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CHAPTER 7

AXIS COLLABORATION, OPERATION BARBAROSSA, AND THE HOLOCAUST IN UKRAINE

Wendy Lower

The history of the Nazi-led genocide against the Jews is inseparable from Operation Barbarossa and the Axis occupation of the Soviet Union. Today such a statement is taken as a given in the fields of Holocaust studies and World War II. But this was not always the case. Prior to the 1990s, few military specialists followed the lead of Gerhard Weinberg and Jürgen Förster by connecting the battles on the front with the genocide behind the lines. Even the pioneering study by American Sovietologist Alexander Dallin, *German Rule in Russia, 1941–1945*, while paying much attention to the totalitarian framework of the SS terror, skimmed over the unique plight of the Jews, dealing with it marginally as a demonstration of Nazi internecine struggles over *Ostpolitik*. In the past twenty years a veritable deluge of studies on the Holocaust has shifted the focus of military history to studies of genocidal violence and its development in military planning and security measures in times of war. In Holocaust studies specifically, Operation Barbarossa has been the primary focus for reconstructing the history of decision making and the escalation of atrocities against Jews in the summer and fall of 1941.

Historians Christopher Browning, Jürgen Matthäus, and Christian Gerlach have delved into the peripheral and central events that came together in the Soviet Union and precipitated the mass murder of Jews. Besides the *Einsatzgruppen*, we have now created an expanding and more detailed picture of SS-police involvement, especially the role of the Order Police (*Ordnungspolizei*) and the Waffen-SS. As it turns out, more Jews were shot in Ukraine by regular order policemen than by special security personnel in the *Einsatzgruppen*. The criminal activities of the Wehrmacht have been diligently researched and controversially exhibited. Furthermore, a plethora of civilian agencies, foremost among them the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture, also have blood on their hands, by introducing plans to starve out the cities of the Soviet Union and the

less fertile agricultural regions in Belarus and northcentral Russia. The unique Nazi targeting of Jewish POWs and civilians was no secret, or at least as historian Richard Breitman discovered, it remained an “official secret.”¹ During the first months of the invasion, British radio intercepts of German SS-police communiqués from Ukraine and Belarus revealed in shocking numbers the pattern of anti-Jewish killings. So striking was this intelligence information that British analysts surmised in September 1941 that the Nazis were pursuing a “policy of savage intimidation if not of ultimate extermination.”² Thus the extensive research and historiography on Nazi decision making, the origins of the Final Solution, and Allied intelligence have established without a doubt that the Nazi *Vernichtungskrieg* against the Soviet Union coincided with the physical extermination of all Soviet Jews and other so-called undesirables, and that we can no longer study the military history of the eastern campaigns and occupation policies without their genocidal components.³ This consensus begs the question, what now? What areas have been overlooked or remain largely unexplored in the history of Operation Barbarossa and the Holocaust? There are many, but one in particular will be the focus of this essay: Axis collaboration.

The aim is to show how Axis diplomacy and participation in Operation Barbarossa and the occupation of Ukraine shaped the history of the Holocaust there. Did Axis participation decisively bring about an acceleration of anti-Jewish policy, resulting in genocide, or did it slow developments? The so-called Jewish Question as it concerned the Soviet Union was a subject of Axis diplomacy from the planning stages through the execution of Operation Barbarossa. While there was general consensus about a “Jewish problem” in Europe, there were important differences and similarities in how Axis powers treated Jews in the territories that they conquered and occupied. More than 1.5 million Jews were killed in the territory of Ukraine by Germans, Romanians, Hungarians, Slovaks, ethnic Germans, and Ukrainians. The genocide was an interethnic phenomenon on the perpetrator side. This statement is not made to somehow minimize Germany’s ultimate responsibility for a genocidal Final Solution, but rather to throw new light on the history of collaboration and its multinational features. Hitler’s primary role in the planning and implementation of the war against the Soviet Union is certain; however Hitler did not act alone. He relied on his Axis allies. The “war against the Jews” was a topic of German-Romanian and German-Hungarian interaction at the highest levels and in the local small town settings of Ukraine. Germans and Austrians comprised the overwhelming majority of soldiers in the invasion (more than 3 million men), but they were joined by about

half a million Slovaks, Romanians, Finns, Italians, Hungarians, as well as Spanish volunteers.⁴ Every sixth soldier that marched into the Soviet Union under the Nazi banner at the end of June 1941 was a non-German ally; among them was a critical mass of ideologues driven by a similar fear and hatred of bolshevism and, to a significant extent, motivated by anti-Semitism.⁵ Were these Allied forces, which were mostly deployed as separate units under direct German command, involved in the promotion or suppression of the Holocaust, for instance in sparking pogroms or assisting in the mass shootings? Did they act in accordance with superior orders that originated from possible exchanges and agreements reached between Nazi leaders and the leaders of their respective countries? In short, the interethnic dimension that has been explored recently as forms of local collaboration might also be tied back to the highest levels of Axis diplomacy. We have looked at the interaction of the center and periphery within the German administration and documented the radicalizing effects of this dynamic. The question remains to what extent did German interaction with its allies on the ground and in high-level diplomatic exchanges steer the course of the Final Solution: did it have a radicalizing effect as well? This essay will explore these questions by examining specific cases in Ukraine of German-Romanian, German-Hungarian, and German-Slovak collaboration. It provides a preliminary sketch of this piece of the history because the documentation and published research on this topic of Axis diplomacy and the Holocaust is uneven and scattered, and the source material is in multiple languages that no individual scholar in the field commands (German, Hungarian, Slovak, Romanian, Italian, Ukrainian, Serbo-Croatian, Bulgarian, and Spanish).⁶ To date, most of the published research on this topic has focused on German-Romanian and German-Hungarian relations; more has appeared in recent years on local forms of German-Ukrainian collaboration, which will be addressed in this essay as well.

In the months leading to the outbreak of the war on June 22, 1941, Hitler met with his European allies and determined what each country would contribute and could potentially gain from the conquest of Soviet territory.⁷ According to the war diary of the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW), Hitler outlined these roles to the military in February and March 1941. He stated that except for Romania, the other allies should not be informed until the last possible moment, especially Hungary, since, he argued, this country would press for more political guarantees vis-à-vis its neighbors and against German territorial gains. In other words, Hitler wanted a free hand; he did not want to get bogged down in diplomatic discussions or be constrained by the geopolitical

interests of his allies. Only Romania, he stated, could be informed, since the country's participation in the conquest of the Soviet Union was critical to its future. As Hitler argued, Romania was similar to Germany in that the two countries were engaged in a life and death struggle with the Soviet Union; Operation Barbarossa was, as he stated, a question of survival, a *Lebensfrage*.⁸ With his top military brass, Hitler planned for an encirclement of the enemy through a strong German spearhead north toward Kiev, clinched by Romanian armies in the southern regions of present-day Moldova and Ukraine. In addition there were economic targets to consider in the German command's strategic planning and negotiations with its allies, in particular the Romanian oil fields. In mid-March 1941, the Führer decided that "Hungary should in no way participate in Operation Barbarossa, Slovakia [should] only [be] exploited for the supply and deployment of troops, and the road and bridge building operations should be assigned to Hungary."⁹ As it turned out, however, Army Group South's forty-one divisions were supported by a Slovak infantry division (Mobile Combat and Rear Area Security), Royal Hungarian Army units including Jewish labor battalions attached to the Seventeenth Army, the Italian Expeditionary Corps attached to the Eleventh Army, and the Romanian Third and Fourth Armies. Additionally, non-German forces were sponsored by German military intelligence, such as the Ukrainian *Nachtigal* and *Roland* units.¹⁰

The diplomacy of the Jewish Question among the Axis powers was an integral feature of Operation Barbarossa. As one might expect, Germany's closest ally in this regard was Romania. Under some pressure from the German military, the Romanian military purged its rank and file of Jews.¹¹ Then, according to historian Jean Ancel: "On January 14, 1941, Adolf Hitler revealed to the Romanian dictator Ion Antonescu the plan to invade the USSR, and on June 12, 1941, his 'Guidelines for the Treatment of the Eastern Jews.' Well before the Wannsee Conference of January 20, 1942, Antonescu launched Romania's Final Solution in response to Hitler's cue."¹² He established his own Office for Jewish Questions and at the end of March 1941 a German "Adviser for Jewish Questions" arrived in Bucharest.¹³ Antonescu aimed to recover the "lost" territories of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, which had been occupied by the Soviets, and schemed to build his own imperial realm free of Jews along the Nazi model. To prepare for this, the Romanian military and security services worked out an arrangement similar to the German one whereby regular troops worked side-by-side with police and special security forces.¹⁴ The Romanian version of securing Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina was known as the *Curatirea terenului*, or Cleansing of the

Land, and it included “liquidation on the spot of all Jews in rural areas; internment of Jews in ghettos in urban centres; arrest of all persons suspected of being activists in the Communist Party.”¹⁵

Meanwhile, between January 18 and 20, 1941, Hitler met with his Italian ally, Benito Mussolini, at the Berghof. German and Italian generals discussed the most important theaters in the European war with Italy, focusing on Albania, Libya, and eastern Africa. At the closing session on January 20, Hitler expounded on Germany’s geopolitical position. He stated that America was no big threat, “much more dangerous was the huge block of Russia.” Although Germany enjoyed advantageous political and economic treaties with “Russia” [Soviet Union], it would be better in the long run, Hitler argued, to abandon this “means of power.” Furthermore, Hitler added, “as long as Stalin lives, he is clever and careful, we face no immediate threat. However when he [Stalin] is no longer around, then the Jews, who have stepped back now, will again return to the forefront.” He warned that, in this age of aerial bombing, the Russians had become a bigger threat to Germany. Hitler surmised that the Russians would turn the precious Romanian oilfields into a smoking pile of rubble, “and these oil fields are critical for the existence [*lebenswichtig*] of the Axis powers.” In closing, the Führer praised Antonescu as someone who made an excellent impression on him, as a man possessing a “glowing fanaticism” and who was ready to engage in any fight for his country.¹⁶

