

John-Paul Himka

The Place of Religion in the Ukrainian National Revival

Introduction

This article examines two aspects of the problem of religion and nationality in Ukraine: 1) the role of religion in the formation of a Ukrainian national culture and political movement and 2) the impact of nationalism on Ukrainian religious life. The chronological framework is the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, from the emergence of the Ukrainian idea at the turn of the nineteenth century to the first years of independent statehood at the end of the twentieth.

It is necessary to treat separately the historical experience of Ukraine's regions. In this article I will only deal with the two principal regions: Central-Eastern or "Dnieper" Ukraine and Galicia. Dnieper Ukraine was mainly Orthodox. It was part of the Russian empire until 1917 and part of the Soviet Union from 1921 until 1991. Galicia was mainly Greek Catholic (Uniate). It was part of Austria until 1918, part of Poland from 1919 until 1939 and part of the Soviet Union from 1939 to 1991. Both Dnieper Ukraine and Galicia established short-lived independent states in the aftermath of World War I, both experienced German occupation during World War II and both became part of the independent Ukrainian state in 1991. (The specific historical experiences of Volhynia and Polissia, regions which might be considered transitional between Galicia and Dnieper Ukraine, are not covered.)

Religion and the Formation of the Ukrainian National Culture and National Movement

In the Russian Empire

The Ukrainian movement originated in the Russian empire at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century. Conventionally, it is dated from the publication of Ivan Kotljarev'skyj's long poem in the vernacular, *Enejida* (1798), a humorous reworking of Vergil's *Aeneid*. Historians consider the key factors in the movement's emergence to have been: the assertion of its historical rights on the part of the Ukrainian Cossack elite as its specific institutions and local autonomy were abolished and also the impact on this elite of the new all-European ideas (especially Herder's brand of nationalism) and politics (especially through the medium of the Napoleonic wars).

Religion was not a factor in the emergence of Ukrainian identity in the Russian empire, although religion had been an important legitimizing factor in the Cossack uprising against Poland in the mid-seventeenth century. But in the latter

case, the Cossacks had championed Orthodoxy against the Roman Catholic Poles. No such religious difference existed between the epigones of the Cossack elite at the turn of the nineteenth century and the other Orthodox faithful in Russia. The Ukrainian church, i.e., the metropolis of Kyjiv, had come under the jurisdiction of the patriarch of Moscow in 1686. From then through the end of the eighteenth century, the Orthodox hierarchy throughout Russia was largely recruited from the educated clergy of the Ukrainian lands. This had the effect of bringing into being a fairly homogeneous Orthodoxy throughout the empire. Hence religious differences and, indeed, religious motivations of any sort were absent in the original formulation of the Ukrainian idea. No prominent Ukrainian activist in the Russian empire was a clergymen of the Orthodox (or any other) church.

In the mid-nineteenth century, religious motifs did figure prominently in the works of Ukrainian activists. This was most strikingly manifest in the programmatic document of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood, the so-called "Books of Genesis of the Ukrainian People," which argued that Ukraine alone among European nations had preserved intact the Christian principles of brotherly love and equality; for this it had been martyred, but it would arise and lead a universal spiritual renewal.¹ This was, of course, the commonplace claim "to be a chosen people, a holy nation, with some special divine mission to fulfil."²

Related and more heterodox religious imagery also permeated the writings of the pre-eminent national poet, Taras Ševčenko.³ He frequently assumed the role of a national prophet, taking God to task for his sufferance of injustice and calling upon Him to mete out retribution to his people's persecutors. He wrote, for example, in his *Kobzar*: "For without Your will, o God, / we would not languish naked in paradise. / But maybe You Yourself in heaven / are laughing, Father, at us, / and maybe you are even taking counsel with the landlords / about how to govern the world." Ševčenko awaited "the great time / of heavenly punishment."⁴ Ševčenko himself became the object of a national cult after his death; his portrait can be found in many Ukrainian homes, decorated with an embroidered towel just as Ukrainians decorate their icons.

Religious language and imagery in national service was a transitory phenomenon, however. It should be understood as the sacralization of the nation rather than the nationalization of religion.

