


THE UKRAINIAN QUESTION

The Ukrainian Question

**The Russian Empire and Nationalism
in the Nineteenth Century**

by
Alexei Miller



Central European University Press
Budapest New York

© 2003 by Alexei Miller

First published in Russian as *“Ukrainskii vopros” politike vlastei i russkom obshchestvennom mnenii (vtoraia polovina XIX v.)* in 2000 by Aleteia

Published in 2003 by
Central European University Press

An imprint of the

Central European University Share Company
Nádor utca 11, H-1051 Budapest, Hungary
Tel: +36-1-327-3138 or 327-3000
Fax: +36-1-327-3183
E-mail: ceupress@ceu.hu
Website: www.ceupress.com

400 West 59th Street, New York NY 10019, USA
Tel: +1-212-547-6932
Fax: +1-212-548-4607
E-mail: mgreenwald@sorosny.org

Authorized translation by Olga Poato

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted,
in any form or by any means, without the permission
of the Publisher.

ISBN 963 9241 60 1 Cloth

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Miller, A. I. (Alexei I.)

[*“Ukrainskii vopros” v politike vlastei i russkom obshchestvennom mnenii (vtoraia polovina XIX v.)*. English]

The Ukrainian question : the Russian Empire and nationalism in the nineteenth century / Alexei Miller ; translated by Olga Poato.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN (Hardback)

1. Ukraine—History—1775-1917. 2. Nationalism—Russia—History.
3. Ukraine—Relations—Russia. 4. Russia—Relations—Ukraine.
5. Russia—Politics and government—1855-1881. I. Title: Russian Empire and nationalism in the nineteenth century. II. Title.

DK508.772.M5513 2003

947.7'07—dc21

2003013589

Printed in Hungary by
Akadémiai Nyomda, Martonvásár

To the memory of my parents

Contents

<i>Preface</i>	ix
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xi
<i>Introduction</i>	1
Theoretical principles of nationalism studies important for this book	2
Comparative–historical context	11
The “All-Russian nation” project	20
On terminology	30
 <i>Chapter 1</i>	
Russia and Ukrainophilism in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century	49
 <i>Chapter 2</i>	
The First Years of Alexander II’s Reign and Latent Ukrainophilism	61
 <i>Chapter 3</i>	
The Advancement of Ukrainophilism in the 1860s. <i>Osnova</i> and the Russian Press	75
 <i>Chapter 4</i>	
The Imperial Authorities and Ukrainophilism, 1862 to 1863. The Genesis of the Valuev Circular	97
 <i>Chapter 5</i>	
The Valuev Circular in Government Structures and Public Opinion	117
 <i>Chapter 6</i>	
Government Policy after the Valuev Circular	127

Chapter 7

Strengthening the Russian Assimilation Potential in the
Western Borderland 139

Chapter 8

The Kiev Period of Ukrainophilism (1872–1876) 155

Chapter 9

The Ems Edict 179

Chapter 10

The “Execution” of the Ems Edict 191

Chapter 11

The Consequences of the Ems Edict 199

Chapter 12

The Subsidy for *Slovo*. Galician Rusyns in the Policy
of St. Petersburg 211

Chapter 13

The 1880–1881 Crisis of Power and the Attempt to Abolish
the Ems Edict 221

Conclusion 247

Appendix 1 263

Appendix 2 267

Sources and Literature 275

Glossary 289

Index of Names 291

Preface

Since the early 1990s, a great number of books have been published in English that have “Russia and Ukraine” or “the Russian–Ukrainian encounter” in their titles. The majority of these books are devoted to current political issues, but a fair share of the publications is about history. They invariably note that a special role in imperial policy toward Ukraine was played by the Valuev Circular of 1863 and the Ems Edict of 1876, whereby the tsarist government imposed a host of prohibitions on the publication and circulation of books and other printed materials in the Ukrainian language. Up to the present day, however, the circumstances under which these documents were adopted and the reasons why they remained in force longer than any other prohibitive measures of their kind—namely, until the revolution of 1905—have been a matter of more or less educated guesswork. This book provides a response to these questions. Using archival documents, it reconstructs in minute detail, sometimes on a day-by-day basis, the process of the adoption of administrative decisions that eventually resulted in these prohibitions. This reconstruction is of interest not only to historians of Russian–Ukrainian relations, but also to those who are studying more generally the mechanisms of imperial government and nationality policies in the late imperial period.

The book traces in detail the public polemic over the “Ukrainian question”—that is, it provides important material for those interested in the way public opinion influenced bureaucratic decision making in the Romanov empire. The book also offers a new perspective on one of the central questions of late imperial history, that of the correlation between the empire and the nation in Russian public thought. The book shows why the “Ukrainian and Belorussian questions” occupied a special place in Russian nationalist thought, and why this resulted

in special conditions for the development of Ukrainian nationalism in the Russian Empire.

This is a historical study, but, to the extent to which it touches on the history of ideas and the imagined geography of nation and national territory, it will also be useful for an understanding of contemporary problems, since many of the ideas and images of the nineteenth century have survived, in a modified form, to the present day in Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian and Polish political thought.

Acknowledgements

I would like above all to thank Professor Andreas Kappeler of Vienna University and Professor Alfred J. Rieber of Central European University—not only did they provide invaluable organizational assistance, but were the first attentive and critical readers of the manuscript, thereby substantially contributing to its improvement. It is understood of course that they are not responsible in any way for the errors that may persist despite their efforts.

A great number of people have helped me in the course of this project, both in collecting material and by offering valuable advice and criticism in discussing individual chapters. I would like to mention with gratitude Iurii Pivovarov, Sergei Volkov, Ostap Sereda, Yaroslav Hrytsak, Iurii Shevtsov, Roman Solchanik, Viktor Dudko, Aleksandr Samarin, Oleg Ken, Ricarda Vulpius, Benjamin Schenk, Philipp Ther and to apologize to all others whom I have not mentioned.

The staff of the St. Petersburg and Moscow archives in which I had to work deserves a special commendation—all of them were very attentive to my needs.

Fine conditions for the work on the book were provided thanks to the financial and organizational support of The Alexander von Humboldt Foundation whose grantee I was in 1998–99.

The Collegium Budapest provided me with equally good opportunities to prepare the English edition. I would like to thank for their help Sergei Dobrynin and Tatiana Trokhina, and, of course, Olga Poato who did the English translation of this text.

My very special gratitude is to Tatiana, my wife, for her patience and sacrifice.

Introduction

The only book on the policies of the Russian imperial authorities with respect to the “Ukrainian question” was written in the late 1920s by Ukrainian historian Fedor Savchenko.¹ He, along with other colleagues of M. S. Grushevskii, who returned to the Soviet Union in 1924 and became chief of the Ukrainian history section of the History Division of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, did much at the time to research the subject.² Savchenko’s book was, in a sense, the sum total of this work—it included a large body of documents, most published for the first time, and touched, with varying degrees of detail, on all the key episodes of that story. Reprinted in 1970 in Munich—the Kiev edition had by then become a rarity—the work of Savchenko defined the concept of the subject for historians working in adjacent areas. As a matter of fact, Savchenko was thought to have “closed” the subject. It was only in the late 1980s that British historian David Saunders returned to the study of state policy with regard to the Ukrainian national movement in the early 1860s. For instance, he put forward such questions as why the authorities resorted to these particular repressive measures, largely unique in terms of their nationality policies, what they sought to achieve, and what they feared. The Savchenko book did not give any definitive answers to these questions. This is partially explained by the fact that Savchenko erroneously believed many of these questions to be self-evident. But there was another reason as well. It is not hard to detect that Savchenko was writing his book in a hurry, which considerably affected both its analytical component and the clarity of the arrangement of his material. Savchenko had serious reasons for such haste in the late 1920s—the Soviet policy of “Ukrainization” was coming to an end, and he correctly believed that in the near future not only the publication of such a book would become impossible, but he himself might become a victim of the terror.

This is exactly what happened: in 1934, Savchenko, like almost all the other colleagues of Grushevskii, was arrested, sent to the Solovki camp, and executed along with many other Ukrainian intellectuals in 1937.

But Sounders, too, had to limit himself to hypothesizing. The problem was that he, like Savchenko, worked only with a part of the documents, which were divided between the Moscow and St. Petersburg archives. Thus, the first task of the present study has been to bring together the entire body of relevant sources and to reconstruct as completely as possible the process of decision making on the “Ukrainian question.”³ In addition, I have tried to follow the polemic around this question in the most popular and influential publications, the polemic which, contrary to the claims of some researchers,⁴ remained very lively until the early 1880s.

However, having solved these problems, the author encountered a more general and complex question—that of how to tell this story. First of all, how adequate for this are the words we commonly use today? Secondly, what is this story about? In search of an answer to these questions, which are far from simple and which take up the introductory chapters of the book, we have to turn to problems and comparisons that go far beyond the scope of the original subject.

THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES OF NATIONALISM STUDIES IMPORTANT FOR THIS BOOK

This book is about nationalism. The subject is fashionable in a positive sense. It is safe to say that in the last two decades nationalism studies have turned into the most dynamically developing trend among the social sciences—the quantity of publications is huge, and the number of specialized research centers and academic journals is constantly growing. However, there are few generally accepted “truths” in the theoretical interpretations of nationalism, and the skeptic will say there are none. A discussion of controversial theoretical issues would be out of place here.⁵ Our objective is more modest—to explain the particular theoretical positions that served as points of departure and guided the author in his work on this text.

One of these starting points is the concept of nation as an “imagined community,” as formulated by Benedict Anderson. Anderson

apparently feared, and not without reason, that his term “imagined community” would be interpreted incorrectly, and he provided it with a comprehensive commentary. Anderson regards as “imagined” *all* communities whose members do not and cannot personally, or even “by hearsay,” know the majority of the other members, but who have in mind an idea of such a community, its image. The “imagined” nature of such communities does not indicate in any way that they are false or unreal.⁶ Large communities, which include not only nations but also classes, can be classified according to the styles and methods of their imagining. Anderson illustrates the thesis that the nature of a community is subject to change by the example of the aristocracy, which came to be perceived as a social class only in the nineteenth century while before that it had been understood through the categories of kinship and vassal ties.

Anderson has asked the question of what constitutes the principal novelty of the nationalist way of imagining a community. It is precisely the delineation of “the processes by which the nation came to be imagined, and, once imagined, modeled, adapted and transformed,” according to Anderson’s own definition, to which the main part of his book is dedicated.⁷

Several of Anderson’s theses are directly related to the subject of this book. First of all, he correctly points out the secondary, imitative character of Central and East European nationalisms, which have borrowed ready-made constructions and adapted them to their own conditions. This means that the “nation” was an idea, a goal, an image to which one could aspire from the outset of the movement rather than a gradually forming concept.⁸ We will add, on our part, that some nationalisms, including the Ukrainian, borrowed their models from the Central European peoples, primarily the Czechs and Poles, while Russian nationalism mostly sought its models in Western Europe, which is easily explained by the differences in their goals.

The borrowing of ready-made ideological “modules” means that the backwardness in the ideological sphere was significantly less pronounced than in the sphere of socioeconomic development. Consequently, in Eastern Europe nationalist ideas and images emerged and functioned in a social environment that was essentially different from the conditions under which these ideas were initially formulated. The possibilities of mass communication, the mechanisms of exercising

power and the means that the state authorities had at their disposal in resolving the new problems that appeared with the advent of nationalism were all different.

Anderson has also correctly pointed out the difference between the nationalism of the “dominant” nations and the “official nationalism” of the ruling dynasties. I have deliberately put the notion of “dominant” in quotation marks. Under the old regime the French, Spanish, or Russian nationalisms as social movements were developing “from below,” just as the nationalisms of the “small peoples.” Both formally and in practice power belonged not to the nations, but to the dynasties. All over Europe the old dynasties, with greater or lesser success, and with greater or lesser enthusiasm (as a rule, with very limited enthusiasm), were living through the process of their own nationalization. They were forced to do so. The old world, in which they received their power “from God” and lorded it over various “languages and peoples” (including those that are habitually called dominant), was more familiar and comfortable, but the gradual establishment of nationalism as a way of looking at the social universe was forcing the monarchies to compensate for the weakening of the old mechanisms of the ideological legitimization of their power by this new source of legitimization, even if it was not always comfortable for them. Anderson’s thesis that this official nationalism was reactive in the sense that it served as a response to the development of nationalistic sentiments among their subjects, including both the suppressed minorities and the peoples who constituted the ethnic core of the empires, is very important.

The process of the “nationalization” of the Romanov dynasty was much protracted and took practically the entire nineteenth century, and the consequences of this delay were aggravated by the autocratic character of the Romanovs’ power.⁹ As a matter of fact, it was the desire to preserve autocracy that was the main reason why the Romanovs were more obstinate (and more successful) than the majority of the European dynasties in their resistance to nationalization, thereby depriving for a long time the process of nation formation in the Russian Empire of such key components as the expansion of political participation and the establishing of a civil society. There was no real contact and cooperation between the autocracy and Russian society in the field of nation building in the nineteenth century. In other major European countries state power left much more room for public involvement, including in matters of nation building, and the state itself began to take part in

this process much earlier and more consciously. When, after 1905, Nicholas II finally deemed it necessary to seek a union with the Russian nationalists, his choice fell upon the most extremist and most odious organizations, oriented rather toward pogroms than building of any kind.

Anderson is quite justified in correcting Hugh Seton-Watson, who wrote about the Romanov “nationalization” as a unique phenomenon, and points out that largely similar processes were going on in London and Paris, Berlin and Madrid.¹⁰

Thus, we shall formulate the main thesis: *Russian nationalism as a public sentiment, and the “official nationalism” of the autocracy, are closely connected yet independent phenomena, sometimes going on side by side, but no less often entering into conflict with each other.*

Another important consequence of Anderson’s concept is that a significant period of time elapses between the moment the nation is “imagined,” that is, when its image, which we will provisionally call the ideological or ideal fatherland,¹¹ is conceived among the elite, and the moment when a corresponding national identity takes hold among the majority of the members of this imagined community. It is very important to stress that this process is far from predetermined, that is, *the efforts to establish a particular variation of national identity can result in either success or failure; it is equally probable that the realization of the nation and its relations with the state, even in the event that the project is implemented, can differ significantly from its original version.*¹²

Different nation-building projects may have conflicting interests, for example, they may claim the same territory or even ethnic group. Occasionally the possession of a particular borderland area is contested by two or more imagined communities. (As we will see, the conflict between the Russian and Polish images of the “ideal fatherland” can serve as an example.) The conflict may have a total character, in the sense that one image of the ideal fatherland includes the entire territory and population of the other, denying the alternative project as such. (An example here would be precisely the conflict between the Russian and Ukrainian nationalisms.)

The ethnic and cultural characteristics of the population that becomes an object of contention among different national activists exert a significant influence on their concepts and the way in which the struggle proceeds. In this respect, we are on the side of Anthony Smith rather than the radical modernist Ernest Gellner, who claimed

that the original ethnic material does not in practice limit the freedom of creativity of nationalists in their nation-building projects.¹³ This does not mean, however, that the original ethnic characteristics exclude the possibility of their different—within certain limits—interpretation and their use as a base for different nation-building projects. A great number of other factors, along with the characteristics of the original ethnic material, define in the end the more or less complete success or failure of a particular project. One of the purposes of this book is to attract attention to those factors that have been previously underestimated or omitted completely when analyzing Russian–Ukrainian relations.

Practically all the theoretical studies of nationalism of the last few decades are to some extent based on the work of Karl Deutsch.¹⁴ Deutsch's interest was concentrated on the formation and development of a communication system that would make it possible to form and *reproduce* the idea of national unity. He considered it to be a consequence of urbanization, of the formation of market and railroad networks—in a word, the industrial revolution. Anderson has corrected Deutsch's thesis in a sense by showing in his book that the formation of such a communication system is, strictly speaking, not a consequence, but part of the modernization process that can sometimes even precede the industrial revolution.

In Russia, the formation of the public sphere (*obshchestvennost'*), public opinion, and a market for the press as the principal mass medium of the time became possible, if still significantly limited by administrative restrictions, mainly after the reforms of Alexander II. It was precisely in this "public sphere," that is, among the educated, literate public, that images of the nation and concepts of national interests were discussed, formulated and reproduced. It was from this "public" that these ideas were transferred to the "people" as it became reachable by the propaganda and the printed word. A number of "public spheres" were formed in the expanses of the Russian Empire. The Moscow and Petersburg newspapers and journals dominated, practically without competition, the reading public of Pskov, Nizhnii Novgorod, Orenburg and Irkutsk. They were read in Kiev, too, but the reading circle here was not limited to them. On the other hand, in the Kingdom of Poland, Finland and the Baltic provinces, the Moscow and Petersburg press played only a marginal part.¹⁵

These "public spheres," different but not completely isolated from each other, can also be called spaces of functioning of particular dis-

courses. The interpretation of nationalism as a discourse is an important starting point for this work. It is largely based on the writings of Deutsch and Anderson, although neither used this term. The notion of discourse includes socially acceptable ways of seeing and interpreting the outside world, as well as human actions and institutional forms of social organization that ensue from precisely this vision. Michel Foucault wrote in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* of revealing “a task that consists of not—or no longer—treating discourses as groups of signs (signifying elements referring to contents or representations) but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak.”¹⁶ “The ‘nation’ is precisely what Foucault has called a ‘discursive formation’—not simply an allegory or imaginative vision, but a gestative political structure [...] Nationalism is a trope for such things as ‘belonging’, ‘bordering’, and ‘commitment’. But it should also be understood as the *institutional* uses of fiction,” wrote Timothy Brennan in 1990, in the collection *Nation and Narration*.¹⁷

Katrin Verdery, developing Anderson’s comment on the nation as the most universal legitimate value in modern-day political life,¹⁸ devoted a special article to the symbolic nature of the nation. According to Verdery, the peculiarity of a national symbol is that it evokes a whole spectrum of powerful emotions while remaining, as any symbol, polysemous and open to various interpretations. Verdery calls the nation “a basic operator in a widespread system of social classification,” “an aspect of political and symbolic/ideological order and also of the world of social interaction and feeling.”¹⁹

Verdery defines nationalism as “the political utilization of the symbol nation through discourse and political activity, as well as the sentiment that draws people into responding to this symbol’s use.”²⁰ Nationalism is thus not located on the same plane as ideologies such as liberal or socialist, and cannot be reduced to one of the several political movements existing in society. It is impossible, for instance, to imagine a liberal–socialist, if one understands liberalism not as a behavioral style but as a value system. At the same time, history provides us with an unlimited supply of liberal–nationalists as well as socialist–nationalists.²¹ In the vast majority of cases, all political actors, whether they want to or not, are forced to get involved in the fight for their right to establish in society their own interpretation of the nation symbol which is key for modern political discourse. They are fighting for this ideological and mobilizational resource in order to achieve certain goals

with its help, whether liberal or socialist, authoritarian or democratic. "To reject nationalism absolutely," states Simon During categorically, "is to accede to a way of thought by which intellectuals... cut themselves off from effective political action."²² The situation was somewhat different in the nineteenth century—nationalism was only just beginning to establish itself in this way in the struggle against other forms of political discourse, both old (religious and dynastic) and new (class). In Russia, the establishing of the nationalist discourse as a dominant one met with great difficulties, but in the second half of the nineteenth century its role was already quite prominent.

Within the framework of the broadly conceived nationalist discourse, there is interaction and competition between various interpretations of the nation and national interests, very different in their degree of aggressiveness, xenophobia, or tolerance. This means that it would be incorrect to speak of French, Russian, Polish or Ukrainian nationalisms as something homogeneous. The question is, which of the interpretations of the nation and national interests become dominant at a particular moment in a particular society, in this or that social milieu, and why? If we pose the question in this way, it in practice disavows the traditional classifications and periodizations of nationalism used by Hans Kohn, John Plamenatz and Ernest Gellner, in which different types of nationalism have rigid geographical ties.²³

Another very important methodological consequence of this point of view is the interpretation of the notions of "nationalism" and "nationalist" as value free. In Soviet times, the negative connotation of these terms was firmly established in such oppositions as (bourgeois) nationalism *vs.* (Soviet) patriotism; and cosmopolitanism (obviously bad) *vs.* internationalism (obviously good, proletarian). Typologically similar phenomena were named in a positive or negative way depending on whether or not the narrator liked them. According to this logic, there were "our" intelligence agents and "their" spies.²⁴ The arbitrarily selective and implicitly negative use of the notion "nationalist" exists to the present day, and not only in Russia. For instance, German president Johannes Rau explained in his inaugural speech that a patriot is a person who loves his homeland, while a nationalist is one who hates other peoples and nations. There is no doubt that such remarks are motivated by the best intentions, but it is not clear in which category, within this classification, we should place, for instance, Silesian Germans whose love for their homeland, as they understand it,

provoked them in the past, and continues to provoke them to this day, even if increasingly less often, to rather aggressive statements against the Czech Republic and Poland, where their homeland, from which they were expelled, is now located. It is clear that for a scholarly study devoted to the analysis of a conflict over a nation, especially in an Eastern Europe of a time when nations were only forming and often had designs on the same territory, this practice is not applicable, since it automatically turns the text into propaganda. *In this book the definition of someone as a nationalist (whether Russian, Polish or Ukrainian) carries neither a positive nor a negative connotation. We call a nationalist everyone who participates in the nationalist discourse, that is, who accepts and attempts to interpret in some way the categories of national interests and nation as symbolic values.* A particular individual can only be evaluated after an analysis of what that person understands as the nation, and how they interpret national interests and methods of their implementation. Furthermore, the criterion for such evaluation should not be the extent to which the author sympathizes with the ideal of the nation espoused by a certain individual—that would in fact mean turning our own *subjective* ideal into a criterion for assessment—but rather the social cost of the methods of achieving the ideal that our individual considers acceptable. A certain degree of conflict and aggressiveness is present in any world-view and in any ideological system. With regard to those variations of nationalism where these qualities are dominant and which, precisely for this reason, we feel obligated to provide with an unequivocally negative assessment, we will use the adjectives “chauvinistic” and “xenophobic.”

One more important innovation of recent years is formulated most clearly in the article by John Hall, “Nationalisms: Classified and Explained.” The essence of Hall’s main thesis is reflected already in the title of the work, which uses nationalisms in the plural. “No single, universal theory of nationalism is possible. As the historical record is diverse, so too must be our concepts,”²⁵ he writes.

Hall based his conclusions on what was perhaps the main achievement of nationalism studies in the 1970s and 1980s. This was the formation of a certain consensus that resulted not from concurrence but from difference of positions on the issue of factors that had conditioned the emergence of nationalism and “launched” the processes of nation formation. Thus, Gellner emphasized the role of industrialism and the formation of a system of comprehensive standardized educa-

tion; Deutsch emphasized the advent of mass communication systems; Anderson accentuated the importance of “print capitalism,” “linguistic revolutions,” and new ways of seeing the world; Charles Tilly and Michael Mann stressed the role of the state and the wars of the absolutist era; Miroslav Hroch and Eric Hobsbawm commented on the role of intellectual elites; Anthony Smith noted the significance of the ethnic factor; and Józef Chlebowczyk spoke of the importance of the emotional factor.²⁶ This multitude of voices bore fruit in the recognition of the multiplicity of factors that influence the process of nation formation, of the endless variety of their combinations in history, and of their relative significance in these combinations.

Hall’s thesis can be developed further. No nationalism exists without opposition to another nationalism, or sometimes a number of nationalisms, eager to establish their own hierarchies of identities and values.²⁷ The structure of these oppositions and mutual influences—and nationalisms have no qualms about borrowing ideas, images and tactics from their adversaries—is uniquely different in each particular case. Only by identifying the basic oppositions and the systems of correlation of the sets of values that are established by a particular nationalism can we understand the logic of the development of the situation.²⁸ In a sense, it is a war of all against all, where the confrontation takes place both within a particular nationalist discourse (between those who acknowledge a certain nation as a symbolic value but differ on the question of the interpretation of national interests), and vis-à-vis other, external nationalist discourses that, in their turn, experience other outside influences and internal contradictions. Hence an important methodological consequence—*the necessity for a situational and communicative approach to nationalism studies*. More productive are the kinds of analysis and classification that involve not individual nationalisms, but rather structures of interaction among different nationalisms, both on the level of ideological confrontations and influences and on the level of political interaction between different national movements and between these movements and state structures.

A valuable addition to what has been said is the study by Peter Sahlins, who demonstrated the way a conflict between major political forces aggravates the problem of identification for the local community that is drawn into its field.²⁹ This is of great importance to our subject, since the formation of identities on the territory of present-day Ukraine was happening in the field of the centuries-long competition

between the Polish Commonwealth, Muscovy and the Ottoman Empire, and later between the Romanov empire and the Polish nobility.

In his study of one of the regions of Catalonia divided by the French–Spanish border, Sahlins made a correction to the image of state and nation building as a process whose vector points exclusively from center to periphery. He demonstrated that, as early as the seventeenth century, this process was taking place in both directions. The center did not simply establish its values in local communities, but the local communities played an important part in the formation of state and national borders. The Catalonians of Cerdania and Roussillon were far from passive in their choice of loyalty and in the use of the state for their own interests. Relations between the Little Russians, primarily the Cossack community, and the Polish Commonwealth, Muscovy, and later the Russian Empire, and their role in the formation of the Russian nation, provide a great wealth of material in support of this thesis.³⁰

Many of Sahlins's conclusions develop the ideas on the formation of identities in borderland spaces that were put forward much earlier by Józef Chlebowczyk.³¹ Especially relevant for our purposes is the differentiation between the “adjacent” and “transitional” borderlands that Chlebowczyk introduced. The former concept denotes a space of coexistence of radically different ethnic and linguistic groups (e.g., Poles and Germans, Slovaks and Hungarians), and the latter, that of related groups (e.g., Slavic).³² However, Sahlins's study corrects one of the principal errors of Chlebowczyk, who believed that the processes he investigated were not characteristic of Western Europe, in which he included Spain.³³

COMPARATIVE–HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Thus, we agree with Benedict Anderson that the nation is an imagined community. A significant time span divides the moment the nations are first imagined, that is, when the nation-building projects have been formulated by ideologues, and the stage in the development of the national movements when the formation of national identities allows us to judge which of the projects were successful and which failed, and to what extent. This temporal distance, which in Russia spanned the period from the 1830s to the first decades of the twentieth century,

is rich in alternatives that inevitably follow from the conflicts between different nation-building projects.

In order to see these alternatives, it is very important to “emancipate” our look into the past from our knowledge of subsequent events. To help explain this point we will enlist the aid of Emmanuel Wallerstein, who published in the late 1980s an essay with the apparently strange title “Does India Exist?”³⁴ The essence of Wallerstein’s work can be summarized in the following way. We know very well that India exists today and possesses a sufficient set of the attributes of a state and, although it is more problematic, of a nation. But what are we to do with books called, for instance, “The History of India in the Sixteenth Century”? Let us imagine—it is perfectly possible—that half this peninsula was colonized by the English and the other half by the French. It is likely then that two states would have emerged on the peninsula after decolonization. The English-speaking state could be called, say, Dravidia; the other, French-speaking, state, Hindustan. In that case, we would today be reading books called “The History of Dravidia in the Sixteenth Century” or “The Culture of Hindustan Prior to Colonization.” Precisely because we know of India’s existence today, we are projecting this knowledge into the past. This practice—not only in India, of course—is widely encouraged by state structures that use historic myths to legitimate the nation-state.

It would be only a relatively slight simplification to suggest that until now there were two ways of telling the story of Russian–Ukrainian relations in the nineteenth century. In one case, it is the story of a nation, which, in its drive toward self-determination, like grass breaking through asphalt, triumphantly overcomes all the obstacles created by the anti-Ukrainian policies of the empire. In the other case, it is the story of how, due to an extremely unfortunate combination of circumstances, the Polish, German, Vatican and Austrian schemes succeeded in breaking apart the body of the All-Russian nation regenerated after the unification in the Russian Empire of the bulk of the former Kievan Rus’. It cannot be said that the advocates of these two approaches are divided strictly along national lines, but it is clear that the first is characteristic of Ukrainian historiography, while the second was especially popular in Russian pre-revolutionary nationalist literature.

I am speaking here of pre-revolutionary Russian literature, since in Soviet times the issues regarded by the bosses as part of the Ukrainian

history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries could only be studied “on location.” In any case, Moscow and the communist authorities of Ukraine itself closely controlled what was written in Kiev and Lvov. The study of nationalism in general, and of nationalism and nation-formation processes in the Russian Empire, let alone in the USSR, in particular, was not welcome. By the way, there was nothing unique about this situation. “Nationalism studies were perceived as opposition to the existing regime in the 1960s and 1970s, since the regime emphasized unity. Nationalism itself was almost totally ignored by researchers. [...] Characteristically, there was an almost complete absence of comparisons with similar processes abroad.” This was not written about the USSR—this is how Xosé Núñez describes the situation in Spanish historiography under Franco.³⁵ It comes as no surprise, then, that the book the reader now holds is the first book on Russian–Ukrainian relations in the nineteenth century written in Russia after 1917.

The majority of foreign historians, who are less engaged politically and emotionally, still experience the influence of one of the concepts mentioned above. With all their differences, these points of view have one thing in common—referring to the nineteenth century, they more or less openly treat the Ukrainian and All-Russian nations not as projects but as complete, consolidated communities. For the sake of fairness we should say that not everyone is ready to agree with this approach—thus Mark von Hagen wrote of the impossibility of presenting the history of Ukraine within the framework of a traditional “national” narrative.³⁶ However, the responses to his article published in the same issue of the *Slavic Review* testify that resistance to such “revisionism” among historians is quite strong.

It is self-evident that any “national” concepts of history are to a very large extent the present or an ideal future projected onto the past. In this sense they reflect the interests of national political elites. Political pressure and commissioning are especially prominent in the new, “nationalizing” states, which include modern-day Russia and Ukraine.³⁷ “Ukrainian independence [...] raises the question of the shaping and reshaping of identities, and the perception of history has been and continues to be a chief battleground in the struggle over identity”—this is how the present-day situation in Ukrainian historiography is defined by the well-known American historian of Ukrainian descent, Zenon Kohut.³⁸ Some Russian historians today also tend to perceive themselves as fighters in this battle.³⁹

As a matter of fact, the first casualty in such battles is history as a profession. History must generally try to answer two questions. How did “this” happen? And why did “this” happen? The second question also inevitably reads: Why did events and processes develop in this and no other way? With regard to our subject, it means we will analyze the historically realized way of development of Russian–Ukrainian relations and nation formation in Eastern Europe as *logical but not predetermined*. We thus reject the determinism implied in one of the approaches, but, at the same time, we reject the interpretation of the historically realized course of events as an unhappy, unnatural accident, as is implied in the other. The starting questions for us, then, become: What was the alternative to the historically realized scenario in the nineteenth century? And why was this alternative not implemented? In fact, we are speaking of a variation of “prospect analysis” as described by Charles Tilly.⁴⁰

To answer the first of these questions we will return to the essay of Wallerstein on India, quoted above. The author concludes with the remark that a more or less similar “problematization of the past” can be done with respect to any other nation, including European nations. We will attempt to develop this thesis. So, do France, Spain, Great Britain, Germany, Italy exist in that ontological sense that Wallerstein had in mind when he asked if India existed? For a sufficiently long time, including the nineteenth century, all of these states, in different historical circumstances and by different means, were resolving what was ultimately the same problem of the political consolidation and cultural homogenization of the nation-state.

In the cases of Germany and Italy the political side of the problem was laid completely bare—separate small states had to be united. The outcome of these efforts was not clearly predetermined. “In the last period of the [Holy Roman] Empire, at the turn of the eighteenth century, it was thus possible to imagine that an Austrian, a Prussian or a Bavarian nation could be a political reality,” writes Klaus Zernack.⁴¹ Another German historian, Franz Schnabel, believes that alternativity is characteristic of the nineteenth century, too: “The chance for a central European solution [i.e., a broad and relatively loose federation of German states] was just as evident in German life as was the chance for a *kleindeutsch* solution [i.e., a closer and geographically more limited unification of Germany by Prussia]. Before Bismarck’s appearance...all possibilities were still open.”⁴² As a matter of fact, the his-

tory of the Austrian nation, whose formation was finally completed only in the latter half of the twentieth century, demonstrates that the mental image of the borderlines of the German nation could significantly change in later days. The formation of the Italian nation was likewise far from devoid of alternative possibilities. The differences and contradictions between the north and the south, which are exploited by the present-day Lega Nord, emerged long before the twentieth century. One way or another, it is clear that both Germany and Italy could fail to “materialize,” at least in the way we know them today. It is possible to assume that in these countries the problem of unification dominated the political agenda in the nineteenth century to such an extent that it effectively blocked the appearance of political movements that would aim to formulate particularist nationalist projects, even if the regional cultural, historical and linguistic differences provided sufficient raw material for such projects.

For further comparisons, however, we are more interested in the examples of France, Britain and Spain, that is, states that could easily be found on the map of Europe already in the eighteenth century. There is no need to argue specifically for the ethnic, cultural and linguistic heterogeneity of the populations of Great Britain and Spain. Contrary to the widespread myth, the continental part of the French empire also remained culturally and linguistically heterogeneous throughout the nineteenth century. A statistical review carried out by the French Ministry of Public Instruction in 1863 shows that at least a quarter of the population of continental France spoke no French at the time. French was a foreign language to approximately half of the 4 million French schoolchildren. Eugen Weber, who published this document, provides evidence further on that the ministry deliberately lowered the number of non-French-speaking people in order to demonstrate its successes.⁴³ Practically the entire south and a large part of the southeast and southwest of the country spoke dialects to which the French gave the collective name *patois*, and which were largely so different from French that Parisian travelers were unable to ask for directions. (It would be difficult to imagine a Russian nobleman traveling through Little Russia in this kind of situation.) “In 1858 the Virgin who appeared to Bernadette Soubirous needed no interpreter; but she did find it necessary to address the girl, at least in part, in the Pyrenean dialect of Lourdes,” notes Eugen Weber.⁴⁴ The peasants of Brittany and Provence, who spoke local dialects, were no French

patriots, not by a long shot, and the question of whether they would become Frenchmen remained open for most of the nineteenth century. In the latter half of the nineteenth century there were sufficiently active groups of intellectuals in France (*félibres* and the neo-Celtic movement) who tried to turn *patois* into standardized languages, which was a typical step by nationalists in Central and Eastern Europe on their way to the creation of "their own" nations.

The Scottish people were no patriots of Britain either, especially in the Highlands. The Scot Tom Nairn, armed with a knowledge of subsequent events and not free from emotional involvement, calls the Scottish romantic movement of the 1850s and the successive Home Rule movements only the precursors of Scottish nationalism,⁴⁵ but it would still be more correct to define these phenomena as moderate, and in many ways self-limiting, nationalism.⁴⁶ The Irish example goes further by demonstrating that British efforts to consolidate the nation-state could suffer severe defeats. In all these states various possibilities as to the outcome of the struggle between the consolidating and centrifugal tendencies were preserved for a long time after nationalism had become one of the dominant political concepts, at least in the sense that not all the regions of present-day Spain, Great Britain and France were bound to become part of these nation-states.

Each of these states, depending on the circumstances and its own potential, used a different nation-building strategy and achieved a different degree of success. The maximalist program, assimilationist in cultural and linguistic terms and centralizing in its administrative aspect, was carried out in France. Eugen Weber has described in detail the ways in which the French government used the administrative system, schools, army, and church as instruments of linguistic and cultural assimilation. Nor did France stop short of imposing administrative prohibitions and practices of severe psychological pressure.⁴⁷ The law that for the first time allowed the optional teaching of local languages in schools was passed in France only in 1951. On the other hand, the relative effectiveness of economic development and the rather generous material support of the local communities by the French state played no less important a part in the success of assimilation than did repressive actions.⁴⁸ Spain, which generally followed the French model, achieved much more limited results because of its backward economic development and the relative weakness of state power. As a result, today the Catalonians on the French side of the border are calling

themselves, if not French, then at least *French* Catalonians, while on the Spanish side the Catalonians prefer Catalanian identity as national and oppositional to Spanish.⁴⁹

The English strategy was differentiated. The policy in Ireland was close to colonial—the repressive component was obviously predominant. The province was governed as an occupied territory, and terror was legitimized by special acts. In Scotland, the English suppressed the Jacobite rebellions no less brutally than Peter the Great persecuted the adherents of Mazepa. After the defeat of the last rebellion in 1746, for several months the English troops killed without trial any Highland Scot they managed to capture. The suggestion to exterminate all women of childbearing age from the Jacobite families was discussed in earnest, and the commander of the English troops in Scotland demanded for himself official authority to execute suspects and confiscate their property. However, from the late eighteenth century, based to a great extent on the experience of the assimilation of Lowland Scotland, England began a transition to legalist forms of government.⁵⁰ The attractiveness of England, the world leader in economic and political development at the time, as well as career and entrepreneurial opportunities opening up for the Scots within the British Empire, led to a situation in which the nationalist movements received no substantial support in Scotland. Demands were still being made to make Gaelic the language of schooling, but England did not have to interfere—these demands were rejected by the Scottish elites themselves.

The effort to “Frenchify” all the residents of France was understood as an effort to suppress regional identity completely. It was no accident that Napoleon replaced all the traditional names of the French *départements* with purely formal, geographical names related to the names of the rivers flowing through their territories. In contrast, the effort to establish British identity did not in any way presuppose that all the residents of Britain should be turned into Englishmen. It was important that the Scottish or Welsh identity functioned as regional, that is, that it did not deny the all-British identity and did not demand a separate state. The purpose was not total but partial assimilation, which Chlebowczyk calls semi-assimilation or “cultural hybridization.”⁵¹

“In the case of state nationalisms, the state tries to minimize the internal national diversity by diffusing, through folklorism, or by elimi-

nating, through a combination of education and repression, the existing ethnic feelings which could generate ethnonationalist demands. Because the 'national cultures' that most states try to impose are in fact the hegemonic cultures of the ruling cores (southeast England in the UK, Castile in Spain, the region of Paris in France, etc.), they have to be reinforced with the ideologies derived from political nationalism"—this is how Josep Llobera sums up the Western European experience.⁵² With all the differences in the implementation of this policy in various states, one common basic program can be singled out—the affirmation of a language of high culture, administration and education, as well as of a common national identity that could either suppress regional differences or tolerate them, but only as subordinate.

What does all this have to do with our subject? Until now, the nation-formation processes in the Russian Empire have been compared mostly with those of the Habsburg Empire.⁵³ This comparison should be regarded as productive for the study of the national movements of a number of oppressed peoples in the Romanov empire, but its absolutization, especially when applied to Russian-Ukrainian relations, can produce misleading results. In this comparative context, it is often overlooked that the situation in the Austrian empire—that is, the character of the political regime, ethnic balance and the Austrian Germans' orientation toward the project of the great German nation—made it highly complicated for the ruling classes to aim at the consolidation, in one way or another, of the empire's core into a nation-state. (Only after passing the 1844 law on the exclusive rights of the Hungarian language in the lands of St. Stephen's Crown, and the 1867 agreement on dualism, did the Hungarian political elite receive such an opportunity, which they exercised immediately.)

France, Spain and Britain were also empires, but maritime empires, not continental as were the empires of the Habsburgs and Romanovs. The process of consolidation of the nation-state took place mostly in the cores of the maritime empires, separated from most of their colonies by the ocean. The examples of Algiers and Ireland demonstrate that this rule was not without exceptions, but on the whole the sea substantially facilitated for the elites of these empires the isolation of the core as a space for nation building, though as a matter of fact continental France and Spain, as well as the British Isles, were also empires rather than homogeneous core states. The peasants who were not assimilated into the culture of the dominant center were, in

full concordance with the traditions of colonial discourse, described as savages and compared with the American Indians.⁵⁴

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, for participants in the events in Russia the analogy between the problems that were becoming relevant with the emergence of the Ukrainian national movement and the situation in the major West European countries of the time seemed unavoidable. Practically everyone who wrote of the “Ukrainian question” considered it necessary to define their attitude toward this comparison. Obviously, it was not a comparison “without anger or prejudice.” The opponents of the Ukrainian movement were using it as one of the main arguments in their effort to prove that the claims of the Ukrainian nationalists were inappropriate, impossible or harmful. It seems that V. I. Lamanskii was the first to compare Ukrainian with *patois* in the Slavophile *Den*.⁵⁵ Subsequently, this comparison was actively used by M. N. Katkov, the main critic of the Ukrainophiles. The Ukrainophiles (N. I. Kostomarov, M. P. Dragomanov) and those Russian publicists who shared their opinion (N. G. Chernyshevskii), on the contrary, usually tried to prove that this analogy was inapplicable. On the other hand, this same Dragomanov published in 1875, before his emigration, the long article “The Neo-Celtic and Provençal Movement in France,” in which he actually insisted on this analogy. The point is that in this article he tried to demonstrate that the regionalist nationalist movements were gradually gaining recognition in France and that their demands were being met, and he posited this imagined change in French policies as an example for the Russian authorities and public opinion.⁵⁶

It was at the end of his life, in 1891, that Dragomanov returned to this subject in his famous work “Strange Thoughts on the Ukrainian National Question.” This article was written in Ukrainian and was a polemic against the kind of undereducated Ukrainian nationalists who, in Dragomanov’s opinion, discredited and disoriented the movement by the tendentiousness and primitivism of their writings. The fourth chapter of the work is devoted entirely to a comparison between the Russifying policy and the policies of the major European states. Dragomanov’s conclusion is as follows: “Russification is not a system that ensues from the national spirit of the Great Russians or specifically from the soil of the Russian state. It is, to a large extent at least, the consequence of a certain phase of an all-European state policy. What can be considered a special Russian element in the present system of

Russification is a certain brutality which is reflected, for example, in returning the Uniates to Orthodoxy or in the prohibition on Ukrainian literature. But even this brutality seems like a specifically Russian feature only for our nineteenth century because in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the attitude of Louis XIV toward the Huguenots or of the English toward the Highland Scots was even more brutal. Even now, if we compare the attitude of the Russian autocratic, that is, archaic, government to the Uniates and Ukrainians with the attitude of the constitutional Hungarian government to the Slovaks, it is an open question who would win the palm in this contest of brutality.”⁵⁷ Among the nineteenth-century literature, this work of Dragomanov provides the most detailed treatment of the comparative context for analysis of the policies of the Russian authorities in the Ukrainian question.

Twentieth-century historians have, until recently, either ignored this comparison or, in any case, have not treated it seriously.⁵⁸ This can be explained largely by the fact that knowledge of the “future past,” that is, the course of events after the period in question, has once again narrowed the perspective of researchers: since developments have taken place differently, the analogy does not make sense from the beginning. We beg to differ. If the original structure of the problem allowed such a comparison—for the contemporaries, who did not know the subsequent course of events, there was no doubt about it,—it would be highly unproductive to reject it, since it is precisely within this comparison that the historian should search for the answer to the key question as to why one of the two theoretically possible outcomes materialized rather than the other. It is exactly the comparison between those who failed and those who more or less succeeded in solving similar problems that allows us to understand the causes of this failure.

THE “ALL-RUSSIAN NATION” PROJECT

Let us try to “insert” Russian–Ukrainian relations into this unusual comparative context. For this, we will have to answer a number of questions. First of all, did the imperial rulers and Russian elites have a conscious image of a nation that would occupy the core of the empire, and what place in it belonged to Ukraine?

To understand the logic of events, which is not devoid of a certain

irony, we will have to go deeper into history, to the latter half of the sixteenth century. In 1674, exactly 20 years after Left-Bank Ukraine came under the rule of the Muscovite tsar, a book called *The Synopsis* was published in Kiev, the work of one of the local Orthodox clerics, presumably the archimandrite of the Kiev Caves Monastery, Innokentii (Innocentius) Gisel. The book spoke of the unity of Great and Little Russia, of the single state tradition of Kievan Rus', of the common Rurikovich dynasty, and of one "Russian" or "Russian-Orthodox" people.⁵⁹ It is quite likely that the author of the *Synopsis* pursued concrete and immediate goals: first, to provide motivation for the Russian tsar to continue his struggle against the Polish Commonwealth for the liberation from Catholic power of the remaining part of the "one Orthodox people," and secondly, to facilitate the incorporation of the Hetmanate elite into the Russian nobility. (These things were far from self-evident at the time—suffice it to say that the Moscow church authorities demanded re-baptism even for those Orthodox clerics who moved to Muscovy from Little Russia before the Periaslav Treaty, since they considered Little Russian Orthodoxy somewhat imperfect.)⁶⁰

In this context, it is not important to us how effectively the *Synopsis* contributed to resolving these problems. What is important is the delayed influence of this text, which, essentially, remained the only history textbook in Russia until the 1760s. A very wide circulation and a stable buyer demand for the *Synopsis* in eighteenth-century Russia have been demonstrated in the well-documented new study by A. Iu. Samarin. "The status of a single printed book on national history explains the presence of the *Synopsis* in practically all the large book collections of the prominent personalities of the era that are known today," he writes.⁶¹ As "folk reading" the *Synopsis* remained popular until the mid-nineteenth century. By that time, it had been reprinted about 30 times. It is remarkable that despite the numerous editions and large circulation numbers the *Synopsis* remained the most popular text for manuscript copying.⁶² It is the *Synopsis* that laid the grounds for the Russian historical narrative. The *Synopsis* is indicated directly by V. N. Tatishchev as one of the sources of his views.⁶³ "The spirit of the *Synopsis* still reigns in our historiography of the eighteenth century, defines the tastes and interests of the readers, serves as a point of departure for the majority of researchers, elicits protests from the most serious of them—in a word, serves as a kind of back-drop for the development of the historical science of the last century,"

wrote P. N. Miliukov.⁶⁴ Even though attitudes toward the *Synopsis* as a historical writing were becoming increasingly critical with time, the elements of its scheme that refer to the unity of Great and Little Russia can be found in all the comprehensive Russian histories, from N. M. Karamzin to S. M. Solov'ev and V. O. Kliuchevskii.⁶⁵

Generally speaking, the culture we know today as Russian was created in the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century by a joint effort of the Russian and Ukrainian elites,⁶⁶ if we can apply the notions of a later time to that period, or, more correctly, the Great Russian and Little Russian elites.⁶⁷ It was this common heritage that the Ukrainian nationalists would later have to struggle with; among them was M. Grushevskii, who went to a great deal of trouble to critique the "traditional scheme of Russian history" composed in Kiev.⁶⁸

The ethnic groups dominant in the continental empires experienced serious difficulties with the advent of nationalism, differentiating between the traditional, supra-national (or, to be exact, pre-national and supra-ethnic) empire on the one hand, and the nation and fatherland understood as a national territory, on the other. In the Ottoman Empire this contradiction had produced, by the late nineteenth century, four ideological answers—Ottoman, that is, traditionally imperial-dynastic; pan-Turkism, that is, racial; pan-Islamism; and Young Turk, that is, nationalistic. In Russia a similar situation had evolved even earlier: pan-Slavism, the ideology of Russian imperialism, and Russian nationalism were developing in a contradictory atmosphere of rivalry and mutual influence. *Nationalist motives in Russian public opinion were gradually increasing in relevance throughout the latter half of the century, a process aided and abetted by the predominance of nationalism in Western Europe in that period and by conflict, first with the Polish and later with other national movements within the Russian Empire itself.*

Many researchers who have discussed in their work Russian nationalism and Russification have paid attention to the fact that both these notions are used to denote a whole group of diverse views and practices. Edward Thaden singled out the spontaneous Russification of the elites, "administrative Russification" as part of the policies of the absolutist administrative centralization of the latter half of the eighteenth century, and, finally, forced Russification (an effort to impose the Russian language and Orthodoxy) in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.⁶⁹ Thaden also wrote of Russian "conservative," "roman-

tic,” and “bureaucratic” nationalisms.⁷⁰ Andreas Kappeler defined the main varieties of Russian nationalism as “reactionary–anti-Semite, conservative–Orthodox, and liberal–constitutional.”⁷¹ Within this classification it is possible to speak of “revolutionary–democratic” nationalism, too. In essence, this classification anticipates the Verdery thesis by reflecting the differences in interpretations of the nation and national interests in various ideological systems and thinking styles.⁷² Dietrich Geyer wrote of different functions and variations of Russian nationalism.⁷³ Kappeler claimed that the very concept of the Russian nation was not clear: it could include (1) all the subjects of the empire; (2) members of the privileged estates (in accordance with the pre-modern concept of *natio*); (3) Russian–Orthodox (i.e., Great Russians); or (4) all the East Slavs, in the spirit of the traditional meaning of *Rus*.⁷⁴

Let us try to bring all this in order, with regard to our goals. This means that we will attempt to construct a system of possible ideological reactions to the problem of the correlation between the state and the nation in tsarist Russia, paying special attention not to the sociopolitical aspects of the concepts, but to attitudes toward the problem of the spatial and ethnic borders of the nation and to the desirable type of state relations, such as empire, unitary nation-state, federation, or group of independent states. We will regard these reactions as “ideal types,” that is, logically complete and consistent. Of course, in reality they were more likely to come in unfinished or mixed forms, although, as a rule, it is possible to find real-life examples even for our “ideal types.”

First of all, one could well be a Russian imperialist without being a Russian nationalist. As a matter of fact, this is what the Russian emperors had been for a long time: they cared for the preservation of the empire primarily as familial property. One could be a Russian nationalist while rejecting the empire, believing that its preservation did damage to the interests of the Russian nation, and seeing the future in the creation within this space of a number of independent national states, including the Russian national state. Between these two poles one can find a great number of other possible positions.

The effort to preserve and even expand the empire could be combined with nationalism, that is, regarded as serving Russian interests. The ideological makeup of this thesis could follow the line of “national egotism” as well as the idea of “the civilizing mission.” The expansion might also be substantiated through pan-Slavism, which, in its

“democratic” version, suggested the dissolution of the empire in an expanded union of Slavic peoples.

The preservation of the empire could be seen through its Russification and transformation from empire to nation-state. Some believed it could be achieved within an autocracy and placed an emphasis on the traditional forms of Russification, that is, conversion to Orthodoxy, thereby assuming an opposition stance, in a way, to the principles of modern nationalism. Others, more in accordance with nationalist principles, believed that the way to their goal lay through democratization and the acceleration of economic development to create more beneficial conditions for linguistic and cultural assimilation. Occasionally the same individuals may have defended different strategies of Russification depending on the region and the situation in question.⁷⁵

It was also possible to make a distinction between the Russian nation as the imperial core and the “national borderlands,” forgoing the effort to Russify them totally. (The logic of the former approach suggested, for example, that schools throughout the empire should be an instrument of Russification and that all instruction should be in Russian, while the advocates of the latter approach saw Russian as just another subject in the non-Russian borderlands, which did not presuppose the total expulsion of local languages from schools.)

The recognition of the fact that the evolving Russian nation did not equal the empire but was less than the empire, was a realistic point of view. When it went together with efforts to preserve the unity of the state, ideas as to the methods of achieving this goal could vary. For some, it was equal to the preservation of the old regime. There were individuals, however, who, on the contrary, considered national conflicts to be a consequence of autocratic policies, and who believed that state unity, or at least the unity of the bulk of the empire, would be automatically safeguarded if it were democratized and federalized. Still others believed that the state could only be held together through force but not the force of a dynasty, or not so much of a dynasty as of the Russian nation as a “state-forming” power. *Regardless of their attitude toward the empire, the people who admitted that the Russian nation was not congruent to it inevitably faced the problem of the definition of Russianness and of the borders of this Russian nation.*⁷⁶

Russianness could be understood as a denotation of cultural or ethnic unity. In the former case it was open to all “Russified” subjects, in the latter not. When Baron Tuzenbach, in Chekhov’s *Three Sisters*,

says he is Russian because Russian is his native tongue and because he was baptized Orthodox, he defends the interpretation of Russianness precisely as a cultural rather than an ethnic unity. The “bad” German surname makes his Russianness dubious from the perspective of the ethnic interpretation of this notion.

However, the borderlines of the Russian ethnic community were also understood differently in the nineteenth century. The interpretation of the notions “Russian” and “Great Russian” as equal existed, but was not dominant. The Russian image of the national territory or “ideal fatherland” was formed in acute conflict with the corresponding Polish concept. For the Poles, the “ideal fatherland,” that is, the way it should be “by rights,” was the Polish Commonwealth within the 1772 borders. Thus the Polish image of the “ideal fatherland” included a substantial part of the territory with a predominantly East Slavic population (present-day Belorussia and part of modern Ukraine), which the Russian social consciousness considered “genuinely Russian.” It was this overlapping of “ideal fatherlands” that made the Polish–Russian conflict irreconcilable, and the concept of the All-Russian nation uniting Great, Little, White, and Red (Chervonaja) Russia and with its roots in Kievan Rus’ was the main ideological basis for the Russian position in this conflict.⁷⁷

In the nineteenth century the territory of modern Ukraine was made into the object of a real terminological war. The Poles called the lands occupied by the Russian empire as a result of the partitions of the Polish Commonwealth *kresy wschodnie* (the eastern borderlands of the Polish Commonwealth). In Russia, this territory was known as the *Western Provinces*. It was further subdivided into the *Southwestern Provinces* (*Iugozapadnyi krai*), including the Podolsk, Volynian, and Kiev guberniias, and the *Northwestern Provinces* (*Severozapadnyi krai*), with the Vilno, Kovno, Mogilev, Minsk, and Vitebsk guberniias. The lands on the left bank of the Dnieper were called *Little Russia* (*Malorossia*), and those on the Black Sea coast *New Russia* (*Novorossia*). As a whole, the territory of modern Ukraine was often called *South Rus’*. A special name existed for Eastern Galicia—*Chervonaia Rus’*.

The same situation existed with respect to the terms used to denote the East-Slavic population of modern Ukraine. The Poles called them *rusini*, invariably with one “s,” while for the Great Russians used the word *moskali*.⁷⁸ Before the mid-nineteenth century, the predominant Polish view denied the ethnic otherness of the Rusyns and proclaimed

them to be a part of the Polish people, like, for example, Mazurs. Gradually, more and more Poles began to support the Ukrainian idea as one undermining the wholeness of the main adversary of the Polish national movement—the Russian Empire.

In Moscow and St. Petersburg the predecessors of the modern Ukrainians were called *malorossy* or *malorossiiane*, sometimes Russians or Russyns, invariably with the double “s,” to emphasize their unity with all the Russians, that is, Great Russians and White Russians (Belorussians). (The name for the latter was also spelled with the double “s”—*belorussy*.) The notion *Russian* was thus wider than its modern meaning. It referred to all the East Slavs and denoted that goal of the nation-building project that we will provisionally call the “big Russian nation” or “All-Russian nation.” While it was an ethnic concept that drew a sharp distinction between Russians and other peoples of the empire, this project simultaneously denied the qualitative character of the differences between Great, Little and White Russians by including all of them into one ethnic entity.

Little Russians and Belorussians never experienced discrimination in the Russian Empire at the individual level. “For the Ukrainians and Belorussians, who were officially considered Russian, any career was open in principle—on the condition that they had a command of Russian. There were no obstacles for the children of mixed marriages of Russians and Ukrainians, either. [Strictly speaking, such marriages were not even considered mixed.] The Ukrainians were neither singled out nor discriminated against on either confessional or racial principles,” writes Andreas Kappeler. In the hierarchy of the different ethnic groups of the empire, which he imagines as a system of concentric circles, all the Orthodox Slavs were included in the common center of the system.⁷⁹

This attitude to Little Russians as a part of the Russian people was preserved as the official position of the authorities and as the conviction of the majority of educated Russians throughout the nineteenth century. Even early in the twentieth century, when the strengthening of the chauvinistic, xenophobic motives in Russian nationalism expressed itself in the interpretation of Russianness as a strictly ethnic category rather than a certain cultural standard, it was only Little Russians and Belorussians who were not described as “aliens” (*inorodtsy*).⁸⁰ Thus, in the language of the period, the two last variations from the Kappeler classification would be named identically as “All-Russian,”

but in one case “Russian” would stand for Great Russians, and in the other for all East Slavs.

An attachment to the latter point of view did not necessarily suggest complete denial of the differences between a Little Russian and a Great Russian. For instance, in his 1898 short story “The Cossack Way,” Ivan Bunin writes: “I liked the *khokhly* very much at first sight. I immediately noticed the sharp difference that exists between a Great Russian *muzhik* and a *khokhol*. Our peasants are mostly worn-out folk, wearing *zipuns* full of holes, *lapti* and *onuchi*, with emaciated faces and uncombed hair. While the *khokhly* produce a pleasant impression: tall, healthy and strong, they look at you calmly and gently, are dressed in clean, new clothes.” However, Bunin makes this contrast between “our kind” and the “*khokhly*” as a Great Russian, and in the same story he speaks about Shevchenko, who “embodied in songs all the beauty of his native land,” and who “will forever remain a flower of Russian literature.” Already in 1919, “the ubiquitous savagery and massacres in the Ukraine [of the times of Bogdan Khmel'nitskii], the bloodthirsty boor Razin” are separated only by a comma in one sequence of the examples of Russian rebellion, “senseless and cruel.”⁸¹ In the writings of Bunin, like many other authors of the time, we can find a great number of examples of this sort, when the idea of Russian unity holding together all the East Slavs is not even formulated specifically but is effortlessly revealed in sayings on other matters. This, as a matter of fact, is what makes these sayings valuable, since they demonstrate that the notion of an “All-Russian” unity came naturally to their authors, as something that did not require explanations and proof.

The cultural and historical particularity of Little Russia, as well as the special regional patriotism of the Little Russians, were quite acceptable to the advocates of the All-Russian nation concept. Moreover, in the first half of the nineteenth century Little Russian specificity evoked lively interest in St. Petersburg and Moscow as a more picturesque, romantic variation of Russianness.⁸² The Bunin story mentioned above serves as an example that this attitude still had wide currency in later times.

Literary experiments in the “Little Russian dialect,” which reflected local exotica, aroused sympathetic interest in Petersburg and Moscow as a part of Russian literature, but any attempts to interpret this “Little Russian dialect” as an independent Ukrainian language, separate from Russian, was unacceptable for the advocates of the All-

Russian nation concept. Ukrainian nationalism rejected a Little Russian identity that could peacefully coexist with the All-Russian identity, and created its own image of the ideal fatherland which contradicted both the Polish and Russian images. The Ukrainian idea was "taking away" from the Russian idea not simply a part of the national territory, but Kiev as "mother of the Russian cities," the place where the Orthodox faith and Rus' statehood were acquired. It also undermined an ideological basis in the conflict with the Polish movement. It was no accident that the most influential Russian nationalist journalist, M. N. Katkov, depicted Ukrainophiles as willing or unwilling agents of the "Polish intrigue."

The challenge of other nationalisms was perceived by the government and by Russian public opinion as a challenge from "outside," while the threat of Ukrainian nationalism meant, for the supporters of the All-Russian nation, sabotage from within the "national body." Until the reign of Alexander III, marked by the doomed attempt to conduct a Russification policy on an imperial scale, Russification in the borderlands had a limited character. This could be, to use the definition of Edward Thaden, administrative Russification in the same vein as the policies of Joseph II in Austria, which were directed at creating more favorable conditions for the functioning of the state apparatus. Under certain conditions Russification could also have the character of a repressive measure, a kind of punishment for disloyalty, as it was in the Kingdom of Poland after the rebellions of 1831 and 1863–64. But in either case the total linguistic assimilation of the local population was not a goal.⁸³ As a result, repression against Polish culture in the Kingdom of Poland, that is, on territories predominantly populated by ethnic Poles, could be subject to bargaining, unlike the same or even more severe measures in the Southwestern and, partially, Western Provinces, that is, in the "truly Russian lands," because in these areas they were a means of "Russification" (*obrusenie*), which was understood as the reconstruction of the genuine character of these lands corrupted by Polonization. As for repression against the Ukrainian movement, it was interpreted as a struggle against attempts to corrupt the national organism itself.

Thus, the attitude of the imperial authorities and Great Russians to Little Russians and Belorussians implied an integration based on the principle of individual equality accompanied by the denial of institutionalization to these groups as ethnic minorities, while in regard to

non-Slavs or Western Slavs (Poles) the principle of individual equality was denied, but their status as separate ethnic groups was not questioned.

The moment a Little Russian accepted Ukrainian identity at the expense of All-Russian identity, he, unlike representatives of other ethnic groups, would become a renegade from the perspective of the advocates of the All-Russian nation. Within this concept, the formula “one Ukrainian more means one Russian fewer” was correct. “An outrageous and absurd sophism [...] that two Russian nationalities are possible [a reference to the well-known article by Kostomarov, “Two Russian Nationalities,” in which he spoke of Little Russians and Great Russians as two Russian nationalities], and two Russian languages—it’s as if two French nationalities and two French languages were possible!” It was in this unequivocal way that Katkov, Kostomarov’s main opponent, defined the essence of his fears over Ukrainophilism.⁸⁴ Thus, the perception of the Ukrainian and Belorussian (to the extent to which the latter revealed itself) national movements was radically different from the perception of other national movements in the empire. The struggle against other national movements was a struggle for imperial unity. The struggle against the Ukrainian movement, on the other hand, was also directly connected to the issue of the unity of the Russian people (for those who believed that the triune Russian nation existed) or the issue of which territories and what population would constitute the core of the empire that had to be consolidated into a Russian nation (for those who realized that the All-Russian nation was no more than a project). This is why the policies of St. Petersburg in Little and White Russia should be compared with the policies of Paris in continental France and the policies of London in the British Isles, and not with the policies of, say, London in India, as Anderson erroneously does in his book.

We will emphasize again here that the project of the All-Russian nation was interpreted by the majority of its advocates as a middle ground between the French and British models. The supporters of Ukrainian autonomy were few, but equally few were those who considered it necessary completely to suppress the Little Russian regional identity and Little Russian cultural specificity.

I believe I have provided sufficient argumentation to accept, at least as a serious hypothesis, the thesis of the existence in Russian public opinion and in the consciousness of a substantial part of the

bureaucracy of an image of the All-Russian nation that would include all the East Slavs of the empire. The analysis of official documents and the press that takes up the next few chapters will allow us to present additional arguments in favor of this thesis, as well as to demonstrate that many officials and publicists also had a clear enough idea of the methods of implementation of this nation-building project.

We will leave open a number of other questions for the time being. What were the motives of the opponents of this project? (The motives were different for the supporters of the traditional religious and imperial legitimization of autocracy and for such adversaries of tsarism as Chernyshevskii.) How consistent were the efforts of the advocates of the All-Russian nation project toward its implementation? All this will be the subject for discussion in the chapters dedicated to the description of events.

ON TERMINOLOGY

If we assume that the mutually exclusive nation-building projects of the Ukrainian and All-Russian nations during the period in question were exactly that, *projects* with greater or smaller chances of implementation, then, if we mean to be consistent, this creates substantial problems with terminology.

At a 1978 conference, the most authoritative historians from the Ukrainian diaspora were discussing, among other subjects, the legitimacy of using the terms “Ukraine” and “Ukrainians” in respect to the time when they were not commonly accepted. Ivan Rudnytsky remarked: “It is legitimate, I believe, to apply retrospectively the modern national term ‘Ukraine’ to past epochs in the life of the country and the people, when the term did not yet exist or possessed different connotations. The case of Ukraine is not unique in this respect. French historians do not hesitate to include Celtic, Roman and Frankish Gaul into the history of France, in spite of the fact that the term ‘France’ emerged only later and originally applied to the area of Paris alone, the Ile-de-France.”⁸⁵ Incidentally, by doing so, French historians follow in the footsteps of nineteenth-century French nationalists. Russian nationalists of the nineteenth century, who insisted that the Little Russians were a part of the Russian people, followed the same logic. Should the All-Russian nation-building project have been successful,

Russian historians, too, could well continue to call the territory of modern Ukraine Southern Russia or Little Russia, if one is to agree with Rudnytsky. The arguments used by Rudnytsky and by Omeljan Pritsak, who opened this discussion (the latter made a comparison with Spain⁸⁶), refer us directly to the problem we have already discussed in connection with Wallerstein's essay "Does India Exist?" The participants in the discussion are correct in stating that it is common practice. It is unlikely that it could be changed in the foreseeable future. That, however, should not blind us to the shortcomings of this practice.

"The change of collective designations for Ukrainians from *rusyny* to *malorosiiany* to *ukraintsi* with regional variations in usage creates considerable tension. Yet the employment of so many terms for a people that was clearly demarcated and perceived as a historical community is cumbersome. Hence, we may well use 'Ukraine' and 'Ukrainian' as long as we make clear what names were used in various periods," said Frank Sysyn in the course of the same discussion.⁸⁷ Is it true that it was only the terms for designating a people "clearly demarcated and perceived as a historical community" that changed throughout history? It is difficult to agree with this completely. The understanding of whether this community was a part of a "greater whole" or was a self-contained unit changed with time. Equally changeable were ideas about the borders of this community. In Transcarpathia, a political trend still exists today that considers the Rusyns as a separate people, and not a part of the Ukrainian nation.⁸⁸ In the nineteenth century, quite a few people shared the same point of view in Galicia, while other Galicians considered their people to be a part of the All-Russian nation.⁸⁹ The content of the notion *Little Russian* was likewise far from equivalent to the notion *Ukrainian*. Ukrainian activists initially used the notion *Rus'*, which, in their system, as well as in Polish, was different in principle from the notion *Russia*, which stood both for the empire and for Great Russia. They gradually switched to the term *Ukraine* to avoid constant confusion between their treatment of the notion *Rus'* as Ukraine and the meaning of this term as common for all East Slav lands. Ukrainophiles also had to establish the new term *Ukrainians* instead of the more widespread self-designation *Rusyns* in order to overcome the tradition of the previous two centuries that had accentuated the commonality of the name for the entire East Slav population. This move met with staunch resistance on the part of those people with Little Russian identity who understood that it was more

than a simple change of name. It is impossible to “impart to Ukraine, this ordinary name for a place, for a borderland, a meaning it never had, does not have, and cannot have...Ukraine is not a name contemporaneous with the original parts of ancient Rus’, but one that appeared much later, and designated, as we said, only a swath of land to the south of Kiev, or even from the river Ros’...Who, indeed, has authorized the Ukrainophiles to deprive us of the ancient name Russians and of all the attributes of this name, including our common, cultured Russian language that is the product of such a long and difficult process of our history, and to replace all this with something Ukrainian, that is, with a notion that came into being much later, is purely particular, and denotes only a *borderland*?” wrote S. S. Gogotskii, professor of philology at Kiev University, in the mid-1870s.⁹⁰ We note that he was far from original in his views. In general, among the most aggressive opponents of the Ukrainian movement there were quite a few people who in today’s terminology, ill-suited to the nineteenth-century realities, should have been called Ukrainians. Thus, the anti-Ukrainophile Ems Edict was inspired by the Little Russian M. V. Iuzefovich, and the Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists was organized by A. I. Savenko, who was born in the Poltava guberniia. These people were not “traitors of the Ukrainian people,” because, while preserving the Little Russian identity and believing that they understood the interests of their land better, they rejected the very project of the Ukrainian nation and the version of identity associated with it. They were Russian nationalists in the sense that they supported the project of the All-Russian nation, of which the Little Russians, in their view, were a part, but they did not at all believe that they were sacrificing the interests of the Little Russians while doing so. They did not necessarily believe that the Little Russians had to reject their identity in favor of Great Russian identity—we should remember that the All-Russian nation of their imagination differed from the Russian nation we know today not only by its size.

All these observations concern more or less educated people who constituted scarcely more than 2 percent in the sea of the peasant East Slav population of what is now Ukraine. The overwhelming majority of those peasants operated with very different categories. The first, manifesto-like issue of the Ukrainophile journal *Osnova* in 1861 featured, among others, an article by M. M. Levchenko called “Places of Residence and Local Names of the Present-Day Rusyns.” The author

defines his subject as “Southern Russians, Little Russians, or, more correctly, Rusyns.” “The Rusyns,” Levchenko observes, “are one tribe in their origin, style of life and language, but bear different names depending on where they live.” He then lists these names: *het’mantsy* (south of Chernigov guberniia), *stepoviki* (Poltava and Ekaterinoslav guberniias), *ukrain’tsy* (“residents of Kiev guberniia, which is called Ukraine”), *Rusyns* (Lublin guberniia and Galicia), *Hutsuls* (Carpathians), *polshchaki* (“Podol guberniia, which is commonly called Polshcha”), and so on. Interestingly, Levchenko adds that in New Russia the name “Polshcha” is often applied to Volyn and Ukraine as well.⁹¹

It is difficult to judge with certainty to what degree the peasants’ sense of belonging coincided with the views of Levchenko. (Galician Rusyns, for example, continued to say, even in the early twentieth century, that they would go “to Russia” to look for work even though they went to modern-day Ukraine. Of the Polish peasants in the same Galicia W. Witos reminisced that “those living on the right bank of the Vistula for a long time thought their neighbors on the other shore to be Moskals, wondered why they spoke Polish, and treated them with greater suspicion than Germans or Jews.”)⁹² It is clear that in the peasant hierarchy of identities the sense of belonging based on class and religion (Orthodox peasants), dynastic loyalty, and local identity (“we are locals,” that is, *het’mantsy*, *ukrain’tsy*, *polshchaki*) in any case stood above the “All-Rusyn” identity. On the Right Bank in 1863 these Orthodox peasants, loyal to the Orthodox tsar, were enthusiastically hunting down the Polish rebels, Catholic noblemen. The government used this enthusiasm with caution, fearing a repetition of the Galician massacre of Polish noblemen in 1846.

Levchenko does not use the term “Ukrainians” as a common name. This was not the result of censorship—in the same issue Kostomarov writes about the Ukrainian language in the modern sense of the word. Consequently, we must realize that *in the mid-nineteenth century only a tiny minority of the residents of modern-day Ukraine called themselves Ukrainians in the sense in which the term was used by the Ukrainophiles.*

In the above-mentioned debate among Ukrainian historians, Rudnytsky made a very important proviso: “A conscientious student should be aware of the danger of anachronisms. Therefore, he will pay close attention to the actual content of terms at any given time and to their semantic evolution. For instance, in early-nineteenth-century

official usage 'Ukraine' referred to the Slobozhanshchyna region. This explains why contemporary writers could contrast 'Ukraine' (the Slobidska-Ukrainian province) with 'Little Russia' (the provinces of Chernihiv and Poltava, corresponding with the former Hetmanate). Polish sources of the nineteenth century speak regularly of 'Volhynia, Podillia and Ukraine', the latter meaning the Kiev region. Going further back in time, in the seventeenth century 'Ukraine' meant the land under Cossack jurisdiction. Therefore, the name did not extend to Galicia, Volhynia and Transcarpathia. In these latter territories the term 'Ukraine' prevailed only in the course of the present century, in the wake of the modern national-liberation movement and recent political change."⁹³ With this proviso in mind, the practice of the retrospective usage of present-day terms for nationality can be accepted in most cases as an unavoidable evil.

However, for a study dedicated precisely to the processes of national identity formation, this compromise is still unacceptable. The same Rudnytsky once wrote that "no issue facing the Ukrainian people in the nineteenth century was more portentous than the dilemma of choosing between assimilation in an all-Russian nation or assertion of separate national individuality."⁹⁴ This phrase serves as a good illustration of the dangers hidden in common practices even for the most accurate and conscientious historians, who see the alternativity of the process. In this quotation the Ukrainian people already in the nineteenth century is presented as a consolidated community making some choice. As a result, the conflict of *nationalist movements*, and *nation-building projects* turns into a conflict of full-fledged *peoples* and *nations*; even if, according to Rudnytsky himself, "separate national individuality" still had to be asserted. In the same article Rudnytsky quite correctly states that "Ukrainian history of the nineteenth century may mean two different things: a history of the nationalist movement on the one hand, and a history of the country and the people on the other hand."⁹⁵ This people—interpreted as the lower classes and peasantry—was not in the least concerned about this "portentous" choice. The very existence of this dilemma had yet to be explained to the peasants. Theodore Weeks, who has studied the early twentieth century, writes: "I have found little evidence that would show the peasant masses in the southwest to have been nationally self-conscious before 1914,"⁹⁶ thus finding a more exact formulation for the thesis of Bohdan Krawchenko: "On the eve of the First World War and the Revolution, Ukrainians

were a people who had not yet developed a crystallised national consciousness.”⁹⁷ Even after they learned about the dilemma described by Rudnytsky, the peasants, as the history of the Civil War shows, were often inclined to be led by motives other than national.

Incidentally, the formulation of this dilemma also calls for elaboration. The assimilation into the All-Russian nation of the Orthodox population of modern Ukraine did not necessarily imply the dissolution and total loss of the Little Russian identity and cultural specificity that Rudnytsky calls a “portentous” alternative to the preservation of national individuality. While I do not consider any particular variation of establishing such an All-Russian nation preferable to the historically implemented way of formation of the Ukrainian nation, I will remark nonetheless that I do not see anything portentous or unnatural about it—the processes of assimilation were just as “normal” in nineteenth-century history as the processes of formation of “national individualities.”

I understand full well that it is impossible for a modern-day Ukrainian to imagine such a perspective without emotional protest, since that would mean that many values to which he is attached as a Ukrainian would simply have ceased to exist. Let us remember, however, that this study does not purport to “take away” the already formed national identity and all the corresponding values, but to analyze the historical alternatives at the stage of development when this identity did not yet exist as a mass phenomenon.

I should add that assimilation as it is described here was not at all the only alternative. If we suppose that, for example, the Polish Commonwealth had not been divided in the late eighteenth century, then the formation of a single nation out of all the East Slavs living within its borders would have seemed very likely. This, in its turn, would have had consequences for Little Russia, which became part of Muscovy after the uprising of Bogdan Khmel'nitskii. One can also imagine the formation of several “Ukrainian” (I put the word in quotation marks because no one knows what they would have been called) nations if Joseph Stalin had not, among other things, acted as a “collector of Ukrainian lands.” Addressing the activists of the Ukrainian movement in 1906, M. Grushevskii had grounds to refer to the example of the Serbs and Croats, warning of the dangers present in the formation of two different peoples on a single ethnic basis.⁹⁸

In respect to the Russian nation, alternatives do not necessarily

ensure its larger size. The formation of a separate nation in Siberia or the “Island of Crimea” modeled by Vasiliĭ Aksenov on the real-life Taiwan scenario could also be quite possible. We discuss the “Siberian separatist” trend that originated almost simultaneously with the Ukrainian national movement later in the book.

But let us return to the problems of terminology. I will use the terms “Ukraine” and “Ukrainians” when describing the views of Ukrainian nationalists, that is, people who thought in these terms in their modern sense. When speaking of individuals who rejected the exclusively Ukrainian identity or were not yet aware of the existence thereof, I will use the terms they themselves used, that is, “Southern Russians,” Little Russians (*malorussy; malorossiiane*), Rusyns.⁹⁹ In this way we will be able to reflect the uncertainty in the hierarchies of identities, which was characteristic of the entire nineteenth century.

It is in accordance with this principle, too, that I will use the terms “Russian,” and “Great Russian,” and place-names. We should remember that, depending on the context, the notion “Russian” could encompass all the East Slavs or refer only to the Great Russians. This means, in particular, that the notion “Russian public opinion,” used in the book’s title, includes the journalistic writings of all those authors who considered themselves Russian, that is, both Great Russians adhering to various interpretations of Russian identity and those Little and White Russians who shared the concept of the All-Russian nation.

In contemporary opinion the correlations between the notions Russian, Great Russian, Belorussian, Little Russian, etc., could differ significantly. For example, M. A. Maksimovich, a Little Russian patriot but not a Ukrainian nationalist,¹⁰⁰ was linguistically dividing East Slavs into four parts, which, in their turn, constituted two groups, while being a part of the All-Russian whole: “The Great Russian dialect is related most closely to Belorussian, and they comprise one Northern Russian speech or language, which, together with the Southern Russian language or speech (comprised of two main dialects—Little Russian and Chervono-Russian) creates one great East Slav or Russian speech.”¹⁰¹ Maksimovich characteristically admits the linguistic heterogeneity of the space that in the ideology of the Ukrainophiles becomes Ukraine. The “Little Russian and Chervono-Russian dialects” become, in this classification, as different or as close as Great Russian and Belorussian. What is important about his evaluations is not their accuracy

from the standpoint of modern linguistics but precisely the principal difference of the classification and ideology of Maksimovich from the views already espoused at the time by the people of the next generation, the Ukrainophiles Kulish and Kostomarov. Different interpretations of these ethnic categories and their correlations were not necessarily a result of a willful distortion of reality—reality itself was still so amorphous and without predetermination that it allowed for different, subjectively quite conscientious interpretations.¹⁰²

The general conclusion is this: *In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the processes of East Slav identity formation could follow substantially different scenarios and yield substantially different results.* It is necessary here again to add the caveat that the emphasis on alternativity and the undetermined character of the processes under analysis is not motivated by the author's preference for a particular unrealized option over one historically implemented, but comes out of the desire for a deeper understanding of the logic of events.

The author believes that in situations like these it is detrimental for a historian to ask the question of which of the options under review is preferable, since this question in full inevitably implies "preferable for someone," and the answer entails taking sides in the conflicts described. Besides, we do not have the power to envision the absolutely unexpected, unforeseeable, and perhaps negative consequences that a particular alternative option might have had.