In the weeks prior to the invasion Hitler spoke more explicitly about the war of annihilation and the intended atrocities. He was quite blunt in his discussions with *Generaloberst* Alfred Jodl, operations chief of the Armed Forces High Command, about possible “preventive measures” against the “Russians,” reckoning the use of gas and the poisoning of food.¹⁷ Then on June 12, 1941, Hitler met with Ion Antonescu again, this time privately in his Munich apartment, and it was during this meeting, Ancel argues, that Hitler revealed “his regime’s intention to exterminate the Jews of Eastern Europe.”¹⁸ An understanding was reached, though specifics were not committed to paper. Later, during the invasion, conflicts emerged in the field as to who was authorized to deal with the Jews, in particular those refugees who had fled from the newly reoccupied Romanian territories and were in German-occupied zones of eastern Ukraine. Apparently Antonescu and his staff in the Foreign Office were under the impression that Himmler’s SS and police apparatus would take care of these Jews, while in Romanian occupation zones, local authorities (military, gendarme, and special security forces) would develop their own approaches based on the guidelines issued from superiors.




Figure 7.1. Hitler and Mussolini touring Ukraine in August 1941. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC, photograph 18565, courtesy of Stanley Weithorn.

Transnistria: The “Romanian Solution to the Jewish Problem”

In the days leading to the outbreak of the war, the Romanian dictator Ion Antonescu made clear to his officials in cabinet meetings Romanian intentions vis-à-vis the Jews. Antonescu spoke of the “purification of the population” as regards the Jews and all nationalities. As he put it, “we will implement a policy of total and violent expulsion of foreign elements.” On June 25, 1941, Antonescu’s deputy prime minister, Mihai Antonescu (no relationship to Ion) related in another cabinet meeting what their leader wanted: “General Antonescu has taken the decision—while he is in Moldavia—to remove the Jews from this very moment from all the villages of Moldavia, Bessarabia, and Bukovina.”¹⁹ They were removed across the Dniester into German and Hungarian occupied zones, and as many as 27,000 were subjected to death marches, random shootings, rape, and starvation along the banks of the river. This refugee problem caused bitter conflicts among the Axis powers in the region.²⁰ Ion Antonescu was not pleased when German troops in Ukraine forced

Jews on the Bessarabian border back into Romanian territory. Antonescu raised this problem with Hitler and remarked that German soldiers were not acting according to the guidelines that they had discussed during their private meeting in Munich on June 13.²¹ The conflict was resolved by a territorial change. As of August 19 the primary destination of most Romanian deportees would be the newly created territory of Transnistria, a swathe of territory between the Southern Bug and Dniester rivers, a territorial gift that Antonescu received from Hitler. According to the research of Dennis Deletant, Jean Ancel, and Radu Ioanid, about 250,000 Jews and 12,000 Roma died there in makeshift camps, ghettos, and in massacres around these sites.²²

Ion Antonescu was less guarded in his ranting against the Jews and virulent anti-Semitism than were other Axis leaders. Like Hitler, he fumed about the Jewish commissars in the Red Army during discussions with his ministers and military brass, especially in explaining Romanian casualties in the war. Then when the massacres and abuses of Jews in occupied Romanian territory became known, and the head of the Federation of the Jewish Communities in Romania, Wilhelm Filderman, tried to protest the deportations of Jews to Transnistria, Ion Antonescu published his response to Filderman in the press:

Mr. Filderman, no one can be more sensitive than I am to the suffering of the humble and defenseless. I understand your pain, but all of you should, and especially should have, understood mine at the time, which was the pain of an entire nation. Do you think, did you think, of what we were going through last year during the evacuation of Bessarabia and what is happening today, when day by day and hour by hour, we are paying generously and in blood, in a great deal of blood, for the hatred with which your co-religionists in Bessarabia treated us during the withdrawal from Bessarabia, how they received us upon our return and how they treated us from the Dniester up to Odessa and in the area around the Sea of Azov?²³

Here is a strong example, uncovered by historian Dennis Deletant, of Antonescu's promotion of anti-Semitism and anti-bolshevism as part of the diplomatic territorial arrangements worked out during Operation Barbarossa. Antonescu's public scapegoating of the Jews in Bessarabia incited waves of anti-Semitic violence there and across the expanding Romanian empire.

Hitler's initial reluctance to involve Hungary in the military campaign was not solely a matter of preferring Antonescu as a like-minded fascist dictator. He and his generals in the field wanted to avoid any possible conflicts on the ground, any clashes that might emerge between

Hungarian and Romanian units during the action or in the administration of the conquered territory, although as it turned out many of the Hungarian units contained high percentages of Romanians and Ruthenians.²⁴ The political territorial claims that Hitler referred to in the case of Hungary were based on two treaties, the Vienna Awards of 1938 and 1940, that deprived Romania of land. As the victor in these treaties, Hungary was the potential spoiler in Germany's relations with Slovakia and Romania²⁵ and to some degree with the Ukrainian nationalist leaders (Stepan Bandera and Andrij Melnyk), since Admiral Miklós Horthy had received or made claims to territory that these parties considered their rightful homeland, regions such as Subcarpathia and northern Transylvania.²⁶ Though the Hungarian military participated in the war in Yugoslavia and its units demonstrated their willingness to carry out atrocities, in particular in the Bačka (Vojvodina, Serbia), Hitler remained wary of Hungary as a military ally or strategic partner in the campaign against the Soviet Union. Even though the Nazi example accelerated anti-Semitic trends in the 1930s in Hungary, Hitler also questioned Hungary's commitment to the Final Solution.²⁷ He told Croatian Minister of War Slavko Kvaternik on July 21, 1941, that Hungary would be the last European country to surrender its Jews. As historian Gerhard Weinberg has observed, "This was one of the few predictions Hitler made in July 1941 that turned out to be correct."²⁸

Yet some of his more pragmatic military chiefs must have realized that they would need Hungary's help after all. Halder, for example, engaged in unauthorized negotiations to both stage German troops in Hungary and gain the direct participation of Hungarian forces.²⁹ Thus on the eve of the invasion, the Royal Hungarian Army was called up. According to historian Krisztián Ungváry, this was all arranged in a rather last-minute fashion and so, as Hitler assumed, the Hungarian soldiers were poorly equipped and trained. Officially, Hungary joined the Axis forces against the Soviet Union on June 27, 1941. Under the direction of German Army Group South, the Hungarian Carpathy Corps moved over Seret into Borszców in early July. In mid-July the Hungarian *Schnell* Corps was sent to Bratslav to relieve troops of the Eleventh Army. The Second Hungarian Army, later attempting to hold the front line on the Don, was decimated by the Soviets, and nearly all two hundred thousand of its men died or surrendered. Hungarian troops tried to keep up with the German advance in their own shoddy tanks, peasant carts, bicycles, and rented automobiles, which the Germans scoffed at (though the Hungarians' horse-drawn carts moved better on the muddy country roads than did the German automobiles). As it turned out, the most valuable Hungarian

contribution (in cruder Nazi terms) to the campaign in the east was in the areas of antipartisan warfare and labor (Jewish battalions that they put to work repairing roads and bridges). For their part in the initial success of the campaign, the smaller Hungarian mobile corps were praised by Army Group South observers, who commented on their high quality material and general usefulness.³⁰

According to the pioneering research of Randolph Braham and Krisztián Ungváry, as many as forty thousand Jewish laborers attached to the Hungarian military perished in the territory that falls roughly within Ukraine's borders today. Some were killed in the combat zones around Stalingrad, while others died in the course of their torturous work owing to illnesses related to malnutrition, exhaustion, and beatings. Many were killed at the insistence of local German officials. Near Sumy, German members of *Sonderkommando* 4a shot a group of Hungarian Jewish laborers, and on April 30, 1943, some three hundred to eight hundred Hungarian Jewish laborers were burned in the barns of a collective farm in Korosten, near Zhytomyr.³¹

Several thousand non-Jewish civilians who were branded partisans were massacred in Hungarian-led raids on villages in Komorovka, Nosovk, Karjukova, Luky Hutor, Ivangorod, Jelino, Seredina Buda, and many other places in and around the Bryansk Forest.³² German officers complained that Hungarian methods of partisan warfare were excessive; one reported in May 1942:

In propaganda terms, their undisciplined and completely arbitrary behavior towards the local population can only harm German interests. Looting, rape and other breaches are the order of the day. In addition to the ill feeling caused among the local population, it is apparent that the Hungarian troops are not in a position to defeat the enemy.³³

Behind the front, during 1942 and 1943, Hungarians and Slovaks served under the Wehrmacht Commander for Occupied Ukraine; they were stationed in various spots within the *Reichskommissariat* and attached to the local German *Feldkommandantur*, but also recruited for anti-Jewish security measures including ghetto liquidations and deportations. According to plans devised by the High Command of the Army, Himmler's SS-police, and representatives of Alfred Rosenberg's Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories:

The security of the part of the Reich Commissary [*sic*] Ukraine to be set up on September 1, 1941 will be carried out in the south by a Hungarian Division (two brigades), connected in the north with a Slovakian security division

besides four battalions of militia. All units, including the Hungarian and Slovaks, are under the command of the commander of the Wehrmacht.³⁴