¹ LUCKYI, George S.N.: *Young Ukraine: The Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius in Kiev, 1845-1847*. Ottawa 1991, 47-51.

² HASTINGS, Adrian: *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism*. Cambridge 1997, 196.

³ Some aspects of Ševčenko's attitude towards Christianity are discussed in CHYZHEVSKY, Dmytro: *Shevchenko and Religion*. In: *Shevchenko and the Critics 1861-1980*. Ed. George S.N. Luckyj. Toronto 1980, 250-65.

⁴ Bo bez Tvojeji, Bože, voli / My b ne nudylys' v raji holi. / A može j Sam na nebesi / Smiiešsja, Batečku, nad namy / Ta, može, radyšsja z panamy, / Jak pravyt' myrom. -- Nastane čas velykij / nebesnoj kary. ŠEVČENKO, Taras: *Tvory v pjaty tomach*. 5 vols. Kyjiv 1978-79. Here vol. 2, 221 and vol. 1, 254-55.

The next generation of activists, exemplified and influenced by Mychajlo Drahomanov,⁵ was consistently secular, anticlerical and agnostic or even atheistic. They formulated the Ukrainian idea in the language of socialism and populism, not of religion. From the 1860s on the Ukrainian movement in the Russian empire was closely connected with socialist and revolutionary currents, and relations between church and national movement can best be characterized as estrangement.

In addition to these political aspects, there was a cultural context to the religion-nationalism relationship. One need not accept every premise of the constructivist view of nationalism to agree with Ernest Gellner's observation that national awakeners do not revive or continue the traditional culture of a people, but rather create a variant of universalistic modern culture using elements of a pre-existing folk culture.⁶ For the theme of this essay, what is important is that the new national culture is therefore fundamentally secular, while the traditional culture it displaces was religious. National culture serves as an exit point from this traditional, religiously infused culture. Hymns give way to symphonies, psalters to textbooks, icons to portraits. Within the new national-cultural perspective the religious becomes invisible.

There are numerous examples of the invisibility of religion within nationalism, but one of the most striking, to my mind, relates to a collection of sermons published in Počajiv in 1794. The sermons had originally been composed in Italian, then were translated into Polish, then into "Slaveno-Ruthenian" (*slavensko-ruskij jazyk*) and finally into "the simple and ordinary Ruthenian language" (*prostyj i zvyčajnyj ruskij jazyk*). The preface notes that in writing in the vernacular the translator faces the problem of an unstandardized language: "It is well known to you, pious reader, that in this simple, common and ordinary Ruthenian speech in Poland, the words and how they are pronounced are different and not the same: in Volhynia they are different, in Podillia and in Ukraine they are different, in Polissia they are different..."⁷ In spite of how self-conscious this book was about the use of the vernacular, it does not figure at all in any historical account of the Ukrainian movement. At the time of its publication, the sort of intellectuals who

⁵ For a thorough account of Drahomanov's views on religion see: KRUHLAŠOV, Anatolij: *Drama intelektualna: polityčni ideji Mychajla Drahomanova*. Černivci 2000, 180-212.

⁶ "This is the age of the birth (or allegedly 'rebirth') of nations, and of the transmuting of low cultures into newly literate high ones." GELLNER, Ernest: *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca, N.Y. 1983, 75. I have discussed this point with reference to the Ukrainian case in *The Construction of Nationality in Galician Rus': Icarian Flights in Almost All Directions*. In: *Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation*. Ed. Ronald Grigor Suny and Michael D. Kennedy. Ann Arbor 1999, 110-12. For thoughtful critiques of Gellner's views, see especially HASTINGS (as in note 1); WALICKI, Andrzej: Ernest Gellner and the 'Constructivist' Theory of Nation. In: *Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk*. Ed. Zvi Gitelman, et al. Cambridge, Mass. 2000, 611-17.

⁷ *Nauky parochial'nyja na nedili i S[vja]ta uročystyja ciloho roku...z Slavensko-Ruskaho na prostyj, i pospolytyj jazyk Ruskij* [Parochial lessons for Sundays and solemn feasts for the whole year...from the Slaveno-Ruthenian into the simple and common Ruthenian language]. Počajiv 1794, foreword [unpaginated].

would formulate the Ukrainian idea were most likely not even aware of its existence, even though the press run was large. A sermon collection simply did not "count." Only the publication of the secular *Enejida* four years later could initiate the Ukrainian national awakening.

