

John-Paul Himka

## The Construction of Nationality in Galician Rus': Icarian Flights in Almost All Directions

E. J. Hobsbawm argues that the literature on nations and nationalism entered a particularly fruitful phase in the late 1960s, a phase that marks a turning point in our understanding of the subject.<sup>1</sup> One might make the case that the 1980s marked even more of a turning point, since at this time the emphasis in the literature shifted to the problem of the social construction of nationality and national cultures. The purpose of this essay is to apply the framework of cultural construction developed in the newer literature to the particular case of the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia. It is hoped that this confrontation of the general theoretical literature with a concrete case study will serve both to explore the utility and the limitations of the new thinking on nationalism and to generate fresh formulations and questions with regard to the history of the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia. After sketching the general thrust of the newer literature, the essay that follows will look at different "constructions" that competed or could have competed for the cultural loyalties of the inhabitants of the easternmost extension of the Habsburg monarchy. The people under consideration call themselves Ukrainians in the twentieth century, but in the nineteenth they called themselves *rusyny*, usually rendered in English as Ruthenians. For reasons that will become obvious, I will use the historical name in this essay; I will also make use of their traditional name for their own territory: Galician Rus'.

### ***The Cultural Work of Nationalism***

One of the most striking features of the new literature (especially Hobsbawm, Emil Niederhauser,<sup>2</sup> and Ernest Gellner)<sup>3</sup> is a major displacement of emphasis with regard to the so-called national characteristics. The nationalists themselves and much of the older literature on nationalism emphasized that certain characteristics—particularly language, but also others, including religion, historical experience, and territory—created nations.<sup>4</sup> The emphasis of the new literature is rather that nations create these characteristics. In particular, it has focused on “the invention of tradition” and the *questione della lingua*, that is, on the active role national awakens played in constructing a version of the past and a standard literary language. Where the awakens themselves thought they were only reviving an existing national culture,<sup>5</sup> their most recent analysts think rather that they were creating a new culture.<sup>6</sup> The fullest theoretical development of this view is by Gellner.

Gellner divides the whole of world history into three phases—hunting-gathering, agrarian, and industrial—and postulates that nationalism is a form of politics appropriate to the transition between the second and third phase; in fact, it creates the cultural-political conditions in which industrial society can function. Although Gellner’s framework of industrialism does not seem directly relevant to persistently agrarian Galicia, his view on the cultural work of nationalism certainly is. He postulates that the nationalists create a new cultural amalgam that, on the one hand, contains enough elements of the traditional culture of a particular ethnic community to be accessible to and function as a source of identification for its members, but that, on the other hand, also contains the essential elements of the new universalist culture appropriate to the industrial age. Nationalism thus uses elements of traditional culture to create a new cultural unit that can participate in a larger modern society based on a shared cognitive base and a global economy.<sup>7</sup>

Whether one prefers Gellner’s “industrial culture” or Benedict Anderson’s “print culture”<sup>8</sup> or even the loaded older terms used with regard to a similar conceptualization (e.g., *high culture*, *civilization*, *history*), it is clear that many East Central European peoples developed one of these cultural systems as part of their national awakening. The case of the Ruthenians of Galicia is not untypical in this regard. Before the national awakening, they lacked, for example, their own professional

theater and composers in the classical style—these did not constitute components of the authentic culture of Galician Rus'; but by the 1860s they had both a national theater company and a number of orchestral works with national themes. Such examples of the introduction of new cultural pursuits following models from the general European high culture, but with a national twist, could constitute a long list. Perhaps heading such a list would be the creation, through translation, imitation, and original composition, of a literary medium capable of expressing all the concepts contained in other European literary mediums.

Elements of the traditional culture were incorporated into the new culture, but this was a very selective process.<sup>9</sup> Selectivity is most obvious in the case of language (since, of course, not all dialectical features could be absorbed into a single literary standard), but the principle extends to every one of the national characteristics. Not all customs, for example, found a place in the new national culture. The Ukrainian national culture readily incorporated painted Easter eggs (*pysanky*), which could be taken as an expression of the high aesthetic demands of the folk culture, but the tradition of night courting (*dosvitky, vechornytsi*),<sup>10</sup> which seemed to suggest savagery and immorality, was rejected.

A number of features of the Galician Ruthenian case are particularly interesting.