In the author's contemplations that do not recount or comment on other people's opinions, the terms Little Russia, Ukraine, and their derivatives are intentionally mixed when applied to the nineteenth century. However, for the twentieth century, when they had really asserted themselves as self-designations, we abide strictly by the terms "Ukraine" and "Ukrainians."

Now a few words on other "loaded" terms. We have already agreed that the notions "nationalism" and "nationalist" in this text are value-free, that is, by calling someone a Ukrainian or Russian nationalist we do not imply that he is "good" or "bad." The notion "Ukrainian separatists" used in this study is likewise devoid of any positive or negative connotations. The foes of Ukrainian nationalists certainly imbued it with a negative meaning. But apart from the quotations, in the author's text it only means that the characters thus defined considered it desirable to create an independent Ukraine, and it contains neither endorse-

ment nor condemnation of their views. (We need the notion “separatists” because not all Ukrainian nationalists embraced such views—quite a few of them were committed to federalism.)

The notion “Ukrainian nationalists” is often replaced in the text by the term “Ukrainophiles.” Its history is similar to other “nicknames” given to particular trends of public thought by their opponents. Like both Westernizers and Slavophiles (the term “Ukrainophiles” was modeled after them), Ukrainophiles reclaimed this nickname as a self-designation. The negative connotation of this notion, which was weak from the outset, soon became obsolete, so that the Ukrainophiles’ adversaries had to invent new offensive names—*khokhlomany*, *mazepintsy*. Sometimes the notion “Ukrainophilism” was used in a broader sense, to denote an interest in Ukrainiana that existed among people who were not necessarily Ukrainian nationalists, and sometimes even had a clear Polish or Russian identity.¹⁰³ In instances when the term is used in this expanded sense it is specified in the text.

NOTES

- 1 F. Savchenko, *Zaborona ukrainstva 1876 r.* (Kharkov–Kiev, 1930; reprinted with an introduction by V. Dmytryshyn, Munich, 1970).
- 2 The annual “Za sto lit” published by this group and a number of other journals of the time featured numerous articles and publications of the sources. In addition to F. Savchenko, this subject was actively researched by V. Miiakovskii, N. Buchbinder and others (see bibliography).
- 3 The notion of the “Ukrainian question,” just as the “Polish,” “Jewish,” or “Muslim” question existed in the language of the imperial bureaucracy and denoted a totality of problems associated with a particular ethnic or religious group in the empire. It was then adopted by the press and later accepted by historians as well.
- 4 See, e.g., the papers of Olga Andrievski at the conference “Russian–Ukrainian Relations” at Columbia University in New York City in 1994, and “The Formation of Identities in the Borderland Zone” at Central European University in 1999.
- 5 The author has repeatedly done this in specialized publications. See A. Miller, “Nationalism and Theorists,” in *CEU History Department Yearbook*, 1996, pp. 207–214, as well as my articles in A. Miller, ed., *Natsionalizm i formirovanie natsii: teorii—modeli—kontseptsii* (Moscow, 1994); “Natsionalizm kak teoreticheskaia problema,” *Polis*, 1995, no. 6; “O diskursivnoi prirode natsionalizmov,” *Pro et*

- Contra*, vol. 2 (1997), no. 4; "Otvét P. Kandelii," *Pro et Contra*, vol. 3 (1998), no. 3; "Natsionalizm i formirovanie natsii. Teoreticheskie issledovaniia 80–90-kh godov," in A. I. Miller, ed., *Natsiia i natsionalizm* (Moscow, 1999).
- 6 It is exactly in this erroneous sense that one often hears talk about an "imagined" character of nation.
- 7 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London, 1983), p. 129.
- 8 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 67.
- 9 We can agree with Liah Greenfeld (Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity*, Cambridge, Mass., 1992), who believes that an important phase of the process of the formation of Russian, as well as other European nationalisms, happened during the eighteenth century. But her attention is concentrated on the emotional aspect of the relations between the major European empire-states and their elites. (It is no accident that the notion of "resentment" is a key category in her book.) The problem of nationalism became central to the internal policies of these states only in the nineteenth century.
- 10 Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States. An Enquiry Into the Origins of Nations and Politics of Nationalism* (Boulder, 1977), pp. 83–87; Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 87.
- 11 The image of the "ideal fatherland" represented a complex ideological structure. It delineated—in a more or less Utopian vein—the social and political relations that were supposed to make the fatherland happy, and defined the "correct" and "just" spatial and ethnic parameters of this fatherland—i.e., what the national territory should encompass and who must live there.
- 12 Since this book was first published in Russian, a great number of researchers have come to similar conclusions in studying the nation-formation processes of the empire's other ethnic groups. Theodore R. Weeks recently wrote about Belorussians in the same vein in the article: "Us or Them? Belorussians and Official Russia, 1863–1914" (forthcoming). The same can be said, e.g., about the Tatars. See: Robert P. Geraci, *Window to the East. National and Imperial Identities in Late Tsarist Russia* (Ithaca and London, 2001), esp. pp. 3–4. See also Alexey Miller, "Shaping Russian and Ukrainian Identities in the Russian Empire During the 19th Century: Some Methodological Remarks," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 49 (2001), vol. 4, pp. 257–263. For a more general theoretical discussion of this subject, see: Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, "Beyond 'Identity,'" *Theory and Society* 29, 2000, pp. 1–47, esp. p. 16, for a discussion of the "hard work and long struggles over identification as well as the uncertain outcome of such struggles" in Eastern Europe.
- 13 Anthony Smith wrote extensively on the role of the ethnic factor in the processes of nation formation. See Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford, 1986). For the last discussion of Smith and Gellner, shortly before the latter's death, see *Nations and Nationalism*, vol. 2, pt. 3, 1996.

- 14 Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry Into the Foundations of Nationality* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953).
- 15 On that, see Andreas Renner, *Russischer Nationalismus und Öffentlichkeit im Zarenreich. 1855–1875* (Cologne, 2000), as well as Ulrike v. Hirschhausen, “Stand, Region, Nation und Reich: Die Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen im lokalen Raum Ostmitteleuropas. Das Beispiel Riga 1860–1914,” in Ulrike v. Hirschhausen and Jörn Leonhard, ed., *Nationalismen in Europa* (Göttingen, 2001), pp. 372–397.
- 16 Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language* (New York, 1972), p. 49. Later, in *The Will to Truth*, Foucault introduced another important category, even if it was not accepted as widely as “discourse”: that of “dispositif.” The interested reader will find it in Michel Foucault, *The Will to Truth* (London and New York, 1993).
- 17 Timothy Brennan, “The National Longing for Form,” in Homi K. Bhabha, ed., *Nation and Narration* (London and New York, 1990), pp. 46–47.
- 18 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 12.
- 19 Katrin Verdery, “Whither ‘Nation’ and ‘Nationalism’?,” *Daedalus*, Summer 1993, p. 37.
- 20 *Ibid.*, p. 38.
- 21 E.g., Ralf Dahrendorf describes the political spectrum of Germany in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century thus: “There were in Imperial Germany national–nationals like [Heinrich von] Treitschke, national–socialists like [Gustav von] Schmoller, national–liberals like [Max] Weber, and many versions and shadings of these positions—but all groups stood under the spell of the primacy of the national.” (Ralf Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany* [New York and London, 1969], p. 57).
- 22 Simon During, “Literature—Nationalism’s Other? The Case for Revision,” H. K. Bhabha, ed., *Nation and Narration* (London and New York, 1990), p. 139. This means that all of us, insofar as we think in terms of the nation and national interests, are participants in this discourse. Consequently, a reflection on the character of one’s own involvement in the national discourse should become a kind of regular hygienic practice for a student of nationalism.
- 23 See Hans Kohn, *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History* (Princeton, 1955); idem, *The Idea of Nationalism*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1967). On the concept of H. Kohn, see Aira Kemilainen, *Nationalism, Problems Concerning the World, the Concept and Classification* (Yvaskyla, 1964); John Plamenatz, “Two Types of Nationalism,” in Edward Kamenka, ed., *Nationalism. The Nature and the Evolution of the Idea* (London, 1976); Ernest Gellner, “Prishestvie natsionalizma. Mify natsii i klassa,” *Put’*, 1992, no. 1. Thus, Tom Nairn, for instance, gives convincing arguments in support of the thesis that Scottish nationalism, of which we will speak repeatedly, is typologically close to the nationalisms of the “small” peoples of Central Europe. See Tom Nairn, “Scotland and Europe,” first pub-

- lished in *The New Left Review*, 83, January–February 1974, pp. 57–82. Quoted from Jeff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds., *Becoming National. A Reader* (New York and Oxford, 1996), pp. 79–104.
- 24 See: M. Epstein, “Sposoby vozdeistviia ideologicheskogo vyskazyvaniia,” in *Obraz cheloveka XX veka* (Moscow, 1988).
- 25 John Hall, “Nationalisms: Classified and Explained,” *Daedalus*, Summer 1993, p. 1.
- 26 See Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, 1975); Michael Mann, *Sources of Social Power. Volume Two: The Rise of Modern Nations and Classes, 1760–1914* (Cambridge, 1993); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford, 1983); Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, 1983); Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (New York, 1990); Miroslav Hroch, *Obrozeni malych evropskikh narodü* (Prague, 1971); idem, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe* (Cambridge, 1985); Józef Chlebowczyk, *Procesy narodotwórcze we wschodniej Europie Środkowej w dobie kapitalizmu* (Warsaw and Cracow, 1975. Edited English version: *On Small and Young Nations in Europe* [Wrocław, etc., 1980]); idem, *O prawie do bytu małych i młodych narodów. Kwestia narodowa i procesy narodotwórcze we wschodniej Europie Środkowej w dobie kapitalizmu*. Wyd. 2 (Warsaw, 1983); as well as the works of these authors quoted above.
- 27 A number of scholars have emphasized the key importance of such an interaction for “historic” nations. See Klaus Zernack, “Germans and Poles: Two Cases of Nation-Building,” in Hagen Schultze, ed., *Nation-Building in Central Europe* (Leamington Spa, Hamburg, New York, 1992); Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity*. But this is true for all nationalisms.
- 28 This method with regard to the study of ideological phenomena was given a comprehensive treatment by Andrzej Walicki in his book on Slavophilism. See Andrzej Walicki, *W kręgu konserwatywnej utopii. Struktura i przemiany rosyjskiego sławianofilstwa* (Warsaw, 1964).
- 29 Peter Sahlin, *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees* (Berkeley, 1989).
- 30 The story of the Kiev Archaeographic Commission can serve as an example of how, in the case of Little Russia, local activists were trying to use the resources of the imperial center to solve their own local problems. See O. I. Zhurba, *Kiivs’ka arkheografichna komisiia, 1843–1921* (Kiev, 1993).
- 31 Józef Chlebowczyk, *Procesy narodotwórcze*, pp. 21–52.
- 32 *Ibid.*, p. 23.
- 33 *Ibid.*, pp. 10–14.
- 34 Immanuel Wallerstein, “Does India Exist?” in I. Wallerstein, *Unthinking Social Science. The Limits of Nineteenth-century Paradigms* (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 131–134.

- 35 See Xosé Manoel Núñez, "Historical research on Regionalism and Peripheral Nationalism in Spain: A Reappraisal," *EUI Working Papers in European Cultural Studies*, no. 92/6 (Florence: European University Institute/European Culture Research Centre, 1992), pp. 87–91. We note, for the sake of fairness, that works on the deconstruction of the English and French myths about the "natural, ages-old" formation of these nations also began to appear not too long ago, only in the 1970s.
- 36 Mark von Hagen, "Does Ukraine Have a History?" *Slavic Review*, Fall 1995.
- 37 For more detail see A. Miller, "Ukraina kak natsionaliziruiushcheesia gosudarstvo," *Pro et contra*, Spring 1997.
- 38 Zenon E. Kohut, "History as a Battleground. Russian–Ukrainian Relations and Historical Consciousness in Contemporary Ukraine," in S. Frederick Starr, ed., *The Legacy of History in Russia and Historical Consciousness in Contemporary Ukraine* (Armonk and London, 1994), p. 123.
- 39 The author does not know any recent publications by Russian researchers on Russian–Ukrainian relations in the period in question. I will note only a more general article by V. S. Diakin ("Natsional'nyi vopros vo vnutrennei politike tsarizma [XIX v.]," *Voprosy istorii*, 1995, no. 9), whose treatment of the Ukrainian issue (pp. 135–136) is close to my own. It is quite symptomatic that already there are enthusiasts that have made an effort to reprint some of the old works. See, e.g., the collection with the works of A. I. Savenko, T. D. Florinskii and other opponents of Ukrainophilism, *Ukrainskii separatizm v Rossii. Ideologiya natsional'nogo raskola* (Ukrainian separatism in Russia: An ideology of national break-up) (Moscow, 1998), as well as the book by Russian émigré N. I. Ul'ianov, written in the pre-revolutionary tradition, *Proiskhozhdenie ukrainskogo separatizma* (The Origins of Ukrainian Separatism) (Moscow, 1996; first edition New Haven, 1966). It is regrettable that the texts selected for reprinting are not the best, even among the writings in this particular trend. The unprinted book of S. N. Shchegolev, *Ukrainskoe dvizhenie kak sovremennyi etap iuzhno-russkogo separatizma* (The Ukrainian Movement as the Contemporary Stage of South-Russian Separatism) (Kiev, 1912), while no less biased than the writings mentioned above, is much more valuable for the factual material it contains.
- 40 Charles Tilly, *The Formation of the European Nation States* (Stanford, 1975), p. 14.
- 41 Klaus Zernack, "Germans and Poles: Two Cases of Nation-Building," p. 159.
- 42 Franz Schnabel, "Federalism Preferable to a National State," in Otto Pflanze, ed., *The Unification of Germany, 1848–1871* (New York, 1968), p. 98.
- 43 Eugen Weber, *Peasants Into Frenchmen. The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914* (Stanford, 1976), pp. 67–69.
- 44 *Ibid.*, pp. 74–75.
- 45 Tom Nairn, "Scotland and Europe," in Jeoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds., *Becoming National. A Reader* (New York and Oxford, 1996), p. 81.

- 46 See T. C. Smouth, *A Century of the Scottish People, 1830–1950* (London, 1988), on how the majority of Scots successfully blocked late-nineteenth-century nationalist attempts to introduce school instruction in Gaelic, replacing English.
- 47 See, e.g., J. E. Reece, *The Bretons Against France. Ethnic Minority Nationalism in Twentieth-Century Brittany* (Chapel Hill, 1977), pp. 30–32.
- 48 Eugen Weber, *Peasants Into Frenchmen*, p. x; Peter Sahlins, *Boundaries. The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees*, pp. 282–285.
- 49 Peter Sahlins, *Boundaries. The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees*, pp. 290–291.
- 50 The most comprehensive analysis of the British nation-building strategy was done by Linda Colley. See Linda Colley, *Britons. Forging a Nation, 1707–1837* (New Haven, 1992).
- 51 Józef Chlebowczyk, *Procesy narodotwórcze*, p. 29.
- 52 Josep R. Llobera, *The God of Modernity. The Development of Nationalism in Western Europe* (Oxford, 1994), p. 214.
- 53 See, e.g., Richard Rudolph and David Good, eds., *Nationalism and Empire. The Habsburg Monarchy and the Soviet Union* (New York, 1992); Orest Subtelny, “The Habsburg and Russian Empires: Some Comparisons and Contrasts,” in Teruyuki Hara and Kimitaka Matsuzato, eds., *Empire and Society. New Approaches to Russian History* (Sapporo, 1997).
- 54 See, e.g., Eugen Weber, *Peasants Into Frenchmen*; Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism. The Celtic Fringe in British National Development. 1556–1966* (Berkeley, 1975).
- 55 *Den’*, no. 2, 21 October 1861, p. 15. In the same spirit, but without such comparisons, V. G. Belinskii was speaking of the “Little Russian dialect” already in the early 1840s.
- 56 *Vestnik Evropy*, 1875, no. 8, pp. 703, 706, 727.
- 57 M. Dragomanov, “Chudats’ki dumki pro ukrains’ku natsional’nu spravu,” in M. P. Dragomanov, *Vibrane* (Kiev, 1991), pp. 533–534.
- 58 Analogies between the Ukrainian movement on the one hand, and the Scottish, Welsh and Provençal movements on the other can be found in the works of I. Rudnytsky. (See Ivan Rudnytsky, *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History*, pp. 25, 395). David Laitin and his co-authors spoke decisively in 1992 in favor of the comparison between the state linguistic policies of Russia with those of France, Britain and Spain. They called the opinion on the principal difference between the processes of nation formation in Eastern and Western Europe the “oriental exceptionalism syndrome,” though it would be more correct to speak of an “oxidental exceptionalism syndrome” since it was precisely the Western researchers of nationalism, like H. Kohn, who insisted on emphasizing the special, inclusive-civil character of nationalism in Western Europe, in contrast to the nationalisms of Central, Eastern and southeastern Europe. See David D. Laitin, Roger Petersen, and John W. Slocum, “Language and the State:

Russia and the Soviet Union in Comparative Perspective,” in Alexander J. Motyl, ed., *Thinking Theoretically About Soviet Nationalities. History and Comparison in the Study of the USSR* (New York, 1992), pp. 129–130. However, their treatment of this thesis in the cited article as applied to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century history turned out to be shallow, possibly because the authors are not specialists in this field. Among the historians specializing in our subjects, it was A. Kappeler who pointed out the fruitfulness of the comparison of Russian–Ukrainian relations with the processes in France and other West European countries, in an article written around the same time, in 1992, but published only recently. See A. Kappeler, “Die ukrainische Nationalbewegung im Russischen Reich und in Galicien: Ein Vergleich,” in Heiner Timmermann, ed., *Entwicklung der Nationalbewegungen in Europa 1850–1914* (Berlin, 1998), pp. 195–196. The already quoted article of S. Velychenko, which compares Russian–Ukrainian and English–Scottish relations, was published in 1997. This book’s author presented its program in 1996 at the Moscow conference “Russia–Ukraine: The History of Relations,” and in 1997 published an article based on this comparison: “Rossiia i rusifikatsiia Ukrainy v XIX v.” (Russia and the Russification of Ukraine in the Nineteenth Century), in A. I. Miller, V. F. Reprintsev and B. N. Floria, eds., *Rossiia-Ukraina: istoriia vzaimootnoshenii* (Moscow, 1997). That same year R. Szporluk spoke of Russian–Ukrainian relations in a comparative context with the European powers in the article “Ukraina: ot periferii imperii k suverennomu gosudarstvu,” in D. E. Furman, *Ukraina i Rossiia: Obshchestva i gosudarstva* (Moscow, 1997). (See my article “Rossiia i Ukraina v XIX-nachale XX v.: nepredopredelennaia istoriia” [Russia and Ukraine in the 19th and early 20th centuries: An unpredetermined story], *ibid.*) Szporluk also speaks of the competition between the Russian and Ukrainian nation-building projects, but we do not agree with his interpretation of the Russian project as either exclusively imperial or exclusively ethnic, i.e., Great Russian.

- 59 For details on the role of the *Synopsis* in the formation of the concept of the unity of Great and Little Russia, see Zenon Kohut, “The Question of Russian–Ukrainian Unity and Ukrainian Distinctiveness in Early Modern Ukrainian Thought and Culture,” in *Peoples, Nations, Identities: The Russian–Ukrainian Encounter* (forthcoming).
- 60 For details see Edward L. Keenan, “On Certain Mythical Beliefs and Russian Behaviors,” in S. Frederick Starr, ed., *The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (New York and London, 1994); Edward L. Keenan, “Muscovite Perceptions of Other East Slavs Before 1654: An Agenda for the Historians,” in Peter Potychny et al., eds., *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter* (Edmonton, 1992).
- 61 A. Iu. Samarin, *Rasprostranenie i chitalatel’ pervykh pechatnykh knig po istorii Rossii (konets XVII-XVIII v.)* (Moscow, 1998), p. 58.

- 62 *Ibid.*, p. 128; E. M. Apanovich, "Rukopisnaia svetskaia kniga XVII v. na Ukraine," in *Istoricheskie sborniki* (Kiev, 1983), p. 65.
- 63 V. N. Tatishchev, *Istoriia Rossiiskaia*, Ch. 1 (Leningrad, 1962), p. 433.
- 64 P. N. Miliukov, *Glavnye techeniia russkoi istoricheskoi mysli* (St. Petersburg, 1913), p. 7.
- 65 The role of nineteenth-century Russian historians in the development of Russian nationalism is emphasized in Andreas Kappeler, ed., *Die Russen. Ihr Nationalbewusstsein in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Cologne, 1990), p. 24.
- 66 Liah Greenfeld, speaking of the eighteenth century, notes that "it is possible that as much as 50 percent of this first mass of Russian nationalists were Ukrainians": Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), p. 238.
- 67 N. S. Trubetskoi later even tried to defend the thesis that in the eighteenth century the Little Russian culture had, in fact, pushed out and replaced the culture of Muscovy. (See his articles "K ukrainskoi probleme" and "Otvét D. I. Doroshenko," in the book N. S. Trubetskoi, *Istoriia. Kul'tura. Iazyk* [Moscow, 1995].) Edward L. Keenan, on the other hand, leans towards the idea that the perception of the Little Russian culture in Muscovy was superficial. (See Edward L. Keenan, "On Certain Mythical Beliefs and Russian Behaviors.") The truth is probably somewhere in between these diametrically opposed points of view, and David Saunders and other authors, who wrote of a significant mutual influence of the Little Russian and Great Russian cultures, are closer to it. See David Saunders, *Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture 1750–1850* (Edmonton, 1985); Olena Dziuba, "Ukrainci v kul'turnomu zhitti Rosii (XVIII st.): prichini migratsii," in A. I. Miller, V. F. Reprintsev and B. N. Floria, eds., *Rossia-Ukraina: istoriia vzaimootnoshenii* (Moscow, 1997). R. Szporluk is absolutely correct when he disagrees with L. Greenfeld, who believes that the descendants from Little Russia "were forging the Great Russian national consciousness," and points out that the Russianness of the time is not at all equal to Russianness in its present-day meaning. (See R. Szporluk, *Ukraina: ot periferii imperii k suverennomu gosudarstvu*, p. 49.)
- 68 See M. Hrushevs'kii, *Zvichaina skhema "russkoi" istorii i sprava ratsional'nogo ukladu istorii skhidnogo slov'ianstva* (St. Petersburg, 1904).
- 69 Edward C. Thaden, ed., *Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland* (Princeton, 1981), pp. 8–9; idem, "Russification in Tsarist Russia," in Edward C. Thaden, with the collaboration of Marianna Forster Thaden, *Interpreting History: Collective Essays on Russia's Relations with Europe* (New York, Boulder, 1990), pp. 211–220.
- 70 Edward C. Thaden, *Conservative Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Russia* (Seattle, 1964).
- 71 Andreas Kappeler, "Einleitung," in A. Kappeler, ed., *Die Russen. Ihr Nationalbewusstsein in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Cologne, 1990), p. 9.

- 72 On the category of "style of thought" see Karl Mannheim, "Conservative Thought," in Karl Mannheim, *Essays in Sociology and Social Psychology* (London, 1954).
- 73 Dietrich Geyer, "Funktionen des russischen Nationalismus," in Heinrich August Winkler, ed., *Nationalismus* (Königstein, 1978), pp. 173–186.
- 74 Andreas Kappeler, "Bemerkungen zur Nationalbildung der Russen," in A. Kappeler, ed., *Die Russen. Ihr Nationalbewusstsein in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Cologne, 1990), p. 21.
- 75 See Alexei Miller, "Russifikatsii—klassifitsirovat' i poniat'," *Ab Imperio*, 2002, no. 2, pp. 133–148.
- 76 See Alexei Miller, "The Empire and the Nation in the Imagination of Russian Nationalism" (conference paper, www.empires.ru).
- 77 On the role of the "Polish factor" in Russian–Ukrainian relations see Andreas Kappeler, *Russland als Vielvolkreich: Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall* (Munich, 1992), p. 179; R. Szporluk, *Ukraina: ot periferii imperii k suverennomu gosudarstvu*, pp. 55–63.
- 78 In the Little Russian community the notion *moskal* was also very widespread but was undergoing a curious evolution. Unlike the Polish *moskal*, which denoted all Great Russians, the Little Russian *moskal* referred only to the bureaucrats, officers and soldiers, i.e., to "state servants." The most typical trait of the *moskal* in Little Russian adages is the tendency to cheat and general rascality. In close up, the image of the *moskal* turns out to be very close to that of the soldier from Great Russian tales, which, however, in contrast to the Little Russian proverbs, sympathize with this character rather than with the peasants he cheats. If we recall that until the latter half of the nineteenth century the Russian army had no barracks and soldiers were billeted in private houses, and that the contents of a soldier's canteen depended directly on its owner's entrepreneurship, the origins of the Little Russian image of the *moskal* becomes clear. For the Great Russian peasant the Little Russians had a number of other names (*katsap* was the most widespread), which did not carry the intensely negative connotation of *moskal*.
- 79 Andreas Kappeler, "Mazepintsy, malorossy, khokhly: ukraintsy v etnicheskoi ierarkhii Rossiiskoi imperii," in A. Miller, ed., *Rossiiia-Ukraina: istoriia vzaimootnoshenii* (Moscow, 1997), pp. 134–135.
- 80 See John W. Slocum, "Who and When Were the *Inorodtsy*? The Evolution of the Category of 'Aliens' in Imperial Russia," *The Russian Review*, April 1998, pp. 173–190. The notion *inorodtsy* initially had a narrow legalistic meaning and referred to the nomadic peoples of the Russian Empire. Its extension to all the "non-Russians" in the xenophobic version of Russian nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was accompanied by the denial of "Russianness" to people of a different ethnic descent assimilated into the Russian culture—Germans, Jews, Poles, etc.

- 81 Ivan Bunin, *Cursed Days. A Diary of Revolution*. Trans. Thomas Gaiton Marullo (Chicago, 1998), pp. 242–243.
- 82 See Paul Bushkovich, “The Ukraine in Russian Culture 1790–1860: The Evidence of the Journals,” in *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 39 (1991).
- 83 See, e.g., this testimony of D. A. Miliutin on the position of Alexander II in regard to the Russification of Poland already after the 1863 rebellion: “When Count Valuev made a remark about the excessive toughness of Paniutin, the monarch said, with an even greater severity, ‘This is what is needed with the Poles.’ Then he proceeded to explain his view of the system of action on Poland. After an historical introduction, from the times of Alexander I until the latest Polish troubles, the monarch made the following résumé of his system: ‘I know well that Poles can never be made into Russians; and I am not attempting this; but it is essential that the Polish government should be Russian, and, while I am alive, I will not change my policy.’” *Dnevnik D. A. Miliutina. 1878–1880*, vol. 3 (Moscow, 1950), pp. 245–246.
- 84 M. N. Katkov, *1863 god. Sobranie statei po pol'skomu voprosu, pomeshchavshikhsia v Moskovskikh Vedomostiakh, Russkom Vestnike i Sovremennoi Letopisi. Vypusk 1* (Moscow, 1887), p. 276.
- 85 “Problems of Terminology and Periodization in the Teaching of Ukrainian History. Round Table Discussion,” in Ivan Rudnytsky, ed., *Rethinking Ukrainian History* (Edmonton, 1981), pp. 234–268. Rudnytsky’s formulation is on p. 240.
- 86 *Ibid.*, p. 235.
- 87 *Ibid.*, p. 251.
- 88 See I. Rudnytsky, “Carpatho-Ukraine: A People in Search of Their Identity,” in I. Rudnytsky, *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History*, pp. 353–374. On Robert Magocsi, the renowned modern Canadian historian, as an ideologist of this trend, see also C. Hann, “Intellectuals, Ethnic Groups and Nations: Two Late-Twentieth-Century Cases,” in Sukumar Perival, ed., *Notions of Nationalism* (Budapest, London and New York, 1995).
- 89 For details see chapter 13.
- 90 *Russkii vestnik*, 1875, no. 7, p. 414.
- 91 *Osnova*, 1861, no. 1, pp. 263–264.
- 92 W. Witos, *Moje wspomnienia* (Paris, 1964), pp. 132–134.
- 93 “Problems of Terminology and Periodization,” p. 240.
- 94 I. Rudnytsky, “The Role of Ukraine in Modern History,” in I. Rudnytsky, *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History*, p. 25.
- 95 *Ibid.*, p. 12.
- 96 Theodore R. Weeks, *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia. Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863–1914* (De Kalb, 1996), p. 125. The title of Weeks’s book is significantly broader than its content—the study concerns only the twentieth century. The preceding period receives only cursory treatment based on existing literature and repeating many of its mistakes.

- 97 Bohdan Krawchenko, *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine* (New York, 1985), p. 1.
- 98 M. Grushevs'kii, "Ukraina i Galichina," *Literaturno-naukovii visnik*, XXXVI (1906).
- 99 I spell *malorussy* and *velikorussy* according to the outdated orthographical tradition, with the double "s," since, as was already stated, it had a special meaning in the nineteenth century. (The term *Belorussians* was likewise spelled with the double "s.") *Russyns* will also appear in the text with the double "s" in cases when I quote or describe the views of the people who spelled it exactly this way.
- 100 We again emphasize that we do not contrast "good" patriotism and "bad" nationalism, but traditional regional patriotism and nationalism as a new, modern form of ideology and world-view.
- 101 M. Maksimovich, "Otvetye pis'ma M. P. Pogodinu," *Russkaia beseda*, 1857, book 2, p. 87.
- 102 There were no clear linguistic demarcation lines in this space—instead there existed sufficiently broad expanses of borderland where the population spoke a mixture of Great and Little Russian or Little and White Russian dialects.
- 103 See, for details, my article "Ukrainofil'stvo," *Slavianovedenie*, 1998, no. 5.

CHAPTER 1

Russia and Ukrainophilism in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century

The century-and-a-half-long incorporation of the Left-Bank territories into the Russian Empire took place relatively smoothly. The abolition of the Hetmanate's autonomy at the end of the eighteenth century was part of a wider expansionist process of administrative unification under Catherine's rule and did not provoke any serious opposition from the local elites.¹ Zenon Kohut, a thorough researcher into the history of the Hetmanate, mentions two types of opinion that prevailed in the minds of the Little Russian elite at that time. One of these—which Kohut calls “assimilationist”—was oriented at incorporation into the Russian nobility and unification with Great Russia. The other is defined by Kohut as “traditionalistic.” The traditionalists strove to preserve and restore the rights and privileges they had inherited either from the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth or following the Bogdan Khmelnytsky revolt, when Little Russia fell under the rule of the Romanovs.

Kohut points out that the traditionalists did not question their loyalty to the Romanovs and were not politically organized.² Kohut remarks that “this attachment [to what was left of the autonomy of the Hetmanate] seemed more a product of inertia and convenience than a defense of historic Little Russian rights and privileges.” He concluded that “the oppositionist tendencies slowed but could not stop the integration and gradual assimilation of the Ukrainian gentry into an imperial Russian nobility. Despite the tenacity of certain native traditions, in the end, the factors favoring integration proved too strong.”³ The predominance of the assimilation mood was conditioned by the fact that Little Russians and Great Russians perceived the differences between them as minor compared to those of the Poles or Baltic Germans. Besides, the tradition of loyalty to the tsar was common to the overwhelming majority of both assimilationists and traditionalists.⁴

Thus, by the end of the eighteenth century Little Russian nobility and clergy not only faithfully served the Russian monarchy, but also contributed considerably to what is now known as “Russian culture.”

This situation radically changed in the late eighteenth/early nineteenth centuries. After the partition of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Russian Empire acquired the Right-Bank territories with Polish or deeply Polonized local *szlachta*. This acquisition coincided with the French Revolution, which, together with the subsequent Napoleonic Wars, opposed the priority of national sovereignty to ancient religious and dynastic principles of legitimacy. Simultaneously, European culture saw the affirmation of Romanticism with its keen interest in national problems and folk themes. The ideas advocated by Johann Herder acquired wide popularity since he predicted, among other things, that a special role would be played by the Slavic peoples in the forthcoming century and emphasized the relevance of a nation’s “own” language in its development.⁵ Soon, the Decembrist movement and the Polish uprising of 1830–31 were to mark a crisis in the old regime based on the loyalty of various—often non-Russian—aristocratic elites.

In the milieu of the Polish nobility, Romanticism became the dominant artistic and ideological venue to express new nationally conscious concepts. Polish cultural intermediation played a significant role in the dissemination of Romanticism in Russia. Many poets, writers and ethnographers displayed a vivid, fashion-driven interest in the Cossacks and their folklore. However, not all ethnographers at that time—and scarcely even the majority—belonged among the Ukrainians according to modern classification (or the Ruthenians or Little Russians in contemporary parlance). For instance, it was a Georgian aristocrat, N. A. Tsertelev, who published the first collection of “Little Russian Songs” in St. Petersburg in 1819. A noteworthy contribution to the collection of Little Russian folklore and ethnographic studies was made by M. A. Maksimovich, I. I. Sreznevskii, O. M. Bodianskii, Z. Dolenga-Khodakovskii, A. L. Metlinskii and P. A. Lukashevich.⁶ These early Ukrainophiles were of Little Russian, Great Russian and Polish origin. In the first half of the nineteenth century one could speak about Polish, Little Russian, and to some extent Great Russian Ukrainophiles as interconnected but independent phenomena, each inspired by different ideas and goals.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, Ukrainian themes

aroused interest and sympathy in Russia.⁷ But it was interest in and sympathy towards a part of the Russian people. Romantic features that were lacking in the history of Muscovite Russia would be sought in the history and characters of southern Russia. *Evenings on a Farm near Dikanka*, *Taras Bul'ba* and other works by Gogol were marked by Little Russian specificity, and their affectionate reception by audiences in Moscow and St. Petersburg serves as a clear illustration of this pro-Little Russian mood. Yet, on the whole, the Ukrainian theme was less important in Russian culture than it was in Polish culture.

An important symbol of Polish Ukrainophilism was the myth of *kresy* as the lost paradise. In the first half of the nineteenth century one could easily be a Polish nationalist and a Ukrainophile at the same time. Being a Ukrainophile in this case meant love for the land that made up part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Ukrainian peculiarities were marginalized as regional or ethnic, which did not exclude Ukraine from the Polish world. (This corresponded approximately to the reception of Ukraine by the Russian public, although emotions were further enhanced by nostalgia.) One of the most famous and typical Ukrainophile poets of the time, Tymko (Thomas) Padura, would perform epic Cossack songs (*dumy*) of his own composition, in a dubious version of the Ukrainian or Ruthenian language, at the courts of the richest Right-Bank magnates.⁸ The latter, following the fashion for Ukrainian, or rather Cossack, specificity, often maintained their own Cossack guard.⁹

It was the Polish Ukrainophilism of the 1830s that for the first time clearly assumed political implications. The intense interest in Ukraine among Polish ideologues, many of whom had emigrated after the failure of the 1830–1831 Polish uprising, was aimed primarily at the search for potential allies in the struggle against the Russian Empire. I. Lysiak-Rudnytsky, who compiled the biographies of three prominent proponents of Polish Ukrainophilism in the 1830s and 1840s—Hippolit (Vladimir) Terlecki, Michal Chajkowski and Frantyszek Duchiński—argues that: “Polish Ukrainophiles and Ukrainians of Polish origin (the borderline between these two terms was rather vague), contributed greatly to the creation of a new Ukraine [...] Their influence helped the Ukrainian renaissance through a stage of apolitical cultural regionalism and strengthened its bellicose anti-Russian sentiments.”¹⁰ One more Polish Right-Bank Ukrainophile of that time—Jakub Jaworski—was described in detail by A. N. Pypin.¹¹ In their writings, Polish

Ukrainophiles emphasized the contrast between Rus', as they called the Eastern Slavic territories, and despotic Muscovy. The most radical among them went as far as to deny the Slavic extraction of *moskali*. Instead, they idealized the past of Polish–Ruthenian encounters and saw the future of Rus' in the re-establishment of the Polish Commonwealth as a union of three, not two, elements—Poland, Lithuania and Eastern Slavic Rus'.

Little Russian Ukrainophiles of this generation were not, strictly speaking, nationalists, and never became such in the subsequent decades. For instance, Maksimovich's Little Russian patriotism did not invariably contradict his All-Russian identity. Never in his life did he doubt the feasibility of the union of southern and northern Rus'. He simply did not think in nationalistic categories.¹²

In the 1820s and 1830s, Kharkov University emerged as a center of Little Russian romantic Ukrainophilism.¹³ However, according to Grushevskii, "In contrast to 'true' Great Russian culture, which was treated seriously not only by the government but also by the local society, this Ukrainian movement was no more than a manifestation of provincialism, a sort of idle entertainment for ethnographers and antiquaries."¹⁴ The appearance of political thinking among young Ukrainophiles was to a more significant extent connected with the establishment of St. Vladimir University in Kiev in 1834, which was the successor to Vilno University, abolished after the Polish uprising of 1830–1831.

In his poems of the 1840s, Shevchenko was the first to formulate with great emotional force the idea of the "millenarian" revival of Ukraine and its unique future, thus contributing significantly to the ideological development of the Cyril–Methodius Society (or Brotherhood).¹⁵ The members of the Society, together with Shevchenko, transformed cultural Ukrainophilism into nationalistic ideology.¹⁶

This new generation to a large extent consisted of commoners (*raznochintsy*) and was populist (*narodnik*) in its beliefs. It did not totally replace old "traditionalist patriots" but rather coexisted with them. The relationships between these two generations still need a thorough analysis. "Old" Ukrainophiles often supported the younger generation, without sharing or even understanding the goals of the latter.

The influence of Polish romantics, particularly of Adam Mickiewicz, is obvious in the works of members of the Kiev circle, especially

in Kostomarov. Borrowed were forms and styles, borrowed were some ideas, but the anti-Polish sentiment of Ukrainian Ukrainophiles was still rather strong.¹⁷ (Later, in the 1860s and 1870s, Ukrainian activists deliberately emphasized their anti-Polishness as a sign of loyalty in the eyes of Russian public opinion hostile to the Poles.)

The term *Ukrainophilism*, coined by analogy with the then already widely spread *Slavophilism*, may date to the case against the Cyril–Methodius Society. In the first secret investigation report submitted to the tsar, the chief of gendarmes, Count A. F. Orlov, warned: “In Kiev and Little Russia Slavophilism is being transformed into Ukrainophilism. Young people there merge the idea of pan-Slavism with that of restitution of the language, literature and mores of Little Russia, sometimes evoking memories of previous *volnitsa* (liberties) and the Hetmanate.”¹⁸

Having crushed the Cyril–Methodius Society, the tsarist authorities, if judged by the standards of the epoch of Nicholas I, were surprisingly lenient towards its members (with the exception of Shevchenko and A. Gulak).

The conclusion reached by P. A. Zaionchkovskii, who studied the evidence from the Cyril–Methodius case, was that Nicholas I directly linked the emergence of the Society with the influence of Polish post-insurrectionist emigration: “This is the result of Paris propaganda, which for a long time we did not believe. Now we no longer have any doubts.”¹⁹ Not willing to push Little Russians into an alliance with the Poles, and realizing that the dispersal of Ukrainophile ideas was extremely limited, the tsarist authorities decided to refrain from harsh repression and conceal the true character of the case. The report of the Third Department of His Majesty’s Chancellery clearly stated: “It is highly advisable to be cautious with Little Russians, even though separatist ideas promoted by young Ukrainophiles such as Shevchenko and Kulish may well have circulated among older people. The application of repressive measures, however, may only advance the banned ideas further and incite the so far obedient Little Russians to manifest against our government together with the Poles. It would be wiser and more useful not to show Little Russians that the government had ever doubted their loyalty and to proceed with steps contrary to those exercised in the Kingdom of Poland.”²⁰ In accordance with this tactical ruse, the head of the First Expedition of the Third Department, M. M. Popov, visited the detained Kostomarov, who by that time had

been giving sincere evidence about the separatist ideas of the members of the Society. Popov advised Kostomarov as to what he should write instead of his earlier sincere evidence in order to avoid severe punishment. Popov even provided Kostomarov with a sample copy of the evidence given by Belozerskii, to whom Popov seems to have made the same offer.²¹ Later, the constructed official version held that the members of the Society strove to unite the Slavs under the scepter of the Russian tsar. The dissemination of true information on the case was strictly limited. Nicholas I's order to transfer the Kiev educational district to the direct control of the governor-general, D. G. Bibikov, was issued "without explaining the reasons."²² The instruction containing the official reaction to the Cyril-Methodius case sent by Uvarov to the universities was so incomprehensible that the trustee of Moscow University, Count Stroganov, being unaware of the details, refused to read it out to the professors as it was absolutely meaningless.

In the last years of Nicholas's reign the tsarist authorities vigilantly followed up any expressions of "Little Russian separatism." However, since the understanding of the ideology of the Cyril-Methodius Society as separatist and nationalistic was confined to the initiated coterie of the highest officials, the majority of lower officials held on to the official version. This is evident from one of the cases investigated by the Supreme Censorship Committee (SCC) in 1853. The action was instituted to analyze the conflict between the Kiev censor D. Matskevich and the Kiev Interim Commission for Investigation of Ancient Acts (*Vremennaya Komissija dlia razbora drevnikh aktov*) concerning the publication of *Letopis' Gadiacheskogo Polkovnika Grigoriia Grabianki*.²³ The censor considered, perfectly in accordance with governmental policy, that "The founding of the Interim Commission had as its major goal to prove the presence of the Russian component in the guberniias acquired from Poland and not the separate historical uniqueness of Little Russia."²⁴ Matskevich added the reminder that after the Cyril-Methodius case the reprinting of previously authorized works by T. Shevchenko, P. Kulish and N. Kostomarov was prohibited, since "in those writings the authors tend to eulogize the Ukrainian past and revive nostalgia for the old-time *volnitsa*."²⁵ The investigator, Volkov, shared the censor's opinion by pointing out in his report to the minister of education, S. Uvarov, that: "Little Russians are still slow to forget their Hetmanate, Cossack *volnitsa* and lost privileges."²⁶ Uvarov, in his turn, in a letter to the minister of the interior on 27 April 1854,

mentioned the 1847 Highest Decree, which suggested that “writers should be most careful when handling the question of Little Russian ethnicity and language, lest the love for Little Russia outweigh the affection for the fatherland—the Empire. They should banish everything that may weaken the latter, especially the memories of the so-called ideal past.”²⁷ In sum, at all levels of the imperial bureaucracy, from minister to rank-and-file censor, Little Russian separatism was perceived more as a vestige of traditionalistic regional patriotism doomed to extinction than as the *birth* of modern Ukrainian nationalism, which, in fact, constituted the essence of the activities of Shevchenko, Kulish, Kostomarov and other Ukrainian activists of this generation.²⁸

The emerging conflict was reflected in the Russian press. From the start of the 1840s, the question of the status of the Little Russian language attracted Belinskii’s close attention. He wrote an array of reviews of Ukrainian publications. Fascinated as he was with Little Russian autochthonous culture, Belinskii, in the spirit of the then fashionable idea of “civilizing imperialism,”²⁹ argued: “Having joined its Russian kindred, Little Russia took the civilizing path of art, science, civilization and enlightenment, which had before been completely inaccessible to this half-barbaric country.”³⁰ From this logically followed his approach to the language: “Now we can rightfully say that the Little Russian language ceded to the Little Russian vernacular dialect similar to that of White Russia, Siberia and other regions [...] The literary language of Little Russians should be the one used in a civilized society—the Russian language.”³¹ This belief survived until the late 1850s, when P. A. Lavrovskii, for instance, called for the preservation of information about the “dying” Little Russian dialect.³² Yet, as P. Bushkovich perceptively noted, many Russian publicists, being skeptical about the future of the Little Russian language, at the same time helped to publish Little Russian literary samples.³³ Belinskii’s aggressive position also revealed itself in his reaction to the failure of the Cyril–Methodius Society. He wrote to P. V. Annenkov in early December 1847: “Oh, those *khohly*! A flock of stupid sheep, they too much pretend to act the liberals in the name of *galushki* and *vareniki* with lard. It is impossible to write now. Everything is supervised. On the other hand, why complain about the government? What government would tolerate the printed propaganda of regional separatism?”³⁴

Belinskii was not alone in advocating the need to Russify the west-

ern borderlands. Belonging to the opposite pole of the Russian ideological spectrum was N. I. Grech, aide to F. V. Bulgarin. But in his memorandum to the Third Department, suggesting some possible concessions to Polish national feelings, he remarked: "One should treat residents of the Western guberniias differently. Here other measures are required, the most important being the propaganda of the Russian spirit and language."³⁵

In the second half of the 1840s, *Readings of the Imperial Society of History and Ancient Russian Times*, the periodical edited by Bodianskii, included several early-nineteenth-century historical works on the encounter between Little and Great Russia. In 1846, *A History of the Ruthenians* (Istoriia Rusov), widely circulated until then in manuscript, was published.³⁶ Without challenging loyalty to the tsar, the book, written in Russian, traditionally stressed Little Russian separateness and colorfully depicted the lawlessness and cruelty of the imperial authorities in Little Russia. In 1848, after, and possibly in connection with, the arrest of the members of the Cyril-Methodius Society, the periodical came out with the bitterly anti-Polish article "Notes on Little Russia," in which a special accent was placed on All-Russian unity and Little Russians were defined as "Russian people."³⁷

In this context, the unfinished work by Iu. Venelin, "The Debate between Southerners and Northerners about Their Russianness," deserves special mention. Venelin, himself a Ruthenian, adhered to the concept of an All-Russian nation, arguing that "the whole Russian nation, as it is now, is generally ... divided only into two branches ... the Northern and the Southern." The number of Little Russians (or Southerners in Venelin's language) amounted, according to Venelin, to 15 million, or to 20 million including the Ruthenians living in the Austrian Empire.³⁸ The root cause of the distinction between the two branches stemmed, Venelin continued, from the Tatar, Turkish and German invasions. He included "Liakhi" (Poles) among the German invaders, thus, to some extent, turning on its head Duchński's theory of the non-Slavic, Turanian origin of *moskali*.³⁹ Venelin maintained that in modern times the major differentiating factor was the "mutual and gradual linguistic deviation" that had finally led to the formation of the southern and northern dialects (*narechiia*). The popular collective sense of "being other" Venelin ironically described as a "common people's prejudice" that had become appealing even to a certain part of the educated public: "Indeed, how can one welcome a person who

does not wear a red shirt, calls '*shchi*' '*borshch*', and says '*dobre*' instead of '*harasho*'?"⁴⁰ It is worth noting that the popular understanding of what we would call today an "ethno-linguistic" register, Venelin shrewdly treats as a resource prone to manipulation, depending on whether it was exploited by the *bezborodye* (the educated public, literally the "beardless") for their political aims. Venelin's text was no more than a small introductory article. Yet the author's ideological conclusion can be easily reconstructed—both northerners and southerners have to eradicate mutual biases and smooth over linguistic dissimilarities, accumulated during the centuries of alien rule.

Contrary to Belinskii's aggressively assimilationist, and Venelin's moderate (albeit ironical), views, one of the most distinguished Slavophiles, Iu. F. Samarin, appeared as an advocate not only of Ukraine's cultural distinctiveness but also of its administrative autonomy. In his Kiev 1850 diary he polemizes with Kulish's interpretation of Ukrainian history. Kulish had argued that Ukraine could have obtained autonomy in the seventeenth century had it not been for the betrayal of the Cossack *starshina*. However, Samarin remarked: "Let the Ukrainian people keep their language, traditions, songs and legends; let them join in the fraternal embrace with Great Russians and develop their scientific and artistic talents so lavishly bestowed upon them by nature; let Ukraine advance her spiritual singularity in all possible manifestations; let the institutions created in Ukraine adjust more and more to her local needs; let the Ukrainians not forget, however, that their historical role is in Russia, in the common Muscovite state, and not beyond it."⁴¹

After the suppression of the Cyril-Methodius Society these ideas could not be published. Yet they logically add to the broad spectrum of responses of educated Russians to the Ukrainian question. All shared the thesis of All-Russian unification. Some called for the adoption of a more (Belinskii) or less (Venelin) aggressive Russification policy and the creation of a culturally and linguistically homogenous nation. Others, like Samarin, understood this process as a coexistence of political integrity and cultural regionalism. (It is very unlikely, however, that Samarin went as far as to suggest the replacement of Russian by Ukrainian. Rather, he must have limited the evolution of the Ukrainian language to non-public spheres.)

The limited interest in the Ukrainian question in the 1840s had faded by the first half of the 1850s. With the members of the Cyril-

Methodius Society exiled, the “ostrich” tactics adopted by the government towards the Ukrainian problem worked well until the regime of Nicholas I collapsed as a result of defeat in the Crimea and the subsequent death of the tsar, supposedly broken by the Crimean disaster.⁴² Everything, including the Ukrainian question, changed with the accession of Alexander II.

NOTES

- 1 Zenon E. Kohut, *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy. Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate 1760s–1830* (Cambridge, 1988).
- 2 Zenon E. Kohut, “The Ukrainian Elite in the Eighteenth Century and Its Integration into the Russian Nobility,” in I. Banac and P. Bushkovich, *Nobility in Russia and Eastern Europe* (New Haven, 1983), pp. 75–76.
- 3 *Ibid.*, pp. 78, 83.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p. 84.
- 5 “Denn jedes Volk ist Volk; es hat seine National Bildung und Sprache,” in Aira Kemilainen, *Nationalism: Problems Concerning the Word, the Concept and the Classification* (Jyväskylä, 1964), p. 42.
- 6 *An Experimental Collection of Old-Time Little Russian Songs* was published in St. Petersburg in 1819. *Little Russian Songs* was published by M. Maksimovich in Moscow in 1827. For a more detailed analysis of the ethnographic component of what we can conditionally call “early Ukrainophilism” see A. N. Pypin, *A History of Russian Ethnography*, v.3, *Little Russian Ethnography* (St. Petersburg, 1891). Pypin’s analysis of the political aspect of the phenomenon is now anachronistic. We use the term “early Ukrainophilism” to refer to the interest in Ukrainian, or rather Cossack, themes without involving the concept of exclusive Ukrainian identity.
- 7 See P. Bushkovich, “The Ukraine in Russian Culture 1790–1860: The evidence of the Journals,” in *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 39 (1991), pp. 339–363, and D. Saunders, *Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture 1750–1850* (Edmonton, 1985). See also A. Kappeler, “Masepintsy, Malorossy, Khohly: Ukrainians in the Ethnic Hierarchy of the Russian Empire,” in A. Miller et al., eds., *Rossija-Ukraina: istorija vzaimootnoshenij* (Moscow, 1997), pp. 125–144.
- 8 Padura’s works were published in 1844: *Ukrainky z nutoju Tymka Padurky* (Warsaw, 1844). On Padura see A. N. Pypin, *Little Russian Ethnography*, pp. 252–258.
- 9 Ukrainian Ukrainophiles were highly critical of this practice. Shevchenko wrote that “The invention of lap-dog-like Cossacks belongs to the Polish civilizers of the Right-Bank Ukraine [...] The *szlachta* representatives, with a sense of enlightened pride, call it ‘time-honored patronage over the Ukrainian nationality’, which

- was allegedly so characteristic of their ancestors [...] Taming a Cossack in the traditionally Cossack country is similar to taming a deer in Latgalia." See *Sovremennik*, 1860, no. 3, p. 102.
- 10 See I. Lysiak-Rudnytsky, *Istorychni ese* (Kiev, 1994), vol. 1, p. 276.
- 11 A. N. Pypin, *Little Russian Ethnography*, pp. 262–272.
- 12 For more on Maksimovich see chapter 2.
- 13 See D. I. Bagalei, *Opyt istorii Khar'kovskogo universiteta*, vol. 1–2 (Kharkov, 1893–1904); A. Shamrai, ed., *Khar'kovskaia shkola romantikov*, vol. 3 (Kharkov, 1930); *ibid.*, *Khar'kovskie poety 30–40gg. XIX stoletia* (Kharkov, 1930); J. Ajzenstok, "Romantycy Ukrainscy a zagadnienia jednosci slowianskiej," in *Slavia Orientalis*, 1973, no. 3.
- 14 M. Grushevskii, *Ocherk istorii ukrainskogo naroda*, p. 348.
- 15 See G. Grabovich, *Shevchenko iak myfotvorets. Semantika simvoliv u tvorchosti poeta* (Kiev, 1991).
- 16 On the significance of the early period in the activity of Shevchenko, Kulish and Kostomarov for Ukrainian nationalism see O. Pelech, "The State and the Ukrainian Triumvirate in the Russian Empire, 1831–1847," in B. Kravchenko, ed., *Ukrainian Past, Ukrainian Present* (New York, 1993).
- 17 On the Cyril–Methodius Society and the ideology of its members see P. A. Zaionchkovskii, *Kirillo-Mefodievskoe obshchestvo 1846–1847* (Moscow, 1959).
- 18 O. O. Franko, L. Z. Gictsova et. al., eds., *Kirilo-Mefodiiivs'ke Tovaristvo* (Kiev, 1990), p. 309.
- 19 P. A. Zaionchkovskii, *Kirillo-Mefodievskoe obshchestvo*, p. 118.
- 20 *Ibid.*, pp. 129–130.
- 21 *Ibid.*, pp. 125–126.
- 22 *Ibid.*, p. 118.
- 23 RGIA, f. 772, op. 1, ed. khr. 3210.
- 24 *Ibid.*, l. 13.
- 25 *Ibid.*, l. 9.
- 26 *Ibid.*, l. 18ob.
- 27 *Ibid.*, 22ob.
- 28 O. Pelech, "The State and the Ukrainian Triumvirate in the Russian Empire, 1831–47."
- 29 "Here are the Redskins of Fenimore Cooper," wrote, for instance, Balzac about French peasants in 1844. For other opinions of a similar kind on the part of the educated French public see Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*, chapter 1, "A Country of Savages," pp. 3–6.
- 30 V. G. Belinskii, PSS, vol. 7 (Moscow, 1955), p. 64–65.
- 31 V. G. Belinskii, PSS, vol. 5 (Moscow, 1954), pp. 177, 330. For details see Andrea Rutherford, "Vissarion Belinskii and the Ukrainian Question," *Russian Review*, vol. 54 (October 1995), no. 4.

- 32 P. A. Lavrovskii, "Obzor zamechatel'nykh osobennostei narechiia malorusskogo sravnitel'no s velikorusskim i drugimi slavianskimi narechiiami," *Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia*, June 1859, p. 225.
- 33 See P. Bushkovich, "The Ukraine in Russian Culture 1790–1860: The evidence of the Journals," in *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 39 (1991), p. 341.
- 34 V. G. Belinskii, PSS, vol. 12, p. 441.
- 35 See A. I. Reitblat, ed., *Vidok Figliarin. Pis'ma i agenturnye zapiski F.V. Bulgarina v Tret'e otделение* (Moscow, 1998), p. 556.
- 36 "Istoriia Rusov ili Maloi Rossii. Sochinenie Georgiia Koniskago Arkhiepiskopa Belorusskogo," *Chteniia imperatorskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh* (hereafter *ChIOIDR*), 1846, nos. 1–4. The real author of the work is still unidentified.
- 37 *ChIOIDR*, 1848, no. 2.
- 38 *ChIOIDR*, 1847, no. 3, pp. 2–3.
- 39 *Ibid.*, p. 9.
- 40 *Ibid.*, p. 4.
- 41 From Samarin's 1850 Kiev diary, *Russkii Arkhiv*, 1877, no. 6, p. 232. Khomiakov's letter to Samarin, dated 30 May 1847, is often cited in this context as being representative of the Slavophiles' overall attitude to the Cyril–Methodius Society: "Little Russians were eventually infected with political stupidity. It is sad and painful to see such nonsense and backwardness." The citation is usually cut unfinished. See, for instance, T. Poleshchuk, "Rosiiska gromads'kist' ta ukrains'kii kul'turno-natsional'nii ruh kintsia 50kh-pochatku 60kh rokiv XIX stolittea," *Vistnik L'vivs'kogo universitetu. Serioa istorichna*. Vipusk 33 (Lvov, 1998), p. 102. If we continue the citation further, it becomes clear that Khomiakov, arguing with the Little Russian ideologues, did not comment on their ideas about Ukraine's future: "When the social question is only barely raised, when it is not solved, but is very far from being solved, how can people, who seem smart, stick to politics!? [...] I do not know whether the Little Russians' delusion was criminal, but I know that their thoughtlessness is more that striking. The age of politics is over [...] Moral struggle—this is what we have to think about today."
- 42 The refusal by the sick Nicholas I to accept any medicines is often treated as an original form of suicide.

CHAPTER 2

The First Years of Alexander II's Reign and Latent Ukrainophilism

Even the initial steps towards liberalization after the accession of Alexander II affected the status of the exiled members of the Cyril–Methodius Society. Permission was given for their previously censored works to be printed. Kostomarov returned from his provincial exile and was appointed as professor at St. Petersburg University. His arrival at the university was indeed triumphal—after his first lecture he was carried out of the auditorium on the shoulders of his students. Kulish soon set up his own publishing house in St. Petersburg.¹ Shevchenko was the last to return, arriving in the capital in 1858. St. Petersburg was gradually becoming the center of an active and numerous Ukrainophile circle. In 1861 Kulish wrote to one of his Ukrainian correspondents: “I am sorry you are so far from the motherland and St. Petersburg, which, by the number of Ukrainians living here, partly compensates us for our motherland.”²

The official surveillance of Ukrainophiles at that time almost came to naught. Only some rank-and-file officials, still remembering the routine of the Nikolaevan regime, would bother the higher authorities. In 1857 the Petersburg censor Lazhechnikov discovered in Kulish’s foreword to his historical chronicle *Chiornaia Rada* “reflections on the introduction of some conciliatory principle between two materially and spiritually brotherly cultures divided by old misconceptions and shortcomings of mutual biased attitudes.” Lazhechnikov held that “such an important subject needed to be reviewed by the Supreme Censorship Committee” (hereafter SCC), to which he applied.³ The SCC ignored the inquiry of the zealous censor by proposing to examine the question “in accordance with the general provisions.”⁴

In 1860 another censor, V. Beketov, inspecting Kulish’s *Hmel’nychina* and not finding “anything subversive except for some words hinting at the strained condition of Little Russia during the initial Russian

annexation" doubted, however, "whether the history of Little Russia, which ostensibly implies the idea of regional independence, can ever be authorized."⁵ Again the SCC could not find enough plausible reasons to treat the Ukrainian question outside "the general statutes." "Censorship cannot and must not hinder the popular distribution of specialized historical writings on different formerly independent imperial regions, provided that these works pursue purely academic aims, do not implicate the idea of the independent existence of those regions and do not contain any separatist moods and ideas."⁶ The SCC proved to be unable, naively, to discover the latter in *Hmel'nichina* and authorized its publication.

The one case where the government did behave promptly and ruthlessly was in its effort to thwart the intentions of the Poles to disseminate in the western territories books printed using the Latin alphabet.⁷ At that time the Habsburg monarchy was diligently converting the literature of local Ruthenians into the Latin script. In May 1858, the Galician governor, Count A. Goluchowski, ordered the establishment of a special commission to transfer Galician Ruthenians from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet. Another project of a similar kind was prepared, with the blessing of Austria, by J. Ireček, a high-ranking Czech appointee in the Austrian Ministry of Education.⁸ These designs never materialized due to the fierce resistance of Galician Ruthenians.

As early as 1859, "the printing of the Russian ABC in Polish characters" was outlawed. The regulation stipulated that "Little Russian books written for the *narod* [something the authorities did not prohibit] should be printed exclusively in Russian letters."⁹ The same resolution was shortly passed in relation to the Belorussian language as well.¹⁰ Thus, both Little Russian and Belorussian were treated as dialects of Russian. By and large, these instructions belonged to the 1830–1831 post-insurrectionist imperial policy that, according to the perceptive remark of the French historian Daniel Beauvois, recognized the western Ukrainian peasantry as the economic but not cultural and national property of the Polish landowners.¹¹

On the eve of the Emancipation Edict, the Russian government and public opinion were concerned with the promotion of primary schooling for peasants. In this respect, the authorities were not particularly sensitive to the danger of Ukrainian nationalism and did not pursue a rigid assimilation policy. The special committee that studied this question in 1861 came to the conclusion that during the first two

years of primary school (which remained the usual duration of primary education in many imperial provinces, including Ukraine, up to the early twentieth century), "in the regions where the Great Russian language does not count as native," instruction should be conducted in the local dialects (*narechiia*). Only at higher levels of further education were local dialects to be replaced by Russian.¹² In fact, this policy reiterated the 1804 *Ustav* postulates, requiring the teaching of both Russian and local grammar. The illustrative proof of this policy comes with a story told by the Poltava Hromada member D. Pil'chikov about the conflict between the Poltava Ukrainophiles and local landowners concerning the language of instruction in the local Sunday school in 1861. Pil'chikov recalled that in the heat of the debate "an unknown Petersburg general happened to drop in on the school, took, to our great surprise, our side and found our claim quite legitimate. The Hamocratia [as Pil'chikov called the local landowners] has shut up."¹³

At the beginning of 1862 one could buy in Moscow and St. Petersburg up to six Ukrainian primers by different authors including Kulish and Shevchenko.¹⁴ The first Belorussian ABC was published the same year, due to the efforts of the Minsk marshal of the nobility, A. Askerrek.¹⁵ It should be noted that the 1858 instruction to the censorship committees prescribed, in the event of reprinting, the cutting out from Kulish's *Gramatka* articles "permeated with Ukrainian national spirit."¹⁶ The authorities had never been wise enough to understand that the very publication of Ukrainian primers was much more important for the advance of Ukrainian nationalism than the banning of the few separatist ideas expressed in the book. The presence of several anti-Polish articles in *Gramatka* provided the authorities with yet another pretext to censor the book. In 1858 the Kiev governor-general, Prince I. I. Vasil'chikov, under pressure from local landowners, petitioned the minister of education to ban the sale of *Gramatka* in his guberniias and to exclude the above-mentioned articles from subsequent editions.¹⁷

Not only did the authorities facilitate the publication of Ukrainian primers, they also granted, through the Ministry of Education, five hundred rubles for the publication of Ukrainian textbooks for primary schools.¹⁸

Some of the Ukrainian activists even tried to use church structures as a venue for spreading Shevchenko's primer in schools. In early 1861 a group of Kharkov Ukrainophiles sent six thousand copies of the primer to the Kiev Metropolitan Arsenii. The very fact that the

organizers of this action did not bother to inquire from Arsenii beforehand as to whether he would consent to accept the books but instead, exposing themselves to serious expenses, sent him such a huge number of copies, testifies that they did not expect anything but a welcoming reception. Arsenii, however, proved to be more cautious and on 19 April sent a letter to the chief procurator of the Holy Synod, A. P. Tolstoy, asking for his advice and official guidelines regarding the use of Little Russian primers in peasant schools.¹⁹ Tolstoy readdressed the letter to the head of the Third Department, V. A. Dolgorukov,²⁰ who, in his turn, immediately passed it on to the minister of education, E. V. Putiatin. The latter applied to the SCC for information. The censors finally determined that “there is no instruction to ban the publication of primers in the Little Russian dialect. The only existing provision demands the use of the Russian alphabet in books published for the *narod*, as well as the prohibition of imported popular books printed in the Polish script abroad.” A small postscript added to the document in Putiatin’s chancery reads: “The Supreme Censorship Committee’s Resolution: there are no de jure reasons not to allow the book. However, it is advisable not to encourage the use of the local dialects inasmuch as they separate two cultures. To submit for further consideration to Secret Counselor (*Tainyi Sovetnik*) Troinitskii, 8 June 1861.”²¹

Troinitskii submitted his comments on 14 July. He confirmed the SCC’s resolution on the absence of any legal prerequisites for the withdrawal of the book but expressed a reservation that “it would be inappropriate to officially patronize the dissemination of the book for public education in Little Russia.” “The publication of this book for the *narod*,” his argument ran, “in the Little Russian dialect, albeit in Russian letters, intends to resurrect the Little Russian nationality whose gradual, steady and non-violent fusion with Great Russians should permanently constitute one of the pre-eminent aspirations of the government. We share the same confession; thank God, the upper strata of the Little Russian population have considerably approached those of Great Russia and much infused with the latter in service and social life. The Russian army largely consists of common people whose commercial, agricultural and industrial interests may only enrich and develop through the mutual bond with the same interests of the Russian state. True, Little Russians and Great Russians still differ in some local customs and the use of two dialects of the same language. It is impossible

and unwise to try to abolish these differences by force, for instance, through the banning of all Little Russian books. It is similarly inadvisable, however, to obstruct the natural time-governed *rapprochement* process and encourage, on behalf of the government, the revival of the Little Russian dialect and literature, for this may result in a schism between our related peoples, so deleterious for both of them in the past and so dangerous for our state's integrity in the future. I dare add that England and France, initially unified from regions more heterogeneous than our Russia, owe their present might first and foremost to the implementation of the above-mentioned policy."²²

In his interpretation of the Great/Little Russian differences, Troinitskii followed Venelin's line of argument. His conviction as to the uselessness of harsh censorship anticipated, as we will see, the position of the Russian press in 1861. Troinitskii, as far as the sources suggest, was the first high-ranking state official to formulate in a bureaucratic document the assimilation approach based on the All-Russian nation project and to draw a direct analogy between the latter and the experience of France and Britain. Yet Troinitskii did not offer any clear-cut outline of possible assimilation pressure counting solely upon "the natural course of time."

To be sure, after this note, Arsenii was recommended to "decline the donation and distribution of the Little Russian primer."²³ It would be erroneous, however, to regard the year 1861 as a turning point in governmental policy. For instance, in 1862 one of the Ukrainian books for popular use—*Skazki* by Glebov—was published at state cost.²⁴ The Holy Synod, censoring all religious works, also opted for a moderate position. Thus Kostomarov did not encounter any difficulties when, in 1862, he published, with the help of public donations, a popular Ukrainian edition of *The Holy History* by Father Stepan Opatovich.²⁵ As we will see, at that time the Holy Synod was quite prepared to tolerate the publication of the Holy Scriptures in Ukrainian. When the authorities really cared about being heard by the peasants, they were ready to address them in Ukrainian. In 1861 Kulish was officially invited to translate the Emancipation Edict into Ukrainian.²⁶ The translation was not issued, however, since the state secretary V. P. Butkov demanded from Kulish that he adjust the translation to be as close as possible to the peasants' language. Kulish refused to amend the work because he was dedicated to the idea of creating a standard Ukrainian language.²⁷ In 1862 the Kiev civil governor, N. P. Hesse, as he traveled

around his guberniia persuading peasants to compose statutory charters, had another official at his side simultaneously translating the speech into the Little Russian language and distributing the printed text among the elders.²⁸

To conclude, even after Troinitskii had clearly formulated the problem, for quite a long time the authorities could not work out a coherent attitude towards the “language issue” in schools and were not receptive to the identity problems. Such a slow reaction proves that the Russian autocracy was at least several decades behind the West in grasping the importance of nationalistic political principles.

★ ★ ★

In the second half of the 1850s the debate between two famous scholars—academician Mikhail Pogodin and the former rector of Kiev University Mikhail Maksimovich, who spoke for the “Little Russian people”—can be viewed as a prelude to the impending aggravation of the Ukrainian question.²⁹ At the heart of the polemics, carried out on the pages of the Slavophile journal *Russkaia Beseda*, lay the question of who (Great or Little Russians) had more rights to claim the legacy of Kievan Rus'. Maksimovich opened the discussion with his “Philological Letters” to Pogodin, objecting against Pogodin’s theory according to which Kievan Rus', before the Tatar invasion, had been populated by Great Russians while Little Russians settled in this territory only in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries after the migration of Great Russians to the North. (It is O. Andriewsky’s argument that in the formulation of this theory Pogodin was influenced by the Cyril–Methodius affair.)³⁰

Emphasizing the Little Russian character of Kievan culture, Maksimovich mentioned that “the Little Russian and Great Russian dialects or, to speak more exactly, Southern and Northern Russian, are brothers, the sons of the same Russian culture [...] and they should indisputably be considered together within one system.”³¹ Furthermore, touching on the “language issue,” Maksimovich gives a fairly systematic view of the “All-Russian community” concept: “The Great Russian dialect is closest to the Belorussian one. They form the Northern Russian language and together with Southern Russian (which, in its turn, consists of the Little Russian and Red Russian—*chervonorusskii*—dialects) belong to the Great Eastern Slavic or Russian language.”³² In his informal response to his old friend (the debate was rather ami-

cable and the opponents addressed one another using the non-formal *you—ty* in Russian), Pogodin accused Maksimovich of displaying a “distinct Ukrainophile bias.”³³ Characteristically, Pogodin objected to “calling Little Russian what belongs from time immemorial to us (Great Russians).”³⁴ Thus, consciously or not, he admitted the threat of the division and denied in essence the concept of the “triune Russian nation.” In his interpretation, the legacy of Kievan Rus’, from being a perfect building material for the creation of the “triune nation” historical myth, became “a bone of contention in the property division lawsuit.”

At this point one comes across a typical romantic debate in the framework of the nationalistic conflict with all its claims to this or that territory and the establishment of this or that variant of ethnic hierarchy. Pogodin developed the idea of the “seniority” of the Great Russian element while Maksimovich defended the concept of equality, not questioning, however, the unity of these elements.³⁵ Their debate signals the gradual process of the “nationalization of patriotism,” although until the end of their lives modern nationalistic ideology remained alien to both of them.³⁶

The abundance of special terms and the detailed investigations of linguistic peculiarities made it difficult for a lay reader to detect the ideological core of the debate—the fact that invariably precluded the issue from becoming a subject of wide popular interest.

However, as extant fragments of private correspondence from the late 1850s show, already at that time one could find in letters an enthusiastic discussion of the questions destined to ignite public debates by the early 1860s. In 1857 Kulish began to look for funds to sponsor the publication of the Ukrainian journal. “If only we had our journal, we would find enough enthusiasts who would create our own language not inferior to that of the Czechs or Serbs,” Kulish wrote to G. P. Galagan, a rich landowner and Ukrainophile sympathizer.³⁷ (While borrowing symbols, images and texts from the Poles, Ukrainophiles formulated their strategy based on the Czech example of nationalism, since it better corresponded to the task of cultural and linguistic emancipation, which was central for the Ukrainian movement.) With the finest accuracy Kulish worded the essence of the problem—a literary Ukrainian language was still to be created.³⁸ He himself was ready to participate in the project: “We have enriched the Muscovite language with words unfamiliar before to the benighted *moskali*. Now it is time to demand

the payment back with interest, without even bothering about the fact that Pushkin was there on our property. I have recently translated into our language the first canto of *Child Harold* as if there is no Muscovite language but only English and ours.”³⁹

Kulish, however tendentious, was closer than Belinskii to historical truth in describing the Russo–Ukrainian cultural interaction of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.⁴⁰ The Poles, if invited to join the discussion, would offer their own vision of where Little Russians had borrowed “smart words.” Further, one should give the floor to the Germans...

At the end of 1858 plans for the creation of the journal generated a lively argument between Kulish and the Slavophile S. Aksakov. In October 1858 Kulish wrote to Aksakov: “My words might sometimes resemble a harsh cry for they were not preceded by a free dispute with the reading public. We, Little Russians, are deprived of freedom of speech more than any other nationality in the empire, we have to sing our song in the alien land. Not only the government but also your educated public is against us. Even our own imbecile co-nationals oppose us. We are no more than a handful, but we do keep faith in our future, which, to our deep conviction, is different from that of Great Russians. Between us lies as deep an abyss as between the tragedy and the epos. Both are the great children of the divine genius but they cannot blend into one family. But this is exactly what your society expects and in what it blindly believes. Your society thinks that the world is not large enough for us without Moscow and that only Moscow is able to provide for our future. We see and feel this attitude constantly and being unable to write what our compatriots write at home, only seldom we break our silence...

If only we could write like Iskender [pseudonym of Alexander Herzen], then each insulting phrase directed at you would turn into a biographical, ethnographical or social treatise and the whole lot of literature would spring out of our debate on issues that are now presented only from a Moscow or Petersburg point of view. We will not live to see it, but this time will undoubtedly come. The best proof of it is in the very existence of people who, even at the time of the highest development of your written culture, realize how one-sided and prejudiced it is. For the time being we do not demand the impossible either from the government or from the educated public, but we are cherishing our dream of independent evolution.”⁴¹

Kulish sounds here like a determined Ukrainian nationalist of a separatist sort, who defines Moscow and Russian culture as “alien” and sees Ukraine’s secession as the ultimate goal. Still, it is worth noting that Kulish trusts his correspondent, being sure that he will not make the letter public. At the beginning of the 1860s the behavior of the overwhelming majority of the Ukrainophiles’ opponents consistently anticipated the logic of F. M. Dostoevskii and A. S. Suvorin, exposed by the latter in the famous episode in his *Diary* in 1881 in which they talked about the impossibility of reporting on the plotters.⁴² This is not to argue that Ukrainophiles can be compared to the People’s Will (*Narodnaia Volia*) terrorists, but rather that many liberally minded Russian opponents not only abstained from reporting on Ukrainophiles but also avoided for a long time any overt disputes, which in the conditions of the police regime, were tantamount to denunciation. From that time until well into the twentieth century this interpretation of liberal ethics in the police regime more than once framed the debates over Ukrainophilism.

Moreover, in St. Petersburg many Russians were conscious supporters of Ukrainophilism. Kulish, for instance, observed to Aksakov reproachfully in November 1858: “The Russians in St. Petersburg accept the Little Russian nationality and do their best to support it as truly enlightened people of our age should do.”⁴³

In correspondence from the late 1850s one can already sense the accelerating conflict that, with time, appeared crucial for the destiny of Ukrainophilism in Russia. It was the conflict between Ukrainophiles and those Little Russians (it would be a mistake to call them Ukrainians) who supported the idea of the unity of Ukraine with Russia. The following comes from a letter written by S. S. Gogotskii, professor of pedagogy at Kiev University, to Father V. V. Grechulevich, the author of one of the numerous Ukrainian primers: “In your primer you did an excellent job by reminding people in their own language about all the vile deeds of the Liakhi. It was more than necessary, for even now their propaganda, I am sure, waits for the slightest chance to unleash itself on us. In their minds they had already destroyed us. In Paris Soltyk wrote that Little Russians populate the territory from the Dnieper to the Volga, with not a single word about the six million Little Russians on the Right Bank. It seems to me that you did not take into consideration the situation of Little Russia as an entity when you: a) tell the people about the so-called independent way of living [*samostoi-*

kost']. This kind of *samostoikost*' would kill us in a year; b) implicitly and tacitly allude to the division between us and Great Russians, whereas it is essential to suggest to the people that our well being is in the unity, and solely in the unity, of all Russian parts. Believe me, this is the only effective tool against Polish propaganda, which I can perfectly see and I know where it hides. I have noticed that the Left-Bank Little Russians had completely forgotten about us...; c) you visibly aim at inciting our people's hostility towards Russia and eliminated, regrettably, the literary Russian language from some of your articles. By doing this you are, even judging from a purely practical point of view, bringing upon us not one but two enemies: the Poles and the Russians. I cannot possibly understand how we will be able to manage both of them if now we survive solely due to the Russian government.

My conclusions are the following: a) We have to provide popular instruction for the people on both sides of the Dnieper; b) We have to keep alive the idea of the triune Russian nation, without which our destruction will be soon within sight; c) The literary Russian language should be universal in all primers. The faith and the language must serve as two connecting links between the two peoples. But it will also be beneficial to publish *something* in our own language; d) We must never urge for discord with Great Russia. It is not the sensible way of claiming changes. Do not forget that our real enemies are the Liakhi and Rome!"⁴⁴

Kulish's letter about the "imbecile anti-Ukrainophile compatriots" suggests that Gogotskii was not alone in his views. The head of the Kiev Interim Commission for the Investigation of Ancient Acts, M. V. Iuzefovich, similarly attempted to convince Kulish that the final goal lay in "the reciprocal interrelationship between the two age-old Russian dialects from which [...] our perfect standard literary language should be created."⁴⁵ Iuzefovich used to subsidize Kulish and the latter wrote to his "stupid" compatriot: "Though you do not write like one of us, you do not sound a stranger either. We do not live in enmity with Muscovy and we love the Muscovite idiom no less than we love our Rus'. God forbid that we move away from Moscow."⁴⁶

Gogotskii's letter shows that since the end of the 1850s a yet unpublished political Ukrainophile program was lucid enough to interested observers. The Third Department, having perused the letters of Gogotskii and Kulish, also fell from 1858 into the category of "initiated observers." From the point of view of the interests they were

supposed to protect, the gendarme authorities did not fail to evaluate properly both letters. Thus, Dolgorukov personally added a margin note to Gogotskii's letter: "It has much sense." The letter of Kulish has gone to the departmental archive as "The letter [...] containing reasoning of a nationalistic character about the impossibility of Great/Little Russian future coexistence in one state as well as the idea of Little Russia's separate statehood etc." However, by that time the Nikolaevan regime had been safely buried and Kulish did not suffer any direct persecutions.