Ethnography, which may perhaps be considered the national science par excellence, displays what seems to be an almost willful blindness to the religious elements in the cultural heritage. A fundamental codification of Ukrainian national knowledge, the two-volume encyclopedia prepared by the Shevchenko Scientific Society in the diaspora, devotes three columns to what Ukrainians do on Christmas eve and Christmas day.⁸ Christmas eve, the encyclopedia informs us, "is definitely an agricultural festival and is related to the cult of the family and the commemoration of ancestors." Not a word, of course, is said about any post-pagan significance of this holiday. "Spells" are mentioned, and the custom of touching livestock's heads with bread three times is presented as if this were practiced universally by Ukrainians, but the most obvious thing that happens at Christmas, that which really was universal among the Ukrainians is omitted: they participated in liturgical services.

Ethnographic research was often affected by the religious indifferentism or anti-Christian attitudes of its practitioners. Moreover, pagan roots were eagerly sought in order to establish an ancient pedigree for Ukrainian culture.

Religion fared only somewhat better in history, if distortion is superior to omission. The pre-eminent Ukrainian historian, Mychajlo Hruševs'kyj, looked at religion as simply a phenomenal form of the national. In vol. 7 of his *History of Ukraine-Rus'* (originally published 1909), chapter VII is entitled: "Cossackdom in the Service of Ukrainian National Aspirations: The Kyivan Educational Movement and the Restoration of the Orthodox Hierarchy." Here is the viewpoint put forward in that chapter, so influential on subsequent national historiography, even in its Soviet form: "Cossackdom entered a new era of its existence by rendering an extremely important service to the religious and thus also the national life of Ukraine, and by deliberately, from that time on, making service to Ukrainian national needs in their religious form part of the Cossack program. From that time on, the demand of guarantees for the Orthodox Church -- the Ukrainian national palladium of that time -- became an almost invariable part of the demands and desiderata that Cossackdom set before the government."⁹ Religious history was completely subsumed into the national narrative; it could only be validated by national history.

In the 1920s, when Hruševs'kyj was running the Ukrainian Sociological Institute in exile in Vienna, he wrote a book on religious thought in Ukraine. It dealt sympathetically with freemasons and sects, but not with representatives of

⁸ Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia. Ed. Volodymyr Kubijovyč. 2 vols. Toronto 1963-71. Here vol. 1, 321-22.

⁹ HRUSHEVSKY, Mykhailo: *History of Ukraine Rus'*. 10 vols. Edmonton 1997-. Here vol. 7, 303.

traditional, i.e., Orthodox or Greek Catholic, Christianity, to which it displayed an open hostility.¹⁰

The Soviet Ukrainian identity constructed by the Bolsheviks in this particular regard did not make a radical break.¹¹ It was able to incorporate (but, of course, also to deepen and render virulent) the heritage of the preceding national movement with regard to religion. Under Soviet rule the Ukrainian movement underwent further secularization, as did the branches of Ukrainian humanistic scholarship, such as ethnography.

Religious sensibilities entered Ukrainian national ideology in the dissident movement of the 1960s-80s. Religion and Ukrainian nationalism became bedfellows as both were persecuted by the Soviet authorities, but this was not just an alliance of the outcast. A number of dissidents sought spiritual renewal as much as political change. An exemplary figure among the Orthodox was Jevhen Sverstjuk.

Galicia

Developments were different in Ukrainian lands under Habsburg rule, especially in Galicia. Here religion was an important factor, because the Ruthenians (as the Ukrainians were then known) were of the Greek rite, while their rivals the Poles were of the Latin rite. Moreover, the first generations of activists were almost exclusively bishops, priests and seminarians.¹²

In Galicia the Ukrainian orientation found itself in intense conflict with a competing all-Russian (Russophile) orientation, which claimed that the Ruthenians of Galicia were a branch of the Russian nation. The Russophiles gravitated toward Russian Orthodoxy, and the victory of the Ukrainian orientation in Galicia was connected with the inability of the Greek Catholic church to reconcile itself to religious Russophilism. Subsequently the Galician church developed as a Ukrainian national church.¹³

Here, as in Russian Ukraine, religious imagery was impressed into national service, the most successful example being the poem "Mojsej" of Ivan Franko, in which Moses was emblematic of the national leadership. Again: what was transpiring was the sacralization of the nation rather than the nationalization of religion.