Documentation on Hungarian involvement in the Holocaust during Operation Barbarossa in the military occupation administration and in the civilian administration (the *Reichskommissariat* and General Government) is spotty, but in the evidence that has emerged one sees certain patterns of ad hoc collaboration in antipartisan warfare and the Final Solution. According to Ungváry, most of the Hungarian records from Ukraine are not in the archives, and he relied on those bits and pieces he located and then combined them with German reports. Here are some examples. In the Chernihiv region, near Konotop, the German *Sonderkommando*, being short staffed and lacking trucks and petrol, relied on members of the Hungarian military stationed there to carry out anti-Jewish massacres in July 1942. Near Cholmy on February 10, 1942, “two partisans and a Jewish woman were shot while escaping by a Hungarian patrol in the vicinity.”³⁵ Nazi officials in Ukraine routinely employed the stock phrase “shot while trying to escape”; it infers that the Jews were guilty fugitives, when in fact innocent men, women, and children (mostly hiding and seeking refuge in the forests) were gunned down. Some Jewish males were accepted into the Soviet partisan movement, but the elderly, women, and children were left to fend for themselves in these war zones.³⁶ In another report, the claim is made that ninety Jews (perhaps a small community) supported enemy partisans: “A group of Jews supplied food to the partisans. The band of Jews, numbering 90, was executed.” This was communicated to the chief of staff of the 105th Infantry Division [Hungarian] on December 22, 1941.³⁷ One of the better documented German-Hungarian murder operations occurred in Chernihiv on February 28, 1942. Eight surviving photographs show the massacre of between forty and sixty civilians (identified as Jews on the back of the photos). The Hungarians apparently kept guard while the German military Secret Field Police (*Geheime Feldpolizei*) carried out the killing to ensure an orderly execution.

In another more detailed case, investigated by the Hungarians immediately after the war and by the West Germans in the late 1960s,³⁸ Hungarian troops participated in the liquidation of the Haisyn/Gajsyn ghetto at the end of May 1942. A meeting was held on May 26, 1942, in the office of the local Wehrmacht *Ortskommandantur* that included the local Hungarian military commander; the German district commissioner, Becher; the Wehrmacht major, Heinrich; and the station chief of the gendarme post, Dreckmeier. Because they intended to round up the Jews from three

villages, Commissioner Becher split the action into two transports. One of these was led by *Major* Heinrich and supported by Ukrainian *Schutzmänner* and Hungarian infantry. In the early morning at 3:00 a.m., Hungarian and Ukrainian auxiliaries sealed off the ghetto; they then forced the Jews onto trucks and drove them to the execution site at Tepyk where a shooting commando of SD men stood ready. About four hundred Jews were killed in these massacres. According to Ungváry's research in the Hungarian trial records, some of the Hungarian volunteers shot Jews.³⁹

One of the more infamous massacres in Holocaust history that marked the escalation in the summer of 1941 from the selective killing of Jewish males to the annihilation of entire communities occurred at Kamianets-Podilskyi (Kamenets-Podolsk). An important aspect of this history that has not been researched fully is Hungary's role and the presence of Hungarians in the massacre as victims, bystanders, and perpetrators. Here the Hungarian perpetrators and accomplices were on the ground, involved in the shooting of approximately 23,600 Jews over a few days, and they were also responsible for an anti-Jewish diplomacy that drove almost half the victims, Hungarian Jewish refugees, into the mass graves of Ukraine.

On August 25, a meeting of army commanders and Rosenberg's representatives took place in Vinnytsia, Ukraine. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss how territory in the rear area of Germany's Army Group South would be transferred to the jurisdiction of the civilian administration, the Reich Commissariat Ukraine. During the meeting the following issue was raised (as it was recorded in the official meeting notes):

Near Kamenets-Podolsk, the Hungarians have pushed about 11,000 Jews over the border. In the negotiations up to the present it has not been possible to arrive at any measures for the return of these Jews. The higher SS and police leader (*SS-Obergruppenführer* Jeckeln) hopes however to have completed the liquidation of these Jews by September 1, 1941.⁴⁰

To the Hungarian government, these 11,000 refugees were alien Jews. They resided in territories annexed by Hungary in 1938 (Carpatho-Ukraine) or were Polish, German, Austrian, Czech, and Slovak Jews who had crossed over the border into these territories.⁴¹ As Operation Barbarossa was getting under way, the Hungarians decided this might be an opportune moment to deport these Jews eastward into Ukraine. In the chaos of the military campaign, and indeed under the cover of war, they were shoved into freight cars, dumped across the Hungarian border, and then marched as far as Kamianets-Podilskyi.⁴² The town was captured by the Germans and Hungarians in early July and fell under the regional military administration of the 183rd Field Command. As

the refugee Jews began arriving in the thousands, the local German military officials began to complain that the Jews were taking up housing and food, that they would spread epidemics and represented a security problem. They wrote to superiors that an "immediate order for their [the Jews'] evacuation is urgently requested."⁴³ According to historian Dieter Pohl, "diplomatic efforts to convince the Hungarians to take back these Jews failed."⁴⁴ The crisis was resolved by bringing in the higher SS and police leader for Southern Russia, Friedrich Jeckeln, Himmler's right-hand man in Ukraine. Jeckeln deployed Order Police Battalion 320 and an Orpo company of *Volksdeutsche* (from the Baltic). He contacted the Hungarian authorities and, according to historian Randolph Braham, a Hungarian sappers' platoon was put at Jeckeln's disposal.⁴⁵ Local Ukrainian auxiliaries were also recruited. On August 26 the massacre commenced. Some 4,200 men, women, and children were gunned down in pits; each was forced to lie on top of layers of corpses and killed with a bullet in the back of the head. The next day another 11,000 were killed in this manner. Postwar testimony of eyewitnesses placed Jeckeln at the scene, observing from a nearby hill with a group of Wehrmacht officers.⁴⁶ Among the eyewitnesses was Gyula Spitz, a Jewish truck driver with the Hungarian army, who secretly photographed events from the front seat of his vehicle. When the *Aktion* was over, Jeckeln radioed to Himmler's Command Staff that his units had killed 23,600 Jews (14,000 from Carpatho-Ukraine). This was the largest massacre in the Barbarossa campaign thus far, only to be outdone in Kiev at Babi Yar about a month later, then at Odessa and Bogdanivka.

The crisis that prompted this large-scale massacre began with Hungary's expulsion of the Jewish refugees. Like the tensions that arose between German and Romanian regional military and SS-police leaders over refugee Jews who were becoming border problems, the Kamianets-Podilskyi massacres manifest the fact that each of the Axis powers refused to take in Jews from other countries and that their views of the Jewish problem, while broadly anti-Semitic, were also at the center of specific clashes over national borders and territorial gains. The Germans wanted the Hungarians to take back "their Jews," and in the final German SS-police report submitted by HSPFF Jeckeln, the local Jews killed there were distinguished from the refugee Jews from Hungary.

The Jewish Question or the plight of the Jews, who were viewed as the most detested or unwanted minority in Europe, was an important feature of Axis diplomacy. When conflicts arose, such as the Kamianets-Podilskyi crisis, these moments of diplomatic exchange might have opened up the possibility of bringing Jews into less life-threatening circumstances, to

move them from the path of mobile killing units, or out of Jeckeln's reach, for example. But this did not happen. Instead, both the local and senior level problem solving and crisis management was almost always resolved to the detriment of the Jews and usually triggered a *radicalization* of the genocidal violence. Already in the pogroms of July 1941 and increasingly in the mass shootings in August, Axis genocidal policy targeted entire Jewish communities. This was the case in Romania during the summer and fall of 1941 (though it was reversed in 1942 when Marshal Antonescu suspended deportations), and was increasingly so in Hungary, leading ultimately to the deportations of Hungarian Jews in the summer of 1944.⁴⁷

The horrors of the Kamianets-Podilskyi massacre were reported by survivors who made their way back to Hungary. The more liberal member of the Interior Ministry, Mr. Fischer, tried to halt these expulsions of Jews to the eastern territories. However, the deportations continued. In fact four months later, on December 22, 1941, an urgent notice was sent from the highest offices of the Reich Commissar for Ukraine informing German regional governors of Hungarian deportations of Jews:

The Foreign Office has informed us that the Hungarian government has been attempting to expel Hungarian Jews into the occupied eastern territories. This is supposedly already happening to a large extent with those [Jews] who were sent to the General Government. I request an immediate report about whether such cases have occurred in your respective regions and, if yes, what measures have you taken against the Jews in question who have been seized in your areas.⁴⁸

Unfortunately, the requested reports from the regional governors are not in the files. But one can assume that such reports would have revealed anti-Jewish atrocities undertaken by German regional officials and would have perhaps illuminated relations between German and Hungarian officials over the Jewish problem. It is interesting to note the timing of this communication; it coincided with German plans for the mass murder of all European Jews and deportations from the Old Reich to ghettos and killing sites in Ukraine. As German officials across Reich offices, including the Foreign Office, prepared for the meeting at Wannsee, regional officials in Ukraine were asked to provide information about their Jewish populations, local and alien, as well as to report on local railway connections to ghettos that could accommodate deported Jews.⁴⁹

The documentation surrounding this history also reveals an important irony in German-Hungarian and German-Romanian relations over the Jewish Question and occupation policies in Ukraine. The German accounts of Hungarian treatment of local Jews tended to exaggerate

Hungarian behavior as barbaric and disorderly. As with the German critiques of marauding Romanian soldiers, the anti-Semitism as such was not questioned and no expressions of pity toward the Jews emerged; rather, the inferior nature of Germany's subordinate allies was criticized. For instance, one local German official complained that "wherever you go, occupation by Hungarians and Romanians is viewed as the worst kind of scourge. There was general agreement that Hungarian and Romanian behavior in the occupied territories was solely motivated by greed and lust."⁵⁰ In a similar vein, but occurring at a higher level, Ungváry found: "The German Foreign Office's liaison officer in the *Generalgouvernement* drafted a complaint which, among other issues, dealt with the 'murder tourism' of Germany's allies. He hoped to achieve the Hungarians' removal." The excesses of Hungarians in Galicia were carefully documented by German intelligence. The foreign/counter-intelligence department in the Lemberg *Abwehr* office compiled a list of misdemeanors, which included "activities by Hungarian officers [who are] collecting photographs relating to the treatment of Jews (trenches, camps, and evacuation points)."⁵¹ At first glance one might view such reports as the petty criticisms of rival powers or as German arrogance vis-à-vis its subordinate allies. Upon reflection, however, it seems that these German reports can be read in yet another way. By asserting the inferior methods of Hungarians and Romanians regarding the treatment of the Jews, local Germans were attempting to legitimize their own more thorough policy of genocide. In asserting that we Germans can do it better, were these German critiques not also asserting that the German approach was correct, even more civilized?