NOTES

- 1 Between 1860 and 1862 Kulish's publishing house issued in the *Sel'skaia biblioteka* series thirty-nine various brochures in Ukrainian, which equalled the total number of all books published during the four previous decades. See O. I. Dej, "Kniga i drukartstvo na Ukraini z 60-kh rokiv XIX st. do Velikogo Zhovtnia," in P. M. Popov, ed., *Kniga i drukartstvo na Ukraini* (Kiev, 1964), p. 129.
- 2 P.A. Kulish to V. P. Maslov, 7 December 1861, OR RGB, f. 418, k. 1, ed. khr. 15, l. 1. For details on the Petersburg Ukrainophile circle see L. F. Panteleev, *Vospominaniia* (Moscow, 1958) and Z. Nedoborovskii, "Moi vospominaniia," *Kievskaiia starina*, February 1893. Grushevskii noted later: "The very fact that Petersburg, the capital situated as far as 1,500 *versts* from Ukrainian territory, became the center of the Ukrainian movement reveals how weak this movement was and how inextricably it was connected with a few individuals." See Grushevskii, *Ocherk istorii ukrainskogo naroda* (St. Petersburg, 1904), p. 352.
- 3 RGIA, f. 772, op. 1, ed. khr. 4027, ll. 1-1ob. Letter dated 4 January 1857.
- 4 *Ibid.*, l. 8. Resolution of the SCC dated 12 January 1857.
- 5 RGIA, f. 772, op. 1, ed. khr. 5536, ll. 1-1ob, 22 February 1861.
- 6 *Ibid.*, ll. 4-4ob. Letter of SCC member N. Mukhanov, 22 February 1861.
- 7 See the article of V. Lamanskii in *Den'*, no. 2, October 1861, p. 16.
- 8 See V. Mojseenko, "Pro odnu sprobu latinizatsii ukrain'skogo pis'ma," "I" *Nezalezhnij kul'turologichnij chasopis*, no. 9 (Lvov, 1997), pp. 140-147.
- 9 RGIA, f. 772, op. 1, p. 2, ed. khr. 4840.
- 10 RGIA, f. 772, part 2, ed. khr. 4950. It is interesting to note that V. Dunin-Marcinkiewicz, the editor of the confiscated translation of *Pan Tadeusz*, was reimbursed for expenses.
- 11 D. Beauvois, *Polacy na Ukraine 1831-1863* (Paris, 1987), 31.
- 12 RGIA, f. 775, op. 1, ed. khr. 188, ll. 9-9ob.

- 13 V. Dudko, "Poltavs'ka Gromada pochatku 1860-h rr. u listah Dmitra Pil'chikova do Vasilii Bilozars'kogo," *Kiivs'ka Starovyna*, no. 2 (1998), 162.
- 14 See *Osnova*, no. 1 (1862), p. 108. Other authors included L. Iashchenko, N. Gatsuk, I. Derkach, K. Shejkovskii and M. Maksimovich.
- 15 P. U. Tserashkovich, *Belarusy. Entsyklopedyia Gistoryi Belarusi* (Minsk, 1993), p. 471.
- 16 RGIA, f. 772, op. 1, part. 2, ed. khr. 4503.
- 17 RGIA, f. 772, op. 1, d. 4503, l. 1.
- 18 See N. Fabricant, "Kratkij ocherk iz istorii otnoshenii russkikh tsenzurnykh zakonov k ukrainskoi literature," *Russkaia Mysl'*, vol. 3 (1905), p. 131.
- 19 See V. S. Borodin, *T. G. Shevchenko i tsarska tsenzura. Doslidzhennia ta dokumenty 1840–1862* (Kiev, 1969), p. 75. Borodin has published all the documents concerning this story. To his inquiry Arsenii attached the letter from the benefactors but asked for it to be returned, which Tolstoy eventually did, thus from the extant documents it is impossible to find out the names of those involved in this action.
- 20 *Ibid.*, p. 154.
- 21 *Ibid.*, pp. 154–155.
- 22 *Ibid.*, pp. 155–156.
- 23 *Ibid.*, p. 156.
- 24 O. I. Dej, "Kniga i drukartstvo na Ukraini," p. 308.
- 25 Opatovich, who served at the Smolensk cemetery, was close to Kostomarov and other Petersburg Ukrainophiles. See Z. Nedoborovskii, "Moi vospominaniia," *Kievskaia starina*, no. 2 (February 1893), pp. 201–202.
- 26 *Ob otmene stesnenii malorusskogo pechatnogo slova* (St. Petersburg, 1910), p. 14.
- 27 V. Dudko, "Poltavs'ka Gromada pochatku 1860-h rr," p. 176. Pil'chikov, the Poltava Ukrainophile, was of the same opinion as Butkov about the text by Kulish and wrote: "Such a translation will be useless for the *narod*." See *ibid.*, p. 163.
- 28 B. Sheveliv, "Petitsii ukrain'skikh gromad do peterburz'skogo komitetu gramotnosti z r. 1862," *Za sto lit*, no. 3 (1928), p. 14. See also *Sovremennaia letopis' Russkogo vestnika*, no. 4 (1862).
- 29 Maksimovich's Little Russian patriotism did not invariably contradict his All-Russian identity. Never in his life did he doubt the feasibility of the Southern and Northern Rus' union. Until his last days Maksimovich did not think in nationalistic categories. Explaining why he loved Kiev more than Pogodin, Maksimovich wrote that "loving Kiev as any Russian and Little Russian does, I feel additional affection to it as it is *the motherland of my family*," thus drawing on the social values of a hereditary nobleman. M. Maksimovich, "Otvetye pis'ma Pogodinu," *Russkaia Beseda* 2 (1857), p. 85. See also A. N. Pypin, *Istoriia russkoi etnografii*, vol. 3 (St. Petersburg, 1891), pp. 15–37, and M. Dragomanov, "Maksimovich. Ego literaturnoe i obshchestvennoe znachenie. Nekrolog," *Vestnik Evropy* (March 1874), pp. 442–453.

- 30 O. Andriewsky, *Becoming Invisible: Ukrainians in the Rhetoric of Empire in 19th-Century Russia*. Paper delivered at the conference "Shaping identities in the borderlands: Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania in the Nineteenth Century," CEU, Budapest, 4–6 March 1999.
- 31 M. Maksimovich, "Filologicheskie pis'ma k Pogodinu," *Russkaia Beseda* 3 (1856), pp. 84–85.
- 32 M. Maksimovich, "Otvetye pis'ma Pogodinu," *Russkaia Beseda* 2 (1857), p. 87.
- 33 M. Pogodin, "Otvety na filologicheskie pis'ma Maksimovicha," *Russkaia Beseda* 4 (1856), p. 124.
- 34 *Ibid.*, p. 137.
- 35 Logically, Maksimovich later stopped supporting *Osnova* and its distinct nationalistic program. See M. D. Bernstein, *Zhurnal "Osnova" i ukrains'kii literaturnii protses kintsia 50–60 rokiu* (Kiev, 1959), p. 34.
- 36 The term "nationalization of patriotism" was proposed and analyzed on the basis of West European materials in Mauricio Viroli, *For Love of Country. An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism* (Oxford, 1995), pp. 140–160.
- 37 "Chastnaia Perepiska G. P. Galagana. Pis'ma P. A. Kulisha," *Kievskaiia starina* (September 1899), p. 349.
- 38 It was the generation of Kulish and Shevchenko who laid the foundation for this process, which had not been completed even by the mid-twentieth century. See George Y. Shevelov, "Evolution of the Ukrainian Literary Language," in Ivan L. Rudnytsky, ed., *Rethinking Ukrainian History* (Edmonton, 1981), pp. 224–227.
- 39 "Chastnaia perepiska G. P. Galagana. Pis'ma P. A. Kulisha," *Kievskaiia starina* (September 1899), p. 349.
- 40 See David Saunders, *Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture 1750–1850* (Edmonton, 1985).
- 41 GARF, f. 109, Secret Archive, op. 1, ed. khr. 1762, l. 1–2.
- 42 *Dnevnik A. S. Suvorina* (Moscow, 1923), p. 15.
- 43 Cited from M. D. Bernstein, *Zhurnal "Osnova" i ukrains'kii literaturnii protses kintsia 50–60 rokiu* (Kiev, 1959).
- 44 GARF, f. 109, Secret Archive, op. 1, ed. khr. 1763, ll. 3–4ob. From S. Gogotskii's letter to Father Vasilii Grechulevich, 19 December 1859. The punctuation of the original preserved.
- 45 *Kievskaiia starina* (March 1899), p. 324.
- 46 *Ibid.*, p. 314.

The Advancement of Ukrainophilism in the 1860s. *Osnova* and the Russian Press

The year 1861 saw a remarkable acceleration in the Ukrainian movement. This was primarily due to the long-awaited (since 1857) foundation of the Southern Russian literary monthly *Osnova*. When, in October 1858, Kulish officially applied to the Ministry of Education for permission to establish the journal *Khata* and the ministry in turn requested the opinion of the Third Department, the gendarmes were in the middle of preparing Kulish's personal dossier for Dolgorukov. What was extraordinary about it was not that Kulish's perلustrated letter provoked Dolgorukov's genuine interest, but that he needed to read the dossier to find out who Kulish was. Amazingly, Dolgorukov seemed to be unfamiliar with the ten-year-old Cyril–Methodius affair in which Kulish had appeared as one of the major defendants.¹ When “enlightened,” Dolgorukov came out with a decidedly negative answer: “Taking into consideration the evidence on the guberniia secretary Kulish presented to my predecessor Count Uvarov, on 30 May 1947, #897, and the fact that in his literary activity Kulish insists on the direction that has once already exposed him to special governmental measures, I would recommend that Kulish's application be declined.” But, as Kulish himself rightly noted: “The minister declined *my* application but not the idea of the journal.”² When, the following year, the same request was submitted by V. Belozerskii, another member of the Cyril–Methodius Society and a relative of Kulish, Dolgorukov made a similar objection, although less energetically, and finally permission was granted. Probably the efforts of those “enlightened Petersburg Russians,” whom Kulish had mentioned in his letter to Aksakov, had finally proved effective.

The first announcement about the forthcoming edition of *Osnova* appeared in June 1860 and the first issue was released in January 1861. It was a peculiar time in Russian history. “Everything has turned upside

down and is only now coming to order,” wrote Leo Tolstoy about post-Emancipation Russia. This fresh sensation in the early 1860s was characteristic for the government and its subjects alike. The latter did not know where the boundaries of the permissible would run and to what extent this would depend on them or the will of the authorities. The rulers, having launched the reforms, did not know where to stop. Being well aware of the axiomatic peril of liberal thaws for authoritarian regimes, they were afraid of losing control of the situation.

National movement activists reflected in their own way on the tumultuous atmosphere of the time. The letter sent by A. Konisskii to Kulish from Poltava serves as a good example of this agitation. “On 19 February [the day on which the abolition of serfdom was proclaimed] our small society organized a reception at which the first toast was proposed to the freed serfs and the second to Ukrainian writers and *Osnova* [...] So what? Now *moskali* keep silent! God willing our day will come too!”³ It was exactly by the start of the 1860s that major cities in Ukraine faced the establishment of the so-called *hromadas*—the self-governing circles of Ukrainian national activists.

Concomitantly, the Polish national movement in the Western territories continued to be an everlasting trouble for the tsarist authorities. Polish nationalism again revealed itself through demands to annex at least a part of Kresy to the Polish Kingdom.⁴ The government, on the one hand, was seeking a compromise with the Poles; on the other, it excluded the very idea of paying for this compromise with the western borderland.⁵ From 1861 and up to the Polish uprising of 1863, an increasing number of secret governmental documents focused on the “necessity of strengthening the Russian element in the Western region.”⁶ The permanent tension in the Western guberniias, the beginning of Polish manifestations, the absence of any coordinated retaliatory plans in the ruling circles as well the pressing need for peasant reforms in the region pushed the problem of the western borderland to the top of the government’s priority agenda. Later these circumstances would prove a catalyst for the tightening of the anti-Ukrainian policy.

The atmosphere of suspicion that had blackened Russo-Polish-Ukrainian relationships influenced, in an interesting way, the attitude to the phenomenon that the Poles contemptuously called *khlopomanstvo*. *Khlopomany* were young people from Polish or traditionally Polonized families who, due to their populist convictions, rejected social and cultural belonging to their stratum and strove to approach the local peas-

antry. (The same tendency, albeit of a much lesser dimension, existed in Belorussia as well.)⁷ The government could not but rejoice at the fact that some *khlopomany* renounced their Catholic faith, converted to Orthodoxy, and refused to support the Polish national movement. However, the Polish ill-wishers were quick to draw the government's attention to the subversive flavor of the *khlopomany*'s social views and pro-Ukrainophile orientation. The authorities were more often than not inclined to pay heed to these accusations, being guided more by the instinct of social solidarity with Polish landowners than by the strategy of national confrontation with the Poles. The most radical Russian opponents of Ukrainophilism viewed *khlopomanstvo* as a particularly insidious offspring of *vallenrodianstvo* and part of the Polish conspiracy.⁸

Among the more than fifty *Osnova* members could be found such *khlopomany* as V. Antonovich and F. Ryl'skii. Of greater interest, however, are the names of two old comrades-in-arms, Kostomarov and Kulish, who became, together with Shevchenko, the most prolific contributors to the new journal. By the end of his life the author of *Kobzar* had become the symbolic epitome of his Ukrainophile generation. The expression "Shevchenko is our father, Ukraine is our mother" logically ended in the sanctification of his tomb as a national symbol.⁹ The fact that every new issue of *Osnova* opened with Shevchenko's letters and diaries also assumed a symbolic significance.

The program of the journal stated that: "The region, to the study of which *Osnova* is devoted, is mostly populated by the Southern Russian people. Though most of the population in the Crimea, Bessarabia and the Don region does not belong to the Southern Russians, we also include these regions within the sphere of our research, for they as yet lack their own printing organs and stand in immediate industrial, commercial and geographical proximity to other Southern Russian territories."¹⁰ The editors immediately pronounced that "the journal welcomes contributions in both languages" and emphasized that "the answer to the question of whether it is necessary or acceptable to write in Ukrainian has been given by reality itself."¹¹ A special consideration, according to the editorial staff, was to be accorded to the "practical significance of the popular language in teaching and preaching—an important but still arguable question, the answer to which has not yet been found, solely due to the lack of empirical observations."¹²

At the center of *Osnova*'s attention was the task of defining the Little Russian or Ukrainian identity, with the accent on the idea, typ-

ical for such nationalist discourse, of the independent status of the Ukrainian language, on the interpretation of history, and on the problem of the national character.¹³

The key issue, and the issue most discussed, was that of the Ukrainian language and in particular its use for educational purposes. The issue was extensively treated by Kulish, Kostomarov, and two young Ukrainophiles, P. Zhitetskii and P. Chubinskii. Zhitetskii was to become one of the leaders of the Ukrainian movement of the 1870s, and Chubinskii was the author of the Ukrainian national anthem.¹⁴ Kostomarov's letter to A. Kotliarevskii tellingly reveals the importance of the language issue for *Osnova*: "Alexandr Alexandrovich! It is imperative to create a prominent academic philological work in order to show that the Southern Russian dialect is an original language and not an awkward Russian-Polish mixture. The task is absolutely indispensable. Everything depends on this."¹⁵ If Shevelev's thesis that "linguistic development" triggered off the Ukrainian political movement can be regarded as exaggerated, his statement that the language issue was central for the Ukrainian national movement in the nineteenth century is less open to debate.¹⁶

Before the 1860s, the debate over the language issue was confined to the so-called non-status aspects. Nobody objected to the use of the Ukrainian language in fiction writing and in the publication of old historical texts. Still, the usual reaction of many Russians to the existence of "highbrow" independent Ukrainian literature was one of skepticism. This did not mean, however, that throughout the nineteenth century anybody, including the government, was willing to employ prohibitive measures, since the authorities were convinced about the self-defeating nature of Ukrainophile efforts in this sphere.

In fact, the fate of *Osnova* bore out this skepticism. The 1861 edition did not sell out and from 1862 the journal suffered a serious shortage of finances and subscribers. New issues were constantly delayed and by the end of the year the journal was closed down to no noticeable outward pressure.¹⁷

The possibility of using Ukrainian in primary instruction for peasants, as we have already demonstrated, still seemed feasible in 1861. The situation radically changed when, in *Osnova* articles, the language issue acquired a sacred and universal aura at the expense of the simple and practical tasks of expressing regional specificity in literature or delivering governmental instructions to peasants. The identification,

symbolic and nation-representing function of the language became more and more important. All the other functions that the Ukrainian language had previously performed were openly declared by *Osnova* to be merely initial steps along the route to full linguistic emancipation. Zhitetskii exclaimed: "Does Russian really have the monopoly as the only organ of science and conductor of enlightenment? The Great Russian language, both literary and popular, is not the direct or closest organ of Little Russians."¹⁸ Kostomarov agreed by adding that "it would be ridiculous if somebody attempted to translate Humboldt's *Cosmos* or Momsen's *The Roman Empire* into the Southern Russian language, since the time for such endeavors *is not yet ripe*."¹⁹

At this point it is necessary to introduce one theoretical digression. In the literature on nationalism it is widely accepted that the language issue, that is, the emancipation of the language and its transformation from a popular vernacular to a literary standard, has been a typical feature of national movements in Central and Eastern Europe. Benedict Anderson called this stage "the lexicographic revolution."²⁰

Sociolinguists studying these processes have distinguished several decisive factors for successful linguistic emancipation: first, a level of linguistic maturation sufficient for all cultural, social and communicative contexts; second, the historical legacy of the language, either real or constructed; third, a level of linguistic standardization; fourth, the distance of the "emancipating" language from the one which opposes this emancipation; and finally, the availability of an activist group that identifies itself with, and devotes its efforts towards, the protection and development of the target language.²¹

There were numerous and selfless Ukrainophile activists available. (This factor was absent in the Belorussian case.) The historical legacy could be, and was, traced back as far as Nestor's times. Yet the Ukrainian movement for linguistic emancipation lagged far behind, for instance, the exemplary Czech movement. The realization of these tasks in the Ukrainian case remained a goal to be attained throughout the whole nineteenth century.²²

The unique status of the Ukrainian language in this process was conditioned first and foremost by the problem of distancing Ukrainian from Russian. The problem itself was not at all novel. In Galicia, there was a similar attempt to detach Ukrainian from Polish. Both Russians and Poles persisted in treating Little Russian or Ruthenian as a popular vernacular of their civilized languages. What made the situation

unique was the status of the Russian language. It was a single Slavic language functioning as the official language of the huge empire and thereby its expansionist and assimilatory claims could be supported by the might of state institutions and the privileges that the mastering of the Russian language could yield. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries this logic was all too obvious to the Little Russian elite and led to the universal acquisition of the Russian language.

Interestingly, Kostomarov's program for the application of the Ukrainian language in education echoed in essence and in argument Chernyshevskii's review of the first issue of *Osnova*: "Popular instruction in the Little Russian language and the development of popular Little Russian literature are, in our opinion, the attainable goals to which Little Russians should first strive."²³ This is not to argue, of course, that Chernyshevskii "invented" the program for Kostomarov. Rather Kostomarov, although with wisdom in hindsight, followed the advice of the more experienced conspirator and consciously refrained from open statements about the ultimate goals of the movement in order to avoid political repression and the alienation of educated Russian public.

As modern European nationalist models in Germany, Britain and France demonstrated, the imposition of a unifying language of high culture was a universal tendency in the consolidation of nation states. It is not without reason that Chernyshevskii, supporting *Osnova*'s "language battle," nevertheless devoted most of his article to the deposition of the nation state analogy in the Russo-Ukrainian context. "Fifty or seventy years ago every Little Russian was as likely to abandon his native language for Russian as every Czech for German ... or as every contemporary inhabitant of Provence for standard Parisian French. Little Russians have greatly changed since then."²⁴ As the Russo-Polish rivalry in the western region increased, so did the awareness of the Russian public of the difference between the ethnically heterogeneous empire and its Russian core, in which some included, unlike Chernyshevskii and according to the Provençal model, Little Russian territories. The antagonistic potential of the language issue had sharply escalated.

The vexed question of Ukrainian identity was exhaustively addressed in Kostomarov's "Truth about Rus' to the Muscovites" and "Truth about Rus' to the Poles," in which the author stressed the uniqueness of Ukrainians in comparison with Russians and Poles,

maintaining at the same time that Southern Rus' was politically close to Moscow whereas by its national character it was closer to Poland.²⁵ In the light of the Russo-Polish relationship in general and Russo-Polish rivalry in the western region in particular, Kostomarov's last thesis sounded rather risky. He should have understood this perfectly, since by that time the motif of a unified anti-Polish front had become central to all Ukrainian publications. Kostomarov saw the unity of Rus', that is, of its Northern and Southern branches, as a unity of equal and independent parts, and emphasized the importance of the federative principle that, as he maintained, lay at the basis of Rus' apanage principalities.

Kostomarov developed his federalist ideas in detail in the programmatic article "Thoughts on the Federative Element in Ancient Rus'," printed in the first issue of *Osnova*. "The entire history of apanage principalities is a gradual development and struggle of the federative element with the autocratic one. This federative component of our history is not unique to the Slavic culture. We can find it in the history of other ancient and modern peoples, everywhere where human moral strength was not oppressed by violent unification," he wrote, suggesting the modern pathos of his thoughts and underlining the incompatibility of his understanding of federalism with that of the Slavophiles.²⁶ (The latter argued that local autonomy was not in conflict with autocracy, because the lack of autocratic interference in local affairs was combined with a voluntary delegation of all rights in the political sphere to the exclusive prerogative of the tsar.)

In fact, Kostomarov's articles in *Osnova* form a comprehensive, if cautiously self-censored, exposition of the concept publicized by him in the anonymous article "Ukraine" in Herzen's *Kolokol*.²⁷ "In the prospective all-Slavic union [...] our Southern Rus' is to form a separate civil entity from the territories where people speak Southern Russian." The article concluded: "So, neither Great Russians nor Poles can claim as *theirs* the lands inhabited by our people."

The articles published in *Osnova*, especially those by Kulish and Kostomarov, played a significant role in the subsequent course of events and had a powerful premeditated propagandistic effect. Kostomarov's article "Two Russian Nationalities" (*Dve Russkiya narodnosti*) was called the "Gospels of Ukrainian Nationalism" by D. Doroshenko.²⁸ One anonymous correspondent, in a letter from 1861 perlustrated by the gendarmes, stated the following: "To be sure, most of the young

generation today are contaminated by Ukrainophilism; of course, this is what *Osnova* should be thanked for.”²⁹ Yet the unintended effect was no less powerful. *Osnova* was attentively read by the Russian educated public, which with time managed to figure out the true goals of the Ukrainian movement. In his autobiography, written in 1875, in which Kostomarov consistently (and insincerely) denies any separatist ideas and intentions on the part of *Osnova*, he recalls that “irrespective of the published to-the-point and out-of-place reviews in our periodicals, I used to receive critical letters [concerning “Thoughts on the Federative Element in Ancient Rus”], in which people attempted to find a second meaning I did not claim.”³⁰ Pil’chikov wrote to Belozerskii from Poltava in as early as 1861 that the *hamocratia* was looking for, and fussing over, the “ulterior motives” in Kostomarov’s articles.³¹

The first reaction to the journal on the part of the Moscow and Petersburg press was so welcoming that *Osnova* expressed gratitude to the “educated Great Russians for their touching ... benevolence.”³² However, gradually, with the publication of Kostomarov’s articles, more and more Russian periodicals joined the debate with *Osnova*, each motivated by particular incentives.

The only periodical that unconditionally backed the Ukrainian movement was the censure-free *Kolokol*. In 1863 *Kolokol*’s editorial board, expressing solidarity with Kostomarov’s views, claimed: “The author of the brilliant article [“Ukraine”] in the 1869 *Kolokol* concluded with an opinion that we fully share: ‘Neither Russians nor Poles can claim as *theirs* the lands inhabited by our people.’”³³

The attitude of *Kolokol*’s closest ally in Russia, *Sovremennik*, towards the Ukrainian national movement was already by that time far from unequivocal. In 1860, with the first signs of the Ukrainian movement’s escalation on the way, N. I. Dobroliubov produced reviews on Shevchenko’s collection of poems *Kobzar* and Kulish’s almanac *Khata*. Ideologically, Dobroliubov was close to Belinskii but he entirely lacked the characteristic aggressiveness of “the furious Vissarion.” “Russian civilization,” according to Dobroliubov, does not defy old Little Russian barbarity but rather “a genuine simplicity of the Little Russian way of life.” “Of course, ‘*Onegin*’, ‘*Geroi nashego vremeni*’, the articles of Mr. Bezobrazov on aristocracy or the moralizing articles of Madam Tur will not sound melodically enough in Little Russian [...] Those Little Russians who share Onegin’s or Madam Tur’s interests speak Russian [...] True Little Russians, who are not affected by

the Russian language, are as alien to high literary culture as our own peasants.”³⁴ Dobroliubov wrote about “insignificant discrepancies between the Little and Great Russian dialects” and doubted “if *chumatskaia zhizn'* and old *haidamak* memories are sufficient, as Kulish argues, for the development of Ukrainian literature and if the latter again does not have to succumb consciously to the so much unwelcome unity with the ‘neighboring language’.”³⁵ For all Dobroliubov’s remarks that “at present Little Russians do not suffer any more from the mockery and distrust they have complained about before,” his own article testified to the opposite.³⁶

Chernyshevskii, the second “pillar” of the journal, completely shared Herzen’s position. Apart from his above-mentioned review on the first issue of *Osnova*, it was reflected in his other works as well. Admitting that Ukrainians formed a separate nation, in his famous article “National Tactlessness” (*Natsional’naia bestaktnost*) he condemned those Galician Russophiles and their newspaper *Slovo* for rejecting their Ukrainianness and urged Ukrainians to ally with the Poles against the common enemy—Russian autocracy.³⁷

Displaying an unfamiliarity with Western realia typical of Russian democrats of all times, Chernyshevskii argued: “Today people should not mold their feelings and actions according to the principles of their forebears but according to their contemporary needs; otherwise the Bretons would hate the French who long ago subjugated them.”³⁸ (In fact, in the nineteenth century, assimilatory pressure on the Bretons and their resistance to this pressure was not at all consigned to oblivion but, on the contrary, driven to the extreme.³⁹)

Apollon Grigor’ev also shared the idea of a separate Ukrainian nation with its separate literary language. “Shevchenko is the last kobzar and the first great poet of the new great literature of the Slavic world,” wrote Grigor’ev about *Kobzar*, arguing with Dobroliubov.⁴⁰

Yet *Sovremennik* did not like the anti-enlightenment and anti-modernization pathos of some of *Osnova*’s articles.⁴¹ Shortly after the death of Dobroliubov, who was critical of Ukrainophiles, in the section “The Whistle” in the January issue of 1863 *Sovremennik* lashed peevish attacks at “the sons of Little Russia who, having diligently studied philosophy, still turned out to be unable to master the difference between a Jew and a dog and to come to the idea that the human race needs for its welfare more knowledge than the art of making lard and fruit liqueur.”⁴²

This allusion to *Osnova's* anti-Semitism appeared in *Sovremennik* after the dispute between the two periodicals on the "Jewish question."⁴³ In articles in *Osnova* one could often find the word *zyd*. One Jewish reader, V. Portugalov, wrote a protest letter to the editors demanding the elimination of this, as he believed, insulting nickname. *Osnova* responded with the June article "Misunderstanding Concerning the Word 'Zyd'" (*Nedorazumenie po povodu slova "zyd"*), in which *Osnova* explained that this word, as used in the journal, was not intended to carry any offensive connotation, since in Little Russian and Polish it was equivalent to *evrei* in Russian and meant the same—simply a Jew. This justification did not appear logical because the word *zyd* was used in both Ukrainian and Russian *Osnova* texts. The author of the refutation further delved into sophisticated speculations regarding the Little Russians' hostility towards Jews and in passing justified this attitude by the argument that Jews were reluctant to learn Ukrainian. "For the nation, nothing can be more damaging than the presence of other communities which remain aloof and indifferent to the nation's destiny," wrote *Osnova*. (It should be remarked, without much surprise, that when Ukrainophiles turned into the winning side in relation to another ethnic group, their anti-assimilatory pathos tended to change to the absolute opposite.)

This article extended the controversy to the pages of the Russian-language journal *Sion*, published in Odessa. In September 1861 it released the editorial "Osnova and the Nationality Problem" (*Osnova i vopros o natsional'nostiakh*): "It is not in the oft-repeated word 'Zyd' that we see the danger but, exclusively, in the nationalistic ambitions of *Osnova*. Why on earth do you mistake a part, however huge, for the whole? Why do you demand that a certain nationality (the author meant the Jews) should feel sympathy not to the whole (the author meant the All-Russian nation) but to a part of it (Little Russians)," wrote *Sion*, claiming that if the Jews were going to assimilate they would undoubtedly assimilate into the All-Russian culture. *Sion* disapproved of *Osnova's* attempts at "splitting the more than scanty public (the educated stratum) into tiny groups with their own dialects and sub-dialects instead of leading this public under the banner of the common literary language, past petty partisan feuds, to sublime humane ideals."⁴⁴

Osnova retorted with "Progressive Jews" (*Peredovye Zhidy*), an extremely peevish article by Kulish in which he restated the previous thesis that "Little Russians are not concealing hostility towards the

Jews” and compared *Sion* with Judas, that is, an informant and instigator.⁴⁵ *Sion* reciprocated *Osnova*’s compliment and published “An Address to Russian Journals” (*K russkim zhurnalam*), thus “submitting the debate to the verdict of Russian journalism.”⁴⁶ The article had serious repercussions: according to Serbyn at least a dozen Russian periodicals joined in the dispute.⁴⁷ It would be a mistake to assert, however, as Dragomanov later did,⁴⁸ that these were the first attacks by the Russian press on *Osnova*. The first critical articles appeared in *Den*’ in as early as October and the confrontation with *Sion* only precipitated the transformation of *Osnova*’s political orientation into the object of heated discussions.

Russkii vestnik responded to *Osnova*’s accusations: “We are only repeating him [Kulish] in his own words, but he flies into a hysterical rage [...] Does he really assume that his views on the Southern Russian dialect and nationality were a secret only to be revealed by *Sion*?”⁴⁹ Furthermore, however, *Russkii vestnik* argued that Kulish and his co-thinkers could do no harm and, therefore, that he was free to pursue his hopeless project. *Russkii invalid* responded with the same scornfully condescending remark, likening *Osnova* to typical provincial Russian periodicals: “Does Mr. Kulish seriously believe that an educated, thinking person can treat *Osnova* as something different from *Permskii sbornik* or the newspaper *Amur*?”⁵⁰ To conclude, even in 1862 the anti-Ukrainophile Russian press was inclined, sincerely or not, to consider *Osnova*’s ambition to represent a separate nation as an inoffensive eccentricity.⁵¹

This viewpoint marked a crucial shift in *Russkii vestnik*’s attitude to Ukrainophilism. At the beginning of 1861 Katkov wrote in the literary review section of *Russkii vestnik*: “Ukraine has its own dialect that has so remarkably displayed itself with time and now is ready to shape into a unique language.” Of course, even in this first work on the Ukrainian question Katkov clearly formulated his preferences. Reflecting on the peculiarities of the Ukrainians he emphasizes that “in those peculiarities we would like to find the elements of the all-Russian nation. Little Russians and Great Russians, as history proves, are two unalienable parts of the Russian people; they add to each other, and this struggle of opposites only leads to a single harmony.” Yet Katkov continues in the subjunctive mood: “Just how much more beneficial the elements that the Ukrainians would contribute to Russian life and Russian thought if it were not for the unfavorable conditions!” Bring-

ing in a comparison with the Western Slavs, Katkov seeks to demonstrate the peril of the adverse course of events, but for him the question of Russo-Ukrainian harmony still remains open. He clearly detected the incompleteness and unpredictability of the Russian nation's formation. "No one can doubt Russia's might and grandeur [...] This is an extraordinarily great and irrefutable fact. However, the problem is not in the enormity of the fact, and even not in the fact itself as it has already existed for a long time. It is that the Russian word has not yet been heard in the world; the Russian nationality is still questioning its very self, it is only searching for its self, it is only coming into being. If a certain nationality is in great demand, if it is much speculated about, it means that there is not enough nationality there or that it does not exist at all."⁵² Moreover, it was Katkov who, throughout 1861, published Kostomarov's fund-raising appeals for Ukrainian publications. In this context Katkov's claim that "any mechanical attempt to discriminate or impose language from outside is an historical insanity and dishonorable violence" sounds completely different from his previous readiness to lend Kulish a hand in the "anyway-doomed-to-failure" Ukrainophile project.

At the beginning of 1861 Katkov was open to dialogue with Ukrainophiles. He recognized, though by no means welcomed, the idea of the separate Ukrainian nation and protested against anti-Ukrainophile policy. At the end of the same year Katkov dogmatically denied any objective existence of the "invented" problem and Ukrainophiles suddenly fell into disgrace. It was only one step from this to the stigmatization of Ukrainophilism as "dangerous" and the opening of the way to repression. A talented analyst, Katkov turned into a no less gifted preacher of Russian nationalism by hiding, and with time abandoning, his doubts and critical vigor so inappropriate for the new genre.⁵³

To his credit, Katkov understood the problem much more deeply than most of his contemporaries and followers, who later devotedly emulated what he wrote in 1862. He consciously avoided introducing his early understanding of the complexity of the problem into his later works for the sake of propaganda. Dragomanov wrote that Katkov in his new role was unique only for Russia, "since in Germany, for instance, every professor or publicist is a Katkov-like expert in national and political affairs."⁵⁴ This adds new nuances to the assessment of Katkov's evolution—at least at the beginning of his career he must have seen

his choice as a sort of service, even sacrifice, dedicated to the fulfillment of the rough, not to say dirty, work that he considered it necessary to accomplish in absence of other qualified volunteers to perform the duty in Russia in the 1860s.

The Slavophile *Den'* proceeded in 1861 with quasi-academic squabbling about the historical rights of the Little and Great Russians to Kiev, launched earlier by Pogodin and Maksimovich, and this time provoked by Kostomarov's articles.⁵⁵ The newspaper then published the speech against "Little Russian separatism," refuting the feasibility of developing the Ukrainian literary language. The question of such feasibility, according to *Den'*, "is, a priori, responded to in the negative."⁵⁶

A special place in *Den'* publications on the Ukrainian question belongs to the article written by V. I. Lamanskii in October 1861, in which he formulated the main components of the anti-Ukrainophile attitude that would be so aggressively advanced two years later by Katkov. Lamanskii directly compared the Little Russian language with the French patois, underlying the inexpediency of the Ukrainophiles' efforts to transform this vernacular into a developed language "in conditions in which a common language had been already agreed upon."⁵⁷ Concerning the ambitions of the Poles to annex the Western borderland, Lamanskii wrote that "Little Russians, Great Russians and White Russians, for all their differences, form a single Russian nation, a single Russian land, inextricably united by common faith and civil institutions ... To renounce Kiev with its guberniias would lead to the decomposition of the Russian nation, to the splitting and partition of the Russian land." (Interestingly, Lamanskii consistently talks about "the Russian nation" and "the Russian land," not the empire.)⁵⁸ His article, rightly interpreted in the Ukrainophile camp, generated a wave of protest in *Osnova*: "We equally deride the *szlachta* arrogance of the Poles, who call Little Russian 'peasant jargon' (*chłopska mowa*), and the high-brow conceited politeness of the Great Russians who use a French misnomer for the same purpose."⁵⁹ It took *Osnova* six months to respond to Lamanskii's article. The journal probably decided to join in the debate only after its conflict with *Sion*, when it became clear that most of the Russian periodicals were ready to break neutrality. At least in the case of the Petersburg liberal press this tactic of non-interference could be treated as Ukrainophile-friendly. Thus *Russkaia rech'* blamed *Sion* for throwing down the "tactless gauntlet which the opponents would not be able [for political reasons] to pick up."⁶⁰

The period of a more bitter dispute began in summer 1862 when *Russkii vestnik* published in its *Sovremennaia letopis'* supplement a wordy letter, "From Kiev," by P. V. Annenkov, with its critique of the "Little Russian faction."⁶¹ It was only after this publication that *Russkii vestnik* refused to place Kostomarov's fund-raising appeals. In other periodicals, for instance in *Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti*, the appeals were published until the distribution of the Valuev Circular.

Provincial periodicals were similarly in confusion. Lebedintsev, the editor of *Kievskie vedomosti*, defended *Osnova* in his polemic with the Little Russian editor of *Peterburgskii ezhenedel'nik*, V. I. Askochenskii.⁶² On the other hand, *Vestnik Iugo-Zapadnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii*, established by K. A. Govorskii in 1862, objected, still rather moderately, to Chernyshevskii: "Though we too belong to the Little Russians, we decidedly cannot find in our language the merits the author [Kostomarov] mentions for some reason; moreover, we cannot talk about the integrity of the Little Russian language judging from the books issued. Our All-Russian literary language belongs to both Little and Great Russians, as they both participated in its creation [...] The idea of a separate Little Russian nation and language is a nonsense that can lead Little Russians to perdition and not to independence; deprived of the developed written culture of the Russian language, Little Russian would unavoidably perish in the swell of Western propaganda."⁶³ The supposed author of this anonymous article was Gogotskii, who, as we have demonstrated, had been harboring these ideas since 1859: "We should support the idea of the triune Russian nation, otherwise [...] the Liakhi will immediately destroy it, or at the very least suppress and assimilate it [the Little Russian people]. The Liakhi perfectly understand this and this is why they, under the most sincere guise, whisper to us the idea of Little Russia's independence. We, the Western Little Russians, are not so easy to deceive, but our Eastern neighbors, as I have noticed, are too naive and have already fallen into the Polish trap. They do not want to realize that the Liakhi and Jesuits aim at: a) driving a wedge between Little and Great Russians; b) propagating the idea of Little Russian separatism; and c) forcing out the literary Russian language. They know far too well that if Little Russians cede from the empire, they will immediately invade the Western borderland and strangle it as a cat strangles a mouse."⁶⁴

With the Polish question becoming gradually more complicated, the debate over *Osnova* and Ukrainophilism in general increasingly

touched the frontier problem, fundamental to the Russian public, and the principles of the Russian nation's organization. The corollary was that more and more Kiev, Moscow and Petersburg periodicals joined the discussion, the tone of which had changed so abruptly that in 1862 the Ukrainian activists thought it safer to send to *Russkii vestnik* a collective letter responding to previous accusations. *Russkii vestnik* published the letter in September under the title "Reaction from Kiev" (*Otzyv iz Kiev*).⁶⁵ The text, written in the populist spirit, rejected the accusations of "state separatism" and underlined that "none of us talks about or thinks of politics."⁶⁶ "It is another matter entirely if under the separatist umbrella one puts the attempt to develop the Southern Russian language and culture. This is what we are really striving towards," admitted the Ukrainian respondents, assuming that this explanation would not provoke the Russian public's suspicion. The letter was signed by twenty one respondents, with the signatures of Vladimir Antonovich and Pavel Chubinskii, the leaders of the Kiev Hromada, at the top.

Concomitantly, an unknown author undertook another defensive and ingenious maneuver. Among the papers of Senator Polovtsov was an anonymous "Memorandum on the Western Region" (*Zapiska o sostoianii Iugo-Zapadnogo kraia*), dated October 1862. Polovtsov must have received it from the head of the Third Department, P. A. Cherevin, when preparing for the inspection of the region in 1880.⁶⁷

This memorandum, composed in a moderate liberal tone and on behalf of a Great Russian, contained a description of the region. The role of the main enemy was reserved for the Poles. Of special interest is the definition of Ukrainophilism that it contained: "*Osnova* has become a herald of the moderate Little Russian party, which aims at the intellectual revival of Little Russians not in the form of separatism but through conscious participation in the progressive pace of the Russian nation. Though some 'purists' pursue their love for the Little Russian culture to the extreme and try to impose on the people the exclusive use of the Little Russian language, there is nothing dangerous in this manifestation of Little Russian patriotism." The *khlopomany*—as the Poles called members of the Kiev Hromada—were characterized as "somewhat akin to our modern Slavophile party, an interim stage to the final fusion of the *szlachta* with the Russian population of the region. The hatred of the Poles towards the *khlopomany* is the best proof of the *khlopomany*'s harmlessness."⁶⁸ Obviously the author(s) of the

message were attempting to neutralize the negative effect of the anti-Ukrainian articles in the eyes of the Third Department.

In spite of the fact that the formerly friendly, or at least tolerant, tone towards Ukrainophilism in the Kiev and Moscow press had given way to suspicion and alertness, throughout 1862 the conflict still did not fit into the categories of fierce confrontation. Even Katkov's *Sovremennaia letopis'*, after publishing the collective letter, claimed that it would not welcome any "outward pressure and opposition to the efforts of Little Russian literature," and only lamented that "the creative force runs the risk of being wasted in vain."⁶⁹ The crisis, however, was within sight.

The Petersburg supporters of Ukrainophilism emphasized the groundlessness of the "separatist allegations." Ukrainophiles themselves tried to reject those accusations. Without doubt, some Ukrainophiles were insincere. Yet it is worth remembering that in the 1860s this was the only chance for those who were not immediately tempted to become a target of police repression. The fear of provoking coercive measures against *Osnova* formed an intrinsic background to this debate and in 1861 and 1862 all periodicals, irrespective of their ideological orientation, stood for freedom of speech.

NOTES

1 "Who is Kulish?" This was the question Dolgorukov wrote on the margins of the letter. GARF, f. 109, Secret Archive, op. 1, ed. khr. 1762, l. 2.

2 See M. D. Bernstein, *Zhurnal "Osnova" i ukrains'kii literaturnii protses kinstia 50–60 rokiv* (Kiev, 1959), pp. 14–17.

3 GARF, f. 109, Secret Archive, op. 1, ed. khr. 1764, l. 1ob.

4 In 1862 the marshals of the nobility of the Podol'sk guberniia addressed the tsar with a suggestion to unite the southwestern borderland with the Polish Kingdom and leave the peasant reform in these territories to the discretion of the Polish landowners.

5 "Not a single inch of Russian land can be yielded to the Poles," wrote the most compromise-minded high official P. Valuev in his report to the emperor in December 1862. RGIA, f. 908, op. 1., ed. khr. 185, l. 5. When the influential leader of the Polish Agricultural Society, Andrzej Zamojski, stipulated the annexation of the western region as the condition for the compromise, all negotiations with him were curbed.

- 6 It seems that the earliest project of this kind that immediately attracted Valuev's attention was proposed in the letter of the Podol'sk governor, R. I. Braunschweig, later a high appointee in Poland, on 4 June 1861. See RGIA, f. 1282, op.1, ed. khr. 19, ll. 20–23. For a series of the later projects see GARF, f. 109, op. 37, 1863, ed. khr. 23, p. 175.
- 7 P. U. Tserashkovich, *Belarusy. Entsylapedyia Gistoryi Belarusi* (Minsk, 1993), p. 471.
- 8 See, for instance, Katkov's criticism of "the Polish fanatics who are ready to feign earnest Ukrainophiles having in mind the great ideal of Konrad Vallenrod." *M. N. Katkov. 1863 god. Sobranie statei, po pol'skomu voprosu, pomeschavshikhsia v Moskovskikh Vedomostiakh, Russkom Vestnike i Sovremennoi Letopisi, vypusk 1* (Moscow, 1887) pp. 276–277. See also A. N. Pypin, *Istoriia russkoi etnografii*, vol. 3, *Etnografiia malorusskaia* (St. Petersburg, 1891), and A. Miller, "Ukrainophilism," *Slavianovedenie*, no. 5 (1998).
- 9 On this see S. Yekelchuk, "Creating a Sacred Place: The Ukrainophiles and Shevchenko's Tomb in Kaniv (1861–ca.1900)," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 20, nos. 1–2 (Summer–Winter 1995), pp.15–32.
- 10 See *Osnova. Ob'iaвление ob izdanii i Programma*. Supp. to no. 1 (1861).
- 11 *Ibid.*, p. 2.
- 12 *Ibid.*, p. 5.
- 13 On the typical features of such movements see B. Anderson, "Old Languages, New Models," in *ibid.*, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 2d ed. (London, 1991), pp. 67–82.
- 14 P. Chubinskii, "Dva slova o sel'skom uchilishche dlia sel'skikh uchitelei," *Osnova*, no. 4 (1862), and P. Zhitetskii, "Russkii patriotism. Otvet 'Dniu'," *Osnova*, no. 3 (1862).
- 15 "Kil'ka zapisok M. Kostomarov z 1859–1870 rokov," *Ukraina*, nos. 10–11 (1929), p. 70.
- 16 George Y. Shevelov, "Evolution of the Ukrainian Literary Language," in Ivan L. Rudnytsky, ed., *Rethinking Ukrainian History* (Edmonton, 1981), pp. 226–227.
- 17 Of course, censors intervened in *Osnova's* activities, but no more often than in other periodicals. No official warnings, two of which could result in the closure of the journal, were issued to the editor-in-chief. For more on the reasons for the closing of *Osnova*—financial, organizational or ideological—see M. D. Bernstein, *Zhurnal "Osnova" i ukrains'kii literaturnii protses kinstia 50–60 rokov* (Kiev, 1959), pp. 198–208. He writes: "The opinion that *Osnova* died under the pressure of censorship is ungrounded." The petition of Belozerskii to the SCC proves that the initiative to dissolve the journal came from the editors themselves. RGIA, f. 772, op. 1, p. 2, ed. khr. 5049. This view was also shared by Dragomanov: "*Osnova* was closed because of the split in its own ranks and not because of administrative pressure." M. Dragomanov, "Literatura rosiiska,

- velikorus'ka, ukrains'ka i galits'ka," *Pravda*, no. 3 (1874), p. 113. The crisis can be illustrated by the following figures: in 1861 in Poltava, the bulwark of Ukrainophilism in the Left-Bank territory, fifty-five people subscribed to the journal; in 1862 this figure dropped to 24. V. Dudko, *Poltavs'ka Gromada pochatku 1860-kh rr*, 156. The point needs to be explained thoroughly because the thesis that *Osnova* closed as a result of government repression is widely accepted in emigrant Ukrainian historiography.
- 18 P. Zhitetskii, "Russkii patriotism. Otvet 'Dniu'," *Osnova*, no. 3 (1862), pp. 8, 14–15.
 - 19 N. Kostomarov, "Mysli iuzhnorussa. O prepodavanii na iuzhnorusskom iazyke," *Osnova*, no. 4 (1862), p. 2. (Author's italics.)
 - 20 B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, pp. 67–84. See also H. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, p. 11.
 - 21 See W. A. Stewart, "A Sociolinguistic Typology for Describing National Multilingualism," in Joshua Fishman, ed., *Readings in the Sociology of Language* (The Hague: Mouton, 1968); and R. Sussex, "Lingua Nostra: The Nineteenth-Century Slavonic Language Revivals," in R. Sussex and J. C. Eade, eds., *Culture and Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Eastern Europe* (Columbus, OH, 1983).
 - 22 See, for example, George Y. Shevelov, "Evolution of the Ukrainian Literary Language," pp. 225, 229–230.
 - 23 "Novye periodicheskie izdaniia. Osnova. 1861, no. 1," *Sovremennik*, no. 1 (1861), pp. 71–72.
 - 24 *Ibid.*, p. 70.
 - 25 *Osnova*, no. 10 (1861).
 - 26 *Osnova*, no. 1 (1861), pp. 121, 158.
 - 27 *Kolokol*, 15 January 1860, l. 61, pp. 499–503.
 - 28 See Dmytro Doroshenko, "A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography," *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States*, sp. s., 5–6 (New York, 1957), p. 139.
 - 29 GARF, Secret Archive, f.109, op.1, ed. khr. 1765, ll.1-1ob. (Extract from a letter with an unidentified signature from Repka, Chernigovskaia gub., to Ivan Vasil'evich Driga in Moscow, 19 November 1861.)
 - 30 N. Kostomarov, "Autobiography," in *ibid.*, *Istoricheskie proizvedeniia*, 2d ed. (Kiev, 1990), p. 533.
 - 31 V. Dudko, "Poltavs'ka Gromada pochatku 1860-h rr," p. 164.
 - 32 *Osnova*, nos. 11–12 (1861), p. 76.
 - 33 *Kolokol*, 10 July 1863, l. 167, p. 1375.
 - 34 *Sovremennik*, "Sovremennoe obozrenie section," no. 3 (1860), p. 99.
 - 35 *Ibid.*, pp. 109, 117.
 - 36 *Ibid.*, p. 115
 - 37 *Sovremennik*, "Sovremennoe obozrenie" section, nos. 7–8 (1861), pp. 1–18. *Kolokol* fully shared the program of Kostomarov and published the writings

of Bakunin about the future Slavic federation in which "Ukraine will not be Poland or Russia but sui generis." See M. A. Bakunin, "Russkim, pol'skim i vsem slavianskim druž'iam," *Kolokol*, supp. to nos. 122–123 (February 1862), p. 1026.

38 *Sovremennik*, nos. 7–8 (1861), p. 4.

39 See J. E. Reece, *The Bretons against France. Ethnic minority nationalism in twentieth-century Brittany* (Chapel Hill, 1977), pp. 30–32.

40 *Vremia*, no. 4 (1861), pp. 636–7.

41 See, for example, the stylized *Pis'ma s khutora* by Kulish, which he published in Ukrainian in *Osnova*. "Yes, we do not know your bookish idiom but would it have been of any good if a century ago we had read and acquired together with you the same vices and had lived like you in our own villages? What kind of filthy borrowed language would it have been? You are rejecting it yourselves and publishing good books for us [...] God save us from you, civilizers! You think in terms of demand and supply only and if the whole world swirled in the cauldron of trade, you would even renounce heaven." See *Osnova*, no. 1 (1861), pp. 313–314. Kulish, his general anti-modernization pathos notwithstanding, saw modernization primarily as a dangerous assimilationist tool opposed by the Ukrainian peasant—a true upholder of Ukrainianness.

42 *Osnova*, no. 2 (1862), p. 103.

43 The question of the anti-Semitism of some Ukrainophile leaders is marginal to this book and deserves special treatment. It is sufficient to note here that the anti-Semitic views of not only Kulish, but also of Kostomarov, leave no room for doubt. When in exile and on service in Samara, Kostomarov composed for the governor a "scientific memorandum," arguing the possibility that Jews use Christian blood in their rituals. Recalling this episode in his autobiography, he lamented that he had been forced to abandon research into the Jewish question due to the indignant reaction of the governor. N. I. Kostomarov, *Istoricheskie proizvedeniia. Avtobiografia* (Kiev, 1989), pp. 494–5. There are reports of Dragomanov's anti-Semitism as well. See, for example, Ben-Ami, "Moi snosheniia s Dragomanovym i rabota v 'Vol'nom slove'," *Evreiskaia starina*, nos. 3–4 (Petersburg, 1915), p. 360. For more on Dragomanov's attitude to the Jews see the article by Rudnytsky, who, while acquitting Dragomanov of accusations of anti-Semitism, also mentions the opposite opinions. "Mykhailo Dragomanov and the Problem of Ukrainian–Jewish Relations," in I. L. Rudnytsky, *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History* (Edmonton, 1987), pp. 283–297. It should be remarked, however, that the anti-Semitic mood of Ukrainophilism does not represent a "specific" feature in the Russian and European context of the time.

44 *Sion*, no. 10 (10 August 1861), pp. 159–160.

45 *Osnova*, no. 9 (1861), p. 56.

46 *Sion*, no. 21 (24 November 1861), p. 325.

- 47 R. Serbyn, "Sion-Osnova Controversy of 1861–1862," in Peter J. Potychynj and Howard Aster, eds., *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective* (Edmonton, 1988), p. 94. *Sion* mentioned *Russkaia rech'*, *Russkii invalid*, *Russkii vestnik*, *Russkoe slovo*, *Syn Otechestva*, *Russkii mir*, and *Severnaia pchela*.
- 48 "The idea of 'separatism' was launched by *Sion* and caught up by *Russkii vestnik*." See M. T. Dragomanov, "Vostochnaia politika Germanii i obrusenie," *Vestnik Evropy* (March 1872), p. 211.
- 49 "Kakoi byvaet vred ot monopolii," *Russkii vestnik* (November 1861). Here from *Sion*, no. 37 (16 March 1862), p. 582.
- 50 *Russkii invalid*, no. 2 (1862). Here from *Sion*, no. 37 (16 March 1862), p. 583.
- 51 In this debate *Osnova* was backed by *Odesskii vestnik*, edited by the Ukrainophile N. Sokal'skii, and *Severnaia pchela*. They recognized the independent status of the Ukrainian nation and literary language (*Severnaia pchela*, no. 44 [1862], p. 174). In more detail see R. Serbyn, "Sion-Osnova Controversy," pp. 96–98. It is worth noting that the article, though rich in sources, is not always free from "pro-Ukrainophile" bias in its interpretation.
- 52 *Russkii vestnik* 32 (1861), pp. 2–5.
- 53 The similar evolution of Katkov's position on the Polish question was thoroughly traced by Henryk Głębocki. See Henryk Głębocki, "Co zrobic z Polską?" in *Kwestia polska w koncepcjach konserwatywnego nacjonalizmu Michaila Katkova*, *Przegląd Wschodni*, vol. IV, Z.4, 1998, S.853–889; and Wiktoria Śliwowska, "Petersburg i społeczeństwo rosyjskie wobec kwestii polskiej," *Powstanie styczniowe Wrzenie-Bunt-Europa-Wizje*. (Warsaw, 1991), p. 541–569. (Among Western literature on Katkov the most relevant is chapter 4 in Edward Thaden, *Conservative Nationalism*, pp. 38–56.) This evolution did not come painlessly to Katkov. As early as the 1850s T. N. Granovskii said: "Katkov will make a brilliant scholar but you need something different to be a good journalist, and he does not have it at all." E. M. Feoktistov, *Vospominaniia. Za kulisami politiki i literatury 1848–1896* (Leningrad, 1929), p. 91.
- 54 M. T. Dragomanov, "Vostochnaia politika Germanii i obrusenie," *Vestnik Evropy* (March 1872), p. 641.
- 55 See the article by I. D. Beliaev, *Den'* no. 6, 18 November 1861.
- 56 See the article by A. O. Gil'ferding, "Slavianskie narodnosti i russkaia partiia v Avstrii," *Den'*, 25 November 1861, p. 17.
- 57 *Den'*, no. 2, 21 October 1861, p. 15.
- 58 *Ibid.*, p. 17. Later Lamanskii, in the spirit of pan-Slavism, wrote that Russian, as "the language of the highest enlightenment," would serve an instrument of the pan-Slav political union and "the unification would not be challenged, unlike Germany, by grand impediments." He warned, though, that "the violent imposition of the Russian language is out of the question," since the success of the union was to be directly proportionate to the successful development of Russia. "For this, Russian should become the language of humanity and free-

- dom, the full-fledged bearer of enlightenment.” See V. Lamanskii, “Natsional’nosti ital’anskaia i slavianskaia, v politicheskom i literaturnom otnoshenii,” *Otechestvennye zapiski* 157, nos. 11–12 (1864), pp. 615–616.
- 59 *Osnova*, no. 3 (1862), p. 14.
- 60 *Sion*, no. 37 (16 March 1862), p. 581.
- 61 *Sovremennaia letopis’ Russkogo vestnika*, no. 25 (June 1862).
- 62 See N. Fabricant, “Kratkii ocherk iz istorii otnoshenii russkikh tsenzurnykh zakonov k ukrainskoi literature,” *Russkaia mysl’*, b. III (1905), p.131.
- 63 *Vestnik Iugo-Zapadnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii* 1 (1862), pp. 25, 26.
- 64 GARF, Secret Archive, f. 109, op. 1, ed. khr. 1763, l. 1–3. (Gogotskii’s letter to Father Vasilii Grechulevich in St. Petersburg.) Proceeding from these assumptions, Gogotskii censured Grechulevich’s primer, insisting on the position that “the literary Russian language should be common in all primers. The Orthodox faith and the language should become the connecting elements. But it will be also beneficial to publish *something* in our native language.” L. 4ob.
- 65 *Sovremennaia letopis’*, no. 46 (November 1862).
- 66 *Ibid.*, p. 5.
- 67 For more on this see chapter 14.
- 68 RO RNB, f.600, ed. khr. 606, l. 52ob–55.
- 69 *Sovremennaia letopis’*, no. 46 (November 1862), p. 3.

CHAPTER 4

The Imperial Authorities and Ukrainophilism, 1862 to 1863. The Genesis of the Valuev Circular

Historians have frequently addressed the problem of the genesis of the Valuev Circular, sent on 18 July 1863 to the censorship committees, and much of its history has been reconstructed. However, the picture has never been restored in its entirety since, for various reasons, no scholar was able to obtain access to all the necessary documents.¹ However, in the depths of the bureaucratic apparatus two, formally independent, cases relating to Ukrainophilism had developed over time. Eventually, both reached the minister of the interior, P. A. Valuev, who signed the famous circular.² It is only by studying both cases from GARF and RGIA that can one gain an insight into the process of the circular's creation.

More than a year before the distribution of the circular, on 29 June 1862, the war minister, D. A. Miliutin, sent the chief of gendarmes, Prince V. A. Dolgorukov, a brief memorandum: "Confidential. Consider it essential to acquaint yourself with the secret evidence about the Kiev events, submitted by the governor-general of His Majesty's Suite, Count Sivers. The enclosed note has been read to His Majesty."³ Familiar with tsarist bureaucratic traditions, Miliutin knew how to make the unwieldy machinery of the secret police work. By mentioning the emperor's acquaintance with the evidence, or that "the case was under the tsar's control," Miliutin was sure that the case would be thoroughly investigated.

This extra precaution taken by Miliutin was not superfluous. By that time the gendarmes already had at their disposal substantial evidence on the activity of the Ukrainophiles, including the above-mentioned perlustrated correspondence, but had not undertaken, except for routine investigation procedures, any special measures. Miliutin's letter roused the Third Department to serious vigilance. Thus B. F. Sivers drew the attention of the authorities to the existence of the *khlopomany*

society in Kiev, "who foment peasants against their lords and against government edicts in order to restore Little Russia's independence. Making no secret of their belonging to the society, they wear national costumes in public and travel around villages."⁴ Among the activists Siverts mentioned were the famous signatories of the 1862 article in *Sovremennaya Letopis'*, V. Antonovich, F. Ryl'skii and P. Chubinskii.⁵ Siverts was obviously informed by certain local people in Kiev, or was even urged to write this letter. These could have been the Little Russian opponents of the Ukrainophiles, although most probably the informants were local Polish landowners. It was they who had earlier invented the term *khlopomany* or *peasants' admirers*⁶ and who exaggerated the danger of peasant mutinies against the landlords, most of whom were Poles. Finally, two of the mentioned Ukrainophiles—Antonovich and Ryl'skii—were particularly despised by the Poles as "apostates" since, having been born into Polish, or rather old Polonized *szlachta* families, they had become Ukrainians by identity and populists by social conviction. In 1861 *Osnova* published a very emotional "Confession" (*Ispoved'*) by Antonovich, in which he explained to his Polish opponents why he could not, and would not, consider himself a Pole. By 1860 Antonovich and similar members of a student clandestine organization, *gmina*, formed the core of the Kiev Hromada—a semi-legal organization of Ukrainian national activists.⁷ It should be noted that in one way or another, the "local initiative" made itself visible from the very beginning.

The replies of the gendarme officers from the southwestern region to inquiries from Petersburg were calm and uninformative. "Rumors that the paltry *khlopomany* circle seeks to restore Little Russia's independence [sic!] are not worth serious consideration; from time immemorial Little Russia has never been, nor can it ever be, independent," concluded the Pole, Colonel Gribovski, the staff officer of the Kiev Gendarme Corps, in his broken Russian. (This "has never been and can never be" formula was later paraphrased by Valuev in the circular.)⁸

Miliutin's memorandum, nevertheless, required urgent attention and in January 1863 the Kiev governor-general was instructed by Dolgorukov "to take adequate measures to prevent further activity on the part of the above-mentioned society." Hromada was blamed for its connection with Polish *gminy* and for "the initiative to promulgate liberal ideas through the printing of Little Russian books for the *narod*."⁹

In other words, at that moment Dolgorukov was more concerned with the social than the nationalistic aspect of Hromada's ideology.

This letter was addressed to the new governor-general, N. N. Annenkov, Miliutin's protégé, who was appointed on 3 December 1862.¹⁰ The seemingly threatening instruction could not, and did not, in fact, entail serious repression. As a non-official organization, Hromada could not be dismissed at the will of the authorities. Dolgorukov provided Annenkov with no tangible compromising evidence thus excluding the menace of police persecution, the more so since such measures were Dolgorukov's prerogative. All that Annenkov could do on the basis of this letter was to summon and reprimand the members of the Kiev Hromada. However, the perspective of being "just a scarecrow" was far from Annenkov's ambitions.

On 23 February he sent Dolgorukov a letter devoted to the problem of Ukrainophilism. First, he dutifully conformed to the opinion about "the danger of communist and socialist theories." Then, lamenting over the inefficacy of secret surveillance, he proposed to provoke a press debate with the Ukrainophiles in order to "help the government detect the true spiritual and ideological aspirations of those who signed the article in *Sovremennaya Letopis'*."¹¹ Annenkov, in fact, recommended proceeding with the already tested "provocation" strategy: the letter signed by the Ukrainophiles was an answer to the article "From Kiev," written by the governor's namesake P. Annenkov. Later, the governor asked Dolgorukov to send an experienced secret agent to the Ukrainophile camp. Annenkov demonstrated a higher professional qualification in the art of political investigation than the chief of gendarmes and tried to urge the latter to authorize more militant actions.

In March, Dolgorukov received an anonymous letter from Kiev, written, as the text proved, by somebody from the upper clergy. Observing at the beginning that the Ukrainophiles had "recruited to their ranks some influential, though ignorant, people in Kiev and Petersburg," the author(s) continued: "We, all loyal Little Russians, being well aware of the people's needs and our *khlopomany's* escapades, beseech you to employ every available means to protect our faith from profanation and our fatherland from division and dangerous schism." After demanding the banning of the Holy Scriptures in Ukrainian, the authors concluded with an unequivocal ultimatum: "If our supplication, now soli-

tary, is not properly satisfied in favor of our church and fatherland, we will take our protest out to the public, to the whole Russian world.”¹² The authors must have been extremely annoyed by the Third Department’s sluggishness if they dared to address Dolgorukov in such an impertinent manner. It is worth noting at the same time that the demand to ban the Little Russian translation of the Holy Scriptures was delivered to the wrong address—all questions of a religious character were under the jurisdiction of the Holy Synod. Apparently the authors, although dissatisfied with the functioning of the Third Department, thought it most likely that they would gain protection with the help of the gendarmes and not from their direct superiors.

Dolgorukov forwarded this letter to Annenkov, and on 17 March the latter was ready with the second “anti-Ukrainophile” epistle. It clearly demonstrates that the governor welcomed, if not initiated, the letter of the “church and fatherland protectors.” In comparison with the February letter, in the second petition the critical accents have been shifted and the problem of the translation of Holy Scripture has gained priority. Annenkov emphasized that “the Polish and Little Russian parties, although having different goals [Annenkov recognized Ukrainophilism as an independent movement and did not pin the “Polish conspirator” label on the Ukrainophiles], use identical methods of populist propaganda, because even the Poles in their appeals to ordinary people started recalling Ukraine’s former independence and Cossackdom.”¹³ Annenkov compared Ukrainian with the “dialects of other Great Russian guberniias.” In this respect, the translation of the Bible into Ukrainian had turned, according to Annenkov, into “a matter of political significance.” “The question of whether the Little Russian dialect is a part of the Russian language or constitutes a separate language is still debated in literature. On obtaining permission to translate the Holy Scriptures into Little Russian, the partisans of the Little Russian party will obtain the recognition of the independent status of the Little Russian language and may lay claim to Little Russia’s autonomy.”¹⁴

Thanks to his research in Ukrainophilism, Annenkov was now able to formulate the Russificatory ideas more precisely. Shortly after his appointment he wrote to D. Miliutin that the main task was “to reinforce the Russian nationality,” implying exclusively the struggle with the Polish influence.¹⁵ In May, in a letter to the foreign minister A. M. Gorchakov, Annenkov proposed to “irreversibly establish a per-

fect coincidence of fundamental community elements in Western Rus' with those in Eastern Rus' and, thereby, the fullness of Russia's national unity."¹⁶

Two remarks made by Dolgorukov on the margins of the letter prove the importance of the document: "Reported to His Majesty on 27 March" and "The Highest permission received to contact relevant offices on the matter [the translation of the Bible]. 27 March."¹⁷

Thus the Holy Synod was not, as some scholars think, the initiator of prohibitive measures and the translation of the Bible has never been an initial pretext for launching repression against the Ukrainian language.¹⁸

At this point an additional commentary is in order. The first attempt to produce a translation of the Bible into Russian was undertaken by the Russian Biblical Society with the permission of Alexander I, and dated back to the early 1820s. The opposition of the upper clergy left this enterprise unfulfilled. Several hundred thousand copies of the Russian Bible were burned. During the subsequent years the Moscow Metropolitan Filaret tried laboriously and unsuccessfully to overcome the hostility of his more conservative colleagues. His *Catechism* was under the Synod's censure for a long time because three prayers, including the "Our Father," were rendered in Russian.¹⁹ For years after, the major opponent of Filaret, Archimandrite Fotii, would mention with rancor "the venture of translating the New Testament into the humble Russian dialect."²⁰

Fotii's attitude to Filaret's endeavor proves that Russian at that time had not yet reached the status of other leading European languages. It was not only the nobility of the time, including Pushkin, who acquired French earlier than Russian. The church hierarchy in its turn deprived "the simple" Russian dialect of the right to become the language of the Holy Scriptures, thereby depriving it of the tremendous advantage that West European languages had already gained over the less "lucky" dialects, which were only trying to emancipate themselves during the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century.²¹

Only in 1859, at Alexander II's behest, did the Holy Synod finally authorize the unabridged Russian translation of the Holy Scriptures. The New Testament was published in 1862 and the full text in 1876, a year after the Russian translation of *Das Kapital*. After the Russian translation was finally permitted the Synod was inclined to pursue the same policy in relation to Little Russian as well. In 1862 it allowed the

printing of Opatovich's *Holy History*, considering at the same time the publication of the Ukrainian version of the New Testament drafted by F. S. Morachevskii. Thus, in the early 1860s, the issue of the Ukrainian translation of the Holy Scriptures was part of a more general problem of the Bible's accessibility to the congregation and the emancipation of the modern East Slavic languages from Church Slavonic. The controversial debate in the press on the status of the Ukrainian language or the Little Russian dialect and its role in school instruction and literature made it clear that the question of the Bible's translation touched on the status of the languages in relation to each other. The popularity of the Russian translation of the New Testament among peasants, and hence its assimilatory power, can best be grasped from the fact that between 1863 and 1865 more than 1,250,000 copies of the Holy Scriptures were sold.²²

Executing the tsar's resolution of 27 March, Dolgorukov informed Valuev of the evidence against the Ukrainophiles and enclosed Annenkov's second letter together with the anonymous Kiev communication.²³ On 14 April Valuev sent to the chief procurator of the Holy Synod, Major General A. P. Akhmatov, an inquiry regarding the Ukrainian translation of the New Testament, attaching Annenkov's letter. Akhmatov's reply on 19 April was cautious. He wrote that the translation had been placed under the scrutiny of the bishop of Kaluga and promised that the "Holy Synod will take into consideration" Annenkov's opinion.²⁴ Akhmatov's reaction to this communication showed little concern. Even in May, when another inquiry was received, Akhmatov considered it necessary to ask for more guidelines on other religious writings referring to the fund-raising appeals "for the publication of Little Russian books for the *narod*."²⁵ Having finally understood where the wind was blowing, Akhmatov, not willing to put the bishop of Kaluga into an embarrassing situation should the latter give a positive assessment of the translation, ordered him to leave Morachevskii's text *unreviewed*.²⁶ If Akhmatov foresaw the possibility of a positive evaluation of the translation, it meant that the bishop himself had not received any additional instructions of a negative character.

Therefore, after the three-month period that had passed since the tsar's order to Dolgorukov to discuss the translation problem with other high state dignitaries, only Valuev and Akhmatov possessed information on the case. The minister of education, A. V. Golovnin, was kept in ignorance. It was only on 17 June that Valuev wrote to Dolgo-

rukov that he “fully shared” the governor of Kiev’s opinion.”²⁷ Meanwhile, the adversaries of the Ukrainophiles were trying to bring the issue into the public light.

It is not known whether it was Dolgorukov who acquainted Katkov with Annenkov’s provocation plan or Annenkov himself who got in touch with Katkov. Both variants are possible. Whatever the truth, Katkov was prompt to react. The first bait designed for the Ukrainophiles was the article “On the Little Russian Language and Its Use in Instruction” (*O malorusskom iazyke i ob obuchenii na nem*), published in *Russkii vestnik* by A. Ivanov in 1863. This article appeared to be the most consistent and convincing exposition of the anti-Ukrainophile position in the Russian press. Possibly Ivanov, a student at Kiev University since 1858, was directly instructed by the Kiev governor-general. In any case, several times in his article Ivanov invites the Ukrainophiles to answer his accusations.

Ivanov, unlike other anti-Ukrainophile Russian publicists, did not question the potential of “the Little Russian dialect” to develop into an advanced language²⁸ but, as a proponent of the assimilation approach, he attacked Ukrainophilism on ideological grounds. Referring to the French and German experience he emphasized the unifying role of language and culture. He called for a pan-Slav unity on the basis of four advanced literary languages—Serb, Czech, Polish, and Russian.²⁹ For him the question was not about the existence or non-existence of the Little Russian language, but about the possibility of doing without it by making Russian a common language for Great and Little Russians. His answer to this question was, of course, positive, which logically meant that “Ukrainophile separatists strive to annihilate what has been already half done, almost done, they want to destroy the most precious achievements of our history.”³⁰

Nor does he deny the major “official” argument of the Ukrainophiles in favor of the use of Ukrainian in schools—speeding up the process of literacy acquisition. However, easy momentous gains could lead, he maintained, to future losses, because the amount of culture accessible to the literate in Ukrainian was considerably smaller than that accessible to the literate in Russian. His further remark, not devoid of reason, placed the language issue, and the Russification problem in general, into its social context. “It is quite possible that at present instruction in Little Russian is more efficient than in Russian. But the reason for this is, however, that Ukrainian is now taught by the parti-

sans of separatist intentions, who possess formal, if superfluous, education, which is still infinitely better than that of village clerks and sextons [...] The problem is not in the language but in the teachers.”³¹ (Paradoxically, at that very time Petersburg buried the idea of recruiting laic teachers to primary schools!)³²

In Kiev the conflict over the use of the Ukrainian language in schools had broken out earlier than in the capital. In as early as 1862, the Statutes Drafting Committee, chaired by I. Ia. Neukirch, a professor at Kiev University, unanimously voted to eliminate in the statutes of primary and secondary schools the term “mother tongue” and replace it with “Russian.”³³ In 1863 S. Gogotskii, a professor at Kiev University, and the secondary-school teacher I. Kul’zhinskii (both Little Russians) published special brochures against the introduction of the Ukrainian language in school instruction.³⁴

Ivanov understood that the language issue belonged to a larger nationalistic project. “This idea aims at developing in Little Russians [...] the awareness of their sharp and absolute difference from Great Russians.”³⁵ He was critical of the tendency to teach Ukrainian to already Russified urban children. Here he pointed at a visible contradiction in the “official” logic of the Ukrainophiles, according to which pupils were to be taught in their native tongues. “When, in private conversations with some Ukrainophiles, I exposed this false and insincere line of their reasoning, they had nothing to retort, except that they wanted to bring the urbanites back to their lost nationality.”³⁶

Ivanov perfectly grasped the essence of the conflict between the two nationalisms, in which the questions of language and identity, as well as the rivalry between two intellectual elites, were inextricably mingled.³⁷ (He was highly critical of the motives of the Ukrainian movement’s activists. However, he only once mentioned, and then in passing, Russo–Polish rivalry, although his text dated to the post-insurrectionist period.) He objected to the imposing of bans and insisted on measures of “positive counteraction” through the creation of a competitive Russian state school system.

The Ukrainophiles ignored Ivanov’s challenge and, in the absence of the desired results, Katkov himself took the initiative. He made his critical remarks particularly poignant and personal. Attacking Kostomarov personally, Katkov finally managed to provoke a polemic on the part of the Ukrainophiles, thus implementing the plan of provocation, suggested by Annenkov in his letter to Dolgorukov.

Katkov targeted his arrows at the fund-raising campaign for the publication of popular books in Ukrainian, initiated by Kostomarov. Katkov, with good reason, sensed in this initiative the potential for transforming Ukrainophilism into a legal collective cause of powerful propaganda. If one draws on Hroch's conceptual apparatus for the periodization of national movements, the Ukrainophiles were half-way between stage A (scientific interest in Ukrainophilism) and stage B (creation of organizational structures and extensive nationalist propaganda). Katkov, certain high-ranking bureaucrats, as well as many radically minded oppositionists such as Herzen and Chernyshevskii, had they been familiar with the theory, would have grasped the potential transition to stage C (mass mobilization of peasants in the favorable conditions of the post-Emancipation Edict period).³⁸ After the publication of the edict, the peasants expected a great deal from the so-called *slushnyi chas* ("the hour that has been foretold")—the proclamation of real "*volia*" ("freedom") and the termination of the so-called temporary obligation state. Some intellectuals, both in Russia and abroad, even went as far as to predict the exact date of a mass peasant uprising. The very term *slushnyi chas* originated in the western borderland.³⁹ Today it has been proved that those expectations were ungrounded, but this does not invalidate the subjective fears and hopes of the contemporaries.

The first attempt to plant Ukrainophilism in the political ground—the creation of the Cyril–Methodius Society—was cut short due to the general atmosphere of the Nikolaevan regime and the insignificant number of members. However, in the early 1860s this perspective became feasible by virtue of a more liberal regime and the creation of numerous interconnected Ukrainophile groups in Petersburg (the *Osnova* circle), Kiev, and other parts of Ukraine (*hromadas*). In as early as March 1862, members of the Poltava Hromada informed other *hromadas* of the need to send a petition to the Petersburg Literacy Committee demanding the introduction of Ukrainian in schools.⁴⁰

Such was the archetypal picture of the Ukrainian national movement that Katkov depicted with all his sarcasm: "There have recently appeared in the Ukrainian villages, in sheepskin caps, so-called disseminators of Little Russian literacy and organized Little Russian schools ... There have appeared books in the newly fudged language. Finally, one famous professor has solemnly opened a nation-wide fund-raising subscription for publishing Little Russian books."⁴¹

"It is a scandalous and absurd sophism that there can be two Russian nationalities [an allusion to the famous article by Kostomarov] and two Russian languages, as if there could ever exist two French nationalities and languages!," wrote Katkov, clearly defining the reasons for his enmity towards Ukrainophilism.⁴² Katkov, following Ivanov's argument, did not deny the potential of Ukrainian to become a separate language, but he emphasized the subversiveness of this potential: "Public donations for this cause in the long run [...] are even more dangerous than voluntary donations in Rus' for the Polish mutiny."⁴³ This stone was thrown not only at Kostomarov, but also at Ukrainophiles in general. Katkov knew that the "donation" initiative was widely supported in Petersburg. (On 6 April 1863, for example, the Petersburg Assembly of Nobility [*Dvorianskoe sobranie*] organized a literary-musical party in aid of the Little Russian popular books publishing campaign, attended by K. I. Bestuzhev-Riumin, V. I. Kakhovskii, and N. G. Pomialovskii. Kostomarov's presentation "several times elicited deafening applause.")⁴⁴ Katkov's article contemptuously offered Kostomarov help in fund-raising for the "development of the Provençal dialect in France or the Northumberland dialect in England."⁴⁵

In the spirit of his obsessive idea about the ubiquitous "Polish plot," Katkov claimed that the "voluntary donations for book publishing [...] in the South-Russian language was part of the secret Polish intrigue," of which Kostomarov and other Ukrainophiles had become a docile instrument.⁴⁶ "The conspiracy it is, the conspiracy everywhere, insidious Jesuit plot, Jesuit by its origin and nature!," proclaimed the article.⁴⁷ This was the major polemical "hit" of Katkov—by ascribing Ukrainophilism to the "Polish plot" he automatically translated it from the category of "harmless delusions" to that of "immediate political threats."

The next day after the publication of Katkov's article, the Kiev civil governor Hesse sent to the minister of the interior a report on the arrests of several young Ukrainophiles. One of them, Vladimir Sinegub, provided investigators with evidence on the so-called Kiev Society of Little Russian Propagandists and its complicity with Polish plotters. Of special concern was the fact that the conspirators had been connected with the arrested Colonel A. A. Krasovskii—the official attitude to subversion in the army was completely different from the attitude to student unrest.⁴⁸

Just several days later Valuev received, not through the Third

Department but through the Censorship Committee, a new document on the Ukrainian question, very probably inspired by Annenkov. On 27 June, the chief of the Kiev Censorship Committee, Novitskii, sent Valuev a letter, written on the basis of the censor Lazov's memorandum, to say that "the very idea of using the Little Russian dialect in schools was accepted by most Little Russians with indignation. They convincingly prove that there has never been a separate Little Russian language and the dialect used by the plebes is the same Russian language, corrupted by the Polish influence." "The All-Russian language," the letter ran, "is much more comprehensible for ordinary people than the so-called Ukrainian language invented by some Little Russians, and especially Poles. Those trying to prove the opposite are being blamed by other Little Russians for harboring subversive ideas which are hostile to Russia and perilous for Little Russia."⁴⁹ (All these phrases, including "has never been and can never be," will be later included into the text of the circular unchanged.)⁵⁰ A special emphasis was put on the evidence that the printing of popular books was first organized by the activists of the Kharkov secret society, and then by those arrested in Kiev—in other words, by conspirators and political criminals.