¹⁰ HRUŠEV'S'KYJ, Mychajlo: *Z istoriji religijnoji dumky na Ukrajinu* [From the history of religious thought in Ukraine]. L'viv 1925.

¹¹ The degree to which Communism continued nineteenth-century nationalism is brought out brilliantly in SAYER, Derek: *The Coasts of Bohemia: A Czech History*. Princeton, N.J. 1998. For an interesting contribution which makes a similar point with regard specifically to the Ukrainians, see YEKELCHYK, Serhy: *Diktat and Dialogue in Stalinist Culture: Staging a Patriotic Historical Opera in Soviet Ukraine, 1936-1954*. In: *Slavic Review* 59 (2000): 597-624. Neither of these focus on religion, however.

¹² See the contribution by Anna Veronika Wendland in this volume.

¹³ HIMKA, John-Paul: *Religion and Nationality in Western Ukraine: The Greek Catholic Church and the Ruthenian National Movement in Galicia, 1867-1900*. Montreal 1999. Idem: *The Greek Catholic Church and Ukrainian Society in Austrian Galicia*. Cambridge, Mass. 1986.

The blindness of ethnography to the Christian culture of the peasantry was also in evidence. Ksenofont Sosenko was not only an ethnographer, but also a Greek Catholic priest. Yet, throughout his book on Christmas customs he emphasized ancient pagan roots at the expense of Christian content in the domestic rituals.¹⁴

The estrangement between church and national movement characteristic of the Ukrainian movement in the Russian empire was also known in Galicia, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, but only partially, in the overtly anticlerical wing of the movement, and in great part owing to the direct influence of Ukrainian activists from Russia, especially Drahomanov. On the whole, however, the characteristic outlook in Galicia was a partnership between "God and fatherland," with the latter in practice taking the upper hand.

In the interwar era, the Greek Catholic church in Galicia served as a surrogate state for the Ukrainians under Polish rule. Metropolitan Andrej Šeptyc'kyj carried on active diplomatic activity in the early 1920s in a vain attempt to prevent Galicia's incorporation into Poland. The Greek Catholic Theological Academy which he founded in L'viv in 1928 was intended to "serve as the embryo of a future Ukrainian university."¹⁵

During the late Soviet period Galician dissidents such as Ihor Kalyneč and Ivan Hel' called for the restoration of the Greek Catholic church, which had been driven underground by the Soviet authorities after 1946.

Nationalism and Ukrainian Religious Life

The primary effect of nationalism was to accelerate the modernization and secularization of Ukrainian culture and indeed almost all spheres of life. Yet nationalist intellectuals sometimes developed an interest in the church, particularly in using the church as an instrument of national consolidation. Efforts of this sort were attractive because of the weakness of a Ukrainian consciousness, especially in Dnieper Ukraine.

The second part of this study concentrates not on the role of religion in the formation of the nation, but on the role of the nation in the transformation and even formation of religious confessions.

¹⁴ SOSENKO, Ksenofont: *Kul'turno-istoryčna postać staroukrajyns'kykh svjat Rizdva i Ščedroho večerja* [The cultural-historical form of the old Ukrainian feasts of Christmas and Generous Evening]. L'viv 1928 (reprint Kyiv 1994). Generous Evening is the eve of the feast of the Theophany (Baptism of Christ).

¹⁵ LENCYK, W.: Greek Catholic Theological Academy. In: *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*. Ed. Volodymyr Kubijovyč and Danylo Husar Struk. 5 vols. Toronto 1984-93. Here vol. 2, 94.