Slovakia

Little is known about Slovak involvement or input in Operation Barbarossa. Though Hitler was in principle against having Slavs actually participate in the Eastern campaign, the High Command of the Army had already reckoned in the prewar planning that they would utilize Slovak units in the occupation of the southern sector. The formal arrangements for this were not finalized, however, until the day of the invasion. According to Dieter Pohl's research, just "two days later the units marched off" with a similar ideological motivation: to combat bolshevism, fortified by their own campaign of state-sponsored anti-Semitism with a strong religious, Catholic component.⁵² Furthermore, Slovakia had Germany to thank for its newly gained autonomy; the breakup of Czechoslovakia had been orchestrated by Hitler and the Munich Pact in 1938–39. In conjunc-

tion with this, German-Slovak relations were formalized in March 1939 under the terms of a “protective treaty,” which gave Germany the upper hand over Slovakia’s foreign, military, and economic policies. Slovakia’s precarious status was also demonstrated in Germany’s upholding of the First Vienna Award, which resulted in Hungary’s annexation of one-third of Slovakia’s territory.

The Slovak presence in Nazi-occupied Ukraine began with expeditionary groups. To keep apace with the German units advancing eastward, the Slovaks of the 1st (Mobile) Infantry Division formed mobile units, *Schnell* divisions, consisting of about 10,000 men attached to the Seventeenth Army (e.g., The Brigade Pilsfousek). At the end of August 1941, the Slovak Army Group was reorganized into two infantry divisions, the 1st (Mobile) and 2nd Infantry Divisions (about 42,000 men). The *Schnell* divisions were active in the Zhytomyr region, in the battle for Kiev around the Dnieper, near Rostov, Melitopol, and in coastal patrols in the Crimea. The 2nd Slovak (Security) Infantry Division (about 6,000 to 8,000 men, 101st and 102nd Regiments) carried out policing and combat duties against alleged saboteurs, partisans, and other security threats behind the lines, especially concentrating their activity in the northern half of the Zhytomyr region after October 1941. It is not clear if they were involved in anti-Jewish massacres, but they were involved in security raids of villages around Choiniki and Ovruch.⁵³ Research on this has been hampered by the loss of the war diaries of the German liaison officer attached to the Slovakian units.⁵⁴ Besides the broken chronological record, the Slovak unit histories are tricky to follow, as they underwent several transformations including assignments that combined regular combat and special security duties.⁵⁵

Among the scant evidence on Slovakian participation in the massacres is the diary of an SS officer, Felix Landau. While leading a special *Einsatzkommando* in the summer of 1941, Landau wrote that near Drohobych on July 2, 1941, he and his comrades shot Jewish laborers and prisoners. He continued: “In this instance the Slovaks dug the graves and [afterward] immediately covered them.”⁵⁶ Another incident has recently come to light from the records of the Security Services Archive in Prague. On October 13, 1941, in Miropol (about forty kilometers southwest of Zhytomyr), ninety-four Jews (forty-nine of them children) were shot in the local park. A Slovak, Škrovina Ľubomir, testified in 1958 that he was in the area assigned to guard bridges for the Wehrmacht. His Slovak commander, Hruska, ordered him and two other Slovak soldiers to attend the mass shooting. Ľubomir brought his camera. He testified that the two Ukrainian militia who shot the Jews were locals, because they knew the victims. The three commanders in the photo were attached to Order Police Battalion 303 (see figs. 7.2 and 7.3).⁵⁷

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Figures 7.2. German Order Police commanders and Ukrainian policemen shoot a Jewish woman and child at close range in the public park in Miropol while a member of the Slovakian Army photographs the murders, October 1941. Courtesy of Security Services Archive, Prague, Czech Republic (H-770-3.0020).



Figure 7.3. German Order Police commanders and Ukrainian policemen shoot a Jewish woman. The Slovakian photographer was questioned after the war in Prague, and the Ukrainian policemen were arrested by the KGB, tried, and convicted in 1987. The identities and fates of the German Order Policemen are unknown. Courtesy of Security Services Archive, Prague, Czech Republic (H-770-3.0020).

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Figure 7.4. Occupied Ukraine, September 1942. Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower, eds, *The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, and Memorialization*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009, 45. Courtesy of Indiana University Press.

About this time in early November 1941, President Jozef Tiso traveled through Ukraine and stopped in Zhytomyr, which was a Slovak garrison town. According to historian James Mace, who researched Tiso's postwar testimony, during Tiso's tour in Ukraine he learned from the chief of the Slovak military, General Ferdinand Catlos, about the mass shootings of Jews and that conflicts had emerged between local Slovak and German military. As Tiso explained:

German civilian commissars wanted to order our soldiers on what they should do in the occupied territory and how they should behave towards civilians. They wanted to use [our troops] for . . . purposes that our soldiers did not consider reconcilable with the laws of war. . . . I then talked about this with Ludin [the German Ambassador in Slovakia] and requested him to announce to Berlin that our soldiers will not accept such instructions from civilian commissars.⁵⁸

Once German military and SS-police started to systematically kill all Jews in Ukraine as of August 1941, the enormous task required the acquiescence and compliance, if not direct involvement, of the local population and occupation forces. Tiso claimed that his men resisted participation because they did not want to take orders from German civilian leaders. It is not clear if the conflict was purely about jurisdictional matters, if this issue was used to spare Slovaks the dirty work of the genocide, or if regional Slovak military leaders were voicing their opposition to the Holocaust on moral grounds. In fact, according to Mace, some of the first reports of the atrocities to reach the Vatican came from Slovak field curates in October 1941.

Tiso's postwar testimony is problematic. Though it reveals his presence in Ukraine and perhaps a conflict among his forces there, it perhaps overstates the "misunderstanding" between Germans and Slovaks; Tiso sought to minimize his close collaboration with Nazi leaders regarding the Jews, a collaboration that is documented. In September 1941, Tiso's government issued a series of anti-Jewish laws along the German model. On October 20, 1941, just prior to his tour of Ukraine, Tiso had tea with Himmler and they discussed deportations of Jews to the east.⁵⁹ The first Jews deported to Auschwitz were Slovak Jewesses, in March 1942. Apparently Tiso was so anxious to rid his country of Jews that he paid Hitler five hundred reichsmarks for each deported Jew.

Axis Occupation Forces and Local Collaborators: Pogroms

Pogroms became a common feature of the first days and months of the Axis "liberation" of the Soviet Union. The role of the Germans and other

Axis forces (Hungarians, Slovaks, Romanians) in inciting the violence varied from place to place. However, western Ukraine saw some of the worst cases, not only in the region's capital of Lviv, but also across the villages and towns extending eastward and southward. What details about and explanations for this violence have emerged in recent research? Did certain situational factors or an interethnic dynamic cause or aggravate tensions that led to massacres? Once the Red Army had left, did local populations attack Jews before the Germans had arrived? What role did the Axis troops, Romanian, Hungarian, and Slovakian, play?

In eastern Galicia, historian Dieter Pohl estimates that as many as twelve thousand Jews died in about one hundred pogroms, the largest occurring in the city of Lviv, where approximately four thousand Jews were brutally murdered between June 30 and July 25, 1941. As was the case in nearby Stanyslaviv, Zolochiv, Drohobych, Buchach, and Ternopil, the Jews in Lviv were blamed for the mass murder of political prisoners and others whose mutilated remains were found in NKVD jails. The pattern of events during World War II is clear. The Soviets carried out a policy of mass murder of Ukrainian prisoners during the retreat, and the Germans and their Ukrainian allies exploited this policy to organize anti-Semitic retaliation campaigns. The fact that Jews, Russians, and Poles were also victims of NKVD atrocities in Galicia and Volhynia was conveniently suppressed. Typically, Jewish men were forced to exhume bodies of dead prisoners; in some cases they had to wash the corpses and dig the graves to prepare for a religious burial. While the Jews carried out these gruesome tasks, the local population was allowed to vent their rage against them; they beat the Jews at random with clubs, rods, and other blunt instruments.⁶⁰