Novitskii perceptively remarked that "the position of a censor inspecting such manuscripts is particularly difficult, as it is only the purpose of the book that is subversive, while the content, as a rule, is of no offence."⁵¹ The letter concluded that the phenomenon of Little Russian separatism was "especially lamentable and deserves the attention of the government because it goes along with the plans of the Poles, to whom it virtually owes its birth."⁵²

It can be assumed that Novitskii's letter and the first of Katkov's articles against the Ukrainophiles, published on 21 June in *Moskovskie Vedomosti*, were part of a general anti-Ukrainophile offensive. The coincidence of the dates in the letters can hardly be accidental. The six days that passed between the publication of Katkov's article and the dispatch of Novitskii's letter were just enough for Novitskii to receive the newspaper in Kiev and amend the text of the letter. (It is exactly at the end of his letter that Novitskii introduced an essentially new interpretation of Ukrainophilism suggested by Katkov.) Katkov, in his turn, referred twice to the Kiev letters as a source of inspiration for his writings.⁵³

Kostomarov, smelling the storm, replied in *Den'* in a cautious, self-justifying tone.⁵⁴ He discarded the accusations of a pro-Polish ori-

entation among the Ukrainophiles and stressed that “nobody plans, or has ever planned, to force out from Southern Rus’ the literary universal state language, nobody has ever desired to replace it with other languages in universities, secondary schools and seminaries. We talk only about instruction in villages.” Kostomarov, out of tactical considerations, found it imperative to condemn “the young Southern Russian literature” for producing “vain fiction” and insisted on the primacy of literature for educational purposes. “Russian society could have helped us in this undertaking [...] not allowing the absurd suspicion that any Little Russian cause can have any solidarity with any Polish cause,” concluded Kostomarov.

Aksakov provided Kostomarov’s text with verbose commentaries. Though disapproving of the attempts to create an independent Ukrainian language, Aksakov believed that “the Little Russian idiom” might be used “for the transmission of elementary knowledge to Little Russian peasants.” In this case, “private schools should be granted more freedom; the government, nevertheless, must obligatorily support instruction in Russian and *only* in Russian—the official language it uses for communication with all Russian people irrespective of their local dialects.” Aksakov, with information on the contact between Golovnin and the Ukrainophiles at his disposal, objected to the help allotted by the Ministry of Education to the Little Russian language. Thus, as an adherent of the All-Russian nation concept and opponent of the Ukrainophiles, Aksakov argued at the same time that “every lie must be allowed full liberty to commit suicide.” He was determined in his conviction that Little Russian should not be banned from schools, for “bans are infinitely more dangerous than unrestricted freedom. They can only deepen the error, which in the conditions of freedom will soon degenerate into a cumbersome and excessive whim of the false federalist logic.” (This is a reference to Kostomarov’s views.) Emphasizing that “the Little Russian and the Little Russian ‘patriot’ are two different phenomena that stand in contradiction to each other,” Aksakov proposed a more flexible and less oppressive strategy for countering Ukrainophilism. *Den’* resolutely opted for this moderate position—the day after Katkov’s anti-Kostomarov publication the newspaper came out with an article in support of primary instruction in the “Belorussian vernacular.”⁵⁵

Novitskii’s letter of 27 June was an inquiry and demanded a reply.

This reply came, almost immediately, in the form of the Valuev Circular, which banned the publication of books for the *narod* in Ukrainian.

The circular reflected a whole range of official concerns. First and foremost, it was the reaction of Russian officialdom to the gradual increase of both the legal and underground activities of the Ukrainophiles, whose separatist intentions, even postponed for the distant future, were quite recognizable. The authorities and most Russian periodicals, on the contrary, perceived Little Russians as a part of the All-Russian nation. In 1862/63 the conflict was for the first time comprehended in nationalistic categories not by the narrow circle of the members of the Cyril–Methodius Society or high state officials as in 1848, but by broader segments of the educated public.

Second, the Russo–Polish tension of the time significantly increased official distrust of any unsanctioned political agitation in the southwestern borderland. This anxiety resulted in the creation of the Committee on the Affairs of the Western Borderland, chaired by Count P. P. Gagarin, in 1862. The committee, which included the ministers of the interior, justice, war and state domains, started functioning in November.⁵⁶ Several months after the outbreak of the Polish uprising, the government became determined to crush it at any cost. (The appointment of the new Vilno governor–general, M. M. Muraviev, whom Herzen would later call “the hangman,” became the symbol of this determination.) The overwhelming fear of the authorities to face the formation of the Polish–Ukrainian coalition can best be demonstrated by the letter of the Chernigov guberniia governor, Prince S. P. Golitsyn, to Valuev on 2 July 1863. Golitsyn proposed “to halt the formation of the Little Russian Cossack regiments, or at least to proceed with much greater caution.” (These units were supposed to be used against the Polish rebels.)⁵⁷

The combination of the fear of Ukrainian separatism as such with the danger of its manipulation by the Polish liberation movement was the main reason for harsh government reaction. The authorities suspected the Ukrainophiles, sometimes with good reason, because of their socialist populist orientation. The significance of this factor was growing together with the socialist movement.

None of the historians who have written about the Valuev Circular mentioned that Valuev planned the document as a provisional measure. This follows from the memorandum “On the Books Published

for the *Narod* in Little Russian,” which he sent to the tsar on 11 July, a week before the circular was signed: “Recently, the question of Little Russian literature has acquired a new dimension by virtue of political circumstances.”⁵⁸ Valuev stressed the fact that members of the illegal societies systematically turned out to be involved in the publication of popular books. He suggested that the question be discussed with the minister of education, the chief procurator of the Holy Synod, and the head of the gendarmes. “Till then, only the *belles-lettres* in Little Russian can be allowed for publishing. The production of religious books, textbooks, and other books for popular reading is to be temporarily suspended.”⁵⁹ Alexander II approved Valuev’s proposal the next day, on 12 July.⁶⁰ On 18 July Valuev sent out two documents—the circular to the Kiev, Moscow, and Petersburg censorship committees, and letters to the ministers with an invitation to discuss this problem.

The same word, “suspension,” can be found in the entry in Valuev’s diary on 28 July 1863: “I have been visited by several petitioners, Kostomarov among them, who were greatly surprised at the suspension of popular editions in the *khokhol* dialect. I answered them, mildly but categorically, that the circular would remain in force.”⁶¹ Valuev’s “mild” response proves his reluctance to quarrel with Kostomarov. The latter, in his autobiography, recalled how Valuev underlined the temporary character of the circular.⁶²

Valuev kept up correspondence on this question with other high-ranking officials long after the circular had been issued. Thus, the chief procurator of the Holy Synod, Akhmatov, replied to Valuev’s inquiry as late as 24 December 1864. (Akhmatov, as the correspondence proves, preferring to write to Valuev and Dolgorukov what they wanted to see in his letters, remarked: “I am inclined to think that everybody would have won more if the Ukrainophiles’ efforts could have been cut short by the force of public opinion, without the interference of the authorities.”⁶³) By the same token, the censorship committees did not perceive the circular as a permanent measure. In March/April 1865, the Petersburg committee suggested that the question be revised. In all probability both Akhmatov and the censors thought that the suppression of the Polish uprising had abolished the “political circumstances” that Valuev had mentioned in his letter to the tsar.

There is indirect, though convincing evidence that Valuev himself regarded the circular as a temporary and, in the long run, inefficient

expedient. In his secret correspondence with Katkov concerning the Polish question, he seemed clearly to understand that it was impossible to achieve serious changes by the imposition of prohibitive measures: "This problem can be solved only in Moscow and Petersburg and not in Kiev and Vilno. It can be solved when Kiev and Vilno turn their face to Sankt-Petersburg and Moscow. One has to have courage to look in the mirror when in illness. Neither Aksakov in *Den'* nor Govorskii in *Vestnik Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii* will convince me of our moral dominance in the West. We are powerful materially and we can be powerful morally. But how can we achieve this?"⁶⁴ (The passage explains why Valuev did not adopt Aksakov's or Ivanov's logic in the Ukrainian question. He thought that the Ukrainophiles were winning the race. His circular came out of his belief in the weakness, not in the strength of Russian assimilationist potential at that time.) Later he again returned to this topic: "We need to employ 'light' force."⁶⁵ Valuev understood that first of all a "light"—in other words, assimilationist and civilizing—force was needed in order to strengthen Russian influence in the western borderland. But he also understood that such a force cannot be acquired quickly, which is why he asks the painful question "But how can we achieve this?" A year later Valuev confronted Katkov with the same question: "I would like you [...] to answer this question: What tools do we need, with the center and the peripheries we possess, to generate centripetal not centrifugal forces?"⁶⁶ Constantly "repeating it by word of pen or mouth," as he himself put it, Valuev simply could not abstract himself from this dilemma when signing the circular.⁶⁷

On 18 July, the same day that Valuev signed the circular, Alexander II, on the recommendation of the Western Committee, ordered the prohibiting of instruction in Polish in public institutions in the western region. Valuev and Gorchakov, who had been absent at the meeting of the Western Committee when the memorandum to the tsar was prepared, protested against this new ban and soon the prohibition was mitigated.⁶⁸ Thus, Valuev would not only constantly speak about the need to find a "light" alternative to administrative bans, but was ready, in some cases, actively to defend his position.

All these indirect but, in the aggregate, convincing arguments show that Valuev perceived the circular as a temporary measure for the time of the Polish uprising. He intended to "hold back" the wave of Ukrainophile activity in order to provide the government with time to

prepare itself for a competition suggested by the conception of Aksakov and Ivanov. However, he was convinced of the indispensability of the circular for that very moment. This became evident during the discussion of the measures against the Ukrainophiles, to which he invited other high-ranking officials on 18 July 1863.

NOTES

- 1 M. Lemke, in his book *Epokha tsenzurnykh reform 1859–1865* (St. Petersburg, 1904), had to use copies from unidentified sources. F. Savchenko, in *Zaborona ukrainstva 1876 r.* (Kharkov, 1930), did not use the Petersburg documents, and D. Saunders did not use the Moscow ones. Saunders has recently published several articles on the origin of the Valuev Circular: D. Saunders, "Russia's Ukrainian Policy 1847–1905: A Demographic Approach," *European History Quarterly* 25 (1995); idem., "Russia and Ukraine under Alexander II: The Valuev Edict of 1863," *International History Review* 17 (1995); idem., "Mikhail Katkov and Mykola Kostomarov: A Note on Petr Valuev's Anti-Ukrainian Edict of 1863," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 17, nos. 3–4 (1996 for 1993).
- 2 For the text of the circular see Appendix 1.
- 3 GARF, f. 109, first expedition of the Third Department, op. 37, ed. khr. 230, p. 38, l. 1. Cited from F. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, pp. 183–184.
- 4 GARF, f. 109, op. 37, ed. khr. 230, p. 38, l. 3. Cited from Savchenko, idem., pp. 184–185.
- 5 *Sovremennaia Letopis'*, no. 6 (November 1862).
- 6 *Chlop* in Polish means "peasant." In Russia this word was often restyled as *khokhlomany*.
- 7 Antonovich refers to the founders of Hromada as "We, Poles-Ukrainians." The term *hromada* was also borrowed from the Poles. See V. Miyakovskii, "Kievskaiia Hromada. Iz istorii ukrainskogo obshchestvennogo dvizheniia 60-kh godov," *Letopis' revoliutsii*, no. 4 (Kharkov 1924), pp. 129, 134.
- 8 GARF, f. 109, op. 37, ed. khr. 230, 38, l. 10ob.
- 9 See V. Miyakovskii, "Kievskaiia Hromada," pp. 149–150.
- 10 Valuev, who still counted on peaceful negotiations with the Poles, did not welcome this candidate and tried to convince Miliutin that "the western borderland demands not the force that General Bibikov used extensively but in vain, but the ability to get on with people." Letter of Valuev to D. Miliutin, 16 November 1862. OR RGB, f. 169, k. 59, ed. khr. 32, l. 5. Valuev's apprehensions were very soon confirmed.
- 11 GARF, f. 109, op. 37, ed. khr. 230, p. 38, l. 46–47.
- 12 See M. K. Lemke, ed., *Herzen A. I.*, vol. XVI (Petersburg, 1920), pp. 229–300.

- 13 GARF, f. 109, op. 37, ed. khr. 230, p. 38, l. 56.
- 14 GARF, f. 109, op. 37, ed. khr. 230, p. 38, l. 56ob. Later, in April, Annenkov forwarded to Dolgorukov the letter of the director of Trans-Caucasian schools, Kul'zhinskii, who, troubled by Kostomarov's fund-raising campaign, asked: "Is it really not possible to hold Kostomarov back from his separatist plans?"
- 15 OR PGB, f. 169, k. 14, ed. khr. 3, l. 58ob.
- 16 AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, 1863, ed. khr. 83, l. 4ob. Letter of Annenkov to Gorchakov, 24 May 1863. Annenkov tried to enlist the support of Gorchakov when, lobbying for the construction of a railway line from Odessa to Moscow via Kiev, not Kharkov, he used not only economic but also assimilationist arguments.
- 17 GARF, f. 109, op. 37, ed. khr. 230, p. 38, l. 55, 56ob.
- 18 See V. Dmytryshyn, introduction to F. Savchenko, *Zaborona ukrain'stva 1876 r.*
- 19 Igor Smolitsch, "Geschichte der russischen Kirche," *Forschungen zur osteuropaischen Geschichte*, teil 2, Band 45 (1991), p. 19; Stephen K. Batalden, "Printing the Bible in the Reign of Alexander I: Toward a Reinterpretation of the Imperial Russian Bible Society," in Geoffrey A. Hosking, ed., *Church, Nation and State in Russia and Ukraine* (London, 1991), p. 67; "Filaret pod tsenzuroiu," *Russkii arkhiv*, no. 2 (1904), p. 311. See also A. N. Pypin, *Religioznye dvizheniia pri Aleksandre I* (Petrograd, 1911); idem., "Rossiiskoe bibleiskoe obshchestvo," *Vestnik Evropy*, nos. 8–12 (1868).
- 20 "Avtobiografia iur'evskogo arkhimandrita Fotiia," *Russkaia starina*, no. 7 (1894), p. 218.
- 21 B. Anderson mistakenly took the publication of the six-volume academic dictionary at the end of the eighteenth century for a triumph of the Russian language over Church Slavonic. See B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 73.
- 22 See Geoffrey Hosking, *Russia: People and Empire, 1552–1917* (London, 1997), pp. 233–234.
- 23 GARF, f. 109, op. 37, ed. khr. 230, p. 38, l. 58.
- 24 RGIA, f. 1281, op. 1, ed. khr. 166.
- 25 GARF, f. 109, op. 37, ed. khr. 230, p. 38, l. 66. Letter of Dolgorukov of 22 May 1863.
- 26 GARF, f. 109, op. 37, ed. khr. 230, p. 38, l. 78. The authors of the Academy of Science Committee report on the question of the "abolition of restraints over the Little Russian printed word" mention, without referring to the source, that the bishop was about to approve Morachevskii's work.
- 27 GARF, f. 109, op. 37, ed. khr. 230, p. 38, l. 68.
- 28 By 1863 Katkov had rejected this possibility.
- 29 *Russkii vestnik* (May 1863), p. 253.
- 30 *Ibid.*, p. 254.
- 31 *Ibid.*, p. 260.
- 32 For this see Chapter 7.
- 33 *Russkii vestnik* (May 1863), p. 258; *Universitetskie izvestiia*, no. 4 (1862), pp. 19, 25, 35.

- 34 See S. Gogotskii, *Na kakom iazyke sleduet obuchat' v sel'skikh shkolakh Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii?* (Kiev, 1863). I. O. Kulzhinskii, *O zarozhdaishcheisia tak nazyvaemoi malorossiiskoi literature* (Kiev, 1863).
- 35 *Russkii vestnik* (May 1863), p. 259.
- 36 *Ibid.*, p. 261.
- 37 *Ibid.*, pp. 256, 257, 266. "If they managed to create a Little Russian literature, they, as founders, would be glorified, they would go down in posterity." Of course, in as far as this analysis is correct, it refers to activists of all movements of this sort and not only to the Ukrainian movement.
- 38 M. Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe* (Cambridge, 1985). On Hroch's concept see M. Bobrovich, "Miroslav Hroch: formirovanie natsii i natsional'nye dvizheniia malykh narodov," in A. Miller, ed., *Natsionalizm i formirovanie natsii. Teorii, modeli, kontseptsii* (Moscow, 1994). For the application of Hroch's scheme to the Ukrainian movement see A. Kappeler, "The Ukrainians of the Russian Empire, 1860–1914," in *Comparative Studies on Governments and Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups in Europe, 1850–1940*, vol. VI.; A. Kappeler, ed., *The Formation of National Elites* (Dartmouth, 1996), pp. 112–113. In recent works some scholars have proposed the revision of Hroch's scheme. It presupposes a special preliminary phase, when the interest of ethnographers, historians, and philologists in ethnic peculiarities was devoid of any partisan nationalistic coloring. In this case, stage A would embrace only the next generation (in our case members of the Cyril–Methodius Society). See Serhy Yekelchuk, "Nationalisme ukrainien, bielorusse et slovaque," in Chantel Mellon-Delson and Michel Maslowski, eds., *L'Histoire des idées politiques centre-est européennes* (Paris, 1998), pp. 377–393. This correction seems more valid than the position of R. Szporluk, who maintains that political motives should be *obligatorily* present at the earliest stages of academic interests in folklore. See R. Szporluk, *Ukraina: ot periferii imperii k suverennomu gosudarstvu*, p. 47.
- 39 See, for example, I. S. Miller, "Slushnyi chas i taktika russkoi revoliutsionnoi partii v 1861–1863 gg.," in I. S. Miller, *Issledovaniia po istorii narodov Tsentral'noi i Vostochnoi Evropy XIXv.* (Moscow, 1980), pp. 240–267.
- 40 Such were the letters sent to Petersburg from Poltava and Kiev. The letter of the Chernigov Hromada was seized by the police and generated special investigation procedures. See B. Sheveliv, "Petitsii ukrains'kikh gromad do peterburz'skogo komitetu gramotnosti z r. 1862," *Za sto lit*, no. 3, (1928).
- 41 M. N. Katkov, *1863 god. Sobranie statei po pol'skomu voprosu, pomeschavshikhsia v Moskovskikh vedomostiakh, Russkom vestnike i Sovremennoi letopisi 1* (1887), pp. 276–277.
- 42 *Ibid.*, p. 276.
- 43 *Ibid.*, p. 282.
- 44 *Golos*, no. 83 (1863). See also N. Bukhbinder, "List Kostomarova do I. P. Kornilova," *Za sto lit*, no. 6 (Kharkov, 1930), p. 122.

- 45 M. N. Katkov, "1863 god," p. 282.
- 46 *Ibid.*, p. 277.
- 47 *Ibid.*, p. 273.
- 48 RGIA, f. 1282, op. 1, ed. khr. 162, l. 3, 3ob. (Delo o neblagonadezhnykh postupkakh pomeshchika Pototskogo i dvorian Sineguba i Pelipenko.)
- 49 RGIA, f. 775, op. 1, ed. khr. 188, l. 1ob.
- 50 RGIA, f. 775, op. 1, ed. khr. 188, l. 5ob–6. Thus the references Saunders makes to the book of F. O. Iastrebov, *Revoliutsionnye demokraty na Ukraine: Vtoraia polovina 50kh—nachalo 60kh godov XIX st.* (Kiev, 1950), p. 284, to prove that these words belong to Katkov, are mistaken. Katkov's correspondence with Valuev shows that Valuev rather tried to influence Katkov than to surrender to Katkov's influence. The argument that the circular was the result of an unknown letter from Katkov to the minister is ungrounded. See D. Saunders, *Mikhail Katkov and Mykola Kostomarov*.
- 51 RGIA, f. 775, op. 1, ed. khr. 188, l. 2ob.
- 52 RGIA, f. 775, op. 1, ed. khr. 188, l. 2ob–3.
- 53 M. N. Katkov, "1863 god," pp. 277, 279. *Moskovskie vedomosti*, no. 136, 21 June 1863.
- 54 *Den'*, no. 27, 7 July 1862, p. 18.
- 55 *Den'*, no. 25, 22 June 1863, p. 3.
- 56 See, for example, D. Miliutin, *Moi starcheskie vospominaniia*, OR PGB, f. 169, k. 14, ed. khr. 2, l. 88ob.
- 57 RGIA, f. 1282, op. 1, ed. khr. 166, l. 20ob. Golitsyn was bothered by the fact that the very formation of special Little Russian regiments might have been interpreted as "the recognition on the part of the government of a certain autonomy of Little Russia." *Ibid.*, l. 25.
- 58 RGIA, f. 775, op. 1, ed. khr. 188, l. 4.
- 59 RGIA, f. 775, op. 1, ed. khr. 188, l. 7ob–8.
- 60 RGIA, f. 775, op. 1, ed. khr. 188, l. 4.
- 61 *Dnevnik P. A. Valueva, ministra vnutrennikh del*, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1961), p. 239.
- 62 N. Kostomarov, *Avtobiografia*, p. 595.
- 63 RGIA, f. 775, op. 1, ed. khr. 188, l. 24. According to the testimony of the *Russkaia starina* editorial board (Feb. 1872, p. 320), Akhmatov's letter was based on a certain anti-Ukrainophile note, which was composed as a response to Golovnin's letter. In other words, the decision makers of the time made extensive use of people whom we would call today "experts."
- 64 OR RGB, f. 120, k. 1, ed. khr. 57, l. 17ob., 20. Letter to Katkov, 19 September 1863.
- 65 OR RGB, f. 120, k. 1, ed. khr. 57, l. 31. Letter to Katkov, 5 May 1863.
- 66 OR RGB, f. 120, k. 1, ed. khr. 57, l. 53ob. Letter to Katkov, 16 July 1864.
- 67 OR RGB, f. 120, k. 1, ed. khr. 57, l. 14ob. Letter to Katkov, 15 August 1863.
- 68 RO RNB, f. 208, ed. khr. 105 (memorandum of 1 August), l. 15.

The Valuev Circular in Government Structures and Public Opinion

The chief procurator of the Holy Synod and the chief of gendarmes welcomed the circular. The letter sent by the latter was lapidary, and contained only one phrase: “I find neither use nor necessity in the publication of Little Russian books for the plebes.”¹

Golovnin, whom Valuev intentionally kept in ignorance until the very last moment, appeared to become a fierce opponent of the circular. His reaction was vigorous. As early as 20 July, two days after the distribution of the circular, Golovnin came out with a wordy and highly animated letter in which, among other things, he wrote: “It is the content of the book, the thoughts and ideas that the book popularizes and not the language or vernacular the book is written in that form a pretext for banning or permission [...] The attempts of the literati to perfect grammatically every language or dialect [...] are very useful for educative purposes and deserve attention and esteem.”² Golovnin believed that “the Little Russian translation of the New Testament ... will be the noblest endeavor” and, out of respect for Annenkov, explained his objections as a mistake by the clerk who had copied the letter. (Annenkov and Novitskii, as if foreseeing the logic of Golovnin, argued that in most cases it was the aim, not the content, of the Ukrainophile publications that was dangerous.)

Golovnin’s logic was radically different. Valuev’s doubts as to the efficacy of the circular spawned exclusively from purely pragmatic, not general enlightening concerns. This was explicit from the margin note Valuev added to the paragraph in Golovnin’s letter, in which the latter referred to the unfavorable impression left by the Russification policy among the Finns in the 1840s. Valuev wrote: “The comparison of Little Russia with Finland is the best self-defeating refutation of what was so grammatically correctly but so politically blindly argued.”³ Valuev understood that, unlike in Finland, the Russification policy in

Ukraine in the context of Russo-Polish relationships pursued cardinally different goals. (It should be mentioned that precisely in 1863 the government, after a break of fifty-five years, authorized the assembly of the Finnish Diet.) At the end of his life, in 1882, Valuev entrusted to his diary an account of his conversation with one of the higher officials: "I briefly presented him with my usual argument about the complicated coexistence of the solid and homogeneous center and heterogeneous frontiers." This thesis was definitely one of Valuev's favorite ideas.⁴ It can be argued that the Valuev-Golovnin controversy epitomized a revealing moment in government policy, when some ministers were learning to think in the categories of modern nationalism while others remained "stuck" in the enlightenment imperial ideals mostly of the "pre-nationalist" Russia of the first half of the nineteenth century.

Three days after Golovnin's letter, on 23 July, Valuev received another letter, this time from Kostomarov. The latter complained that the censors had withdrawn his article with his objections to Katkov, as well as two of his manuscripts, "having found in their content nothing subversive with respect to the regulations," but "solely because they were written in Little Russian."⁵ Referring to the censorship regulations, he asked that Katkov be obliged to publish his reply to *Moskovskie vedomosti's* criticism. "When it comes to the publication of academic literature in the South-Russian language, I beg Your Excellency to cast away all suspicions, which are facile and extremely insulting to every Little Russian, of complicity between the sacred cause of popular education and subversive ideas. Let this question be addressed on purely academic grounds and let pro and contra arguments be allowed free exchange, and hopefully the truth will reveal itself with time."⁶ (Kostomarov's tactical "ruse" was correctly spotted by D. Saunders. When writing about popular textbooks Kostomarov ascribed them to academic literature, which was not banned by the circular.)⁷

At the end of 1863, Golovnin again spoke out in defense of the Ukrainophiles, this time in connection with the report of the Third Department, according to which, in the Kharkov secondary school, the Russian literature teacher "turned out to be a disseminator of Ukrainophilism." The trustee of the school, Foigt, responded that "Ukrainophilism has never existed in the Kharkov schools."⁸ This was proved, as Golovnin argued, by a special investigation. "Neither teachers nor students in the local schools display interest in Ukrainophile ideas."⁹ Golovnin was apparently a "careless" searcher—Kharkov did have its

Ukrainophile activists. Golovnin confidently reported the results of the investigation to the tsar and claimed that the agents of the Third Department were unreliable informants. Still, he failed to convince the gendarmes.

Golovnin's efforts along bureaucratic channels were safeguarded by Kostomarov's activity in the press. Kostomarov managed to publish several articles containing his objections to Katkov. The tone and character of this polemic were qualitatively different from the friendly exchanges between Pogodin and Maksimovich in 1856. It was a different time with different mores.

In early July, an anonymous article in *Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti* lashed out at "the wretched publicists" who, "by stirring uproar over it [the publication of Ukrainian books] do not realize that they serve obscurantism and our enemies, who in every possible way are trying to halt Russian popular development. These publicists have resorted to truly Kalmyk [i.e. Asiatic, barbarian] means."¹⁰

After the adoption of the circular, the poignancy of the debate was somehow softened. Still, even on 20 July, Kostomarov referred in *Den'* to "the tricks" of *Moskovskie vedomosti*, *Kievskii telegraf* and *Vestnik Iugo-Zapadnoi Evropy* as "drastic violence."¹¹ *Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti* cautiously supported Kostomarov: "It was recently believed, primarily in the capital, that primary instruction in the western borderland should be conducted in local dialects, especially in the areas where the Little Russian dialect was dominant. Later there appeared local voices rejecting this view. Now we are in confusion and we can only hope that the western Russians will be, despite everything, provided with school instruction. The question as to how they should be taught—in Great Russian, Belorussian, Little Russian, or in local dialects—must be answered by life itself. It would be harmful to regulate this problem a priori by an administrative regulation."¹² The newspaper, in fact, called for a return to Aksakov's formula in order to, at least partially, soften the Valuev prohibition. Interestingly, the author correctly defined "local," in other words Kiev, activists, as the most energetic proponents of prohibitive measures. This means that he must have had confidential sources of information in government circles.

Golovnin and the Ukrainophiles coordinated their efforts in their attempts to reverse the circular. In January 1864 Golovnin sent Dolgorukov a letter and an anonymous memorandum, written in a justifying

tone, which, according to Golovnin, “contained much of good sense.” The note emphasized that “its activity [i.e., the activity of the Ukrainophile party] was and is taking place in the public eye, free of any political or social intrigues. Its concerns lie solely in the promotion of literacy and the proper understanding of duty and obligations among peasants.”¹³ The impressive expertise in the Ukrainophilism of 1860 to 1863 manifested by the author, allows the assumption that he must have belonged to the *Osnova* circle. It is most probable that the note was composed by Kostomarov, who, in the second half of 1863, was particularly active in his attempts to push through the abolition of the circular. The author was also familiar with Golovnin’s letter to Valuev—some arguments from the text were rendered verbatim.

The Ukrainophiles, in their turn, tried to buttress Golovnin in the press. Kostomarov was ready to continue his open debate with Katkov, but his long article was censored, this time by A. V. Nikitenko. This is how the latter recalled in his diary the decision to suspend Kostomarov’s article: “Kostomarov rejected the charges of separatism. I was to inspect this article; intricately written, the article asserted the Ukrainophiles’ beloved idea of introducing instruction in the local dialect. This was the reason why I withdrew the article. Goncharov unconvincingly objected; he must be absolutely ignorant of the real intentions of these gentlemen. I insisted on every possible counteraction to their plans since their demands hide seeds of separatism.”¹⁴ The conflict between Nikitenko and his colleague censor, the writer Goncharov, tellingly betrays once again the lack of any coherent opinion on the Ukrainian question in Russian society. It also proves the absence of clear-cut instructions “from above.” Nikitenko’s decision to censor the article was more a result of Katkov’s propaganda than the execution of the Valuev Circular, which in fact did not prohibit public debate of the issue.

The attempt to use Aksakov’s *Den’* in the campaign against the Valuev Circular proved to be more successful. On 25 January, Aksakov published a long article against anti-Ukrainophile repression. It began with the bombastic and, at the very least, naive argument that for those wise people who recognized “the might of Russia and the Russian state” it was ridiculous to fear such petty threats as revolution or Ukrainian separatism.¹⁵ Aksakov plunged into an open dispute with *Moskovskie vedomosti*, namely with an article by a certain Volynets, who had developed Katkov’s perception of the Ukrainophiles as conscious or uncon-

scious accomplices of the Polish conspiracy, and of the Ukrainian question as one that was more important for Russia's destiny than the Polish problem. Aksakov called Volynets and, implicitly, Katkov, "the unconscious tools of the Polish plot," arguing that their speculations only diverted attention from real problems. Partly repeating the logic of the authorities in the Cyril–Methodius Society affair, Aksakov praised the government for its ability to ignore the insinuations of *Moskovskie vedomosti* and refrain from repressing Kostomarov. Aksakov argued that his punishment could have played into Polish hands.¹⁶ Though he did not openly criticize the circular, Aksakov decisively attacked press appeals to ban the publication of Ukrainian books, including the New Testament. Aksakov recalled that the authorized Russian translation of the New Testament had the subtitle "In the Russian dialect," which logically meant that the New Testament in the "Little Russian dialect" was quite acceptable as well. In the light of what Aksakov had written before on the relationship between literary Russian and "dialectal Little Russian," his own argument, ripped out of the polemical fervor of the moment, must have seemed to him rather doubtful—after all, he, unlike the church hierarchs, did not consider nineteenth-century Russian to be "just a humble dialect" of Church Slavonic.

However, the most curious part of Aksakov's article was the enclosed letter from Kiev, composed, according to Aksakov, by "one true Little Russian, the inveterate enemy of any separatism."¹⁷ The author remarked that he thought it incorrect to insist on the "exclusive use of Little Russian" in schools, but protested against all restraints imposed on the Little Russian publishing campaign, since he could not understand "how the book can be harmful not in its content but in its form." Intentionally italicized in the original text, this citation, almost word for word taken from Golovnin's letter to Valuev, proves that the author was to be sought not in Kiev but in St. Petersburg. Kostomarov's article was rejected by Nikitenko because of its argument on the language of instruction, and precisely this issue was presented in a new way in the letter from Kiev. This allows for the assumption that Kostomarov was indirectly involved in the creation of this text, or that at least he informed the author of the censor's claims. The letter was concluded with an attempt to formulate, in a rhetorical form, a new and tactically more flexible position on the key question of the time: "What would any Ukrainian peasant say, if a certain ill-wisher told him how indignant Great Russians felt just because some teacher

dared to teach his children grammar and reading from books written in their mother tongue?"¹⁸

Thus, even as late as January 1864, the Ukrainophiles managed to put forward, this time without mentioning names, their critique of Katkov and the circular. This confirms that Valuev never imposed silence on this question and that the banning of Katkov's article was Nikitenko's personal initiative.

The position of the famous censor and memoirist deserves special comment. Nikitenko was a convinced opponent of the Ukrainophiles in the language issue debate: he recalled in his *Dnevnik* that in 1863 he had strongly objected to G. P. Danilevskii, "the ardent preacher of Little Russian separatism and school instruction in the Little Russian dialect."¹⁹ Nikitenko's opposition, however, did not mean hostility towards Little Russia or Little Russian culture. On 16 February 1864, three weeks after Kostomarov's articles were banned and three days before he made the entry on Danilevskii, Nikitenko wrote in *Dnevnik*: "The Petersburg Little Russians decided to stage two plays of Osno-v'ianenko in their language, *Shchira Liubov* and *Svatannia na Goncharivtsi* [...] The acting was really good, a certain Madame Gudima-Levkovich was especially impressive [...] The theater was rather full and, on the whole, it was a success. The performance was given in aid of war-affected families."²⁰ Nikitenko liked everything because this charity initiative was "politically correct" and Little Russian specificity on the St. Petersburg stage did not look like a political demonstration.

In one of his articles from this period Katkov described very accurately the evolution that he and his readers, ordinary citizens and those of rank, had gone through, from the welcoming reception of *Osnova* in 1861 to the hostile anti-Ukrainophile campaign in 1863. "There were times when the Petersburg Ukrainophiles humbly kept their petty journal in order to publish, among other things, Little Russian fairy tales and poems. They trembled at the very thought of being blamed for this innocent and genial pursuit; and now these gentlemen dare to place ten million Russian people in their ward, impose upon them a particular nationality, translate the laws of the Russian Empire and the Holy Scriptures into the newly-fudged language, open public subscriptions to publish Little Russian textbooks and nourish the hope of obtaining official support for the establishment of Little Russian schools, which Little Russian people do not want and only the sworn enemies of Russia may dream of."²¹

Katkov spoke the language of modern European nationalism. "The contrasts and differences between the elements of the German and French nations are more marked than those between Great Russians and Little Russians, these differences are even greater than between Slavic peoples in general. However, neither in France nor in Germany are these differences used as the basis for nonsense theories about two French or two German nationalities and languages. How much courage or how much contempt of common sense should one have in order to talk about the existence of two Russian nationalities and languages!"²² "Already now, when there are still no separate nationalities or languages, we can find people who dare to claim their belonging to a separate nationality. What is going to happen when we really have something, at least distantly, resembling a separate language?"²³ Katkov then pointed out a new danger: "It is likely that soon the Ukrainophiles will be joined by some other *philes*," he remarked, referring to a plan to launch a newspaper in "the Belorussian dialect" in Vilno. For this he blamed liberal Petersburg, "which at any cost strives to fertilize all our jargons and create as many Russian nationalities and languages, as many lands as we are ready to sacrifice."²⁴ The problem of "the strong Russian element" in the western borderland, including Belorussia, was frequently elaborated in the 1860s, but Katkov was the first to detect the potential of Belorussian separatism in direct connection with Ukrainophilism.

It was in his polemic with Kostomarov that Katkov, trying to mobilize society on nationalistic grounds, offered a programmatic thesis of the falsity of the liberal principle, according to which it had always been considered necessary to avoid open confrontation in cases when opponents were threatened with persecution. (It is sufficient to recall here how openly Kulish expressed his views to S. Aksakov.) "Some cunning dodgers have convinced our liberals that their duty of honor demands from them that they shut their eyes at the sight of public lies and evil by using euphemisms. We think it imperative to announce to our opponents, whoever they are, that we are not going to constrain ourselves when unmasking actions that we consider false and harmful."²⁵

It is interesting to see, however, how Katkov explained the reasons for the need for administrative censorship: "If Mr. Kostomarov lived in France, England, or Germany [...] nobody would prohibit him to publish academic and school literature in this language—just because

his initiative would be of no noteworthy meaning [...] Nowhere else but Russia could the idea of instruction in local dialects emerge, and nowhere else is there the necessity to protest against inoffensive [...] manifestations of eccentricity." In Russia, on the contrary, as Katkov argued, "there is a tradition of talking for a long time about the most elementary things as if they were some sophisticated speculative philosophy." Even the government in Russia "consists of people who see many things in completely different ways." In a situation in which "the Ukrainophiles could enjoy the leverage of this or that ministry, why should not those who see the matter in a different way consolidate, as much as possible, their counteraction?"²⁶ Katkov, without doubt, was hinting at Golovnin, whom he considered a conscious enemy of Russia, in complicity with revolutionaries and foreign conspirators.²⁷ Thus, according to Katkov, Valuev was forced to resort to bans in order to neutralize other pro-Ukrainophile institutions. Paradoxically, the most radical heralds of nationalism rightly understood the Valuev Circular as a sign of the weakness of Russian nationalism. No other newspaper supported the Valuev Circular.

★ ★ ★

The circular appeared to be a corollary of the complex bureaucratic process and nationalistic shift in public opinion, predetermined for the most part by the Polish uprising of 1863/1864.

We can evaluate the role of different administrative departments in the evolution of the circular. The war minister, Miliutin, a consistent liberal-nationalist even on the Polish question, initiated the process. (It is worth noting, however, that Sivers's letter, which motivated Miliutin's actions, was inspired by somebody in Kiev.) The Kiev governor-general, Annenkov, and his subordinates, who actively supported the prohibitive measures and devised the argumentation for this resolution, became the levers. The Third Department, initially passive, assumed a coordinating role after the interference of Miliutin and Annenkov. In June this function was taken over by the minister of the interior, who finally signed the circular. The emperor appeared on the stage at least three times, when he was addressed by Miliutin, Dolgorukov and Valuev, each time playing the role of a catalyst. He finally approved the circular. The Holy Synod played second fiddle and succumbed to the imposed plan of action. Vigorous attempts to reverse the circular were undertaken at later stages by Golovnin.

In the press Katkov was the most fervent and consistent adversary of Ukrainophilism. (Katkov's outlook, for all his permanent disagreement with Ukrainophile goals, had dramatically changed from tolerance and readiness to negotiate in 1861, to "the doomed-to-failure cause" in 1862, to aggressive hostility in 1863.) Aksakov and *Den'* were more moderate opponents of Ukrainophilism. In general, the Kiev and Moscow press, traditionally more nationalistic than in Petersburg, occupied a more aggressive position. The liberal press of the northern capital, and primarily *Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti*, backed Kostomarov in his struggle against the circular. Aksakov joined them in 1864, not because he had changed his attitude to the Ukrainophiles but solely because he thought that the repressive measures against the Ukrainophiles went too far and could benefit the Poles.

NOTES

- 1 RGIA, f. 775, op. 1, ed. khr. 188, l. 18.
- 2 RGIA, f. 775, op. 1, ed. khr. 188, l. 15–15ob.
- 3 RGIA, f. 775, op. 1, ed. khr. 188, l. 16.
- 4 P. A. Valuev, *Dnevnik 1877–1884* (Petersburg, 1919), p. 188.
- 5 RGIA, f. 775, op. 1, ed. khr. 205, l. 1–2. The unabridged letter in Russian and English is published in D. Saunders "Mikhail Katkov and Mykola Kostomarov," pp. 378–383.
- 6 *Ibid.*, p. 379.
- 7 *Ibid.*, p. 381.
- 8 RO RNB, f. 208, ed. khr. 105 (memorandum of 19 Nov.), l. 144ob.
- 9 *Ibid.*, l. 145.
- 10 *Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti*, no. 152, 7 July 1863.
- 11 *Den'*, no. 29, 20 July 1862, p. 19.
- 12 *Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti*, no. 171, 1 August 1863.
- 13 GARF, f. 109, op. 1, ed. khr. 1766, l. 2, 2ob.
- 14 A. V. Nikitenko, *Dnevnik*, vol. 2 (Leningrad, 1955), p. 398. In the notes, p. 628, I. Ia. Aizenshtok mentions that this text of Kostomarov was published by Iu. T. Oksman in Odessa in 1921 (N. I. Kostomarov, *Ukrainskii separatizm. Neizvestnye zapreshchennye stranitsy*), but I could not find this edition. The anonymous note in defense of the Ukrainophiles sent by Golovnin to Dolgorukov could have been a revised version of this banned article by Kostomarov.
- 15 I. S. Aksakov, *Sochineniia*, vol. 3, *Pol'skii vopros i zapadno-russkoe delo. Evreiskii vopros. 1860–1886* (St. Petersburg, 1900), pp. 201–202.
- 16 *Ibid.*, p. 205.

17 *Ibid.*, p. 207.

18 *Ibid.*, p. 207.

19 A. V. Nikitenko, *Dnevnik*, vol. 2, p. 409.

20 *Ibid.*

21 M. N. Katkov, "1863 god. Sobranie statei po pol'skomu voprosu, pomeshchavshikhsia v *Moskovskikh Vedomostiakh*, *Russkom vestnike* i *Sovremennoi letopisi*," no. 2 (1887), p. 706. (*Sovremennaia letopis'*, no. 26, 1863).

22 *Ibid.*, p. 695. (*Sovremennaia letopis'*, no. 26, 1863).

23 *Ibid.*, p. 703.

24 *Ibid.*, p. 682. (*Moskovskie vedomosti*, no. 91, 4 Sept. 1863).

25 *Ibid.*, pp. 680–681.

26 *Moskovskie vedomosti*, no. 191, 4 August, 1863.

27 See E. M. Feoktistov, *Vospominaniia*, pp. 130–131.

CHAPTER 6

Government Policy after the Valuev Circular

As noted earlier, the Valuev Circular did not become a milestone in government policy. The authorities were in the process of defining their attitude to Ukrainophilism. In September 1863, aide-de-camp Colonel N. V. Mezentsov was dispatched by the Third Department to “the southern guberniias to research on the spot the developing Little Russian propaganda.”¹ Mezentsov sent his first report from Kharkov and the second from Kiev. Judging from these reports the future chief of gendarmes was to present an overall assessment of Ukrainophilism and reveal its connection with the Polish movement. (Mezentsov had one more important errand, which will be discussed in the following chapter.) Concomitantly, the emperor’s aide-de-camp, Colonel Korf,² duplicated Mezentsov’s mission in the Chernigov guberniia and was instructed to report “everything concerning the guberniia’s interior politics.”³ Korf submitted his report to Alexander II on 23 December 1863.⁴

Osnova, as Mezentsov believed, was the major center of Ukrainophilism. Moreover, he drew a sharp distinction between *Osnova*’s Ukrainophilism and Ukrainophilism in Ukraine. Having enumerated “some obvious symptoms of separatism from a certain part of the society,” such as “wearing national costumes, speaking the Little Russian dialect, and manifesting in commemoration of Shevchenko,” Mezentsov concluded that “these signs of separatism would not be of any threat, if along these lines some talented and influential personalities, like Kulish, Kostomarov, and their accomplices, did not systematically propagate the ideas of Little Russia’s political secession from the rest of the Russian empire.”⁵

In Ukraine the potential centers of Ukrainophilism, in Mezentsov’s opinion, were Kiev and Kharkov, being university cities. Mezentsov saw a certain difficulty for the development of Ukrainophilism in

Kharkov in the absence of “old Little Russian Cossack tradition.” However, he managed to discover in Kharkov a “small Little Russian party,” which included, among others, some university professors.⁶ Already in his first report from Kharkov Mezentsov mentioned the Poles “who dream about the unification of Little Russia’s fate with the restored Poland.” Upon a more attentive scrutiny of the situation in Kiev, Mezentsov came to the conclusion that Ukrainophiles were split in their opinions with regard to the Polish movement. “Progressive Little Russians are divided into two camps; most of them, by virtue of age-old hostility to Polonism, have become more moderate in their claims, only keeping strong insistence on the realization of young Little Russia’s dream—the introduction of primary instruction in popular schools in Little Russian; [...] the remaining minority, though demonstrating a more distinct inclination to separatism, are still perplexed as to what means should be used to attain this goal; at the back of their mind they harbor a hope to side, in the last resort, with the Poles, who are always ready to make all possible efforts to win over Little Russian separatists.”⁷ (The image of youth was used by most modern nationalist movements, and the notion “young Little Russia” used by Mezentsov was very symptomatic: Mezentsov translated Ukrainophilism from the category of “survivors from the past” and remnants of the regional separatism of the old elites to where it belonged in reality, namely to modern nationalism.)⁸

Concerning the anti-Polish-minded Ukrainophiles, Mezentsov strongly recommended refraining from “unreasonable and dangerous political penalties.” He suggested that these people should be influenced by “the power of the printed word,” including local periodicals, “which have so indignantly reacted to the separatist aspirations of Kulish, Kostomarov, and their followers.” He proposed “driving out the pro-Polish Ukrainophile leaders from the field of their activity.” This meant either exile to inner provinces or job dismissals, since A. I. Stoianov and A. A. Gatsuk, who were mentioned by Mezentsov, were gymnasium and lyceum teachers.⁹ In general, Mezentsov concluded that “Little Russian propaganda can be dangerous only in combination with Polonism, which is highly improbable. Until we have more obvious symptoms of this alliance, we have to temporize by employing close surveillance, the more so since the Polish element in the region is trying to ‘distort’ the ideas of the *khlopomany* in order to provoke the government to a coercive reaction and a final rupture

between the administration and the Little Russian faction and to force the latter to seek union with Poland.”¹⁰ Thus Mezentsov was against anti-Ukrainophile repression, as something that would play into Polish hands. For him, the Little Russian party was an object of contention between Russia and Poland and a potential ally against the Polish movement. The concluding phrase from his last report was a response to the anti-Ukrainophile campaign, provoked by Katkov’s articles and shared by some people in government circles: “The belief that this question in the region is primarily under the Polish influence is ungrounded.”¹¹

Korf similarly appealed for the application of “tolerant measures in Little Russia.” First, he explained this by the “absence of the very necessity to be strict,” because Ukrainophiles, unlike Poles, did not demonstrate “inveterate hatred” towards Russia. Korf described the Great/Little Russian relationship as the relationship “between two brothers,” being apparently among the first to use this subsequently famous metaphor.¹² Second, Korf emphasized the inefficiency of repression which, unable completely to curtail the movement, would only provide it with the banner of martyrs and “innocent victims.”¹³ In his evaluation of Ukrainophile plans and perspectives Korf was more perspicacious than Mezentsov. He clearly stated that the success of the Ukrainophile “language program,” irrespective of the subjective attitudes and moods of the movement participants, would logically lead to “Little Russia’s cession from Russia.”¹⁴ “The Polish factor” in Korf’s report was not emphasized.

Mezentsov’s reports contained two important theses, later adopted in government policy. First, Mezentsov, in his recommendations on appropriate forms of punishment, in fact reproduced the logic of Nicholas I and the chief of gendarmes, A. F. Orlov, in the Cyril–Methodius Society affair. All members of the Society were exiled to the distant guberniias of Russia’s European part and provided with positions in government service.¹⁵ By the time Mezentsov wrote his reports, nearly twenty Ukrainophile activists had been detained. To investigate their cases the tsar authorized the establishment of the Special Committee of Inquiry chaired by Prince A. F. Golitsyn.¹⁶ Seven detainees from Poltava and Chernigov were accused of “active participation in the formation of circles (*kruzhenki*), where, in the guise of literacy missionaries, they incited the *narod* against the government in order to separate Little Russia.”¹⁷ They were all exiled in 1863 with

the same privileges as their predecessors. Some of them made a good career. Thus the first defendant, a teacher from Poltava, A. I. Stronin, ended his career in Petersburg as a member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Communications. The four arrested in Poltava were of special interest. One of them, Vladimir Sinegub, a student at Kiev University, immediately disclosed his membership of a certain "Kiev Society of Little Russian Propagandists."¹⁸ He also talked about the Society's connection with the Poles and provided investigators with many names. Although this evidence aroused distrust even among local investigators, in January 1864 the suspects were delivered to the capital for a more detailed interrogation. Finally it was proved that Sinegub's testimony was more fiction than fact. His friends were released but Sinegub was exiled to Viatka "with a position provided."¹⁹ Chubinskii and Konisskii suffered the same punishment.²⁰

A six-year-long exile to Arkhangel'sk or Viatka for propaganda for Little Russian Sunday schools was too cruel a punishment for there to be any doubt about the repressive character of the regime. However, the authorities had at their disposal far more severe punitive measures. In 1865, for example, the Omsk police discovered a secret society of Siberian separatists, who propagated the creation of an independent state on the territory from the Urals to the Pacific. The "*corpus delicti*" in this case was not essentially dissimilar from that of the exiled Ukrainophiles. In 1868 the Senate sentenced the leaders of the society, G. N. Potanin and A. N. Iadrntsev, to fifteen years' hard labor and ten years' imprisonment respectively.²¹ Dragomanov later wrote that the punishment for the Russian nihilists had been far more brutal than the sanctions against the Ukrainophiles.²² Obviously the government granted the Ukrainophiles some time to "change their minds." The slackening of political tension in the second half of the 1860s changed the fate of the exiled Ukrainophiles. Konisskii was allowed to travel abroad in as early as 1865 and in 1866 he had already returned to Ukraine.²³ Others were released in the late 1860s.²⁴

The second significant thesis in Mezentsov's reports concerned the possibility of exploiting, as the government interests dictated, "the innate historic hostility of the Ukrainians to Polonism." Before 1863, the government often cut short Ukrainophile attacks on the Poles. Such was the case when Vasil'chikov satisfied the demands of the Poles to withdraw the anti-Polish fragments from Kulish's *Gramatka*, and

when the censors suspended the publication of Kostomarov's article in *Osnova*, criticizing the Krakow newspaper *Chas*.²⁵ In the late 1860s the situation was slowly changing. Soon this thesis was developed further.

Senator A. A. Polovtsov, who communicated with Galagan in the early 1880s, recalled in his 1880 diary entry the story told by Galagan about his meeting with the tsar in 1863. Galagan sent his colleague from the Editing Commission, Iu. F. Samarin, one of the would-be leaders of peasant reforms in the Polish Kingdom, a plan of the offensive against the influence of the Polish landowners in the western borderland. Via Valuev, Samarin submitted this note to the tsar, and the latter invited Galagan for a conversation. "The emperor agreed to everything Galagan was saying, hesitant, however, to advance his own opinion. Finally he said: 'Look, Galagan, many people reproach you for being a Ukrainophile.' Galagan answered: 'I love my motherland and the region I was born to.' 'Yes, but among Ukrainophiles there are those who dream of separatism. They should not to be trusted in your mission.'" Later during the conversation, as Polovtsov recalls, they agreed that they would not be able to do without local assistants, and thus "a certain number of those suspected of Ukrainophilism have to be allowed in."²⁶ This episode demonstrates that even in the 1860s the government was able to find suitable mediators among rich Little Russian nobles to contact Ukrainophiles.

Galagan's story shows how the hierarchy of enemies looked in the tsar's perception. His reluctant permission to accept Ukrainophiles into administrative decision making untied the hands of Samarin and V. A. Cherkasskii in the Polish Kingdom. In as early as 1864 Cherkasskii, appointed director general of the State Interior Committee of the Polish Kingdom, invited Kulish and Belozerskii to hold two important positions in Warsaw.

Kostomarov was persistently but unsuccessfully invited to join his colleagues in Warsaw. In 1864 he was awarded the degree of Doctor Honoris Causa from Kiev University. With this, the authorities confirmed his status as *persona grata*. N. A. Miliutin personally discussed with Kostomarov his possible move to Warsaw.²⁷ (The authorities, however, had a different opinion about Kostomarov's possible activity in Ukraine and later, under the instruction of the Ministry of the Interior, he had to decline chairs offered to him in Kiev and

Kharkov.) Kulish, with all his proverbial enthusiasm, invited Kostomarov to Warsaw: "Please, come and let us triumph over the *szlachta* who so often used to despise our rights!"²⁸

Kulish's letter to Kostomarov betrays the changes that the author went through as a result of the Warsaw background and his good allowance. "That our government party does not always consist of the best Russian people is only natural [...] But everything that has been done so far has been done by *this party*, it is *this party* that deserves the respect of the whole nation; the future of the Russian world depends on the activity of *this party* [...] I know that the opposition will bring its benefits and that without opposition the government would not have done what it has done. But of course, you know which side to ally yourself with, do you not? On one side lies a historically justified creative force, and on the other—chaotic ferment [...] By helping the latter you will teach it to trust the noblest minds and it will yield to the spirit of time sooner than to the pressure of opposition. Moreover, we will have to fight a common enemy. The Polish intelligentsia is still sure that only the government is against its autonomy. It should be argued out of this delusion by people such as you siding with the government."²⁹ This tirade was not the mood of the moment. A year later Kulish wrote to A. A. Gatsuk:³⁰ "Let the Muscovites run Russian business in a Muscovite way. History has proved that without the Muscovite way of doing things the Slavs would not have had as much land as they have now. The time will come when the Russian cause will not be conducted in the Muscovite way, but until then it is of no avail to try snatching the cudgel out of Hercules's hands. As to the outrageous things happening around us, they are inevitable in the chaos into which the Slavic world in general and the Russian world in particular are swirled. But being angry with lice, you do not throw your furs into the fire!"³¹ Even here Kulish is too critical of the government for the assumption to be made that these letters were written as a demonstration of loyalty in the event of perlustration (which, however, took place). But now he was ready to cooperate with the authorities and considered this cooperation possible. The Kulish of 1865 would never have written the 1858 letter to Aksakov.

Kulish's opinion on the language issue also underwent interesting transformations. Early in 1863, after the closure of *Osnova*, Kulish, searching for new funds, wrote the following to the Kharkov merchant millionaire A. K. Al'chevskii:³² "Indeed, a provincial journal in our

country can hardly survive and remain independent. We should guide our readers from the center of enlightenment and administration. We have to publish our periodical in the capital. We have to cooperate with the financially independent and ideologically influential rather than with the humble and illiterate [...] You might guess that I do not mean the Ukrainian journal proper, but the journal for Ukrainians or Southern Russians. The Ukrainian literary language and Ukrainian political independence is another problem that will take centuries to solve. The point is that, for all our love for the native idiom, we should put it into the background and write in the language we all possess and all our readers understand [...] This new journal is to abound with intelligent articles in the All-Russian language so that it can compensate Ukrainians for any of the Great Russian periodicals. If we only make our journal a vital necessity for all Southern readers we will achieve, as a nation, literary autonomy even without the Ukrainian language.”³³ This piece reveals Kulish’s disillusionment as to the prompt success of the Ukrainian movement that had inspired many Ukrainophiles in the early 1860s, and a significant shift in priorities—the move from propaganda for peasants to that for intellectuals, as well as the final recognition of the fact that the All-Russian language was the language that both Ukrainophiles and their readers “possessed and understood.” Kulish therefore did not now see in linguistic emancipation the major weapon of national struggle but a distant, probably “for ages” unattainable, goal.

The idea of inviting Ukrainophiles and other “unreliables” to the Polish Kingdom was not Cherkasskii’s personal initiative,³⁴ but rather a semi-official state policy. This is how Dragomanov, then a teacher at the second Kiev gymnasium, recalls being invited in 1864 to Warsaw by Viluev, gymnasium director and trustee of all the schools in the Warsaw guberniia: “How can you invite me to Warsaw after having publicly denounced me as a ‘nihilist’? I will not make a good tamer of Poland!” Viluev enthusiastically retorted: “This is exactly the reason I have chosen you, because you are a nihilist, of course, not in the vulgar sense of the word. You are a rationalist and a democrat, and we do need such people in Poland [Viluev liked to sound like a statesman]. There we do not fight Polish nationality but clericalism and aristocracy.”³⁵

Valuev would hardly agree with the explanations of his near namesake. He believed that the anti-Polonist and anti-aristocratic orien-

tation of the Ukrainophiles should not be taken for signs of loyalty. Before going on the inspection trip to the Kiev governorate, Valuev formulated his tasks in a memorandum to the tsar: "Concerning the nationality question, attention should be paid to the cause of Little Russian separatism, lest the Ukrainophiles, under the disguise of patriotic counteraction to Polonism, incite the masses against the Great Russian state principle of Russia's unity."³⁶ Kulish, Belozerskii, and other prominent Ukrainophiles were still shadowed at the end of the 1860s.³⁷

In his reports Mezentsov insisted on keeping in force the ban on instruction in Ukrainian, permitting the use of Little Russian "only for the explanation of some unknown words."³⁸ The Valuev Circular, according to Mezentsov, should have been preserved as a permanent measure. Korf was of the same opinion, although his perception of the problem was considerably deeper. Like Mezentsov, Korf considered the Ukrainophile influence to be very limited, but nevertheless called for an immediate anti-Ukrainophile offensive. (The tsar agreed, writing in the margin "essential."³⁹) Considering the anti-Ukrainophile measures, Korf recommended "beating the Ukrainophiles with their own weapon" and countering the spread of Little Russian literacy by disseminating Russian literacy.⁴⁰ He proposed "flooding the region with the cheapest *Russian* books," including the publication of cheap books for the *narod* at public expense, granting private publishers the right to free delivery of books to Little Russia (delivery expenses sometimes exceeded those of production⁴¹), and authorizing the governors of Little Russian guberniias to contribute fully to the success of the program. An edition of ten thousand copies of a primer, the minimum Korf proposed as a beginning, at a price of two kopeks per issue, allowed for the covering of all production costs. (If the Ukrainophiles, in as early as 1861, despite the scantiness of their financial resources, could afford to produce six thousand primers for Metropolitan Arsenii, Korf's plans were more than affordable for the budget of the Russian Empire.) Korf maintained that the availability of less expensive Russian books would make administrative bans redundant. In the long run, Korf believed, it would deprive Little Russian literature of the slightest chance of enlarging its audience.⁴² Alexander II approved Korf's plans, writing on the margins: "Makes sense. Quite good idea. Should be developed."

Korf comprehensively articulated the core of the problem and for-

mulated the assimilation approach for its solution. "The *narod*, being in the very inception of its development, will easily obey and yield to everyone able and willing to enlighten it."⁴³ The conditions of the time, so Korf thought, were most propitious for the successful realization of the project. "At present, Little Russians feel their bond to Russia through the tsars and religious kinship, but this kinship will become even stronger, even more indissoluble [...] The road to this unity is paved with rails and sleepers. Together with goods along this railroad travel books, thoughts, customs and ideas [...] The capitals, views, thoughts, and traditions of Great and Little Russians will mingle, and these two peoples, already so close to each other, will fuse into one. So let the Ukrainophiles preach, even through the seething poems of Shevchenko, about Ukraine, her struggle for independence, and the good old days of the Hetmanate."⁴⁴ Korf recalled that the migration of the workforce could also serve as an instrument of assimilation, referring to the factories of the merchant N. Tereshchenko,⁴⁵ where two-thirds of the five thousand workers were Great Russians.⁴⁶ Korf found it necessary to oppose any plans for Little Russia's institutionalization, by mentioning the then widely circulated rumors about the establishment of a Little Russian governorate and the position of the district military chief in Little Russia.⁴⁷ Korf's position, founded on an understanding of the mechanisms of nation building and free from ideological blinkers, was sober and well considered. Besides, it demanded a fair amount of courage to claim in a report for Alexander II that railway communication was a more effective tool of national unification than loyalty to the tsar.

The closure of *Osnova*, the Valuev Circular, the exile of some Ukrainophiles, the recruitment of others to government service in Poland, and the dissolution of the Kiev Hromada—all these factors finally led to what Dragomanov called an "interlude" in the development of the Ukrainian national movement. In 1864 only twelve Ukrainian books were printed in the Empire, in 1865 five, and in 1866 none, followed by only two books during the three subsequent years. Thus, during the post-circular decade, the number of Ukrainian publications was the same as in 1862.⁴⁸ Dragomanov believed that the reason for this recession was not only the repression but also the inability of Ukrainophiles to make use of the niches that the circular left open. "It must be admitted that Ukrainophilism appeared to be the weakest and the most slow-witted of all liberal movements in Russia," wrote

Dragomanov, of course not without a certain element of polemical exaggeration.⁴⁹

It did not mean, however, that Petersburg considered the Ukrainian question solved. It remains to clarify how effectively the authorities were able to use this interlude to promote the Russification program, presupposed in Valuev's reflections on a "light" force, clearly formulated by Korf and approved by Alexander II.

NOTES

- 1 See F. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, p. 193. Savchenko's surprise concerning the duration of Mezentsov's trip (after the Valuev circular) was due to his unawareness of the circular's provisional nature.
- 2 Unfortunately, the available documents do not tell us whether it was Andrei Nikolaevich or Ivan Nikolaevich Korf—both brothers were colonels in 1863.
- 3 RGIA, f. 733, op. 193 (1863), ed. khr. 86, l. 11. I acknowledge my debt here to Ricarda Vulpius, who kindly mentioned this document to me.
- 4 *Ibid.*, l. 21.
- 5 RGIA, f. 776, op. 11, ed. khr. 61, 28–28ob.
- 6 It must have been this data that Golovnin tried to refute at the end of 1863. Referring to the results of his own investigation, he was trying to prove to the tsar that the Third Department's agents were unreliable. Naturally Mezentsov, who succeeded Dolgorukov as chief of gendarmes in 1866, enjoyed Alexander's confidence in investigation matters more than the minister of education.
- 7 RGIA, f. 776, op. 11, ed. khr. 61, l. 30ob–31.
- 8 On the movements *Young Italy, Young Germany, Young Poland*, and others see E. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution, Europe 1789–1948* (London, 1962), pp. 164–165.
- 9 F. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, p. 197.
- 10 *Ibid.*, p. 198.
- 11 *Ibid.*
- 12 RGIA, f. 733, op. 193 (1863), ed. khr. 86, l. 14ob, 17ob, 21.
- 13 *Ibid.*, l. 21.
- 14 *Ibid.*, l. 14ob.
- 15 Kostomarov, for example, on the personal order of Nicholas I, was exiled to Saratov with its mild climate instead of Viatka, the initial exile destination. His allowance at Kiev University was left to his mother. Kostomarov was allotted three hundred rubles to cover traveling expenses (a considerable sum at that time). The Saratov governor was sent an official reference to guarantee Kostomarov a decent post in the guberniia administration. See N. Kostomarov,

- Avtobiografia*, and Dimitri von Mohrenschild, *Toward a United States of Russia. Plans and Projects for the Federal Reconstruction of Russia in the Nineteenth Century* (Rutherford, Madison, Fairleigh, 1981), p. 51. The cruelty of Shevchenko's punishment can be explained by the fact that his behavior—not only his membership of the Society but also some of his insulting poems—was taken by Nicholas I as a “*kholop*” offense, the more so since the emperor had personally made efforts to secure Shevchenko's freedom from serfdom. Compared to Petrashevtsy, who was sentenced to years-long hard labor, the exiled Ukrainophiles drew a “privileged ticket.”
- 16 RGIA, f. 1282, op. 1, ed. khr. 162; P. Gurevich, “Delo o rasprostraneniі malorossiiskoi propagandy,” *Byloe*, no. 7 (1907).
- 17 *Ibid.*, p. 169.
- 18 RGIA, f. 1282, op. 1, ed. khr 162, l. 3ob.
- 19 *Ibid.*
- 20 We can learn about the financial state of P. Chubinskii in exile from his father's letter of 10 May 1863, in which he thanked his son for having sent him fifty rubles. F. Savchenko, “Listi P. P. Chubin'skogo do Ia. P. Polon'skogo (1860–1874),” *Za sto lit*, no. 6 (1930), p. 139. (Kharkov, Kiev.)
- 21 See Dimitri Von Mohrenschild, *Toward a United States of Russia...*, pp. 104–105; I. Popov, “Iz vospominanii o G. N. Potanine,” *Golos minuvshogo*, no. 1 (1922), p. 141. Later the sentences were mitigated, but Potanin did serve his five years in Sveaborg.
- 22 M. Dragomanov, “Antrakt z istoriі ukrainofil'stva (1863–1872),” in M. P. Dragomanov, *Vibrane* (Kiev: Libid', 1991), p. 220.
- 23 AVPRI, f. 155, op. 241, ed. khr. 1.
- 24 Chubinskii's dossier in the Third Department shows that he was helped not only by literati from the capital, but also by some high officials, for example successive Arkhangel'sk governors. On the whole, as far as it can be judged from the extant documents, the attitude of the administration towards Ukrainophiles was rather benevolent.
- 25 RGIA, f. 772, op. 1, p. 2, 1861, ed. khr. 5603.
- 26 GARF, f. 583, op. 1, ed. khr. 18, l. 170–171. *Dnevnik A. A. Polovtsova*, entry of 6 February 1881.
- 27 RO RNB, f. 385, ed. khr. 13. l. 1. Letter of A. O. Gil'ferding to Kostomarov, 26 December 1865, to say that Miliutin, who had just returned from Warsaw, required an urgent meeting with Kostomarov.
- 28 GARF, Secret Archive, f. 109, op. 1, d. khr. 1767, l. 2ob. Letter from Kulish to Kostomarov, 5 January 1866.
- 29 GARF, f. 109, op. 1, ed. khr. 1767, l. 1, 1ob.
- 30 A. A. Gatsuk was a teacher at the Richelieu Lyceum. Mezentsov placed him among those Ukrainophiles who allowed the possibility of concluding an alliance with the Poles. See F. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, p. 197.

- 31 GARF, f. 109, op. 1, ed. khr. 1769, l. 2ob.
- 32 The views of the Al'chevskii family can be judged from one episode with his wife, Kristina Al'chevskaia, who ran a school. She used to wear national costume on holidays and sing national Ukrainian songs, but when a pro-Ukrainophile teacher, B. Grinchenko, took up the teaching of Ukrainian from Ukrainian textbooks, she immediately dismissed him. S. Rusova, "Moi spomini (1879–1915)," *Za sto lit* 1 (1928), p. 172. See also S. Yekelchuk, "The Body and National Myth: Motifs from the Ukrainian National Revival in the Nineteenth Century," *Australian Slavonic and East European Studies*, no. 2 (1993), p. 45. This position was rather typical for certain rich people with Little Russian identity.
- 33 Letter of 28 February 1863. Here from N. A. Ship, "Ukraïns'kii natsional'no-kul'turnii rukh v umovakh antiukraïns'koi politiki rosiis'kogo tsarizmu," in V. G. Sarbei, ed., *Narisi z istorii ukraïns'kogo natsional'nogo rukhu* (Kiev, 1994), pp. 79–80.
- 34 On Cherkasskii's policy in the Polish Kingdom see A. I. Koshelev, *Zapiski Kosheleva* (Moscow, 1991), pp. 127–152.
- 35 M. Dragomanov, "Dva uchiteli," in idem, *Vibrane*, pp. 581–582. Dragomanov did not accept the invitation but recommended to Viluev his beloved teacher K. I. Polevich, who went to Warsaw.
- 36 RGIA, f. 908, op. 1, ed. khr. 231, l. 4ob.
- 37 GARF, f. 109, op. 1, ed. khr. 1769, 1770, 1771.
- 38 F. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, p. 197.
- 39 RGIA, f. 733, op. 193 (1863), ed. khr. 86, l. 16.
- 40 *Ibid.*, l. 18.
- 41 *Ibid.*, l. 18.
- 42 *Ibid.*, l. 18–19.
- 43 *Ibid.*, l. 12ob.
- 44 *Ibid.*, l. 20. It is worth noting that in 1865 Katkov, when presenting the immediate tasks of the Russification measures in the western borderland, also underlined the primary importance of the railway connection between the Volga and the Dnieper basins. See M. N. Katkov, *Sobranie peredovykh statei "Moskovskikh vedomostei"* (Moscow, 1865), p. 757.
- 45 The fate of the merchant's family is quite interesting. M. I. Tereshchenko, the grandson of the above-mentioned Little Russian merchant Mykola Tereshchenko, became minister of finance and later minister of the interior in the Provisional Government, was an ardent proponent of the war until victory, and after 1917 was one of the leaders of Russian, and not of Ukrainian, emigration.
- 46 RGIA, f. 733, op. 193 (1863), ed. khr. 86, l. 20ob.
- 47 *Ibid.*, l. 19–19ob.
- 48 See O. I. Dei, *Kniga i drukarstvo*, p. 134; and N. A. Ship, *Ukraïns'kii natsional'no-kul'turnii*, p. 82.
- 49 M. Dragomanov, "Antrakt z istorii," pp. 219–220.

Strengthening the Russian Assimilation Potential in the Western Borderland

If Valuev's logic has been reconstructed correctly, the circular should have become only an administrative shelter to protect the Russification program from competitive Ukrainian nationalists. Therefore, to assess the adequacy and efficacy of the Valuev Circular as an administrative measure, it is important to analyze attentively what steps the government undertook, or at least planned to undertake, in order to "Russify" the western and southwestern region and to increase Russian assimilation potential.

The first memoranda from high-ranking local administrators on the policy implementation were sent to Petersburg in as early as 1861. The earliest project of the kind that immediately attracted Valuev's attention was presented by the Podol'sk civil governor, R. I. Braunschweig, on 4 June 1861. "After observing the region for three years, I came to the conviction that the only way to secure peace and protect the region from political tumult is to develop the Russian element and make it dominant not only within the administration but in all walks of popular life, in the masses, which are akin to the Russians by religion and origin, and ill-disposed, even hostile, to the Poles."¹ What strikes the eye is that Braunschweig calls a spade a spade as he defined the local population as one only "akin to the Russians," hence not limiting the scope of the policy to the undermining of the Polish influence. His suggestion "to open village schools on the landowners' estates and Sunday schools in towns" as well as to promote the establishment of the Kamenets-Podol'sk theater, revealed a distinct assimilatory direction of the program.

The Western Committee began holding sessions in Petersburg from November 1862. Valuev prepared a special "Study of the Russification Strategies in the Western Borderland" (*Ocherk o sredstvakh obruseniia Zapadnogo Kraia*) and in December 1862 sent the tsar a

memorandum with its main theses. His program, like all programs of this kind, focused on two particular goals. The first presupposed the creation of a privileged Russian stratum to counterbalance the absolute dominance of the *szlachta*. This was to be implemented by broadening Russian landownership in the region and increasing the number of the Russian gentry. After the beginning of the Polish uprising the government was more and more determined to resort to crude methods, including the introduction of certain property restrictions for the Poles. Attempts to materialize this part of the project date mainly to the period after the 1863/4 insurrection. The estates of the participants in the uprising were subject to confiscation. All Polish landowners were liable to a special 10 percent tax, officially to cover the damage caused by the uprising. They were also forbidden to buy land in the western region and to sell it to anyone of non-Orthodox creed. As Beauvois thoroughly explained, the modest success of this policy was predetermined by the excessive corruption of local officials.² Even the transfer of the western lands to the Russian gentry could not produce the desired results. In Great Russian guberniias the gentry made up only 0.76 percent of the population, a considerably smaller proportion even compared with the percentage in England, France, Austria, and Prussia, where the gentry traditionally did not exceed more than 1.5 percent. In the Polish Commonwealth, including the Right-Bank territories, this number amounted to more than 5 percent.³ However, the main problem was not the insignificant number of Russian landowners but their weak assimilation potential. Most of the Russian nobles were too poor to procure land at real prices. A significant number of the estates, supposedly transferred into Russian hands, were bought cheaply by the officials. As a result, a typical feature of the Russian nobility—absenteeism from estates—became even more pronounced among those nobles who bought land in the southwestern region. Thus, the assimilation potential of the poor, scattered Russian gentry, with a weakly developed corporate spirit,⁴ could hardly outweigh the dominance of the age-old Polish *szlachta*, united by the common cause of resistance to those measures of the imperial government that violated the property rights of the Polish landowners. Given this, the proposal of the Vilno governor-general V. I. Nazimov to populate the confiscated lands with “a more appropriate material from the low strata” seemed more viable.⁵ However, this idea could not be buoyed in Petersburg—the court and the majority of the ministers kept, even after the Eman-

cipation, to old conservative–aristocratic views, inherited from the vanished epoch of the Holy Alliance.

As a result, even in 1910, when the government finally decided to introduce zemstvo (local self-government) reforms in the western borderland, P. A. Stolypin had to argue for “special statutes of zemstvo election” in this part of the empire in order “to protect the rights of the economically weak Russian majority from the economically and culturally strong Polish minority.”⁶

The second important constituent of the Russification program—peasant policy—is the most interesting since it was a matter of contention among Russian, Polish, and Ukrainian nationalists. In his report to the tsar Valuev honestly admitted: “To achieve our goals, we have used only one strategy—force in all possible manifestations. Only two other measures turned out to be organic—the unification of the Uniates in the past and the Emancipation in the present.”⁷

Valuev believed that after the Emancipation the popular education problem should have gained priority. “It is imperative to establish village schools so that they not only maintain but also disseminate the Russian nationality in the region. However, extremely little has been done so far and even this insignificant progress was due exclusively to the efforts of the Orthodox clergy. To be more successful we have to conduct our business on a large scale, following energetically a detailed and systematic plan of action.”⁸

This extract deserves a thorough examination as it implicitly touches on two important questions. First, Valuev tried to remind the tsar of the problem of the indeterminate national identity of the peasants in the region. Valuev’s opinion that “village schools should not only help maintain but also disseminate the Russian nationality” can be explained, if necessary, by the fact that he referred to Lithuanian peasants. However, the report contains more phrases of the sort that, although leaving room for different interpretations, can hardly be treated in this text as accidental. The addressee of this report rightly sensed this ambiguity and, as if answering the silent question, noted next to the title “Russification Strategies in the Western Borderland”—“Should be applied to the gentry and urban population in these guberniias.” In other words, in 1862 Alexander II was not yet ready to give away the official concept of the “natural” Russianness of Belorussian and Little Russian peasants.

Second, Valuev’s reflections overtly confronted Golovnin and his

plans. In 1862 much of Valuev's time and energy was taken up with blocking the project on the development of popular schools proposed by Golovnin. The minister of education was promoting ideas launched as early as 1859 by the liberal trustee of the Kiev educational district and prominent surgeon N. I. Pirogov and supported by the Kiev governor-general Prince Vasil'chikov. Pirogov proposed to "recruit teachers from young peasants who during two years can master the literacy basics in special pedagogical schools for peasants."⁹ Back then the Synod attacked this idea, demanding that primary instruction be left under the patronage of the clergy. In 1860 the tsar took the side of the Synod and authorized primary instruction by parish priests. According to the official data, by the start of 1862 four thousand parish schools—three thousand of which were built in 1860 and 1861—taught more than sixty thousand students.¹⁰ Still, this figure might have been forged, as had always been the case in Russia. Dragomanov wrote that during the bishop's inspection the schools used to share the same exemplary "display" students.¹¹ The quality of instruction in these schools, which remained very much unchanged since the eighteenth century and included the basics of reading and writing in Russian and Old Slavonic (the latter was often taught first), was an object of shame and derision throughout the empire. Even Korf, having mentioned in his 1863 report to the tsar the potential assimilatory role of the clergy, did not want to elaborate on this problem further and only mentioned that "until the life of the clergy is improved, very little can be said about it."¹²

In January 1862 Vasil'chikov resumed his labors for the creation of pedagogical schools for peasants. Golovnin, actively supporting Vasil'chikov, obtained the tsar's permission to leave old schools to the church and build new ones under the auspices of the Ministry of Education, and the same year the Kiev provisional pedagogical school admitted its first students. In as early as June 1862 Golovnin drafted the statutes of the "Literacy and Orthodoxy Dissemination Society in the Guberniias of the Kiev Educational District." Golovnin and Vasil'chikov planned to fund the schools from the income of 157 farms, owned by the state in the Kiev, Volyn', and Podolia guberniias. In May 1862, after long and unsuccessful attempts to gain permission from the minister of finance M. Kh. Reiter, Vasil'chikov made a request to Valuev. The reply of the latter on 20 September was a genuine bureaucratic masterpiece: "Without doubt, I have to decline the project [...] since the direct revenue assignment from one ministry to another does

not correspond to the essential principles of the state estimates and accounts system.”¹³

Valuev acted in close cooperation with the local church hierarchs, who tried to prove that “pedagogical schools may unfavorably impact on parish schools” since “the priests teaching in these schools almost without any remuneration, will lose their moral vigor and enthusiasm if they see that the same labor is generously paid in the ME schools.”¹⁴ In his report to the tsar Valuev directly insisted on leaving primary schools under the control of the church. Also directed against Golovnin was Valuev’s proposal to curtail additional funding for universities and other institutions in the region. Valuev regarded universities as a breeding ground for potential political unrelia- bles, whereas Golovnin looked forward to filling in the scarce ranks of officials and teachers with new professionals. He even proposed increasing the number of state scholarships in return for graduates’ obligatory employment in public schools for six or more years after graduation.¹⁵

The personnel problem in the western borderland was indeed thorny. A memorandum by the Ministry of Education official E. V. Tsekhanovskii provides, for instance, the following figures: out of all service estates in the European part of the Russian Empire, which amounted to 720 thousand, the Poles made up 346 thousand or 48 percent.¹⁶ In the western borderland their dominance was unquestionable. In the early 1860s in the southwestern region alone there were more than 1.5 thousand Polish officials.¹⁷ Even after 1863 Poles could be found among the directors of chancelleries of local governors. They often reprimanded their subordinates for not speaking Polish, which was a usual language of communication among most of the officials.¹⁸

The ratio of officials to the population as a whole on the territory of modern Ukraine at the end of the nineteenth century (1:1642) was the same as in the French colonies (1:1063 in Indochina and 1:1903 in Algeria), and could not be in any way compared with other European powers (1:141 in Great Britain, France, and Germany, and 1:198 in Austria). The traditional image of an omnipresent superbureaucratic centralized autocracy belied in reality a weak, underdeveloped administrative system. The author of the above-mentioned calculations, S. Velychenko, sees a direct correlation between the vulnerability of the administrative control and the activity of the Ukrainian national movement: it is not surprising that in the Poltava guberniia, the place

of origin of 27 percent of Ukrainophile activists, the ratio of officials to the population as a whole was the lowest (1: 2096).¹⁹

Attempts by the authorities to replace with Russians if not all gymnasium teachers in the western and southwestern borderland, then at least history teachers, fell short of expectations due to the catastrophic shortage of professionals. For example, the February 1857 instruction to the trustees of the Kiev and Vilno educational districts included a telling proviso: "The posts of history teachers in gymnasia and *uezd* schools should be replaced exclusively by Russians. Should it be impossible to find adequate Russian candidates, the vacancies are to be temporarily offered to local teachers."²⁰ (Interestingly, the instruction concerned only thirty positions.)

