

## 6

**History as a Battleground****Russian-Ukrainian Relations and Historical  
Consciousness in Contemporary Ukraine**

---

*Zenon E. Kohut*

With headlines focusing on tensions over the future of the Commonwealth of Independent States, economic integration, nuclear disarmament, the fate of the Black Sea fleet, and border disputes, it may seem strange to address such a seemingly esoteric problem in Ukrainian-Russian relations as the perception of history. Yet it is my contention that the current disputes are symptomatic of a much more fundamental set of problems. Foremost among them is the question of “deimperialization”—the adjustment of structures and intellectual concepts to the dissolution of an empire. In the case of Russian-Ukrainian relations the problem is even deeper than what Ukraine’s president Leonid Kravchuk has labeled “Russia’s imperial disease” or “imperial thinking.” After all, even some staunch Russian nationalists, for example, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, are willing to let go of most of the former Soviet Union for a reconstituted Russia. Their “Russia,” however, also includes Ukraine.<sup>1</sup> Ukrainian independence, therefore, raises not only the problem of deconstructing an empire but also such fundamental questions as, What is Russia? What is Ukraine? And what is the historical relationship between them? It raises the question of the shaping and reshaping of identities, and the perception of history has been and continues to be a chief battleground in the struggle over identity.

For most of modern history, the Russian point of view had been that

Ukraine is a part of Russia, historically, linguistically, culturally, and even spiritually. While the origins of this view may be traced to Muscovite scribes, its modern foundation was laid by the classic Russian historians from the late eighteenth through early twentieth centuries: Nikolai Karamzin, S.M. Solov'ev, and V.O. Kliuchevskii, who viewed the Kievan Rus' state, which emerged in the tenth century in central Ukraine, as the first Russian state and its East Slavic inhabitants as Russians. In the thirteenth century Kievan Rus' was partially destroyed and subjugated by the Mongols. According to the Russian imperial view, this state, despite the "Mongol yoke," survived in the north-east—centered first in Vladimir-Suzdal, then in Moscow, and finally in St. Petersburg—as the Russian Empire. Thus in a series of territorial shifts the Russian state continued from Kievan Rus' to the nineteenth-century Russian Empire, although the southwestern parts of Rus' (Ukraine and Belarus) were lost to foreigners, first to Lithuania and then Poland. From the Russian imperial view, therefore, it follows that the ancient unity of the Russian state should be reconstituted by the gathering of all "Russian" lands, including Ukraine and Belarus.<sup>2</sup>

In placing the original Russian state in Ukraine, the traditional imperial scheme had difficulty accounting for the existence of Ukrainians. In 1856, Mikhail Pogodin advanced a thesis that ancient Kiev had been inhabited by Russians, but the Mongol invasion resulted in a massive out-migration to the territories in Russia. New tribes from the Carpathians settled in Ukraine during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, forming the ethnic basis for the Ukrainians.<sup>3</sup> Although Pogodin's theory enjoyed some popularity, the occurrence of such a population exchange could not be substantiated. Most Russian historians explained the substantial differences between Russians and Ukrainians in speech, custom, and outlook as corruption of the basically Russian ethos by Polish influences.

The traditional or Russian imperial scheme of history was not just the musings of a few academicians. Disseminated through the educational system and the press, it was the dominant concept in the Russian Empire until the 1917–21 revolutions. Russian émigré historians brought it to Europe and North America, where it enjoys virtual canonicity.<sup>4</sup> This historical scheme was utilized in policy formulations: the justification for the partitions of Poland or for the Russian war aim in World War I of annexing Galicia to the empire. It was the backdrop to banning all public use of the Ukrainian language (1863 and 1876) and

the formulation of a policy and attitude expressed so succinctly by the Russian Minister of Interior, Count Peter Valuev, on 8 June 1863, that “there never was any separate Little Russian [Ukrainian] language, there is not one now, and there cannot be one.”<sup>5</sup>

By combining dynastic, imperial, and Russian national history, the Russian imperial scheme was able to provide a justification for the Russian Empire, equating it with a virtually unbroken thousand-year history of “Russia” and the “Russian people.” The scheme left very little room for the history of Ukrainians and Belarusians, except as wayward branches of the Russian national family. As Ukrainians began to achieve a measure of national consciousness and organize a national movement, they could no longer accept the thesis that their history was merely an adjunct to Russian national history. The Russian imperial government, ironically, encouraged the study of Ukrainian history in order to prove that the lands annexed from Poland were from time immemorial genuinely “Russian.” Nineteenth-century historians were able to produce many major studies in Ukrainian history, particularly of the Cossack period. Under the influence of Romanticism, the populist historians did not focus so much on state structures as on the “folk” or “common people.” In the process, they accumulated more and more evidence that Ukrainians were distinct not only from Poles but also from Russians. Without replacing the Russian imperial scheme, populist Ukrainian historiography demonstrated that in various time frames Ukraine had followed its own separate historical process.<sup>6</sup>

A conceptual breakthrough was made by Ukraine’s most outstanding historian, Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi. In his ten-volume *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, other monographs, and hundreds of source publications and articles, he refuted the traditional imperial Russian scheme and offered an alternate view. Hrushevs’kyi succinctly summarized his concept in 1904 in “The Traditional Scheme of ‘Russian’ History and the Problem of a Rational Organization of the History of the Eastern Slavs.” In this article, Hrushevs’kyi pointed out that the Russian imperial scheme was illogical in equating the history of dynastic relations with the Russian state and even the Russian nation. He vehemently rejected the concept of the transfer of geographic centers and the mechanical linking of various historical time frames in order to trace a straight linear development of the Russian nation from Kievan Rus’. According to Hrushevs’kyi, the imperial Russian scheme not only left

out Ukrainians and Belarusians, but it was also incapable of explaining the origins of the Russian nation.<sup>7</sup>

In discrediting the imperial Russian scheme, Hrushevs'kyi presented his own thesis that Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Russians have separate and distinct histories. He asserted that rather than moving to the northeast, the Kievan Rus' state continued in the Ukrainian territories through the Galician-Volhynian state and subsequently Lithuanian-Rus'. While some legal, governmental, and religious structures were transplanted to the Russian territory, Russia developed *sui generis* and was not organically tied to Kievan Rus'. Thus the history of the Russian nation began with the northeastern territories, while that of Ukrainians began with Kievan Rus'. Subsequently, each nation evolved separately, although at times their fates intertwined.<sup>8</sup>

