
yekûn
100600

...

yekün
neferen
20

gedüksüz müteferrika ve kâtiblerdür

Nigbolı ve Paşa ve Koca ایالسا
Hüseyn efendi '[an] kâtibân-ı divân
ve müteferrika '[an] der gâh-i 'âlî
بارویل tâbl'-ı Çernovı
ve gayrih
43900
yekün
100000

İzvornık
müteferrika İbrâhim '[an] müteferrikagân-ı der gâh-i 'âlî
بسنه در صورتی tâbl'-ı
ve gayrih
3000

Silistre
müteferrika İbrâhim ağa '[an] müteferrikagân-ı mezbûrân (?)
رادم tâbl'-ı درحکی
ve gayrih
41000

müteferrika Muştafâ veled-i vezir Hasan paşa
...
دارغی tâbl' ذوللوق
ve gayrih
96600
yekün
100000
...

p. 42

Hüve

vezir-i âşaf-ra 'izzetli kapudan Hasan paşa bîñ otuz yedi senesinde Kırım hanını iclâsa me'mûr olduklarında ta'yîn olınan tavâyif-i 'askerden Kefede inhizâm bulan şabur hizmetinde ve han iclâsında ve Özi muhâfazasında mevcûd bulunanlarıñ yoxlamasıdur fî sene-i seb' ve şelaşin ve elf

p. 45

mağallına vaz' olınub lâzım
olduğda mürâca'at olınmağ¹⁴

cemâ'at-ı
müteferrikagân-ı der gâh-i 'âlî
[16 entries]

¹⁴A note in another hand, written at an angle to the following heading.

yekûn
neferen
16
on altı neferdür

cemâ'at-ı
kâtibân-ı divân-ı hümayûn
[10 entries]
on neferdür

p. 46

cemâ'at-ı
çavuşân-ı der gâh-ı 'âlî
[39 entries]
on çokuz neferdür

p. 47

cemâ'at-ı
çavuş zâdegân
[30 entries]

cemâ'at-ı
müteferrika zâdegân
[3 entries]

pp. 48-50

livâ'-ı
Silistre
[211 entries]

p. 51

livâ'-ı
Vidin
[10 entries]

p. 52

livâ'-ı
Prizrin
[1 entry]¹⁵
yalnız bir neferdür

livâ'-ı
Vülçetrin
[1 entry]
yalnız bir neferdür

p. 53

livâ'-ı
Çirmen
[34 entries]

livâ'-ı
İskenderiye
[3 entries]

¹⁵Alongside the first entry there are three more empty entries with beyâz ("white [i.e., empty]") written in them.

pp. 54-55
livā'-i

İzvornık
[206 entries]

p. 56

livā'-i
Nigbolı
[9 entries]

p. 57

Kefede han iclâsında hizmetde bulunub donanma-yı hümayûn ile 'avdet idenler ve vüzerâ-yı 'izâm hizmetinde olanlardır

cemâ'at-i
müteferrikan
[16 entries]

cemâ'at-i
kâtibân-i divân-i hümayûn
[9 entries]

cemâ'at-i
çavuşân-i der gâh-i 'âli ve çavuş zâdegân
[27 entries]

p. 58

cemâ'at-i
zu'amâ ve erbâb-i timâr
[45 entries]

(mühür)

translation

p. 1

To be preserved in the imperial house of registers 12 Ramadan 1037 (8 May 1628).

As in the year one thousand thirty six, his excellency, the wise vizier [and] *kapudan* Hasan Pasha was assigned to the defense of Özi and fortress construction, this is a muster register of the *zeamet* and *timar*[-holding] *gedüklü* and *gedüksüz* *müteferrikas* and scribes and *çavuşes* and their sons and the scribal apprentices and other *zuama'* and timariots from the *livas* who were assigned to this service.

p. 2

regiment of <i>müteferrikas</i> ve scribes		regiment of <i>çavuşes</i>	
total		total	
men		men	
97		179	
<i>gedüklü</i>	<i>gedüksüz</i>	<i>gedüklü</i>	<i>gedüksüz</i>
20	77	21	150
regiment of <i>müteferrikas</i> and sons of <i>çavuşes</i> and apprentices of scribes		regiment of <i>müteferrikas</i> and <i>çavuşes</i> and others who were appointed [to the campaign] by <i>emr-i şerifs</i>	
total		total	

men
111
one hundred eleven men

liva of
Silistre
total
263
two hundred sixty three men

liva of
Vidin
total
189
one hundred eighty nine men

liva of
Vize
total
29
twenty nine men

liva of
İzvornik
total
215
two hundred fifteen men

regiment of
dismissed [*sipahis*]
total
12
twelve men

men
26
twenty six men

liva of
Nigbolu
total
257
two hundred fifty seven men

liva of
Çirmen
total
92
ninety two men

liva of
Kırk Kilise
total
13
thirteen men

regiment of
Tulca
total
21
twenty one men

regiment of
akıncıs
total
41
forty one men

regiment of
some were *cebelü*

altogether
men
1582
one thousand eighty two men

one thousand eighty two men mustered

p. 42

He

This is a muster register of the year one thousand thirty seven of those present troops who were assigned to the camp (*tabur*) that found victory in [the mission] to enthrone [the new] khan and were present in the defense of Özi in the year one thousand thirty seven when the wise vizier *kapudan* Hasan Pasha was appointed to enthrone the [new] Crimean khan.