Valuev was well aware of this data. He also knew far too well that the quality of parish education was poor and it could not be essentially improved. This was confirmed by reality—in as late as 1881 a moderate-minded Russian landowner and zemstvo member, V. I. Albrand, wrote in a memorandum for the senate inspection of A. A. Polovtsev: "Parish schools exist only for the sake of appearance, they are nothing else but children's 'prisons'."²¹ Valuev also understood what A. Ivanov wrote in *Russkii vestnik* in as early as May 1863: Parish schools would be doomed to failure in the competition with Ukrainophile schools, should such competition be allowed.

Why then did Valuev bar Golovnin's projects? To a significant degree his actions may be explained by narrow departmental interests. It was in 1862 that Valuev was trying to obtain (and in 1863 that he did obtain) permission to transfer censorship from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education to the Ministry of the Interior. Thus, any pretext that could undermine the tsar's trust in Golovnin was shrewdly used. Valuev considered Golovnin to be a serious and dangerous opponent. In his diary at the end of 1861 Valuev characterized him as "a clever, cold, egoistic, pragmatic, and unpleasant type of a person."²² Valuev himself was not free from the sin he lamented over in his report to the tsar—the dissonance among different branches of central and local administration and their frequent and conscious action against one another. Alexander II understood the expediency of this problem very well. Following Valuev's words "The success is impossible in the condition of radical difference of views and lack of cooperation between the Ministry of the Interior and the governor-generals" the tsar noted: "That is the reason why I have authorized the Western Committee."²³

The committee, however, quite in the tradition of the Russian bureaucracy, proved to be short lived. Its activity soon degenerated into a sequence of conflicts and intrigues among its members. The dimension of the problem was so noticeable that in 1865 Alexander II found it necessary to reprimand the council of ministers by reminding them about the “commitment to cooperate in common administrative matters” and that “each of them occupies his post by virtue of royal trust and should cooperate with others at least out of respect for the tsar.”²⁴ D. Miliutin worded the verdict to the Western Committee: “This committee, like many others in Russia, suffered from idle talking. Not a single measure has been worked out to improve the situation in the region [...] All instructions were so vague and abortive that there was nothing left except worthless platonic speculations. The government did recognize the necessity to act—but, instead, betrayed its total feebleness.”²⁵

The conflict between the two ministers was not confined to different departmental interests, but had a serious ideological basis. Valuev looked at the problem of the Orthodox population in the western borderland from the point of view of assimilation, alien to Golovnin. Consequently, Valuev doubted that the Ministry of Education would be able and willing to secure the Russificatory orientation of new schools. According to the characteristic episode recounted by Dragomanov, when one of the Vladimir guberniia bishops volunteered to supply popular schools in Little Russia with his seminarists, Vasil’chikov and F. F. Witte, the Kiev educational district curator, refused the offer, arguing that for this purpose they needed local teachers, though the risk of recruiting pro-Ukrainophile graduates from local universities was decidedly higher.²⁶ Dragomanov emphasized that when establishing zemstvo schools in the second half of the 1860s, the Ministry of Education and leading Russian teachers, including K. D. Ushinskii, called for the introduction of local language. The major opponents of this claim on the Right-Bank territories were the local Little Russian activists Andriiashev, Bagatimov, and Nedzel’skii. “It is shameful to admit that it is not Great Russians but our native Little Russians who are trying to banish the Ukrainian spirit from schools,” wrote Dragomanov.²⁷

Another important source of the conflict between the ministers was that Valuev kept to aristocratic convictions and, unlike Golovnin, was skeptical about hiring *raznochintsy* to state service. A Polish count

was still socially closer to Valuev than a Russian parvenu. "Unfortunately, you do not disapprove of the many who persist in the delusion that it is possible to eliminate the Poles from the state by dispatching from the inner guberniias the Fedotovs, Nikanorovs, and Pakhomovs to replace the Tyszkiewicz, Potockys, and Radziwills. It is not that easy," wrote Valuev to Katkov in August 1863, not without malicious irony, deliberately counterpoising the names of the noblest Polish families to the "humble" *raznochintsy*.²⁸ Valuev could also have sent "mentally" to Golovnin his accusations regarding Katkov's "passion for making Russia plebeian."²⁹ When the conflict with Golovnin accelerated due to Golovnin's harsh criticism of the circular, Valuev decided to discredit his opponent by using Mezentsov's inspection trip to Ukraine, whose reports could easily have made their way to the emperor's desk. Mezentsov, of course, received special instructions in Petersburg. His reports from the region maintained that "the Education Department yearly fills local institutions with ultra-liberal and separatist-minded people" and the local universities "lack appropriate internal structure." The reports contain direct allegations that "the *Osnova* circle's activity [...] enjoys strong support in the Ministry of Education." "Educational departments are the source of all evil,"³⁰ concluded the zealous gendarme colonel. All these "philippics" appeared to be in perfect harmony with the general mood of the conservative circles, for which even the abolition of Nicholas I's restriction of the student body (no more than 300 in each university) seemed more than a doubtful initiative. Starting from 1862, with the famous Petersburg fires over and with the "Young Russia" proclamation, which they had swelled, in the air, the conservatives tried with renewed vigor to present the universities as the main source of freethinking, and students as the main threat to public order.

Sad as it may be, the conservatives were right to a certain extent. Russian universities were as much forgers of nihilists as they were suppliers of professionals.³¹ The problem was that in the universities, with very few exceptions, as was the case with one hundred name stipends awarded in 1880 by M. T. Loris-Melikov, the authorities, instead of improving students' welfare and career opportunities, preferred to resort to repression and class discrimination.³²

Mezentsov was correct in his evaluation of the role of the universities in the development of Ukrainophilism—between 1860 and 1864 students comprised more than 70 percent of the Ukrainophile move-

ment's activists.³³ Eric Hobsbawm, having sacrificed accuracy to stylistic refinement, believed that "the progress of schools and universities measures that of nationalism, just as schools and especially universities became its most conscious champions."³⁴ It is important to remember that in Britain, France, and Germany schools and universities were effective conductors of centralized nationalism, whereas in Eastern and Central Europe they became centers of opposition to the assimilation pressure of dominant groups. The existence of universities in Kiev and Kharkov and their absence in Belorussia was a no less decisive reason for the qualitative difference between the active Ukrainian and practically non-existent Belorussian national movements than the oft-cited Cossack traditions and the memory of the Hetmanate.

The ideological conflict between the two ministers reflected deep contradictions in Russian politics—the still dominant court circles distrusted the *raznochintsy*, without whom the successful implementation of the assimilation policy was impossible. Radical populists, in their turn, and the increasing number of liberals, openly hated autocracy. The nationalists regarded tsarism as an obstacle on the road to the fulfillment of their national ideals.

It was this very contradiction that Katkov undertook to resolve by making at least conditional loyalty to the regime a constituent of the nationalistic ideology. For the authorities, which would rate highly the editor of *Moskovskie vedomosti*, even this type of nationalism was part of Katkov's "passion for making Russia plebeian." The more Katkov developed his nationalistic ideas, the more the authorities "tightened the reins."³⁵ As a result, from 1871 to 1882 Katkov had to abstain from writing on the national question.³⁶ The liberals, in their turn, not mentioning the radicals, ostracized Katkov for his fealty to the regime, which by the end of his life seemed to have transformed into servility. Clarion calls by Aksakov and other publicists to "all active Russian people" to go to the western borderland in order to strengthen the Russian element were no more than a dream: without government support any cause of this kind was virtually impossible. In 1864 Aksakov wrote with disappointment and bitterness concerning his appeals to populate the western region with Russians: "In Europe they would have long ago found enough volunteers to colonize this region..."³⁷

The Polish uprising was finally suppressed only by the end of 1864. It was at this moment that the government circles resumed dis-

cussion on the possible mitigation or abolition of the Valuev Circular, which was reflected in the above-mentioned letter of Akhmatov in December 1864 and the inquiry by the Petersburg Censorship Committee in March 1865. Possibly, this inquiry was somehow connected with the law on the abolition of preliminary censorship, drafted by Valuev and published on 6 April 1865.

This law was destined to become the last significant liberal concession of the 1860s. This period ended with the failed assassination attempt on the tsar by D. V. Karakozov on 4 April 1866. The tsar was deeply shocked by the incident, a fact that entailed serious consequences for the characters in our story. Dolgorukov was dismissed in a way that appeared quite natural. The circumstances of Golovnin's dismissal, however, were rather unusual. Having found many students among the arrested conspirators Alexander II dismissed Golovnin peremptorily, without any resignation appeal. Later Golovnin wrote bitterly in his memoirs: "The young people arrested in Moscow remorselessly and somewhat boastfully admitted that they had destined themselves to teaching in public schools in order to free the *narod* from what they called 'religious prejudices'."³⁸ With Golovnin dismissed, the years-long conflict between liberals and conservatives was logically drawn to its bureaucratic end.

As time passed the *narodniks* increasingly aroused the suspicion of the authorities. Primary instruction was left to the clergy. In an atmosphere of doubt as to whether they had not gone too far with reforms and concessions, the authorities did not dare to question any longer the autocratic and highly centralized principle of state organization. Accordingly, it was impossible for the authorities to switch to "the English-Scottish" model and seek a compromise with the Ukrainian elites, especially since the new *narodnik* generation of Ukrainophiles consisted mostly of "unreliable" writers, teachers, and former exiles rather than of "socially related" landowners. Still, the very possibility of such a shift in policy was not seriously debated in ruling circles. In the second half of the 1860s the government may well have been deceived by the illusion that they were simply repeating the scenario of the 1840s: the same people, former Cyrilo-Methodians, were repulsed again, and the problem might have been forgotten for another decade or two.

Thus, even after the nationalistic shift in public opinion, the national policy of the imperial authorities, in its principles of power

legitimization, remained inconsistent, contradictory, and too poorly drafted to be successful. Being aware that it was impossible to follow the "French" assimilation model due to a lack of resources, the government, motivated by its own weakness, had to resort to prohibitive measures typical for this model. The Valuev Circular, which was initially planned as a temporary forced expedient but which remained in force for years, became a specific symbol of this policy.

To Valuev can be re-addressed his own reproach to Golovnin, that the development of popular education in the western borderland largely remained speculation. He never tried to correct according to his own views the project of Golovnin and Vasil'chikov but simply buried the only chance that could have changed the situation. Moreover, he banned other similar projects created by loyal Kiev public figures in 1864, in particular by M. V. Iuzefovich. He never proposed his own "systematically drafted plan." Alexander II's remark on the margins of Korf's program—"Should be developed"—equally remained on paper.

The policy of D. A. Tolstoy, who succeeded Golovnin, can best be illustrated by the fact that he refused for a number of years to sponsor popular instruction from the funds specially allocated for this purpose by the Kiev governor A. P. Bezak.³⁹ The number of gymnasia and progymnasia in the Kiev educational district during his administration scarcely increased (17 in 1871 and 20 in 1882). In the Moscow district at the same time this number doubled from 17 in 1871 to 37 in 1882.⁴⁰ Primary education was developing slowly throughout the empire. There was practically no increase in state expenditure on peasant schools from 1862 to 1895. In 1879 the state budget covered no more than 11.3 percent of all expenses for primary schools. Peasants themselves gave three times more, and the zemstvos covered 43 percent of all costs. In the southwestern region, where zemstvos appeared only in 1911, the situation was even more difficult: in zemstvo-free gubernias the per capita expenditure on primary education was three times lower than in those with zemstvos.⁴¹

The deplorable results of the Ministry of Education's activity under Tolstoy, especially in the sphere of primary education, betrayed the pragmatic impotence of Russian nationalism. The problem was that Tolstoy fell under Katkov's influence. Katkov's protégé, A. I. Georgievskii, who was appointed as chair of the Scientific Committee, reported to his patron everything concerning the activity of the ministry and received appropriate instructions. "It can be argued without exagger-

ation that all reforms in popular education in the second half of the 1860s and 1870s were inspired by Katkov,” wrote P. A. Zaionchkovskii.⁴² However, the same Katkov, who had earlier so zealously argued that the consolidation of the All-Russian nation was the primary political goal and the accelerated development of primary education in Russian for peasants in Little Russia and Belorussia was the main means to attain this goal,⁴³ turned out to be unable to use his influence on the Ministry of Education to implement this program. The figure of 11 percent, the state’s share in the costs of primary education, meant a death sentence to all assimilation projects.

When, in 1905, the proponents of primary instruction in Ukrainian lamented that the low literacy level among Ukrainian peasants was due to instruction in a non-native language, the minister of education, V. G. Glazov, suggested that the problem be solved not by the introduction of Ukrainian but by the extension of primary education from two to four years.⁴⁴ Unfortunately, during the decades that passed between the Emancipation and the First Russian Revolution, the authorities did not manage to verify this thesis in practice. Serious changes for the better occurred only in the mid-1890s.⁴⁵ The three decades from the abolition of serfdom were virtually lost and the system of primary education in Russia has never become an effective tool of assimilation. Only on the eve of the First World War did Russia draw close to a practical realization of the principle of compulsory primary education.

The Valuev Circular, initially part of a “positive” assimilation program, was doomed to go down in history as a purely repressive measure.

NOTES

1 RGIA, f. 1282, op. 1, ed. khr.19, l. 20–23. Later Braunschweig obtained a high position in the civil administration of the Polish Kingdom.

2 Daniel Beauvois, *La bataille de la terre en Ukraine 1863–1914* (Lille, 1994). The extended version in Polish that I used is D. Beauvois, *Walka o ziemię. 1863–1914* (Pogranicze, 1996). Beauvois illustrated that in return for bribes Russian officials often helped Polish landowners to avoid the confiscation of their estates. The new Russian landowners, who received the confiscated estates, did not live in their estates and thus could hardly exert any ponderable assimilation influence, on which the government counted.

3 M. L. Bush, *Rich Noble, Poor Noble* (Manchester & New York, 1988), pp. 8, 10.

- 4 On the inability of the Russian nobles to become the *soslovie*, united by a sense of solidarity and common corporate interests, see M. Raeff, "The Russian Nobility in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries: Trends and Comparisons," in I. Banac, P. Bushkovich, *Nobility in Russia and Eastern Europe* (New Haven: Slavica Publishers, 1983), pp. 99–122; L. H. Haimson, "The Problem of Social Identities in Early Twentieth-Century Russia," *Slavic Review* 47, no.1 (Spring 1988), pp. 1–20.
- 5 GARF, f. 109, op. 38, 1863, ed. khr. 23, p. 175. l. 4ob. Nazimov proposed to proceed from the assumption that "in western guberniias the nobility is absent completely since the Polish nobles will never do anything beneficial for the Russian state." *Ibid.*, l. 6. Characteristically, enumerating the towns and regions subject to Russification, Nazimov clearly differentiated between the western territories with the "time-honored Eastern Slav population, and the regions with a Lithuanian and Jewish majority." The latter, according to Nazimov, should not have been subject to immediate Russification.
- 6 P. A. Stolypin, *Rech' v Gosudarstvenoi Dume i Gosudarstvennom Sovete 1906–1911*, compiled by Iu. G. Fel'shtinskii (New York, 1990), p. 233.
- 7 RGIA, f. 908, op. 1, ed. khr. 185, l. 2, 2ob.
- 8 *Ibid.*, l. 7ob.
- 9 RGIA, f. 908, op. 1, ed. khr. 174, l. 1.
- 10 *Ibid.*, l. 2, 28ob.
- 11 M. Dragomanov, "Antrakt z istorii," p. 210. The following comes from the diary of General A. A. Kireev, who wrote as late as the 1890s with a certain degree of exaggeration on the dimension of the Russian tradition of creative accounting (*pripiski*) and who cannot be suspected of anticlericalism: "Count Tolstoy, the minister of the interior, told Georgievskii that, according to his trusted sources, parish schools existed only on paper. [...] One marshal of the nobility told Georgievskii that in his region, as the official church statistics maintained, there were 104 (or 94) schools. In reality there are no more than four or five. Here from P. A. Zaionchkovskii, *Rossiiskoe samoderzhavie*, p. 365.
- 12 RGIA, f. 733, op. 193 (1863), ed. khr. 86, l. 19ob.
- 13 RGIA, f. 908, op. 1, ed. khr. 174, l. 5.
- 14 RGIA, f. 908, op. 1, ed. khr. 174, l. 29.
- 15 OR RGB, f. 169, k. 42, ed. khr. 5, l. 10.
- 16 GARF, f. 109, op. 38, ed. khr. 23, p. 175. l. 23, 24.
- 17 I. S. Aksakov, *Sochineniia*, vol. 3, p. 186.
- 18 See Mezentsov's report from Kiev, 9 November 1863. RGIA, f. 776, op. 11, ed. khr. 61, l. 32.
- 19 Stephen Velychenko, *Were Tsarist Borderlands Undergoverned and Did it Matter?* Paper delivered at the conference "Shaping Identities in the Borderland," Budapest, Central European University, 4–6 March 1999. See also idem, "Identities, Loyalties and Service in Imperial Russia: Who Administered the Borderlands?"

- Russian Review* no. 2 (1995), pp. 188–208; idem, “The Size of the Imperial Russian Bureaucracy and Army in Comparative Perspective,” *Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas* no. 3 (2001), pp. 346–62.
- 20 OR RGB, f. 169, k. 42, ed. khr. 5, l. 9.
- 21 RO RNB, f. 600, ed. khr. 608, l. 8.
- 22 P. A. Valuev, *Dnevnik*, vol. 1, p. 137.
- 23 RGIA, f. 908, op. 1, ed. khr. 185, l. 11.
- 24 P. A. Valuev, *Dnevnik*, vol. 1, p. 299.
- 25 D. A. Miliutin, *Moi starcheskie vospominaniia za 1816–1873 gg.* OR RGB, f. 169, k. 14, ed. khr. 2, l. 89ob (according to manuscript pagination—p. 170).
- 26 M. Dragomanov, “Antrakt z istorii,” p. 210.
- 27 *Ibid.*, pp. 221–222.
- 28 OR RGB, f. 120, k. 1, ed. khr. 57, l. 14, 14ob.
- 29 *Ibid.*, l. 33ob.
- 30 RGIA, f. 776, po. 11, ed. khr. 61, l. 28ob, 29, 32.
- 31 See, for example, D. Brower, *Training the Nihilists. Education and Radicalism in Tsarist Russia* (London, 1982).
- 32 On official education policy under Alexander III see P. A. Zaionchkovskii, *Rossiiskoe samoderzhavie*, pp. 309–65.
- 33 A. Kappeler, “The Ukrainians of the Russian Empire, 1860–1914,” in idem., ed., *Comparative Studies on Governments and Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups in Europe, 1850–1940*, vol. VI, *The Formation of National Elites* (Dartmouth, 1992), p. 116.
- 34 Here from B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 71.
- 35 The head of the Third Department, P. A. Shuvalov, directly accused Katkov of “inciting and supporting disorder in the borderlands of the empire,” referring to Katkov’s emotional propaganda for Russification. See I. V. Orzhekhovskii, *Administratsia i pechat’ mezhdru dvumia revoliutsionnymi situatsiiami 1866–1878* (Gor’kiy, 1973), p. 59. Starting from the late 1860s, the task of preserving the social hierarchy of the old regime became more dominant in government policy than the attempt to rely on the lower strata against unreliable provincial elites. The pressure on the Polish landowners was mitigated.
- 36 See V. G. Chernukha, *Vnutrenniaia politika tsarizma s serediny 50-kh do nachala 80kh gg. XIX v.* (Leningrad, 1978), p. 181. Probably, it was the result of a special session on 20 November 1871, at which the minister of the interior, A. E. Timashev, initiated a discussion on the overly independent stance of *Moskovskie vedomosti*. See P. A. Valuev, *Dnevnik*, vol. 2, pp. 275, 503; A. V. Nikitenko, *Dnevnik*, vol. 3 (1955), p. 161.
- 37 I. S. Aksakov, *Sochineniia*, vol. 3, p. 239. *Den’*, 28 April 1864.
- 38 A. V. Golovnin, “Zapiski dlia nemnogikh,” *Voprosy istorii*, no. 6 (1997), p. 68.
- 39 M. P. Dragomanov, “Avtobiografia,” *Byloe* (June 1906), p. 198.

- 40 See L. V. Kamosko, *Politika pravitel'stva v oblasti srednego obrazovaniia v 60-70-eg. XIX v (gimnazii, real'nye uchilishcha)* (Diss. abstract, Moscow, 1970).
- 41 See Ben Eklof, *Russian Peasant Schools. Officialdom, Village Culture and Popular Pedagogy, 1861-1914* (Berkeley, 1986), pp. 89, 94.
- 42 P. A. Zaionchkovskii, *Rossiiskoe samoderzhavie*, p. 69. For a vivid description of Katkov's immense influence on Tolstoy and the role of the former in education counter-reforms, see in E. M. Feoktistov, *Vospominaniia*, pp. 173-179.
- 43 For a detailed list of the Russification measures in the western borderland proposed by Katkov in his articles of the 1860s, see S. Nevedenskii, *Katkov i ego vremia* (Petersburg, 1888), pp. 257-58. Katkov wrote about the need to increase funding for popular schools, for example in *Moskovskie vedomosti*, 16 March 1865, underlining that in the Russian conditions "the success of popular education depends, for the most part, on the support of the government." See M. N. Katkov, *Sobranie peredovykh statei "Moskovskikh vedomostei" 1865 g.* (Moscow, 1897), p. 157. In issue 262, November 1865, he emphasized the role of the time factor in the process of the Russification problem in the western region and its priority compared to other problems, lamenting that "precious, irretrievable time, labors and funds are wasted on matters of unimportant, accidental character." *Ibid.*, p. 755.
- 44 O. Andriewsky, "The Politics of National Identity: The Ukrainian Question in Russia, 1904-1912" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard, 1991), p. 85.
- 45 From 1896 to 1900, state expenditure on primary schools doubled, followed by another significant increase by 1907. From 1907 to 1914 they increased four-fold. If, in 1881, education costs made up only 2.69 percent of the budget and primary schools did not have any advantage in the share, in 1914 expenditure on education amounted to 7.21 percent and the share of primary schools was more significant. See Ben Eklof, *Russian Peasant Schools*, pp. 89-90.

CHAPTER 8

The Kiev Period of Ukrainophilism (1872–1876)

A new period of Ukrainophilism dates back to the first half of the 1870s, which again, as at the end of the 1850s/beginning of the 1860s, coincided with, or rather became a part of, a broader all-imperial social revival.¹ The first articles that questioned the policy embodied in the Valuev Circular appeared in Russian journals in 1872. The publication of the lengthy article “The Eastern Policy of Germany and Russification” in four volumes (from February to May 1872) by the liberal *Vestnik Evropy* was the most significant. Its author, Dragomanov, hid himself behind the pseudonym M. T.

Dragomanov developed in detail an ideological basis for the thesis that an assimilatory and centralizing policy towards the western borderlands contradicted Russia’s interests. First, he claimed that it suited well the enemies of Russia, among whom he counted the Poles and Germany. The latter, according to his interpretation, was preparing to extend its influence over the east of Europe. Second, he argued that the assimilatory policy copied from French and Prussian experience did not correspond to Russian conditions. Here he referred to the different scale of the country and to the relative youth and weakness of Russian culture as compared to French and German. The third argument was that France and Prussia enjoyed the rights of conqueror, which Russia did not have in Little Russia.² In another part of his article, and outside the comparative context, in order not to tease the censors, Dragomanov also noted that the success of “Frankoization” was to a large extent due to the fact that the French language was “a language of liberty.”³

The main goal of Dragomanov was to rehabilitate Ukrainophilism. His interpretation of Ukrainophilism seemed to go back to the official interpretation of A. F. Orlov, the head of the gendarme corps, at the end of 1840s: “Kostomarov is not a Ukrainophile but a ‘Ukrainian

Slavophile', like the 'Moscow Slavophiles',⁴ and Shevchenko is "the only Russian poet born in the southwestern land."⁵ If they could be called Ukrainophiles, they were Russian Ukrainophiles as opposed to Polish Ukrainophiles, in other words, Poles, who aimed at using the Ukrainian idea with the purpose of alienating Little Russia from Northern Rus'. Dragomanov argued that they were supporters of Russian unity, but unity in diversity with the preservation of Little Russian specificity and the development of the local language.⁶ In Dragomanov's view this position had found wide support among Russian society until the alien people—*Sion* and the Poles—falsely accused Ukrainophiles of political separatism.⁷ According to Dragomanov, only later were these accusations of separatism taken up by *Russkii vestnik*, which promoted the false idea of the adaptability of West European assimilatory programs to Russian conditions.

At the same time, Dragomanov criticized the Petersburg liberal press, "evidently hostile to all discussions on the borderlands." This part of his argument deserves quoting *in extenso*. "This is our true ultra-Russian party, large in number among educated people in the capitals and Great Russia; these new 'Great Russian separatists' say: forget about those borderlands; we, true Russians, in true Russian land, are still 30 to 40 million; let us deal with our affairs, and let the borderlands live the way they prefer! Certainly, if those 'ultra-Russians' remained without Riga and Warsaw, or, who knows, without Vilno and Kiev, they would not feel themselves quite comfortable. After giving it thorough consideration they would see even now how the moral and economic interests of Central Russia (*seredina Rossii*) are tightly bound to the fate of the Carpathian and Danubian countries situated beyond our borders. Nevertheless, this ultra-Russian separatism of people in Central Russia is absolutely understandable and natural as a reaction to a trend, which in such an awkward way shows concern about the Russification and re-Russification (*zabotitsia ob obrusenii i pererusenii*) of tribes."⁸

Two important ideas are formulated in this fragment. First, Dragomanov aimed at eliminating the danger of special assimilation "care" towards Little Russia as a part of the Russian "ideal fatherland" that, along with White Russia, would have been subject to Russification before other, "non-Russian" western borderlands. With that end in mind he, on the one hand, talks about the falseness of the tendency to "re-Russify" (*pererusenie*) or to "finalize Russification" (*dorusenie*),

thereby stressing the “Russian” nature of Little Russia. (Here Russian-ness is interpreted as a family notion, which does not presume total cultural homogenization.) On the other hand, partly contradicting himself, Dragomanov tries to “insert” Ukraine into the general row of other borderlands, listing the problem of Little Russia on the same level as the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian ones.⁹

Secondly, and most importantly, he proposed a new “make-up” for the federalist idea, more attractive to Russian imperialists, which not only provided for the integrity of the empire but also for its expansion. Dragomanov insists that it is the non-assimilating character of Russian policy that will give an advantage to Russia in the struggle with the centralized, nationalist Germany for domination in Eastern Europe. In this connection he discusses meticulously how repression against Ukrainophiles in Russia undermines sympathy for Moscow among Rusyns in Eastern Galicia.¹⁰ This particular idea of Dragomanov, as we will see, found adherents even among high-ranking officials.

Shortly thereafter Dragomanov published a special article, “Russians in Galicia,” in which he condemned the repressive policy of Vienna and, among other things, told, with sympathy for the sufferer, the story of the Uniate priest S. Kachala. The latter lost his deanery because, in 1868, at the Slavic Congress in Stromouc (near Prague), he started his speech with the phrase “Gentlemen, let me as a Russian talk to you in Russian.”¹¹ Besides, in order to secure the leadership of the Kiev Hromada, Dragomanov criticized Galician politicians for their conservatism and indecision.

Dragomanov wrote all these articles while traveling through Europe on a research trip financed by Kiev University. At the same time in Kiev people of various political views came up with projects for the organization of scientific societies. It would be incorrect to characterize all these initiatives (as did F. Savchenko in his time) as attempts towards “Ukrainian cultural-scientific self-determination.”¹² M. A. Maksimovich, who proposed the organization of the “Kiev Society of History and Slavic-Russian Antiquities,” and M. V. Iuzefovich, one of the cofounders of the Kiev branch of the Russian Imperial Geographic Society (hereafter KGS), all their mutual fundamental differences in views and habits notwithstanding—Iuzefovich soon began to write denunciations of Ukrainophiles, while Maksimovich would not even think of such a possibility—shared a non-nationalistic interpretation of Little Russian specificity and were far from those

Ukrainian nationalists, the former Kiev contributors to *Osnova*, who at that time revived the Kiev Hromada. It was the active participation of Hromada members in the organization and functioning of the KGS that made a short period of its history an important milestone in the development of Ukrainophilism.

The history of the KGS was described in detail by F. Savchenko.¹³ The work of the ethnographic–statistical expedition for the description of the southwestern borderland became a prologue to the establishment of the KGS. The organization of the expedition was entrusted by the Russian Geographical Society (hereafter RGS) to P. P. Chubinskii, who had just returned from exile. By that time, the RGS was considered to be one of the most influential and respected organizations in Russia, with Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich as its head and many liberal, high-ranking officials among its membership. (The RGS provided almost half of the leading figures of the 1861 peasant reform.) The name of the RGS guaranteed Chubinskii the assistance of all authorities, including the church, and, to a great extent, saved him from the stigma of political unreliability. Between 1870 and 1872 the newspaper *Kievlianin*, edited by V. Ia. Shulgin, who shortly became a bitter enemy of Chubinskii and Dragomanov, repeatedly published articles of commendation about the expedition's achievements. Indeed, the newspaper advocated the establishment of a Kiev office of the RGS in as early as 1866. Finally, on 20 April 1872, the Kiev governor–general, A. M. Dondukov-Korsakov, sent a letter to Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich to suggest the establishment of an RGS branch in Kiev.¹⁴ While preparing the necessary documents, Dondukov-Korsakov consulted with both Iuzefovich and Chubinskii. The names of Iuzefovich and Chubinskii, Antonovich and Shulgin, that is, Ukrainophiles and their future persecutors, were written next to each other on the list of the founding members.

Conflict was inevitable from the very opening of the KGO. In the 1850s Iuzefovich chaired the Commission of the Kiev Educational District, organized by the governor–general D. G. Bibikov, and expected to obtain the position of head of the KGS. However, the professional qualities of the aged Iuzefovich left much to be desired—even the former commission effectively worked under his supervision only until 1855, and then “exhausted itself.” The Commission for the Investigation of Ancient Acts, which was also chaired by Iuzefovich, functioned almost solely thanks to V. Antonovich. Regardless of that,

Chubinskii and Antonovich, representing the interests of Hromada, were not willing to cede control of the KGS. Shulgin and Iuzefovich were useful only at the very beginning of the KGS organization, when their names imparted reliability and conservatism to the list of founders. Dondukov-Korsakov, familiar with the work of Chubinskii's expedition, had a clear idea of who represented a real creative force and lent his support to the "youths." On 23 February 1873, at the constituent assembly of the KGS, G. P. Galagan—*persona grata* both for the authorities and Hromada—was elected head of the KGS.¹⁵ Chubinskii became executive secretary. Dragomanov watched closely the process of the KGS organization from abroad. He wrote: "The main point is that the members and secretary are ours."¹⁶ Iuzefovich and Shulgin found themselves with titular roles as "wedding generals."¹⁷

At his election Chubinskii delivered a speech in which he mentioned that after the liberation of the peasants and the 1863 Polish uprising, the Russian element had revived in the western borderland. He urged those present to work for the welfare of the region "where lie the origins of the Russian land." After the meeting, the members of Hromada criticized Chubinskii for his statements and argued that it was possible to avoid declarations of political loyalty and consider exclusively the research objectives of the KGS. Chubinskii justified himself by referring to the "highest considerations." One Hromada member, F. K. Vovk, noted later in his memoirs: "In fact, everything could be explained by an outburst of his [Chubinskii's] expansive temperament."¹⁸

It seems that the situation was more complicated. This is what Dragomanov wrote in July 1863 from Strasbourg to V. Navrotskii, who was connected with the editorial board of the Lvov Ukrainophile newspaper *Pravda*:¹⁹ "You will say that *Pravda* protests against the national oppression of Ukraine, and my response will be that Ukraine as a nationality has not yet expressed herself in Russia and is only on the way to self-understanding. It needs academic and literary work in order to understand herself. By shouting, and, moreover, by shouting from abroad, you will damage this work, which has recently received help from the government, who provided for such organizations as the Geographic Society [...] Allow us, along with Great Russians, to reform Russia [...] Please, deliver my words to Lvov. I would like people there to ask themselves the question of whether they feel the strength of Mazzini and whether they see "Young Italy" in Kiev—if

yes, then let them go against Russia and call for revolution immediately; otherwise, *Pravda* should not make Locarno or Lugano out of Lvov, nor should *Slovo* make it another Venice!"²⁰

One of the most important sources for characterizing Dragomanov's views of the period was his article "An Interval in the History of Ukrainophilism, 1863–1872." It was written in 1872 for *Pravda*, and Dragomanov could safely forget about censorship. The article was addressed not to Russian readers, but to pro-Ukrainophile Galicians.²¹ The author severely criticized the previous generation of Ukrainophiles for their romanticism and radicalism, especially on the language question. He considered their demand to introduce the Ukrainian language as the main and the only language of instruction in schools as not simply "tactless," but "rather destructive than constructive." He admitted that peasant protests against such plans "have indeed taken place" and were quite reasonable, because it "would have limited peasants to the ration of Saint Anthony, that is 10 to 15 Ukrainian books."²² More than once he repeated that "the ability to read Russian would not damage our folk," and that "I consider the introduction of the Russian language in Ukrainian schools as a historically unavoidable fact."²³ Dragomanov's program regarding the language question was free from a frontal opposition between the Russian and Ukrainian languages. It aimed at bilingual teaching in primary schools with a bilingual ABC based on the principles advocated by K. D. Ushinskii, and an increase in the number of Ukrainian books, with better textbooks, which should be selected "not by the language in which they are written, but by the value of what is written."²⁴ Comparing Ukrainian with patois and Platt-Deutsch, Dragomanov noted that both the Provençal and Low German dialects had more ground to claim the status of an independent language than Ukrainian, which had neither a systematized grammar nor vocabulary.²⁵

Seemingly, Dragomanov, Chubinskii, and Antonovich, the leaders of the Kiev Hromada, attached paramount importance to the legal aspect of their activity. They were ready to restrict themselves for a long time to positivist activity (cultural, scientific, economic, etc.), which the Polish liberal positivists, who gained popularity exactly at that time, called "organic work."²⁶ Dragomanov spoke with sympathy of the evolution of Russian nihilism into "serious positivism."²⁷ The willingness "to reform Russia together with Great Russians" demonstrates that the federalist concepts proclaimed by Dragomanov were

not a tactical ploy. Professor V. Antonovich from Kiev University, M. Dragomanov, assistant professor at the same university since 1874, and P. Chubinskii, a full member of the RGS and executive secretary of the KGS, who also had a handsome income as manager of a sugar-refinery—these people and other activists in the Ukrainian movement of the early 1870s could have become partners in a dialogue with the government, if the latter had been more liberal and open to negotiation.²⁸

Some intelligent members of the Kiev administration understood this even earlier. According to the documents, in as early as November 1868 a high-ranking Kiev official wrote to St. Petersburg about the desirability of “rendering some advantages” and improving the material welfare of V. Antonovich, since, being an influential person among the Ukrainophiles, he, at the same time, demonstrated an invariable moderateness of views and behavior.²⁹ It is not improbable that there were several people interceding for Antonovich. In a note dated 1875 the curator of the Kiev Educational District, P. A. Antonovich, mentioned that it was the head of the Gendarme Corps of the Kiev guberniia, General Pavlov, who personally interceded with the authorities asking for Antonovich to be rewarded with a farm.³⁰ At that time he did not succeed. In the mid-1870s Dondukov-Korsakov was ready to collaborate with the group, being well aware, as we will see shortly, of the Ukrainophile character of their convictions. Nevertheless, he hoped to find with them a certain *modus vivendi*—of course on his own terms. The governor-general hoped, not without good reason, as Dragomanov’s texts illustrated, that the attempts to preserve legal organizational opportunities, accorded to Hromada members, would serve as a limiting factor of no lesser importance than a desire for personal well-being. It is obvious that the Kiev governor-general was truly devoted to fulfilling his task, defined by the tsar at the moment of his appointment: “To serve the national purpose of the final unification of the southwestern borderland with the great Russian family.”³¹ However, he acted at his own risk, not even trying to seek approval and support for his tactics in St. Petersburg. In his memorandum to the tsar, “On important questions concerning the governing of the southwestern borderland,” prepared exactly in 1872, Dondukov-Korsakov totally omitted Ukrainophilism and the Ukrainian problem, while extensive special sections were devoted to the Poles and the Jews.³² Dondukov-Korsakov was fully confident that he would not receive

the tsar's understanding and approval in the delicate game that he intended to play with the Ukrainophiles. Again, we encounter a lack of unity in government policy on the Ukrainian question.

At that time the public in Kiev treated cultural manifestations of Ukrainophilism with enthusiasm. Even *Kievlianin*, which from 1874 became a center of consolidation for the opponents of Ukrainophilism, had to admit that the performance of Lysenko's opera *Ridzviiana Nich* (Christmas Night) had become "a topical issue of the day in Kiev, attracting crowds of spectators and causing delight and inspiration in the audience."³³

As early as 1874 *Kievlianin* was demonstrating tolerance towards the Ukrainian cultural movement. The newspaper regularly published the materials and minutes of the KGS. *Kievlianin* even published in Ukrainian a short story written by I. Levitskii, "a humorous sketch from everyday life in original Little Russian language, which is not translatable in this kind of essay."³⁴ The initial tolerant position of the newspaper can also be confirmed by the fact that its editor, Shulgin, when leaving a chair at Kiev University in 1862, recommended Dragomanov, whose views were well known to him, as his successor.

Shortly thereafter, however, *Kievlianin* began a campaign against Hromada and its position in the KGS. The conflict between the *Kievlianin* and Hromada leaders was not limited to the struggle for influence in the KGS. Soon it was complicated by the conflict of economic interests—Dragomanov started editing a new newspaper, *Kievskii telegraf*. The very existence of two daily newspapers in Kiev gave rise to acute competition, given that the *Kievskii telegraf* was more liberal and vivid than *Kievlianin*. (Dragomanov wrote: "To tell the truth, there has never been a better periodical in Ukraine that would, according to its character, more perfectly fit the program of the Cyril–Methodius Society of 1847 as our *Kievskii telegraf*, of course, with changes corresponding to new times."³⁵ However, it should be noted that the pro-Ukrainophile orientation of the *Kievskii telegraf* was expressed in a very moderate way, in the spirit of Dragomanov's positivist approach. In 1875 the KGS transferred the rights to publish the minutes of its meetings from *Kievlianin* to the *Kievskii telegraf*, which became an additional source of irritation for Shulgin.³⁶

Finally, it is obvious that in 1874 a personal conflict arose between Iuzefovich on the one side, and Dragomanov and Chubinskii on the other. The details are unknown, but one can guess that the latter

allowed themselves some disrespectful remarks regarding the age of their opponent, perhaps as a response to Iuzefovich's references to the authority of great age. Subsequently, *Kievlianin* would invariably write about "those who remain youths forever, although claiming the role of leaders of the young generation," while the *Kievskii telegraf* would respond to the attacks of "toothless authorities."³⁷ It is possible that Dragomanov's article "On the Kiev table talks," published in the December issue of *Vestnik Evropy* in 1873, initiated the conflict. Having compared the speech of Iuzefovich, which he delivered at a dinner to commemorate the visit to Kiev of the minister of education, Tolstoy, with a liberal speech of the same Iuzefovich at a dinner in honor of Pirogov in 1861, Dragomanov sarcastically admired "the self-resignation which allows Mr. Iuzefovich to outlive different epochs, serve different systems, and express different opinions with equally stoic strength."³⁸ Apparently, Iuzefovich was deeply offended. F. Vovk, an eyewitness to these events, considered the article as the main reason for hostility between Iuzefovich and Dragomanov.³⁹

To be sure, *Kievlianin* did not restrict its offensive only to personal attacks. The subject for an ideological offensive was shrewdly selected—the language issue. At first, the newspaper's statements had the character of admonition—"We do not see any reasonable ground in the attempts to necessarily distinguish, even in the alphabet, Little Russians from Great Russians, and the attempt to impose a universal literary quality on a language, of which every parish has its own dialect—is a vain endeavor, indeed."⁴⁰ Soon these claims were supplemented with "fatherly" warnings. "We, the local people, having closely observed this movement, can only smile at it [...] Nevertheless, other people from afar might look at it differently, and then, apart from some random victims of this childish pursuit, it will cause, as a reaction, more rigorous measures, unfavorable enough for our intellectual and social development."⁴¹ The newspaper immediately explained where the limits of this local development should lie: in the "earnest aspiration of serious people to polish up South Russian folk music," and "serious, purely scientific ethnographic research." Thus *Kievlianin* denied not so much Little Russian specificity as such, but any attempts to represent the latter as a basis for a political program, not to mention national and political self-determination. In a sketch from the Voronezh guberniia, where both Little and Great Russian peasants lived side by side, the newspaper presented a moving image of "the

combination of Little Russian tidiness and some sense of elegance with Great Russian energy and ambition” as a symbolic embodiment of All-Russian unity.⁴²

Later in 1875 this position was reflected in the polemics of *Kievlianin* with Kulish, who undertook a harsh personal attack on Kostomarov, Shevchenko, and Maksimovich. (It was then that Kulish wrote the well-known phrase about the “drunk muse” of Shevchenko.) Maksimovich was taken under the newspaper’s protection unconditionally as a sincere and consistent supporter of Rus’ unity. Stressing that it did not consider Shevchenko and Kostomarov to be prophets, the newspaper defended the “people’s poet Shevchenko,” who had fallen under the harmful Ukrainophile influence that “perverted his natural pure intentions.” Kostomarov was called “a noteworthy Russian historian,” whose “hidden convictions” were “of no concern” to the editors.⁴³ *Kievlianin* tried to fight with the *Kievskii telegraf* for the right “to appropriate” Shevchenko, Kostomarov, and Maksimovich. In its turn, the *Kievskii telegraf* came to the defense of the offended as members of the Ukrainophile “pantheon”: “Ukrainophilism was hardly created and led by talented and serious people,”⁴⁴ and “censuring absurd and savage Ukrainophile ideas, we have always sympathized with, and had respect for, the works of the South Russians.”⁴⁵

Let us go back to 1874. By that time KGS activities were approved by the delegates to the Third Archaeological Congress, which took place in Kiev in late August/early September. Meanwhile, all attempts by Iuzefovich and Shulgin to introduce their supporters into the KGS failed, as the Ukrainophile majority voted their candidates down. The KGS conducted a one-day Kiev population census, and again, Shulgin and Iuzefovich, who were against its program, could do nothing. Gradually the Ukrainophiles broadened their publishing activities.⁴⁶

This state of affairs was subjected to more and more aggressive criticism from *Kievlianin*. Besides Iuzefovich and Shulgin, L. Lopatin-skii, a gymnasium teacher, N. Rigel’man, M. Rennenkampf, S. Gogost-kii, and other professors from Kiev University wrote critically about the KGO.⁴⁷ The newspaper attacked the bookstall of L. V. Il’nitskii for selling Ukrainophile publications—“a collection of motley variations on the language, claimed to be Little Russian.”⁴⁸ The problem of clumsy translations (“*perekladoŭ*”) into Ukrainian was a permanent topic in the newspaper.⁴⁹

The discussion of the language question had firmly shifted in a

political direction. "Why teach in a language, which, though native, has no future and is used only by uneducated people? [...] Where should this teaching stop? [...] Should we start thinking of establishing gymnasia where instruction will be conducted in Little Russian? Would it be better to transfer all local documentation to this language? Should we prevent those who do not know the language well from occupying positions as justices of the peace and in district courts? These and similar questions are far from absurd, since they naturally follow the question of compulsory teaching in Little Russian in elementary schools."⁵⁰ Although the author of the article, N. A. Rigel'man,⁵¹ used the pseudonym *Levoberezhnyi* and stressed that he was "also *khokhol* [...] fascinated by the very pronunciation of such words as *galushki* and *varenykha* [...] enamored with Little Russian melodies and the Little Russian countryside," in tone his article resembled Katkov's arguments. This critique simply did not leave any space for Dragomanov's compromise program of bilingual instruction with Russian as the state language.

The newspaper urged the KGS to condemn "attempts to propagate the Little Russian language," underlining that "the severe disapproval of such efforts would not only separate the KGS in public opinion from this sort of activity, but, perhaps, would bring to their senses those people who, as its members, misuse the name of the KGS."⁵² Another criticism targeted at the KGS concerned its isolation. "The KGS has become similar to the Catholic order," wrote *Kievlіanin* in connection with the rejection of the candidates proposed by Iuzefovich and Shulgin.⁵³ The KGS calmly responded that it did not discuss political subjects, it was not responsible for its members' activities outside the KGS, and that 114 out of 118 admission applications had been satisfied.⁵⁴

Kievlіanin criticized the one-day census, first of all because Little Russian was included in the language list, and also because the question asked was about native but not spoken language, which increased the percentage of the Little Russian language.⁵⁵ Again, the KGS was ready with a response: in the census materials the Russian literary language was prudently called "language," while Little Russian, Great Russian, and White Russian were referred to as *narechija* (vernaculars), thereby the official hierarchy was retained.

The warnings addressed by *Kievlіanin* to the Ukrainophiles also started to sound like threats. The newspaper cautioned "enthusiastic

youths against repeating what their predecessors paid for in full in the 1860s.”⁵⁶ “So it was in the late 1840s and so it was in the early 1860s; is it not going to happen again in the 1870s?”—*Kievlianin* directly recalled the suppression of the Cyril–Methodius Society and the Valuev Circular.⁵⁷

The anti-Ukrainian campaign of *Kievlianin*, which was taking place against the background of mass arrests of *narodniki* in the summer of 1874, had yielded certain results by early 1875. In February, V. V. Borisov, the deputy chair of the KGS, attacked more than once by *Kievlianin* for his assistance to the Ukrainophiles, announced his resignation. On 28 April Galagan declared his decision to resign as chair of the KGS. The newly elected chair, General A. O. Schmitt, refused the honor. As a result, V. B. Antonovich, who commanded far less confidence in St. Petersburg than Galagan, became chairman of the KGS.

Nevertheless, an attempt to destroy the KGS altogether at that time failed due to the strong support of the main chief of the borderland (*Glavnyi Nachalnik Kraja* was Dondukov-Korsakov’s official title). He approved the election of Antonovich and put an end to the prolonged crisis within the KGS leadership. When, on 28 March 1875, Iuzefovich, unlike Galagan and Borisov, attempted to make his resignation from the KGS particularly demonstrative and wrote a harsh article explaining the reasons for his decision, the governor-general hastened to censure this publication for provoking unnecessary passions.⁵⁸ In order to prevent the publication of this article outside the region, Dondukov-Korsakov ordered the article to be sent, together with a negative review, from a Kiev censor to the Supreme Censorship Committee. On 16 April the governor-general himself sent a letter to the minister of the interior, A. E. Timashev. In his message Dondukov-Korsakov decidedly defended the KGS. He stressed that he was aware of all KGS activities and that the fact that many of the KGS members “sympathized with Ukrainophilism” did not mean that the KGS itself was a center of Ukrainophilism.⁵⁹ (The last comment demonstrates that the governor-general was not a naive victim of Hromada’s consiracy, but perfectly understood the situation.) Furthermore, Dondukov-Korsakov gave an assurance that he would not have objected to the publication of the article by Iuzefovich if it had been written in an ironic rather than pathetic style. He also underlined that he had

been trying hard to prevent a press polemics on Ukrainophilism in order not to exaggerate the political importance of the movement.⁶⁰

P. A. Antonovich, the curator of the Kiev Educational District, also tried to protect the Ukrainophiles. In a letter to P. A. Antonovich dated 23 January 1875 the minister of education, D. A. Tolstoy, mentioned that, according to "inquiries on the propagation of different criminal ideas among the people, it has been found that the Kiev Ukrainophiles party strives to spread among the populace an idea concerning the benefits of the separation of the Little Russian land from Russia. Among the means chosen by Ukrainophiles in order to achieve the mentioned objective the most significant is the establishment of contacts between the leaders of that party and the teachers of primary schools."⁶¹ Along with the letter Tolstoy forwarded to Antonovich an anonymous note, "On the activities of Ukrainophiles in the Kiev guberniia." (Savchenko believed Rigel'man to be the author of this note.⁶²) The note described the general character of Ukrainophile activists and their periodicals, including those published in Galicia. It also mentioned Ukrainophile involvement in the educational system. Tolstoy's letter was one of the numerous steps undertaken by the higher St. Petersburg's authorities in early 1875 to increase vigilance for *narodnik* propaganda.⁶³

Antonovich did not react to the minister's letter. Taking into consideration that Tolstoy could fairly be said to be suckled with the saliva of a mad dog, such behavior on the part of Antonovich demanded substantial courage and confidence.

Naturally, the Kiev opponents of Ukrainophilism were nervous, and Iuzefovich simply lost control of himself. At the official ceremony to award the title of honorable citizen of Kiev to Dondukov-Korsakov, even before the governor-general had left Iuzefovich broke out into accusations against the Ukrainophiles. He claimed that if the governor-general did not pay attention to the Ukrainophiles' activities, he (Iuzefovich) would not hesitate to write directly to the Third Department and His Majesty. Dondukov-Korsakov did not say a word.⁶⁴ Somebody from the guberniia administration must have told Iuzefovich about the letter in defense of the Ukrainophiles, sent by Dondukov-Korsakov to Timashev, and this news must have provoked this emotional outbreak.

Iuzefovich gradually accomplished his threat. First, the anti-

Ukrainophiles undertook a number of preparatory steps. The head of the Kiev municipal дума, M. Rennenkampf, lodged a complaint about the *Kievskii telegraf* to the Central Department of the Press (*Glavnoe Upravlenie po Delam Pechati*, hereafter GUP). According to him, the newspaper had a biased view of the дума's activities. This encouraged the GUP to study the newspaper and the activities of Puzyrevskii, the censor responsible for the *Kievskii telegraf*. The latter, fearing dismissal, put pressure on Gogotskaia, the owner of the newspaper, demanding information on who in fact edited the newspaper and who wrote the leading articles that usually appeared under pseudonyms. Puzyrevskii threatened to suggest that the GUP close the newspaper unless she provided him with the necessary evidence. Thus the publishing organ of the Ukrainophiles found itself under threat.⁶⁵

Furthermore, Hromada's opponents attempted to draw the central press into the struggle. In February 1875 their old and reliable ally, Katkov's *Russky vestnik*, published the lengthy article "Modern Ukrainophilism," signed by Z. (N. Rigel'man). The article contained a standard set of accusations, including the definition of the KGS as an organizing center for the Ukrainophiles, and information about Polish subsidies for Ukrainophile activities in Galicia.⁶⁶ However, Rigel'man rated highly ethnographic studies by the KGS, including the research of Antonovich and Dragomanov. The author did not propose to close the organization, but called for a cleansing of "false, voluntary or involuntary, admixture."

In June 1875 *Russkii vestnik* published an article by S. Gogotskii, "Some more words about Ukrainophilism," in which he repeated most of Rigel'man's thesis and added a demand to prohibit the Little Russian language even for the explanation of unknown Russian words to first-grade pupils.⁶⁷ Additional comments to the article, written by Gogotskii and published in the July issue, are especially interesting. They are devoted to the terminology problem, directly connected to the problem of identity. "Our southwest is not *ukraina*; since the ancient times of Russian history this Russian land has been called *Rus'*, *russkii* [...] That is why, to this day in the southwest they say, for instance, *Russian* farm as opposed to Polish [...] but no one ever says [...] *Ukrainian* farm. [...] By what right do we dare to intrude with Ukrainian plans into the centuries-old (*izdrevle*) Russian, not Ukrainian land? All these terms are not nicknames that can be changed at any time, are they? Who, in fact, authorized the Ukrainophiles to deprive us of

the ancient name of the Russians and all its attributes, including our common cultural Russian language, which has been formed by the long and difficult process of our history, and to replace all this with something *Ukrainian*, that is, something which originated far later, something particular meaning only *a borderland*? [...] What an absurd and miserable hope that *Ukrainian* can become for us more important than *Russian*!”⁶⁸ (Original italics.)

Still, the main danger for the Ukrainophiles came from the article written by Rigel'man, and especially the part criticizing Dragomanov's work "Russian, Great Russian, Ukrainian, and Galician literatures," published in *Pravda* in 1874. That article, written by Dragomanov under the pseudonym "Ukrainian," was a comprehensive summary of his program, outlined earlier in his article "An Interval in the History of Ukrainophilism" in 1872. He stressed the necessity "not to break away with Russia either politically or morally, and not to abandon Russian literature," and spoke about a "common *rusaskaia* or *rossiskaia* intelligentsia that is composed of Great Russians and Little Russians." The main objective of Ukrainophilism, according to him, was to assist the Ukrainian people "not to lose its existence while participating in Russian (*rossiiskoe*) development."⁶⁹ Rigel'man even had to admit that "one can only wish many of those proposals be implemented."⁷⁰ However, Dragomanov's article contained many incautious statements concerning the future independence of the Ukrainian nation in a federative union with Russia. That gave Rigel'man an opportunity to claim that all stipulations regarding Russo-Ukrainian unity were just a cover for the real separatist ideas of the author and the Ukrainophiles. Perhaps Dondukov-Korsakov's patronage of the KGS lulled Dragomanov's caution and he made the same mistake against which he himself had warned *Pravda* a year before—not to touch upon the subject of Ukrainian independence in order not to harm the activities of the Kiev Ukrainophiles. Dragomanov's authorship was not a secret to anybody. After the publication of Rigel'man's article he accurately estimated the real danger and tried to protect himself. He responded by a brief unsigned note and then a lengthier anonymous article in the *Kievskii telegraf* in which he denied any separatist plans on the part of the Ukrainophiles.⁷¹ Yet this was far from enough. What he needed was the intervention of the metropolitan press and some renowned Russian publicist. In early May Dragomanov wrote to A. P. Pypin, who was supportive of the Ukrainian cultural movement but did not

accept its separatist ideas. "Having read Rigel'man in *Russkii vestnik*, I thought it would be useful if an honest man, even an opponent, but not a swindler, wrote openly about 'L. r.' and others."⁷² Pypin rejected the offer and proposed that Dragomanov answer Rigel'man himself. Dragomanov then asked Pypin to pass Rigel'man's article to P. A. Rovinskii, a member of the friendly *Vestnik Evropy*, hoping that Rovinskii could start a dispute with Rigel'man.

In the July issue of *Vestnik Evropy*, Dragomanov published a lengthy review of a subsequent volume of the materials of Chubinskii's expedition and repeated his own 1872 definition of Ukrainophilism as a variety of Russian Slavophilism. He condemned Galician public figures who refused to recognize Russian literature as All-Russian, and explained their rapprochement with the Poles by the repression against Little Russian literature in the 1860s. Addressing his persecutors in St. Petersburg, Dragomanov wrote: "Observing the process of the social and cultural movement in Little Russia from Mazepa to nowadays, one can say that aspirations to political-national uniqueness have gradually weakened while aspirations to social-cultural development in popular forms and in harmony with similar North Russian aspirations have gradually become stronger."⁷³

Following this, in August and September, *Vestnik Evropy* published Dragomanov's lengthy article "The New-Celtic and Provençal movement in France." Although Ukraine and Ukrainophilism were not mentioned there, the article was larded with quite lucid allusions. Dragomanov wrote about the rise of "Celtophilism," "Bretonophilism," and the Provençal movement in France as a typical and positive tendency that reflected a more general development of self-governance, de-centralization, and the cultural and political growth of the "rural classes."⁷⁴ Sympathizing with these processes and "rejecting the chase for uniformity of hearts and speech" was, according to Dragomanov, a dominant mood all over France.⁷⁵ At the same time, he condemned the radicalism of some leaders of "Bretonophilism" and asked "whether the latter would be stronger if they directly admitted their connection with progressive people in the society of evil Gauls."⁷⁶ Finally, he directly addressed the subject of his unfortunate article in *Pravda*. "There is no doubt that the first domestic needs in literary education can be satisfied by the literature in native dialects (*narechiia*). Yet, the division of great world literatures such as French, German, and Italian into provincial literatures would be a disastrous cultural phenomenon

just as the complete political division of great national units would be a political disaster.”⁷⁷ Dragomanov, only in a slightly veiled form, attempted to justify himself by stressing the federalist, not separatist, nature of his convictions. However, he did not embark on an open debate with Rigel’man. The other solution, in the form of open repentance, was simply unacceptable to him.

Concomitantly, Dragomanov was trying to recruit Pypin, stressing that his opinion “would serve as the best barrier to the chatter of all sorts of insects.” This letter, most likely written in August 1875 since the matter concerning Iuzefovich’s denunciation to the Third Department is mentioned as a *fait accompli*, sounds almost like a cry for help. Having mentioned Iuzefovich’s threats to report directly to the Third Department, an intention that Iuzefovich, according to the rumors, had already accomplished, Dragomanov continued, “I am picked up as a person who should be exiled to secure public order. The metropolitan press keeps silence [...] and so do the Ukrainophile notables, and others, like Lysenko in *Golos*, write utter banalities!”⁷⁸

Rigel’man’s article had the expected effect—it attracted the attention of the Petersburg authorities. On 5 May 1875, A. P. Shirinskii-Shikhmatov, the deputy minister under Tolstoy and former curator of the Kiev Educational District, sent a new letter to Antonovich. He suggested that Antonovich pay special attention to the activities of teachers and professors who sympathized with Ukrainophilism and asked for a list of the unreliaables. In order to deprive Antonovich of the smallest opportunity to neglect the inquiry, as had happened with the January letter of the minister, Shirinskii-Shikhmatov suggested that a list of all teachers be sent to him, promising that, based on his former experience, he would easily identify the obvious Ukrainophiles. Among these he immediately mentioned Dragomanov, V. Antonovich, and P. Zhitetskii. Dragomanov’s article “Literatura rossiska...,” which was destined to play a fatal role in the author’s biography, was also attached to the letter.⁷⁹

Antonovich’s response of 19 July was a lengthy note, in which the author disputed in detail most of Shirinskii-Shikhmatov’s accusations. The suspicion that V. Antonovich was a Ukrainophile was entirely rejected and Zhitetskii’s behavior was said to be decent enough for the moment. However, Antonovich refused to vouch for Zhitetskii’s reliability and promised to fire him at the slightest suspicion of unreliability. Although stressing that Dragomanov’s teaching activity did

not provide any grounds for accusations, Antonovich agreed that the attached article served as a solid pretext for his dismissal from the university. This was what he suggested should be done. Antonovich's rigor was obviously demonstrative. Certainly, he knew about Dragomanov's article long before it was sent to him from St. Petersburg—*Kievlianin* wrote about it as early as 1874 and in February 1875 it became a subject for investigation in *Russkii vestnik*. However, P. Antonovich avoided any action even after receiving a letter from the minister of education in January, which clearly testified that the curator made every possible effort to avoid repression against Hromada's leaders.

Furthermore, P. Antonovich criticized "Shulgin's insinuations" and Iuzefovich's "public outburst of anger" against the KGS, reducing their accusations to the settling of personal accounts. Not without slyness he denied that Chubinskii, the former exile, played a key role in the KGS. Antonovich stressed that Chubinskii was an insignificant and unknown person, and mentioned that among the founders of the KGS one could count his present-day critics. Concluding his note, Antonovich pointed out that "however that may be, the Kiev Geographic Society is under the patronage of the main chief of the borderland, who honors its meetings by his presence and, in general, actively participates in its activities; therefore, it is hard to accept that the Society could have become the center of Ukrainophilism in Kiev."⁸⁰

Thus, after sacrificing a "ritual victim" in the form of Dragomanov's dismissal from the university, the Kiev authorities launched an all-round defense, aimed at protecting the KGS and avoiding a wider campaign of personal repression. Hromada also undertook steps in the same direction—on 1 August its members left the *Kievskii telegraf* and, in this way, stopped the polemic with *Kievlianin*. In their written statement they did not mention the actual reasons for their conduct—written in a loyal style, it contained some accusation against the Poles as the main and only enemy. Ukraine was never mentioned, the statement spoke only about Southern Russia. It was only a call to discuss "the Slavic-Russian question from the progressive-popular point of view" that gently hinted at the real circumstances.⁸¹

The minister of education turned out not to be sufficiently influential to break down Dondukov-Korsakov's resistance. It was in these circumstances that, in early August 1876, Iuzefovich wrote to A. L. Potapov, the head of the Gendarme Corps.

NOTES

- 1 The fact that declines and rises in the Ukrainian national movement coincided with All-Russian ones has already been mentioned by I. Lysiak-Rudnytsky. See I. L. Rudnytsky, *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History*, pp. 12–13.
- 2 *Vestnik Evropy* (May 1872), p. 241.
- 3 *Ibid.* (February 1872), pp. 687–689.
- 4 *Ibid.* (March 1872), p. 200.
- 5 *Ibid.*, p. 198.
- 6 In 1878, after emigration, Dragomanov acknowledged the tactical character of his ideas when he wrote how Ukrainophilism “was hiding under the protection of Moscow Slavophilism.” (See M. Dragomanov, *Shevchenko, ukrainophili i sotsiializm* (Lvov, 1906), p. 145. (First edition vol. 4, *Hromada*: Geneva edition, 1878).
- 7 *Vestnik Evropy* (March 1872), pp. 211–212.
- 8 *Ibid.* (May 1872), p. 239.
- 9 *Ibid.*, p. 238.
- 10 *Ibid.* (March 1872), pp. 237–239.
- 11 “Russkie v Galitsii,” *Vestnik Evropy* (January 1872), pp. 149–151.
- 12 See F. Savchenko, “Ukrainske naukovo-kulturne samovyznachennia 1850–1876 rr.,” *Ukraina* (Kiev, 1929).
- 13 F. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, pp. 1–126.
- 14 *Ibid.*, pp. 6, 10–13.
- 15 G. P. Galagan, a rich landowner, was a member of the editorial commissions and the state council. He was also given personal commissions by the tsar. At the same time, he had been supporting the Ukrainophiles since the late 1850s.
- 16 K. Studinsky, “Lysty Dragomanova do Navrots’kogo,” *Za sto lit*, no. 1 (Kharkov, Kiev, 1927), p. 117.
- 17 In as early as 1874 Iuzefovich wrote with obvious irritation: “In a very vulgar way I became a tool of those people, who, in order to reach their goals, hid themselves behind several plausible names.” Here from F. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, p. 369.
- 18 See F. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, p. 23.
- 19 On Navrotskii and some details regarding his relations with the editorial staff of *Pravda*, see D. Zaslavskii and I. Romanchenko, *Mikhailo Dragomanov. Zhitt’a i literaturno-doslidnitska diiatelnost’* (Kiev, 1964), p. 41.
- 20 K. Studinskii, “Lysty Dragomanova do Navrots’kogo,” p. 135. Interestingly enough, in this letter Dragomanov in fact predicted the sources of future troubles for Ukrainophiles, expressing anxiety concerning the possible discontent of those people who would not be accepted in the KGS, as well as the publication of excessively frank articles in *Pravda*. Dragomanov himself made that mistake when he published the article “Literatura rosiiska, velikoruska, ukrainska i galitska” in *Pravda*.

- 21 Since the editors did not like it, Dragomanov repeatedly demanded its publication. Finally, the article was published in *Pravda* only in 1876. ("Antrakt z istorii ukrainofilstva," *Pravda*, nos. 12–16, 1876.) D. Zaslavskii and I. Romanchenko, *Mikhailo Dragomanov*, p. 49. Here from M. P. Dragomanov, *Vybrane...* (Kiev, 1991), pp. 204–233.
- 22 M. P. Dragomanov, *Vybrane*, pp. 211–212.
- 23 *Ibid.*, pp. 211, 231.
- 24 *Ibid.*, p. 211.
- 25 *Ibid.*, p. 229. Here, he means an explanatory dictionary of the Ukrainian language. On the role of such monolingual dictionaries as a peculiar "tool of linguistic ownership" in the development of nationalistic movements of "non-historical" nations see B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*. An attempt to create a Russian–Ukrainian dictionary, undertaken by several groups of Ukrainian activists in the 1860s, finally resulted in the publication of two dictionaries only in the 1890s. Even at that time these dictionaries were focused rather on collecting different folk dialects than on the standardization of the language, hence modern researchers define them as "dialectological" or "ethnographical." See S. Yekelchuk, "Nation's Clothes: The Construction of a National High Culture by the Ukrainian Intelligentsia in the Russian Empire, 1860–1900," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 49, no. 2 (2001), pp. 230–39. Also P. I. Goretskii, *Istoriia ukrainskoi leksikografii* (Kiev, 1963), pp. 68–149.
- 26 See K. V. Dushenko, *Iz istorii polskoi burzhuaznoi obshchestvennoi mysli. Varshavskii pozitivizm 1866–1886* (Ph.D. diss., Moscow, 1977).
- 27 M. P. Dragomanov, *Vybrane*, p. 220.
- 28 Later, to all accusations of insufficient adherence to the Ukrainian cause, Dragomanov responded that in the journalistic struggle for the Ukrainian cause he had sacrificed both his position at the university and his reputation as a contributor to the best Russian journals. (See D. von Mohrenschild, *Toward a United States*, p. 141). However, in the period between 1874 and 1876, Dragomanov did not aim at "burning down the bridges." He valued his position, and his Ukrainophile activities—his unfortunate article in *Pravda* notwithstanding—were rather careful. It was only after his forced departure from Russia in 1876 that he turned to open opposition to the regime, and even then Dragomanov continued in his adherence to the federal idea. It is difficult to see how Dragomanov, with his public temperament, would be able to work at the university for his entire life, as did, for instance, B. Antonovich, or further his career by becoming a member of the Collegium of the Finance Ministry, as did another member of Hromada, I. Ia. Rudchenko, or of the Collegium of the Ministry of Communications, as did A. I. Stronin, a former teacher of Dragomanov. Nevertheless, his fate could have been entirely different from how it was in reality.
- 29 RGIA, f. 1282, op. 1., ed. khr. 532, l. 135.

- 30 F. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, p. 71.
- 31 RGIA, f. 932, op. 1., ed. khr. 160, l. 104.
- 32 *Ibid.*, l. 1–104.
- 33 “Novaia malorusskaia opera,” *Kievlianin*, 2 February 1874, no. 15.
- 34 *Kievlianin*, 24 January 1874, no. 11.
- 35 F. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, p. 17.
- 36 *Kievlianin*, 1 January 1875, no. 1.
- 37 *Kievlianin*, 5 November 1874, no. 132; *Kievskii telegraf*, 30 April 1876, no. 51. *Kievlianin* turned repeatedly to the theme of conflict between generations and to personal attacks on Dragomanov. The newspaper wrote about the “hackneyed and boring Mr. T-ov” (a pseudonym for Dragomanov) (5 November 1874, no. 132), “a local genius” (1 January 1875, no. 1), and overweening parvenus, who “consider those who attained civil maturity *eo ipso* useless conservatives” (9 January 1875, no. 4). Dragomanov “returned the favor” by calling Iuzefovich “a privy councilor and an evident spy.”
- 38 “Po povodu Kievskikh zastol’nykh rechei,” *Vestnik Evropy*, no. 12 (1873), p. 906.
- 39 *Nedelia*, 27 July 1876, no. 30.
- 40 *Kievlianin*, 2 February 1874, no. 15.
- 41 *Ibid.*, 9 February 1874, no. 18.
- 42 *Ibid.*, 10 July 1875, no. 81.
- 43 *Ibid.*, 22 March 1875, no. 35. The newspaper’s position towards Kostomarov is particularly interesting because shortly before, during the archaeological congress in Kiev in late August/early September 1874, Iuzefovich had suffered cruel public humiliation at the hands of Kostomarov. He approached a group of participants, which included Kostomarov, and greeted him: “Ah, Nikolai Ivanovich, I am so glad to meet you! It has been quite a while since we saw each other!” Kostomarov, remembering the damaging role Iuzefovich had played in the Cyril–Methodius Society affair, responded: “Yes, long enough. But I am still not going to shake your hand,” then turned away and left. (“Vospominaniia A. D. Korsakova,” *Byloe*, no. 9 (1906). Here from F. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, p. 61.)
- 44 *Kievlianin*, 8 March 1875, no. 29.
- 45 *Ibid.*, 22 March 1875, no. 35.
- 46 Both published in Ukrainian in 1872—the small brochure on geography, *Descho pro svit Bozhii*, and the small collection of poetry, *Sopilka*, became a “touchstone” of the Ukrainophiles’ publishing activity. Having met no obstacles from censorship they became a signal for the activation of Hromada’s publishing business.
- 47 F. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, p. 62.
- 48 “Sklad razlichnykh ukladov, vykladov i perekladov na iazyke, vydavaemom za malorusskii,” *Kievlianin*, 7 November 1874, no. 133.

- 49 See, for instance, *Kievlianin*, 2 February 1874, no. 15; 9 February 1874, no. 18; 28 September 1874, no. 116, etc. A popular "shocking" sample of clumsy translations into the Ukrainian language was allegedly taken from the translation of *Hamlet* by M. P. Staritskii. Hamlet's famous question was said to be translated as: "Buty chy ne buty? Os' to zakovyyka." In fact, the translation read: "Zhyty chy ne zhyty? Os' v chim rich'." Staritskii kept sending protests and copies of his book to editorial offices, but all his attempts to stop the sneering failed. However, Staritskii's translations and neologisms were repeatedly subjected to criticism, not only by the opponents of Ukrainophilism but also by Kostomarov and Nechuy-Levitsky. See S. Yekelchuk, "Nation's Clothes: The Construction of a National High Culture by the Ukrainian Intelligentsia in the Russian Empire, 1860–1900," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 49, no. 2 (2001).
- 50 *Kievlianin*, 17 September 1874, no. 111.
- 51 N. A. Rigel'man was the head of the Kiev office of the "Slavic charitable committee" that actively supported the Moscowphiles in Eastern Galicia. In the 1840s he was close to the members of the Cyril–Methodius Society, and then shifted to an anti-Ukrainian position.
- 52 *Kievlianin*, 30 September 1874, no. 118.
- 53 *Ibid.*, 30 September 1874, no. 118.
- 54 *Ibid.*, 26 October 1874, no. 128.
- 55 *Ibid.*, 21 November 1874, no. 139.
- 56 *Ibid.*, 12 September 1874, no. 109.
- 57 *Ibid.*, 24 July 1875, no. 87.
- 58 F. Savchenko published the article by Iuzefovich that had been forbidden by the censors. See F. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, pp. 368–372.
- 59 F. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, p. 63.
- 60 *Ibid.*, p. 146.
- 61 Here from V. Miyakovskii, "Zapiska 1874 r. pro ukrainski ruh," *Arhivna Sprava*, nos. 2–3 (1927), p. 21.
- 62 F. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, p. 65. His opinion is much stronger than the version of Miyakovskii, who considered Iuzefovich to be the author. Besides, it is possible to add that in the note one can find some negative remarks regarding Plochshanskii, the editor of *Slovo*, while Iuzefovich, a year later, was actively pressing for a subsidy for Plochshanskii from the government.
- 63 The special report by Potapov, head of the Gendarme Corps, "On the exposure and distribution of destructive thoughts," was discussed by the Cabinet of Ministers in March 1875. See P. A. Valuev, *Dnevnik*, vol. 2, pp. 514–515.
- 64 See O. Doroshkevich, "Listi M.P. Dragomanova do O.M. Pypina," *Za sto lit*, no. 3. (Kharkov, Kiev, 1928), p. 75; F. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, p. 62.
- 65 F. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, pp. 147–150.
- 66 *Russikii vestnik*, no. 2 (1875), pp. 820, 827.
- 67 "Echshe neskol'ko slov ob ukrainofilstve," *Russiky vestnik*, no. 6 (1875), p. 790.

- 68 *Russkii vestnik*, no. 7 (1875), pp. 414–415.
- 69 *Ibid.*, no. 2 (1875), pp. 837, 839.
- 70 *Ibid.*, p. 838.
- 71 *Kievskii telegraf*, 22 March 1875, no. 36; and 9 April 1875, no. 43.
- 72 O. Doroshkevich, “Lysty M. P. Dragomanova do O.M. Pypina,” p. 74. Pypin constantly criticized, as far as censorship allowed, the police repression against the Ukrainophiles. His article on the history of Ukrainophilism in *Istoriia Russkoi etnografii* (History of Russian ethnography) occasionally repeated, almost word for word, Dragomanov’s thoughts in his articles of 1872. At the same time, the publication “Little Russian Ethnography” in *History of Russian Ethnography*, as well as the insertion of his and V. D. Spasovich’s article on Little Russian literature into the section on Russian literature in *Ocherk istorii slavianskikh literature* (SPb., 1865) indicated that, although opposed to forced assimilation, he shared the idea of the All-Russian nation.
- 73 M. Dragomanov, “Retsenziia na t. 7 ‘Trudov etnograficheskoi-statisticheskoi ekspeditsii v zapadno-russky kraj’ pod rukovodstvom P. P. Chubinskogo,” *Vestnik Evropy*, no. 7 (1875), pp. 158–167, 169.
- 74 *Vestnik Evropy*, no. 8 (1875), pp. 703, 706, 727.
- 75 *Ibid.*, p. 692.
- 76 *Ibid.*, p. 727.
- 77 *Vestnik Evropy*, no. 9 (1875), p. 188.
- 78 O. Doroshkevich, “Lysty M.P. Dragomanova do O.M. Pypina,” p. 75. According to these letters Dragomanov attempted, as far as he could, to settle quietly the incident caused by his carelessness and to keep his position in Kiev.
- 79 See F. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, pp. 64–70.
- 80 *Ibid.*, pp. 70–73.
- 81 *Kievskii telegraf*, 30 July 1875, no. 90.

CHAPTER 9

The Ems Edict

On 27 August 1875 the head of the Third Department, general–adjutant A. L. Potapov, signed the following letter: “Due to the manifestations of Ukrainophile activities, in particular the translation and printing of textbooks and prayer books in Little Russian, His Majesty the Tsar, has deigned to establish a Special Council (*Soveschchanie*) under the chairmanship of the minister of the interior for the thorough discussion of this question. It will include the minister of education, the chief procurator of the Holy Synod, the chief of the Third Department of His Imperial Majesty’s Chancellery, and the chair of the Kiev Archaeological Commission, Privy Councilor Iuzefovich.”¹ The next day the letter was sent to A. E. Timashev at the Ministry of the Interior, D. A. Tolstoy at the Ministry of Education, K. P. Pobedonostsev at the Synod, and Iuzefovich (apparently through Dondukov-Korsakov) in Kiev.

The archives of the Special Council do not contain documents preceding this message.² It is obvious, however, that Iuzefovich wrote to Potapov probably in early August. To all appearances, the head of the Gendarme Corps shared his correspondent’s opinion and, reporting to Alexander II before the tsar’s visit to Kiev in September, proposed including Iuzefovich in the Special Council. (The fact that in the letter the commission headed by Iuzefovich in Kiev was called “Archaeological” rather than “Archaeographical” once more demonstrates that Iuzefovich was not included in it “out of duty.”) The publication of Ukrainian popular books, prohibited by the Valuev Circular and personally approved by the tsar in 1863, appeared as the main point of the initial accusation.

September was spent on the preparation of two expert memoranda for the Special Council. The first was composed by the GUP on the instruction of Timashev and presented for his consideration

on 3 October.³ The documents do not contain the author's name, but he defines himself as a Great Russian. The GUP memorandum exclusively concerned the language issue. It compared the situation in Little Russia with that in Brittany and the southern provinces of France, where the majority of the population spoke patois. It was emphasized that non-French-speaking people "do not by far constitute such a substantial proportion of the French population as a whole as do Little Russians within the Russian population. It is possible, with perfect security for Russia's integrity, to look at the emergence of, for instance, Latvian literature, but allowing the isolation of 13 million Little Russians by raising the Ukrainian dialect to the status of a literary language would be the greatest political imprudence, especially so in view of the unifying movement that is taking place in the neighboring German tribe (*plemia*)."⁴ The note also referred to the role of Little Russia in the Russo-Polish conflict, mentioning that Russia gained predominance over Poland "mainly due to the fact that from Poland she obtained Little Russia: if the latter again turns from us to the Poles, the current greatness of the Russian state will be at stake."⁵ The motive of the triune nation is invoked here in passing, as the emphasis is given to the strategic significance of Little Russia and the demographic weight of Little Russians on the scale of the empire.⁶ The separatist aspirations of the Ukrainophiles are implicitly discussed through the prism of the "Polish intrigue," and the separation of Little Russia from Russia is understood as her alliance with Poland. The memorandum formulated a number of recommendations on the limitation of the publication of Ukrainian books and the prohibition of the importing of such books from abroad. Later, these recommendations were included in the conclusion of the Special Council.