For example, almost totally neglected or misunderstood by the new literature,<sup>11</sup> but extremely important in the Galician Ruthenian (and, for that matter, the Galician Jewish) case, was what might be termed a "larval stage." Before the creation of the new Ruthenian national culture came a stage in which educated Ruthenians assimilated to Polish culture, that is, into an alien "high" culture. Whether it would have been possible for the Ruthenians of Galicia to have proceeded directly from their traditional cultural environment to the task of creating the new national culture is an open question, but there can be little doubt that this larval stage accelerated the process. The same applies to the creation of a modern Jewish culture on the territory of Galicia at the end of the nineteenth century; until then the Jewish elite had tended to assimilate to German and, later, Polish culture. The Czech national revival also began from a situation in which the better-educated classes were acculturated or at least deeply steeped in German culture. It is within the framework of the recent emphasis on nationalism's creation of a new high culture that the function of this

acculturation becomes clear, even if this point has not been brought out: the very earliest "awakeners," and their predecessors, entered a foreign high culture, which provided them with a model upon which to base a new, national high culture.

Also, in Galician Rus' there was not only an acute *questione della lingua* and fashioning/refashioning of a national language, but a prominent *questione della religione* and fashioning/refashioning of a national religion, that is, a modification of the traditional Greek Catholicism (movements for ritual purification to shed Latin-Polish accretions) or abandonment of it for "the faith of the forefathers" (Orthodoxy). Although there are many other cases in which nationalism has introduced considerable modification into traditional religious practices and allegiances (e.g., the *Los von Rom* movement in Austria, the creation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, the establishment of national patriarchates in the Balkans), this is a topic that has not received the attention it deserves in the literature.

But perhaps of greatest interest in the case of the Galician Ruthenians, at least from the perspective of the national-construction literature, is that in the nineteenth century the Galician Ruthenians elaborated two very distinct and mutually exclusive constructions of their nationality (Ukrainian and Russian), could well have been drawn into a third (Polish), exhibited tendencies toward a fourth (Rusyn), and had at least the theoretical possibility of formulating a fifth (a hypothetical nationality, with serious historical underpinnings, that would have included the peoples now called Ukrainians and Belarusians). This proliferation of real and hypothetical constructions on the basis of a single, socially and culturally rather homogeneous, and territorially quite compact ethnic group would seem to confirm the validity of the new approach to the study of nationality. It would also, however, seem to raise a new question, which can be formulated in different ways: why did some constructions fail and some succeed? how free was the emergent national intelligentsia in its creative work of national-cultural construction? to what degree did the national characteristics after all determine the viability of the national construction plans? The case of Galician Rus' offers unusually rich material for the exploration of this theme. In the remainder of this essay, I will begin the exploration and suggest questions and directions for further research. As an organizing framework, I will examine each of the constructions in terms of the cultural,

political, religious, and social factors influencing its development or lack of development.

### **Natione Polonus, Gente Ruthenus**

The most important question to ask initially is why the Galician Ruthenians did not simply assimilate to the Polish nationality.<sup>12</sup> In the past, the acquisition of a high culture had often been synonymous with adopting Polish culture, not developing Ruthenian culture to a higher level. Thus in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the Ruthenian nobility became polonized, abandoning its ancestral religion and adopting the Polish language;<sup>13</sup> the assimilation of the traditional elite created the situation of the early nineteenth century in which the Ruthenians constituted a largely plebeian people with only a thin stratum of clergy at the (rather low) summit. In the eighteenth century, after Galician Ruthenians accepted the church union with Roman Catholicism, the clergy of the Ruthenian church consisted of an elite of Basilian monks who monopolized episcopal office, received the most lucrative benefices, and acquired a formal education, and also of parish priests who were poor, informally and imperfectly educated, and of such low social prestige that their sons could be enserfed; the former were largely Polish by culture, the latter Ruthenian.<sup>14</sup> Ruthenians who migrated to Galicia's largest city, Lviv, were steadily assimilated to Polish culture until at least some time in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century.<sup>15</sup>

When an entire generation of candidates for the Ruthenian priesthood acquired a higher seminary education as a result of the Austrian reforms of the late eighteenth century, the immediate result was linguistic and cultural polonization. A polonized Ruthenian described the situation in the first half of the nineteenth century:

The education of the Ruthenian clergy . . . acquainted it with the civilized world, showed it various needs and paths. . . . You wouldn't say his wife was the spouse of a Ruthenian priest, because she began to dress up like some countess in hats, scarves, and fashionable dresses; guests from the manor came over frequently, and the reception was lavish.