p. 45

[this register] is to be put in its proper place
and referred to when necessary¹⁶

¹⁶A note in another hand, written at an angle to the following heading.

regiment of
müteferrikas of the Sublime Porte
[16 entries]

total
men
16
sixteen men

regiment of
scribes of the Sublime Porte
[10 entries]

p. 46

regiment of
çavuşes of the Sublime Porte
[39 entries]

p. 47

regiment of
çavuş sons
[30 entries]

regiment of
müteferrika sons
[3 entries]

pp. 48-50

liva of
Silistre
[211 entries]

p. 51

liva of
Vidin
[10 entries]

p. 52

liva of
Prizrin
[1 entry]¹⁷

liva of
Vülçetrin
[1 entry]

p. 53

liva of
Çirmen
[34 entries]

¹⁷Alongside the first entry there are three more empty entries with *beyâz* ("white [i.e., empty]") is written in them.

liva of
İskenderiye
[3 entries]

pp. 54-55

liva of
İzvornık
[206 entries]

p. 56

liva of
Nigbolı
[9 entries]

p. 57

Those who served in the installation of the khan at Kefe and returned with the Imperial fleet and who were in the service of great viziers.

regiment of
müteferrikas
[16 entries]

regiment of
scribes of the imperial divan
[9 entries]

regiment of
çavuşes of the Sublime Porte and *çavuş* sons
[27 entries]

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regiment of
ze'amet- and *timar*-holders
[25 entries]

(*mühür*)

GLOSSARY

Abbreviations

A = Arabic
It = Italian
G = Greek
O = Ottoman
P = Persian
S = Slavic
T = Turkic

' <i>ahdname</i>	عهد نامه	A,P, "oath letter," a document issued by the sultan to foreign ambassadors granting peace (includes the words ' <i>ahd u amān</i> , referring to the "oath and amnesty" that the sultan granted to the country "asking" for peace; İnalcık, "Power Relationships," 202-3); foreign states, e.g., the Commonwealth considered ' <i>a</i> . as a peace treaty (<i>przymierze</i>) between equal states.
<i>akça</i>	ا ك چ ا	O, "asper," a small silver coin which served as a common coin of account in Ottoman currency. In the first half of the seventeenth century it went through periods of drastic devaluation and its rates fluctuated widely. According to one contemporary list of coin equivalents, from the early 1620s to the late 1630s its value fell from 150 per gold piece to 250 (Sahillioğlu, "Râici"; also Gerber, "Monetary System").
<i>akıncı</i>	ا ك چ ا	O, "raider," light Ottoman cavalry settled on the frontier in Europe, used for raiding the across the frontier, as well as to harass the enemy during campaigns.
<i>aklam</i>	ا ق ل ا م	A, plural of <i>kalem</i> .
<i>alay begi</i>	الاي بكی	O, a <i>sipahi</i> officer under the <i>sancakbegi</i> responsible for mustering timariots of his <i>sancak</i> .
' <i>amil</i>	ع ا م ل	A, a tax collector, in the classical Ottoman tax-farming system a tax-farmer i.e., an person who contracts to deliver on predetermined intervals a given sum for from the revenues of a <i>mukata'a</i> or <i>mukata'at</i> ; in seventeenth sources ' <i>a</i> . appear more often as employees hired by <i>emin</i> to collect the tax-farm revenues that were contracted to the latter.