Ukrainian nationalists from the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), both those supporting Stepan Bandera (OUN-B) and those supporting Andrij Melnyk (OUN-M), were useful, expedient local collaborators for securing the territory in these first chaotic months. German military intelligence and field offices relied on Ukrainian nationalist activists (*pokhidny hrupy*) who had joined them in the invasion, as well as local Ukrainians who stepped forward to join the local administration as militia forces, leaders in self-help, and other local governing committees. These Ukrainian officials and militia members became involved in anti-Bolshevik, anti-Jewish security measures. Their work was incited by the collaboration of senior Ukrainian and German officials in the Wehrmacht, Abwehr, and SD who supported the secret training and deployment of Ukrainian legions, *Nachtigal*, and *Roland*. In fact, among the first units to arrive in Lviv on June 30, 1941, was the German Brandenburg Division led by the *Nachtigal* Battalion. Their arrival was followed

by a Ukrainian (OUN) proclamation of statehood, which was abruptly suppressed by the Germans, and the first in a series of pogroms in Lviv, among the most well known in the history of the Holocaust.⁶¹

Further east in the Podolian towns of Bar and Shpykiv, the Ukrainian militiamen attached to OUN-B, who wore the nationalist symbol of the trident on their sleeves, issued the first security directive to the locals, Order No. 1: all Jews over seven years of age must wear the white star.⁶² The *Polissian Sich*, supporting the nationalist faction under Taras Bulba-Borovets, was active until November 1941 in the cleansing of the Pripet marshlands. According to Karel Berkhoff's research, one fifteen-year-old member of the Sich recalled that "we did everything they [the Germans] asked. I went everywhere, rode everywhere, fought and shot Jews who had treated me badly." The Sich had its own newspaper, in which it announced at the end of 1941 that "now the parasitical Jewish nation had been destroyed."⁶³ Jared McBride also documented Sich pogroms north of Zhytomyr at Olev'sk. In this case, the robbing, torture, and killing of Jews was done with no German involvement.⁶⁴ Historian Franziska Bruder uncovered a diary of an OUN-B member of the *Nachtigal* Battalion. The diarist described the battalion's actions during its march in mid-July 1941 from Lviv to Vinnytsia: "During our march, we saw with our own eyes the victims of the Jewish-Bolshevik terror, which strengthened our hatred of the Jews, and so after that we shot all the Jews we encountered in two villages."⁶⁵ In these cases, Ukrainian paramilitary and militia forces shot Jews independently of the Germans because they wanted to and apparently because they could.

In terms of the links between local collaborators and official Axis policy toward Jews, events in Odessa were more revealing than those in Kiev. In October 1941 an estimated thirty-four to thirty-five thousand Jews were shot or burned alive in Odessa. Such a high death toll clearly shows the result of a highly organized series of massacres. In fact the killings were ordered by Marshal Ion Antonescu himself, who demanded (in Order No. 302.26) "immediate retaliatory action, including the liquidation of eighteen thousand Jews in the ghettos and the hanging in the town squares of at least one hundred Jews for every regimental sector."⁶⁶ This order was issued after an explosion in Romanian military headquarters that killed dozens of occupation officials including the commanding officer. Romanian methods of murder included throwing grenades at and shooting Jews who had been crammed by the thousands into wooden buildings. In an act reminiscent of the burning of Strasbourg's Jews in the fifteenth century, Romanians forced Jews into the harbor square and set them on fire. Except that in this twentieth-century version, the Romanians did not allow Jews

to save themselves through conversion (baptism). Thus the barbarism of the religious wars was outdone by these modern campaigns of colonization and national purification. Still they shared demotic elements that rippled across the borderlands and reappeared throughout the war. Anti-Jewish massacres in places such as Bogdanivka and Domanivka continued into 1942 and were caused in part by expulsions of Jews over the Bug River. This time the Germans were forcing Jews from their occupation area into the Romanian zone. Many Jewish refugees hoped that conditions on the Romanian side might be better and fled across the German-Romanian border, but in 1941 those refugees did not fare much better.⁶⁷

German officials in Ukraine rationalized that they were more civilized than the Romanians in their approach to the Final Solution.⁶⁸ For example, in the activity report of the Sipo and SD in the USSR (covering the period July 29 to August 14, 1941), *Einsatzgruppe C* described the situation in Romanian territory, in Bessarabia, as “catastrophic,” mainly owing to the rampant plundering by Romanian troops along with gunfights and mass raping. A German member of the Security Police intervened in Borowka, where “marauding” Romanian soldiers had settled in with the Jews and from there operated their “plundering business.” The German official apprehended the Romanian soldiers and handed them over to officers in the Romanian headquarters.⁶⁹ The atrocities at Bogdanivka during Christmas 1941 were among the bloodiest in the history of the Holocaust; at least forty-eight thousand died in mass shootings, an orgy of violence perpetrated by Romanian soldiers and Ukrainian and ethnic German militia, among others. These were not spontaneous acts; they were ordered by Marshal Antonescu.⁷⁰ On the other hand, as Vladimir Solonari discerned in his research, there was an important difference between the Romanian occupation administration and the German: “Returning Romanian officials [to Bukovina and Bessarabia] knew local realities incomparably better than newly arrived Germans [in Poland or Ukraine] did, and they could and did rely on a much broader societal support than Nazis ever enjoyed.”⁷¹

Both the Germans and Romanians had to rely on the local population because manpower was lacking to carry out all the tasks needed to fully exploit the Jewish population and commit the genocide. One of the challenges, as historians, is to determine on the ground where official orders ended and locally initiated violence started, with or without direct Nazi oversight. Yet Frank Golczewski finds that

even non-Ukrainian scholars have sometimes gone too far in minimizing the depth of anti-Jewish, anti-Communist, and anti-Russian sentiment in these regions. Raul Hilberg, for example, argues that “truly spontaneous pogroms, free from

Einsatzgruppen influence, did not take place,” and that “all pogroms were implemented within a short time after the arrival of the [German] killing units.” This, however, does not explain the pogroms that broke out in places such as Stanyslaviv (today, Ivano-Frankivs’k), Kolomyia, Horodenka, and Obertyn, towns that were in the Hungarian zone of operations and occupation in Galicia.⁷²

Actually, the interethnic dynamic in the history of the pogroms is far from clear. There are conflicting reports about the Hungarian role in Kolomyia, Horodenka, and Stanyslaviv. Historian Andrzej Zbikowski found that Ukrainians there expressed their “delight at their sudden rescue from Soviet oppression” by carrying out a two-day pogrom in the town as soon as the Soviets had left. In his assessment, only the firm attitude of the commander of the Hungarian troops that seized the town brought events under control. In his essay, “Local Anti-Jewish Pogroms in the Occupied Territories of Eastern Poland, June–July 1941,” Zbikowski quotes testimonies to support his argument of Hungarian moderation, but does not footnote them. Most likely his conclusions are drawn from survivor testimonies held at the Jewish Historical Institute at Warsaw, which is referenced as a source elsewhere in this essay.⁷³ And in the case of Zhytomyr, Hilberg cites another incident documented in an *Ereignismeldung* from *Einsatzgruppe C*, in which the Hungarian military headquarters stopped the local auxiliary police from launching a pogrom. Historian Yitzhak Arad also concludes (based on Jewish survivor testimony) that Hungarian forces stopped pogroms in Kolomyia, Kosov, Obertyn, and Bolekhov because they feared Ukrainian reprisals against Hungarians in Transcarpathia, and sought “conditions of relative calm.”⁷⁴ Yet *Einsatzgruppe C* also reported on another incident in western Ukraine: apparently, rumor had it that Hungarian soldiers encouraged Ukrainians to plunder, then filmed them as marauders so that the Hungarians could cover up their own crimes. In a deliberate act meant to foment local interethnic tensions, Hungarians employed Polish officers to carry out anti-Ukrainian measures.⁷⁵ The lines here between reality and rumor are blurry, but at the very least one can see from the mixed reports that interethnic rivalries and tensions were a key feature of the escalating measures against the Jews.

Conclusion

This essay set out to establish the role of Axis collaboration in Operation Barbarossa as a contributing factor to the Holocaust in Ukraine. The historiography on the crimes of German Wehrmacht soldiers has recently shown that the military was heavily involved in the anti-Jewish violence leading to

genocide. The myth of the clean Wehrmacht has been debunked. At the same time the role of Germany's allies in the war of extermination has not been fully elucidated. In fact, Antonescu did not begrudgingly go along with or follow Hitler's radical course in 1941 out of pressure. He seems to have been included in the prewar conspiracy, and once the war was underway he implemented his own purification programs, deportations from northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, established ghettos in Transnistria, ordered death marches from Odessa, and sponsored large massacres in the area of Bogdanivka. Hitler did correctly predict that Hungary would be the last to give up its Jews. However, the country was more than willing to deport its alien Jews in the summer of 1941; as one leading Hungarian official put it, "the largest number possible and as fast as possible."⁷⁶ Hungarian military units participated in mass murder in Kamianets-Podilskyi and in smaller massacres in eastern Galicia. Hungarian formations were also active in antipartisan warfare and routinely killed Jewish civilians; indeed many German officials reported that the Hungarians were excessively cruel. The use of Jewish labor battalions by the Hungarian army is also well documented; tens of thousands perished in these units across Ukraine (and Yugoslavia). Though the paper trail for the Slovak Security Division operating north of Zhytomyr is thin, the history of antipartisan warfare in this area is similar to the catalog of atrocities and ethnic cleansing that occurred around Bryansk. The likelihood that Slovak units participated in anti-Jewish massacres is rather high.

Why did these Axis forces perpetrate crimes against Jews and other so-called enemies or inferiors? In fact, according to Ungváry's calculations, the Hungarian rate of murdering civilians condemned as partisans was comparable to that of the more notorious Waffen-SS Brigades. Ungváry explains that from the start of the campaign, Hungarians on the Eastern Front felt they were taking part in a war that was not their war. The Hungarian occupation forces were a diplomatic maneuver, used to placate German demands for armed assistance. They did not have a big stake in the eastern territory; at least Hitler did not offer it. Thus, as an outsider or guest in the wild east of Ukraine, there was no need to fuss about the consequences of their criminal actions against the local population. With the claim of fighting partisans, like any other good soldier facing an enemy, Jewish civilians were killed with a sense of impunity.