State-Building and the Autocephalous Orthodox Churches

The slow progress made by the Ukrainian movement in Dnieper Ukraine in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century resulted in the formation of Ukrainophile circles among Orthodox seminarians and clergy. Just as there were seminarians and young priests influenced by the revolutionary movements, so there were those influenced by the Ukrainian movement. And just as children of priests entered the revolutionary parties, so too children of Ukrainian priests became active in the Ukrainian movement.¹⁶ However, given the repressive policy of the state and the Russification of the Orthodox church in Ukraine, the Ukrainophile clerics could not achieve hegemony in the church. They shared the fate of the Ukrainophile intelligentsia in Dnieper Ukraine more generally, i.e., they remained a minority among their peers.

Nonetheless, in connection with the state-building efforts of 1918-20 and of 1991 on, there have been attempts to create a Ukrainian national Orthodox church, independent of Moscow and championing national aspirations.

The basic circumstances of the interwar experience are discussed in detail in the contribution to this volume by Ricarda Vulpius. Here I will just mention a few points. The major ideologue of an autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodoxy was Volodymyr Čechiv's'kyj, formerly a prominent social-democratic activist and a minister in the government of the Ukrainian National Republic. No bishop could be found to ordain a bishop for the new church, so all the autocephalist clergy and laymen gathered together to lay hands on Vasyl' Lypkiv's'kyj in 1921. This allegedly "Alexandrian" ordination was not recognized as valid by canonical Orthodox churches. The Soviet authorities forced the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church to dissolve itself in 1930 and exiled most of its lay activists in connection with the trial of the fabricated Union for the Liberation of Ukraine. A small separate Ukrainian Orthodox church continued to exist for another six years and then disappeared.

During the late Gorbachev period, in 1990, dissident elements in the Russian Orthodox church proclaimed the revival of the Ukrainian autocephalous church. By the mid-1990s there were two Ukrainian Orthodox churches claiming autocephaly. One, which retained the historical name (Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church), ended up localized in Galicia, where it only held a minority of parishes (the majority of Galician parishes accepted the jurisdiction of the revived Greek Catholic church). The other autocephalous church was the Ukrainian Orthodox church -- Kyivan patriarchate, which enjoyed considerable government support in the first few years of independence and has been dominated by the controversial figure of Filaret (Denysenko), who had been Russian Orthodox exarch of Ukraine in the late Soviet period. But the vast majority of Orthodox in

¹⁶ A prosopographical analysis of the members of the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party in 1904 showed that 17 percent were the children of clergy. BOSHYK, George Y.: *The Rise of Ukrainian Political Parties in Russia, 1900-1907: With Special Reference to Social Democracy*. PhD thesis: Oxford 1981, 282.

Ukraine belong to neither of these autocephalous churches, but to the Ukrainian Orthodox church under the jurisdiction of the patriarch of Moscow.¹⁷

The autocephalous churches have so far persistently remained minority movements. Even at the height of interwar autocephalism in the mid-1920s, only about 1 of 3-7 Orthodox parishes in Ukraine belonged to the autocephalous church (estimates differ, depending on whether or not one counts as Orthodox the revolutionary "Living Church," which also had more parishes in Soviet Ukraine than the autocephalous church).¹⁸ At the end of the 1990s the autocephalous churches held about 2 of 7 Orthodox parishes in Ukraine.¹⁹

Probably there are a number of factors that explain why the autocephalous churches receive such limited support among Christian believers in Ukraine. One would be the long-standing alienation between the church and the national movement in Central-Eastern Ukraine, where in any case the Ukrainian idea has not been as popular as in Galicia and Volhynia. Another would be that the autocephalous churches place a stronger emphasis on national politics than on spiritual sustenance, so that they often appeal to intellectuals who are patriotic, but not really church-goers.

Then too, there is the problem of canonicity. Orthodox believers were leery of the autocephalous church of the 1920s, the head of which received an invalid ordination; the priests of this church did not have valid orders according to the Orthodox tradition, so their confessions and communions were not considered efficacious. Moreover, under the impact of the revolutionary mood of the early twenties, the priests violated many Orthodox traditions; among other things, they shaved their beards and sometimes remarried after ordination. The autocephalous churches of the 1990s did not flagrantly reject Orthodox practices, but many Orthodox objected to what they regarded as serious irregularities.