From the Ukrainian perspective Hrushevs'kyi's impact was immense. By utilizing scholarly critiques, he was able to challenge the prevailing imperial mythology and set up a new historical structure. Hrushevs'kyi replaced a paradigm in which Ukrainians played virtually no role in history—even on their own territory—with one in which they had an ancient past. He provided the intellectual space within which Ukrainian historical studies could develop. As a result, most Ukrainian historians whose works were not under Russian-Soviet control accepted Hrushevs'kyi's views, while most Russian historians did not. This is an indication of the extent to which the work of the historian (with or without his intention) in Eastern Europe has been utilized to legitimize national myths, and why history itself is a battleground in the struggle of competing identities.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, under the impact of the national movement and Ukraine's brief period of independence, the populist approach was abandoned for a new "statist" orientation. The state school historians looked into the past and saw periods when Ukraine was virtually an independent state. They concentrated on such indicators of statehood as foreign relations, internal administration, and judicial procedures. They viewed Kievan Rus', the Galician-Volhynian princedom, and even the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as embodiments of Ukrainian statehood. Like the populists, the state school historians paid particular attention to the various Ukrainian semi-independent Cossack formations and viewed them not as mere instruments of social struggle but rather as representatives of political and national struggle.<sup>9</sup>

Despite the failed attempt at Ukrainian statehood in 1917–21, the

state school became dominant in Soviet Ukraine, in western Ukraine under Poland, and in the emigration. In Soviet Ukraine, it was soon challenged by Marxist historians, but this developing clash of interpretations was soon overshadowed by the imposition in the 1930s of an official Soviet scheme. Although proscribed in the Soviet Union, the state school continued in western Ukraine (until its incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1945) and also in emigration.

The official Soviet scheme was in essence a reworking of the Russian imperial one, with added Marxist elements and terminology. It also posited the unity of the East Slavs in the period of Kievan Rus'. The East Slavs were referred to as the "old Rus' people" or, as translated by some, the "old Russian people" composed of proto-Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians. As in the imperial scheme, the Soviets also claimed that the unity of "the old Russian people" was shattered by the Mongol invasion, allowing the subsequent development of a separate Ukrainian and Belarusian people. Although Ukrainians were considered to be a part of the "old Rus' nation," some Soviet scholars frequently equated "the old Rus' nation" simply with Russians. The primacy of Russians was further elaborated in the doctrine of the "elder brother," which presupposes that Russians were more ancient and more accomplished than their younger brothers, the Ukrainians.<sup>10</sup>

While recognizing the existence from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries of a separate Ukrainian people, Soviet scholarship claimed that the Ukrainians wanted nothing more than to be "reunified" with their Russian brethren. Thus, the theme of unity with Russia extended to all times—even when Ukrainians were outside Russian political structures. In this scheme the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654, when the Ukrainian hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi conditionally recognized the suzerainty of the Muscovite tsar, was treated as the pivotal event that symbolized the "reunification" of the two lands and peoples for all times. This thesis was sanctified by a decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1954 and remained obligatory until the collapse of the Soviet Union.<sup>11</sup>

The Soviet scheme also assumed complete Russian-Ukrainian solidarity and communality of interests. Ukrainians were not to be concerned with the status of their own nation but to rejoice and glorify in Russian accomplishments. At no point in history could Ukrainians have any legitimate interests that would not coincide with Russian ones. Nor did Ukrainians have any future as a separate nation, since



Soviet nationality policy called for their merger into a wider Soviet people. Ukrainians, therefore, emerged in the fifteenth century in order to reunify with Russians and then ultimately to disappear into the Soviet people.<sup>12</sup>

Within this narrow conceptual straitjacket, Soviet Ukrainian historians attempted to study various aspects of Ukrainian history and culture. The accepted dogma required either expunging a good part of the historical record or manipulating it to fit the myth. Yet some good work could be done within the narrow official parameters, and through the Soviet period historians attempted to test the official boundaries.<sup>13</sup> Nevertheless, only with the policy of glasnost could historians really move beyond the proscribed dogmas in any significant way.

When beginning in 1990 the rigid boundaries suddenly evaporated, it was hardly surprising that the first great debate over history in the era of glasnost was over the work and figure of Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi. The Soviet regime had proscribed him on two accounts: (1) as a historian Hrushevs'kyi had developed a scheme that negated both the Russian imperial and Soviet schemes; (2) as a politician he had headed the Central Rada government of an independent Ukraine and had opposed the Bolsheviks. In early 1988 some scholars attempted to reintroduce his scholarship—a move fiercely attacked by the Soviet Ukrainian scholarly establishment.<sup>14</sup> Nevertheless, by 1989 several Ukrainian journals began to serialize some of Hrushevs'kyi's works, and a number of articles attempted to portray his political activity in a positive manner. The attempt at rehabilitation gained further credibility when the leading Ukrainian specialist on Kievan Rus', Petro Tolochko, endorsed the Hrushevs'kyi scheme of history.<sup>15</sup>

As Ukraine was moving toward greater sovereignty and finally independence, the opposition to Hrushevs'kyi began to dissipate. In August 1991 an International Congress on Hrushevs'kyi held in Lviv, presented a plethora of papers, many of which presumed the correctness of his historical scheme.<sup>16</sup> In the same year, volume 1 of his classic *History of Ukraine Rus'* was reprinted jointly by the Archeographic Commission of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, and the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies.<sup>17</sup> Even Ukraine's declaration of independence referred to the "thousand-year-old tradition of state creation in Ukraine"—an indirect acceptance of Hrushevs'kyi's periodization of history.<sup>18</sup> In 1992 a collection of Hrushevs'kyi's political articles was

reprinted with a foreword by President Leonid Kravchuk.<sup>19</sup> It is clear that Hrushevs'kyi's scheme will be the basis for a newly defined Ukrainian national history and will be utilized as historical justification in the promotion of Ukrainian statehood.

The struggle against the Russian imperial scheme of history became particularly evident in Ukraine's religious and ecclesiastical life. History proved again to be the principal battleground driving church politics and religious ferment.<sup>20</sup> The traditional Russian imperial view was, and to a large extent still is, represented by the Russian Orthodox Church. The Church traced its origins to the 988 Christianization of Rus' in Kiev, lamented the subsequent division of the Church into Ukrainian and Russian branches, and celebrated the "reunion" of the two when, in 1686, the Kiev metropolitan was subordinated to the Moscow patriarchate. Adopting the imperial historical scheme, the Russian Orthodox Church has been a firm supporter of the concept of unity of the East Slavs in some larger "Russian" entity in which it was the only legitimate Orthodox Church.<sup>21</sup> The Church *de facto* approved and cooperated in the proscription of such rivals as the independent Ukrainian Orthodox churches and the Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate) Church.<sup>22</sup>

The Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic churches had a very different historical vision. They, too, traced their origins to the Christianization of Rus' in 988, but they viewed this event as primarily a Ukrainian one.<sup>23</sup> They considered Russia's Christianization to have occurred much later, by Ukrainian missionaries.<sup>24</sup> In contrast to the Russian Orthodox Church's emphasis on early and later East Slavic unity, both Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholics focused on Ukraine, particularly the Ukrainian Church's struggle to preserve its Eastern and Orthodox character under pressure from Roman Catholic Poland.<sup>25</sup> The Ukrainian Catholic solution was the Brest Union (1596), by which a portion of the Church recognized the primacy of the Pope but retained Orthodox rituals.<sup>26</sup> The Ukrainian Orthodox viewed this union as a betrayal rather than a solution. They emphasized the flourishing of a revitalized Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the seventeenth century and condemned its subsequent incorporation into Russian Orthodoxy.<sup>27</sup>

Within the Russian Empire neither the Ukrainian Orthodox nor the Ukrainian Catholic churches survived but were merged into the Russian Orthodox Church. The Ukrainian Catholic Church had survived in Galicia, which was first under Austrian and then, after World War I,

under Polish control. During Ukraine's brief period of independence, an independent Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was established in Ukraine, but in the 1930s it was merged into the Russian Orthodox Church, as was the Ukrainian Catholic Church when Galicia was incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR (1946).<sup>28</sup> Thus, alternative views to the Russian Orthodox Church could be expressed only in emigration or by the Ukrainian Catholic Church, which went underground.