But if one of the parishioners had need to come over, he did not dare to go right into the chamber, because the floor was washed

and covered with a canvas; instead he went to the kitchen or vestibule and waited as long as it took for the good reverend to come out to him. . . .

The conversation in the house was in Polish, the upbringing and conduct of the children in the house was also Polish.<sup>16</sup>

The polonization attendant upon social and cultural advancement in the early nineteenth century was partly due to the absence of a Ruthenian high culture that could meet the newly created needs of an educated Ruthenian elite; thus a priest of the 1820s who maintained an interest in books perforce read in Polish and other languages, but little in Ruthenian or in the Ruthenian liturgical language.<sup>17</sup>

It seemed, from the vantage point of the early nineteenth century, that there was something like a mathematical formula in operation.

Ruthenian + higher education = Pole

This was certainly how most educated Poles understood the situation. Józef Supiński, for example, writing for *Dziennik Narodowy* in 1848, claimed that Ruthenian was but a dialect of Polish, fine for addressing the common people, but unsuitable for higher purposes. To have access to "all the branches of national knowledge" and to "general European culture," it was necessary to use the standard literary language, that is, Polish. Another author writing in the same newspaper at roughly the same time, Leon Korecki, put it even more simply: "Every Ruthenian is a Pole, since every enlightened Ruthenian to this day uses Polish as his customary language."<sup>18</sup> Also in 1848, the radical democrat Kasper Ciglewicz, himself a polonized Ruthenian, argued that the Ruthenian language was a mere dialect, unsuited to be the vehicle of a higher culture, incapable of expressing the needs of an educated community; the vehicle to meet the needs of educated Galician Ruthenians was, naturally, Polish.<sup>19</sup> Again in the same year, Polish democrats appealing to Emperor Ferdinand I not to partition Galicia into separate Polish and Ruthenian provinces explained to the monarch that

the entire literature of this crownland has developed in the Polish language and exclusively in the Polish language. . . . This language is the binding element of all the educated strata of the population;

this language is used by all Ruthenians insofar as they do not belong to the agricultural class.<sup>20</sup>

To rephrase all this: had things run their "natural" course, all Galicians, even those who were Greek Catholic and spoke various Ruthenian dialects, would have adopted "industrial culture" in its Polish form.

They did not, of course, and the reasons behind this unexpected result form the intellectual problem that awaits exploration and, to the extent possible, resolution.

It will be useful, however, before turning to an exploration of the reasons why Ruthenians did not simply become Poles, to sketch the chronology of the differentiation process. The great caesura was undoubtedly the revolutionary years 1848–49. There were, however, educated Ruthenians who sought to develop an independent national culture before those years. The main examples are Viennese seminarians from the 1820s on<sup>21</sup> and a group of Lviv seminarians in the 1830s and 1840s, the so-called Ruthenian Triad. However, their views did not become hegemonic in educated Ruthenian circles (mainly composed of clergymen) until the revolution of 1848 and its aftermath. There were still *gente Rutheni, natione Poloni* in existence after 1848, but they were small in number by the late 1860s and dropped from sight altogether by the late 1880s.<sup>22</sup>

Students of Ukrainian history have assumed that it was only natural that the Ruthenians did not become Poles, so they have never posed the question of why precisely this did not happen. Thus the present essay is not able to build on the insights of a previous literature that has engaged this question directly, and it cannot do much more than offer a few preliminary observations. We will proceed through our four broad categories: the religious, cultural, political, and social.

When confronted with the emergence of an unexpectedly strong political and cultural movement among the hitherto rather dormant Ruthenians in 1848, Polish publicists attempting to explain this anomaly tended to give a great deal of weight to religious factors. Since, as they conceived it, Ruthenian was but a dialect of Polish and since all educated Ruthenians spoke standard Polish, the emphasis of a national difference between Ruthenians and Poles was clearly an emphasis of the religious difference between the Greek and Roman rite. This view seemed confirmed by the prominence of churchmen in the Supreme Ruthenian Council. Thus Cięglewicz wrote that the attempt of the