The second memorandum was prepared by Iuzefovich, who must have extended and elaborated the text he sent to Potapov in August. This note can only have been ready by mid-October, as it mentioned the admission of S. D. Nos and A. Ia. Konisskii to the KGS on 3 October 1875.⁷ Iuzefovich accentuated the concept of the triune Russian nation. His text started from a broad historical excursus, in which he stated that "there has never been national discord among Russian tribes. Faith, language, historical origins, and ideals—everything was common [...] Their ethnographic colors flow together like iridescent, indivisible lines [...] Kiev with its All-Russian sanctity, and Moscow with the All-Russian tsar have become the links of our

national unity that cannot be broken off by any outside force.”⁸ Following this section of pathos, Iuzefovich went on to the history of Ukrainophilism, describing it exclusively as “the fabrication of the Polish–Austrian intrigue.” As proof, he described in detail the story of Kulish’s conversion to Ukrainophilism by a Pole, M. Grabowsky, who later became the minister of education in the Polish Kingdom at the time of A. Wielopolski.⁹ According to Iuzefovich, the aim of Kostomarov’s historical works was to “undermine the Little Russians’ sympathy for the Russian state by exposing its history to humiliation and disgrace.”¹⁰ Iuzefovich also lashed out at the young Ukrainophiles—the KGS as the organizational center of the movement, and Dragomanov and Chubinskii as its leaders, became the main targets. Not refraining from using such “political accusations” as “insolent character,” the note emanated the author’s personal hostility to the mentioned activists.

The concluding passage of the note was aimed at exploiting official fears aroused by the 1874 “going to the people” (*khozhdienie v narod*) movement. It warned of a popular revolt in the Cossack style: “The efforts of the democrats to revive the old memories and old savage instincts of the local people are apparently beginning to elicit a response. I am not the only one who thinks that the armed gangs of bandits in masks who have appeared in our land (*krai*) are nothing other than the embryos of an emerging *haidamak*’ movement (*haidamatchina*).”¹¹

Subsequent documents of the Special Council show that no detailed analysis of KGS and *Kievskii telegraf* activities was carried out. Inquiries about Ukrainophiles sent by Potapov to his subordinates in the southwestern borderland were similarly fruitless. It was only the chief of the Volyn’ guberniia Gendarme Corps, Lieutenant Colonel Bel’skii, who managed to provide his superior with some substantial information. In his reports, Bel’skii mentioned the activities of Lobodovskii, the son of a priest, who worked as a clerk in Raikovska *volost*. Lobodovskii had distributed free Ukrainian books among the peasants, but the books (154 copies) were confiscated by the gendarmes.¹² A list of the confiscated books, most of which were works by Shevchenko, included a translation of Gogol’s *Taras Bulba* into Ukrainian. In this translation, mentioned by Iuzefovich in his note, the words “Russian land” and “a Russian” were removed and replaced by *Ukraina* (Ukrainian land, a Ukrainian), and ultimately even a future Ukrainian

tsar was prophetically proclaimed.”¹³ The fact that Lobodovskii had been recommended to his position by the head of the local congress of justices of the peace, P. A. Kosach, who was married to Dragomanov’s sister Olga, lent the episode a special significance.¹⁴

Bel’skii’s report was dated 3 April 1876 and its publication was timely, as it was in April that the Special Council started working on its journal and elaborating its decisions. For that period Iuzefovich was called to St. Petersburg, where he arrived having petitioned for the reimbursement of “traveling expenses.”¹⁵

Additional information was prepared for the Special Council by the GUP. Some of the GUP conclusions were included in the journal of the Special Council in the following form: “For a long time the censorship department has been paying attention to the appearance of a considerable number of books published in the Little Russian dialect, obviously including nothing related to politics but merely associated with scientific and artistic interests. But watching closely the direction of all publications in the Little Russian dialect one cannot but come to the conclusion that all literary activity of the so-called Ukrainophiles, disguised under the cloak of legality, should be treated as an infringement of state unity and of the integrity of Russia. The center of this criminal activity is currently located in Kiev. The aspiration of the Kiev Ukrainophiles to sow the seeds of dissension and, so to speak, isolate themselves from Great Russian literature, is dangerous, the more so since it coincides with the similar desires and activities of the Ukrainophiles in Galicia, who constantly refer to the 15 million South Russian people as if they were something separate from the Great Russian tribe. Sooner or later such an opinion will throw the Galician, and then our, Ukrainophiles into the arms of the Poles, who, not without good reason, consider Ukrainophile aspirations as extremely useful for their own political purposes. The proof lies in the support provided for the Galician Ukrainophile society Prosvita by the Diet, where Polish influence prevails.”¹⁶

In popular books published by our Ukrainophiles and approved by the censors, it is difficult to find an evident democratic orientation, yet it does not prove that Ukrainophiles remain unaffected by the destructive impulses of socialism.

[...] It is also evident that the ultimate goal of the Ukrainophiles is to separate the Little Russians by the slow, but to some extent reliable way of alienating the Little Russian language and literature. To

allow the creation of a separate popular literature in the Ukrainian dialect would mean laying the foundation for a belief in the possibility of Ukraine's estrangement from Russia in the future, however distant. Reacting indulgently toward the recently developing effort to isolate the Ukrainian dialect by raising it to the level of literary language, the government would have no grounds to ignore the same claim for the isolation of the dialect of the Belorussians, who are as numerous as Little Russians. Ukraine, Little Russia, and Western Russia, inhabited by Belorussians, due to historical events and the natural inclination of the borderlands to relate to the Great Russian center, constitute one great political body together with Russia."¹⁷ This lengthy quotation shows that the Special Council's understanding of the situation, and the ideological basis of its decisions, repeated almost word for word Katkov's argument of 1863 (the "Polish intrigue," the threat of potential Belorussian separatism based on the Little Russian example, linguistic isolation as a premise for political separation) and did not move one step further. Doubts regarding the appropriateness of the tactics chosen in 1863, voiced by Valuev in the 1860s and shared by Dondukov-Korsakov and other high-ranking officials in the 1870s, did not find a single reflection in the Special Council's conclusions. It is indicative that the Kiev governor-general did not even attempt to present his views regarding the subject to the Special Council, although he knew about its work. This conveys a lot about the atmosphere in which the Special Council was functioning, since the disparity of the decisions was already obvious to many at the very moment of their approval. In fact, the Special Council did not try to discuss, analyze, and solve the problem. Rather, it prepared the ideological ground for repressive measures and served as a battlefield for status rivalry among the ministers. Later, we will see that even those members of the council, at the level of ministers, who did not agree with some of the decisions, preferred not to object openly but attempted to block these decisions by purely bureaucratic methods. Yet it was a general tendency—Russia was approaching the first mass political trial over the *narodniki* (the Trial of 193 in 1877), at the basis of which lay the idea of *repressivnost'* as a preventive measure.

On 24 April 1876 the Special Council passed a draft of the resolution composed by Iuzefovich. It consisted of eleven paragraphs. The first three stipulated restrictions on the distribution of literature in Ukrainian and provided for the prohibition of the importing of this

literature as well as its publication in the Ukrainian language within the empire, with the exception of historical documents and “belles-lettres,” and only then by special permission of the GUP in each particular case. Especially emphasized was the prohibiting of *kulishovka*, that is, the phonetic orthography elaborated by Kulish. It was mentioned that “All-Russian orthography” should be observed, that is, it was prohibited to use “i” instead of “ii”, and “i” before a consonant.¹⁸ These paragraphs repeated the Valuev Circular by defining in a more explicit way the attempt to block Kulish’s orthography reforms, which were meant to intensify the differences between the Ukrainian literary language and Russian. In comparison with the Valuev Circular, the prohibition was extended in the fourth paragraph to include stage performances in Ukrainian, “as having the character of Ukrainophile manifestations.”

Paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 related to the Ministry of Education. It was suggested not to permit teaching in the Little Russian language in schools, “to purify the libraries of all primary and secondary educational institutions” from books in Little Russian, and to send graduate teachers from the Great Russian guberniias to the Kiev, Kharkov, and Odessa educational districts and graduates from these districts to other districts.

Paragraph 5 proposed providing the Lvov newspaper *Slovo* with financial support. (A separate chapter will discuss this issue in greater detail.)

Finally, paragraphs 6, 10, and 11 presupposed the closing of the *Kievskii telegraf*, and of the KGS—for “an indefinite period”—and the exile of Chubinskii and Dragomanov. Iuzefovich celebrated his victory—finally he could get even with those who had offended him.

In the Special Council journal prepared for Alexander II, four paragraphs from Iuzefovich’s project underwent considerable changes. A ban on public recitations in Ukrainian and an absurd ban on the publication of musical texts were added to the prohibiting of stage performances. The paragraph on the total resettlement of teachers, which was obviously not feasible, was edited in such a way that only unreliable people were to be relocated.

The most interesting amendments were added to the paragraphs on the prohibiting of the KGS and the exile of Chubinskii and Dragomanov. In Timashev’s copy the paragraph on the KGS was accurately crossed out in pencil in such a way that, if necessary, it was easy

to remove the pencil mark.¹⁹ In the journal prepared by Timashev for the tsar, this paragraph was formulated quite vaguely: "Concerning the activities of the Kiev branch of the Russian Imperial Geographic Society, authorize the minister of the interior to contact the proper offices and submit a special report on the Society members Chubinskii and Dragomanov." Nothing was said about their exile from the region.²⁰ It is obvious that these changes were made by the minister of the interior at the request of the RGS' patron, Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich. Probably Dondukov-Korsakov also interceded for Dragomanov and Chubinskii. Dondukov-Korsakov could have reported to Konstantin Nikolaevich on the plans of the Special Council, whereupon the latter talked to Timashev. Another variant is also possible: Timashev thought it necessary to inform the grand duke about the impending threat to the KGS. It is hard to say whether Timashev simply wanted to do the grand duke a favor or, due to his work experience in Kiev,²¹ he shared Dondukov-Korsakov's views. Whatever the case, he tried to save the KGS and its leaders.

Long before the events under discussion, Valuev, an expert on Russian bureaucracy, including special councils and commissions, wrote in his diary: "Deplorable and ridiculous is our naiveté when we suppose that, after talking for three or four hours and never agreeing on anything, we can achieve worthy results. All strengths are abortively spent on gibberish. They talk, produce a journal, and present it to the tsar for his 'executive' resolution, and that is it. So, what is 'executed'? Only some fragmentary measures—today we go in one direction, tomorrow in another. An ill-assorted team drives badly the state cart of Mother Russia."²² We will see later how neatly these words could be applied to the Special Council on Ukrainophilism. Meanwhile, let us look at just one phrase that describes the mechanism of actions: "They talk, produce a journal, present it to the Tsar for his 'executive' resolution..." The chairman of the Special Council, Timashev, should have controlled both final stages—the production of the journal and its presentation to the tsar. In this case his plan would have worked out well. Unfortunately, Alexander II went abroad in April. Timashev could have postponed the presentation of the journal to the tsar until his return, but he probably believed that the main threat to his plans came from Iuzefovich, who was in St. Petersburg. As a result, he committed a fatal error. On 11 May he sent the journal to Potapov, who was accompanying the tsar in Germany, along with a

note requesting Potapov to show the journal to Alexander II.²³ Thus Timashev let the decisive act of “presenting” the journal to the tsar out of his hands, which entailed grievous consequences.

Apparently, the fact that Potapov was reserved at the meetings of the Special Council, allowing Iuzefovich to insist on the most severe measures, misled Timashev. In fact, the head of the Gendarme Corps shared Iuzefovich’ views. The latter, however, also stood vigilant. Before sending the journal to Potapov, Timashev had to collect the signatures of all the members, including Iuzefovich. On 12 May, the day after the journal was sent, Iuzefovich sent a letter to Potapov, in which he wrote: “Having signed the journal on the measures defined by the Special Council in order to suppress the so-called Ukrainophile movement in Kiev, I believe that it is my duty to report to Your Excellency that it is my strong conviction that all other measures will be ineffective as long as the Kiev Geographic Society exists with its present staff. I cannot deny the feasibility of the special considerations that impelled the council to reject my proposal on the immediate closure of the KGS in order to open it in a new form. But nor can I overcome my anxiety that the task concerning the reorganization of the KGS, entrusted to the minister of the interior, requires extensive correspondence and may long delay the solution to the problem, thus robbing the most important safeguard of a significance that can be weakened or strengthened by the slowness or promptness of its implementation.”²⁴

In his letter of 18 May from Ems, Potapov described the following picture of events: “Having received the due letter of Your Excellency of 12 May, I was happy to present it along with the journal of our council to the tsar. His Imperial Majesty deigned to approve all suggestions concerning the Kiev branch of the Imperial Geographic Society and vouchsafed with his own hand to design a resolution concordant with Your Excellency’s opinion and mine.” I would like to draw attention to the words “the due letter.” It allows us to surmise that the anti-Timashev plan had been agreed upon in advance. In other words, Iuzefovich was supposed to send this letter to Potapov, who, continuing to play the role of impartial mediator, could “present” to the tsar not only the journal but a project for a more radical solution. Brief, clearly formulated, and politically correct towards Timashev, the letter was designed not only for Potapov since further on in his letter Potapov asked Iuzefovich to keep this information “in strict confidence” until its official announcement. It looks as if he was afraid that Timashev

might undertake some counteraction. In his letter to the minister of the interior, also dated 18 May, Potapov omitted all details and stated only that the tsar had looked through the journal and passed his resolution.²⁵

The resolution of Alexander II stated the following: "Execute, on condition that the branch of the Geographic Society in Kiev, with its present staff, should be closed and its re-opening should happen only with my permission and through the minister of internal affairs."²⁶ The fact that M. E. Saltykov-Shchedrin almost exactly foretold this formulation four years earlier imparted a sarcastic tone to the resolution. The project to reform *L'Académie des Sciences*, proposed by one of his characters, endowed its president with the right to "suspend some sciences and, in absence of repentance, abolish them forever."²⁷ Shchedrin perceptively predicted the train of thought of the council's members: the project described by him suggested "industriously inspecting residents to see whether they are infected, and, if they are, sending them to remote and sparsely populated towns," which neatly corresponded to the Special Council's directions with respect to teachers.

It is interesting that in 1882, developing a kind of periodization of Alexander II's state activity, Valuev wrote in his diary: "Some kind of systematic improvement began in 1872 and lasted until 1874. Then, lassitude with state concerns, preoccupation with personal affairs, and irregular galvanization of activity at the international political level began to emerge rapidly and led to the strange caprices of 1876."²⁸ From our story it is clear that this characteristic is correct not only for international affairs.

The final version of the council's conclusions, dated 18 May 1876 (also known in the literature as the Ems Edict after the place in which the tsar signed the Special Council's journal), contained a paragraph on the closing of the KGS and the immediate exile of Dragomanov and Chubinskii from the southwestern province. (Confidential official instructions were composed subsequently on the basis of this journal. Strictly speaking, it is incorrect to call the council's conclusions an "edict," but we will not deviate from the established tradition. Appendix 2 contains the full text of the Ems Edict.) It remains to answer Valuev's question (what was "executed," and how) and to describe the reaction to the edict and its consequences.

NOTES

- 1 RGIA, f. 1282, op. 1, ed. khr. 532, l. 1. Published in F. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, p. 204.
- 2 Documents relating to two fundamentally different cases are kept in the archives of the Third Department in GARF, and the archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in RGIA. Savchenko reviewed only the Moscow version. There is no complete and consistent description of the decision-making process regarding the Ems Edict in Savchenko's research, although he described almost all the important episodes.
- 3 RGIA, f. 1282, op. 1., ed. khr. 352, l. 2.
- 4 *Ibid.*, l. 25ob–26ob. The remark concerning the incomparably higher percentage of Little Russians in the population structure of the Russian Empire as compared to the French population speaking patois is a gross overestimation.
- 5 *Ibid.*, l. 27ob.
- 6 D. Saunders assumes that demographic factors played a decisive role during the determination of the state policy regarding the Ukrainian question. See D. Saunders, "Russia's Ukrainian Policy (1847–1905): A Demographic Approach," *European History Quarterly* 25 (1995), pp. 181–208.
- 7 See F. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, pp. 272–273. The fact of their admission was already reprehensible, since both Nos and Konisskii were members of the second *Zemlia i Volia*.
- 8 See F. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, pp. 272–273.
- 9 *Ibid.*, p. 375.
- 10 *Ibid.*, p. 376.
- 11 *Ibid.*, p. 380.
- 12 GARF, f. 109. op. 50. ed. khr. 85 (1875), l. 25–27ob.
- 13 F. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, p. 379. This passage produced an impression on the members of *Sovechshanie* and was later mentioned in prepared documents. See RGIA. f. 1282. op. 1. ed. khr. 352, l. 91.
- 14 The daughter of P. A. Kosach and O. P. Dragomanova (also known by the pseudonym Olena Pchylka) later became the famous poetess Lesia Ukrainka.
- 15 GARF, f. 109. op. 50, ed. khr. 85 (1875), l. 38.
- 16 Indeed, Prosvita received regular subsidies from the Galician Diet—by that time some Polish politicians had begun purposefully to support so-called *narodovtsy*, who preached separate Ukrainian identity, against the Moscowphiles, who considered Galician Ruthenians to be part of the All-Russian nation.
- 17 Cited in V. Naumenko, "Do istorii ukazu 1876 roku pro zaboronu ukraiinskogo pis'menstva," *Ukraina* (May 1907), pp. 141–145.
- 18 RGIA, f. 1282. op. 1. ed. khr. 352, l. 66–67.
- 19 *Ibid.*, l. 70.
- 20 *Ibid.*, l. 105–105ob.

-
- 21 For several years Timashev served as commander of a cavalry corps in the Kiev headquarters.
- 22 *Dnevnik P.A. Valueva*, vol. 2, p. 127.
- 23 GARF, f. 109, op. 50, ed. khr. 85 (1875), l. 56.
- 24 *Ibid.*, l. 57; F. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, p. 94.
- 25 GARF, f. 109, op. 50, ed. khr. 85 (1875), l. 58.
- 26 F. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, p. 93.
- 27 See M. E. Saltykov-Shchedrin, *Dnevnik provintsiala v Peterburge* (Moscow, 1986), p. 97.
- 28 P. A. Valuev, *Dnevnik 1877–1884 g.*, p. 192.

The “Execution” of the Ems Edict

The first attempt to “rewind” the decision-making process was made by Timashev, right after receiving the final variant of the Ems Edict. Although it is unclear from the documents what steps were undertaken, it is obvious that something was launched, since on 27 May the deputy minister of the interior, Prince N. A. Lobanov-Rostovskii, sent a secret telegram to his superior, who was then in Kiev: “I suppose we should stop for a while any instructions whatsoever regarding the Kiev branch until we have received Your Excellency’s note on the subject.”¹ Lobanov-Rostovskii was most likely well informed about Timashev’s initial plans and was now waiting to see whether the minister, or rather Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich himself, would be able to persuade the tsar to change his decision. In a telegram that the chief of the chancellery of the Ministry of the Interior, L. S. Makov, who was accompanying Timashev, sent to his deputy, S. S. Perfil’ev, in St. Petersburg, he wrote: “Report to the Prince that the minister asks him to stop carrying out the instructions of the known journal of the Special Council until his return.”² Thus Timashev was waiting for the results of some unknown intercession but, realizing that the pause had become too long, he confirmed to Lobanov-Rostovskii his intention to temporize. It was only on 6 July, one and a half months after the edict was signed, that an order on the closure of the KGS was conveyed to the Kiev civil governor, Hesse—all efforts to save it were in vain.³ Dondukov-Korsakov then left Kiev so as not to participate in the closure of his darling child.

No less interesting events took place with respect to the order to exile Dragomanov and Chubinskii from the southwestern borderland.⁴ With rumors of his impending exile having been circulating since 1875, Dragomanov left the country in February. Dondukov-Korsakov, from whom Dragomanov requested a foreign passport, was not able to issue

it on his own authority, because Dragomanov was already under police surveillance. The governor-general sent a dispatch to Potapov, and on 10 January the latter granted his permission. The next day, with unprecedented efficiency for Russian bureaucracy, the chancellery of the Kiev governor-general issued Dragomanov with a foreign passport.⁵

Nor was Chubinskii left without help. On 2 August Dondukov-Korsakov sent a lengthy letter to the acting minister of the interior, Lobanov-Rostovskii, requesting that Chubinskii be allowed to stay in Kiev for half a year because he was "busy as a manager of a sugar refinery."⁶ Within a week Lobanov-Rostovskii informed Chubinskii that permission to stay for three more months had been granted. Moreover, on 26 November the tsar, keeping in force his decision on exile, permitted Chubinskii to live in the capital, and the latter immediately moved from Kiev to St. Petersburg.⁷ Chubinskii was offered a job at the Ministry of Communication. In early 1879, after the insistent petitions of the minister of communication, Admiral K. N. Posietie, and with the consent of the new Kiev governor-general, M. I. Chertkov, he was able to return to Ukraine.⁸ In the spring of 1879, P. A. Kosach, Dragomanov's brother-in-law, was reinstated in his position of peace mediator, but, at the request of the Third Department, not in Novogoradovolynsk, where he had been previously and where there were no agents to watch him, but in Lutsk.⁹ Thus, the personal repression caused by the Ems Edict affected a restricted number of people and was not long lasting.

The instructions concerning the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education were also fulfilled without particular zeal. However, the ministry itself quite zealously, as early as 15 June, sent to the curators of the Kiev, Odessa, and Kharkov educational districts a secret circular containing paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Ems Edict on removing Ukrainian books from school libraries and composing a list of teachers with an indication of "their reliability with respect to Ukrainophile tendencies." However, at the level of the district curators the enthusiasm had already disappeared. The curator of the Kiev district prepared his report only by 9 February 1877. According to P. Antonovich, the directors of the district's gymnasias and schools had characterized eight teachers as unreliable. In his report to the minister the curator staunchly defended those mentioned, arguing in some cases that the accusations were groundless, and in others that the Ukrainophile sympathies of the suspects were of a superficial nature.¹⁰ Five of the teachers mentioned,

including the Zhitetskii brothers, faced the following choice: to accept similar positions in Great Russian guberniias; to find a position by themselves outside Little Russia; or, if they wanted to stay in Little Russia, to leave the Ministry of Education. According to the documents E. Diakonenko accepted a position in Ufa; T. Belen'kii found a position in Baku; N. Bilinskii left his position; and P. Zhitetskii left for the military department. The latter, after the exile of Chubinskii, became a key figure in Hromada. In the Odessa district one Ukrainophile agreed to transfer to Tula. The Kharkov district curator responded that no unreliable teachers had been discovered.¹¹

With regard to the confiscation of books, the archival collections contain only two reports from schools in the Kiev district. In one, five books in the Ukrainian language were discovered, while in the other, two were found.¹² (This fact once more demonstrates the correctness of Dragomanov's remark that the introduction of the Ukrainian language, as the only language of instruction in schools, would have limited pupils to the ration of Saint Anthony.)

Another indication of Dondukov-Korsakov's attitude was revealed when, on 29 July, Kiev civil Governor Hesse asked whether it was necessary to withdraw from bookstores unsold Ukrainian books published before the edict. The governor-general passed a resolution "Not to respond."¹³

The paragraphs on censorship in the Ems Edict had a prolonged and serious administrative effect. From the moment of its adoption, all publications in the Ukrainian language had to be approved by the GUP. On 5 June the chief of the GUP, V. V. Grigoriev, received secret instructions that included the first three paragraphs of the edict on censorship. Undoubtedly the edict toughened censorship policy as compared to the beginning of the 1870s, when the Valuev Circular, although in force, was not followed in practice. In 1872 the unhampered transition through censorship of cheap Ukrainian popular books, prohibited by the circular of 1863, allowed Dragomanov to announce the final of the intermissions in the development of Ukrainophilism. The intermission in censorial persecutions turned out to be twice as short.

From June 1876 the GUP kept its considerations of all manuscripts in the Ukrainian language in a special file. This section of the archive covers the period to April 1880 and allows one a high degree of accuracy in determining not only the general nature of the repressions, but also their proportion in terms of the number of submitted

manuscripts.¹⁴ This estimation is useful in that it produces quite an unexpected result. From June 1876 to April 1880, 53 applications for publication in the Ukrainian language or the importing of such books from abroad were submitted to the GUP. Sixteen works were, to varying degrees, affected by censorship. Four manuscripts were not permitted to be imported into the empire. Of the remaining twelve applications, half were rejected outright and considerable cuts were made in the rest of the books. Of the ten books prohibited for publication or distribution in the empire three suffered on formal ground. It was prohibited to publish the translation of Nekrasov's *Moroz, Krasnyi Nos*.¹⁵ The case concerning the collection of Ukrainian songs by N. V. Lysenko became famous. The St. Petersburg Censorship Committee, who forwarded the case to the GUP, considered it possible to allow the publication after the withdrawal of four songs. However, the GUP suppressed the publication due to paragraph 3 of the Ems Edict, which prohibited the joint publication of texts and music.¹⁶ Often, censors permitted publication on the "indispensable condition that no deviations from the All-Russian orthography be allowed."¹⁷

Here, we encounter a very delicate problem. It is obvious that attempts to regulate, by external administrative influence, the development of a language the existence of which as a literary language was not only denied but also suppressed, appeared not only repressive but also hypocritical. This practice with respect to the Ukrainian language, however, was typical both for the authorities of the Russian Empire and the Polish administration in Galicia, which even attempted to transfer it into the Latin script. In both cases the main motive was an attempt to reduce the grammatical and orthographic differences with the Russian and Polish languages respectively and to fix the status of Ukrainian as a dialect. Both the Polish and Russian sides perceived the growth of such differences not simply as a deviation from their language, but as a drift to the camp of the enemy. However, it would be incorrect to equate the prohibition of *kulishovka*, which deliberately aimed at increasing the distance between the Russian and Ukrainian languages and was quite influential at that time, yet, not generally accepted among Ukrainians, with prohibition of the language as such.¹⁸ The same censorship committee, for instance, explained that *Collected Works in Little Russian Dialect* (Kiev, 1875) by I. P. Kotliarevskii, whom the Ukrainians themselves considered to be the founder of modern Ukrainian literature, should serve as a sample of orthography.¹⁹

In sum, 30 percent of manuscripts submitted to the censorship committee were censored: cuttings were made in 10 percent, and 20 percent were prohibited. Apparently the publishers or authors of a considerable number of manuscripts did not even try to get approval by the censorship committee: many of the books were published abroad, and some of them were not written at all since authors had no hope of receiving censorship permission for publication, which also meant no honorarium. At the same time, according to D. Balmuth, in 1896 the Kiev Censorship Committee banned 42 percent of Ukrainian writings.²⁰ If his estimates are correct, then the end of the 1870s was not the most repressive period in censorship policy with respect to Ukrainian publications.

It should be mentioned that the Religious Censorship Committee understood the Ems Edict as the prohibition of any works in the Ukrainian language. To a request regarding the possibility of importing *Zhitiia muchennikov Borisa i Gleba* (Hagiography of the martyrs Boris and Gleb), published in Lvov, the Religious Censorship Committee responded: "Although, according to its content, the mentioned brochure is irreproachable, it cannot be permitted for circulation within the empire as it is written in the Little Russian dialect." Not satisfied by this decision the Committee of Foreign Censorship applied to the GUP, and with justification. The GUP decided that since it was "published in Cyrillic, it is necessary not only to admit the brochure, but also to be happy that in Galicia there is an anti-Ukrainophile party that publishes in ecclesiastical characters."²¹ Having contested the incorrect argumentation of the Religious Censorship Committee, the GUP canceled the decision—which, in fact, corresponded to the edict, which prohibited cheap popular writings.

All the authorities responsible for the implementation of the edict executed it without zeal. In a certain sense, the famous phrase that the severity of the Russian laws was mitigated by negligence in their execution is correct. A number of high-ranking officials, including the minister of internal affairs, his deputy, the Kiev governor-general, and the curator of the Kiev educational district deliberately attempted to mitigate the edict itself, or its execution. One can assume with a high degree of probability that Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich also undertook steps in that direction. No one among them shared Ukrainophile ideas. We have no evidence to judge whether Timashev and Lobanov-Rostovskii were opponents of the edict or only desired to

please the grand duke. One can definitely argue that Dondukov-Korsakov and P. Antonovich were staunch supporters of a more flexible policy towards the Ukrainian question. The edict was undoubtedly unique by its nature and by the duration of a number of paragraphs as repressive measures in the national policy of the Russian Empire. (Censorship prohibitions, only partly mitigated, existed until 1905. Between 1896 and 1900 the Kiev Censorship Committee annually banned no less than 15 percent of Ukrainian publications, a substantially higher number than the “norm” for other languages, which did not exceed 2 percent.)²² At the same time, *toutes proportions gardées*, it is incorrect to characterize the edict as the total “prohibition of Ukrainism,” a typical interpretation promoted not only by Savchenko, who made these words the title of his book, but also by later historiography.

NOTES

1 GARF, f. 109, op. 50, ed. khr. 85 (1875), l. 120ob.

2 *Ibid.*, l. 133.

3 *Ibid.*, l. 128

4 They were forbidden to live “in those guberniias where the population entirely or partially belongs to the Little Russian tribe (the Kiev, Podol, Volyn, Poltava, Kharkov, Chernigov, Ekaterinoslav, Voronezh, and Kherson guberniias), as well as in the capitals and capital guberniias.” RGIA, f. 1282. op. 1. ed. khr. 374, l. 4.

5 O. Doroshkevich, “Listi M.P. Dragomanova do O. M. Pypina,” p. 93; M. P. Dragomanov, “Avtobigrafiia,” *Byloe* (June 1906), pp. 201–202.

6 RGIA, f. 1282. op. 1. ed. khr. 374, l. 14–15ob.

7 *Ibid.*, l. 31.

8 *Ibid.*, l. 42; GARF, f. 109, op. 50, ed. khr. 85 (1875), l. 113.

9 *Ibid.*, l. 42; GARF, f. 109, op. 50, ed. khr. 85 (1875), l. 122–123ob.

10 F. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, pp. 214–220.

11 F. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, pp. 222–223.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 213.

13 V. Miyakovskii, *Iuvilei Tsenzurnomu Aktu 1876 roku*, p. 13.

14 RGIA, f. 776, op. 11, ed. khr. 61a. Vtoroe otdelenie GUP, “Po vysochaishemu poveleniiu o nedopushchenii k pečati i rasprostaraniyu knig i broshur na malorossiskom narechii” (By imperial order on the prohibition of the printing and distribution of books and brochures in the Little Russian dialect).

15 RGIA, f. 776, op. 11, ed. khr. 61a, l. 30.

-
- 16 *Ibid.*, l. 77. In as early as 1880 it was this case that exposed the absurdity of some paragraphs of the edict and made the Kiev governor-general call for its reconsideration.
- 17 *Ibid.*, l. 41.
- 18 G. Shevelov mentioned two large "linguistic discussions" among Ukrainians themselves between 1891 and 1893, and between 1907 and 1912. See G. Y. Shevelov, "Evolution of the Ukrainian Literary Language," in Ivan L. Rudnytsky, ed., *Rethinking Ukrainian History* (Edmonton, 1981), p. 225.
- 19 RGIA, f. 776, op. 11, ed. khr. 61a, l. 41ob.
- 20 D. Balmuth, *Censorship in Russia, 1865–1905* (Washington: University Press of America, 1979), p. 215.
- 21 V. Naumenko, "Naiblizhchi vygudki ukaza 1876 r. pro zaboronu ukraïnskogo pismenstva," *Ukraina* (June 1907), pp. 249–250.
- 22 D. Balmuth, *Censorship in Russia*, p. 126.

The Consequences of the Ems Edict

An unsigned dispatch dated 4 September 1876 is preserved in the files of the Special Council on Ukrainophilism that was set up by the chancellery of the Third Department. It unambiguously describes the impression created by the Ems Edict in Kiev: "The students who have arrived from Little Russia after the holidays say that the intense displeasure of the local intelligentsia has been provoked by the said governmental edict that prohibited plays and publications in the Little Russian language. As a result, in almost all landowners' families, women have begun to wear the national dress (Little Russian chemises) that has been out of use for a long time. Professor Dragomanov is said to be the main hero of the events and he is enjoying immense popularity in Little Russia, especially in Kiev. They say that he is going to move to Austria to publish a Ukrainophile magazine there."¹

In addition to the tide of negative emotions, the edict caused a number of long-term unfavorable—from the point of view of governmental interests—consequences. All Ukrainophile cultural activity acquired the character of a symbolic manifestation and the attraction of a forbidden fruit. Publishing moved abroad, to Galicia and Geneva, where Dragomanov settled. The funds that Hromada actively collected in the southwestern borderland were also sent there.² Gradually Galicia became a Ukrainian cultural Piedmont, safely protected by the Austrian border from the influence of St. Petersburg. The edict also undermined the positions of pro-Russian Galician Rusyns, whom the government was intending to support by providing *Slovo* with secret financial aid as stipulated by the edict.

Once again the government had made the same mistake. Right after the Polish uprising the Vilno governor-generals, M. N. Muraviev and K. P. von Kaufman, in their attempts to suppress the dissemination of Polish books in the western borderland, did not hesitate to

order the destruction of Latin fonts in the printing houses. Since this resulted in the mass smuggling of Polish books from Galicia and the Polish Kingdom, the prohibition to publish and sell Polish books in northwestern guberniias had to be abolished in as early as 1869.³ It was not difficult to predict that, due to the presence of the Ukrainian publishing industry in Galicia—this problem was even mentioned in the materials of the Special Council—the Ems Edict would lead to similar results. Hardly any of the council participants were able fully to explain how the planned repressions would prevent the rapprochement of the Ukrainophiles and the Poles, who financed Ukrainophile activities in Galicia, a problem that so worried St. Petersburg.

The reaction of the Galician press to the Ems Edict was telling. The Polish newspaper *Gazeta Narodowa* promptly used the situation to propagate the idea of a Polish–Ukrainian alliance against Russia. Having stressed that “the Rus’ folk [...] will never degenerate into Mongolism,” the newspaper stated its unequivocal conclusion: “To be a Rusyn and to keep good relations with Moscow is no longer possible.” The newspaper also provided some practical recommendations: “Who can prohibit Rusyns living abroad from writing and publishing and so escaping censorship, or from importing Ruthenian works from abroad without the permission of the government? Temporarily this blow will be hard for Rusyns, but beneficial in the long run. [...] Those who doubted will become fanatics; weaklings will be able to work wonders. Like a fire or a storm, national repression evokes miraculous self-sacrifice. Children will become heroes; wise men will thirst for the palm of martyrdom [...] There is no need to tell true Galician Rusyns what they must do now!”⁴

The position of *Pravda*, the newspaper of the Galician Rusyns, considerably differed from the position of the Polish newspaper. In its leading article *Pravda* called the Ems Edict “the Russian *Goluchowschina*,” reminding readers of the similar actions of the Polish administration in Galicia under A. Goluchowski in the late 1850s/early 1860s, thus demonstrating the clear unwillingness of the Rusyns to throw themselves into the arms of the Poles. The newspaper emphatically argued that it considered the edict to be a product of the intrigue of the “Kiev informers à la Iuzefovich.” It expressed the hope that “if the Russian government evaluated and comprehended the Ukrainian question seriously by taking off the glasses smoked by the denunciations of the Kiev liars, it would understand the naked truth: these

denunciators of Ukrainian separatism are the main enemies of Russia.” *Pravda* wrote that “all enlightened Russia, all the Slavs, and Europe will take the Rusyn folk’s side against government violence,” and called on the government to reconsider the decision. Even after the adoption of the edict the newspaper continued to promote the moderate line, recommended by Dragomanov in 1873. However, the practical conclusions from this situation inevitably coincided with those of *Gazeta Narodova*. “Now Galicia should proceed with the great and holy cause of national revival [...] When the matter concerns the life of our folk, there will certainly be no parties, no contradictions among Galician Rusyns.”⁵

The awkwardness and counter-productivity of the Ems Edict become particularly evident if one estimates the lost possibilities suggested by the more flexible strategy of Dondukov-Korsakov. The initial supposition of the Kiev governor-general that the Ukrainophiles would value legal opportunities and that a moderate orientation would prevail proved to be true. In 1872/1873, insisting on the priority of legal Ukrainophile activity in Kiev, Dragomanov called on Galician Ukrainophiles to be less emotional. Stressing the benefit of learning the Russian language, he advocated the parallel usage of Ukrainian and Russian in primary schools. Dragomanov envisioned the future of Ukraine, at least from a long-term prospective, in a federative union with Russia. This position was motivated not only by an understanding that it was impossible to achieve independence under existing conditions: Dragomanov also spoke about common interests in Russia’s reformation and the colonization of the sparsely populated areas of Siberia, the Urals, and the Far East. This tendency was shared by some other leaders of the Ukrainophile movement—let us recall the invariable caution of Antonovich and the grudges of some Hromada members against Chubinskii for his far too loyal declarations. However, it would be incorrect to assume that the majority of rank-and-file members of the movement were more radical. Later Dragomanov, who was unwilling to remember his own moderate views of the time, wrote that after his return from abroad in 1873, he liked neither the Kiev Ukrainophiles, for their “compliance to the official world and for flirting with conservative groups, nor young people for their hostility to ‘radicals’, that is, socialists.”⁶ For instance, A. F. Kistiakovskii, a member of the KGS and Hromada, opposed the moderate, positivist-oriented Ukrainophilism of the 1870s to the romantic radicalism of *Osnova* in stronger

expressions than Dragomanov did in his works of the first half of the 1870s. Kistiakovskii wrote in his diary on 18 April 1876: "I ceased to be a politically oriented Ukrainophile eight or nine years ago. My Ukrainophile fanaticism of 1862–64 was exhausted a long time ago and, remaining devoted to the people but being certain of the vanity of political upheavals, I now consider the Little Russian issue with cold rationality."⁷ Although not all Ukrainophiles shared this positivist orientation, the authority of Dragomanov and of other moderate leaders, as well as the real opportunities that were provided for such activities by Dondukov-Korsakov, dampened more radical trends.

This situation allowed the government wide room for maneuver. It could use particular prohibitions and special repressive measures against the seemingly most dangerous actions of the Ukrainophiles, simultaneously keeping in good shape their "inner censor"—the limitations imposed by the Ukrainophiles themselves and advocated by Dragomanov. It was possible only through granting significant legal opportunities for Ukrainophile cultural activity, so that the Ukrainophiles had something to lose. This would also allow the bulk of Ukrainophile activities and financial resources to be kept under the control of the authorities, in other words, to maintain the dominance of Kiev over Lvov.

What could this situation have brought about from a long-term perspective? While the government still remained unable to enhance efficient assimilation pressure through the education system, it was precisely in the 1870s that the effect of other, indirect, mechanisms contributing to the assimilation processes became apparent.

From 1865 to 1875 the railway network in Ukraine grew more than threefold. Twelve thousand kilometers of railroads were built, including those connecting Moscow with Sevastopol and Odessa via Kiev. The active growth of cities also began at this time. In 1860 the population of Kiev was 55,000 (an increase of only 10,000 since 1840), that of Kharkov 50,000 and of Odessa 112,000. By 1874 the population of Kiev was 127,000; by 1881 Kharkov had reached 128,000 and Odessa 220,000 inhabitants. To give a better estimation of the pace of urbanization in the Russian part of Ukraine, it is sufficient to note that in 1860 Lvov, with a population of 70,000, was smaller only than Odessa, and by the early 1880s, with a population of 100,000, Lvov was lagging noticeably behind Odessa, Kiev, and Kharkov.⁸ Even in the second half of the nineteenth century the level of urbanization in

Russia was catastrophically lower than in other European countries: as late as 1890 the Russian urban population amounted to only 12.5 percent of the total population, while in Germany the proportion was 47.0 percent, in France 37.4 percent, and in the Austrian–Hungarian Empire 32.5 percent, not to mention Great Britain, where the figure was 72.0 percent.⁹

The statistical data of the nineteenth century generally do not allow us to trace the correlation between the urbanization and assimilation processes in Ukraine. Only the one-day census of the Kiev population conducted by the KGS in 1874 was designed in a way that provided data for relatively accurate estimations. The census contained a question about native language and respondents were supposed to choose between “All-Russian,” that is, literary Russian, and “its dialects”—Great Russian, Little Russian, and Belorussian. In sum, 80.0 percent of the Kiev population gave “Russian or its dialects” as their native language. Among these people, 49.32 percent chose literary Russian, 39.26 percent the Little Russian dialect, 9.91 percent Great Russian, and 1.51 percent Belorussian.¹⁰ It is clear that 11.42 percent of those who referred to the Great Russian and Belorussian dialects as their native language were migrants from the low social strata. According to the census Ukraine-born respondents made up almost 74.0 percent of the Kiev urban population and they constituted the prevailing majority among the 49.32 percent who named literary Russian as their native language, since in total those born in Great Russia were less than 17,000 or 21.5 percent. Analyzing this data, Dragomanov, one of the organizers of the census, frankly admitted that the percentage of Ukrainian speakers would have been even lower if the question had related not to native but to spoken language.¹¹ In fact, by marking the Ukrainian language as native in the census Ukrainophiles themselves certainly made an ideological choice. The point is not only that all of them had a perfect command of Russian—let us recall that not only Shevchenko but many Hromada members of the 1870s kept their diaries, that is, their most intimate notes, in Russian! Ukrainophile verses of quite dubious quality condemning the Ems Edict (“Dragomanov is guiltlessly exiled / and Sons of Little Russia too / Sons of the nation, the *khlopomans* / All are dispersed and defeated...” etc.) that circulated in Kiev in the summer of 1876 were also written in Russian.¹² Reflecting on this assimilation tendency, Dragomanov wrote in 1878: “What is going to happen if the cities in Ukraine wall

themselves off from Ukrainian villages by their enlightenment and non-Ukrainian language?"¹³

The other assimilating factor that became important after 1874 was universal (at least in principle) military service. From that moment on up to the beginning of the twentieth century the number of those who acquired basic literacy skills in the army exceeded 1.5 million people, and of them, conscripts from Ukraine constituted a significant number.

Finally, mention should be made of an important opportunity that the government did not attempt to make use of in the nineteenth century. While in Great Russia 95 percent of the peasants were members of peasant communes, in Ukraine such peasants constituted 30 percent on the left bank and only 15 percent on the right bank of the Dnieper.¹⁴ This means that it was not after the Stolypin reform, as in the case of Great Russian peasants, but after the abolition of serfdom, that is, forty years earlier, that Little Russian peasants could be involved en masse in migration. This was especially important because of the attachment of the Little Russian peasant to the rural way of life and his unwillingness to migrate to the city. However, P. Woroby notes that the widespread opinion that Ukrainian peasants were unwilling to move to the cities is exaggerated, since in this period the cities simply did not provide enough jobs for migrants from rural areas.¹⁵

In any case, the drive to move to the free lands of Siberia, the Urals, and the Far East was quite common, particularly taking into consideration that after the reform of 1861 the proportion of peasant land tenure on fertile Ukrainian soil decreased by one-third. At the beginning of the twentieth century, within the framework of the newly enacted Stolypin program, such migrants were plentiful. In Northern Kazakhstan, for instance, in 1858, Ukrainians (Little Russians) were not present at all. By the end of the century about 100,000 Ukrainians resided there, and by 1917, after the Stolypin reform was put into action, the number of Ukrainians in Kazakhstan exceeded 789,000. A similar tendency can be traced in other trans-Ural regions. In 1858 there were no Ukrainians there. According to the censuses of 1897 to 1900, there were 137,000 Ukrainians in western Siberia, 25,000 in eastern Siberia, and 61,000 in the Far East. By 1917 the number of Ukrainians in western Siberia had risen sharply to 375,000, in eastern Siberia to 96,000, and in the Far East to 427,000. In 1917 the number of Ukrainians in the Lower Volga region (the Samara, Saratov, and

Astrakhan guberniias) exceeded 545,000. Thus in 1917 about 2.5 million Ukrainians resided in regions not directly bordering their ethnic core area.¹⁶ Among them, peasants constituted the prevailing majority (more than 90 percent).¹⁷ Migrants preserved their cultural and linguistic peculiarities for a long time, but, as a resource for the Ukrainian nationalist policy, these residents of the Far East or Orenburg region were generally lost. During the census of 1926 already one-half of migrants from Ukraine to the Far East indicated Russian as their native language.¹⁸

Moreover, in 1917 the number of Ukrainians in the Tambov, Kursk, Voronezh, and Orlov guberniias bordering modern eastern Ukraine was almost 2 million; almost the same population inhabited the Tersk guberniia, and the Kuban and Stavropol regions.¹⁹ Many of these people were not new migrants, but living in “mixed” regions they also experienced accelerated assimilation processes. According to S. I. Bruk and V. M. Kabuzan, the process of assimilation among Ukrainians actively developed not only in distant regions but even in a number of regions of modern Ukraine, which hosted a large number of migrants from Great Russia. (In New Russia—contemporary southern Ukraine—the proportion of the Ukrainian population fell, to a large extent due to assimilation, from 52.5 percent in 1755 to 41.3 percent in 1917.²⁰) According to their estimates, in total, in the second half of the nineteenth century 1.5 million Ukrainians became Russified (here the term “Russian” is used as a synonym for “Great Russian”). Thus, despite a higher birthrate among Ukrainians, the proportion of Ukrainians in the population of the empire decreased during the first decades of the twentieth century (from 17.5 percent in 1897 to 17.3 percent in 1917).²¹

However, in their attempt to preserve the prevalence of the Orthodox and, as it was considered, Russian, population over the Poles, the authorities did not encourage Ukrainian and Belorussian peasants, who suffered bitterly from lack of land, from moving to free lands in other regions of the empire. In 1879 the governors of the western borderland even received a special secret circular with an order to prohibit unauthorized migration.²² In his report on the revision of the Chernigov guberniia in 1880, Senator Polovtsov noted “quite a strong tendency among peasants to resettle,” and then mentioned the measures designed “to reduce the harmful consequences” of that tendency.²³ Finally, in the summer of 1881, the government adopted *Temporal*

Rules on the Migration of Peasants to Unoccupied Lands. However, this document was not published and the peasants were not informed about it in order not to provoke mass migration.²⁴

No matter how passive the government was, the assimilation processes did accelerate by the First World War. When S. Guthier, a researcher into Ukrainian cities, wrote that on the eve of the war, among 16 Ukrainian cities with a population of more than 50,000, it was only Poltava where the Ukrainians constituted a majority, he in fact meant that it was only there that people named Little Russian as their native language. According to the census of 1897 more than 80.0 percent of the urban population in Ukraine were natives of the guberniia in which their town was located.²⁵ This percentage becomes even higher if one considers migrants from neighboring Ukrainian guberniias. The statistical data do not provide the number of Ukrainians assimilated to Russian culture, but Guthier admits that assimilation proceeded rapidly.²⁶

Guthier reveals, among other things, some interesting data on the development of the Ukrainian press after the prohibition of Ukrainian publications was canceled during the revolution of 1905. He writes: "In 1906 almost every town had its own Ukrainian newspaper. By 1908, however, official harassment and financial failures had reduced the Ukrainian popular press to one daily, *Rada*, in Kiev."²⁷ Among the reasons for this reduction it would be correct to allot first place to financial problems. We know that the persecution of the Russian-language press was no weaker, but nothing even distantly resembling the collapse of the Ukrainian-language press occurred. At the beginning of the twentieth century the majority of Ukrainian periodicals repeated the fate of *Osnova*, which managed to survive for almost two years thanks to the money (20,000 rubles) granted it by Katenin, a relative of Belozerskii.²⁸ Competition with Russian publications, finance, market—even at the beginning of the twentieth century these factors worked against the Ukrainian-language press, and this was even more true for the nineteenth century.

It is obvious that under the conditions of capitalist development, with Russian as the dominant culture in Ukrainian cities and with the preservation of Russian as the language of business, administration, and state secondary and higher education (here the government could stand firm), the partial realization of Dragomanov's program in the form of bilingual primary education could by no means lead to those

consequences that Iuzefovich, the inspirer of the Ems Edict, had envisioned. The Russian language would not be pushed out: it would remain the language of administration, business and career success, the language of mass communication. It should be noted that Dondukov-Korsakov did not plan such serious concessions and was ready to permit the use of Ukrainian only in the first grade of primary school for the explanation of incomprehensible Russian words.

The tactics of Dondukov-Korsakov meant the renunciation of the orientation toward the French version of total assimilation, for which the government did not have the power, means, persistency, skills, or historical time. An Anglo-Scottish plan would take the place of the French project. Another identity would not be rejected as a remnant of the past; the Ukrainian language and culture would receive certain rights, but within the framework of the All-Russian nation, with Russian playing the role that English played in Great Britain. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the most convinced Russian nationalists considered such a position acceptable. "All Russians of different kinds should know how to speak, read, and write in Russian, but nobody can ever have anything against Little Russians knowing how to speak, read, and write in their dialect, and Belorussians in theirs. The dress, mores, and customs of Little Russia and Belorussia are different from those in Russia, but they are similar, and therefore everywhere and under all conditions they must be admissible," wrote the Russian nationalist publicist P. I. Kovalevskii in 1912.²⁹ At the beginning of the twentieth century this situation was also readily admitted at the tsarist court. In February 1903 the grand costume ball in the Winter Palace was devoted to the Russia of the seventeenth century. Along with Great Russian dresses there were several Little Russian costumes. Grand Duke Dmitrii Konstantinovich wore the costume of a colonel of the Sumy Slobodskoi Regiment; Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich the costume of an ataman of the Zaporozhian Cossacks; Countess V. D. Vorontsova-Dashkova the dress of a Little Russian Cossack woman; and the minister of court, V. B. Frederix, a costume copied from a portrait of B. Khmel'nitskii.³⁰ Dondukov-Korsakov had attempted to act in the same manner forty years earlier, at the very beginning of the spurt in Russian capitalism, and this gave to his policy a considerable potential advantage. From the long-term prospective, the success or failure of this project would depend on the stability of Russian economic and political development. It is

hard to judge whether Dondukov-Korsakov was a supporter of constitutional reforms in Russia. At least Bulgaria, where he acted as the imperial commissioner and head of the occupation government from March 1878, was provided with quite a liberal constitution. Dragomanov looked forward to constitutional reforms in Russia, but in 1878 his estimation of the consequences of such reforms for the prospects of Ukrainophilism was far from optimistic: "The constitution in Russia will grant freedom to Ukrainian work ... But the same constitution will give even more freedom and power to Moscow people and they will certainly run their businesses so as to attract many assimilated people in Ukraine. Ukrainism (*ukrainstvo*) will not die but for some time it will again become 'a backwater relative', a drag."³¹

In his comparison of the policy of the British authorities towards Scotland with Russian policy towards Ukraine S. Velychenko suggests that different results can be explained by the absence of the rule of law and the underdevelopment of civil institutions in the Russian Empire.³² In a situation in which a number of factors were involved, ascribing a decisive role to this single factor can be questionable. However, no one can deny its importance.

The government and the tsar himself were not able to judge the situation correctly, nor to understand the advantages of Dondukov-Korsakov's tactics. With reference to this episode, a remark by Valuev concerning other issues was correct: "The mental laziness that is peculiar to so many of us constantly predisposes us to choose simple and therefore rough means for achieving governmental aims. There is nothing easier than to rely on one force instead of several."³³ Acting according to the stereotype of the satirical heroes of Saltykov-Schedrin, Alexander II signed the Ems Edict, which became just another piece of evidence justifying the claim that the history of Russia can be narrated as a history of poor government and its consequences.

NOTES

1 GARF, f. 109, op. 50, ed. khr. 85, l. 92.

2 In the spring of 1877 the new Kiev governor-general, Chertkov, specially informed the Third Department that Hromada, under the leadership of P. Zhitetskii, had collected money for Dragomanov's publications in Geneva. GARF, f. 109, op. 50, ed. khr. 85, l. 106.

- 3 See S. M. Sambuk, *Politika tsarizma v Belorussii vo vtoroi polovine XIX v* (The Policy of tsarism in Belorussia in the second half of the nineteenth century) (Minsk, 1980), p. 89.
- 4 *Gazeta Narodowa*, 15 July 1876, no. 61. Here from R. Solchanik, *Lex Jusephovicia 1876*. "Z privodu 100-letiia zaboroni ukraïinstva," *Suchastnist*, no. 5 (1876), p. 47.
- 5 *Pravda*, 31 July 1876, nos. 13–14, pp. 500–505. Here from R. Solchanik, *Lex Jusephovicia 1876*. "Z privodu 100-letiia zaboroni ukraïinstva," pp. 48–53.
- 6 M. P. Dragomanov, "Avtobiografia" (Autobiography), *Byloe* (June 1906), p. 197.
- 7 F. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, pp. ix–x.
- 8 See P. Herlihy, "Ukrainian Cities in the Nineteenth Century," in Ivan L. Rudnytsky, ed., *Rethinking Ukrainian History* (Edmonton, 1981), pp. 136–137.
- 9 See B. N. Mironov, *Sotsialnaia istoriia Rossii perioda imperii (XVIII – nachalo XIX v.)*, vol. 2, (SPb., 1999) tab. 4, p. 381.
- 10 *Kievskii telegraf*, 30 March 1875, no. 39.
- 11 M. Dragomaniv, *Shevchenko, ukrainofily i sotsializm*, p. 145.
- 12 F. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, p. 226.
- 13 M. Dragomaniv, *Shevchenko, ukrainofily i sotsializm*, p. 147.
- 14 W. Bihl, "Aufgegangen in Grossreichen: Die Ukraine als österreichische und russische Provinz," in F. Golchewski, *Geschichte der Ukraine* (Göttingen, 1993), p. 149.
- 15 P. Woroby, "The Role of the City in Ukrainian History," in Ivan L. Rudnytsky, ed., *Rethinking Ukrainian History* (Edmonton, 1981), p. 207.
- 16 See S. I. Bruk and V. M. Kabuzan, "Chislennost i rasselenie ukrainskogo etnosa v XVIII -nachale XX veka," *Sovetskaia etnografiia*, no. 5, tab. 3 (1981), pp. 20–21.
- 17 A. Kappeler, "Chochly und Kleinrussen: Die ukrainische ländische und städtische Diaspora in Russland vor 1917," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 45, no. 1 (1997), pp. 48–63. According to the 1926 census more than 7 million Ukrainians resided on the territory of RSFSR.
- 18 *Ibid.*, p. 58.
- 19 S. I. Bruk and V. M. Kabuzan, "Chislennost i rasselenie ukrainskogo etnosa v XVIII-nachale XX veka," tab. 4, p. 23.
- 20 *Ibid.*, p. 24
- 21 *Ibid.*, pp. 26, 30.
- 22 RO RNB. f. 600, ed. khr. 1333, l. 28–28ob.
- 23 D. Beauvois, *Walka o ziemię. 1863–1914*, p. 281; S. M. Sambuk, *Politika tsarizma v Belorussii vo vtoroi polovine XIX veka*, p. 154.
- 24 P. A. Zaionchkovskii, *Krizis samoderzhavii na rubezhe 1870–1888 gg.*, p. 425.
- 25 P. Woroby, "The Role of the City in Ukrainian History," p. 208.
- 26 S. L. Guthier, "Ukrainian Cities during the Revolution and the Interwar Era," in Ivan L. Rudnytsky, ed., *Rethinking Ukrainian History* (Edmonton, 1981), pp. 157–159.

27 *Ibid.*, p. 159.

28 M. D. Bernstein, *Zhurnal "Osnova" i ukraiïnskiy literaturniy protsess*, p. 191.

29 P. I. Kovalevskii, *Natsionalizm i natsionalnoe vospitanie v Rossii*, 3rd ed. (New York, 1922; reprint 3rd ed.: SPb., 1912), p. 124.

30 Thus S. Velychenko is mistaken when he claims that the only attempt to use Little Russian dress was undertaken by Nicholas I in 1827. S. Velychenko, "Empire Loyalism," p. 436.

31 M. Dragomaniv, *Shevchenko, ukrainofily i sotsializm*, p. 157.

32 S. Velychenko, "Empire Loyalism," pp. 438–439.

33 P. A. Valuev, *Dnevnik 1877–1884 gg.* (Petrograd, 1919), pp. 61–62.

CHAPTER 12

The Subsidy for *Slovo*. Galician Rusyns in the Policy of St. Petersburg

The paragraph in the Ems Edict dealing with financial support for the Lvov-published newspaper *Slovo* deserves a separate discussion. This was the first attempt by the authorities to exert a systematic influence on the Galician Rusyns, even though by then the struggles of Vienna, Petersburg, and the Poles for the hearts and minds of the residents of eastern Galicia, or, as they often preferred to call it in Moscow and Petersburg, *Cherwonaiia Rus'*, had been going on for some time.

In the course of the 1848 revolution, with the support of the Austrian governor of Galicia, F. Stadion, the *Golovna Rus'ka Rada* and the *Lvov Matytsia* were created, to counterbalance the advance of the Polish national movement. Later, in 1849, the march through Galicia of the endless regiments of Nicholas I setting out to suppress the Hungarian revolution left a deep imprint in the minds of the local population. "The Russian interference in the Hungarian campaign has left a long-lasting, imposing impression in Galicia where the Russian troops passed. They were a reminder of the existence in a powerful neighboring state of a 'Russian faith' and the 'Russian language', close to the literary elucubrations of the Galicians," noted Grushevskii.¹

Up to the early twentieth century, there was an acute debate over the issue of identity among the Galician Rusyns. Canadian historian P. R. Magocsi has noted that in this sense the fate of the members of the famous "Russian trinity," the first Rusyn "awakeners" M. Shashkevich, Ia. Golovatskii and I. Vagilevich, was symbolic. Shashkevich, who died prematurely, remained faithful to the idea of the exclusive Rusyn identity that had united them prior to 1848. (It should be noted that some researchers consider him a precursor of the *narodovtsy*.) Later, Ia. Golovatskii leaned towards the Little Russian–Russian version of plural identity, and Vagilevich to Ukrainian–Polish identity.²

The influence of the orientation that saw the future of the Rusyns in Polonization had practically disappeared by the 1860s. Two movements remained the most visible after that—the so-called Moscowphiles or Russophiles, who supported the idea that the Galician Rusyns belonged to the All-Russian nation, and the *narodovtsy*, who considered the Rusyns to be a part of a separate Ukrainian people. After the 1870s, some Polish politicians and the Austrian authorities began to show support for the *narodovtsy* as opposed to the Russophiles.³

In the more liberal Habsburg monarchy national activism began to acquire legal and political organizational forms early on. From the 1860s, the Ukrainian language had been used in the diet. The none-too-active Lvov-based Matytsia was joined in 1868 by the Prosvita society, and, from 1873, mostly through the efforts of activists from the Russian part of Ukraine, by the Shevchenko Society (known as the Shevchenko Scholarly Society from the early 1890s).⁴

The efforts on the part of Russia to influence the attitudes of the Galician Rusyns sometimes took the form of rumor dissemination directed against Polish landowners. In the summer of 1872 this led to a spontaneous strike by hired agricultural laborers, the first of its kind in Galician history. The laborers came to believe that the Austrian emperor, after a disagreement with the Poles, had turned Galicia over to the tsar, who would soon send in the Cossacks to distribute free bread.⁵ The Russophile activists in Galicia sporadically received subsidies from Russia. At first, these were exclusively private donations—for example, M. Pogodin allotted a significant sum in 1866. From the late 1860s, periodical support for the Russophiles was given by Slavic benevolent committees.⁶ While the Moscow and St. Petersburg committees provided help within the general framework of aid to the Austrian Slavs, the Kiev committee concentrated practically all its attention on Galicia. The government also participated in a mediated way, since the Slavic committees were sponsored by the Ministry of Public Education. As V. Wendland, who carried out detailed research into this issue, has correctly noted, an interest in the Galician Rusyns was typical only of the conservative Slavophile part of the Russian public, and did not turn into an active public movement.⁷

The idea that support for the Russophiles had to be official and systematic was put forward by Iuzefovich, who argued that the Poles were providing such support to the newspaper *Pravda* and the Prosvita society. Again, the decision was made only as a reaction to, and imita-

tion of, similar actions on the part of the adversary. In questions of nationalist policy, the imperial authorities still remained careless students. The Russophile orientation of *Slovo* was mentioned in a letter sent by N. Rigel'man to D. Tolstoy in as early as 1874. The Kiev division of the Slavic Benevolent Committee, of which Rigel'man was chairman, had for a long time supported the Russophile Galicians. In his notes for the council, and in the edict draft he had prepared, Iuzefovich repeatedly emphasized the necessity to subsidize *Slovo*. This paragraph was incorporated into the final version of the Ems Edict, and Potapov, informing Iuzefovich in his letter of 18 May 1876 of the success of their common intrigue, asked Iuzefovich how much money should be given. "In view of the usefulness that it [the Russophile organ] can bring us in the fight against the enemies of our national unity," Iuzefovich responded on 5 June, "I believe we should not be avaricious [...] I think 2,000 guldens would be the right sum."⁸ Iuzefovich suggested that the money be transferred to the editor of *Slovo* through the Russian embassy in Vienna, which had to find a convenient secret channel. Potapov reported these considerations to the tsar, who authorized them on 27 June 1876.⁹ A month later, on 24 July, the first subsidy to *Slovo* was sent to Ambassador E. P. Novikov in Vienna.

However, the publisher of *Slovo*, V. Ploshchanskii, who arrived in Petersburg in late 1879, complained to the then acting minister of the interior, Makov, that he had not received the designated subsidy between 1876 and 1879.¹⁰ The documents contain no answer as to where a thousand rubles, or 2,000 guldens, had gone each year. In response to Makov's inquiry on 10 January 1880, the new director of the Third Department, A. R. Drenteln, a man of initiative, not only decided to undertake an investigation, but showed interest in the contents of the newspaper and its circulation. His inquiries and his addressees (the Kiev governor-general, M. I. Chertkov, and his Warsaw counterpart P. E. Kotsebu) reveal a very telling detail—Drenteln was primarily interested in how influential the newspaper was in the Russian empire rather than in Galicia itself, otherwise the inquiry would have been sent to the ambassador to Vienna. The responses provided very little comfort. Chertkov, praising the newspaper in general, informed him that there were five to eight subscribers in Kiev, and one more in the Volyn guberniia.¹¹ Kotsebu also reported an extremely limited circulation of the newspaper in the Kingdom of

Poland and spoke out decisively in favor of canceling the subsidy, suggesting that only a 500-ruble allowance from the Ministry of Public Education be preserved. He stressed that "there is no full consensus so far between the Carpathian-Rusyn party and the aims and objectives of the Russian government," and the objectives of the Rusyn party were "purely separatist." Thus the newspaper had not created the kind of anti-Ukrainophile propagandistic effect that the authorities had evidently counted upon, and the essence of the whole enterprise, in Kotsebu's opinion, was limited to the support of "the fight of the Rusyn element against the Polish in Galicia." Kotsebu believed that the question of whether the newspaper was worth the expenditure deserved special consideration.¹² On 12 September 1880, the newly appointed minister of the interior, M. T. Loris-Melikov, ordered the canceling of the payment of the subsidy to *Slovo*.

This story, its criminal aspects notwithstanding, is yet another illustration of the extreme inefficiency of the policy of the authorities, who began wondering where substantial sums were going only four years after the beginning of the payments. It also testifies to the fact that at least some high-ranking officials interpreted plans concerning *Slovo* not in an offensive, but in a defensive, light—the newspaper was expected not so much to strengthen Russian influence in Galicia as to counteract Ukrainophilism in the southwestern borderland. It is worth recalling that Iuzefovich, too, had emphasized from the outset precisely this role of the newspaper in the struggle against the "enemies of the people's unity."

This is not the only episode in which defensive measures were given priority. It can be argued that this approach was predominant in the 1860s and 1870s. In 1866, during the Austrian-Prussian war, the Russian ambassador to Vienna, E. G. Stackelberg, sent two messages to Chancellor Gorchakov regarding Russian policy toward Galicia. The first, dated 16 March, was devoted to an assessment of Russia's options in the event that Napoleon III renewed his offers of 1859 concerning the transfer of Galicia to Russia within a broad diplomatic combination that also included Venice and the Danube principalities. Stackelberg pointed out various pros and cons. Among the positive consequences of the annexation of Galicia he counted a more convenient borderline along the Carpathian mountains and the facilitation of the assimilatory policy that "is currently obstructed by the development of autonomy in Lemberg." "Moral support for the Rusyns"

(in the French original Stackelberg uses the Austrian term *Ruthenen*) would, in his opinion, facilitate the reunion. Still, in the final count, Stackelberg proposed rejecting this opportunity, as it would add new problems to the governing of the more than expansive territory of the empire.¹³ The possible annexation of Galicia had not disappeared completely from Petersburg's agenda, but it would be a mistake to believe that it was a priority and that Russia was prepared to use any opportunity to implement it.

In October 1866, Stackelberg returned to the subject of Galicia in connection with the appointment of A. Goluchowski, an advocate of the Polonization of the Galician Rusyns, as the province's governor. He regretted the campaign in the Russian press against this appointment and made an appeal "not to awaken Austria's attention to the Rusyns, who might fall into our hands like a ripe fruit as a result of the incautious tolerance of Vienna to Polonism." Here Gorchakov made a note in the margin—"quite correct."¹⁴ As an addendum, Stackelberg forwarded to Gorchakov a report from the consul in Brody, who gave information about "great discontent among the Rusyns," who were unhappy about the plans of the Austrian government "to force them to sacrifice their Russian name and to join forever the hateful Polish nation."¹⁵ It is interesting that Gorchakov ordered that these reports be shown to the minister of war, D. Miliutin.¹⁶

Once again we encounter the problem of the borderland position of the Ukrainian territory, which prompted various centers of power to follow closely each other's policies in regard to the local population in the hope of taking advantage of the adversary's mistakes.¹⁷ It is self-evident that both Vienna and the Poles, on abandoning the strategy of the Polonization of the Galician Rusyns, had much more room for maneuver in this game than Petersburg, which attempted to impose the exclusive All-Russian identity on the millions of Little Russian subjects. This is also a very clear illustration of the mechanism described by P. Sahlins, who analyzed the case of Catalonia, where the identities and loyalties of an ethnic group divided by a border were formed not exclusively, and sometimes to a lesser extent on the basis of sympathy for one of the power centers, than on the basis of antipathy for the competitor.¹⁸

At the end of 1871, the Russian ambassador to Vienna, Novikov, addressed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a project for establishing a consulate in Krakow or Lvov. He referred to the status of these

cities as the "major centers and, so to speak, main arteries of the ethnic life of the nationalities of Austria," and remarked that "the presence in Galicia of a numerous Rusyn population faithful to us will impart to this consul an undoubted political significance." Novikov, however, pointed out to his superiors that Austria would, without doubt, demand reciprocity, that is, the right to open a consulate in Kiev or "in some other central venue of western Russia."¹⁹ The latter consideration was noted in the margin by the addressee, chancellery chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, V. I. Vestman, or by Gorchakov himself. This was exactly the reason why the chancellor decided to bury the case.²⁰

The situation was to change gradually in the 1880s when the military circles of the empire began to regard Austria, with ever-increasing certainty, as a potential foe. In their plans, the ethnic composition of borderland areas played a major part. It was no accident that it was the minister of war, D. Miliutin, generally the closest associate of Loris-Melikov, who disputed his decision on *Slovo* and, in March 1881, successfully sought a renewal of the subsidy and tripled its amount.²¹

As a whole, the tsarist policy toward the problem of the Galician Rusyns was not only passive, but doomed to failure. One of its weakest aspects, as J.-P. Himka correctly noted, was the clearly unprofitable staff exchange.²² As a matter of fact, Petersburg regarded Galicia not so much as a sphere for the constant reinforcement of its influence, but as a source of recruiting personnel for the empire. Educated pro-Russian subjects were leaving for Russia in droves. According to the calculations of V. Wendland, the Kholm oblast alone, mainly between 1866 and 1870, received 136 Galician clergymen settlers, among them 42 seminarians. The acute shortage of classics teachers that was felt during the reforms of D. Tolstoy was also to a great extent filled in by Galicians. The settlers often received positions outside Ukraine and their influence was negligible, if not completely ineffective. (For example, Ia. Golovatskii, after moving to Russia, received a position in Vilno.) Concomitantly, a lot of Ukrainophiles went from Russia to Galicia, and later played an important, often key, role in Galician politics. It is sufficient to mention the names of Dragomanov, who, although he did not stay in Galicia for long, preserved close ties with it from Geneva, and later M. Grushevskii and D. Dontsov.

From 1882 onwards, in a situation of increasing tension in relations between Russia and Austria-Hungary, the Galician Russophiles were subjected to severe repression by the Polish administration and

Vienna. That year saw a big political trial of Russophile activists in Lvov. V. Wendland correctly remarks that “the lion’s share” of financial help to the Russophiles from Russian state sources came only after the Lvov trial, when the Russophiles had already been reduced to desperate defense. As a result, Galicia in the last decades of the nineteenth century turned into a Ukrainian Piedmont, culturally if not politically—armed with an increasingly powerful publishing base, with Ukrainian scientific and educational institutions (that received substantial intellectual and financial feeding from Russian Ukraine), and later, with political parties that emerged there a decade earlier than in the Russian Empire. This circumstance was a major factor in the defeat of the Russian assimilatory project.

It should be noted, however, that this role of Galicia was largely conditioned by the development of the Ukrainophile movement in the Russian Empire. Galicia had, to a great extent, become the base for the Ukrainian national movement, but it could not become its initiator or its main guiding force. If Russia’s political and economic development had been so successful that the realization of the advantages of unity had decidedly overwhelmed the separatist moods in Little Russian society, then Galicia, with its slower economic development, could not have acquired such political influence, even despite the efforts of Vienna and some Polish politicians who supported the Galician Ukrainophiles in the last decades of the nineteenth century.²³ An example for comparison here might be Highland Scotland, whose type of economic underdevelopment closely resembled, according to T. Nairn, that of Central Europe. The separatist attitudes of its residents did not have the support of the population of the Lowlands, who understood the advantages of a union with England, and, as a result, did not grow into any strong Scottish nationalism.²⁴ Another example, which is structurally even closer to ours, is reviewed by P. Sahlins in his book on Catalonia. An exclusively Catalanian identity was gradually establishing itself throughout the nineteenth century on the Spanish side of the border. It did not, however, have a substantial influence on the attitudes of the French Catalanians, since both economically, and in terms of the political rights available to them as French citizens, they found themselves in a significantly more advantageous position.²⁵

NOTES

- 1 M. S. Grushevskii, *Ocherk istorii ukrainskogo naroda* (St. Petersburg, 1904), pp. 359–360.
- 2 P. R. Magocsi, “The Ukrainian National Revival: A New Analytical Framework,” *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, XVI, nos. 1–2 (1989), p. 57.
- 3 The most comprehensive review of the fight regarding the problem of the Galician Rusyns’ identity is to be found in J.-P. Himka, “The Construction of Nationality in Galician Rus’: Icarian Flights in Almost All Directions,” in Michael Kennedy and Ronald G. Suny, eds., *Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation* (Ann Arbor, 1999), pp. 109–64, and in the monograph by V. Wendland, *Die Russophilen in Galizien. Ukrainische Konservative zwischen Österreich und Russland, 1848–1915* (Vienna, 2001). See also A. Miller, “Vneshnii faktor v formirovanii natsional’noi identichnosti galitskikh rusinov,” in O. Khavanova, ed., *Avstro-Vengriia: Integratsionnye protsessy i natsional’naia spetsifika* (Moscow, 1997); O. Sereda, “Mistse Rosii v diskusiiakh shchodo natsional’noi identichnosti galits’kikh ukraintsev u 1860–1867 rokakh,” in *Rossiiia-Ukraina: Istoriia vzaimootnoshenii* (Moscow, 1997).
- 4 For a more detailed description of the Matytsia, as well as statistical data on Prosvita, see F. I. Steblii and M. M. Kril’, “Galitskaia matytsia vo L’vove,” in I. Leshchilovskaia, ed., *Slavianskie matitsy. XIX vek*, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1996).
- 5 For details, see A. Miller, “Ukrainskie krest’iane, pol’skie pomeshchiki, avstriiskii i russkii imperator v Galitsii 1872 g.,” in A. S. Stykalin, ed., *Tsentrāl’naia Evropa v novoe i noveishee vremia* (Moscow, 1998), pp. 175–180.
- 6 *Slovo* received 500 rubles in 1868, half this amount in 1869, and 300 rubles in 1870. Promises to increase the support and to make it regular remained unfulfilled. See M. Tanty, “Kontakty rosyjskich komitetov slovianskikh ze slovianami z Austro-Węgier (1868–1875),” *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, no. 1 (1964), p. 69.
- 7 V. Wendland, *Die Russophilen in Galicien. Ukrainische Konservativen*, chap. 5, “Russland und die Russophilen.” This stands in sharp contrast to, for example, the truly mass character of the movement on the annexation of Schleswig-Holstein to Germany. Special societies for the Schleswig-Holstein and Germany union sprang up in dozens of cities.
- 8 GARF, f. 109, op. 50, ed. khr. 85, ll. 66–66 ob.
- 9 *Ibid.*, l. 67.
- 10 *Ibid.*, l. 126.
- 11 GARF, f. 109, op. 50, ed. khr. 85, l. 137. Two thousand guldens equaled approximately 1,000 rubles. To put the amount provided by the imperial government into correct perspective, the Kiev Hromada, which comprised a few dozen people, sent Dragomanov 1,500 rubles in 1876, and 3,000 in both 1877 and 1878, to publish his journal. See O. Riabinin-Skliarevskii, “Kiivs’ka Hromada 1870-kh rokiv,” *Ukraina*, nos. 1–2 (1927), p. 146.

- 12 GARF, f. 109, op. 50, ed. khr. 85, ll. 135–136 ob.
- 13 AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, ed. khr. 218, ll. 208–209.
- 14 *Ibid.*, l. 303 ob.
- 15 *Ibid.*, l. 306 ob.
- 16 *Ibid.*, l. 301.
- 17 For more on the interdependence of the policies of the Romanov, Ottoman, Habsburg, and Hohenzollern Empires on national issues see A. Miller, “Between Local and Interimperial: Russian Imperial History in Search of Scope and Paradigm,” (forthcoming in *Kritika*, 2003, no. 4).
- 18 P. Sahlins, *Boundaries*, p. 109.
- 19 AVPRI, f. 155, op. 241, ed. khr. 34, ll. 10–12 ob. Letter of E. P. Novikov to the chancellery chief at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, V. I. Vestman, 25 November 1871.
- 20 *Ibid.*, l. 13.
- 21 F. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, pp. 171–172.
- 22 J.-P. Himka, “The Construction of Nationality in Galician Rus’: Icarian Flights in Almost All Directions.”
- 23 This is what Grushevskii understood perfectly well, since he made attempts to move his activity, at the first available opportunity, from Lvov to Kiev, both before and after the 1917 revolution.
- 24 See T. Nairn, “Scotland and Europe,” in Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds., *Becoming National* (New York–Oxford, 1996), pp. 92–93.
- 25 P. Sahlins, *Boundaries*, pp. 290–291.

The 1880–1881 Crisis of Power and the Attempt to Abolish the Ems Edict

The bomb attack carried out by the conspirators of the People's Will (*Narodnaia volia*) in the Winter Palace on 4 February 1880 was the impetus for a radical change in government policy. Appointed as head of a new extraordinary body—the Supreme Executive Commission on the Protection of the State Order and Public Peace—was M. T. Loris-Melikov, who believed that the fight against terrorists had to be complemented by a union with a “well-meaning part of society.” His program provided for the reorganization of the state apparatus, the resumption of reforms, and public participation in discussion of them. Loris-Melikov was called a “dictator of the heart,” and the new policy was compared to a spring thaw.