The different historical perspectives were clearly evident in 1988 with the celebrations of the millennium of Christianity in Rus'. After some hesitation, the officially atheistic Soviet government launched elaborate celebrations of what was popularly labeled the millennium of "Russian" Christianity and the millennium of the "Russian Orthodox Church." Although the original site of the baptism was Kiev, most of the celebrations occurred in Moscow, a city that did not exist in 988. From the perspectives of both the Soviet government and the Russian Orthodox Church, the celebrations were an opportunity to bolster the concept of the ancient unity of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians. Yet by making the celebrations primarily a "Russian" event, the official ceremonies also underscored the prominence of Russia and Russian history, language, and culture.<sup>29</sup>

Ukrainians in the diaspora also celebrated the millennium of Christianity. Major commemorative events were staged in Rome; Washington, DC; South Bound Brook, New Jersey; and Toronto. Scholarly and commemorative books were published, and the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute launched a major series of publications of premodern Ukrainian literature.<sup>30</sup> Through such activities, the Ukrainian diaspora attempted to counter the claim that it was the millennium of the Russian Orthodox Church and "Holy Russia," and emphasized the continuity of Ukrainian Christianity and culture from the time of the 988 baptism. At the same time, the Ukrainian diaspora raised questions as to the incorporation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church into the Russian Orthodox Church and the banning and persecution of the underground Ukrainian Catholic Church.<sup>31</sup>

The abatement of religious persecution in the USSR in the late 1980s led to the emergence of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Catholic Church. In a fierce three-way struggle over parishes and faithful, the two churches virtually eliminated the Russian Orthodox Church from the most nationally conscious



and traditionally Catholic areas of western Ukraine.<sup>32</sup> In eastern Ukraine, however, the Russian Orthodox Church was able to hold its dominant position. By 1990 the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine was sufficiently challenged by the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church to announce its autonomy from Moscow and rename itself the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.<sup>33</sup> After Ukraine's declaration of independence, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church asked for its autocephaly, or independence, from the Moscow patriarch—a request denied by Moscow. In response, a part of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church joined with the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.<sup>34</sup> Although at this time the institutional relationships are not all clear, the trend toward autocephaly—now also favored by the Ukrainian government—has clearly been established.<sup>35</sup>

While it is complicated by politics, personal ambitions, various scandals, and questions of canon law, the current situation in Ukraine has been and continues to be defined by the fundamentally different historical visions of the various churches. Both the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic traditions see Ukraine as having developed since the 988 baptism a distinct and rich tradition of spirituality, which needs to be reestablished. For the Ukrainian Orthodox this can be accomplished through establishment of an independent or autocephalous church; for Catholics, through a Ukrainian particular church in union with Rome. Another historical vision is that of a common East Slavic spirituality and heritage embellished in a Russian-dominated Orthodoxy. These clashing historical outlooks continue to shape the religious struggle within Ukraine and contribute to tensions between Russia and Ukraine.

Sovereignty and independence also brought new historical themes to the foreground: the development of the Ukrainian nation, statehood, and a plethora of previously forbidden topics. Yet Ukrainian historians and journalists were ill-prepared to present new histories, new interpretations, and new research. For the most part, they turned to the already available material from the past, particularly the work of historians who had been neglected or partially or wholly proscribed. Works were published or republished on or by Dmytro Bahalii, D.I. Iavonyts'kyi, Mykola Kostomarov, and particularly Volodymyr Antonovych, the precursor to Hrushevs'kyi.<sup>36</sup> These historians were favored because they had been nationally conscious and promoted Ukrainian history in spite of tsarist or Soviet restrictions. Scholarly and popular journals began reprinting articles that had been published in the nineteenth century or abroad.<sup>37</sup>

The gap in historical knowledge was also partially filled by Western scholars. A recent textbook on Ukrainian history by Orest Subtelny published in Toronto was quickly translated into Ukrainian and published in massive quantities in Ukraine. Sections of the book were serialized in *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, and the textbook became part of the officer training of the Ukrainian military.<sup>38</sup> Other Western scholars published in Ukraine included Omeljan Pritsak, Roman Szporluk, Taras Hunczak, and Thomas Prymak.<sup>39</sup>

A central theme in the revival of a distinct Ukrainian historical consciousness has been the Cossack experience. In this connection, it is interesting to note that there is also a Cossack revival in Russia. However, the two revivals are working in diametrically opposite directions: the Russian one is fueled by the desire to defend the integrity of the Russian Empire,<sup>40</sup> while the Ukrainian Cossack revival celebrates Ukrainian national consciousness and defends the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

The Cossack experience is capable of rallying Ukrainian public opinion because it strikes a chord in virtually all areas of Ukraine, even in heavily Russified eastern and southern Ukraine, where few Ukrainian traditions remained. Thus, when Rukh, the popular movement for a Ukrainian rebirth, wanted to penetrate and partially de-Russify these regions in 1990, it settled on a series of celebrations commemorating the five hundredth anniversary of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. Through such celebrations, Rukh attempted to demonstrate that the area and its population have a link to the Ukrainian Cossacks and Ukraine. This is in opposition to the Russian imperial vision of southeastern Ukraine being associated with the colonization efforts of Catherine II and the Russian Empire.<sup>41</sup>

Since in the past various Cossack formations were indeed independent or semi-independent, the Cossacks are also seen as precursors of Ukrainian statehood. At the time of the 1991 elections, the then chairman of the Supreme Rada, Leonid Kravchuk, and his principal opponent for the Ukrainian presidency, Viacheslav Chornovil, were photographed holding the mace, the symbol of office of an independent Ukrainian hetman. A similar symbolic reference to Ukraine's Cossack past was Viacheslav Chornovil's elaborate ceremony abrogating the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654—that is, renouncing what only recently had been referred to as the “reunion” of Ukraine and Russia.<sup>42</sup> In Ukraine today, there is hardly a folk festival, rock concert, or major

public event without a number of individuals dressed in colorful Cossack garb. As it is intoned in the recently rehabilitated Ukrainian national anthem, Ukrainians indeed consider themselves descendants of the Cossacks.