Ruthenians to divide Galicia was an attempt to institute "rule by priests," to restore "the times of Moses."<sup>23</sup> The Poles addressing Ferdinand I also explained that the troubles in Galicia were the result of "religious sectarianism" and specifically the ambitions of the Greek Catholic church hierarchy.<sup>24</sup>

Even allowing that such publicists were conjuring up the religious factor to discredit the Ruthenian movement in the eyes of mid-nineteenth-century liberals, they certainly seem to have had a point. The religious division between Poles and Ruthenians was one of the most salient in East Central Europe. Although both Poles and Ruthenians were Catholic, they belonged to different rites, and this latter division—the division between Western and Eastern Christians—constituted a deep cultural cleavage. Single nationalities could be composed of both Catholic and Orthodox, providing they were united by the same Eastern rite (aside from the Ukrainians, the Romanians are an example); they could also be both Catholic and Protestant, since both came out of the same Western tradition (the Germans constitute the classic example, but there are others, including the Slovaks). On the other hand, the differentiation between the Western and Eastern Christian heritage sometimes figured crucially as the fundamental division between nationalities: it marked off Croats from Serbs and East Slavs from West Slavs. Cases in which one nationality incorporated both the Western and Eastern Christian traditions are such singular exceptions as prove the rule.<sup>25</sup> In sum, the divide between Western and Eastern Christianity was one of those religio-civilizational divides difficult to cross, like the divides between Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. It is true that many individuals over the course of history have crossed these divides, especially within the context of intermarriage, but seen in the larger context these have proven rather to be lasting, formative barriers.

Let us add a few more considerations to this: With one exception, all the Ruthenian awakeners before 1848 were priests or seminarians. The Ruthenian leadership in the revolutionary years also consisted largely of priests. Priests continued to dominate the Ruthenian national movement until the 1860s, when the secular intelligentsia (in large part, the sons of priests) took the helm; even then, however, priests served as the most important activists of the movement on the local, village level. Given, then, the unusually strong influence of the clergy in the Ruthenian national movement, perhaps the religious difference between Poles

and Ruthenians took on a greater significance than it would have otherwise. Linguistic obstacles could have been overcome, and perhaps the religious one could have as well, had not priests played so prominent a part in the development of the Galician Ruthenians' national culture. This, of course, brings us back to the view of the Polish contemporaries who saw precisely clerical interests behind the emergence of the Ruthenian movement in 1848.

But we need not single out the relationship between the clergy and the national movement, which sets up the problem somewhat tautologically. We can start instead from a consideration of the weight of the clergy in Ruthenian educated society. Until probably the 1860s priests constituted the majority of all Ruthenians who had acquired any centralized higher education.<sup>26</sup> At least into midcentury they were linguistically polonized. Why did they not then polonize completely? Was it because complete polonization entailed or seemed to entail a change to the Latin from the Greek rite? This was a change that was difficult both psychologically and canonically. In addition, it was a much more impracticable change for clergymen than for laymen: the Greek Catholic clergy was married and could not simply transfer to the Latin rite, which did not accept married clergy; thus even if a Greek Catholic priest somehow managed to overcome the canonical hurdles involved in a change of rite, he would have to abandon his living as a clergyman and enter some new profession.<sup>27</sup> In short, for the vast majority of educated Ruthenians, in the historical period in which the decision was made, total entrance into the Polish national culture was not a real option; running up against the religious barrier to entry, they turned their attention instead to elaborating a separate Ruthenian high culture.

Although the arguments for the impact of religion as the crucial differentiating factor seem fairly strong, there is also something weighty to be laid against them: evidence from three closely related cases suggests that the Eastern rite did not necessarily stand in the way of cultural assimilation to a nationality in which the Western rite predominated. The first case is that of the Greek-rite clergy of the Chełm eparchy, the last surviving Uniate diocese in the Russian empire. The Chełm region was not unlike Galicia: the landlords were Polish-speaking and Roman Catholic, the peasants were Ruthenian-speaking and Greek Catholic. By the 1860s and up until the abolition of the church union and forced conversion to Russian Orthodoxy in 1875, the native Greek Catholic clergy of Chełm eparchy was largely polonized, both