<i>arpalık</i>	ارپه لقي	O, "barley field or bin," a <i>sancak</i> assigned to a governor or other official who was temporarily out of office (<i>ma'zul</i>); the district's <i>hass</i> revenue served him as a temporary stipend.
<i>'avarız</i>	عوارض	A, extraordinary supplemental <i>re'aya</i> taxes levied in emergencies, e.g. time of war.
<i>'azeb</i>	عذب	A, "bachelor," a type of light infantry armed with muskets and based in fortresses (İnalcık, "Diffusion of Fire-arms," p. 199); of local origin, and originally unmarried, they were usually paid with of local funds or <i>ocaklık</i> funds (Murphey, "Ottoman Army," p. 178); 'a. were also based on ships as marines.
<i>badihava</i>	باد هوا	P, "windfall," occasional or miscellaneous fees, fines or customs dues, e.g., bridal tax (Murphey, <i>Memorandum</i> , p. 245).
<i>bailo</i>		It, "bailiff," term used for ambassadors of the Venetian Republic, in Ottoman usage the residing Venetian ambassador in Istanbul accredited to the Porte
<i>baştarda</i>	باشترده	O (from It), a large galley with 26 to 36 thwarts on each side and five to seven oarsmen per thwart; usually reserved for the <i>kapudan paşa</i> or other high naval commanders.
<i>bedel-i mekari</i>	بدل مکاری	A,P, a tax levied during campaigns to cover transport costs.
<i>beglerbegi</i>	بکدر بک	O, "beg of begs, governor-general," governor of a <i>beglerbegilik</i> or <i>eyalet</i> , the highest rank in the Ottoman provincial system (İnalcık, <i>Ottoman Empire</i> , p. 218).
<i>beglerbegilik</i>	بکدر بکچلیک	O, a province, the largest Ottoman territorial unit, headed by a <i>beglerbegi</i> ; in the seventeenth century often referred to as <i>eyalet</i> .
<i>beg gemisi</i>	بک گمپسی	O, a galley-type ship based in one of the maritime <i>sancaks</i> of the Aegean or Mediterranean regions that belonged to the <i>eyalet</i> of the <i>kapudan paşa</i> ; <i>b. g.</i> were variously assigned to guard the coasts in the vicinity of their <i>sancak</i> , join flotillas on special missions, or supplement the imperial fleet.
<i>berat</i>	برات	A, "patent," an order issued in the name of the sultan confirming someone as the holder of an office or privilege.
<i>beşlü</i>	بشلو	O, "fiver," a type of garrison troop; mounted, according to some (e.g., Gibb and Bowen, <i>Islamic Society</i> , pt. 1, p. 181 n. 4); name perhaps derives from fact that originally they recieved a five- <i>akça</i> daily wage.
<i>beytül'-mal</i>	بیت المال	A, "treasury," lit., "house of revenue," in the context here refers to the revenues resulting from the confiscation for the treasury of unclaimed estates. "Public <i>b.</i> (<i>beytül'-māl-i 'amma</i>)" and "private <i>b.</i> (<i>beytül'-māl-i hāşşa</i>)" refer to confiscations from public (<i>kuls</i>) and private individuals respectively.
<i>birun</i>	بیرون	P, "outer," outer service of the sultan's palace.

<i>bostancı</i>	بوستانچی	O (from P), "gardener," Ottoman imperial guard, part of the palace service; among the duties of the <i>b.</i> were guarding the shores and waters of Istanbul and the Bosphorus; they were also used as an urban police force and to carry out important executions.
<i>bölük</i>	بلوک	O, a company of Ottoman troops.
<i>cebeci</i>	جبهه چی	O (from P), "armorer," member of a <i>kapıkulu</i> corps responsible for manufacturing repairing, guarding, and transporting armaments such as muskets, swords, bows and arrows, axes, cuirasses, and other military equipment, as well as tending to the ammunition. The presence of <i>c.</i> in battle close to janissaries was vital because they served important tasks, such as cleaning jammed muskets and resupplying ammunition. From the sources it is clear that <i>c.</i> also played a direct role in fighting.
<i>cebelü</i>	جبهه لو	O (from P), "cuirass-wearer," a mounted retainer a number of which in proportion to the value of a given <i>timar</i> were to accompany a <i>sipahi</i> on campaign.
<i>cema'at</i>	جماعت	A, regiment of Ottoman troops.
<i>cerehor</i>	چره خور	O (from P), one of a class of workmen employed on the repairs of fortresses.
<i>čajka</i>	شایقه	S (from T), a keelless Cossack longboat; suited for both river and sea navigation, it was the most common type of boat for raiding.
<i>çavuş</i>	چاوش	O, an official attached to the palace or other institutions responsible for delivering and enforcing orders.
<i>çiftlik</i>	چغنتلیک	O, originally a plot of land big enough to support one peasant family and allow it to the pay tax for using the land to the landholder, in the seventeenth century <i>ç.</i> began to also denote larger farm enterprises (İnalçık, "Emergence of Big Farms, <i>Çiftliks</i> ").
<i>cizye</i>	جزیه	A, a canonical tax levied on non-Muslim households.
<i>cizye-i gebrân</i>	جزیه کبران	A, P, term used to refer to <i>cizye</i> collected from Christians as opposed to that collected from Jews (Pakalın, <i>Sözlük</i> , 1, p. 303).
<i>cürm ve cinayet</i>	جرم	A, fines imposed for criminal offenses.
<i>çorbacı</i>	چورباچی	O, a janissary officer, comparable to a colonel in rank.
<i>defter</i>	دفتر	P, "register," refers to a variety of Ottoman documents, from simple lists on a sheet to (more commonly and in the original meaning) bound books; <i>d.</i> include fiscal, military, diplomatic and other registers.
<i>defterdar</i>	دفتردار	P, "keeper of the register," a chief of a department of the Ottoman fiscal service. The chief for the whole empire was called the <i>baş d.</i> ;