The widespread Cossackophilia is very much evident in both popular and scholarly publications. Cossacks are presented as models for democracy and as having drafted a constitution in 1710, "the first in Europe."<sup>43</sup> Military newspapers and the journal *Army of Ukraine* feature Cossack military campaigns and suggest that the Cossack heritage has something to offer in developing a Ukrainian military doctrine.<sup>44</sup> In a more scholarly vein, a leading specialist on the Cossacks has suggested making the study of Cossacks a special discipline within Ukrainian history, with its own research institute.<sup>45</sup> Numerous articles on Cossacks and Cossack hetmans extol those who had struggled for "the sovereignty and statehood of Ukraine." In this context, hetman Ivan Mazepa, who fought against Russia in 1709 and was characterized as a "renegade" and "enemy of the people" in Russian imperial and Soviet historiography, is now considered a hero.<sup>46</sup>

A second historical theme with virtually universal appeal has been the exposition of Stalinist crimes. For western Ukraine, these included executions, mass arrests, and deportations in the 1940s and 1950s. For eastern Ukraine, attention has been focused on the man-made famine of 1932–33, in which five to seven million people died. Although the topic had been completely taboo until the era of glasnost, many Ukrainians had some knowledge of relatives' having died in the famine. A film about the famine shown on television on the eve of the December 1991 referendum is credited with influencing the over 90 percent pro-independence vote.<sup>47</sup> Much material on the famine had been revealed in the three years prior to independence.<sup>48</sup> The fact of the famine has been accepted by virtually everyone, but there are still differences in interpretation, with more and more Ukrainians becoming convinced that the famine was not simply the result of forced collectivization but an act of purposeful genocide against the Ukrainian people.<sup>49</sup>

Another historical topic that is just coming to the foreground is Ukrainian statehood in 1918–21, particularly the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR). Only four years ago these formations were viewed as the epitome of evil and reaction, while today they are considered honorable examples of twentieth-century Ukrainian state building. A plethora of articles has focused on the politics, foreign relations, mili-

tary policy, policy toward minorities, and other activities of the independent Ukrainian governments.<sup>50</sup> On a symbolic level, independent Ukraine has underscored its link to the UNR by adopting the same national emblems, the trident and the blue and yellow flag. Awareness of the UNR and other independent Ukrainian formations of 1917–21 is now beginning to penetrate the consciousness of the wider Ukrainian public.

Other historical issues are regionally based and have the potential for being divisive rather than creating a unifying vision. One of the most controversial has been the rehabilitation of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). The UPA fought partially against the Germans but primarily against Soviet rule in western Ukraine until 1952.<sup>51</sup> The popular press has carried many articles about the heroic struggle of the UPA against Soviet occupation. Even the Ukrainian military paper and journal had extensive favorable press coverage about the activities of the UPA.<sup>52</sup> However, other articles object to the veneration of the UPA, arguing that it had cooperated with the Germans and committed atrocities against the Ukrainian and Polish populations.<sup>53</sup> The picture is further complicated by newly released archival materials showing that special detachments of the NKVD posed as UPA and destroyed entire villages in order to discredit the UPA. Opposition to the full rehabilitation of the UPA—whose few remaining members are demanding veterans' pensions—is particularly strong from Red Army veterans who had fought the UPA. It is very difficult to reconcile images of the heroic Red Army defenders against the Nazis and the UPA into a common historical consciousness. Yet this is exactly what the official organ of Ukraine's Defense Ministry attempted to accomplish, with only limited success.<sup>54</sup>

In an effort to determine the extent of the struggle over these historical interpretations and the possible emergence of a new or renewed Ukrainian historical consciousness, I have examined the daily *Pravda Ukrainy* from 1990 to early 1993. This newspaper was chosen because it is a Russian-language paper that until the banning of the Communist Party was the official organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. It had represented conservative, communist, pro-union forces. Even after its transformation into a general civic newspaper—one week after the attempted coup—*Pravda Ukrainy* retained much of its conservative and anti-Ukrainian nationalist charac-

ter. Thus I believe *Pravda Ukrainy* can serve as a barometer of the extent to which certain historical views have gone beyond the narrow stream of nationalist intelligentsia and are beginning to penetrate the Communist and, since independence, ex-Communist political mainstream.

As a daily newspaper, *Pravda Ukrainy* was not primarily interested in historical issues. Yet in its struggle against the Ukrainian movement and particularly Rukh, the newspaper devoted much space to Ukrainian history. For example, when Rukh was preparing to commemorate the 500th anniversary of the Zaporozhian Cossacks in the summer of 1990, *Pravda Ukrainy* attacked these preparations.<sup>55</sup> In this article and a subsequent one, *Pravda Ukrainy* objected to Rukh's attempt to present the Cossacks as a unique Ukrainian phenomenon without reference to Russia and the common Ukrainian-Russian struggle against Polish control over Ukraine.<sup>56</sup> Abruptly, on 31 July 1990, *Pravda Ukrainy* published an article on the Cossacks that treated them as primarily a Ukrainian experience and a bastion of freedom and democracy. The about-face occurred fifteen days after Ukraine's declaration of sovereignty and on the eve of the Cossack commemorative events in early August. The Communists decided to co-opt the Cossack issue, and from late summer 1990 *Pravda Ukrainy* has consistently presented the Cossack experience as forming the core of Ukrainian history and culture. At the same time, the paper continued to oppose the glorification of any anti-Russian aspects of Cossack history. In December 1990, *Pravda Ukrainy* denounced Rukh's commemoration of Hetman Mazepa's stance against Russia at the Battle of Poltava (1709).<sup>57</sup> By January 1992 a more balanced picture of Mazepa emerged, but the hetman was still referred to as an egotist and political adventurer, indicating *Pravda Ukrainy*'s reluctance to accept fully the nationalist pantheon of heroes.<sup>58</sup>

A somewhat similar about-face occurred on the question of Ukrainian independence of 1917–21. *Pravda Ukrainy*'s extensive coverage of this issue was also sparked by the activities of Rukh. On 22 January 1990, on the anniversary of the declaration of independence in 1918 and the union of the West Ukrainian People's Republic in 1919, Rukh sponsored a human chain that linked Lviv and Kiev. The mobilization in the dead of winter of several hundred thousand people to commemorate "bourgeois nationalist" independence and the union of eastern and western Ukraine in one state presented a serious challenge to the



Soviet Communist scheme. *Pravda Ukrainy* repeatedly attacked the event and any revision of the official view that the UNR was a bourgeois nationalist entity, opposed to the workers and peasants, and was in the service of Germany, Austria, and Poland. It particularly lambasted the figure of Symon Petliura, the military chief of the Directory of the UNR, as an epitome of evil, responsible for pogroms and a general bloodbath in Ukraine. The paper reiterated that all aspirations of the Ukrainian people were fulfilled through the Bolshevik Revolution and the formation of the Ukrainian SSR within the Soviet Union.<sup>59</sup> By November 1990, after the sovereignty declaration, the position of the paper toward the UNR softened, with some positive comments about Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi.<sup>60</sup> In 1992 *Pravda Ukrainy* published several positive articles about the Central Rada,<sup>61</sup> the UNR government, and even a reprint of a factual, neutral report on Petliura's assassination.<sup>62</sup> It had finally accepted the UNR as a legitimate example of Ukrainian independence and statehood.