linguistically and politically (even to the extent of supporting Polish insurrectionary activity against the czarist regime). Beginning in the 1860s the Russian government imported Greek Catholic seminarians and clergy from Galicia to serve as a counterweight to the polonized and polonophile native clergy. Relations between the Galicians and the natives were hostile, even though both were clergymen of the same religion and both considered themselves Ruthenians; but the native priests of Chełm also considered themselves, in some way at least, Poles and regularly used the Polish language, while the Galician priests were fanatically anti-Polish. As their confrontation demonstrated, the Galician outcome—that is, the development of a separate, indeed anti-Polish, Ruthenian nationality—was not the only possible outcome of a similar religio-historical starting-point. It should be noted, however, that the situation in the Chełm eparchy was exceptional in some ways; the Chełm region was one of the Ruthenian-inhabited territories most exposed to Polish influence (unlike other Ruthenian/Ukrainian territories in the Russian empire, it had been included in the Congress Kingdom) and the strong attraction of Polish culture evident in the 1860s may have represented a temporary waxing of pro-Polish sympathies connected with the patriotic wave that swept most of the former Polish territories at that time.<sup>28</sup>

The second relevant counterexample is that of the Armenians of Galicia, mainly concentrated in the crownland capital, Lviv. The Galician Armenians, like the Galician Ruthenians, were Uniates, that is, Catholics of the Eastern tradition. They, however, unlike the Ruthenians, were polonized in the nineteenth century and indeed became very prominent representatives of the Polish establishment in Galicia. For example, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the head of the influential Podolian party—the most conservative political grouping in the crownland, anti-Ruthenian and anti-Jewish—was the Armenian Dawid Abrahamowicz. Also, the principal spokesman of the Polish episcopate on social and political issues in the early twentieth century was the Armenian Catholic archbishop of Lviv (and conservative Polish nationalist), Józef Teodorowicz. Again, belonging to the Eastern Christian tradition did not prevent assimilation to a Polish cultural and political identity. However, it should be pointed out that the Armenian community in Galicia was miniscule: Galicia had a total population of over seven million in 1900, of whom a mere 1,532 were

Armenian Catholics.<sup>29</sup> In the mid-seventeenth century, Armenians in Lviv alone had numbered twenty-five hundred, accounting for a tenth of the city's total population;<sup>30</sup> evidently by the end of the nineteenth century many had assimilated so completely to Polish culture that they abandoned their traditional rite and embraced the Latin. It is also well to remember that the Armenians, who came to Galicia as merchants, were concentrated in a Polish urban environment, that is, they were much more exposed to the assimilative forces of the city than were the primarily agrarian Ruthenians.

The third example is that of the Ruthenians of Sub- or Transcarpathia in historical Hungary. Through judicious episcopal appointments, through careful control of the seminaries and the rest of the educational system, and through far-reaching limitations on voluntary associations, the press, and political participation, the Magyar gentry succeeded in fostering a strong Magyarone element in the Greek Catholic clergy of this region. By the early twentieth century most newly ordained priests here seem to have thought of themselves as Hungarian patriots and of their Ruthenianism as a clearly subordinate local identity.<sup>31</sup> Again, however, this is a case that differs substantially from the Galician Ruthenian one, since the Hungarian Ruthenians were a small population exposed to very strong, state-directed assimilatory pressures.

In sum, at least given certain conditions, it was possible for Eastern-rite Christians to assimilate to a cultural identity infused with the Western-Christian tradition. Thus, whatever role religion played in the failure of a Polish construction of Ruthenian nationality, it is difficult to argue that it served as the overriding factor.

The other factors—cultural, political, and social—do not require as detailed treatment as the religious one. By the cultural factor I mean the cultural environment in which the decision not to be Polish was made. The Greek Catholic seminarians and clergymen of the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the “national awakeners” who undertook the construction of a new Ruthenian culture at once national and universal, were exposed to certain intellectual influences and cultural attitudes that did not exist when the old Ruthenian nobility assimilated to Polish culture and that did not, until carefully packaged and delivered, reach the Ruthenian children who came to the city to learn a trade. I mean, of course, the idea of nationality, the vision that every folk should aspire