In the summer of 1880, Secretary of State M. S. Kakhanov, one of Loris-Melikov's closest associates, proposed arranging Senate inspections of the guberniia administrations in order to “rein in the governors,” and preparing recommendations for a reform of provincial government, with an increased role for the zemstvos in view.¹ The first step taken by Loris-Melikov after his appointment as minister of the interior was to report to the tsar about this project, which is convincing evidence of the significance attached to it.² One of the senators who supported this plan and offered his own candidature for one of the inspection commissions was A. A. Polovtsov, “intelligent, competent, even with a statesman's mind,” as he was later characterized by S. Iu. Witte.³ He was ready to go “no matter where.” He was appointed to Kiev, either by sheer accident or because Loris-Melikov wanted to send someone strong and persistent there, since this person would have to inspect the Kiev governor-general M. I. Chertkov, who had replaced Dondukov-Korsakov in 1877 and who was notoriously authoritarian.⁴

Having no knowledge of the peculiarities of the southwestern province, Polovtsov tried to consult as many Petersburg officials as possible who had ever been involved in its problems. He met with the former rector of Kiev University, now deputy minister of finance, N. Kh. Bunge, the minister of public education A. A. Saburov, chairman of the Committee of Ministers, Valuev, and Golovnin and Makov. He also visited the deputy minister of the interior, P. A. Cherevin, who was in charge of the Third Department before it was disbanded. In his lengthy conversations with Polovtsov, which he diligently noted down in his diary, none of them, including Kakhanov and Loris-Melikov, who had only recently left the post of governor-general of Kharkov, mentioned the Ukrainian question. When the discussion turned to ethnic issues, all attention was focused on the Poles.⁵ This is yet further proof that the imperial authorities' approaches to the Ukrainian and Polish questions were different in principle. While the latter was invariably at the center of attention, the former would appear on the agenda from time to time, and, after the passing of another decree, vanish from the sight of the Petersburg bureaucrats for years.

On 12 October 1880, Polovtsov arrived in Kiev. Here the Ukrainian problem invades the pages of his diary immediately. First, Polovtsov is visited by a "vigorous, despite his 79 years," Iuzefovich. "Then two ladies make an appearance and request permission to sing Little Russian songs at a beneficiary concert; the conversation takes a Gogol-esque turn."⁶ Initially, Polovtsov seemed not to comprehend the situation fully, but at least he was aware of its absurdity. He had many such petitioners throughout the fall. It is likely that he consulted on their behalf with the former governor-general of Kiev, then Kharkov governor-general, Dondukov-Korsakov, who, in a letter on the Little Russian language dated 13 January, which will be discussed later, directly referred to "petitions of individuals who addressed Senator Polovtsov about this question."⁷ In addition to private solicitations on individual questions, the Chernigov zemstvo appealed to Petersburg demanding permission for elementary school teachers to explain in Little Russian those Russian words that the children could not understand. The arrival of the inspector was seen as the harbinger of a policy change, and all interested parties sprang into action.

Very early in January 1881, both Chertkov and Dondukov-Korsakov had already sent special reports on the Ukrainian question to Petersburg. The fact that the first letter came from Chertkov strongly

suggests that Polovtsov did not make a great secret of his intention to review the existing rules. The point is that Polovtsov immediately entered into severe confrontation with Chertkov and constantly insisted in Petersburg on the latter's dismissal, which followed in late January.⁸ Under these circumstances any discussion of the Ukrainian issue between Polovtsov and the Kiev governor-general was out of the question. However, the latter was well informed of the matter and apparently decided to take over the initiative from his adversary.

The pretext for Chertkov's letter to the Ministry of the Interior was an appeal by N. V. Lysenko, who addressed him on 29 December complaining about serious damage incurred as a result of the ban on the distribution of a collection of Little Russian songs that he had published in Leipzig at his own expense. Lysenko had been having trouble with his collection ever since 1878, which means the decision to write the request to Chertkov precisely at this moment is likely to have been prompted by A. Ia. Rudchenko, a member of the Kiev Hromada and brother of the renowned Ukrainian author Panas Mirnii, who served as a department head in the office of the Kiev governor-general. Without this prompting it would have been more logical for Lysenko to address Polovtsov, which is what most of the petitioners were doing. Chertkov laid down the kind of resolution expected of him by the participants in this scheme—"Report required on the cancellation of the imposed restrictions"—and transferred the assignment to Rudchenko himself.⁹ "Upon examining the collection of Little Russian songs presented with this request," wrote Chertkov (read Rudchenko), "I have not found anything reprehensible about it, but the issuing of this publication could not be permitted because of the high order announced by the former minister of the interior in a confidential review of 23 June 1876. [...] Since I, for my part, do not have any objections to licensing Lysenko's song collection for sale, I find it appropriate, using this case, to reassess the validity of the 1876 order that prohibited all kinds of works in the Little Russian dialect, except *belles-lettres*." After the caveat that he was not aware of the motives that had "prompted to adopt such a drastic measure, taken without the knowledge and conclusion of the local provincial administration," Chertkov put forward a proposition that its main goal was to "curb Ukrainophile activities in the sense of political separatism." He then moved on to the assessment of the situation and his recommendations: "Referring to my three-year experience in governing the southwestern province, I can

state with confidence that among the local Little Russian population, devoid of any political ideas and selflessly committed to their sovereign, any propagators of separatism, if they revealed themselves, would face the same [reaction] as the propagators of Polonism who attempted to attract the people to their side during the last Polish revolt. Thus, the restrictions imposed on the Little Russian dialect and music, amounting to a mistrust of a people that neither in its past nor in the present has given any grounds for this, are not justified, in my opinion, by real necessity and only serve to cause undesirable aggravation." "Acknowledging on [his] part that the abolition of the restrictions imposed by the 1876 law [was] not only possible but even desirable in the interests of fostering society's trust in the government," Chertkov offered to "put literary and musical works in the Little Russian dialect on equal footing in terms of censorship with works in All-Russian."¹⁰ It is clear that Chertkov himself did not go deep into the matter. The true authorship of the memorandum was revealed in the completely declarative character of the document, whose arguments boiled down to affirmations of the "selfless commitment" of the population entrusted to Chertkov and the repetition of Loris-Melikov's favorite idea of society's trust in the government. This can explain the complete rejection of the separatist threat, the emphasis on the moral aspect in argumentation, as well as the radicalism of the conclusions. Rudchenko, we shall note, decided to avoid completely the most acute problem of Ukrainian as a school language, possibly for fear that this would provoke unnecessary questions from Chertkov himself, if the latter chose to read the letter closely before signing it.

At the Ministry of the Interior, which turned, after the disbanding of the Supreme Commission, into a new center of power, Chertkov's letter elicited a lively response. The resolution, most likely by the head of the GUP, N. S. Abaza,¹¹ read: "Deserves special attention and is subject to a review without delay and a report considering the 1876 measure and the order under which it was introduced."¹² The reformers were in strength and generally intent on reassessing the "order" in cases involving the press, so the changes in question were not of a cosmetic nature. It cannot be excluded that Chertkov's letter attracted the attention of N. Abaza and his protectors—Loris-Melikov and Kakhanov—also because it could be employed in their fight with Valuev, who was the chairman of the Special Council that was considering the reform of the system of control over the press. Valuev resisted Loris-

Melikov's plans in this area, and their confrontation in the Special Council was aggravated precisely in late 1880/early 1881.¹³ If the repressive measures against the Ukrainian publications initiated by Valuev could be presented as harmful, it would give his opponents an additional advantage.

On 13 January, on the heels of Chertkov's letter, Dondukov-Korsakov sent his own message. It seems that by this time Dondukov-Korsakov already had information that gave him serious grounds to hope for a review of the Ems Edict: on 10 January he sent a telegram to Chertkov in which he requested all the KGS materials, clearly expecting an opportunity to re-establish the RGS department in Kharkov.¹⁴ It is very likely that both Chertkov and Dondukov-Korsakov received in late December confidential requests from Valuev's opponents in the Special Council in Petersburg. In any case, this supposition is not only compatible with all the known circumstances, but also explains many of them.

An official pretext for the Kharkov governor-general's message was the GUP request from 9 December 1880 on the possibility of authorization to publish two books in Ukrainian—*Rus'ka khata* and *Svitopogliad ukrains'kogo naroda*. Dondukov-Korsakov expressed his support for the publication and noted that "the licensing for circulation of particular publications is closely connected to the question for permission to use Ukrainian in literature and generally in school."¹⁵ These general questions were considered by Dondukov-Korsakov in the voluminous "Memorandum on the Little Russian Language," prepared with the utmost care and attached to the letter. This is probably the most well prepared document on the Ukrainian question of all those composed in the bureaucratic structures during Alexander II's reign.

In his memorandum, Dondukov-Korsakov defines the Ukrainian question as "a matter of the greatest importance to the state, the incorrect treatment of which can provoke countless future complications with regard to both internal and external policies." The first part of the document is devoted to an analysis of the opinions expressed on this matter in the press. The publications of the Ukrainophiles themselves were accused by Dondukov-Korsakov of insincerity and incompleteness that concealed intentions "not shared even by the majority of their compatriots." The articles by Russian journalists "unconsciously repeating" the Ukrainophiles' claims were regarded by him as "an echo of that sentimental-doctrinaire liberalism that is a character-

istic feature of the Russian capital city press, which makes it so different from even the most liberal press of other nations." These "sentimental liberals" do not comprehend, in Dondukov-Korsakov's opinion, the real goals of Ukrainophilism and, "fearing accusations of the betrayal of the abstract doctrine of equality, are prepared to demand its application regardless of the conditions of time and place, and often against the traditional historical idea of their state."¹⁶

The memorandum then provided a very detailed and knowledgeable history of the development of the Ukrainophile idea. Dondukov-Korsakov began it with *Osnova*, citing Kostomarov, Belozerskii, and Kulish, and paying special attention to the orthographic reform prepared by the latter as a means of magnifying the differences between the Little Russian and Russian languages. He then turned to the KGS, whose activity he judged very critically. The list of Ukrainophile activists in the 1870s had the names of Dragomanov, Antonovich, Chubinskii, Staritskii, and Lysenko at the top, and continued with a great number of other, lesser known figures—it is clear that Dondukov-Korsakov was following events closely. The "circle of proselytes" was defined with great precision—middle and lower gentry, self-employed individuals; "of those whose standing is closer to peasantry"—priests' sons and *volost* scribes.¹⁷ The author also demonstrated a deep understanding of the social mechanisms of assimilation by emphasizing its acceleration "with the increase of contacts and the improvement of communication with Great Russia, railroad building and [...] the reduction of military service terms."¹⁸ "To strengthen in people, with all the entailing cultural and political consequences, the awareness of their tribal and historical separateness which is already leveling off, under the influence of collective historical life, mass education, and the purely Russian upbringing of the higher classes"—this was the way Dondukov-Korsakov defined the goal of the movement.¹⁹

The reading of this part of the memorandum can be confusing. Why did Dondukov-Korsakov consider it necessary to repeat the diatribes against the "sentimental-doctrinaire liberalism" that Katkov first advanced precisely in connection with Ukrainophilism as far back as 1863? Why did he not defend the KGS now, as he did in 1875/1876, but readily confirm its Ukrainophile bias and even accuse the department of outright bribery during the 1874 census?²⁰ Why did he stress the danger of Ukrainophilism and its separatist tendencies? How does it all square with the memorandum's proposals for an almost complete

abolition of the Ems Edict and with plans to re-open the RGS department in Kharkov? The answers to all these questions lie in the difference between the circumstances on the eve of the Ems Edict and those in early 1881. A staunch opponent of Ukrainophilism in its separatist version, Dondukov-Korsakov in 1875 had defended primarily his own tactics in regard to Ukrainophiles, and resisted the repressions that he was sure were ineffective. Now, in January 1881, he had no doubts that the Ems Edict would be abolished. In the new situation Dondukov-Korsakov was more anxious to see to it that this would not become a step in the direction of “sentimental-doctrinaire liberalism,” in order not to let the goal as he understood it—that is, assimilation in its English-Scottish version—out of sight. He had a good sense of the situation—this is confirmed by Chertkov’s letter, of which he was unaware while preparing the memorandum, in which the idea of assimilation does not figure at all. While generally unchanged in principle, the position of Dondukov-Korsakov, perhaps the most qualified and sophisticated opponent of Ukrainophilism among the highest officialdom, is most adequately expressed in his 1881 memorandum.

Passing on to review the Ukrainophiles’ demands “from the perspective of the interests of unified Russia,” Dondukov-Korsakov defined as central among them the effort to replace Russian with Little Russian in elementary schools. He claimed emphatically that no concessions should be made here: “In this way, a complete literary separation will be accomplished, and then the demand will be advanced, supported already by the entire educated folk, to introduce the Little Russian dialect as a language of instruction in gymnasia and higher.”²¹ At the same time, he suggested permission to use Little Russian to explain Russian words unfamiliar to first-grade students, which “is quite sufficient to satisfy unbiased people.”²²

All the other points of the Ems Edict were criticized by Dondukov-Korsakov relentlessly. “It cannot be left unmentioned that the prohibition of stage performances and the singing of national songs contained in this act not only has not reached any purpose whatsoever, but has caused great consternation and disapproval even among all the supporters of a union with Russia. It has directly contributed to the strengthening of the Ukrainophile party’s authority by giving it an opportunity to point out the suppression of even such innocent manifestations of the popular spirit and creativity. The same effect was produced by the prohibition to publish in Russia compositions in

all branches of knowledge except ancient texts and *belles-lettres*. [...] Its only consequence was that it turned Lvov, Chernovtsy, and Vienna into publishing centers, with the support of the Austrian government.”²³ The memorandum emphasized in particular that the circular had led to a weakening of the “Russia-friendly party of Austrian Rusyns” and thus threatened the “traditional direction of Russian foreign policy.”²⁴

Dondukov-Korsakov suggested abolishing all restrictions against stage and music performances and publications in the Little Russian language, with the caveat that the prohibition of the *kulishovka* should be retained.²⁵ He considered it unnecessary to allow church services in Little Russian, believing that “the very style and content of the sermons, scholastic and estranged from life, constituted the main obstacle to their understanding” by Great Russians and Little Russians alike, “regardless of the language of the sermon.” Since a change in these conditions “is not to be expected any time soon,” “permission to preach in Little Russian [...] will not have a tangible influence upon the success of the spiritual enlightenment of the masses,” Dondukov-Korsakov believed, and referred to the experience of Father Grechulevich, who, in the late 1850s and early 1860s preached in Little Russian.²⁶

The memorandum suggested two possible ways of implementing these recommendations—either formal abolition or application “with considerable, constantly growing relaxation,” that is, the use of the same mechanism that de facto put an end to the implementation of the Valuev Circular in the early 1870s.²⁷ In conclusion, Dondukov-Korsakov, returning to the idea of the first part of the memorandum, emphasized specifically that “all the concessions that can be made now or ever without damage for Russia and for the Little Russian people itself” must be limited to the steps mentioned above. “In this respect an opinion must be formed once and for all, without turning back, and no reasoning or extraneous considerations should sway such a decision.”²⁸

Polovtsov himself did not hasten to formulate his considerations on the Ukrainian question. In January and early February he discussed this problem in the greatest detail with Galagan, Rigel'man, Galagan's former deputy at the KGS Borisov, and other eminent representatives of local society. Rigel'man told Polovtsov about his articles against Ukrainophilism and about the treachery of Dragomanov and his collaborators, who were attempting in Galicia “to converge with the supporters of Russia in order to turn them against us.”²⁹ Galagan, with

whom Polovtsov discussed the problems of teaching in public schools, said that “the people themselves do not wish to be taught in this [Ukrainian] language, and the peasants always say that in school their children should learn the language of the tsar’s law.” Of Dragomanov, Galagan said that “he is receiving money both from Russia and from Austria, and generally the Austrian government is favoring the Ukrainophile party, since, with the development of Little Russian peculiarities, the people should get close to Galicia, where these efforts are met with satisfaction, and even find protectors.” The views of Polovtsov’s companions were later reflected in his recommendations.³⁰

Polovtsov, however, had other sources of information. At least some of the bureaucrats accompanying him were discussing the problem with companions of a lower rank and hearing very different opinions. This can be judged from the letter sent in June 1881 by A. Ia. Rudchenko to A. N. Voskoboinikov, a secretary of the Senate’s First Department, who had accompanied Polovtsov during the inspection as a special envoy. Rudchenko mentions their numerous “lengthy conversations,” which had, to judge from the letter’s content, a very confidential air about them: “I am embracing you, my theory-bound but beloved Petersburg—embracing you for the sincerity and directness of your attitude to me, a son of black-soil Little Russia.” He relates that he has almost completed his memorandum on the Ukrainian question, which he has been preparing at the request of Voskoboinikov.³¹ Its main theses were already familiar to his correspondent. Rudchenko demanded “the release of the Little Russian word from the chains” attached by the 1876 Edict, emphasizing its uselessness for achieving “a flowing of all Russian nationalities into one sea.” He directed Voskoboinikov’s attention to the fact that in its fight against the Poles, Petersburg had recourse to no one but the Little Russian peasant: “After this, go on, talk in our province about the untrustworthiness of the Little Russians [...] whereas, forced by historical conditions, not wishing to forego your Russian mission, you have to support them (at least in the economic sense) by your own hands! [...] Yes, history sometimes forces you to work for those whose death you would wish with all your senses.” Voskoboinikov was defending the assimilationist position (it was precisely in this sense, in Rudchenko’s understanding, that he “wished death” on the Little Russians), but Rudchenko was not afraid to express his views, even though he was awaiting his transfer to a higher position in the capital at that time. While reporting to Polovtsov

on these talks and trusting him with this letter from Rudchenko, Voskoboinikov seemed to have reason to believe that he was doing no harm to his trustful correspondent. And, as a matter of fact, Rudchenko did receive the position in Petersburg, having been placed by Polovtsov in the "harmless" category of "vague dreamers," who constituted, in his opinion, the majority among the Ukrainophiles.³²

The senator clearly was no arch-conservative: he supported the election of V. Antonovich as dean of the department of History and Philology, authorized the funeral service for Shevchenko in the Sophia Cathedral,³³ and, as early as February, successfully solicited permission from Kakhanov to stage *Natalka-Poltavka* at Galagan's Collegium, for which he was instantly rewarded with a visit from an enraged Iuzefovich.³⁴ A very different, joyful mood, and great expectations prevailed in Kiev society. Hromada commissioned V. Antonovich to compose a memorandum for the authorities on the goals of Ukrainophilism, in which he spoke of the peculiarities of Ukraine and the "needs and demands ensuing from these peculiarities."³⁵ On 1 April, shortly before the dismissal of Loris-Melikov and the change of government policy, A. A. Kotliarevskii proclaimed at a Shevchenko commemoration meeting, to audience applause: "So may it be that the political life of our native land in its native tongue receives universal recognition and respect, may it secure the full right of fearless, unhindered existence and development."³⁶

Polovtsov sent his secret letter on the Ukrainian problem to Kakhanov in Petersburg on 6 February, a month after the messages of Chertkov and Dondukov-Korsakov.³⁷ There are no references to this document in historical literature, so I am quoting in its entirety the draft, preserved in the Polovtsov papers and dated 4 February:

"In the Chernigov zemstvo, in Petersburg journals, and, finally, here locally, agitation is being raised over the Little Russian language. I consider it necessary to say a couple of words on this issue, only in the desire that this question, complicated by passions, should not be resolved over-hastily.

"At present, the Ukrainophile question is presented by its advocates to prove that school instruction in the Little Russian dialect constitutes the only means of spreading literacy. Such a thesis is but a sophism. The Little Russian dialect is necessary for a public school teacher in order to explain to a village boy who is just beginning to learn the basic notions he needs for his first steps, but in no way does it

follow that schools should create people who ignore our great Russian language (and not the Great Russian dialect). If the petition of the Chernigov zemstvo is to be satisfied, it would be very desirable to say that their demand that the teacher should speak to new students in the Little Russian dialect is quite fair, that it does not require any law, and that it will be satisfied through administrative correspondence. In reality, there is no other way, and if there were any obstinate and dumb zealots, their time, undoubtedly, is past.

“It goes without saying that the agenda of the people called Ukrainophiles is not limited to this zemstvo demand. Some of them, out of perfectly honest and pure motives, belonging to the best Russian people, are dedicated not only to all their motherland but especially to the land where they were born and have spent their lives. They enjoy tuneful Little Russian songs, they love folk tales and proverbs, they are happy to look at the native landscape and at the folk costume. Others, while admiring the peculiarities of the historical life of the people (the past is always more attractive than the present), are dreaming of a popular literature, forgetting that a literary work always requires a firm mechanical and technical training which does not exist for the Little Russian dialect, and for the creation of which there is no necessity with the existing Russian language anyway. Still others add to the literary dreams political dreams. They would like to play a globally important role as Ukraine. This group of people, in their majority, have a most indefinite way of thinking and the vaguest ideas about everything, including ideas of their own political significance. They would be absolutely innocuous and inefficient, were it not for a fourth gang that stands behind them, few in number but looking farther ahead than others, and, unfortunately, seeing in all this a means to do damage to Russia. This gang is so small that, except Dragomanov, it does not have the courage to express its views. Dragomanov expresses them openly, he is clearly hostile and thus less dangerous, but he has supporters who share his views and would like to prove that the Great Russian and Little Russian dialects are equal; upon proving it, to drive the Russian language out of here, and then, in the far future, to subjugate the illiterate, uncultured tribe of Little Russians to superior Slavic nationalities, among which the Polish cannot fail to be the first. The latest re-drawing of the front lines in the literary parties in Galicia serves to confirm these words. So what follows out of all this? That one should not take any steps, especially decisive and without

argument, for the time being. That individual permissions should be given aplenty for particular concerts, publications, etc., that is, for trivialities. That the limit to these permissions should be defined by very careful and intelligent administrators, since after the recent restrictions, unfortunately, arbitrary, small outbursts are inevitable. That things of a more serious nature require careful and multilateral discussion.”³⁸

Polovtsov thus agreed with the recommendations of Dondukov-Korsakov, even if the critical attitude toward the Ems Edict in his letter is not expressed as clearly as in the message of the Kharkov governor-general. Unlike Dondukov-Korsakov, Polovtsov unequivocally supported gradual administrative relaxation over the formal abolition of the Ems Edict—he did not even consider the latter option. In general, Polovtsov’s intentions to review the edict were markedly less radical than many in Kiev seemed to think. The fairly fantastic ruminations about Dragomanov and his plans were, in all probability, the result of the idiosyncratic interpretation by Polovtsov of the information he had received from his Kiev contacts, and they testify that the senator still had a very vague idea of many aspects of the problem.

The letter from Polovtsov undoubtedly had more weight with the central authority than the letters of the governors-general. As early as 25 February, the head of the GUP, N. S. Abaza, sent to the Kharkov censor, A. I. Palomatskii, a secret instruction that clearly was a consequence of the senator’s letter. In it, the censor was advised to peruse more closely publications “in favor of the abolition of the restrictions on the Little Russian tongue,” and informed that “the government, while planning to grant certain concessions regarding the use of the Little Russian dialect, does not, however, find it possible to abolish all the measures taken in 1876 against the development of Ukrainophilism, which is supported, as far as it is known, by the Austrian government.”³⁹

★ ★ ★

Articles and notes calling for the abolition of the “restrictions on the Little Russian word” began to appear from late 1880, both in the provincial and capital city press.⁴⁰ The main tribune of Ukrainophilism, Dragomanov, could not speak in any open manner in the Russian press, and it was Kostomarov who tried to take up his role. His first article, “The Little Russian Word,” appeared in *Vestnik Evropy* in January 1881. Referring to the review of the press laws in general, Kostomarov called

attention to the situation of the Little Russian language as well. His arguments were quite moderate—Kostomarov cited the fact that not all the educated people in the Ukraine knew Russian well enough, and also stated that the restrictions were unpopular. He remarked specifically that the ban had led to the importation from Galicia of sometimes harmful Ukrainian publications, and presented the spread of Stundism among the Little Russian peasants as the result of such a policy.⁴¹ In his article Kostomarov equated the Little Russian dialect with the “Provençal, Breton, Low German, Welsh, and Scottish provincial dialects” that, in his opinion, were not in any way suppressed, and existed “precisely for domestic use.” If the ban were lifted, argued Kostomarov, the Little Russian dialect would occupy the same space.⁴² Compared to his journalistic writings in *Osnova*, Kostomarov was changing his tactics: learning from experience the hard way, he no longer advocated the principle of linguistic equality but employed utilitarian arguments, declaring his readiness to acknowledge the hierarchical priority of the Russian language over the Little Russian vernacular. He formulated only one practical postulate—in school textbooks it was “necessary to attach the Little Russian text of the subject given in Russian,” thereby continuing the eight-year-old argument of Dragomanov, who had advocated the presence of both the Russian text and the Little Russian translation in textbooks.⁴³

The same issue featured a small item by Pypin, “Little Russian–Galician Relations,” in which he expressed open solidarity with Kostomarov’s article and added as an argument in favor of the abolition of the restrictions the fact that they alienated the “Russian Galicians” from Russia. “From the All-Russian national perspective [...] it would be desirable to establish a close connection between our Southern Russian literature with its counterpart, South Russian literature in Galicia,” wrote Pypin, who, it seems, was a sincere supporter of the concept of “big” Russian unity while preserving the hierarchical Russian–Little Russian plural identity.⁴⁴

A more general article by Kostomarov, “Ukrainophilism,” written in December 1880, appeared in the February issue of *Russkaia starina*. In his narration of the history of Ukrainophilism as a purely cultural movement, devoid of political ambitions, Kostomarov explained the repression against the Ukrainophiles by Polish intrigues. “The desire to write in Little Russian ensued from the natural human love for what is one’s own, native, and dear from childhood—the same kind of love

as a man's love for his family [...] The Little Russians were never conquered and attached to Russia, but have constituted since time immemorial one element among those of which the Russian state body was composed."⁴⁵ The entire system of Kostomarov's argumentation thus coincided, sometimes literally, with what Dragomanov was saying in 1872 in his article "Germany's Eastern Policy and Russification."

Katkov's *Russkii vestnik*, the main adversary of the Ukrainophiles, reacted to the Kostomarov articles immediately. In its March issue the journal already published M. F. de Poulet's article "Toward a History of Ukrainophilism." "To consider Ukrainophilism a natural phenomenon that issues forth from the nature of the Southern Russian tribe," wrote de Poulet, "is a big mistake without any basis in facts."⁴⁶ He spoke as an advocate of a tri-united, ultimately homogenous Russian nation: "Little Russia (southwestern Rus' in general), conquered by Lithuania and then oppressed by Poland, *re-united* with northeastern Rus'. [...] Little Russia pushed Muscovy toward the way of reform; Little Russia brought to life the predecessors of Peter and prepared his reforms; without Little Russia there would be no [...] Russian Empire as a great new power [...] It is true that in the eighteenth century Little Russia vanished, as it were, and drowned in the imperial waves, but the same waves engulfed pre-Petrine Russia."⁴⁷ "The beginning of this century saw the end of what was initiated in the late eighteenth century—a complete spiritual union of Little Russia with Great Russia. An All-Russian intelligentsia emerged in Little Russia, that is, the same as in all of Russia (not *starshina* or Cossack intelligentsia, not half-Polish)."⁴⁸ (Note how different this description of the relations between Great and Little Russia is from the ideas of Belinskii—the "colonial-civilizing" discourse is replaced with the concept of a "common cause.")

De Poulet emphasized that he "does not have anything against the writing of stories, poems, stage plays in the Little Russian dialect," and claimed that "such works should not be an exception from the common censorial rules." "We also do not see a reason why a village teacher cannot be allowed to resort to folk speech with his pupils. Why cannot a country priest deal with his congregation likewise, even sermonizing in church?"⁴⁹ As a matter of fact, de Poulet repeated the "permissive" part of Dondukov-Korsakov's memorandum. The only difference was in the Kharkov governor-general's skepticism about the peasants' ability to understand scholastic preaching in any language.

Further, in an exact correlation with the logic of Dondukov-Korsakov, de Poulet passed on to the sanctions, repeating, and in places developing, the former's theses. De Poulet stressed how it was impermissible to grant an official status to the Little Russian language, and to use it in education (with the exception discussed), in court and other state institutions, and in the army. Even church services in Little Russian were to be permitted, in his opinion, only in village churches, since in the city, where Russian was spoken, a sermon in Little Russian could be turned into a propaganda tool. And in secondary schools, "student communication in Little Russian cannot be permitted."⁵⁰ De Poulet's ultimate ideal is linguistic assimilation: "At the present time the proliferation of our state language [...] is going on with amazing speed [...] Of Little Russia there is nothing to be said: here every peasant, every Cossack, upon taking residence in the city, *eo ipso* becomes a *Moskal* [...] The nationality itself is assimilating, itself runs to meet the common motherland, and you are talking of cruelty, violence!"

De Poulet noted that the sphere of the permissible that he had drawn could not satisfy the Ukrainophiles, and insisted that "in case they attempt to cross the lines drawn [...] they should be struck back forcefully—forcefully, like in any internal split."⁵¹ Here he continued the line of Katkov, stressing the special quality of Ukrainophile "linguistic separatism" (de Poulet uses this notion twice⁵²) as sabotage from inside the Russian national body. "We hope that our Ukrainophiles [...] will not point out to us the examples of tribal literary languages that are alive and well and even being born in our empire. [...] This example does not carry weight with us Russians, and does not do us any particular harm, but harm will undoubtedly be done by this division *within the self*, by these two or three Russian literatures, each with its own language," he wrote, mentioning also the threat of the development of a potential Belorussian separatism on the model of Little Russian.⁵³ On the whole, recollecting the caveats with which Katkov had supported the Valuev Circular, de Poulet's article was a summation of Katkov's consistently nationalist position as applied to the circumstances on the eve of the assassination of Alexander II. Note that this position coincided with the views of Dondukov-Korsakov, who demonstrated the most flexible approach to the Ukrainian question among the highest tsarist bureaucrats.

It is indicative that Kostomarov preferred not to get involved in

the polemics with *Russkii vestnik* and responded only to the critical article in *Sovremennye izvestiia* that dealt with more particular issues by publishing in March in *Vestnik Evropy* the article "On the Question of the Little Russian Word." He defended the thesis on bilingual textbooks and denied accusations of linguistic separatism. While condemning in general the tendency to mix the problems of orthography (i.e., the *kulishovka*) with politics, he stated nonetheless that he himself preferred the Maksimovich system, with "ы" for the hard "и" and "и" for the soft, as in Russian.⁵⁴ In conclusion, Kostomarov called for "lifting any sanctions against the Little Russian dialect and granting full freedom to write in it."⁵⁵

Katkov left this article of Kostomarov without a response as well. He resorted to a very powerful, if ungentlemanly, retort by re-printing, under the title "Ukrainophilism and Mr. Kostomarov," his four anti-Kostomarov articles of 1863, in which he accused Kostomarov of abetting Polish efforts to split the Russian nation.⁵⁶ In a brief introduction to this collection, he wrote: "Twenty years ago there was mental confusion—Kostomarov came up with the Ukrainophile question. Now it's more of the same. If one doesn't know anything of what's going on around, his appearance is enough to tell the weather."⁵⁷ In April 1881 these words sounded like a direct accusation, if not of complicity in the regicide then at least of a wish to profit from the assassins' success. (Meanwhile, all the articles of Kostomarov had been written before 1 March 1881.) At the same time, many of the readers of *Russkii vestnik*, who read Katkov's articles for the first time, learnt now that Kostomarov did not always advocate the rights of the Ukrainian language as only "a dialect for domestic use."

The populist *Russkoe bogatstvo* introduced completely new motives into the debate on Ukrainophilism. In February 1881, the journal published an article by its staff publicist L. Alekseev, "What Is Ukrainophilism?" He condemned efforts to present Ukrainophilism as a Polish intrigue and spoke of the movement as "unhappy, unjustly persecuted and libeled." Alekseev promoted himself as "the most ardent and faithful supporter" of the Ukrainophiles' aspirations to "defend the national originality of the Little Russian people, and to fight by legal means against its Russification, against its assimilation by Great Russian." Alekseev quite sincerely regarded the accusations of separatism as absolutely groundless and called for the legitimization of the Little Russian language in schools and in the press.⁵⁸

However, his upbeat tone all of a sudden turned funereal as he began to discuss why he felt an “antipathy” toward Ukrainophilism. “We are Little Russians from the *narodnik* party,” Alekseev wrote, “but we don’t care if Little Russia lives or dies as a nation; we care only about the people, not about the nation ... This is what separates us from the Ukrainophiles who care a lot about Little Russia as a national unit and divorce the Little Russian cause from the Great Russian. In the complex notion ‘the Little Russian peasant’ we foreground the ‘peasant’, and the Ukrainophiles the ‘Little Russian’.”⁵⁹ “The existence or disappearance of national differences does not in the least influence the development and satisfaction of the radical, essential spiritual and material needs of the human being,” is how Alekseev formulated the journal’s credo on the national question. “The renaissance of the Little Russian nationality is not needed. Moreover, it is impossible. It cuts against the grain of our epoch. Ukrainophilism is a retrograde movement.”⁶⁰

Alekseev repeated his main anti-Ukrainophile theses in July 1881 in the article “More on Ukrainophilism,” which was a response to a review in *Nedelia* that noted that Alekseev’s views ultimately coincided with those of A. Ivanov, a *Kievlanian* publicist who first spoke against the Ukrainophiles as far back as 1863, in Katkov’s *Russkii vestnik*. However, Alekseev here, in direct contradiction to his first article, already stated that “the Little Russian language is now already in the stages of extinction.”⁶¹

In the fall of 1881, when hopes for any radical revision of the Ems Edict had finally evaporated, Dragomanov, who had apparently decided that the tactical considerations that had kept him silent had lost their importance, entered the polemic with Alekseev. In his article “What Is Ukrainophilism?” he methodically analyzed the numerous errors and absurdities in Alekseev’s writings, occasionally, however, himself resorting to rather dubious racial arguments such as the degeneration of the Belorussians as a result of miscegenation with other nationalities.⁶² Alekseev had the last word by admitting in his article “The Tale of the White Bull” that the Ukrainians are a nation, but adding that “there is no need whatsoever to ensure that it remains a nation.”⁶³

Dragomanov first met with the fact that the majority of Russian populists of the 1870s regarded the Ukrainian question quite differently from Herzen and Chernyshevskii while he was still in Kiev. He

recalled later the arrival in Kiev in the first half of the 1870s of a delegate from a Petersburg "social-revolutionary circle." Upon hearing Dragomanov's views on Ukrainophilism, the delegate stated, "All that may be true, but it does not help the cause. We must think of the struggle with our common enemy, and you, speaking of the Ukraine as something special, divide our forces!" Dragomanov writes that these words reminded him of the logic of Shirinskii-Shikhmatov, who also always spoke of a common enemy, except for him it was Poland.⁶⁴ The memoirs of L. G. Deich about the beginning of his revolutionary activity in the 1870s reveal that among the young Kiev populists there were quite a few opponents of Ukrainophiles. "In our opinion, with his 'boring enterprises that nobody needed' like 'collecting Little Russian legends' or 'songs' he distracted the vanguard youth, already attracted to Ukrainophilism, from the only essential and useful cause—from the All-Russian revolutionary movement," is how Deich described the attitude toward Dragomanov in his Kiev circle.⁶⁵ It is possible that the hostility of Deich as an assimilated Jew toward Ukrainophilism was especially acute since the Ukrainophiles very often stressed the "harmful influence" of the Jews on the life of the southwestern province. However, it is not to be doubted that the negative attitude toward Ukrainophilism was typical of the majority of the activists of the Russian revolutionary movement of the 1870s and 1880s. Dragomanov himself, recalling the Kiev conflict, wrote in the mid-1880s: "Eleven years have passed since then, during which time we have had opportunity to discuss the Ukraine personally and in print with a good two hundred 'Russian revolutionaries, socialists', etc.—famous and unknown, educated and uneducated—but all our talks amounted more or less to a repetition of the discussion cited above."⁶⁶

From Deich's memoirs we know some details of these discussions between Dragomanov and Russian socialists in Geneva in the early 1880s. At one of the meetings, in July 1880, Dragomanov began to criticize Russian socialists for the fact that many of them, being Little Russians, were doing nothing for their compatriots. Deich relates his response thus: "I did what I could to present Ukrainophile activity in the southwest as a useless waste of time, almost empty talk. I reported how the Ukrainophiles spend years correcting one letter in the Little Russian dictionary or collecting folk songs and proverbs, and when they finally get to writing something for the people they publish

such thoughtful stories as ‘The Grey Mare’ or ‘How Old Woman Paras’ka Bought a Pig’.” “I remember,” remarks Deich, “it was greeted with joyful and supportive laughter.”⁶⁷ When the offended Ukrainians left the meeting and then sent a collective protest, no one suggested that Deich apologize or showed any interest in making peace. Dragomanov’s estrangement from the All-Russian émigré community in Geneva which then took place “did not stop; on the contrary, it was becoming increasingly acute and strong.”⁶⁸ The attempt by Dragomanov to renew contacts in 1883 ended in total failure. He addressed the “All-Russian” émigré community with an appeal to wage a propaganda campaign not only “in Great Russian, but also in the Little Russian language,” referring to the experience of the Austrian socialists. The objection raised by N. I. Zhukovskii—“How do you propose to make propaganda in the languages of all the peoples when some of them do not even have a language of their own?”—was accompanied by “Homeric laughter and thunderous applause.”⁶⁹

Of course, as in any Russian social movement, the attitude of the *narodniks* toward Ukrainophilism was not always so jeering and derisive. That same Zhukovskii was on the editorial board of *Obshchina*, that wrote: “A Muscovite, a Pole, a Ukrainian are not overseers of each other, but comrades. At present they all live under the hegemony of the Great Russians and are called the Russian people because our overlord is Russian; once the overlord is gone all these peoples will be left to their own devices, and to what extent and how they will form a confederation only practice will tell.”⁷⁰ It was noted by M. Iavorskii that a great number of the defendants at the Trial of 193 had Ukrainophile leanings, and D. Lizogub wanted specifically to send his brother to a Ukrainophile teacher because “socialists are best produced under the influence of Ukrainophiles.”⁷¹ The Russian intelligentsia that participated in the revolutionary and opposition movements, while refusing to cooperate with the government, nonetheless partially played an assimilating role—many of the Little Russians involved in the “All-Russian” political movements were lost to the Ukrainophiles. Once again we pay tribute to the visionary gift of Dragomanov, who expressed concern that after the adoption of the constitution “Moscow people ... will conduct their business in such a way that they will pull behind them a multitude of Moscowized people in the Ukraine, too. For a while the Ukrainian nation will survive, but it will become again

a 'backwater relative', a drag."⁷² As we can see, the effort to treat Ukrainophilism in this particular way came through quite clearly long before Russia had any semblance of a constitution.

★ ★ ★

Polovtsov's suggestion regarding the assembly of a special council on the Ukrainian question was implemented, but in circumstances that he could not possibly have foreseen. On 1 March 1881, Polovtsov finished his inspection and set off for Petersburg. Only then did he learn about the death of Alexander II as a result of the seventh, last-ditch attempt by the People's Will. When, in August 1881, Alexander III ordered the council to be assembled as planned, Loris-Melikov had long since been dismissed, nothing was left of his reformist plans but vague traces, and Alexander II's edict, which he had signed on the morning of 1 March, on the formation of two commissions featuring representatives of the gentry, zemstvos, and cities to discuss projects for further reform, was never made public. The thaw ended without having properly begun. Russia was covered by the shadow of Pobedonostsev's "owl's wings." (I hope the reader will forgive the trite quotation—it is too fitting to resist!)

Among the council members there was no one who had participated in the discussion of the issue in early 1881, not even Polovtsov, to say nothing of Dondukov-Korsakov, who by that time had already been removed from the position of Kharkov governor-general. Along with the chairman, the new minister of the interior, Count N. P. Ignatiev, the council included the minister of state property, M. N. Ostrovskii; the minister of public education, D. M. Sol'skii; the chief procurator of the Holy Synod, K. P. Pobedonostsev; and the new GUP head, Prince P. P. Viazemskii. One could not possibly expect anything good from a council with this cast of characters. Only Sol'skii and Viazemskii could, with certain reservations, be counted as moderate liberals. But it was not they who wielded the real power. Not only did Pobedonostsev, in the very first weeks after Alexander II's death, openly oppose Loris-Melikov's projects, he constantly communicated the motif of the "true Russian spirit" to his charge, the new tsar. Alexander III was very responsive to such speeches. "The *mot d'ordre* now is Russian roots, Russian forces, Russian people—in a word, Russicism of all kinds. Things will work out, somehow. The only thing left would be to replace the two-headed eagle in the state emblem with a lobster," wrote the

sarcastic Valuev in his diary at the time.⁷³ On appointing as minister, on the advice of Pobedonostsev, N. P. Ignatiev, who sincerely believed in the all-powerful Polish–Jewish conspiracy, the tsar noted especially that he was a “true, native Russian.”⁷⁴ Ostrovskii also belonged to the party of Pobedonostsev.

From the report of the council prepared for the tsar it became clear that it discussed only those parts of the Ems Edict that were concerned with censorship. The questions of the use of Ukrainian in schools to the limited extent proposed by Polovtsov and Dondukov-Korsakov, and of the re-opening of the RGS department in Kharkov, were not even on the agenda.⁷⁵

The council came to the conclusion that “the five-year use of these rules has revealed some of their inconveniences.” Upon citing the addresses of the Kiev and Kharkov governors–general as well as of “numerous governors and private individuals,” the council still found it necessary “to leave these rules in force for the future, making only certain changes and additions in order to relieve them of the inconveniences revealed by practice without, however, altering the basic principles on which these rules were founded.”⁷⁶ The changes suggested by the council were indeed extremely limited. “The council has found it necessary: (1) to extend article 2 of the rules with the addition that the publications licensed to be printed in the Little Russian dialect now include dictionaries, on the condition that they be published in accordance with All-Russian orthography or the orthography used in Little Russia no later than the eighteenth century”; (2) article 3 is to be interpreted in the sense that the stage plays, acts, and couplets in the Little Russian dialect that were licensed to be produced previously by theatrical censorship and that are currently subject to a renewed license from the Main Administration on the Press, can be performed publicly, but each time with the special permission of the governors–general and, in localities not subject to the authority of the governors–general, with the permission of the governors, and that the license to publish in the Little Russian dialect lyrics to music, with the condition of [using] received Russian orthography, is granted to the Main Administration on the Press.”⁷⁷ It was specifically stressed that “the setting up of a special Little Russian theater and the forming of theatrical companies to perform plays and acts exclusively in the Little Russian dialect” was completely forbidden.⁷⁸ It was envisioned that every performance would include a Russian play along with the Ukrainian

one. Since the Ems Edict was classified, these new rules were also intended to be circulated as an office memorandum, "without a public announcement." The report contained no discussion of the essence of the Ukrainian question and none of the arguments of the supporters of the abolition of the Ems Edict.

The report of the council was authorized by Alexander III in Gatchina on 8 October 1881 without any changes.⁷⁹ The circular on the accepted alterations was sent to the governors on 16 October. The instructions implemented in the following years would only reinforce the use of the Ems Edict, the harmfulness of which was clear to the most realistic opponents of Ukrainophilism among the tsarist bureaucrats from its very inception.⁸⁰ Along with many other marasmic elements of the old regime, the Ems Edict would be abolished only in 1905. However, the regime would fail to come up with any new, more sensible policy toward the Ukrainian issue up until its collapse in February 1917.

The transition during the reign of Alexander III to the policy of Russification on an all-imperial scale meant, in effect, an intellectual surrender to the challenge of Russian nation building. The goal of the Russification of the empire as a whole could be regarded as realistic to some extent, but only in the distant perspective, and only if one agreed with the official thesis about the absolute predominance of Russians among the population of the Russian Empire. Meanwhile, this thesis was defensible only if one included Little Russians and Belorussians into the unified All-Russian nation. And that, in its turn, presupposed ignoring the lessons of the previous reign, the events of which made it perfectly clear to the political elite that uniting the East Slavs into a single nation was a goal that required long and hard work to achieve. These were exactly the lessons that were ignored when conversion to Orthodoxy—the favorite means of Pobedonostsev, who did not understand the mechanisms of nationalist policies—became the core element of the Russification efforts of the authorities.⁸¹ It is not surprising that the main result of the undifferentiated and clumsy Russification policy of the last two reigns was the construction of gigantic Orthodox cathedrals of dubious architectural value—some preserved, as in Helsinki, some later demolished, as in Warsaw.

NOTES

- 1 GARF, f. 583, op. 1, ed. khr. 15, l. 241; ed. khr. 16, l. 12.
- 2 P. A. Valuev, *Dnevnik 1877–1884 gg.*, p. 109.
- 3 S. Iu. Vitte, *Izbrannye vospominaniia* (Moscow, 1991), p. 120.
- 4 GARF, f. 583, op. 1, ed. khr. 15, l. 241; ed. khr. 16, l. 3.
- 5 GARF, f. 583, op. 1, ed. khr. 15, ll. 193, 241; ed. khr. 16, ll. 46, 67, 89–91, 104.
- 6 GARF, f. 583, op. 1, ed. khr. 18, ll. 10, 24.
- 7 RGIA, f. 776, op. 11, ed. khr. 61, l. 25.
- 8 For evidence that Alexander II, who continued to treat Chertkov well, dismissed him exclusively because of the conflict with Polovtsov, see A. E. Peretz. *Dnevnik A. E. Peretza, 1880–1883* (Moscow–Leningrad, 1927), p. 16.
- 9 V. Miyakovskii, *Iubilei Tsenzurnogo Aktu 1876 roku* (Kiev, 1926), p. 15. (Reprint from the journal *Bibliografichni Visti*, 1926, no. 3, published as a separate booklet.)
- 10 [V. Naumenko] “Naiblizhchi vidguki ukaza 1876 r. pro zaboronuukrains’kogo pis’menstva,” *Ukraina* (June 1907), pp. 250–251.
- 11 Savchenko erroneously believes it was a note by P. P. Viazemskii, who became the GUP head only in March 1881.
- 12 F. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, p. 175.
- 13 P. A. Zaionchkovskii, *Krizis samoderzhavii na rubezhe 1870–1880-kh godov* (Moscow, 1964), pp. 263–268; P. A. Valuev, *Dnevnik 1877–1884 gg.*, pp. 117, 126–127, 146–147. The fact that Valuev says nothing in his detailed diary on the plans to abolish the Ems Edict testifies that he was kept in the dark about it.
- 14 F. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, p. 118.
- 15 RGIA, f. 776, op. 11, ed. khr. 61, ll. 24 ob–25.
- 16 *Ibid.*, ll. 27–27 ob.
- 17 *Ibid.*, l. 32.
- 18 *Ibid.*, ll. 34 ob–35.
- 19 *Ibid.*, l. 29 ob–30.
- 20 *Ibid.*, l. 30.
- 21 RGIA, f. 776, op. 11, ed. khr. 61, ll. 34–34 ob.
- 22 *Ibid.*, l. 35 ob.
- 23 *Ibid.*, ll. 36–36 ob.
- 24 *Ibid.*, l. 37.
- 25 *Ibid.*, ll. 37 ob–38.
- 26 *Ibid.*, l. 38 ob. For a positive response to the Grechulevich experiment see in *Russkoe Bogatstvo*, no. 3 (1857), p. 70, in the section “Kritika.”
- 27 *Ibid.*, l. 37 ob. This kind of practice continued to remain a favorite modus operandi of the tsarist bureaucracy, alien to the idea of the rule of law, in the times of Loris-Melikov. This same mechanism was envisioned, e.g., for a certain liberalization of policies toward universities: instead of issuing a special legal

- act it was planned that the right to authorize student mutual funds, inexpensive cafeterias, and forms of corporate activity would be left to every individual trustee. See P. A. Zaionchkovskii, *Krizis samoderzhav'ia*, p. 273.
- 28 *Ibid.*, l. 39–39 ob.
- 29 GARF, f. 583, op. 1, ed. khr. 18, l. 159.
- 30 *Ibid.*, l. 141. Simultaneously, Galagan requested permission to produce *Natalka-Poltavka* in his collegium, thus remaining faithful to the Little Russian view of the problem that he shared with the people of his circle and the generation that had already left the stage, like Maksimovich.
- 31 RO RNB, f. 600, ed. khr. 280, ll. 5–6 ob.
- 32 GARF, f. 583, op. 1, ed. khr. 60, l. 90.
- 33 M. Palienko. “Kiivs’ka Stara Hromada u suspil’nomu ta naukovomu zhitti Ukraini. (Druga polovina XIX–pochatok XX st.)” *Kiivs’ka Starovina*, no. 2 (1998), p. 69.
- 34 GARF, f. 583, op. 1, ed. khr. 18, ll. 177, 183.
- 35 V. B. Antonovich. *Moia spovid’: Vibrani istorichni ta publitsistychni tvori* (Kiev, 1995), p. 40; M. Palenko, “Kiivs’ka Stara Hromada,” p. 69.
- 36 Here from F. Savchenko, “Ukrains’ke nauko-vo-kul’turne samovyznachennia 1850–1876 rr.,” *Ukraina* (Kiev, January–February 1929), pp. 28–29. These sentiments and manifestations did not go unnoticed in Petersburg. L. Panteleev recalls: “It was passed to Kiev, via a private route, through Modestov, that some professors were about to attract a storm of accusations of Ukrainophilism. [...] This was the occasion for [A. F.] Kistiakovskii’s arrival in Petersburg. He paid a visit to Minister I. D. Delianov. [...] I saw A. F. right after the rendezvous with the minister. “‘You know, A. F., I am receiving very, very bad reports about you’ [...] said Ivan Davydovich. ‘I truly don’t know what to do with you.’ However, upon the audience with Kistiakovskii, he let him go in peace, adding at the end: ‘Just be more careful, A. F., and pass it to your comrades.’” (L. F. Panteleev, *Vospominaniia*, p. 244.)
- 37 GARF, f. 583, op. 1, ed. khr. 18, l. 167.
- 38 GARF, f. 583, op. 1, d. 60, ll. 89 ob–91. (The book is bound in such a way that the reverse page precedes the enumerated page, i.e., the letter is on six pages.)
- 39 F. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, pp. 178–179.
- 40 Pypin mentions in the *Vestnik Evropy* small articles in *Pedagogicheskaiia khronika*, *Tserkovno-Obshchestvennyi Vestnik*, *Nedelia* (*Vestnik Evropy*, no. 1 [1881], p. 409). I did not manage to find these publications.
- 41 *Vestnik Evropy*, no. 1 (1881), pp. 402–403.
- 42 *Ibid.*, p. 407.
- 43 *Ibid.*, p. 403.
- 44 *Ibid.*, p. 409.
- 45 *Russkaia starina*, no. 2 (1881), pp. 329–330.
- 46 *Russkii vestnik*, no. 3 (1881), p. 213.

- 47 *Ibid.*, p. 220.
- 48 *Vestnik Evropy*, no. 1 (1881), p. 214.
- 49 *Ibid.*, p. 228.
- 50 *Ibid.*, pp. 229–230.
- 51 *Ibid.*, p. 233.
- 52 *Ibid.*, pp. 224, 227.
- 53 *Vestnik Evropy*, no. 1 (1881), p. 227.
- 54 *Ibid.*, no. 3, p. 364.
- 55 *Ibid.*, p. 359.
- 56 *Russkii vestnik*, no. 4 (1881), pp. 687–725. Katkov included in the collection his leading articles from the *Moskovskie vedomosti* of 24 June 1863, no. 136, and 4 September 1863, no. 191, as well as the articles from nos. 24 and 26 of the *Sovremennaia letopis'* of 1863.
- 57 *Russkii vestnik*, no. 4 (1881), p. 687.
- 58 *Russkoe bogatstvo*, no. 2 (1881), pp. 22–24.
- 59 *Ibid.*, p. 29.
- 60 *Ibid.*, p. 40. It follows from the editorial comment (no. 11, p. 93) that the editor fully shared Alekseev's position.
- 61 *Russkoe bogatstvo*, no. 7 (1881), p. 69.
- 62 M. Petrik (Dragomanov), "Chto takoe ukrainofil'stvo," *Russkoe bogatstvo*, no. 11 (1881), p. 111. Interestingly, Dragomanov himself remarked later: "I shared to a great extent the aspirations and ideas of Ukrainian nationalists, but to an equally great extent they seemed reactionary to me." ("Avtobiografiia M. P. Dragomanova," *Byloe*, no. 6 (1906), p. 187). The essence of Dragomanov's differences with the position of the *Russkoe bogatstvo* is best expressed in his own words: "Here a Ukrainophile is bad who hasn't become a radical, and a radical is bad who hasn't become a Ukrainophile" (*ibid.*, p. 198). However, we have already noted that in the 1880s Dragomanov tended to exaggerate his radicalism of the early 1870s.
- 63 *Russkoe bogatstvo*, no. 12 (1881), p. 37.
- 64 "Avtobiografiia M. P. Dragomanova," *Byloe*, no. 6 (1906), p. 192.
- 65 L. G. Deich, *Russkaia revoliutsionnaia emigratsiia 70-kh godov* (Petersburg, 1920), p. 24.
- 66 M. Dragomanov, "Otnoshenie velikorusskikh sotsialistov 70-kh godov k narodno-federal'nomu napravleniiu," *Kievskaiia starina* (May–June 1906), pp. 8–10.
- 67 L. Deich, "Ukrainskaia i obshcherusskaia emigratsiia," *Vestnik Evropy*, no. 8 (1914), pp. 217–218.
- 68 *Ibid.*, p. 222.
- 69 L. Deich, "Za rubezhom," *Vestnik Evropy*, no. 9 (1912), pp. 181–182.
- 70 Here from M. Iavorskii, "Emskii akt 1876 r.," *Prapor Marksizmu*, no. 1 (1927), pp. 128–129.
- 71 *Ibid.*, p. 129.

72 M. Dragomanov, *Shevchenko, ukrainofili i sotsiializm*, p. 157.

73 P. A. Valuev, *Dnevnik 1877–1884 gg.*, p. 181.

74 See, for example, P. A. Valuev, *Dnevnik 1877–1884 gg.*, p. 161; P. A. Zaionchovskii, *Krizis samoderzhav'ia*, p. 338.

75 RGIA, f. 776, op. 11, ed. khr. 61, ll. 81–82.

76 RGIA, f. 776, op. 11, ed. khr. 61, ll. 82–83 ob.

77 *Ibid.*, ll. 82 ob–83 ob.

78 *Ibid.*, l. 83 ob.

79 *Ibid.*, l. 81.

80 See, for instance, the GUP circular of 31 December 1883 for the southern governors, which included the demand to check that Russian-language plays constituted no less than half of every performance by local companies. RGIA, f. 776, op. 11, ed. khr. 61, ll. 95–96.

81 A good analysis of Pobedonostsev's Russification program can be found in E. C. Thaden, *Conservative Nationalism*, pp. 183–203.

Conclusion

In the introduction we formulated the two main goals of this study. The first was to reconstruct the decision-making process employed by the authorities in respect to the “Ukrainian question,” and the reaction of Russian public opinion to the development of the Ukrainian national movement. Summing up the results, we can suggest a certain periodization of the unfolding events.

The beginning of modern Ukrainian nationalism can be dated back to the mid-1840s. The Cyril–Methodius Society, which became the first attempt at an organizational setup, was crushed by the authorities in 1847. The authorities, however, conscientiously treated most of the Society’s members in a relatively moderate manner, so as not to push the Ukrainophiles towards radicalism and a union with the Poles. The principle of “restraint” in the repressions against individual activists of the Ukrainian movement remained in force at least until the end of the nineteenth century.

Russian public opinion in the 1840s was divided with respect to the Ukrainian national movement. A clearly expressed assimilationist approach was represented by Belinskii and Venelin. At the same time, Iu. Samarin, in the late 1840s and early 1850s, spoke in favor of a political union of Great and Little Russia, with a limited linguistic and cultural assimilation.

Conditions for a new activation of Ukrainophilism emerged in the second half of the 1850s. As a result of general liberalization early in the reign of Alexander II, members of the Society were recalled from exile and received an opportunity to renew their public activities. From the late 1850s, the authorities kept a rather close watch over the Ukrainophiles, but did not resort to repression. Moreover, in 1860 the Ukrainophiles were permitted to publish in Petersburg their journal *Osnova*. It can be ascertained that the authorities were only gradually

coming to a realization of the nature and scale of the threat. Up until 1862, with rare exceptions, they did not resist efforts to emancipate the Ukrainian language, and some government agencies (primarily the Ministry of Public Education) sometimes even supported those efforts.

In the summer of 1863, with the Polish uprising in the background but not exclusively in connection with it, the minister of the interior, Valuev, issued a circular that drastically reduced the publishing opportunities open to the Ukrainophiles. It suspended the publication of all popular literature, including textbooks and religious texts. The circular was aimed mainly at blocking efforts to emancipate the Ukrainian language and to spread Ukrainian literacy among the peasants. The bureaucratic process of its preparation was initiated by the minister of war, D. Miliutin; an active role was played by the Third Department and the Kiev governor-general, N. Annenkov. The minister of public education, Golovnin, staunchly resisted these plans. The role of the Holy Synod in the preparation of the circular, which some researchers believe to be crucial, was in fact marginal.

Government documents of 1863 and 1864 clearly formulate the goal of linguistic assimilation of the Little Russian peasants and contain a comprehensive list of the arsenal of practical measures needed to achieve that goal. This period also saw the only episode in which effective use was made by the Petersburg authorities of non-repressive steps in their fight against Ukrainophilism. This episode involved the employment of Ukrainophiles in the civil administration of the Kingdom of Poland, which exploited the widespread Polonophobia. The years 1864 to 1872 saw a decline in the Ukrainian national movement.

The renewal of Ukrainophile activity in the first years of Alexander II's reign evoked a hostile reaction among the majority of the Russian press, first and foremost on the part of Katkov's Moscow publications and I. Aksakov's *Den'*. A part of the Petersburg press, however, sympathized with the Ukrainophiles. A great number of Russian intellectuals helped Kostomarov to raise funds to publish Ukrainian textbooks. Herzen's *Kolokol* expressed unequivocal support for the Ukrainian movement. Criticism of the Ukrainophiles by their opponents was restrained at that time.

Beginning from the fall of 1862, the polemic against the Ukrainophiles became increasingly aggressive, but the press as a whole invariably opposed repression. At the same time Katkov, without calling for

it openly, provided support to the forces that sought administrative prohibitions. Later he was alone in speaking out in favor of the Valuev Circular.

As a whole, the debate over the “Ukrainian question” in the Russian press reflected a general turn toward nationality issues. The abolition of serfdom and the consequent liberal reforms of the early years of Alexander II’s reign had opened up new opportunities for the press and other means of forming and expressing public opinion, revived hopes of the introduction of a constitution, and thus inevitably contributed to the foregrounding of the subject of the nation. The Ukrainian nationalist challenge had become an exceptionally important catalyst for the debate on the issue of the making of the Russian nation itself. The idea of Little Russia and Belorussia (White Russia) as “age-old Russian lands,” and of the Little Russians and Belorussians as parts of the Russian people, came through clearly in the government documents of the day and was predominant in public opinion. In the articles by Katkov, and in a number of *Den’* articles on the subject of Ukrainophilism, the concept of the All-Russian nation, including Little Russians and Belorussians, found its most comprehensive expression at that time. It should be emphasized that in his first writings on the “Ukrainian question” Katkov demonstrated his understanding that the All-Russian and Ukrainian nation-building projects were nothing but competitive projects, each with a chance of success.

Opposition to the concept of the All-Russian nation on the part of Herzen and Chernyshevskii was based on the idea of national self-determination, a right they recognized for all the peoples of the empire, including Little Russians and Belorussians. In government circles a skeptical, often suspicious, attitude toward accentuating the issues of ethnicity in general, and the problem of Russian nation-building in particular, was typical of the traditionalists—advocates of class order and the old mechanisms of the legitimization of autocracy. Elements of this approach could be combined with elements of nationalism, which happened, for example, with Valuev—the contradictions in his position reflect the objective contradictions of the transitional stage, when nationalism was gradually replacing traditionalist values in the minds of the higher bureaucracy. The same contradiction could later be observed in Pobedonostsev’s views, the difference being that the Orthodox traditionalism and xenophobic nationalism of the chief procurator of the Holy Synod were essentially of a different kind than

Valuev's aristocratic-cosmopolitan traditionalism and moderately liberal nationalism.

The Little Russians who had an All-Russian identity deserve a special mention. Their views can be regarded as part of Russian public opinion. These people had among their ranks quite a few staunch opponents of the Ukrainian nationalists. In the 1860s their role in the public polemic against the Ukrainophiles remained marginal. However, this community produced a number of confidential appeals to the authorities that played an important role in the promulgation of the Valuev Circular.

The advancement of Ukrainophilism in the mid-1870s was already associated with the activity of a new generation that had first made itself known in the early 1860s but that had remained in the shadow of the former members of the Cyril-Methodius Society, who had just resumed their work. The center of Ukrainophile activities then moved from Petersburg to Kiev. Understanding the vacuity of a policy based exclusively on administrative sanctions, the then governor-general of Kiev, Dondukov-Korsakov, resorted to a flexible tactic of "domesticating" the Ukrainophiles: by providing certain opportunities for their cultural and scholarly activity, without, however, making concessions in the key question of admitting the Ukrainian language in schools, he hoped to impart a moderate, loyalist character to the movement. This policy conducted by Dondukov-Korsakov at his own risk, without Petersburg's permission, bore some fruit. However, the conflict between the Ukrainophiles and their opponents in the Little Russian community of Kiev prompted the latter to appeal to Petersburg with a number of complaints—addressed to the minister of public education, Tolstoy, and the head of the Third Department, Potapov. The Secret Council, set up on the tsar's orders, worked out new repressive measures against the Ukrainophiles that became, ultimately, even more stringent as a result of the intrigues of the minority members of the council, who favored maximally strict sanctions as the main instrument in the fight against Ukrainophilism. As in 1863, on 18 May 1876, Alexander II readily endorsed the most radical version of the anti-Ukrainophile instructions that came to be known as the Ems Edict. The efforts of the minister of the interior, Timashev, who most likely had the support of Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, to mitigate the circular while it was still fresh were in vain.

An attempt to review the Ems Edict was undertaken at the ini-

tiative of Senator Polovtsov in 1880. It was actively supported by the Kharkov governor-general, Dondukov-Korsakov, and Chertkov, who had replaced him as the governor-general of Kiev, as well as by a number of influential top officials from Loris-Melikov's entourage in Petersburg, which is further proof that there was no unity in the highest bureaucratic ranks with respect to the "Ukrainian question." After the assassination of Alexander II and the dismissal of Loris-Melikov, the council reviewing the Ems Edict was put under the control of Pobedonostsev and his supporters, and thus limited itself to cosmetic measures. During the reign of Alexander III the policy of censorship in regard to Ukrainian publications was even more severe than under his father. The Ems Edict remained in force until the revolution of 1905.

The public polemics in the 1870s also shifted its center to the Kiev press, only later and intermittently appearing on the pages of the capital city press, wherein, as always, the most biased, anti-Ukrainophile position was taken up by Katkov's publications. This time, however, the key role in this polemics, even in the capital city publications, belonged to the Little Russian opponents of Ukrainophilism. It was they, especially Iuzefovich, who urged the administrative process in Petersburg that culminated in the passing of the Ems Edict. By stressing the prominent role played by the Little Russian opponents of Ukrainophilism in forming public opinion and in bureaucratic decision making, as well as the absence of unity among the central bureaucracy and Great Russian critics in respect to the "Ukrainian question," we are not in any way attempting to redistribute responsibility for the repressions, but rather to show that the division did not take place along ethnic lines. On the issue of responsibility we note—without denying in any way the repressive character of the policy toward the Ukrainian movement—that, unlike in the twentieth century, the scale and scope of repression in the nineteenth century provided little ground for the use of martyrological motifs when describing Russian-Ukrainian relations. Nor are there grounds for claiming that the ban on publications in Ukrainian was total, although this claim is heard often enough in the literature.

The second, more speculative, question formulated in the introduction asked why the All-Russian nation project, the alternative to the Ukrainian nation-building project, failed. Applied to such complex sociopolitical processes as nation building, any attempt to single out a particular factor as decisive inevitably becomes an easy prey for

the critics. This is why I will phrase it carefully: I have concentrated primarily on aspects of the process that have not been given due attention in the past.

Up until now, researchers studying these subjects have discussed the following factors. The first was the success of the Ukrainian movement itself. It is true that, in order to prove that the power of the Ukrainian national movement is not to be underestimated, it is sufficient to compare it with its Belorussian counterpart. But nor is it advisable to overestimate this power. Up to the revolutionary decades it still had not become a mass movement. In his memoirs E. Chikalenko, himself a Ukrainophile, remarked, not without irony, that if the train that had carried the delegates from Kiev to Poltava to the opening of the monument to Kotliarevskii in 1903 had derailed, it would have been the end of the Ukrainian movement for many years, if not decades—practically all its activists were contained in two carriages of that train.¹ Nor should we forget that it was only at the turn of the century that Ukrainophilism was able to resolve the two essential requirements of all such movements—to standardize the language and create a dictionary, and to form its own coherent national concept of history. (The Czechs, who served as a model for the Ukrainophiles, managed to do this in as early as the first half of the nineteenth century.)

Secondly, it is often said that the peculiarities of the Little Russian peasants (such as their attachment to the land), and the serious differences between them and the Great Russian peasants, were an obstacle to assimilation. Without denying these peculiarities and differences, I will still endeavor to argue, citing the authority of the most profound Ukrainian historian of the postwar period, I. Rudnytsky, that the assimilation barrier was not high.² In the terms suggested by J. Chlebowczyk, the Russian-Ukrainian cultural and linguistic borderland can best be described as transitional rather than adjacent. As J. Armstrong correctly noted, it was impossible to determine, using only linguistic signs, where the Little Russians ended and the Great Russians or Belorussians began. Nor was there a religious barrier that played such an important role in Polish-Ukrainian relations. (The impact of the Uniate Church problem increased only in the late nineteenth century, and only in the western part of Ukraine.³) Nor was there any rejection of assimilation on the part of the Russians—a Little Russian by descent, when speaking Russian and identifying himself as Russian,

was automatically considered as such by the Great Russians, which was very different compared to many other ethnic groups. As a matter of fact, this mechanism of the perception of assimilated Ukrainians by Russians still works today.

Nor is it advisable to mythologize the attachment of the peasants to their land. The city during the period in question simply did not create a sufficient number of jobs to be filled by migrants from the countryside. In contrast, the number of Ukrainian migrants in the free lands in the east of the empire even before the 1917 revolution approached 2.5 million—that is, they constituted almost 14 percent of all the Ukrainians in the empire. In addition, almost 8 million Little Russians lived in regions with a mixed Little Russian/Great Russian population, where assimilation processes were also developing intensively. Even though the socioeconomic factors that contributed to assimilation were only just beginning to play a role in the second half of the nineteenth century, 1.5 million Ukrainians were “Russified” during this period. That is why the scale of the Ukrainian demographic mass, while an important factor, still cannot serve as a self-sufficient explanation of the events, especially regarding the fact that the Great Russian/Little Russian ratio was 2.5:1, which roughly corresponded to the proportion of French-speakers and patois-speakers in France in the 1860s.

Russian/Polish political, economic and cultural competition in the western guberniias is often mentioned among the circumstances that complicated the implementation of the assimilationist project. It is true that the role of the Poles and of descendants of Polonized families in the development of the Ukrainian movement was significant, especially in its early stages. Ideological borrowings are evident. Later, Polish politicians often provided material support for the Ukrainian movement in Galicia.

The impact of the “Polish factor” on the situation, however, was ambivalent. Throughout the nineteenth century the majority of educated Little Russians considered the Poles as their number-one enemy, and for the peasants their hatred of the Polish landowners was the foundation stone of their whole world-view. Ethnic, religious, and social hostility toward the Poles pushed the majority of Little Russians in the direction of Russia, if only by default. Even some of the leaders of the Cyril–Methodius Society were later ready to serve the tsar as bureaucrats/Russifiers, if this service was “against the Poles.” It should

be noted that the authorities were rather judicious in the use of the opportunities opened to them by the hostility of the Little Russian peasants toward Polish landowners.

Some researchers give specific emphasis to the role played in the development of this situation by Galicia, or, in other words, by the fact that a significant part of the area populated by ethnic Ukrainians was outside the control of St. Petersburg. And here, while acknowledging the important role of Galicia in the development of the Ukrainian national movement, especially in the later decades of the nineteenth century and in the twentieth century, we should note that Galicia itself did not possess the material and intellectual resources to enable it to act as a Ukrainian Piedmont. Even the support for the Ukrainian movement that was occasionally provided by Polish politicians and Vienna could not radically change the situation. The role of Galicia was, to a great extent, dependent on the situation in the Russian part of Ukraine.

I do not deny the significance of these factors, as should be clear from what has been said here and in the book as a whole. However, if the analysis is limited to them, which is usually the case, it suggests, directly or implicitly, that everything possible was done to implement a nation-building project in competition with that of the Ukrainophiles. It is precisely this thesis that I consider erroneous.

Having argued that the assimilationist pressure on the Little Russians in the nineteenth century was rather weak, one should attempt, first of all, to separate the objective and subjective causes of this phenomenon, keeping in mind that such an operation is somewhat abstract. Russia's social and economic backwardness vis-à-vis the leading European states was evident. It was equally evident that this backwardness—of the railroad system, industrialization, and urbanization—made the implementation of the assimilationist project extremely difficult. It restricted the mobility of the population and decreased the potential profitability of command of the dominant, state language—a realization that led French peasants in the last third of the nineteenth century to replace patois by French. Russia's underdevelopment also limited the human and material resources available to the government.⁴

Modernization was late not just in contrast to France or England, with which we have compared Russia. Equally important is the fact that it was late compared with the "advent of nationalism" on the expanses of the Russian Empire. In France and England the development of the

industrial revolution preceded by several decades the emergence of the nationalist “challenge,” while for Russia the reverse was true.

Here, however, we can already pose a question: To what extent was this backwardness aggravated by the empire’s ruling circles, which handled the problem of eliminating the relics of feudalism and the economic and political modernization of the empire invariably later, and worse, than the Habsburgs and Hohenzollerns with their Junkers?⁵ It is sufficient to begin with the question of whether there was an objective possibility of the introduction in Russia in the 1860s of elements, even if inevitably limited, of a constitutional system. In other words, to what degree did the subjective factor—the autocratic inclination of the tsars—contribute to the increase of the objective backwardness?

In Russia, none of the institutions that France exploited so successfully in its nation-building project—schools, the army, and local government—was able to cope with similar tasks, both because of their status and the low level of state funding. In its turn, the weakness of the administrative system predetermined the inconsistency of Russian policies, which changed significantly not only with the change of the autocrats, but of the governors-general as well. The regrettably poor state of these institutions and of the state machine as a whole was further aggravated by the limited possibility of the use of social resources, even for increasing the number of educated officials who were in extremely short supply. This is to a large extent explained by the obstinacy with which the autocracy attempted to preserve its political monopoly, that is, sought to remain autocratic, even after the abolition of serfdom that had been the basis of the old regime. The reforms of the 1860s, had they been continued in the political sphere, might have opened up an opportunity to overcome the mutual alienation of the authorities and society. That did not happen. Without trying to determine the exact share of guilt, we should note that the responsibility can be laid on both sides. The transition of the authorities to a counter-reformist policy in the 1870s, the establishing of a bureaucratic police regime, and the political conflict that began to ripen in Russian society from that time—all of these inevitably undermined the attractiveness of Russia as a center of integration gravity for the elites of the imperial borderlands.

Whatever the case, I have tried to demonstrate that even the resources that the government possessed were not put to effective use. I will not shy away from repeating: the problem of the consolidation of the All-Russian nation and the mechanisms of this process were

discussed in the press, all the basic elements of the assimilationist program were mentioned in official documents and many were even approved by the tsar. But no coordinated plan of "affirmative" assimilationist action was ever developed. In the debates over the "Ukrainian question" in the power structures, attention was focused almost entirely on restrictive measures. The task of the consolidation of the Russian nation as such, as a task different in principle from the challenge of the preservation of the empire and requiring different approaches, never became a priority in the view of the authorities. The scanty financing of elementary schools, even considering the resources available, the absence of cheap educational mass literature in Russian, the character of the migration policy, and other examples of negligence mentioned in this book all testify to the low efficiency of the Russian bureaucracy as an agency of assimilation.

As a result, during the three relatively stable—compared to the reign of Nicholas II, of course—decades after the abolition of serfdom, when the masses, including the peasantry, still remained beyond the radicals' influence, and opportunities for an assimilating influence on the Little Russian peasants and the implementation of an All-Russian nation-building project, however limited, still significantly outweighed the opportunities of the outnumbered, organizationally and politically amorphous Ukrainian national movement, the imperial authorities were in fact relying on spontaneous assimilation, reducing their own efforts exclusively to administrative prohibitions of the Ukrainian nationalists. The rigidity and isolationism of the political system also excluded a re-orientation to the more limited strategy of "hybrid" assimilation, on the English-Scottish model.

A historian does not have an opportunity to test his hypotheses experimentally—we will never be able conclusively to answer the question of whether the All-Russian nation-building project could have been successful with a more effective state power in general and with a more efficient use of the assimilating opportunities it had at its disposal in particular. Whatever the case, it is clear that the story of the competition between the All-Russian and Ukrainian nation-building projects must be told not only, and perhaps not so much, as the success story of the Ukrainian national movement as the story of the failure of Russian assimilating efforts.

Generally, an assessment of the results of assimilation depends decisively on the criteria selected. If one takes into account purely

quantitative indicators, the assimilation processes were quite successful—the numbers of those “Russified” ran into millions; Ukrainian cities populated predominantly by native residents were nonetheless Russian-speaking; and migrant peasants were assimilated almost inevitably. The assessment changes, however, if one takes as a criterion the competition between the two nation-building projects. In this case, it becomes clear that the scale and tempo of assimilation were still insufficient to secure an advantage for the All-Russian nation-building project at a time of a serious crisis of power and the “coming of the masses” into politics.

One encounters an analogous problem when assessing the effectiveness of the Valuev Circular and the Ems Edict. They were successful in the sense that they considerably slowed down the process of the development of the Ukrainian national movement. However, not being reinforced by a sufficiently powerful “positive” assimilating pressure, they alone could not ensure victory for the All-Russian nation-building project, which was the goal for which their creators were aiming.

Thus the failure of the All-Russian nation-building project is, to a large extent, connected with the objective limitations of the Russian assimilating potential and with the inability of the state and the advocates of the All-Russian project in society to coordinate their efforts, to mobilize the available opportunities for its implementation, and to protect what had already been achieved from the challenge of the competing Ukrainian project. The “window of opportunity” was not used, and the extremely grave political crisis in Russia in the first decades of the twentieth century and its consequences put to rest, among other things, the All-Russian nation-building project.⁶ One can, of course, assume that the truly disastrous scenario that culminated in October 1917 was not inevitable. But even so, Russia simply could not avoid a serious political crisis in the early decades of the twentieth century. It had become clear, even before 1917, that the superseding of the Little Russian version of identity by the Ukrainian, that is, excluding All-Russian, could not be avoided. A successful transition to some form of autonomy or federation could not be excluded, but even that, in the situation of the legitimacy crisis of the central authority, would have been very complicated, and the authorities were not prepared for a change in policies on the Ukrainian question that would precede the crisis. This is why the achievements in the implementation of this

nation-building project can be characterized in the same way as many other aspects of Russian modernization—the achievements were significant, but insufficient to withstand the internal and external challenges that Russia had to face.

Whether or not the reader will be convinced by the proposed assessment of the importance assigned to the various factors that predetermined the failure of the All-Russian nation-building project, I will attempt to insist that it is through the prism of the competition between the All-Russian and Ukrainian projects that the development of events in the nineteenth century and the logic of their participants can be described in the most adequate way.

★ ★ ★

It is self-evident that the history of the Russification of the Ukrainians was far from over in the nineteenth century. However, the terms and mechanisms of its development, as well as those of Russian–Ukrainian relations in general, would change drastically in the twentieth century. The revolution of 1905 would begin the highly compressed advent of mass politics, which already in the years of World War I and the revolution would transform the problems of class and national identity—a subject that had formerly interested only narrow groups of intellectuals would become an agenda for the millions.

The wars of 1914 to 1920; the first experiments with Ukrainian statehood; the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks;⁷ the creation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic; the policy of indigenization (*korenizatsiia*), which in Ukraine took the form of Ukrainization and de-Russification;⁸ the institutionalization of ethnicity in the USSR; collectivization and, in relation to it, the organized hunger of the early 1930s, which struck Ukraine particularly horribly;⁹ the mass repressions against the Ukrainian cultural elite in the 1930s; World War II and the postwar reconstruction that caused new migrations of dozens of millions of people; the contradictions in postwar development, when hundreds of Ukrainians were sent to the Gulag, accused of bourgeois nationalism, while others constituted, along with Russians, the core of the *nomenklatura*, the Soviet ruling class; and, finally, the collapse of the entire Soviet project—all this is a completely different story. An impartial study of Russian–Ukrainian relations in the tragic and contradictory twentieth century is only just emerging.