Kievan Rus' was represented in *Pravda Ukrainy* as an example of ancient Russian-Ukrainian unity, now threatened by both Russian and Ukrainian nationalism.<sup>63</sup> On the eve of Ukrainian independence but prior to the attempted putsch of August 1991, *Pravda Ukrainy* featured an extensive interview with Petro Tolochko, a leading specialist who linked Kievan Rus' firmly with Ukrainian history.<sup>64</sup> The full rehabilitation of Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi as a historian placed the paper even more firmly behind the Ukrainian historical view on the origins of the East Slavs.

On the famine of 1933, *Pravda Ukrainy* was silent until June 1991, when it interviewed Serhii Diachenko, who had produced a film on the topic. Since then, the famine has been touched upon and represented as genocide against the Ukrainian people, for which Stalin was responsible.<sup>65</sup>

No historical theme received so much space in 1990 and 1991 as did the OUN-UPA. In 1990 sixteen issues had materials on the subject; in 1991 there were at least twenty-five.<sup>66</sup> All of these articles were in essence attacks on Rukh and Ukrainian separatists. In fact, the movement for Ukrainian independence was represented as either a front for or as leading to an OUN type of "fascism." *Pravda Ukrainy* was particularly shrill in trying to dispel the notion advocated by some that the UPA was the backbone of armed resistance to Stalinism. For *Pravda Ukrainy* the OUN-UPA was and probably remains the incarnation of

evil beyond any rehabilitation. The virtually continuous exposé of OUN leaders and activities ceased suddenly with the declaration of independence. During all of 1992 there appeared only one factual note on the UPA.<sup>67</sup> Most likely the newspaper, unsure of its own status in a postcommunist independent Ukraine, decided not to take up such a sensitive issue. But an editorial in early 1993 that railed against a planned reunion in Lviv of surviving members of the SS Galicia division also deplored the attempted rehabilitation of the UPA as an equal insult and profanity.<sup>68</sup> *Pravda Ukrainy*, it seems, is not ready to accept OUN-UPA as part of a new Ukrainian historical consciousness.

It is clear that history has been a battleground first and foremost in Ukraine. With independence, historical views that had been underground in Ukraine and more fully developed in the emigration have come to the foreground. A new historical vision is emerging, in part spontaneously and in part by deliberate promotion on the part of historians, journalists, and publicists.

At this stage, Ukrainians are still groping for a shared vision of the past. Some themes, such as the Cossack experience, the Ukrainian view of Kievan Rus', Ukrainian Church traditions, the 1917–21 struggle for independence, and the horrors of Stalinism, particularly the 1933 famine, seem acceptable components of such a vision. Other themes involving World War II, OUN, and UPA have a more narrow political or regional appeal, continue to be divisive, and at this time cannot be incorporated into a broader Ukrainian historical identity.

Although debates over historical interpretations have been normal components of nation building, the Ukrainian case does have some peculiar characteristics. Thus far, the emerging Ukrainian historical consciousness has avoided anti-Russian or anti-Polish rhetoric, despite the fact that some of the historical themes could readily be used for such purposes. The process is largely one of differentiation from, but not rejection of, Russia. It is a search for one's own historical symbols rather than shared ones.

The measured approach toward establishing a historical identity is due to Ukraine's need to simultaneously build a state and a nation. There seems to be a consensus for most Ukrainians that nothing should jeopardize independence, not even nation building. Avoidance of conflict is paramount, not only vis-à-vis Ukraine's minorities but also with former Communists. For example, the exposition of Stalinist crimes is

a frequent historical theme, yet no reference is ever made to living perpetrators of such crimes.

The formation of a new Ukrainian historical consciousness is still in a rudimentary stage, limited to the more nationally conscious elements of the population. A rapid and widespread introduction of a Ukrainian view of history is difficult, because imperial Russian and Soviet rule has resulted in the common acceptance of the dominant interpretations, even among many Ukrainians. Moreover, there is consensus on only some themes and interpretations. At least a preliminary codification of a Ukrainian view will occur with the adoption of new curricula and the publication of new textbooks. Adoption in school curricula would also make the Ukrainian historical view more prevalent among the wider public.

What impact will the emergence of the new Ukrainian historical consciousness have on Ukrainian-Russian relations? Much will depend on further developments in Ukraine. Increased political and economic tensions with Russia have the potential for an anti-Russian historical orientation. Of equal importance is how the Ukrainian historical view is received in Russia and the type of historical outlook that will emerge in post-Soviet Russia.

In Russia, the collapse of communism and the breakup of the Soviet Union have given new urgency to the debates about the "Russian question" and Russian identity. As Russians also are searching for their historical roots, they have attempted to cleanse their history of Marxist ideology and internationalism. The academician Dmitrii S. Likhachev has been in the forefront of the attempt to restore to Russia the essence of its history and culture. According to Likhachev, the Russian nation emerged in the tenth century in Kievan Rus', and even after the split "into two entities, Russia and Ukraine formed not only a political but also a culturally dualistic unity: Russian culture is meaningless without Ukrainian, as Ukrainian is without Russian."<sup>69</sup> The most noted Russian author in exile, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, has echoed very similar views.

The Russian unity myth has been and continues to be so embedded in the Russian psyche that it is very difficult for Russians—from conservative nationalists to liberal democrats—to acknowledge the right of Ukrainians to their own history and national identity. In a round-table discussion, the editor of *Moscow News*, Lev Korpinskii, insisted that Kiev was "the mother of Russian cities" and that "millions of

Russians are convinced that, without Ukraine, it is impossible to speak not only of a great Russia but of any kind of Russia at all."<sup>70</sup> The liberal thinker Aleksandr Tsipko came to the conclusion that "without today's Ukraine, there can be no Russia in the old, real sense of the word."<sup>71</sup> Viktor Aksiuchits, the leader of the Russian Christian Democratic Movement, argued that "despite what we are told now, I am absolutely sure that Belarusians, Ukrainians, and Russians even today continue to belong to one great Russian nation, formed during our joint history on the basis of the Orthodox faith."<sup>72</sup> The emphasis on unity takes on shrill dimensions in the right-wing Russian popular press. Such journals as *Molodaia gvardiia*, *Iunost'*, the newspaper *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, and, in their own specialized fields, *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal* and *Zhurnal Moskovskoi patriarkhii* have been advocating<sup>73</sup> a "one and indivisible Russia" that includes Ukraine both in the past and for the future. This position has been most systematically elaborated in *Molodaia gvardiia*, with the claims that Russia has a thousand-year-old history, that only within this Russian state can Ukraine exist, and that only a reconstituted Russia can provide stability for Europe and the world.<sup>74</sup>

While the more liberal Russian press does not advocate a "recovery" of Ukraine, it has not challenged the intellectual underpinnings for the "Russian idea." So far there has been hardly any attempt to differentiate between the history of Russia and that of the Russian Empire, or to view Russian history as primarily the experience of the Russians. Thus the Russian historical outlook still stresses unity and still presupposes that much of the history and culture of Ukraine is part and parcel of the Russian experience. Such a view is in direct opposition to the emerging Ukrainian historical consciousness, which stresses an autochthonous historical process and differentiation from Russia.