to its place in the sun and that every son of the people should devote himself to finding (less consciously: creating) that place. To a certain extent at least, I find that the problem of why the Ruthenians did not become Polish is solved when I consult the reading list of the archetypical awakeners, the "Ruthenian Triad" of the 1830s (Iakiv Holovatsky, Markiiian Shashkevych, Ivan Vahylevych). When they were between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four they read the Kralovédvorský manuscript, *Časopis českého musea*, Karadžić, Kopitar, Šafarik, Kollar, Dobrovský, Schläzer, Herder, the Lay of Igor's Campaign, the Polish romantic poets, Russian, Ukrainian, and Polish history, and Ukrainian ethnography.<sup>32</sup> The zeitgeist that drove these young men to such books, and then these books themselves, would seem sufficient to explain the motivation of the work of Ruthenian "awakening" they undertook. They were aware that Ruthenians differed from Poles in a number of respects—religion, alphabet, language, folk customs—and their research indicated the historical basis of these divergences. How—in the early nineteenth century, in this part of Europe, with the education they received and the aspirations they absorbed—how could they not help but *make* something of those differences?

The third factor to be considered is the political one. Of course, it could not be mere coincidence that the revolution of 1848 marked the point of no return on the journey toward the construction of a completely separate national culture. The revolution witnessed not only the first political actions of the Ruthenians—the formation of the Supreme Ruthenian Council, the petition to partition Galicia, participation in parliament—but major milestones in their cultural development: the publication of their first newspapers, the establishment of the Galician-Ruthenian *Matytsia* (an educational-literary association modeled on similar *matice* of other "awakening" Slav nations), the first congress of Ruthenian scholars.

In 1848 the Ruthenians became involved in a process that John Breuilly has described thus:

There is a general tendency for the initial nationalist response to come from culturally dominant groups. The nationalist movements express their case in historic territorial terms. They tend to promote, as a reaction, nationalist movements among culturally subordinate groups which express their case in ethnic and linguistic terms.<sup>33</sup>

In this scenario, the Poles were the culturally dominant group, the Ruthenians the subordinate one. What happened at the outset of the revolution was that the Poles formed their national council with the intention that it serve as the political representative of the entire population of Galicia. The Ruthenians were thus forced into making a choice in a way that they had not been even a few years earlier: would the national council represent their interests? were they Poles too? The revolution was giving a political weight to nationality—for Italians, Germans, Croats, Poles, and many others; it perforce raised the question: did the Ruthenians constitute a nationality too? and if so, what were the implications for them in terms of the development of a national culture?

The question is, then: did national *politics* generate the impetus to the construction of a national culture? Its contributory and accelerative role in the period from 1848 on can hardly be questioned, but what about prior to 1848, when, after all, the national awakening began? There has been solid research demonstrating the pervasive influence of the Polish democratic revolutionary movement of the 1830s on Ruthenian seminarians in Lviv.<sup>34</sup> Some Ruthenians joined underground Polish groups like the Association of the Polish People and became completely polonized; Kasper Ciegiewicz is a prominent example. Others joined that same organization and left it after the Poles refused to add the words "and Ruthenian" to its title.<sup>35</sup> Others remained aloof, such as the members of the Ruthenian Triad, but they could not help but be aware of the Polish conspiratorial movement and assess their relation to it. The point is this: in Galicia nationality was formulated within a political framework from the very inception of the Ruthenian awakening. There is, however, a caveat to be registered: the first stirrings associated with the national awakening can be dated to the 1820s, before the Poles undertook large-scale conspiratorial activity, and located in Vienna, where the Polish presence was minimal and the cultural context more important than the strictly political one.

A final point about Polish politics and Ruthenian culture: during the course of the revolution of 1848–49 there crystallized a very small group of Ruthenians—organized in the Ruthenian Assembly—who supported the anti-imperial, revolutionary politics of the Poles yet also championed the retention and development of a separate Ruthenian cultural identity. The group could not play an important role during the revolution because it lacked the support of either the Ruthenians or

the Poles. The mass of Ruthenians held that their political interests were separate from, indeed opposed to, those of the Poles, and they regarded the Ruthenian Assembly as an instrument devised by their foes in order to divide Ruthenian ranks. As for the Poles, many of them did not care for an organization that promoted Ruthenian cultural separatism. Cieglewicz expressed the view of many Polish democrats when he insisted that Ruthenians retain Polish as the language of cultural interchange; otherwise an effective link binding Poles and Ruthenians into a single political nation would be broken.<sup>36</sup> In sum, the Ruthenian Assembly tried to separate the political from the cultural strand during the revolution; its isolation and irrelevance seem to confirm that the development of a Ruthenian national culture cannot be understood apart from the political dynamics of Polish-Ruthenian relations.