		in the seventeenth century the <i>baş d.</i> was mainly responsible for Rumeli while there was another <i>d.</i> for Anadolu, and eventually for a number of other regional fiscal districts such as Aleppo, Diyarbakir, and Tuna (the lower Danube).
<i>defter-i hakani</i>	دفتر خاقانی	P, A, "Imperial register," a register in a series of Ottoman population surveys made for taxation purposes every generation.
<i>defterdarlık</i>	دفتردارlık	P, O, a regional fiscal district headed by a <i>defterdar</i> .
<i>dirlik</i>	درلك	O, "living," local revenue yielded to an official or officer as a salary in exchange for military or administrative service; <i>d.</i> -holders ranged from <i>timar</i> -holders to <i>beglerbegs</i> (Kunt, <i>Sultan's Servants</i> , p. 14).
<i>divan</i>	دیوان	P, "council," council of Ottoman officials.
<i>divani</i>	دیوانی	P, a common chancery style of "cursive" Arabic script characterized by the joining together of most letters.
<i>divan-i hümayun</i>	دیوان همايون	7, "Imperial council," council of the Ottoman viziers and other top officials including the chief <i>defterdars</i> ; headed by the grand vizier, it acted as the chief policy-making organ of the Ottoman government (İnalçık, <i>Ottoman Empire</i> , pp. 89 ff.).
<i>dizdar</i>	دزدار	P, "fortress-holder, castellan," warden of an Ottoman fortress.
<i>du'a-gu</i> (pl. <i>du'a-guyan</i>)	دعاگو دعاگویان	A, P, "one who prays," a pensioner or retiree granted a stipend by the state or an endower of a <i>vakf</i> in exchange for the <i>d.</i> 's reciting prayers for his benefactor (Murphy, <i>Memorandum</i> , p. 246).
<i>efrenc sipahi</i>	افرنچ سپاهی	O, a Christian (<i>efrenc</i> , "Frank, Westerner") <i>sipahi</i> ; the origin (whether they consisted of Ottoman Christian subjects, e.g., descendants of pre-conquest nobility or whether they were foreign renegades or mercenaries) and special function of this group is not known.
<i>eli emirlü</i>	الی امیرلو	O, "with an order in one hand," an applicant for a <i>timar</i> .
<i>emanet</i>	امانت	A "trust," the temporary tenure over a <i>mukata'a</i> usually by an <i>emin</i> in exchange for a fixed wage.
<i>emin</i>	امین	A, "trustworthy," a general term applied to many types of Ottoman officials in charge of offices or departments; in connection to the <i>mukata'a</i> or <i>mukata'at</i> , the <i>e.</i> held an <i>iltizam</i> contract or contracts, while <i>'amils</i> were in his hire to collect the actual revenues.
<i>emr-i şerif</i>	امر شریف	A, P, "noble order," an order issued in the name of the sultan, often not by the sultan himself but by an authorized high official such as a vizier, or institution, such as the <i>maliye</i> .
<i>esir</i>	اسیر	A, captive, slave.
<i>evamir-i şerife</i>	اوامر شریفه	A, P, pl. of <i>emr-i şerif</i> .

<i>evkaf</i>	اوقاف	A, pl. of <i>vakf</i> .
<i>eyalet</i>		A, the more common seventeenth-century name for <i>beglerbegilik</i> .
<i>faris</i> (pl. <i>farisan</i>)	فارس فارسان	A, a member of a cavalry formation of local origin and usually paid with either local funds or <i>ocaklık</i> funds; their responsibilities included patrolling surrounding countryside (Murphey, "Ottoman Army," 177); the <i>farisan</i> formation may have resembled that of the <i>gönüllüyan</i> (İnalcık, "Gönüllü").
<i>forsa</i>	فورسا	O (from It), a galley-slave.
<i>firkata</i>	فرقة	O (from It), "frigate," a small sea-faring boat, without a deck, with one lateen sail, eight to ten oars (d'Ascoli, p. 149, n. 18).
<i>gedük</i>	كدوك	O, a permanent or tenured position in an Ottoman institution such as a fortress garrison, guild, or <i>timar</i> .
<i>gedüklü</i>	كدوكلو	O, "with <i>gedük</i> ," the holder of a <i>gedük</i> .
<i>gedüksüz</i>	كدوكموز	O, "without <i>gedük</i> ," a "novice" in a garrison or other institution without permanent position.
<i>gönüllü</i> (pl. <i>gönüllüyan</i>)	كدوكلو كدوكلويان	O, "volunteer," a member of a garrison troop who began as a volunteer and once he obtained a <i>gedük</i> , was paid a regular wage; both in cavalry and infantry units (İnalcık, "Gönüllü").
<i>güلاميye</i>	غلامييه	A, a fee charged by tax collectors.
<i>gümrük</i>	كمروك	O, Ottoman customs duty assessed <i>ad valorem</i> .
<i>hademe-i mukata'a</i>	خدمة مقاطعه	A, P, the employees administering the day-to-day operations of a <i>mukata'a</i> , usually under the supervision of an <i>emin</i> or <i>'amil</i> .
<i>harac</i>	خراج	A, same as <i>cizye</i> .
<i>hass</i> (pl. <i>havass</i>)	خاص خواص	A, a revenue source reserved for the sultan, a member of his household or court, a <i>beglerbegi</i> , or a <i>sancakbegi</i> , yielding more than 100,000 <i>akça</i> annually.
<i>havale</i>	حواله	A, "transfer," a single transfer of a sum from a <i>mukata'a</i> 's revenue to a specific party; also used to refer to the document ordering such a transfer, to the sum thus transferred, and to the agent of the Ottoman state who was charged with delivering the order.
<i>hatt-i hümayun</i>	خط همايون	A, P, "imperial writing," an order of the highest authority bearing a notation in the Ottoman sultan's own hand.
<i>hatt-i şerif</i>	خط شريف	same as <i>hatt-i hümayun</i>
<i>hazine</i>	خزينه	A, "treasury," the Ottoman state treasury.