What impact does the emergence of a Ukrainian historical consciousness and the persistence of the Russian unity myth have on foreign policy? While historical considerations have not been the primary factors in the conduct of foreign policy of either Russia or Ukraine, they do color the attitudes of each side toward the other. The Russian government, even under the relatively "liberal" foreign policy of Andrei Kozyrev, treats Ukraine more as a wayward child than as an equal partner. Ukraine sees in virtually every action of Russia hegemonic and imperialistic intentions. Moreover, some Russian leaders seem willing to act out the old Russian imperial myth and bring the

Ukrainians and Belarusians into a "Great Russian nation." Any such attempt would run against the growing Ukrainian national and historical consciousness and could result in bloodshed, chaos, and a Yugoslavia-type tragedy. One way to avert such a tragedy would be for Russian historians to focus their attention on historical events that occurred on the territory of contemporary Russia and not seek to legitimate Russian statehood beyond Russian borders. Politicians, moreover, should be careful to act on the basis of genuine national interests of Russia and Ukraine rather than to pursue nineteenth-century national myths.

### Notes

1. See his article, "Kak nam obustroit' Rossiю," in *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 18 September 1990. This also appeared in *Literaturnaia gazeta* on the same day and was reprinted in the Russian émigré periodical *Russkaia mysl'* (Paris) on 21 September. Here, in a section titled "Slovo k ukrainsam i belorusam," Solzhenitsyn adopts a traditional, but still popular, Russian scheme of history when he states that "our people split into three branches only because of the menacing misfortune of the Mongolian invasion and Polish colonization." A full English translation of his "Word to Ukrainians and Belorussians" can be found in *Ukrainian Weekly*, no. 42 (1990). Subsequently the entire work was published in English as *Rebuilding Russia: Reflections and Tentative Proposals* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1991). See also the commentary piece by Roman Solchanyk in *Ukrainian Weekly*, no. 11 (1993), for Solzhenitsyn's recent proclamations regarding Ukraine.

2. N.M. Karamzin's *Istoriia gosudarstva rossiiskogo* was published in twelve volumes in St. Petersburg between 1816 and 1829. It was here that he outlined the so-called official scheme of Russian history, which later Russian or Russo-phile historians have embraced to this day. For a wider discussion of this scheme and how it conflicts with the Ukrainian scheme, see the study by Lubomyr R. Wynar, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: Ukrainian-Russian Confrontation in Historiography* (New York: Ukrainian Historical Association, 1988).

3. On Pogodin's views, see vol. 7 of his work, *Issledovaniia, zamechaniia i lektsii o russkoi istorii* (Moscow, 1856), especially pp. 425–28.

4. Most North American textbooks follow the Russian imperial scheme. See Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia*, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); Michael T. Florinsky, *Russia: A Short History* (New York, 1964); G. Vernadsky and M. Karpovich, *A History of Russia*, 4 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946–59); John M. Thompson, *Russia and the Soviet Union: An Historical Introduction* (New York: Scribner, 1986), among others.

5. Quote from Michael Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine* (New Haven, 1970), p. 496. For the background to the formulation of Russian imperial language policies in 1863 and 1876, see Ivan L. Rudnytsky, *Essays in Modern*



*Ukrainian History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 131–32; and Fedir Savchenko, *The Suppression of the Ukrainian Activities in 1876* (Munich, 1970).

6. On populist historiography, see Dmytro Doroshenko, “A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography,” in a special issue of *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States* (New York), vols. 6–7, no. 4 (1957), pp. 116–87.

7. M. Hrushevs'kyi, “Zvychna skhema Russkoi istorii i sprava ratsional'noho ukladu skhidnoho slov'ianstva,” *Sbornik statei po slavianovedeniiu* (St. Petersburg, 1904), pp. 298–304; the English translation appeared in *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States*, vol. 2, no. 4 (1952), pp. 355–64, and has been reprinted several times.

8. Ibid. See also his ten-volume *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy* (New York, 1954–58).

9. A sample of works by representatives of the “state school,” which touch specifically on this topic, include Nataliia Polons'ka-Vasylenko, *Two Conceptions of the History of Ukraine and Russia* (London, 1968); and Nicholas D. Chubaty, “The Meaning of ‘Russia’ and ‘Ukraine,’” in *Readings in Russian History*, ed. Sidney Harcave (New York: Cromwell, 1962). See also Doroshenko, “Survey of Ukrainian Historiography”; and Olexander Ohloblyn, “Ukrainian Historiography, 1917–1956,” *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States*, special issue, vols. 6–7, no. 4 (1957), pp. 300–303; 307–435.

10. See Lowell Tillet, *The Great Friendship: Soviet Historians and the Non-Russian Nationalities* (Chapel Hill, 1969); and the chapter “Soviet Interpretation of Ukrainian History” in Yaroslav Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine after World War II* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1964), pp. 203–25. For a more recent assessment of this topic, see Roman Szporluk, “The Ukraine and Russia,” in *The Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet Empire*, ed. Robert Conquest (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), pp. 151–82.

11. For a discussion of the Soviet official view of the Treaty of Pereiaslav, see the work by John Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study* (Edmonton: University of Alberta, 1982). The theses alluded to have been published as *Tezy pro 300-richchia vozz'iednannia Ukrainy z Rosiiteiu (1648–1654 rr), skhvaleni Tsentral'nyim Komitetom Komunistychnoi Partii Radians'koho Soiuzu* (Kiev, 1954). The Soviet interpretation was challenged by the dissident Mykhailo Braichevs'kyi in his work *Pryiednannia chy vozz'iednannia* (Toronto, 1972).

12. This is discussed in Roman Solchanyk, “Molding ‘the Soviet People’: The Role of Ukraine and Belorussia,” *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, vol. 8, no. 1 (summer 1983), pp. 3–18; see also his study of Soviet language policies, “Russian Language and Soviet Politics,” *Soviet Studies*, vol. 34, no. 1 (January 1982), pp. 23–42. The Ukrainian dissident Iurii Badz'o protested to the Communist Party of Ukraine against the Soviet historical scheme and the lack of any possibility for Ukrainians to develop their own identity: see his *Vidkrytyi lyst do Prezhydii Verkhovnoi Rady Soiuzu RSR ta Tsentral'noho Komitetu KPRS* (New York, 1981).