What about the cases in which Hungarian intervention saved lives, such as in the halting of pogroms in some Galician villages or in Zhytomyr? This reveals just how much leeway there was in the field; local commanders could intervene, slow the course of the genocide, and without any recourse from above. In these specific cases, the Hungarian

commanders could not fully control events over time in the localities. Their stations were temporary, as the front moved, and eventually their independent action was limited by German field commanders, to whom they reported. But the documented variation in Hungarian collaboration in Ukraine, from full participation (for example in Haisyn/Gajsin) to obstructionism, may also reflect back on Ungváry's observation about not being fully invested in the region, but rather just acting as mercenaries in the fight against bolshevism intended to secure Hungary's own border to the west. Horthy and his military leaders apparently neither pressured their units nor incited them to commit genocide in a manner that has turned up in the German and Romanian documentation.

Does the radicalization thesis commonly applied to the history of the Nazi origins of a genocidal Final Solution apply to the Axis powers as a whole? In the constellation of forces that conquered and occupied Ukraine in the summer and fall of 1941, can one identify a coordinated effort to annihilate Jewry, or an escalating process whereby the most extreme ideas and practices of anti-Semitism were uniformly pursued to advance some political, territorial, or social aim? By the time of the invasion in June 1941, each Axis country had introduced its own anti-Jewish laws, following the German model. But as far as we know, these countries did not have the history of anti-Jewish violence comparable to that in Nazi Germany between 1938 and 1941. A further radicalization of anti-Jewish practices was more than likely in the Nazi case, but not so predictable among Germany's allies. The post-1941 history of Romanian, Hungarian, and Slovak treatment of Jews reveals an important unevenness and vacillation. Over time, German leaders had to place increasing pressure on their allies to turn over all of their Jews, and in the cases of Hungary and Slovakia, German occupation of the countries was necessary. Yet when it concerned foreign, "bolshevized" Jews in conquered areas such as Ukraine, such pressure was not necessary in 1941 and 1942.

In the history of genocide perpetration it is important to distinguish between the most radical idea of mass murder and the realization of this intent across time and space. Axis powers found common ground in the notions that Europe had to be liberated from Judeo-bolshevism and that the spread of communism was a dire threat to Western civilization and Christianity. Nazi Germany was the primary aggressor; it took on the role of the chief crusader, conqueror, and "liberator." Central to this mission was the removal of Jewish influence in Europe; thus Hitler and his cohorts conceived of their anti-Semitic measures as a European solution to the Jewish Question not limited to the German Reich. The implementation of anti-Jewish measures was a matter of diplomacy, intergovernmental

policy making, and decisions that involved myriad agencies and collaborators. This history did not occur in a straight line of radicalization and mutual, unconditional support. The Jews became a pawn in traditional Realpolitik terms, but within an ideological context of extremes, as a factor in negotiations over territory, population exchanges, war matériel, troops, and property, all subject to the dynamic, cataclysmic Nazi-Soviet struggle that engulfed eastern Europe. As the war dragged on, and the victory of fascism seemed less certain, diplomacy and collaboration regarding anti-Jewish measures entered another phase. Hitler's allies were more concerned about securing their place in a postwar world dominated by the victors—Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt. In the case of Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania there is evidence of de-escalation occurring at the diplomatic level, and escalation or a spiralling of mass violence at a popular level. But, as this essay stresses, at a critical time of imperial conquest, Hitler's allies contributed to the onset of the genocide in the summer of 1941 by folding their own anti-Semitic agenda into the Nazi one and by initiating their own violent measures. In the Romanian case, Antonescu and his colleagues organized their own anti-Jewish deportations and massacres in southern Ukraine and its borderlands. In the Slovak case, Tiso's military forces carried out security measures that included the organization of mass shootings in the rear areas of west-central Ukraine. In the Hungarian case, government leaders deliberately pushed Jewish refugees and forced laborers into the massacre zones, Hungarian military units participated directly in the mass shooting sprees at Kamianets-Podilskyi, and in some parts of western Ukraine they initiated pogroms.

The diplomacy of the Jewish Question among Axis powers was an integral feature of Operation Barbarossa that extended to events in the field. By and large, the anti-Semitic actions of local Ukrainian and *Volksdeutsche* pogromists and nationalists were not contained or supported by the occupying powers and authorities, be they Hungarian, German, Romanian, or Slovak. German and Romanian fantasies of imperial realms cleared of Jews were nearly realized. As this became apparent during the military invasion in the summer of 1941, Hitler and Antonescu were increasingly emboldened, opting for ever more radical measures and becoming more explicit about their aims in the autumn of 1941. Such cataclysmic events forever changed the life of one Polish-Jewish lawyer, Raphael Lemkin, who was fleeing the advance of Axis military forces in the summer of 1941. Witnessing the devastation in Nazi-occupied Europe, having lost his own family in the Holocaust, and barely escaping the *Vernichtungskrieg* via Sweden to the United States, he wrote an important study that contributed to the drafting of the United Nations

Convention on Genocide. In *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, he argued for a new concept of war and occupation:

In this respect genocide is a new technique of occupation aimed at winning the peace even though the war itself is lost. For this purpose the occupant has elaborated a system designed to destroy nations according to a previously prepared plan. Even before the war Hitler envisaged genocide as a means of changing the biological interrelations in Europe in favor of Germany. Hitler's conception of genocide is based not upon cultural but [upon] biological patterns.⁷⁷

Lemkin realized in 1944 that the Holocaust was more than a war crime or atrocities committed under the cover of war. He argued that genocide was a form of war behind the lines, in the conquered, occupied areas. It was a continuation of the war by other means, and though the military campaign of imperial conquest made it possible, the two could lead to different outcomes. The battle for Moscow was a major defeat for the Axis military, yet in the rear areas of occupation another genocidal war against the "nations" or peoples, above all against the Jews, was advancing with success. This was the peace that Hitler and his non-German allies hoped to achieve in their war against the Soviet Union.

Notes

1. Richard Breitman, *Official Secrets: What the Nazis Planned, What the British and Americans Knew* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1988).

2. Report covering German SS-police actions of August 15–31, Records of the Code and Cypher School, HW 16, Piece 6, September 12, 1941, 1941, British National Archives, Kew, England. Thanks to Eric Steinhart for supplying me with a copy of this document.

3. Establishing the causal links between the Nazi-Soviet war and the Holocaust has not been without controversy, and has been a major subject of research, much of which was ignited by the *Historikerstreit*, and a controversial book by Arno Mayer. Mayer argued that Hitler's defeatist attitude in December 1941 incited his decision for a final solution and that Nazi anti-Bolshevism was a more significant ideological force than anti-Semitism. Some of his points have been elaborated on by others, but Mayer's overall thesis has not held up against the evidence of an earlier decision to annihilate Jews in the Soviet Union and Europe. See Peter Baldwin's critique in *Reworking the Past: Hitler, the Holocaust, and the Historians' Debate* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1990); and Arno Mayer, *Why Did the Heavens Not Darken?* (New York: Pantheon, 1988). More recently, Christopher Browning has argued that "euphoria of victory," not frustration or fear of defeat, accounts for the origins of the

genocide. See Christopher Browning, with contributions by Jürgen Matthäus, *The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939–March 1942* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004).

4. Gerhard Weinberg, *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War Two* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 264.

5. Dieter Pohl, *Die Herrschaft der Wehrmacht: Deutsche Militärbesatzung und einheimische Bevölkerung in der Sowjetunion, 1941–1944* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008), 80.

6. I am aware of only a few scholars who can deal with most of these languages at once. See the work of Holly Case, *Between States: The Transylvanian Question and the European Idea During World War II* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009).

7. Horst Boog, Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffmann, Ernst Klink, Rolf-Dieter Müller, and Gerd R. Ueberschär, *Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion*, vol. 4 of *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1983). See the war diary of the high command of the armed forces, entry of March 3, 1941, for example. In Hitler's reworked version of the initial draft of the Barbarossa Directive, and its circulated guidelines, Hitler clarified that "dieser kommende Feldzug ist mehr als nur ein Kampf der Waffen; er führt auch zur Auseinandersetzung zweier Weltanschauungen. Um diesen Krieg zu beenden, genügt es bei der Weite des Raumes nicht, die feindliche Wehrmacht zu schlagen." Hitler stressed the need to crush a Judeo-Bolshevik intelligentsia, condemned as oppressors of the people, and to eliminate the formerly bourgeois aristocratic classes; he expressed the importance of the occupation regimes behind the battlefield, and that the political aims of the campaign in the rear areas were very difficult undertakings, which the army could not be expected to implement. According to Hitler's guidelines, specific directives were revised concerning the role of the *Reichsführer-SS* and the nonapplication of military courts when it came to rendering harmless Bolshevik big wigs and commissars. March 3, 1941, entry in Percy Ernst Schramm, ed., *Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtführungsstab) 1940–1945*, vol. 1, *1. August 1940–31. Dezember 1941*, ed. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (Bonn 1965; repr., Munich: Bernard & Graefe, 1982), 341 (hereafter OKW war diary). A few weeks later, on March 30, 1941, Hitler would speak more explicitly with his generals about Operation Barbarossa as a "war of extermination." See Geoffrey P. Megargee, *War of Annihilation: Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front, 1941* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 33–41. In addition to military and security operations, genocidal hunger plans were also part of pre-Barbarossa discussions and guidelines. See Alex J. Kay, *Exploitation, Resettlement, Mass Murder: Political and Economic Planning for German Occupation Policy in the Soviet Union, 1940–1941* (New York: Berghahn, 2006).