<i>hicri</i>	هجری	A, dating from the Hegira of the Prophet Muhammad (622 A.D., considered the beginning of the Muslim calendar).
<i>hil'at</i>	خلعت	A, "robe of honor," an ornate cloak awarded as a sign of distinction by the sultan and other high officials to visiting dignitaries and other honorees.
<i>hizane-i 'amire</i>	خزانه عامره	A, P, "imperial treasury," same as <i>hazine</i> .
<i>hulut-i şerife</i>	حطوط شریفه	A, P, pl. of <i>hatt-i şerif</i>
<i>hüccet</i>	حجت	A, a receipt, generally issued by a <i>kadi</i> .
<i>icazet tezkeresi</i> اجازت تذکره سی		A, O, a document granting a soldier leave from a campaign. campaign.
<i>ihtisab</i>	احتساب	A, an Ottoman official in charge of regulating a market, making sure that order and fair play prevailed.
<i>iltizam</i>	الزام	A, a contract for the farming out of a <i>mukata'a</i> revenue.
<i>imece, imeci</i>	امچه	O, work done in cooperation by a community for its common good.
<i>kaçkun</i>	قاچدون	O, "runaway," fine levied on owners of animals running loose; also applied to the revenue from the sale of unclaimed runaway livestock.
<i>kadı</i>	قاضی	A, "judge," Ottoman judicial and administrative official in charge of a <i>kaza</i> ; responsible for executing orders of the central government and certifying and keeping copies of all official records pertaining to his district.
<i>kadırga</i>	قادریه	"galley," Ottoman galleys of the seventeenth century had one or two masts with lateen sails and usually 25 thwarts on each side with three to five oarsmen manning each thwart. Several cannons were mounted at the prow and sides. A typical crew included 150 to 200 oarsmen, 100 to 150 or more troops, plus about 35 skilled hands—caulkers, carpenters, oarmakers, sailmakers, etc. (Katib Çelebi, <i>Tuhfet</i> , pp. 151-52; Uzunçarşılı, <i>Merkez ve t-iiriye</i> , 460).
<i>ka'im makam</i>	قایم مقام	A, "locum tenens," an official acting in the place of another who is absent, e.g. away on campaign; this could occur at the highest levels of the administration, as when an acting grand vizier (<i>sadaret ka'im makamı</i>) was appointed as caretaker in Istanbul while the grand vizier was off campaigning with the army.
<i>kal'e, (pl. kila')</i>	قلعه، قلاع	A, a fortress.
<i>kalem</i>	کالم	A, an Ottoman fiscal department bureau or district operating under the jurisdiction of a local <i>defterdar</i> ; also a category of revenues entered in an Ottoman tax register.