13. Examples of this include D.K. Kasymenko, “Novi osiahy ukrains'kykh istoriiv,” *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, vol. 3 (1963); F.P. Shevchenko, “Chomu M. Hrushevs'kyi povernuvsia na Radians'ku Ukrainu,” *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, vol. 11 (1966), pp. 13–30; O. Apanovych, *Zbroini syly Ukrainy pershoi polovyny XVIII st.* (Kiev, 1960).

14. For a discussion of the official Soviet attitudes to Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi and the debate sparked by glasnost, see Bohdan W. Klid's, "The Struggle over Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Recent Soviet Polemics," *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, vol. 33, no. 1 (March 1991), pp. 32–45.

15. P. Tolochko, "Istoriia Ukrainy-nove vysvitlennia," *Ukraina*, no. 41 (1989), pp. 4–6.

16. *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi . . . izhnarodna iuvileina konferentsiia prysviachena 125-i richnytsi vid dnia narodzhenni* (Lviv, 1991).

17. M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 1 (Kiev, 1991).

18. The text of the act of independence can be found in *Robitnycha hazeta*, 9 March 1991, p. 1. For an English-language translation, see *Ukrainian Weekly*, no. 35 (1991), p. 1.

19. *Velykyi ukrainets'* (Kiev, 1992).

20. The few paragraphs on church politics are intended only as a vivid example of how history was and continues to be a battleground in Ukraine. The topic will be treated separately and certainly more comprehensively in a forthcoming volume in this series.

21. The basic view of the Russian Orthodox Church has been consistent; for the classic nineteenth-century exposition see Makarii (Bulgakov), *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, vols. 1–12 (St. Petersburg, 1882–84); for a contemporary assessment see *The Russian Orthodox Church, 10th to 20th Centuries* (Moscow, 1988); and Archbishop Makary, *The Eastern Orthodox Church in Ukraine* (Kiev, 1980).

22. Bohdan Bociurkiw, "The Uniate Church in the Soviet Ukraine: A Case Study in Soviet Church Policy," *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, vol. 7 (1965), pp. 89–113; Frank Sysyn, *The Ukrainian Orthodox Question in the USSR* (Cambridge, MA, 1987), pp. 9–20.

23. For a summary of the Ukrainian view on Christianity, see M. Chubaty, *Istoriia khrystiianstva na Rusy-Ukrainy*, 2 vols. (Rome–New York, 1965–76); I. Vlasovs'kyi, *Narys istorii Ukrainy koi pravoslavnoi tserkvy*, 4 vols. (South Bound Brook, NJ, 1955–66); O. Lototskyi, *Avtokefaliia*, 2 vols. (Warsaw 1935–38).

24. See, for example, Ihor Kutash, "The Soviet Union Celebrates 1000 Years of Christianity," *Christian History*, vol. 7, no. 2 (1988), pp. 12–13.

25. Vasyl' Ivanyshyn, "Ukrains'ka tserkva i protses natsional'noho vidrodzhennia," *Ukrains'ke vidrodzhennia i natsional'na tserkva* (Kiev, 1990), pp. 30–31.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 34–35.

27. See the article by Frank Sysyn, "The Russian Sobor and the Rejection of Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephaly," *Ukrainian Weekly*, no. 30 (1990), pp. 8–9; see also "Tretie vidrodzhennia UAPT," *Ukrains'ki visti* (Detroit), 7 October 1991.

28. Sysyn, *Ukrainian Orthodox Question in the USSR*, pp. 12–13; Bohdan Bociurkiw, "The Rise of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, 1919–22," in *Church, Nation and State in Russia and Ukraine*, ed. Geoffrey A. Mosking (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 228–49; and his "Uniate Church in Soviet Ukraine," pp. 89–113.

29. "The Russian Orthodox Church: Its Role in History and the Modern World," *Commission of the Ukrainian SSR for UNESCO Bulletin*, vol. 1 (1988), pp. 1–5.

30. For more information on these publications, the reader is referred to the

catalogue *Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute Publications* (Cambridge, MA, 1992).

31. For example, see Kutash, "Soviet Union Celebrates 1000 Years of Christianity," pp. 14–15; and the pamphlet *The Millennium of Christianity in Rus'–Ukraine: The Harvard Project (988–1988)* (Cambridge, MA, n.d. [c. 1988]).

32. "1991: A Look Back," *Ukrainian Weekly*, no. 52 (1991), p. 7.

33. Metropolitan Philaret [Filaret], "Slovo Mytropolyta Kyivs'koho i vsiiei Ukrainy Filareta na vidkrytti Soboru Ukrains'koi pravoslavnoi tserkvy," *Sobor Ukrains'koi pravoslavnoi tserkvy* (Kiev, 1992), p. 5.

34. "Zvernennia Soboru Ukrains'koi pravoslavnoi tserkvy do sviatiishoho Patriarkha Moskovs'koho i vsiiei Rusi Aleksii II i iepyskopatu Rus'koi pravoslavnoi tserkvy," *Sobor Ukrains'koi pravoslavnoi tserkvy*, pp. 32–33; Sysyn, "Russian Sobor," pp. 8–9; see also Serhii Plokyh, "Ukrainian Autocephaly and Metropolitan Filaret," *Ukrainian Weekly*, no. 31 (1992), pp. 5 and 12.

35. For the most recent assessment of developments with the churches in Ukraine, see the article by Khristina Lew, "Church Split Continues to Plague Orthodox Faithful in Ukraine," *Ukrainian Weekly*, no. 12 (1993), p. 3.

36. On Dmytro Bahalii, see "Dmytro Bahalii: Avtobiohrafia," *Kyivs'ka starovyna*, no. 4 (July–August 1992), pp. 81–95; on Volodymyr Antonovych, see Oleksandra Kyiana, "Kafedral'ne 'viruii' Volodymyra Antonovycha: Z neopublikovanoi spadshchyny," *Kyivs'ka starovyna*, no. 3 (May–June 1992), pp. 63–69. Recent works on Mykola Kostomarov include the book by Iu.A. Pinchuk, *Mykola Ivanovych Kostomarov* (Kiev, 1992); and the article by Petro Tolochko, "Vydatnyi istoryk Ukrainy i Rosii," *Kyivs'ka starovyna*, no. 5 (September–October 1992), pp. 7–14. Examples of the recent interest in D. Iavornyts'kyi include the memoirs of a specialist on this historian, Ivan Shapoval, published in *Kyivs'ka starovyna*, no. 3 (1992), pp. 94–100.

37. Journals such as *Kyivs'ka starovyna* in particular and, to a lesser extent, the popular weekly *Ukraina* have been making this a regular practice.

38. His well-received *Ukraine: A History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) was translated and republished as *Ukraina: Istoriia* (Kiev, 1991), and serialized in nos. 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, and 12 (1991) of *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*.