8. OKW war diary, 1:299 (February 3, 1941). On the prominence of Romania as Hitler's ally in the Soviet Union in the southern sector, see Jürgen Förster, "Die Gewinnung von Verbündeten in Südosteuropa," in Boog et al., *Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion*, 327–64.

9. OKW war diary, 1:361 (March 18, 1941).

10. Army Group South consisted of the Sixth, Seventeenth, and Eleventh Armies as well as Panzer Group 1. See Boog et al., *Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion*.

11. Pohl, *Herrschaft*, 81. Förster, "Gewinnung," 341.

12. Jean Ancel, "The German-Romanian Relationship and the Final Solution," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 19, no. 2 (2005): 252. Hitler was also candid with the Croatian minister of war, Slavko Kvaternick, telling him on July 21, 1941, that no Jews would be allowed to remain in Europe. See Gerhard Weinberg, "Germany's War for World Conquest and the Extermination of the Jews," Meyerhoff Lecture, June 11, 1995 (Washington, DC: US Holocaust Memorial Museum, 1995). Besides Kvaternick, Hitler spoke about the fate of the Jews with the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. Weinberg elaborated on this recently in his speech "Another Look at Hitler and the Beginning of the Holocaust," at the conference Lessons and Legacies, Northwestern University, November 3, 2009.

13. Pohl, *Herrschaft*, 81.

14. *Ibid.*

15. Ancel, "The German-Romanian Relationship," 257. Romanian and German intellectuals shared research and ideas about the science of population transfers. This scientific form of ethnic cleansing (with and without massacres) was a common approach to stabilizing national boundaries (or expanding imperial ones) in the interwar and immediate postwar period across Europe. On the Romanian approach during World War II, see Viorel Achim, "Romanian-German Collaboration in Ethnopolitics: The Case of Sabin Manuilă," in *German Scholars and Ethnic Cleansing, 1919–1945*, ed. Ingo Haar and Michael Fahlbusch (New York: Berghahn, 2005), 139–54.

16. OKW war diary, 1:276 (January 22, 1941).

17. OKW war diary, 1:402 (June 9, 1941).

18. Ancel, "The German-Romanian Relationship," 253; Ian Kershaw, *Hitler, 1936–1945: Nemesis* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000), 383–84. It is possible that mass deportation and not extermination of Jews was discussed. See Peter Longerich, *Politik der Vernichtung: Eine Gesamtdarstellung der nationalsozialistischen Judenverfolgung* (Munich: Piper, 1998), 292. Alternative structuralist interpretations stress that there was no preinvasion decision to kill all Soviet Jews. See Ralf Ogorreck, *Die Einsatzgruppen und die "Genesis der Endlösung"* (Berlin: Metropol, 1996).

19. Dennis Deletant, "Transnistria and the Romanian Solution to the 'Jewish Problem,'" in *The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization*, ed. Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 159.

20. The areas around Yampil' (Yampol) and Mohyliv Podilsky (Mogilev Podolsk) were most effected. See Andrej Angrick, "The Escalation of German-Rumanian Anti-Jewish Policy after the Attack on the Soviet Union, June 22, 1941," *Yad Vashem Studies* 16 (1996): 203–38.

21. Peter Longerich, *Holocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of Jews* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 176.

22. Some of the worst documented massacres committed by Romanian forces (with assistance from Ukrainian and ethnic German helpers), which rank among the largest in the entire history of the Holocaust, occurred at the end of December in Bogdanivka, where some 48,000 Jews were killed. The recent commission concluded that "between 280,000 and 380,000 Romanian and Ukrainian Jews were murdered or died during the Holocaust in Romania and the territories under its control. . . . Between 45,000 and 60,000 Jews were killed in Bessarabia and Bukovina by Romanian and German troops in 1941. Between 105,000 and 120,000 deported Romanian Jews died as a result of the expulsions to Transnistria. In Transnistria between 115,000 and 180,000 indigenous Jews were killed, especially in Odessa and the counties of Golta and Berezovka. At least 15,000 Jews from the Regat (Old Kingdom) were murdered in the Iasi pogrom and as a result of other anti-Jewish measures. Approximately 132,000 Jews were deported to Auschwitz in May–June 1944 from Hungarian-ruled Northern Transylvania." See the "Final Report of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania: Presented to Romanian President Ion Iliescu," November 11, 2004, Bucharest, Romania. Executive Summary in English available on line at: http://www.ushmm.org/research/center/presentations/features/details/2005-03-10/pdf/english/executive_summary.pdf.

23. Deletant, "Transnistria," 160.

24. OKW war diary, 2:421 (June 27, 1941). Additional notation on the wish to separate the Romanian and Hungarian troops during combat on the Ostrog-Rowno line, July 5, 1941. In Bukovina, the German commanders of Army Group South drew the lines of administrative rule between the Romanian and Hungarian forces according to old Romanian borders (July 15, 1941, 432).

25. Croatia will not be dealt with here as a major player in the Nazi-led conquest and occupation of Ukraine, since the contingent of Croatian forces in Operation Barbarossa was small; only one regiment of volunteers was active on the Eastern Front as of the end of August 1941.

26. Holly Case, "Between Hungary and Romania: The Diplomacy of Revision and the Jews of Cluj-Kolozsvár, 1940–1944," paper presented at Lessons and Legacies Conference, Brown University, November 4–7, 2004. See also Holly Case, "Navigating Identities: The Jews of Kolozsvár (Cluj) and the Hungarian Administration, 1940–1944," in *Osteuropa vom Weltkrieg zur Wende*, ed. Wolfgang Mueller and Michael Portmann (Vienna: Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007), 39–53.

27. Joseph Rothschild, *East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), 197. In addition to the more common *numerus clausus*, Hungary introduced anti-Semitic legislation in 1938 with Law 15, and the restrictive Act 4 in 1939. Hungarian government spokesmen argued that the legislation, the first of its kind in East Central Europe, set an example of a just and fair approach in contrast to the terror violence of Nazi Germany and therefore should be reassuring to Jews. Extra Mendelsohn, *The Jews of East Central Europe Between the World Wars* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 116. Margit Szöllösi-Janze, *Die Pfeilkreuzlerbewegung in Ungarn: Historischer Kontext, Entwicklung, und Herrschaft* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1989).

28. Weinberg, "Another Look at Hitler," 3.

29. See Ernst Klink, "Die militärische Konzeption des Krieges gegen die Sowjetunion," in Boog et al., *Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion*, 237, 243. See also Förster, "Gewinnung," 355–56. I am grateful to David Stahel for sharing these references with me.

30. Jürgen Förster, "Der Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion bis zur Jahreswende, 1941/42: Die Entscheidungen der 'Dreierpaktstaaten,'" in Boog et al., *Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion*, 891. Thanks to the editors for this distinction and source.

31. On the burning of Hungarian Jewish laborers in the barn at Kupyshche, see RKU Rivne to Omi Berlin, May 21, 1943, 3676-4-480, Central State Archive, Kiev; microfilm at United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC (hereafter USHMM), RG 31.002M, reel 13. The German report states 300 Jews, but the Hungarian account by Minister of Defense Nagy states 800 Jews. See Randolph Braham, *The Hungarian Labor Service System, 1939–1945* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 39; and Randolph Braham, *The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 45. For an extremely interesting case of one Jewish laborer in the Hungarian units (in Yugoslavia), see Zsuzsanna Ozsváth, *In the Footsteps of Orpheus: The Life and Times of Miklós Radnóti* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000).

32. Braham, *Hungarian Labor System*; and Krisztián Ungváry, "Ungarische Besatzungskräfte in der Ukraine, 1941–1942," *Ungarn-Jahrbuch* 26 (2003): 125–63. See also Istvan Deak, "Endgame in Budapest," *Hungarian Quarterly* 46, no. 179 (2005), <http://www.hungarianquarterly.com/no179/2.shtml>, a lengthy review of Krisztián Ungváry's work, *The Siege of Budapest: 100 Days in World War II*, trans. Ladislaus Löb (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2005); and Ungváry, "Hungarian Occupation Forces in the Ukraine, 1941–1942: The Historiographical Context," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 20, no. 1 (March 2007): 81–120; on the partisan raids, 86. See also Truman O. Anderson, "A Hungarian Vernichtungskrieg? Hungarian Troops and the Soviet Partisan War in Ukraine, 1942," *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* 58, no. 2

(1999): 353; and a Ukrainian source: M. V. Stetiukha, ed., *Vinok Bezsmertia* (Kiev: Vyd-vo politychnoi lit-ry Ukraïny, 1988), 57–61.

33. In Ungváry, “Hungarian Occupation Forces in the Ukraine,” 96. Ungváry’s source is: Report by Lt. Col. Cruwell on his experiences, dated May 29, 1942, RH 23/176, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau (hereafter BA-MA). For a similar evaluation of Hungarian brutality in the rear areas, albeit from the following year, see Ben Shepherd, *War in the Wild East: The German Army and Soviet Partisans* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 173–74.

34. “Notes concerning the conference that has taken place at the OKH concerning the transfer of a part of the Ukraine to the civil administration,” August 27, 1941, International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Exhibit, RG 238, PS-197, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC (hereafter NARA).

35. Cited from Ungváry, “Hungarian Occupation Forces in the Ukraine,” 109. Ungváry’s source for this report is the BA-MA, file N 22/173.