<i>kalga</i>	قالشا	T, the heir-designate in the Crimean Khanate, first in the line of succession.
<i>kalyata</i>	قاليشه	O (<ī), "galliot," a ship, similar to but smaller than the galley (<i>kadırgsa</i>), with 19 to 24 thwarts per side and able to carry about 125 troops. Faster than the standard galley, the <i>k.</i> was especially useful for pursuit of enemy ships and reconnaissance. According to Katib Çelebi, when the fleet was in transit, two <i>k.</i> would sail three miles (<i>mîl</i>) in advance of the fleet, and when in port, two <i>k.</i> would stand guard two or three miles offshore (Katib Çelebi, <i>Tuhfet</i> , pp. 151-52; Uzunçarşılı, <i>Merkez ve bahriye</i> , 460).
<i>kantar</i>	قنطار	A, public scales, also a weight of around 60 kg.
<i>kapıcı başı</i>	قپوچی باشی	O, "head gatekeeper," an official of the sultan's palace in charge of guarding the outer entrances of the palace who performed special missions such as going on embassies, conveying orders, and acting as inspectors (İnalçık, <i>Ottoman Empire</i> , p. 81).
<i>kapudan</i>	قپودان	O (from It), a commander of a maritime or river town's fleet or flotilla of ships or boats that were used for coastal defense and other military operations.
<i>kapudan paşa</i>	قپودان پاشا	O, the grand admiral of the Ottoman fleet and chief of the imperial naval arsenal.
<i>kapukulu</i>	قپوقولی	O, "slaves" or "slaves of the Porte," a slave of the sultan employed in the palace, government, or in an elite military unit (the latter includes janissaries, <i>cebecis</i> , and <i>topcis</i>); also collective term for these units.
<i>kara mürsel</i>	قره مرسل	O, small seagoing craft, primarily used to carry cargo.
<i>katib</i>	کاتب	A, "scribe, clerk," one of expert keepers and writers of records at all levels of the Ottoman bureaucracy.
<i>katib şagirdi</i>	کاتب شاگرد	A, P "apprentice clerk," a <i>katib</i> in training.
<i>katib-zade</i>	کاتب زاده	A, P, "son of a clerk," usually destined for government service.
<i>kaza</i>	قضاء	A, a territorial subdivision of a <i>sancak</i> administered by a <i>kadı</i> .
<i>kıla'</i>	قلاع	A, pl. of <i>kal'e</i>
<i>kıst</i>	قسط	A, an installment paid to the state treasury by a tax-farmer.
<i>kışlak</i>	قشلاق	O, winter quarters.
<i>kul</i>	قول	O, "slave" see <i>kapukulu</i> .

<i>levend</i>	لوند	O (from P), "adventurer," in the Ottoman navy, musketeers hired for duty on a ship on a daily wage basis for the duration of a campaign, also serving as oarsmen, guards and marines for shore landings.
<i>liva</i>	لواء	A, same as <i>sancak</i> .
<i>martolos</i>	مارتلوس	O (from Greek), a member of an Ottoman militia composed of locally recruited Christian sailors who were paid a wage to perform defensive service on the Danube.
<i>maliye</i>	مالیه	A, Ottoman finance department.
<i>masraf</i>	مصرف	A, expense, outlay.
<i>matbah-i 'amire</i>	مطبخه عامره	A, P, "imperial kitchens," the kitchens of the sultan and his court located on the Topkapı Palace, also serving as commissary.
<i>ma'zul</i>	معزول	A, "dismissed," refers to a <i>sipahi</i> dismissed from his <i>timar</i> because of some infraction; also applies to a <i>sancakbegi</i> or <i>beglerbegi</i> dismissed from his post and not yet reassigned to another.
<i>medrese</i>	مدرسه	A, "college," a theological and legal school for the training of jurists, teachers, educators and other functionaries in the religious, legal, administrative and educational hierarchies.
<i>mefkud</i>	مفقود	A, a fine imposed for harboring runaway slaves.
<i>mesarif</i>	مصارف	A, pl. of <i>masraf</i>
<i>mir liva'</i>	میر لواء	A, P, a common seventeenth-century designation for <i>sancakbegi</i> .
<i>miri</i>	میری	A, Ottoman state property, as opposed to <i>mülk</i> (private property) and <i>vakf</i> (mortmain holdings of religious foundations).
<i>mürza</i>	میرزا	P "prince," a member of the tribal nobility of the Crimean Khanate.
<i>mu'af</i>	معاف	A, "immune," refers to a member of the <i>re'aya</i> holding an exemption for all or certain taxes, usually in exchange for some regular service or services.
<i>mübaşir</i>	مباشر	A, "usher," the official who conveys and order of a department, agent.
<i>müfettiş</i>	مفتش	A, inspector, examiner.
<i>mukata'a</i> (pl., <i>mukata'at</i>)	مقاطعه (مقاطعات)	A, a revenue source under the direct control of the Ottoman state that was usually farmed out for collection.
<i>muhafız</i>	محافظ	A, "guardian," a member of a fortress garrison.