39. Examples include O. Pritsak, "Ahatanhel Kryms'kyi," *Kyivs'ka starovyna*, no. 1 (January–February 1992), pp. 11–26. Taras Hunczak and Thomas Prymak are both published in *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* (nos. 10 and 1 [1991], respectively), while Roman Szporluk has had works published in a variety of forums, ranging from *Ukraina, Nauka i kul'tura* in Kiev (1991) to *Geneza* in Lviv (1992).

40. On such tendencies among the Cossack movements in Russia, see Andrew Wilson and Nina Bachkatov in *The World Today* (London), vol. 49, no. 1 (January 1993), pp. 2–4.

41. An elaboration on these points and an assessment of how Cossack history has been treated can be found in Frank Sysyn's "The Reemergence of the Ukrainian Nation and Cossack Mythology," *Social Research*, vol. 58, no. 4 (winter 1991), pp. 845–64.

42. *News From Ukraine* (Kiev), nos. 36–37 (1992) features a picture on its front page of President Leonid Kravchuk holding a mace on the first anniversary

of Ukrainian Independence Day. In a book devoted to interviews with and speeches by him, Kravchuk is again shown holding a Cossack mace; see Leonid Kravchuk, *Ie taka derzhava—Ukraina* (Kiev, 1992). Viacheslav Chornovil was elected leader of Ukraine's burgeoning Cossack Brotherhood, in the process of which he characteristically held a gold and silver *bulava*, or mace. It was during this event, on 21 June 1992, that the Cossack Brotherhood revoked the Treaty of Pereiaslav. See *Ukrainian Weekly*, no. 27 (1992), pp. 8–13.

43. Volodymyr Zamlyns'kyi, "Het'many u borot'bi za suverenitet i derzhavnist' Ukrainy," *Kyivs'ka starovyna*, no. 4 (July–August 1992), pp. 2–6.

44. Ivan Storozhenko, "Kozaky pro doktrynu ne chuly, ale ii znaly," *Vii's'ko Ukrainy*, nos. 2–3 (1993), pp. 16–18; and the interview with General Volodymyr Muliava in *Ukraina*, no. 1 (1993), pp. 14–15.

45. Iurii Mytsyk proposed this in his article "Istoriia ukrains'koho kozatstva: Aktual'ni problemy doslidzhen'," *Kyivs'ka starovyna*, no. 3 (May–June 1992), pp. 2–6.

46. For recent assessments of Mazepa, see the foreword to the translation of Alfred Jensen's work, *Mazepa* (Kiev, 1992), by Bohdan Iakymovych, pp. 5–21.

47. On Saturday, 30 November 1991, Channel 1 of Ukrainian TV premiered the film *Holod-'33* (Famine '33) at 1430 hours. An interview followed with the producers of the film.

48. *Holod 1932–1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoiu dokumentiv* (Kiev, 1990); and Mezhdunarodnaia komissiia po rassledovaniiu goloda na Ukraine 1932–1933 godov, *Itogovyi otchet 1990 god* (Kiev, 1992).

49. Vasyl' Marochko, "Bodai te lykho ne vertalos' . . ." *Suchasnist'*, no. 2 (1993), p. 92.

50. A number of articles have appeared in *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, nos. 5–9 (1991). The organ of the Ukrainian parliament, *Holos Ukrainy*, on the seventy-fifth anniversary of the declaration of Ukrainian independence, has also sympathetically reviewed the UNR past, in nos. 12, 13, and 17 (1993). See also *Molod' Ukrainy*, 19 January 1993 and 21 January 1993.

51. There is a vast literature on the history of the OUN and UPA, some of which is partisan, or otherwise hostile. A useful study that deals with the OUN is John Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 3rd ed. (Englewood, CO: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1990); and chapters 1–4 of Bilinsky, *Second Soviet Republic*.

52. Favorable articles on OUN-UPA appeared in *Narodna armiiia*, 14 October 1992; 16 October 1992; 28 October 1992; 2 February 1993; 4 February 1993; 23 February 1993; and 24 February 1993. The journal of Ukraine's National Guard, *Vii's'ko Ukrainy*, devotes a whole section to the heroic UPA: see no. 1 (1992), pp. 52–80. A very spirited defense of OUN-UPA appeared in *Ukraina*, no. 1 (1993), pp. 18–19.

53. See, for instance, Volodymyr Poniza, "Ne vsim spivaimo slavu!" *Holos Ukrainy*, no. 9 (1993), p. 13.

54. The call for reconciliation between World War II and UPA veterans was published in *Narodna armiiia*, 28 October 1992; 4 February 1993; and 24 February 1993. However, several World War II veterans' groups continue to oppose the rehabilitation of the UPA; see *Narodna armiiia*, 14 January 1993; 23 February 1993.

55. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 6 June 1990.

56. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 25 July 1990.
57. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 12 July 1990.
58. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 21 January 1992.
59. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 23 January 1990; 24 January 1990; and 26 July 1990.
60. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 22 November 1990.
61. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 17 March 1992.
62. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 29 April 1992.
63. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 23 March 1990; 28 December 1990.
64. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 7 August 1991.
65. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 13 June 1991.
66. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 1990: 11 February, 11 April, 19 August, 13 September, 14 October, 1 November, 30 November, 14 December, 16 December, 19 December, 21 December, 22 December, 23 December, 25 December, 26 December, 29 December; 1991: 9 January, 27 February, 28 February, 28 May, 8 June, 14 June, 18 June, 20 June, 21 June, 25 June, 26 June, 27 June, 28 June, 3 July, 5 July, 6 July, 9 July, 10 July, 12 July, 13 July, 18 July, 19 July, 22 August, 23 August, 24 August.
67. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 29 April 1992.
68. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 2 March 1993.
69. Dmitrii S. Likhachev, *Reflections on Russia* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), p. 74.
70. *Moskovskie novosti*, no. 51 (1991).
71. *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 14 January 1992.
72. Radio Rossii, 7 January 1993, as cited in Vera Tolz, "The Burden of Imperial Legacy in Russia," *RFE/RL Research Report*, 22 March 1993.
73. To gain some idea of current Russian views, I have perused the following Russian periodicals and newspapers: *Voprosy istorii*, nos. 1, 2–3, 4–5, 8–9 (1992); *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 (1992); *Molodaia gvardiia*, nos. 1–2, 3–4, 5–6, 7 (1992); nos. 1, 2 (1993); *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, nos. 1, 2, 3, 6–7, 9 (1992); *Grani*, no. 165 (1992); *Kentavr*, October–December 1992, May–June 1992; *Moskva*, nos. 1, 2–4 (1992); *Posev*, nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 (1992); *Iunost'*, nos. 1, 2, 3 (1992); *Oktiabr'*, nos. 9, 10, 11, 12 (1992); *Zhurnal Moskovskoi patriarkhii*, nos. 7, 10, 11, 12 (1991); nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (1992); *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 (1993).
74. *Molodaia gvardiia*, no. 3 (1992); no. 1 (1993); no. 2 (1993); and no. 7 (1993).