Characteristic of the situation in Ukraine in the late 1990s was the existence of three hierarchs claiming to be the patriarch of the Ukrainian church. One was the Greek Catholic archbishop major of L'viv, whose claim to being a patriarch has been recognized neither by the Pope nor by any Eastern church.²⁰ A second was the head of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church, Patriarch Dymytrij (Jarema). And the third was the head of the Ukrainian Orthodox church -- Kyjiv

¹⁷ HORJAČA, Marija: Sučasna deržavna religijna polityka [Contemporary state religious policy]. In: Working Papers in Ukrainian Studies, <http://www.unl.ac.uk/ukrainecentre/WP/11.html>.

¹⁸ HIMKA, John-Paul: „Religious Communities in Ukraine.“ In Peter JORDAN, Andreas KAPPELER, Walter LUKAN and Josef VOGL, eds., *Ukraine: Geographie – Ethnische Struktur – Geschichte – Sprache und Literatur – Kultur – Politik – Bildung – Wirtschaft – Recht*, Ostehefte, Sonderband 15. Reihe zu „Österreichische Osthefte,“ herausgegeben vom Österreichischen Ost- und Südost-europa-Institut (Vienna: Peter Lang, 2001): 241-58. [=Österreichische Osthefte 42, no. 3-4 (2000)]. ZAL'MON, B.I. Pravoslav"ia v Ukrajinі (1917-1938) [Orthodoxy in Ukraine (1917-1938)]. In: *Ukrajins'kyj istoryčnyj žurnal*, 2000, no. 3, 125-26, 129 n. 38.

¹⁹ Relihijni orhanizaciji v Ukrajinі stanom na 1 sičnja 1999 roku [Religious organizations in Ukraine, status as of 1 January 1999]. In: *Ljudyna i svit* (January 1999), 24-27.

²⁰ The politics of the issue are well explained in PLOKHY, Serhii: Between Moscow and Rome: Struggle for the Greek Catholic Patriarchate in Ukraine. *Journal of Church and State* 37 (1995), 849-67.

patriarchate, Patriarch Filaret. Having a patriarchate was a matter of prestige and independence, never mind that the Ukrainian churches had been largely out of action for decades, that they had little influence on the population and that their infrastructures were very weak (as indicated, e.g., by the low number of educational facilities and publications).

Recent developments may change the situation of the autocephalous churches. In February 2000 Patriarch Dymytrij of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church passed away, and no patriarch was elected in his place. Negotiations are underway to unite at least the two autocephalous churches and to have the autocephaly of the Ukrainian church recognized by the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople. The presidential branch of the government of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Orthodox church in the USA are working to facilitate this outcome.

Ukrainian Nationalism and the Greek Catholic Church

As to the Greek Catholic church in Galicia, it had emerged as a national church already by the end of the nineteenth century, when Galicia was under Austrian rule. The close association with the national movement had an effect on the clergy's pastoral activity, which often took on a political coloration. Much of priests' time was devoted to national activism, especially in voluntary associations and in electoral politics.

The 1930s brought the Greek Catholic church close to radical-right nationalism. Although bishops condemned the political terrorism practiced by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, many priests and the laity of the Greek Catholic church found it difficult to resist the spirit of the times. Anti-Communist sentiments were very strong in the Ukrainian Greek Catholic church at this time,²¹ as they were in the Catholic church throughout Europe. Ukrainian bishops joined their confrères in the condemnation of the republicans in the Spanish Civil War. Galician churchmen were well aware of what was transpiring in Soviet Ukraine in the 1930s: the mass arrests of Ukrainian cultural activists and the famine precipitated by mass collectivization.

The evils associated with Communism moved some Greek Catholics close to the fascists. A teacher (later professor) at the Greek Catholic Theological Academy, Rev. Dr. Mykola Konrad, argued in 1934 that the modern nationalism of Hitler and Mussolini was in the process of shedding its anti-Christian rhetoric and constituted the genuine hope of Christian Europe. He also saw a synthesis of nationalism and Catholicism developing in Galicia.²²

²¹ KRAWCHUK, Andrii: *Christian Social Ethics in Ukraine: The Legacy of Andrei Sheptytsky*. Edmonton 1997, 95-109.