<i>Mühimme defterleri</i>	مهمه دفترلری	A, P, O, a series of registers containing copies of firmans issued by the imperial divan to Ottoman officials in various parts of the empire. A special type of m.d. is the <i>defter-i mühimme-i ordu</i> , comprised of copies of firmans issued by a field commander (<i>serdar</i>) in the course of a military campaign.
<i>mültezim</i>	ملتزم	A, an <i>emin</i> holding a <i>mukata'a</i> by an <i>iltizam</i> contract, a tax-farmer.
<i>mürtezika</i>	مرتزقه	A, one who derives his living from a <i>vakf</i> , a designated employee or appointee of a pious endowment (Pakalin, <i>Tarih deyimleri</i> , II, p. 624).
<i>müşavere</i>	مشاوره	A, "mutual consultation," a council of high religious and state officials convoked to offer recommendations on important matters.
<i>mustahfiz</i> (pl. <i>mustahfizan</i>)	مستحافظ مستحافظان	A, same as <i>muhafiz</i> .
<i>mutasarrıf</i>	متمصرف	A, "one who uses and disposes of s.th. at will," a term used for an administrator actually in charge of a given post, later used as a synonym for governor.
<i>müteferrika</i>	متمفرقه	A, a member of a small elite palace corps (in the <i>birun</i> or "outer service"), originally composed of sons or other relatives of high officials and important vassal lords. By the seventeenth century even <i>m.</i> of the palace were not necessarily of distinguished origin, and the term was also applied outside the context of the palace to members of the intimate retinue of pashas and viziers.
<i>mütekaid</i>	متقاعد	A, a retired or pensioned Ottoman official or functionary.
<i>mütesellim</i>	متسلم	A, a <i>sancakbegi</i> 's lieutenant.
<i>navluncu</i>	نولونجی	A, O captain engaged under contract in the transport of wheat (Inalcik, <i>Caffa</i>).
<i>nazır</i>	ناظر	A, "superintendent," in the classical Ottoman <i>mukata'a</i> system, an official charged with supervising the collection of tax-farm revenues and collecting certain revenues as well ; by the seventeenth century, <i>n.</i> also contracted to hold <i>mukata'at</i> as tax-farms.
<i>nezaret</i>	نظارت	A, "supervision," the office of a <i>nazır</i> .
<i>nurredin</i>	نورالدین	A, in the Crimean Khanate the second heir designate, second in the line of succession after the <i>kalga</i> .
<i>ocaklık</i>	اوجاقلق	O, a <i>mukata'a</i> , the revenues of which were assigned, until revoked, for the continued benefit of a recipient. Most commonly <i>o.</i> were assigned to cover the salaries of a fortress garrison.
<i>pençik</i>	پنچك	P, O, "fifth," originally the ruler's canonical one-fifth share of captives (destined for the slave market) taken by the Ottoman state; eventually became a sales tax in Ottoman slave markets.

<i>re'aya</i>	رعایا	A, "grazing flocks," the tax-paying subjects of the Ottoman Empire.
<i>resm-i bac</i>	رسم باج	A, P, a market tax assessed on both the buyer and seller when a good was sold
<i>resm-i bazari</i>	رسم بازاری	A, P, a market tax.
<i>resm-i kantariye</i>	رسم قنطاریه	A, P, a market tax assessed per <i>kantar</i> on goods that needed to be weighed.
<i>ruz-i Hızr</i>	روز خضر	A, P, "St. Georges's day," 23 April (O.S.), falling on 3 May (N.S.) in the seventeenth century; traditional beginning of the naval campaign season.
<i>sancak</i>	سانجک	A, the basic Ottoman administrative unit, a subdivision of a <i>beglerbegilik</i> or <i>eyalet</i> .
<i>sancakbegi</i>	سناچاق بگی	the governor of a <i>sancak</i> ; one of the chief duties of a <i>s.</i> was to mobilize and lead to campaign the timariot cavalry of his <i>sancak</i> .
<i>sebeb-i tahrir hükmî</i>	سبب تحریر حکمی	A, P, an order issued usually by governor, <i>kadı</i> , or the <i>maliye</i> for purposes such as appointing certain officials or assigning funds (<i>havale</i>); the <i>s.t.h.</i> was simpler in its diplomatics than a firman of, for example, the imperial divan.
<i>sekban</i>	سکبان	P, "keeper of the hounds," member of a group of vagrant <i>re'aya</i> who formed themselves into companies of mercenaries armed with muskets; originating as brigands, by the early seventeenth century many <i>s.</i> found employment as part of the Ottoman military (Inalcik, <i>Military and Fiscal Transformation</i> , pp. 292ff).
<i>serdar</i>	سردار	P, "commander in chief," the field commander of an Ottoman expedition. Also applied to commanders of corps and units (e.g., janissary <i>serdars</i>).
<i>sipahi</i>	سپاهی	P, a cavalryman compensated for military services by a <i>timar</i> -grant and responsible for bringing on campaign retinue the size of which was to be in proportion to the size of his <i>timar</i> -holdings; <i>s.</i> also refers to members of a <i>kapukulu</i> cavalry formation which, like other <i>kapukulu</i> units, was based in the capital and received a regular cash wage.
<i>sipahi-zade</i>	سپاهی زاده	P, "son of a <i>sipahi</i> ," <i>sipahi</i> sons served in auxiliary roles in the retinues of their fathers.
<i>şart</i>	شرط	A, "condition, stipulation," the conditions upon which a <i>mukata'a</i> was contracted out to a tax-farmer.
<i>şart-ı hazine</i>	شرط خزینه	A, P, "condition of the treasury," a portion of a <i>mukata'a</i> revenue stipulated, under normal circumstances, to be delivered to the central treasury.