36. Yitzhak Arad, *The Partisan: From the Valley of Death to Mount Zion* (New York: Holocaust Library, 1979), 115–72.

37. Cited in Ungváry, “Hungarian Occupation Forces in the Ukraine,” 109.

38. “Abschlussbericht,” Koziatyn case, 204a AR-Z 137/67, vol. 2, 225, Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, Ludwigsburg, Germany (hereafter BAL).

39. Magyar Köztársaság Belügyminisztériumának Irattára, Magyar Államrendőrség Budapesti Főkapitányának Politikai Rendészeti Osztálya. Kocsis Lajos ügye. Rendezés alatt. Former Archives of the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Hungarian Republic, now the recently [1996] established Historical Archives of Hungarian State Security Agencies (Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltára, ÁBTL). Records of the Hungarian state police, political administration department, Lajos Kocsis case. Ungváry offers no archive number, but gives a date of June 1946. This investigation was based on a series of ghetto liquidation photos taken at Gajsin (sixteen photos of three massacres). The current whereabouts of the photos is unknown. See Ungváry, “Hungarian Occupation Forces in the Ukraine,” 110. The West German account of events is summarized in Wendy Lower, *Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 142.

40. “Notes concerning the conference that has taken place at the OKH concerning the transfer of a part of the Ukraine to the civil administration.” August 27, 1941, Nuremberg Exhibit, RG 238, 197-PS, NARA. See also the related memo, including the High Command and the Foreign Office, stating that Jeckeln would deal with the problem: Kriegstagebuch von Roques, August 24–25, 1941, RG 242, T-501/R5/000773, NARA.

41. Randolph Braham, “Roundup and Massacre of Alien Jews,” in Braham, *Politics of Genocide*, 32–35.

42. Breitman, *Official Secrets*, 64.

43. Dieter Pohl, "The Murder of Ukraine's Jews," in Brandon, *Shoah in Ukraine*, 29.

44. *Ibid.*

45. Randolph Braham, "The Kamianets-Podilskiy and Delvidek Massacres: Prelude to the Holocaust in Hungary," *Yad Vashem Studies* 9 (1973): 141.

46. Pohl, "Murder of Ukraine's Jews," 31.

47. On a comparable Romanian example of diplomatic tensions surrounding the Jews, see Deletant, "Transnistria," 161–67.

48. Office of Reich Commissar Koch to General Commissars, December 22, 1941, fond 1151- opis 1- delo 37, Zhytomyr State Archives, Ukraine (hereafter ZSA).

49. The scant but important documentation on this survived in the Zhytomyr regional archives. See the report from von Wedelstaedt on the "Abschiebung von ungarischen Juden," December 22, 1941, and the report on "Einrichtung von Ghettos" and Jews from the *Altreich*, sent by the RKU Koch and HSSPF Prützmann, January 12, 1942, P1151-1-137, ZSA.

50. Ungváry, "Hungarian Occupation Forces in the Ukraine," 103.

51. *Ibid.*, 111–12, which cites a memo by Erich Kloetzel from November 23, 1943, in 78PA-AA, R101884, Foreign/counter-intelligence office, Lemberg *Abwehr* office, February 24, 1944, Political Archives of the German Foreign Office.

52. Pohl, *Herrschaft*, 82.

53. The Slovak Security Division completed a sweep in the area near Zhytomyr where German Security Division 213 was operating and supporting the First Armored Division. The Slovak Division was then assigned to the areas of Szepetowka, Polonne, and Starokonstantinow. In this same report there is mention of the building up and assignment of the Slovak Schnelle Brigade Pilsfousek. Records of the Commander of the Rear Occupied Area South, August 20, 1941, RG 242, T501- roll 5, frame 000970-971, NARA. See also *Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist and Fascist Europe, 1918–1948*, ed. Mark Cornwall and R. J. W. Evans (Oxford: British Academy, 2007); and Tatjana Tönsmeier, "Kollaboration als handlungsleitendes Motiv? Die slowakische Elite und das NS-Regime," in Christoph Dieckmann, Babette Quinkert, and Tatjana Tönsmeier, *Kooperation und Verbrechen: Formen der "Kollaboration" im östlichen Europa, 1939–1945*, vol. 19 of *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2003).

54. I am grateful to Ray Brandon for this information. (See Guide to the Captured German Records, Guide no. 76, issued by the NARA).

55. Mark Axworthy, *Axis Slovakia: Hitler's Slavic Wedge, 1938–1945* (New York: Europa, 2002).

56. Felix Landau was convicted in 1962. See the trial records: 162/3380, vol. 1, Sta Stuttgart, II 208 AR-Z 60a/1959, BAL.

57. I am grateful to Mr. Peter Rendek for sharing these photos with me and assisting with the translation of the Slovak testimony. Thanks to Alexander Kruglov for sharing documentation with me about the 1987 murder conviction and execution of Ukrainian policemen who shot Jews in Miropol in October 1941.

58. James Mace, "No Saint: Josef Tizo, 1887–1947" (PhD diss, Stanford University, June 2008), 430.

59. Peter Witte, Michael Wildt, Martina Voigt, Dieter Pohl, Peter Klein, Christian Gerlach, Christoph Dieckmann, and Andrej Angrick, eds., *Der Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers, 1941/42* (Hamburg: Christians, 1999), 241.

60. Material in this section is reprinted with the permission of the *Journal of Genocide Research*. See Wendy Lower, "Pogroms, Mob Violence and Genocide in Western Ukraine, summer 1941: Varied Histories, Explanations and Comparisons," *Journal of Genocide Research* 13 (2011): 217–46.

61. Frank Golczewski, "Shades of Grey," in Brandon, *Shoah in Ukraine*, 114–55.

62. Lower, *Nazi Empire-Building*, 91.

63. Karel Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine Under Nazi Rule* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 64.

64. Franziska Bruder, "*Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen oder sterben!*" *Die Organisation Ukrainischer Nationalisten (OUN), 1929–1948* (Berlin: Metropol, 2007). The Bulba-Borovets faction looked to the legacy of the nationalist movement in eastern Ukraine, specifically the Ukrainian People's Republic formed in November 1917, but defeated by the Bolsheviks. In the summer and fall of 1941 Borovets and his recruits (in the Polis'ka Sich) operated independently of the OUN, and were based mainly in the border region of Ukraine and Belarus. On Olevs'k, see the paper presented by Jared McBride, "Eyewitness to an Occupation: The Holocaust in Olevs'k, Zhytomyr, Ukraine," at "The Holocaust in Ukraine: New Resources and Perspectives," Mémorial de la SHOAH, Paris, October 1–2, 2007.

65. Bruder, "*Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen oder sterben!*," 150.

66. "Final Report of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania," chap. 5, p 54, http://www.ushmm.org/research/center/presentations/features/details/2005-03-10/pdf/english/chapter_05.pdf.

67. On the connection between expulsions and typhus, see Mark Levene, "The Experience of Armenian and Romanian Genocide, 1915–1916 and 1941–1942," in *Der Völkermord an den Armeniern und die Shoah*, ed. Hans-Lukas Kieser and Dominik Schaller (Zurich: Chronos, 2002), 452–54.

68. The modern versus premodern aspects of the Holocaust and their comparability to other cases of mass violence have been explored by Mark Mazower in his comparative analysis "Violence and the State in the Twentieth Century," *American Historical Review* 107, no. 4 (2002): 1158–78.

69. Similar scenarios occurred in Sokol and Jelenowka, according to this report. Tätigkeits- und Lagebericht Nr. 2 der Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in der UdSSR, Berichtszeit v 29.7.–14.8.1941, reprinted in *Die Einsatzgruppen in der besetzten Sowjetunion 1941/42: Die Tätigkeits- und Lageberichte des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD*, ed. Peter Klein (Berlin: Edition Hentrich, 1997), 174–75.

70. These events are recounted in Radu Ioanid, *The Holocaust in Romania: The Destruction of Jews and Gypsies under the Antonescu Regime, 1940–1944* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000); and Dalia Ofer, “Life in the Ghettos of Transnistria,” *Yad Vashem Studies* 25 (1996): 228–74. Also see the “Final Report of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania,” <http://www.ushmm.org/research/center/presentations/features/details/2005-03-10/>.

71. On the local mass violence in Bukovina, see Vladimir Solonari’s research on the Romanian, Ukrainian, Jewish, and German dynamic, and the importance of the local power hierarchies, in “Patterns of Violence: The Local Population and the Mass Murder of Jews in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, July–August 1941,” *Kritika* 8, no. 4 (2007): 749–87; and *Purifying the Nation: Population Exchange and Ethnic Cleansing in Nazi-Allied Romania* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009). See also Levene, “Experience of Armenian and Romanian Genocide,” 423–62.

72. Frank Golczewski’s critique of Ukrainian historians is presented in “Shades of Grey,” in Brandon, *Shoah in Ukraine*, 132. Raul Hilberg’s statement is from *The Destruction of the European Jews* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985), 1:312.

73. Andrzej Zbikowski, “Local Anti-Jewish Pogroms in the Occupied Territories of Eastern Poland, June–July 1941,” in *The Holocaust in the Soviet Union: Studies and Sources on the Destruction of the Jews in the Nazi-Occupied Territories of the USSR, 1941–1945*, ed. Lucjan Dobroszycki and Jeffrey S. Gurock (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), 173–81.

74. Hilberg, *Destruction of the European Jews*, 1:304; Yitzhak Arad, *The Holocaust in the Soviet Union* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 91.

75. See “Ereignismeldung UdSSR Nr. 30,” July 22, 1941, R 58/214, Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde.

76. Apparently the words of Sándor Siménvalfy, the Hungarian chief of the KEOKH office that managed aliens, as quoted in Braham, *Politics of Genocide*, 33.

77. Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944), 81.