²² KONRAD, M.: *Nacionalizm i katolicyzm. (Vidbytko z čas. "Meta")* [Nationalism and Catholicism (Offprint from the periodical *Meta*). L'viv 1934. Father Konrad was shot by agents of the Soviet secret police five days after the German invasion of the USSR. He was beatified by Pope John Paul II during his visit to Ukraine in 2001.

During the Second World War, the Greek Catholic church supported the Waffen-SS division "Galizien," composed of Ukrainian volunteers. The hierarchy blessed the division, and Greek Catholic priests served the unit as chaplains. The Greek Catholic clergy also cooperated with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). In these actions, the church was in conformity with the general sentiment prevailing among Galician Ukrainians during the war years. There were limits, however, to how far nationalism would carry the church. The Greek Catholic church was the only Galician-Ukrainian institution that made a significant effort to shield Jews from murder. In particular, the contribution of Metropolitan Andrej was exceptional.²³

In the postwar years the link between Greek Catholic priests and nationalists, especially UPA soldiers, was strengthened as both were fiercely persecuted by the Soviet regime and ended up in the Gulag. Surviving Greek Catholic priests and bishops were released from the camps in the mid-1950s and returned to Galicia. Greek Catholicism was not legally restored, but a Greek Catholic church existed underground. Many Ukrainian patriots in Galicia baptized their children or had their marriages solemnized by underground priests.

In 1989 the Greek Catholic church emerged from the underground. It quickly became the majority church in Galicia, where the population associated it with a heroic record of anti-Soviet, national resistance.

Greek Catholicism gladly accepted the mantle of a national church. However, there has been criticism from within the church that it has gone too far in accommodating nationalism. For instance, Oleh Turij, the deputy director of the Institute of Church History of the L'viv Theological Academy, has identified in the Greek Catholic church "an excessive emphasis on national-political issues by a part of the clergy and lay activists...[which is] drawing it away from its spiritual mission and reviving xenophobic attitudes...."²⁴

Conclusions

Religion contributed little if anything to the formation of the Ukrainian national idea where it originated, in Central-Eastern Ukraine. In fact, the Orthodox church and the Ukrainian national movement were at odds in the late nineteenth and early

²³ POHL, Dieter: Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941-1944: Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens. Munich 1997, 66, 320-22, 352. REDLICH, Shimon: Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi, Ukrainians and Jews during and after the Holocaust. In: Holocaust and Genocide Studies 5 (1990), 39-51.

²⁴ TURIJ, Oleh: Hreko-katolyky, latynnyky i pravoslavni v Ukraini: khto ie khto? [Greek Catholics, Latins and Orthodox in Ukraine: Who is who?]. Postup, 4 November 2000. See also: SENYK, Sophia: A Victim to Nationalism: The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in Its Own Words. In: Het Christeljk Oosten 51 (1999), 167-87. KOTSCHAN, Natalija: Die griechisch-katholische Kirche in der Ukraine heute: Ideologische Hindernisse für den Dialog mit der Orthodoxie. In: Ost-West. Europäische Perspektiven 1 (2000), 135-44. The article by Sister Sophia Senyk drew a rejoinder from Father Peter Galadza at the annual convention of the Learned Societies of Canada, Edmonton, May 2000.

twentieth century. Because Russians as well as Ukrainians mostly adhered to the Orthodox faith, religion was one of the factors that blurred the distinction between the nationalities. In Galicia, however, the Greek Catholic church cooperated with the national movement and took on the characteristics of a national church. Greek Catholicism served to differentiate Ruthenians/Ukrainians from both the Roman Catholic Poles and the Orthodox Russians.

The influence of the national movement on Orthodox clergy and laity in Dnieper Ukraine has twice seen the formation of Ukrainian autocephalous churches, in the 1920s and 1990s. In both cases these national churches were able to gain the allegiance of only a minority of believers. In Galicia the Greek Catholic church was the hegemonic, except when it was banned from the public sphere by the Soviet regime in 1946-89; the church has been deeply affected by nationalism.