<i>şart-ı kula'</i>	شرط قلاع	A, P, "condition of the fortresses," a portion of a <i>mukata'a</i> revenue stipulated, under normal circumstances, to be delivered to an institution in the provinces, e.g., a fortress.
<i>şayka</i>	شایقه	O, a large keelless boat used for river transport (common on the Danube) and along the coast of the Black Sea, as well as for military transports including the defense of river shores (Uzunçarşılı, <i>Merkez ve bahriye</i> , p. 458); <i>ş.</i> was also the Ottoman name for the Cossack <i>čajka</i> ; judging by its name and description, the Ottoman <i>ş</i> appears to have been related to the Cossack <i>čajka</i> .
<i>şem' hane</i>	شمع خانه	A, P, "candle-works," an Ottoman tax on the production of candles by Christian subjects.
<i>şeyhū'l-islam</i>	wlîġIZ "İé	A, chief mufti (Islamic jurisconsult) of Istanbul, the <i>ş.</i> was head of the religious and legal establishment in the Ottoman state and sat in the imperial <i>divan</i> ; as chief mufti, he was qualified to pass judgment even on the actions of the sultan if they impinged on Islamic law.
<i>şürut</i>	شروط	A, pl. of <i>şart</i> .
<i>tahvil</i>	تحويل	A, "transfer, conversion," the appointment of an individual to a position in the administration of a <i>mukata'a</i> , whether as tax-farmer or supervisor; also the period of such tenure.
<i>talyan</i>	طالیان	G, enclosure of nets on poles used for fishing.
<i>tekalif-i 'örfiyye</i>	تكاليف عرفیه	A, P, taxes levied on the <i>re'aya</i> to cover extraordinary services performed by local Ottoman officials.
<i>tersane-i amire</i>	ترسانه عامره	It, A, P, the main arsenal of the Ottoman imperial fleet located on the Golden Horn in the Kasım Pasha district of Istanbul.
<i>tezkere</i>	تذکره	A, a certificate issued by an Ottoman office initiating the process of granting some right or privilege; often a precursor of a <i>berat</i> .
<i>tugra</i>	طغرا	P, calligraphic emblem of the sultan's name and title, serving to certify the validity of important state documents.
<i>vakf</i> (pl. <i>evkaf</i>)	وقف	A, a land grant of other revenue donated in mortmain for pious or charitable purposes (İnalcık, <i>Ottoman Empire</i> , p. 226).
<i>yoklama</i>	یوقلامه	O, a muster of timariot troops before a campaign.
<i>zarar-i kassabiyye</i>	قصر قصابیہ	A, P, "butcher shortfall," an Ottoman tax originally assessed per head of sheep reaching Ottoman ports by ship to make up for the shortfall in endowments for meat-supply for the janissaries; by the seventeenth century the original purpose was forgotten and it became a general tax applied to a variety of goods passing between customs zones (Murphey, <i>Memorandum</i> , p. 73 n. 20).
<i>za'im</i>	زاعم	A, a holder of a <i>ze'amet</i> .

<i>ze'amet</i>	زعامت	A, a large <i>timar</i> -type holding worth an annual 20,000 to 99,999 <i>akça</i> .
<i>zimmi</i>	ذمی	A, "protected person," a non-Muslim (Christian or Jewish) subject of the Ottoman state..
<i>ziyade, ziyade-i cizye</i>	زیاده	A, "increase, extra; extra <i>cizye</i> ," <i>cizye</i> that was uncollected in previous years.

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Abbreviations

AGAD	Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych [Main Archive of Ancient Acts, Warsaw]
AZ	Archiwum Zamoyskich
BCz	Biblioteka Czartoryskich [Cracow]
BJ	Biblioteka Jagiellońska [Cracow]
BK	Biblioteka Kórnicka [Kórnik]
BO	Biblioteka Ossolińskich [Wrocław]
BR	Biblioteka Raczyńskich [Poznań]
Dz. tatarski	Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Dział tatarski (k = <i>karton</i> [box], t = <i>teczka</i> [folder], nr = <i>numer</i> [number])
Dz. turecki	Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Dział turecki (k = <i>karton</i> [box], t = <i>teczka</i> [folder], nr = <i>numer</i> [number])
<i>EI</i> ²	Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edition. Leiden and London, 1960-
<i>İA</i>	<i>İslâm Ansiklopedisi</i> . 12 v. Istanbul: Millî Eğitim Basımevi, 1970-
LNB	L'viv's'ka naukova biblioteka Akademiji nauk Ukrajins'koji RSR im. V. Stefanyka [V. Stefanyk Lviv Scientific Library of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR]
LL	Libri Legationum
MD	Başbakanlık Arşivi [Prime Ministry Archives, Istanbul], Mühimme defteri
TT	Başbakanlık Arşivi, Tapu ve tahrir defteri

A. Unpublished Sources

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LL 30.

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