These dramatic turns of history and the new circumstances they

created have turned the All-Russian nation-building project into a clear anachronism. Gradually, the view of the problem that recognized a separate Ukrainian identity was becoming increasingly common in Russia. As early as 1905, the Russian Academy of Sciences recognized Ukrainian as a fully developed language and not, as it was officially regarded at that time, a dialect of Russian. After 1917 only certain obstinate individuals in the émigré community preserved their commitment to the concept of the All-Russian nation in its pure form. Thus, the famous V. V. Shulgin, the son of V. Ia. Shulgin, who edited *Kievlianin* in the 1870s, answered the question of what would happen if the new states breaking from the empire considered reunion: "Then, instead of a federation, they should be granted a 'broad autonomy'... [It will be] an acceptable, true national autonomy. While ethnic Russia will have autonomous 'oblasts'—say, the Petrograd, Moscow, Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa oblasts—here we shall have Lithuanian, Latvian, and Georgian oblasts. There we shall have, for instance, the 'Kiev Oblast Duma', and here the 'Lithuanian Diet'. There (for instance, in the Kharkov Oblast Duma) the chairman speaks *Russian only*, and the rest what they want, even 'Ukrainian', and here (for instance, in Latvia) the chairman speaks Latvian only, and the rest what they want, even Russian."¹⁰

However, the majority of those Russians who acknowledged a separate Ukrainian identity, whether before or after the collapse of the Russian Empire, did not allow for the creation of a Ukrainian state separate from Russia. The "natural" development, in their view, should have led to a voluntary federal union of Ukraine and Russia. Ukraine-ness in this approach was no longer denied as something unnatural and devoid of reason, and the concept of an objective unity of Little and Great Russians was replaced with the idea of a unity of the Russians and the Ukrainians, based on history and free will. As a rule, this will was seen as predetermined, conditioned by a kind of family tie. Now the Russian "ideal fatherland" was becoming a "family property" and the relations between the family members and their hierarchy were defined in terms of brotherhood, where the role of the elder brother belonged to the Russians.

These views, semi-officially accepted in Soviet times, have survived in a modified form to this day. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, for example, in his famous 1990 essay "How We Should Reorganize Russia," considered it quite possible, and in some cases very desirable, to separate the Baltic states, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, but insisted on

the preservation of the unity of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and northern Kazakhstan with its predominantly East Slavic population. Let us remember how Mikhail Gorbachev, in his address on the eve of the referendum on Ukrainian independence, said that he could not imagine the Union without Ukraine. It is unlikely that he could say that with the same sincerity and with the hope that he would be understood to the citizens of Tadjikistan or Lithuania. Again, the problem was not limited to the size and resources of Ukraine. The passing of Ukraine signified the disruption of those ties and values that, seemingly, should have withstood the collapse of Communism, and that is the reason this passing was lived through so painfully in Russia, and by many in Ukraine as well.¹¹ Or, it would be more correct to say, is still being lived through. "We shall keep the warm feeling of a united tri-Slav people: 'And you, Ukrainians, like Belorussians, are still our brothers!'"—this is a quote from a later work by Solzhenitsyn.¹² The story of the All-Russian nation-building project and its failure that we have told is over, but the echoes of these ideas and subjects in the new conditions, and in new forms, still reverberate today.¹³

NOTES

1 E. Chikalenko, *Spokhady (1861–1907)* (New York, 1955), p. 337.

2 On the low threshold of the assimilation barrier and the openness of the Ukrainian peasant to Russification, I. Rudnytsky wrote in the article "Russifikatsiia ili malorossianizatsiia?" in I. Lysiak-Rudnytsky, *Istorični ese*, vol. 2 (Kiev, 1994), p. 476.

3 J. A. Armstrong, "The Autonomy of Ethnic Identity: Historic Cleavages and Nationality Relations in the USSR," in Alexander J. Motyl, ed., *Thinking Theoretically about Soviet Nationalities. History and Comparison in the Study of the USSR* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), pp. 34–35.

4 On the general under-government of the Russian Empire, and on the situation in the western borderlands in particular, see Steven Velychenko, "Identities, Loyalties and Service in Imperial Russia. Who Administered the Borderlands?" *Russian Review* 2 (1995); idem, "The Bureaucracy, Police and Army in Twentieth-Century Ukraine. A Comparative Quantitative Study," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, nos. 3–4 (1999), pp. 63–103; idem, "The Size of the Imperial Russian Bureaucracy and Army in Comparative Perspective," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, no. 3 (2001), pp. 346–62.

- 5 For an extremely unflattering comparison of the qualities of the Russian nobility as a class and as a political elite with the Prussian nobility see Marc Raeff, "Russian Nobility in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries: Trends and Comparisons," in I. Banac and P. Bushkovich, *Nobility in Russia and Eastern Europe* (New Haven, 1983), pp. 99–122. Of course, one should not idealize the experience of Austria and Prussia. The achievements of these states in the spheres of political modernization and democratization look rather dubious, especially in the light of twentieth-century history. Hundreds of books have been dedicated to the criticism of Prussian political development. However, their successes in economic "catching up" cannot be denied. And even in the political realm they were able to survive the crisis following World War I with less catastrophic consequences than Russia.
- 6 I note that a similar image is used by L. E. Gorizontov, who studied Russian politics in the Polish question: "It seems that the statesmen of the past were oblivious to the idea that the time allowed by history to experiment is not boundless." See L. E. Gorizontov, *Paradoksy imperskoi politiki: poliaki v Rossii i russkie v Pol'she* (Moscow, 1999), p. 219.
- 7 This moment is extremely important, since it signified the disappearance of a legitimate center from the perspective not only of the regional elites, but also of the majority of educated Russians. It is not too difficult to imagine the way the French regions would have behaved had the Paris Commune of 1870 stayed in power for a long time.
- 8 For details, see the excellent book by Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire* (Ithaca, NY, 2001).
- 9 In the passionate debates over the nature and assessment of these events, while I am unquestionably incompetent in this issue, the interpretation of Terry Martin seems the most well balanced to me. *The Affirmative Action*, pp. 302–307.
- 10 V. Shulgin, *Nechto fantasticheskoe* (Sofia, 1922), p. 28. For a comprehensive collection of quotations from other Russian activists of the Civil War and emigration period, which show how individual elements of the All-Russian nation concept were re-imagined, see Volodymyr A. Potulnytskyi, "The Image of Ukraine and the Ukrainians in Russian Political Thought (1860–1945)," *Acta Slavica Iaponica*, vol. XVI (Sapporo, 1998), pp. 22–29. (Unfortunately, Potulnytskyi is not competent in nineteenth-century history, and the parts of his article devoted to that period are full of errors. Suffice it to say that the author, apparently the victim of a typo in one of the books he had used, repeatedly refers to 1863 issues of *Osnova* [see p. 4], while the journal ceased publication in 1862).
- 11 For an analysis of Russian journalism on Ukraine after the disintegration of the USSR, see A. Miller, "Obraz Ukrainy i ukraintsev v rossiiskoi presse posle raspada SSSR," *Polis*, no. 2 (1996).
- 12 A. I. Solzhenitsyn, "Slavianskaia tragediia," *Trud*-7, 29 May 1998, p. 5.

13 This book was written by a historian and about history. The author's views on the current political situation in Russian–Ukrainian relations are most fully described in the article A. Miller, “Osteuropa neu denken. Russland, seine westlichen Nachbarn und die Grenzen Europas,” *Transit*, 21 (2001), pp. 76–90. My other works on the subject in the political science or publicistic vein include “Obraz Rossii i russkikh v zapadnoukrainskoi presse posle raspada SSSR” (The Image of Ukraine and Ukrainians in the Russian Press after the Dissolution of the USSR), *Polis (Politicheskie issledovaniia)*, no. 3, pp. 124–132; “Ukraina kak natsionaliziruiushcheesia gosudarstvo” (Ukraine as a Nationalizing State), *Pro et contra* (Spring 1997); “Zapadnye sosedi Rossii i problema granits Evropy” (Western Neighbors of Russia and the Problem of the Borders in Europe), *Pro et contra* (Spring 1998); “Die Erfindung der geographischen Konzepte Mittel- und Osteuropa,” in *Wieser Encyclopaedia of the European East*, vol. 1, *Europe and the Borders of the Mind* (Vienna, 2003), pp. 135–159. Also, published in Russian, “Tema Tsentral’noi Evropy: istoriia, sovremennye diskursy i mesto v nikh Rossii” (The Subject of Central Europe: History, Contemporary Discourses and the Place of Russia), *NLO*, 6 (52) (2001), pp. 75–96.

APPENDIX 1

The Circular of the Minister of the Interior P. A. Valuev to the Kiev, Moscow and Petersburg Censorship Committees, 18 July 1863.¹

Our press has been engaged for a long time in argumentation over the possibility of the existence of an independent Little Russian literature. These arguments were caused by works of certain authors marked by a more or less outstanding talent or originality. In recent years the question of Little Russian literature has acquired a different character due to purely political circumstances, having no relation to literary interests as such. Previous works in the Little Russian language were addressed exclusively to the educated classes of Southern Russia, but nowadays the advocates of the Little Russian nationality have turned their attention to the uneducated masses, and those of them who aim at the realization of their political designs have undertaken, under the pretext of promoting literacy and enlightenment, the publication of primary-school readers, alphabets and grammar books, geography texts, etc. Among those activists were a great number of individuals whose criminal acts were investigated by the Special Commission.

In St. Petersburg they even collect donations to publish cheap books in the Southern Russian dialect. Many of these books have already been submitted for review to the St. Petersburg Censorship Committee. A substantial number of such books are also being presented to the Kiev Censorship Committee. The latter, especially, is put in a difficult position regarding the authorization of these publications in view of the following circumstances: education in all schools without exception is conducted in the All-Russian language, and the use of the Little Russian language is not permitted in any school; not only has the very question of the benefit and possibility of the use of this dialect in schools not been solved, but even raising this question meets with indignation on the part of the majority of Little Russians, who have often spoken their minds in the press. They prove with great conviction that there was not, is not, and cannot be any special Little

Russian language, and that their dialect, as used by uneducated folk, is the same Russian language, only corrupted by Polish influence; that the All-Russian language is just as understandable to Little Russians as it is to Great Russians, and even more comprehensible than the so-called Ukrainian language which is being invented for them now by some Little Russians and especially Poles. The individuals of the circle trying to prove the opposite are accused by the majority of Little Russians themselves of separatist designs hostile to Russia and fatal for Little Russia.

This phenomenon is all the more lamentable and worthy of attention for the fact that it coincides with the political plans of the Poles, and all but originates from them, judging by the manuscripts that have reached the censors, and also because the greater part of Little Russian writings indeed comes from the Poles. Finally, the Kiev governor-general, too, considers it dangerous and harmful to publish the Little Russian translation of the New Testament that is now being reviewed by the church censors.

Taking into consideration, on the one hand, the present alarming state of society agitated by political events, and, on the other hand, bearing in mind that the question of education in local dialects has not yet received a final legal resolution, the minister of the interior has deemed it necessary, until agreements with the minister of public education, the chief procurator of the Holy Synod, and the chief of the gendarmerie in respect to book publishing in the Little Russian language, to issue a directive to the Censorship Administration to license for publication only such books in this language that belong to the realm of fine literature; at the same time, the authorization of books in Little Russian with either spiritual content or intended generally for primary mass reading should be ceased. This directive was submitted to the highest scrutiny of the emperor, and His Majesty has bestowed upon it monarchical approval.

NOTES

- 1 Originally published by M. K. Lemke in the book *Epokha tsenzurnykh reform 1859–1865 gg.* (St. Petersburg, 1904), pp. 302–304.

Циркуляр министра внутренних дел П. А. Валуева Киевскому, Московскому и Петербургскому цензурным комитетам от 18 июля 1863 г.

Давно уже идут споры в нашей печати о возможности существования самостоятельной малороссийской литературы. Поводом к этим спорам служили произведения некоторых писателей, отличавшихся более или менее замечательным талантом или своею оригинальностью. В последнее время вопрос о малороссийской литературе получил иной характер, вследствие обстоятельств чисто политических, не имеющих никакого отношения к интересам собственно литературным. Прежние произведения на малороссийском языке имели в виду лишь образованные классы Южной России, ныне же приверженцы малороссийской народности обратили свои виды на массу непросвещенную, и те из них, которые стремятся к осуществлению своих политических замыслов, принялись, под предлогом распространения грамотности и просвещения, за издание книг для первоначального чтения, букварей, грамматик, географий и т.п. В числе подобных деятелей находилось множество лиц, о преступных действиях которых производилось следственное дело в особой комиссии.

В С.-Петербурге даже собираются пожертвования для издания дешевых книг на южно-русском наречии. Многие из этих книг поступили уже на рассмотрение в С.-Петербургский цензурный комитет. Не малое число таких же книг представляется и в киевский цензурный комитет. Сей последний в особенности затрудняется пропуском упомянутых изданий, имея в виду следующие обстоятельства: обучение во всех без изъятия училищах производится на обще-русском языке и употребление в училищах малороссийского языка нигде не допущено; самый вопрос о пользе и возможности употребления в школах этого наречия не только не решен, но даже возбуждение этого вопроса принято большинством малороссиян с негодованием, часто высказываю-

щемся в печати. Они весьма основательно доказывают, что никакого особенного малороссийского языка не было, нет и быть не может, и что наречие их, употребляемое простонародием, есть тот же русский язык, только испорченный влиянием на него Польши; что обще-русский язык также понятен для малороссов, как и для великороссиян, и даже гораздо понятнее, чем теперь сочиняемый для них некоторыми малороссами, и в особенности, поляками, так называемый, украинский язык. Лиц того кружка, который усиливается доказывать противное, большинство самих малороссов упрекает в сепаратистских замыслах, враждебных к России и гибельных для Малороссии.

Явление это тем более прискорбно и заслуживает внимания, что оно совпадает с политическими замыслами поляков, и едва ли не им обязано своим происхождением, судя по рукописям, поступавшим в цензуру, и по тому, что большая часть малороссийских сочинений действительно поступает от поляков. Наконец, и киевский генерал-губернатор находит опасным и вредным выпуск в свет рассматриваемого ныне духовною цензурой перевода на малороссийский язык Нового Завета.

Принимая во внимание, с одной стороны, настоящее тревожное положение общества, волнуемого политическими событиями, а с другой стороны, имея в виду, что вопрос об обучении грамотности на местных наречиях не получил еще окончательного разрешения в законодательном порядке, министр внутренних дел признал необходимым, впредь до соглашения с министром народного просвещения, обер-прокурором св. синода и шефом жандармов относительно печатания книг на малороссийском языке, сделать по цензурному ведомству распоряжение, чтобы к печати допускались только такие произведения на этом языке, которые принадлежат к области изящной литературы; пропуском же книг на малороссийском языке как духовного содержания, так учебных и вообще назначаемых для первоначального чтения народа, приостановиться. О распоряжении этом было повергаемо на высочайшее государя императора воззрение и Его еличеству благоугодно было удостоить оное монаршего одобрения.

APPENDIX 2

The conclusions of the Special Council regarding measures to curb Ukrainophile propaganda, after corrections in accordance with remarks made by Alexander II on 18 May in the town of Ems.¹

With the view of curbing the activities of Ukrainophiles, which present a danger to the state, we consider it necessary to take, until further notice, the following measures:

a) For the Ministry of the Interior.

1. To forbid the importation within the imperial borders, without the special permission of the Chief Directorate on Publications, of any books published abroad in the Little Russian dialect.
2. To prohibit the publication in that dialect within the empire of any original works or translations, with the exception of ancient texts—although these latter, if they belong to oral folk tradition (such as songs, fairy tales, proverbs), should also be published in accordance with All-Russian orthography (i.e., should not be published in the so-called *kulishovka*).

Note I. This measure is but an expansion of His Majesty's high order issued on 3 July 1863, whereby it was allowed to pass for publication in the Little Russian dialect only works that belong to the realm of fine literature, while the licensing for publication in the same dialect of books with either spiritual content or intended generally for primary mass reading was ordered to be ceased.

Note II. Retaining in force the above-mentioned high order, it would be possible to publish in the Little Russian dialect, in addition to ancient texts, works of fine literature, on condition that they preserve the All-Russian orthography, and the licenses should be issued exclusively after a review of the manuscript by the Chief Directorate on Publications.

3. To prohibit equally all stage performances, lyrics to music, and public readings (as they presently have the character of Ukrainophile manifestations).

4. To support the newspaper *Slovo*, published in Galicia, whose policy is hostile to Ukrainophilism, by assigning it a small but constant subsidy,² without which it cannot continue to exist and will have to cease publication. (The Ukrainophile organ in Galicia, the newspaper *Pravda*, hostile to Russian interests in general, is published with substantial support from the Poles.)
5. To ban the newspaper *Kievskii Telegraf*³ on the grounds that its nominal editor, Snezhko-Blotskii, is blind in both eyes and cannot take any part in the editing process, which is permanently and arbitrarily supervised by individuals invited for this purpose by the publisher Gogotskaia from the circle of the most ill-intentioned people.
- b) For the Ministry of Public Education.
6. To strengthen the control exercised by the local educational authorities so as not to allow in elementary schools any instruction in the Little Russian dialect, regardless of the subject.⁴
7. To purge the libraries of all elementary and middle schools in the Little Russian guberniias of books and booklets prohibited by the second paragraph of the present project.
8. To pay serious attention to the teaching faculty in the Kharkov, Kiev, and Odessa school districts, by demanding from the trustees of these districts lists of the instructors' names with a comment on each one's loyalty in respect to Ukrainophile tendencies; those marked as disloyal or suspect should be transferred to Great Russian guberniias and replaced by natives of these guberniias.
9. For the future, strict responsibility for the choice of teaching staff in the above-mentioned districts should be placed, insofar as the loyalty of the persons is concerned, on those presenting them for appointment, so that the responsibility in question exists not just on paper but in fact.

Note I. There exist two high orders of the late Emperor Nicholas Pavlovich, not overruled by the High Authority and thus retaining the power of law at present, which assigned the strictest responsibility to the district trustees and educational authorities in general not to tolerate in institutions of learning any individuals with a disloyal way of thinking, not only among instructors, but also among students. It would be useful to remind of them.

Note II. It would be useful to make it a general rule that institutions of learning in the Kharkov, Kiev and Odessa school districts

- should be staffed predominantly by Great Russians, while Little Russians should be appointed to the St. Petersburg, Kazan and Orenburg districts.
10. To close, indefinitely, the Kiev division of the Imperial Geographic Society (just as the Political-Economic Committee, which had originated in the Statistical Department, was closed within the latter in the 1860s) and later permit its re-opening, although permanently purged of persons who are in any way suspect as regards their All-Russian credentials.⁵
 - c) For the Third Department of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery.
 11. To exile Dragomanov and Chubinskii from the province as incorrigible and positively dangerous agitators, to be put into effect immediately.⁶

NOTES

- 1 In this final version the text, known in historical literature as the Ems Edict, became the basis for secret instructions to the relevant government structures. Originally published in F. Savchenko, *Zaborona ukrainstva 1876 g.* (Kharkov and Kiev, 1930; reprinted Munich, 1970), pp. 381–383.
- 2 There is a note in the margins made, most probably, by Potapov: “1,000 r[ubles] from the funds of the 3rd Gend[armerie Department], leave out of the text, only have in mind.”
- 3 Note in the margins: “having in mind the harmful influence of the newspaper.”
- 4 Note in the margins: “this is not essential.”
- 5 Note in the margins: “to suggest that the M[inister of the] I[nterior] enter into the necessary relations with the appropriate authorities regarding further steps in this case.”
- 6 Note in the margins: “to exile from the province and prohibit to enter the southern guberniias and the capitals, under secret surveillance.”

Выводы Особого Совещания для пресечения украинофильской пропаганды после исправления в соответствии с замечаниями, сделанными Александром II 18 мая в г. Эмс.¹

В видах пресечения опасной, в государственном отношении, деятельности украинофилов, полагалось бы соответственным принять впредь до усмотрения, следующие меры:

а) По Министерству внутренних дел.

1. Не допускать ввоза в пределы Империи, без особого на то решения Главного Управления по делам печати, каких бы то ни было книг, издаваемых за границей на малорусском наречии.
2. Воспретить в Империи печатание, на том же наречии, каких бы то ни было оригинальных произведений или переводов, за исключением исторических памятников, но с тем, чтобы и эти последние, если принадлежат к устной народной словесности (каковы песни, сказки, пословицы), издаваемы были без отступления от общерусской орфографии (т.е. не печатались так называемой “кулишовкою”).

Примечание I. Мера эта была бы не более, как расширением высочайшего повеления от 3 июля 1863 года, коим разрешено было допускать к печати на малорусском наречии только произведения, принадлежащие к области изящной литературы, пропуски же книг на том же наречии, как духовного содержания, так учебных и вообще назначаемых для первоначального чтения, повелено было приостановить.

Примечание II. Сохраняя силу означенного выше Высочайшего повеления, можно было бы разрешить к печатанию на малорусском наречии, кроме исторических памятников, и произведения изящной словесности, но с тем, чтобы соблюдалась в них общерусская орфография, и чтобы разрешение давалось не иначе, как по рассмотрению рукописей Главным Управлением по делам печати.

3. Воспретить равномерно всякие на том же наречии сценические представления, тексты к нотам и публичные чтения (как имеющие в настоящее время характер украинофильских манифестаций).
 4. Поддержать издающуюся в Галиции, в направлении враждебном украинофильскому, газету “Слово”, назначив ей хотя бы небольшую, но постоянную субсидию, без которой она не может продолжать существование и должна будет прекратиться, (украинофильский орган в Галиции, газета “Правда”, враждебная вообще русским интересам, издается при значительном пособии от поляков).
 5. Запретить газету “Киевский Телеграф” на том основании, что номинальный ее редактор Снежко-Блоцкий слеп на оба глаза и не может принимать никакого участия в редакции, которой заведуют постоянно и произвольно лица, приглашаемые к тому издательницею Гогоцкою из кружка людей, принадлежащих к самому неблагонамеренному направлению.
- б) По Министерству Народнаго Просвещения.
6. Усилить надзор со стороны местного учебного начальства, чтобы не допускать в первоначальных училищах преподавания каких бы то ни было предметов на малорусском наречии.
 7. Очистить библиотеки всех низших и средних училищ в малороссийских губерниях от книг и книжек, воспрещаемых 2-м параграфом настоящего проекта.
 8. Обратит серьезное внимание на личный состав преподавателей в учебных округах Харьковском, Киевском и Одесском, потребовав от попечителей сих округов именного списка преподавателей с отметкою о благонадежности каждого по отношению к украинофильским тенденциям, и отмеченных неблагонадежными или сомнительными перевести в великорусские губернии, заменив уроженцами этих последних.
 9. На будущее время выбор лиц на преподавательские места в означенных округах возложить, по отношению к благонадежности сих лиц, на строгую ответственность представляющих о их назначении, с тем, чтобы ответственность, о которой говорится, существовала не только на бумаге, но и на деле.

Примечание I. Существуют два ысочайшие повеления покойного Государя Николая Павловича, не отмененные ерховной

ластью, а потому сохраняющие и в настоящее время силу закона, которыми возлагалось на строжайшую ответственность Попечителей Округов и вообще учебного начальства, не терпеть в учебных заведениях лиц с неблагонадежным образом мыслей, не только между преподавателями, но и между учащимися. Полезно было бы напомнить о них.

Примечание II. Признавалось бы полезным принять за общее правило, чтобы в учебные заведения округов: Харьковского, Киевского и Одесского назначать преподавателей преимущественно великоруссов, а малоруссов распределить по учебным заведениям С.-Петербургского, Казанского и Оренбургского округов.

10. Закрывать на неопределенный срок Киевский Отдел Императорского Географического Общества (подобно тому, как в 1860-х годах закрыт в этом последнем Политико-экономический Комитет, возникший в среде Статистического Отделения), и допустить затем открытие его вновь, с предоставлением местному Генерал-Губернатору права ходатайствовать о его открытии, но с устранением навсегда тех лиц, которые сколько-нибудь сомнительны в своем чисто-русском направлении.
- в) По III Отделению Собственной Его Императорского величества Канцелярии.
11. Немедленно выслать из края Драгоманова и Чубинского, как неисправимых и положительно опасных в крае агитаторов.

NOTES

1 В этом окончательном виде текст, известный в литературе как Эмский указ, стал основой для секретных инструкций соответствующим правительственным структурам. Впервые опубликован в кн.: Савченко Ф. "Заборона українства 1876 р." (Харків-Київ, 1930, репринт-München, 1970.) С.381-383.

2 На полях приписано, вероятно, Потаповым: "1000 р. из сьмм III жанд., в текст заключения не водить, а только иметь в соображении".

3 На полях приписано: "в соображении вредное влияние газеты".

4 На полях приписано: "это не същественно".

-
- 5 На полях приписано: “предоставить М.В.Д. войти в надлеж. сношения с кем следует относительно изыскания мер к дал. направлению этого дела”.
- 6 На полях приписано: “выслать из края с воспрещением въезда в южн. губ. и столуцы, под секретное наблюдение”.

Sources and Literature

ARCHIVE DOCUMENTS

Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi imperii (AVPRI) Archive of the foreign policy of the Russian Empire in Moscow

Fond 133 (Kantseliaria MID), op. 469, 1863 g. - ed. khr.83; 1864 g. - ed. khr. 73; 1866 g. - ed. khr. 218, 219; op. 470, 1877 g. - ed. khr.113.

f. 135 (Sekretnyi arkhiv), op. 467, ed. khr. 67.

f.155 (2-oi (vneshnikh snoshenii) departament, 1 otd., 4 sekretnyj stol) op. 241, ed. khr. 1, 34; op.441, 1882 g. - ed. khr. 67, 74, 77, 1888 g. - ed. khr. 210.

Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GA RF) State Archive of the Russian Federation in Moscow

f.1090 (Sekretnyi arkhiv), op. 1, ed. khr. 1762–1771.

f.109 (1-aia ekspeditsia III otdeleniia), op. 37, ed. khr. 230, ch. 38; op.38, ed. khr. 23 (ch.175, ch.313); op. 50, ed. khr. 85

f.569 (Loris–Melikov M. T.), op. 1, ed. khr. 16, 24, 26.

f.583 (Polovtsev A. A.) op. 1, ed. khr.15–20, 60, 61, 72.

Otdel Rukopisei Rossiiskoi Gosudarstvennoi Biblioteki v Moskve (OR RGB) Manuscript Department of Russian State Library in Moscow

f.120 (Katkov M. N.), karton 1, ed. khr. 37, 57, 68; karton 2, ed. khr. 29; karton 43, ed. khr. 18; karton 46, 47, 55, ed. xp.5.

f.169 (Milutin D. A.), karton 14, ed. khr. 2, 3; karton 42, ed. khr. 5, karton 59, ed. khr. 32.

f.265 (Samarins), karton 82, ed. khr. 2

f.418 (Maslov V. P.), karton 1, ed. khr. 15.

Rukopisnyi Otdel Rossiiskoi Natsional'noi Biblioteki v Sankt-Peterburge (RO RNB) Manuscript Department of Russian National Library in Sankt-Petersburg

f.208 (Golovnin A. V.), ed. khr. 105

f.600 (Polovtsov A. A.), ed. khr. 606, 608.

f.385 (Kostomarov N. I.), ed. khr. 13.

Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv v Sankt-Peterburge (RGIA)

Russian State History Archive in Sankt-Petersburg

- f.733 (Ministerstvo narodnogo prosveschenia), op.193 (1863 g.), ed. khr. 86.
f.772 (Glavnoe upravlenie tsenzury MNP), op. 1, part 1, ed. khr. 188, op. 1, part 2, ed. khr. 3165, 3210, 3263, 4027, 4152, 4503, 4840, 4950, 5049, 5536, 5603, 5722.
f.775 (Tsentral'noe upravlenie po tsenzurnomu vedomstvu MVD), op. 1, 1863 g. – ed. khr. 188, 205, 322, 332.
f.776 (Tsentral'noe upravlenie po delam pechaty) op. 11, ed. khr. 61, 61a; op. 11, 2 otd., 1872 g. – ed. khr. 35, 84, 1873 g. – ed. khr. 38, 1876 g. – ed. khr. 59, 61a, 61b, 1877 g. – ed. khr. 81; op. 20, 1880 g. – ed. khr. 28.
f.908 (Valuev P. A.), op. 1., ed. khr. 109, 132, 174, 182, 185, 234.
f.932 (Dondukov–Korsakov A. M.), op. 1., ed. khr. 160.
f.1281 (Kantseliariia ministra vnutrennikh del), op. 1, ed. khr. 166.
f.1282 (Kantseliariia ministra vnutrennikh del), op. 1, ed. khr. 19, 160, 162, 166, 352, 374.
f.797 (Kantseliariia Ober-Prokurora Sviashennogo Sinoda) op. 29, 1 otdelenie, 2 stol, ed. khr. 158; op. 53, 2 otdelenie, 3 stol, ed. khr. 21.

CITED PERIODICALS

Vestnik Evropy

Vestnik Iugo-Zapadnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii

Golos

Den'

Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia

Kievlianin

Kievskii Telegraf

Kolokol

Moskovskie Vedomosti

Osnova

Otechestvennye Zapiski

Pravda (Lvov)

Russkaia Beseda

Russkii Arkhiv

Russkii Invalid

Russkoe Bogatstvo

Sankt-Peterburgskie Vedomosti

Severnaia Pchela

Sion

LITERATURE IN RUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN

- Aksakov, I. S. *Sochineniia*. V. 3, *Pol'skii vopros i zapadno-russkoie delo. Evreiskii vopros. 1860–1886*. SPb., 1900.
- Ananich, B. V., ed. *Vlast' i reformy. Ot samoderzhaviia k sovetskoii Rossii*. SPb. 1996.
- Apanovich, E. M. "Rukopisnaia svetskaia kniga 18 v. na Ukrainie." *Istoricheskie sborniki*. Kiev, 1983.
- Bagalei, D. I. *Opyt istorii Kharkovskogo universiteta*. V.1–2. Kharkov, 1893–1904.
- Bakunin, M. A. "Russkim, pol'skim i vsem slavianskim driziam." *Kolokol* (Fevral' 1862). Prilozhenie k. no. 122 and 123.
- Belinskii, V. G. *Polnoie sobranie sochinenii*. V.5, Moscow, 1955.
- Ben-Ami. "Moi snosheniia s Dragomanovym i rabota v 'Volnom slove.'" *Evreiskaia starina*, no. 3–4, Petrograd, 1915.
- Bernshtein, M. D. *Zhurnal "Osnova" i ukrain'skii literaturnyi proces kincia 50–60-h rokov 19 st.* Kiev, 1959.
- Bobrovich, M. "Miroslov Hroch: formirovanie natsii i natsionalnykh dvizhenii malykh narodov." In A. Miller, ed. *Natsionalizm i formirovanie natsii. Teorii-modeli-kontseptsii*. Moscow, 1994.
- Borodin, V. S. *T. G. Shevchenko i tsarska cenzura*. Kiev, 1969.
- Bunin, I. A. "Iz 'Velikogo durmana.'" In I. A. Bunin. *Okaiannye dni. Vospominaniia. Statii*. Moscow, 1990.
- Bukhbinder, N. "Lyst M. Kostomatova do I. P. Kornilova." *Za sto lit*, no.6, Kharkov–Kiev, 1930.
- "Chastnaia perepiska G. P. Galagana. Pis'ma P. A. Kulisha." *Kiev'skaia starina*, no. 9 (1899).
- Chernukha, V. G. *Vnutrenniaia politika tsarizma s serediny 50-kh do nachala 80-kh gg. 19 v.* Leningrad, 1978.
- Chikalenko, E. *Spohady (1861–1907)*. New York, 1955.
- Dei, O. I. "Knyga i drukarstvo na Ukraini z 60-kh rokov 19 st. Do Velykogo Zhovtnia." In P. M. Popov, ed. *Knyga i drukarstvo na Ukraini*. Kiev, 1964.
- Diakin, V. S. "Natsional'nyi vopros vo vnutrennei politike tsarizma (19 v.)." *Voprosy istorii*, no. 9 (1995).
- Doroshkevych, O. "Lysty M. P. Dragomanova do O. M. Pypina." *Za sto lit*, no.3, Kharkov–Kiev, 1927.
- Dragomanov, M. P. "Avtobiografia." *Byloe*, no. 6 (1906).
- . *Vybrane*. Kiev, 1991.
- . *Shevchenko, ukrainofily i socializm*. Lvov, 1906.
- Dudko, V. "Poltavs'ka Hromada pochatku 1860-kh rr. U lystakh Dmytra Pyl'chykova do Vasyla Bilozers'kogo." *Kyivs'ka Starovyna*, no. 2 (1998).
- Dziuba, O. "Ukrain'tsy v kul'turnomu zytii Rosii (18 st.): prychyny migratsii." In A. Miller, V. Reprintsev, B. Floria, eds. *Rossia-Ukraina: istoriia vzaimootnoshenii*. Moscow, 1997.
- Epshtein M. *Sposoby vozdeistviia ideologicheskogo vyskazyvaniia*. In *Obraz cheloveka XX veka*. Moscow, 1988.

- Fabrikant, Nik. "Kratkii ocherk iz istorii otnoshenii russkikh tsenzurnukh zakonov k ukrainskoi literature." *Russkaia mysl'*, no. 3 (1905).
- Feoktistov, E. M. *Vospiminaniia. Za kulisami politiki i literatury. 1848–1896*. Leningrad, 1929.
- Furman, D. and O. Bukhovets. "Paradoksy belorusskogo samosoznaniia." *Druzhba narodov*, no. 6 (1996).
- Gellner, E. "Prishestvie natsionalizma. Mify natsii i klassa." *Put'*, no. 1 (1992).
- Gorizontov, L. E. *Paradoksy imperskoi politiki: poliaki v Rossii i russkie v Pol'she*. Moscow, 1999.
- Gorshkov, M. K, ed. *Nesostoiaivshiiisia iubilei. Pochemu SSSR ne otprazdnoval svoego 70-letiiia?* Moscow, 1992.
- Golovnin, A. V. "Zapiski dla nemnogikh." *Voprosy istorii*, no. 6 (1997).
- Grabovich, G. *Shevchenko iak mifotvorets. Semantyka symvoliv u tvorchosti poeta*. Kiev, 1991.
- Grushevskii, M. *Ocherki istorii ukrainskogo naroda*. SPb., 1904.
- Grushevskii, (Hrushevsky) M. *Zvychaina skhema "russkoi" istorii i sprava ratsionalnogo ukladu istorii skhidnogo slovianstva*. SPb., 1904.
- . "Ukraina i Galychyna." *Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk*, XXXVI, 1906.
- Gurevich, P. "Delo o rasprostranenii malorossiiskoi propagandy." *Byloe*, no. 7 (1907).
- Herzen, A. I. *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, ed. M. K. Lemke. V. 16. Peterburg, 1920.
- "Istoriia Rusov ili Maloi Rossii. Sochineniie Georgiia Konisskogo arkhiepiskopa Belorusskogo." *ChOIDR*, no. 1–4. Moscow, 1846.
- Jastrebov F. O. *Revolutsionnye demokraty na Ukraine: Vtoraia polovina 50-kh –nachalo 60-kh. godov 19 st.* Kiev, 1960.
- Kamosko, L. V. *Politika pravitel'stva v oblasti srednego obrazovaniia v 60–70-e gg. 19 v. (gimnazii, real'nye ichilisha)*. Avtoreferat kand. diss. Moscow, 1970.
- Kappeler, A. "Mazepintsy, malorossy, khokhly: ukraintsy v etnicheskoi ierarkhii Rossiiskoi imperii." In A. Miller, V. Reprintsev, B. Floria, eds. *Rossia-Ukraina: istoriia vzaimootnoshenii*. Moscow, 1997.
- Katkov, M. N. 1863 god. *Sobraniiie statei, po pol'skomu voprosu, pomeschavshikh-sia v Moskovskikh Vedomostiakh, Russkom Vestnike i Sovremennoi Letopisi*. Vypusk 1. Moscow, 1887.
- . *Sobraniiie peredovykh statei "Moskovskikh vedomostei."* 1865 g. Moscow, 1897.
- "Kil'ka zapysok M. I. Kostomarov z 1859–1870 rokiv." *Ukraina*, no. 10–11 (1929).
- Koroteeva, V. V. "Suschestvuiut li obshepriznannye istiny o natsionalizme." *Pro et Contra* 2, no. 3 (1997).
- Korsakov, A. D. "Vospominaniia A. D. Korsakova." *Byloe*, no. 9 (1906).
- Kostomarov, N. "Avtobiografiia." In N. I. Kostomarov. *Istoricheskie proizvedenia. Avtobiografiia*. 2nd ed. Kiev, 1990.
- Kovalevskii, P. I. *Natsionalizm i natsional'noe vospitanie v Rossii*. New York, 1922 (reprint of the 3rd ed.—SPb., 1912)

- Lavrovskii, P. A. "Obzor zamechatel'nykh osobennostei narechiia malorusskogo sravnitel'no s velikorusskim i drugimi slavianskimi narechiiami." *Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia*. Iiun' 1859.
- Lamanskii, V. I. "Natsional'nosti italianskaia i slavianskaia, v politicheskom i literaturnom otnoshenii." *Otechestvennye zapiski* 157, no. 11–12 (1864).
- Lenke, M. *Epokha tsenzurnykh reform 1859–1865 gg.* SPb., 1904.
- Lysiak-Rudnytsky, I. *Istorychny ese*. V. 1, 2. Kiev, 1994.
- Mannheim, K. "Konservativnaia Mysl'." In *Diagnoz nashego vremeni*. Moscow 1994.
- Miakovskii V. "Kievskaa gromada. (Iz istorii ukrainskogo obschetvennogo dvizhenia 60-kh godov)." *Letopis' revoliutsii*, no. 4, Kharkov, 1924.
- Miller, A., ed. *Natsionalizm i formirovanie natsii. Teorii-modeli-kontseptsii*. Moscow, 1994.
- . "Natsionalizm kak teoreticheskaia problema." *Polis*, no. 6 (1995).
- . "Obraz Rossii i russkikh v zapadnoukrainskoi presse." *Polis*, no. 3 (1995).
- . "Obraz Ukrainy i ukraintsev v rossiiskoi presse posle raspada SSSR." *Polis*, no. 2 (1996).
- . "Vneshnii faktor v formirovanii natsional'noi identichnosti galitskikh rusinov." In Khavanova O, ed. *Avstro-Vengriia: integratsionnye protsessy inatsional'naia spetsifika*. Moscow, 1997.
- , Reprintsev V. and Floria B, eds. *Rossia-Ukraina: istoriia vzaimootnoshenii*. Moscow, 1997.
- . "Rossiia i rusifikatsiia Ukrainy v 19 v." In Miller A., Reprintsev V. and Floria B, eds. *Rossia-Ukraina: istoriia vzaimootnoshenii*. Moscow, 1997.
- . "Rossiia-Ukraina v 19 v. – nepredopredelennaia istoria." In Furman D. E, ed. *Ukraina i Rossiia: oschestva i gosudarstva*. Moscow, 1997.
- . "Ukraina kak natsionaliziruiuscheesia gosudarstvo." *Pro et Contra*, no. 1 (1997).
- . "O diskursivnoi prirode natsionalizmov." *Pro et Contra*, no. 4 (1997).
- . "Otvet P. Kandelu." *Pro et Contra*, no. 3 (1998).
- . "Ukrainofil'stvo." *Slavianovedenie*, no. 5 (1998).
- . "Natsionalizm i formirovanie natsii. Teoreticheskie issledovania 80–90-kh godov." In Miller, A., ed. *Natsia i natsionalizm*. Moscow, 1999.
- . "Rusifikatsii – klassifitsirovat' i poniat'." *Ab Imperio*, no. 2 (2002).
- Miller, I. S. "Slushnyi chas i taktika russkoi revoliutsionnoi partii v 1861–1863 gg." In Miller, I. S. *Issledovaniia po istorii narodov Tsentral'noi i Vostochnoi Evropy*. Moscow, 1980.
- Milukov, P. N. *Glavnye techeniia russkoi istoricheskoi mysli*. SPb., 1913.
- Milutin, D. A. *Dnevnik D. A. Milutina. 1878–1880*. V. 3. Moscow, 1950.
- Mironov, B. N. *Sotsial'naia istoria Rossii perioda imperii (18 – nachalo 20 v.)*. V. 1, 2. SPb., 1999.
- . "Zapyska 1874 r. Pro ukrainskii rukh." *Arkhivna Sparava*, no. 2–3 (1927).

- . *Iuvilei Tsenzurnogo Aktu 1876 roku*. (b.m i d.)
- Moiseenko, V. "Pro odnu spröbu latynyzatsii ukrainskogo pys'ma." *"I": nezalezhnyi kulturologichnyi chasopys*. Lvov, 1997, no. 9.
- [Naumenko, V.] "Naiblizhchi vidhuky ukazu 1876 r. Pro zaboronu ukrainskogo pysmenstva." *Ukraina*, no. 6 (1907).
- Naumenko, V. "Do istorii ukazu 1876 roku pro zaboronu ukrainskogo pysmenstva." *Ukraina*, no. 5 (1907).
- Nevedenskii, S. *Katkov i ego vremia*. SPb., 1888.
- Nedoborovskii, Z. "Moi vospominania." *Kievskaiia starina*, no. 2 (1893).
- Nikitenko, A. V. *Dnevnik*. V. 2, Leningrad, 1955
- Ob otmene stesnenii malorusskogo pechatnogo slova*. SPb., 1910.
- Orzhekhovskii, I. V. *Administratsiia i pechat' mezhdv dvumia revoliutsionnymi situatsiiami (1866–1878 gg.)* Gor'kii, 1973.
- Panteleev, L. F. *Vospominaniia*. Moscow, 1958.
- Peretts, A. E. *Dnevnik A. E. Perettsa, 1880–1883*. Moscow–Leningrad, 1927.
- Poleschuk, T. "Rosyiska hromadskist ta ukrainskii kul'turno-natsional'nyi rukh kintsia 50-kh – pochtku 60-kh rokiv 19 stolittia." *Vistnyk Lvivskoho universytetu* 33. Seria istorychna. 33, Lvov, 1998.
- Popov, I. "Iz vospominanii o G. N. Potanine." *Golos minuvshogo*, no. 1 (1922).
- Pypin, A. N., Spasovich V. D. *Ocherk istorii slavianskikh literatur*. SPb., 1865.
- . "Rosiskoe bibleiskoe obschestvo." *Vestnik Evropy*, no. 8–12 (1868).
- . *Istoriia russkoi etnografii*. V.3. Etnografiia maloruskaia. SPb., 1891.
- . *Religioznye dvizheniia pri Aleksandre I*. Petrograd, 1911.
- Riabinin-Skliarevskii, O. "Kyivs'ka Hromada 1870-kh rokiv." *Ukraina*, no. 1–2 (1927).
- Rusova, S. "Moi spomyny (1879–1915)." *Za sto lit* 1 (1928).
- Savchenko, F. *Zaborona unkrainstva*. Kharkov–Kiev, 1930. (reprint - Munich, 1970)
- . "Lysty P. P. Chubyn'skogo do Ja. P. Polon'skogo (1860–1874)." *Za sto lit*, no. 6. Kharkov–Kiev, 1930.
- . "Ukrain'ske naukovu-kul'turne samovyznachennia 1850–1876 gg." *Ukraina*, no. 1–2 (1929).
- Saltykov-Schedrin, M. E. *Dnevnik provinciala v Peterburge*. Moscow, 1886.
- Samarin, A. Ju. *Rasprostranenie i chitatel' pervykh pechatnykh knig po istorii Rossii (konets 17–18 v.)*. Moscow, 1998.
- Samarin, Ju. F. "Iz dnevnika, vedennogo Ju. F. Samarinyim v Kieve, v 1850 godu." *Russkii Arkhiv*, no. 6 (1877).
- Sambuk, S. M. *Politika tsarizma v Belorussii vo vtoroi polovine 19 v.* Minsk, 1980.
- Schegolev, S. N. *Ukrainskoe dvizhenie kak sovremennyi etap iuzhno-russkogo separatizma*. Kiev, 1912.
- Sereda, O. "Mistse Rosii v dyskusiiakh schodo natsional'noi identychnosti galitskykh ukrainsiv u 1860–1867 rokakh." In Miller A., Reprintsev V., Floria B, eds. *Rossia-Ukraina: istoriia vzaimootnoshenii*. Moscow, 1997.
- Shamrai, A., ed. *Kharkovskaia shkola romantikov*. Vol. 3. Kharkov, 1930.

- . *Kharkovskie poety 30–40-kh gg. 19 st.* Kharkov, 1930.
- Sheveliv, B. "Petytsii ukrainskikh hromad do pererburz'skogo komitetu gramotnosti z r. 1862." *Za sto lit*, no. 3. Kharkov–Kiev, 1928.
- Ship, N. A. "Ukrains'kii natsional'no-kulturnyi rukh v umovakh antyukrains'koi polityky rosyiskogo tsarizmu." In Sarbei V. G, ed. *Narysy z istorii ukrainskogo natsional'nogo rukhu*. Kiev, 1994.
- Smolin, M. B. (sost.) *Ukrainskii separatizm v Rossii. Ideologiiia natsional'nogo raskola*. Moscow, 1998.
- Solchanyk, P. "Lex Jusephovicia 1876. Z pryvodu 100-littia zaborony ukrainstva." *Suchasnist'*, no. 5 (1976).
- Stolypin, P. A. *Rechi v Gosudarstvennoi Dume i Gosudarstvennom Sovete 1906–1911*. Compiled by Ju. G. Fel'shtinskii. New York, 1990.
- Studins'kii K. "Lysty Dragomanova do Navrotskogo." *Za sto lit*. no.1, Kharkov–Kiev, 1927.
- Suvorin, A. S. *Dnevnik A. S. Suvorina*. Moscow, Petrograd, 1923.
- Szporluk, R. "Ukraina: ot periferii imperii k suverennomu gosudarstvu." In Furman D. E. *Ukraina i Rossia: obschestva i gosudarstva*. Moscow, 1997.
- Tatischev, V. N. *Istoriia Rossiiskaiia*. Ch. 1. Leningrad, 1962.
- Trubetskoi, N. S. *Istoriia. Kul'tura. Iazyk*. Moscow, 1995.
- Tserashkovich P.U. *Belarusy. Entsylapedyia Gistoryi Belarusi*. Minsk, 1993.
- Ul'ianov, N. I. *Proiskhozhdenie ukrainskogo separatizma*. Moscow, 1996.
- Valuev, P. A. *Dnevnik Valueva, ministra vnutrennikh del*. V. 1, 2. Moscow, 1961.
- . *Dnevnik 1877–1884 gg.* SPb, 1919.
- Venelin, Ju. "Spor mezdu juzhanami i severianami po povodu ikh rossizma." *ChOIDR*, no.3, Moscow, 1847.
- Zaionchkovskii, P. A. *Kirillo-Mefodievske obschestvo (1846–1847)*. Moscow, 1959.
- . *Krizis samoderzhavia na rubezhe 1870–1880 godov*. Moscow, 1964.
- . *Rosiiskoe samoderzhavie v kontse 19 stoletiiia. (Politicheskaiia reaktsiia 80-kh – nachala 90-kh godov)*. Moscow, 1970.
- "Zamechaniia, do Maloi Rossii prinadlezhaschie." *ChOIDR*, no. 2. Moscow, 1848.
- Zaskavs'kyi, D. and I. Romanchenko. *Mikhailo Dragomanov. Zhittia i literaturno-doslidnytska diial 'nist'*. Kiev, 1964.
- Zhurba, O. I. *Kyivs'ka arkheografichna komisiia, 1843–1921*. Kiev, 1993.

LITERATURE IN OTHER LANGUAGES

- Ajzensztok, J. "Romantycy Ukrainscy a zagadnienia jednosci słowianskiej." *Slavia Orientalis*, no. 3 (1973).
- Anderson, B. *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London, 1991. 2nd ed.
- Andriewsky, O. "The Politics of National Identity: The Ukrainian Question in Russia, 1904–1912." Ph.D. diss., Harvard, 1991.

- Armstrong, J. A. "The Autonomy of Ethnic Identity: Historic Cleavages and Nationality Relations in the USSR." In Alexander J. Motyl, ed. *Thinking Theoretically About Soviet Nationalities. History and Comparison in the Study of the USSR*. New York, 1992.
- Balmuth, D. *Censorship in Russia, 1865–1905*. Washington, 1979.
- Batalden, S. K. "Printing the Bible in the Reign of Alexander I: Toward a Reinterpretation of the Imperial Russian Bible Society." In Hosking G. A, ed. *Church, Nation and State in Russia and Ukraine*. London, 1991.
- Beauvois, D. *La bataille de la terre en Ukraine 1863–1914*. Lille, 1994.
- . *Polacy na Ukrainie, 1831–1863*. Paris, 1987.
- . *Walka o ziemię. 1863–1914*. "Pogranicze," Sejny, 1996.
- Bihl, W. "Aufgegangen in Grossreichen: Die Ukraine als österreichische und russische Provinz." Golchewski F.(Hrsg.) *Geschichte der Ukraine*. Göttingen, 1993.
- Brennan, T. "The National Longing for Form." In Homi K. Bhabha, ed. *Nation and Narration*. New York, 1990.
- Brower, D. *Training the Nihilists. Education and Radicalism in Tsarist Russia*. London, 1982.
- Bush, M. L. *Rich Noble, Poor Noble*. Manchester & New York, 1988.
- Bushkovich, P. "The Ukraine in Russian Culture 1790–1860: The Evidence of the Journals." *Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas* 39 (1991).
- Chlebowczyk, J. *Procesy narodotwórcze we wschodniej Europie Środkowej w dobie kapitalizmu*. Warsaw–Cracow, 1975.
- . *On Small and Young Nations in Europe*. Wrocław, 1980.
- . *O prawie do bytu małych i młodych narodów. Kwestia narodowa i procesy narodotwórcze we wschodniej Europie Środkowej w dobie kapitalizmu*. Wyd.2. Warsaw, 1983.
- Darendorf, R. *Society and Democracy in Germany*. Westport, 1969.
- Deutsch, K. W. *Nationalism and Social Communication: an Inquiry Into the Foundations of Nationality*. Cambridge, Mass. 1953.
- Dmytryshyn, B. "Introduction." In F. Savchenko. *Zaborona ukrainstva*. München, 1970.
- Doroshenko, D. "A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography." *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States*. New York 1957. Special issue, vol.5–6.
- During, S. "Literature – Nationalism's other? The case for revision." In H. K. Bhabha, ed. *Nation and Narration*. New York, 1990.
- Eklof, B. *Russian Peasant Schools. Officialdom, Village Culture and Popular Pedagogy, 1861–1914*. Berkeley, 1986.
- Geyer, D. "Funktionen des russischen Nationalismus." In Heinrich August Winkler ed. *Nationalismus*. Königstein, 1978.
- Głębocki, H. "Co zrobić z Polską" Kwestia polska w koncepcjach konserwatywnego nacjonalizmu Michaila Katkowa." *Przegląd Wschodni*, t.IV, z.4, 1998.
- Greenfeld, L. *Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity*. Cambridge, Mass., 1992.

- Guthier, S. L. "Ukrainian Cities during the Revolution and the Interwar Era." In Ivan L. Rudnytsky, ed. *Rethinking Ukrainian History*. Edmonton, 1981.
- von Hagen, M. "Does Ukraine Have a History?" *Slavic Review* (Fall 1995).
- Haimson, L. H. "The Problem of Social Identities in Early Twentieth Century Russia." *Slavic Review* 47, no. 1 (Spring 1988).
- Hall, J. "Nationalisms: Classified and Explained." *Daedalus* (Summer 1993).
- Hann, C. "Intellectuals, Ethnic Groups and Nations: Two Late-twentieth-century Cases." In Perival S, ed. *Notions of Nationalism*. Budapest – London – New York, 1995.
- Hechter, M. *Internal Colonialism. The Celtic Fringe in British National Development. 1556–1966*. Berkeley, 1975.
- Herlihy, P. "Ukrainian Cities in the Nineteenth Century." In Rudnytsky I. L. *Rethinking Ukrainian History*. Edmonton, 1981.
- Himka, J.-P. "The Construction of Nationality in Galician Rus': Ikarian Flights in Almost All Directions." In Michael Kennedy and Ronald G. Suny, eds. *Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation*. Ann Arbor, 1999.
- Hobsbawm, E. J. *The Age of Revolution, Europe 1789–1948*. London, 1962.
- and Ranger T, eds. *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge, 1983.
- . *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. New York, 1990.
- Hosking, G. *Russia, People and Empire, 1552–1917*. London, 1996.
- Hroch, M. *Obrozeni malych evropskich narodů*. Prague, 1971.
- . *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe*. Cambridge, 1985.
- Kaiser, R. J. *The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR*. Princeton, 1994.
- Kappeler, A. "Einleitung." In Kappeler A. (Hg.) *Die Russen. Ihr Nationalbewusstsein in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Cologne, 1990.
- . "Bemerkungen zur Nationalbildung der Russen." In Kappeler A. ed. *Die Russen. Ihr Nationalbewusstsein in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Koln, 1990.
- . *Russland als Vielvolkerreich: Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall*. München, C.H. Beck, 1992.
- . "The Ukrainians of the Russian Empire, 1860–1914." In Kappeler, ed. *Comparative Studies on Governments and Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups in Europe, 1850–1940*. Vol. VI, *The Formation of National Elites*. Dartmouth, 1992.
- . *Kleine Geschichte der Ukraine*. Munich, 1994.
- . "Die ukrainische Nationalbewegung im Russischen Reich und in Galicien: Ein Vergleich." In Heiner Timmermann ed. *Entwicklung der Nationalbewegungen in Europa 1850–1914*. Berlin, 1998.
- . "Chochly und Kleinrussen: Die ukrainische ländische und städtische Diaspora in Russland vor 1917." *Jahrbucher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 45 (1997) H.1.
- Keenan, E. L. "On Certain Mythical Beliefs and Russian Behaviors." In Starr S. F, ed. *The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*. Armonk, New York and London, 1994.

- . "Muscovite Perceptions of Other East Slavs before 1654: An Agenda for Historians." In Peter Potychny et al., eds. *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter*. Edmonton, 1992.
- Kemiläinen, A. *Nationalism: Problems Concerning the Word, the Concept and the Classification*. Yväsylä, 1964.
- Kohn, H. *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History*. Princeton, 1955.
- . *The Idea of Nationalism*. 2nd ed. New York, 1967.
- Kohut, Z. E. *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy. Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate. 1760–1830's*. Cambridge, Mass. 1988.
- . "The Ukrainian Elite in the Eighteenth Century and Its Integration into the Russian Nobility." In Banac I., Bushkovich P. *Nobility in Russia and Eastern Europe*. New Haven, 1983.
- . "History as a Battleground. Russian–Ukrainian Relations and Historical Consciousness in Contemporary Ukraine." In Starr S. F., ed. *The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*. Armonk, New York, London, 1994.
- Kravchenko, B. *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine*. New York, 1985.
- Laitin, D. D., Petersen R., and Slocum J. W. "Language and the State: Russia and the Soviet Union in Comparative Perspective." In Alexander J. Motyl. *Thinking Theoretically About Soviet Nationalities. History and Comparison in the Study of the USSR*. New York, 1992.
- Llobera, J. R. *The God of Modernity. The Development of Nationalism in Western Europe*. Oxford, Providence, 1994.
- Mann, M. *Sources of Social Power*. Vol. 2. *The Rise of Modern Nations and Classes, 1760–1914*. Cambridge, 1993.
- Mannheim, K. *Essays in Sociology and Social Psychology*. London, 1954.
- Miller, A. "Shaping Russian and Ukrainian identities in the Russian Empire during the 19th Century: Some Methodological Remarks." *Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas* 49, no. 4 (2001).
- von Mohrenschild, D. *Toward a United States of Russia. Plans and Projects of Federal Reconstruction of Russia in the Nineteenth Century*. Rutherford, Madison etc., 1981.
- Nairn, T. "Scotland and Europe." In Eley J. and Suny R. G., eds. *Becoming National. A Reader*. New York, Oxford, 1996.
- Núñez, X. M. "Historical Research on Regional and Peripheral Nationalism in Spain: a Reappraisal." EUI Working Paper ESC No.92/6. Badia Fiesolana, San Domenico, 1992.
- Pelech, O. "The State and the Ukrainian Triumvirate in the Russian Empire, 1831–1847." In Kravchenko B., ed. *Ukrainian Past, Ukrainian Present*. New York, 1993.
- Plamenatz, J. "Two Types of Nationalism." In Edward Kamenka, ed. *Nationalism. The Nature and the Evolution of the Idea*. London, 1976.
- Potulnyskyi, V. A. "The Image of Ukraine and the Ukrainians in Russian Political Thought (1860–1945)." *Acta Slavica Iaponiaca*, V. XVI. Sapporo, 1998.

- "Problems of Terminology and Periodization in the Teaching of Ukrainian History. Round Table Discussion." In Rudnytsky I., ed. *Rethinking Ukrainian History*. Edmonton, 1981.
- Raeff, M. "The Russian Nobility in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries: Trends and Comparisons." In Banac I., Bushkovich P. *Nobility in Russia and Eastern Europe*. New Haven, 1983.
- Reece, J. E. *The Bretons against France. Ethnic minority nationalism in twentieth century Britany*. Chapel Hill, 1977.
- Renner, A. *Russischer Nationalismus und Öffentlichkeit im Zarenreich. 1855–1875*. Cologne, Böhlau, 2000.
- Rudnytsky, I. *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History*. Edmonton, 1987.
- Rudoph, R. and Good D., eds. *Nationalism and Empire. The Habsburg Monarchy and the Soviet Union*. New York, 1992.
- Rutherford, A. "Vissarion Belinskii and the Ukrainian National Question." *Russian Review*, vol.54, no. 4 (October 1995).
- Sahlins, P. *Boundaries. The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees*. Berkeley, 1989.
- Saunders, D. *Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture 1750–1850*. Edmonton, 1985.
- . "Russia and Ukraine under Alexander II: The Valuev Edict of 1863." *International History Review* 17 (1995).
- . "Russia's Ukrainian Policy (1847–1905): A Demographic Approach." *European History Quarterly* 25 (1995).
- . "Mikhail Katkov and Mykola Kostomarov: A Note on Petr Valuev's Anti-Ukrainian Edict of 1863." *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 17, nos. 3–4 (1996 for 1993).
- Schnabel, F. "Federalism Preferable to a National State." In Pflanze O, ed. *The Unification of Germany, 1848–1871*. New York etc., 1968.
- Serbyn, R. "The 'Sion' – 'Osnova' Controversy of 1861–1862." In *Ukrainian–Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*. Edmonton, 1988.
- Seton-Watson, H. *Nations and States. An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism*. Boulder, 1977.
- Slezkine, J. "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism." *Slavic Review* 53, no. 2 (Summer 1994).
- Slocum, J. W. "Who and When, Were the *Inorodtsy*? The Evolution of the Category of 'Aliens' in Imperial Russia." *The Russian Review*, April 1998.
- Smith, A. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. Oxford, 1986.
- Smolitsch, I. "Geschichte der russischen Kirche. Teil 2." *Forschungen zur ost-europaischen Geschichte*, 45 (1991).
- Smouth, T. C. *A Century of the Scottish People, 1830–1950*. London, 1988.
- Shevelov, G. Y. "Evolution of the Ukrainian Literary Language." In Ivan L. Rudnytsky, ed. *Rethinking Ukrainian History*. Edmonton, 1981.
- Subtelny, O. "The Habsburg and Russian Empires: Some Comparisons and Contrasts." In Teruyuki Hara and Kimitaka Matsuzato, eds. *Empire and Society. New Approaches to Russian History*. Sapporo, 1997.

- Szporluk, R. "The Russian Question and the Imperial Overextension." In Davisha K. and Parrot B., eds. *The End of the Empire? The Transformation of the USSR in Comparative Perspective*. Armonk, New York, London, 1997.
- Śliwowska, W. "Petersburg i społeczeństwo rosyjskie wobec kwestii polskiej." *Powstanie styczniowe*. Warsaw, 1991.
- Thaden, E. C. *Conservative Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Russia*. Seattle, 1964.
- . ed. *Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland*. Princeton, 1981.
- . "Russification in Tsarist Russia." In Thaden E. C. with collaboration of Thaden M. F. *Interpreting History: Collective Essays on Russia's Relations with Europe*. New York, Boulder, 1990.
- Thompson, E. P. *The Making of the English Working Class*. London, 1963.
- Tilly, Ch, ed. *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton, 1975.
- Velychenko, S. "Where Tsarist Borderlands Undergoverned and Did It Matter?" Conference paper.
- . "Empire Loyalism and Minority Nationalism in Great Britain and Imperial Russia, 1707 to 1914: Institutions, Laws, and Nationality in Scotland and Ukraine." *Comparative Studies in Society and History*. Vol 39, no.3, July 1997.
- . "The Size of the Imperial Russian Bureaucracy and Army in Comparative Perspective." *Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas* no. 3 (2001)
- Verdery, K. "Whither 'Nation' and 'Nationalism'?" *Daedalus*, Summer 1993.
- Viroli, M. *For Love of Country. An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism*. Oxford, 1995.
- Wallerstein, E. "Does India Exist?" In Wallerstein, I. *Unthinking Social Science. The Limits of Nineteenth-century Paradigms*. Cambridge, 1995.
- Weber, E. *Peasants into Frenchmen. The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914*. Stanford, 1976.
- Weeks, Th. R. *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia. Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863–1914*. De Kald, 1996.
- Wendland, V. *Die Russophilen in Galizien. Ukrainische Konservative zwischen Osterreich und Russland, 1848–1915*. Vienna, 2001
- Witos, W. *Moje wspomnienia*. Paris, 1964.
- Woroby, P. "The Role of the City in Ukrainian History." In Ivan L. Rudnytsky, ed. *Rethinking Ukrainian History*. Edmonton, 1981.
- Yekelchuk, S. "Creating a Sacred Place: The Ukrainofiles and Shevchenko's Tomb in Kaniv (1861–ca.1900)." *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*. Vol.20, nos.1–2 (Summer–Winter 1995).
- . "Nationalisme ukrainien, bielorusse et slovaque." In Mellon-Delson Ch. and Maslowski M, eds. *L'Histoire des idées politiques cente-est européennes*. Paris, 1998.

-
- . "The Body and National Myth: Motifs from the Ukrainian National Revival in the Nineteenth Century." *Australian Slavonic and East European Studies* Vol.7, no. 2, 1993.
- . "Nation's Clothes: The Construction of a National High Culture by the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the Russian Empire, 1860–1900." *Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas* 49, no. 4 (2001).
- Zernack, K. "Germans and Poles: Two cases of Nation-Building." In Schultze, H. ed. *Nation-Building in Central Europe*. Hamburg, New York, 1994.

Glossary

- AVPRI – Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi imperii (Archive of the foreign policy of the Russian Empire in Moscow)
- GARF – Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (State archive of the Russian Federation in Moscow)
- GUP – Glavnoe Upravlenie po Delam Pechati (Main department for the press)
- KGS – Kiev branch of the Russian Imperial Geographic Society
- ME – Ministry of Popular Education
- ORRGB – Otdel Rukopisei Rossiiskoi Gosudarstvennoi Biblioteki v Moskve (Manuscript department of the Russian state library in Moscow)
- RGIA – Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv v Sankt–Peterburge (Russian state history archive in St. Petersburg)
- RGS – Russian Imperial Geographic Society
- RORNB – Rukopisnyi Otdel Rossiiskoi Natsional'noi Biblioteki v Sankt–Peterburge (Manuscript department of the Russian national library in St. Petersburg)
- SCC – Supreme Censorship Committee
- op. – *opis'* (description)
- ed. khr. – *edinita khranenia* (file)
- f. – *fond* (collection of documents)

Index of Names

(Names in *Italics* refer to contemporary scientists discussed in the text)

- Abaza, N. S. 224, 232
Aksenov, V. 36
Anderson, B. 7, 10, 11, 79, 113
Akhmatov, A. P. 102, 110, 115, 148
Aksakov, I. S. 108, 111, 112, 119–121, 125, 147, 248
Aksakov, S. T. 68, 69, 75, 132
Albrand, V. I. 144
Al'chevskaia, K. 138
Al'chevskii, A. K. 132
Alekseev, L. 236, 237
Alexander I 101
Alexander II 47, 58, 61, 101, 110, 111, 127, 131, 134–136, 142, 179, 184–188, 225, 235, 240, 243, 247–251
Alexander III 240, 242, 251
Anderson, B. 2–5, 7, 10, 11, 79, 113
Andrievski, O. 38, 66
Annenkov, N. N. 99, 100, 102–104, 107, 113, 117, 124, 248
Annenkov, P. V. 55, 88, 99, 192
Antonovich, V. B. 77, 89, 98, 112, 158, 160, 161, 166, 168, 171, 201, 226, 230
Antonovich, P. A. 161, 167, 171, 172
Armstrong, J. 252
Arsenii, metropolitan 63–65, 134
Askerek, A. 63
Askochenskii, V. I. 88

Bakunin, M. A. 93
Balmuth, D. 195

Beauvois, D. 62, 140, 150
Beketov, V. 61
Belen'kii, T. 193
Belinskii, V. G. 55, 57, 82, 247
Belozerskii, N. M. 54, 75, 82, 91, 131, 134, 206, 226
Bel'skii, 181, 182
Ben-Ami, 93
Bestuzhev-Riumin, K. I. 106
Bezak, A. P. 149
Bibikov, D. G. 112, 158
Bilinskii, N. 193
Bismark, O. von 14
Bodianskii, O. M. 50, 56
Borisov, V. V. 166, 228
Borodin, V. S. 72
Braunschweig, R. I. 91, 139, 150
Brennan, T. 7
Bruck, S. I. 205
Buchbinder, N. 38
Bulgarin, F. V. 56
Bunge, N. Kh. 222
Bunin, I. A. 27
Bushkovich, P. 55
Butkov, V. P. 65

Chajkowski, M. 51
Cherevin, P. A. 89, 222
Cherkasskii, V. A. 131, 133
Chernyshevskii, N. G. 19, 30, 80, 83, 88, 105, 237, 249
Chertkov, M. I. 192, 208, 213, 221–225, 227, 230, 243, 251

- Chikalenko, E. 252
 Chlebowczyk, J. 10, 11, 17, 252
 Chubinskii, P. P. 78, 89, 98, 130, 137, 158–162, 181, 184, 185, 187, 191–193, 201, 226
 Danilevskii, G. P. 122
 Deich, L. G. 238, 239
 Delianov, I. D. 244
Deutsch, K. 6, 7, 10
 Diakonenko, E. 193
 Dmitrii Konstantinovich, Grand Duke 207
 Dobroliubov, N. I. 82, 83
 Dolenga-Khodakovskii Z. 50
 Dolgorukov, V. A. 64, 71, 75, 90, 97–104, 110, 113, 119, 124, 136, 148
 Dondukov-Korsakov, A. M. 158, 159, 161, 166, 169, 172, 183, 185, 191–193, 201, 202, 207, 208, 221, 222, 225–230, 232, 234, 235, 240, 241, 250, 251
 Dontsov, D. 216
 Doroshenko, D. 81
 Dostoevskii, F. M. 69
 Dragomanov, M. P. 19, 20, 85, 86, 91, 93, 130, 133, 135, 136, 138, 145, 155–163, 168–177, 181, 184, 185, 187, 191–193, 199, 201–203, 206, 208, 216, 218, 226, 228–234, 237–239, 245
 Dragomanova, O. P. 188
 Drenteln, A. R. 213
 Duchński, F. 51, 56
 Dunin-Marcinkiewicz, W. 71
During, S. 8
 Filaret, metropolitan 101
 Fotii, archimadrite 101
Foucault, M. 7, 40
 Frederix, V. B. 207
 Gagarin, P. P. 109
 Galagan, G. P. 67, 131, 166, 228–230, 244
 Gatsuk, A. A. 128, 132, 137
Gellner, E. 5, 8, 9
 Georgievskii, A. I. 149, 151
Geyer, D. 23
 Gisel, I. 21
 Glazov, V. G. 150
 Gogol, N. N. 51, 181
 Gogotskaia 168
 Gogotskii, S. S. 32, 69–71, 88, 95, 104, 164, 168
 Golitsyn, A. F. 129
 Golitsyn, S. P. 109, 115
 Golovatskii, Ia. 211, 216
 Golovnin, A. V. 102, 108, 117–121, 124, 136, 142–149, 248
 Goluchowski, A. 62, 200, 215
 Goncharov, I. A. 120
 Gorbachev, M. S. 260
 Gorchakov, A. M. 100, 111, 113, 214, 215
 Govorskii, K. A. 88, 111
 Grabowski, M. 181
 Granovskii, T. N. 94
 Grech, N. I. 56
 Grechulevich, V. V. 69, 95, 228, 243
Greenfeld, L. 39
 Gribovskii 98
 Grigor'ev, A. A. 83
 Grigor'ev, V. V. 193
 Grinchenko, B. 138
 Grushevskii, M. S. 1, 2, 22, 35, 52, 211, 216, 219
Guthier, S. 206
Hagen, M. von 13
Hall, J. 9, 10
 Hercen, A. I. 68, 83, 105, 109, 237, 248, 249
 Hesse, N. P. 65, 106, 191, 193
Himka, J.-P. 216
Hobsbawm, E. 10, 147
Hroch, M. 10, 105, 114
 Iadrintsev, A. N. 130
 Ignatiev, N. P. 240, 241
 Il'nitskii, L. V. 164

- Ireček, J. 62
 Iuzefovich, M. V. 32, 149, 157–159,
 162–167, 171, 172, 175, 176,
 179–186, 200, 207, 212–214,
 222, 230, 251
 Ivanov, A. 103, 104, 106, 111, 112,
 144, 237
 Jaworski, J. 51
Kabuzan, V. M. 205
 Kachala, S. 157
 Kakhnov, M. S. 221, 224, 230
 Kakhovskii, V. I. 106
Kappeler, A. 23, 26, 44
 Karamzin, N. M. 22
 Katkov, M. N. 19, 28, 29, 85–87, 90,
 91, 94, 103–108, 111, 115,
 118–125, 129, 138, 146, 147,
 149, 152, 153, 183, 226,
 234–237, 245, 248–251
 Kaufman, K. P. von 199
Keenan, E. L. 45
 Khmel'nitskii, B. 27, 35
 Kistiakovskii, A. F. 201, 202, 244
 Kliuchevskii, V. O. 22
Kohn, H. 8
Kohut, Z. 13, 49
 Konisskii, A. Ia. 76, 130, 180
 Konstantin, Nikolaevich, Grand
 Duke 158, 185, 191, 195, 250
 Korf, (A. N. or I. N.) 127, 129,
 134–136, 142, 149
 Kosach, P. A. 182, 188, 192
 Kostomarov, N. I. 19, 29, 33, 37,
 53–55, 61, 65, 77–82, 86–88,
 92, 93, 104–108, 110, 118–121,
 123, 125, 127, 128, 131, 132,
 136, 137, 155, 164, 175, 181,
 226, 232–236, 248
 Kotliarevskii, A. A. 78, 230
 Kotliarevskii, I. P. 194, 231
 Kotsebu, P. E. 213, 214
 Kovalevskii, P. I. 207
 Krasovskii, A. A. 106
Kravchenko, B. 34
 Kulish, P. A. 37, 54, 55, 57, 61, 63,
 65, 67–70, 73, 75–78, 81–86,
 90, 93, 123, 127, 128, 130–134,
 164, 181, 184, 226
 Kul'zhinskii, I. 104, 113
 Lamanskii, V. I. 19, 87, 94
 Lavrovskii, P. A. 55
 Lazhechnikov 61
 Lazov 109
 Lebedintsev P. G. 88
Lemke, M. K. 112
 Levchenko, M. M. 32, 33
 Lizogub, D. 239
Llobera, J. 18
 Lobanov-Rostovskii, N. A. 191, 192,
 195
 Lobodovskii 181, 182
 Lopatinskii, L. 164
 Loris-Melikov, M. T. 146, 214, 216,
 221, 222, 224, 230, 240, 243,
 251
 Lukashevich, P. A. 50
 Lysenko, N. V. 162, 171, 194, 223,
 226
Magocsi, P. R. 47, 211
 Makov, L. S. 191, 213
 Maksimovich, M. A. 36, 37, 50, 52,
 66, 67, 72, 73, 87, 119, 157, 164
Mann, M. 10
 Matskevich, D. 54
 Metlinskii, A. L. 50
 Mezentsov, N. V. 127–130, 134, 136,
 137, 146
Miakovskii, V. 38
 Mickiewicz, A. 52
 Mikhail Nikolaevich, Grand Duke
 207
 Miliukov, P. N. 22
 Miliutin, D. A. 47, 97–100, 112, 124,
 145, 215, 216, 248
 Miliutin, N. A. 131, 137
 Morachevskii, F. S. 102
 Muraviev, M. N. 199

- Nairn, T.* 16, 40, 217
Navrotskii, V. 159, 173
Nazimov, V. I. 140, 151
Neukirch, I. Ia. 104
Nicholas I 53, 54, 58, 129, 137, 146, 211
Nicholas II 256
Nikitenko, A. V. 120–122
Nos, S. D. 180
Novikov, E. P. 213, 215, 216
Novitskii 107, 108, 117
Núñez, X. M. 13
- Opatovich, S.* 65, 102
Orlov, A. F. 53, 129, 155
Ostrovskii, M. N. 240, 241
- Padura, T.* 51
Palomatskii, A. I. 232
Panteleev, L. F. 244
Perfil'ev, S. S. 191
Pil'chikov, D. 63, 82
Pirogov, N. I. 163
Plamenatz, J. 8
Ploshchanskii, V. 213
Pobedonostsev, K. P. 179, 240–242, 246, 250
Pogodin, M. P. 66, 67, 87, 119, 212
Polovtsov, A. A. 89, 131, 144, 205, 221–223, 228–230, 232, 240, 241, 250
Pomialovskii, N. G. 106
Popov, M. M. 53, 54
Portugalov, V. 84
Posiette, K. N. 192
Potanin, G. N. 130
Potapov, A. L. 179–181, 185–187, 192, 213, 250
Poulet, M. F. de 234, 235
Pritsak, O. 31
Pushkin, A. S. 68, 101
Putiatin, E. V. 64
Puzyrevskii 168
Pypin, A. N. 51, 169, 171, 177, 233, 244
- Rau, J.* 8
Razin, S. 27
Reitern, M. Kh. 142
Rennenkapf, M. 164, 168
Rigel'man, N. A. 164, 165, 167–171, 175, 176, 213, 228
Rovinskii, P. A. 170
Rudchenko, I. Ia. 174, 223, 224, 229, 230
Rudnysky, I. 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 51, 93, 173, 252
Ryl'skii, F. 77, 98
- Saburov, A. A.* 222
Sahlins, P. 10, 11, 215, 217
Saltykov-Schedrin, M. E. 187, 208
Samarin, Iu. F. 21, 57, 131, 247
Saunders, D. 1, 2, 45, 112, 118, 188
Savchenko, F. 1, 2, 38, 112, 157, 158, 167, 188, 243
Savenko, A. I. 32
Schmitt, A. O. 166
Schnabel, F. 14
Serbyn, R. 85
Seton-Watson, H. 5
Shashkevich, M. 211
Shevchenko, T. G. 27, 52–55, 61, 63, 73, 77, 82, 83, 127, 137, 156, 164, 181, 203, 230
Shevelev, Iu. 78
Shirinskii-Shikhmatov, A. P. 171, 238
Shulgin, V. Ia. 158, 159, 162, 164, 165, 172, 259
Shulgin, V. V. 259
Shuvalov, P. A. 152
Sinegub, V. 106, 130
Sivers, B. F. 97, 98, 124
Smith, A. 5, 10, 39
Solov'ev, S. M. 22
Sol'skii, D. M. 240
Solzhenitsyn, A. I. 259, 260
Sreznevskii, I. I. 50
Stackelberg, E. G. 214, 215
Stadion, F. 211
Stalin, J. V. 35

- Staritskii, M. P. 176, 226
 Stoianov, A. I. 128
 Stolypin, P. A. 141
 Stroganov, S. G. 54
 Stronin, A. I. 130, 174
 Suvorin, A. S. 69
Sysyn, F. 31
Szporluk, R. 44

 Tatishchev, V. N. 21
 Tereschenko, M. I. 138
 Tereschenko, N. 135
 Terlecki, H. 51
Thaden, E. 22, 28
Tilly, Ch. 10, 14
 Timashev, A. E. 152, 166, 167, 179,
 184–186, 191, 195, 251
 Tolstoy, A. P. 64
 Tolstoy, D. A. 149, 151, 153, 163,
 167, 171, 179, 213, 216, 250
 Tolstoy, L. N. 76
 Troinitskii, A. 64–66
 Trubeckoi, N. S. 45
 Tsekhanovskii, E. V. 143
 Tsertelev, N. A. 50

 Ushinskii, K. D. 145, 160
 Uvarov, S. S. 54, 75

 Vagilevich, I. 211
 Valuev, P. A. 88, 90, 91, 97, 102,
 106–112, 117–122, 124, 131,
 133–136, 139, 141–146, 149,
 183, 185, 187, 208, 224, 225,
 241, 243, 248–250
 Vasil'chikov, I. I. 63, 130, 142, 145,
 149
Velychenko, S. 143, 208, 210
 Venelin, Iu. 56, 57, 65, 247
Verdery, K. 7, 23
 Vestman, V. I. 216
 Viazemskii, P. P. 240, 243
 Viluev 134
 Vorontsova-Dashkova, V. D. 207
 Voskoboinikov, A. N. 229, 230
 Vovk, F. K. 159, 163

Wallerstein, I. 12, 14
Weber, E. 15, 16
Weeks, Th. 34, 39, 47
Wendland, V. 212, 216, 217
 Wielopolski, A. 181
 Witos, W. 33
 Witte, F. F. 145
 Witte, S. I. 221
Woroby, P. 204

Zaionchkovskii, P. A. 53, 150
 Zamojski, A. 90
Zernak, K. 14
 Zhitetskii, P. 78, 79, 171, 193, 208
 Zhukovskii, N. I. 239