In a recent article, Roman Szporluk argues against Miroslav Hroch's model of a progression of national movements from a cultural to a political stage. Szporluk stresses instead that the development of Ukrainian nationalism in the nineteenth century was preeminently and from the first a political, not a cultural, question and that it was closely linked with the development of two other political questions, the Russian question and the Polish question. The thrust of his argument is not, on the whole, belied by the evidence of the Galician Ruthenian case.<sup>37</sup>

The last factor to be discussed is the social factor, which overlaps to some degree with the previous, political factor. In its starkest form it is this: almost all landlords in Galicia were Polish, almost all Ruthenians were peasants. This had immense political ramifications. In 1848, when the questions of emancipation and terms of emancipation appeared on the political agenda, it determined that the interests of educated Poles and most Ruthenians would be diametrically opposed. It meant that the peasantry, who took an active part in the revolution, opposed the landlord-dominated Polish National Council and supported the Supreme Ruthenian Assembly, in which their pastors took an active part. This in turn made the Ruthenian entrance into politics all the more forceful, since it brought to the revolutionary situation the energy and political clout of the popular masses. While it was easy to dismiss the political opinions of a group composed largely of priests, it was much harder to do so when hundreds of thousands of peasants stood behind them (moreover, these were Galician peasants, infamous throughout

the empire for slaughtering their landlords two years earlier). The continuing antagonism between Polish landlords and Ruthenian peasants in the decades after emancipation was to ensure that the Ruthenian national movement always enjoyed a large popular base.

The social difference between Poles and Ruthenians also had immense cultural implications. The Polish gentry had developed a "high" culture that was linked with the "high" culture of the rest of Europe. This lay at the root of the claim that Polish culture was the natural vehicle for all Galicians who wished to be connected to the achievements of universal culture (European culture, "industrial" culture). The Poles enjoyed a language with words for every item and every concept that existed in contemporary Europe. The Ruthenians had a traditional, "low" culture, a folk culture, and a (intellectually underdeveloped) religious culture that was primitive by the standards of, and incapable of communicating with, Europe. Their language had separate words for branches that had fallen off a tree and branches that were broken but were still attached, since these words came in very handy when gathering fuel in the strictly regulated Galician forests, but it did not have words to express the scientific, technological, and political advances that had been made in Europe and almost no vocabulary for philosophy, philology, and other branches of scholarship. Poles played the piano, Ruthenians the handmade hurdy-gurdy. In short, the social differences between Poles and Ruthenians established the situation that is being explored here: to join the rest of the world culturally, Ruthenians either had to adopt Polish culture or else fashion a culture of their own that could perform the same functions.

But did the social differences not only set up the terms of the problem, but also influence the way in which it was eventually to be solved? I think so. The variant of high culture that the Poles offered was one that had been developed in an aristocratic and gentry context and necessarily incorporated elements from this formative social milieu. This was evidenced in certain linguistic formulations of the standardized language (*Pan mówi*—"You say," but literally "The squire says") and permeated the national historical mythos. It is certainly conceivable that a largely peasant people like the Ruthenians could have assimilated to such a culture, since after all the Polish peasantry eventually did. Yet the national acculturation of the Polish peasantry was a slow process and entailed, perhaps as a necessary condition, the positing of

a mediating identity (articulated by Polish populism or *ludowstwo*). It is probable that the social origins of modern Polish culture had a repellent rather than attractive effect on the Ruthenians.

### ***The Ukrainian and All-Russian Ideas***

From the 1830s through World War I two different constructions of nationality existed and competed in Galician Rus'—the Ukrainian and the all-Russian. Adherents of the Ukrainian orientation maintained that they were of the same nationality as the Ukrainians or Little Russians across the river Zbruch in the Russian empire. Adherents of the all-Russian orientation, or Russophiles (as they are more frequently called in the literature), did not deny this, but they minimized the differences between Little Russians and Great Russians and saw all East Slavs, including the Ruthenians of Austria-Hungary, as part of a single Russian nationality.

The two orientations elaborated different versions of the primary national characteristics. The literary language of the Ukrainophiles, for all purposes, was a mixture of local Galician vernaculars and the emerging standard Ukrainian as represented in the works of Ivan Kotliarevsky, Hryhorii Kvita-Osnovianenko, Taras Shevchenko, and other exponents of the Ukrainian literary revival in Russia. The Russophiles also made use of a Ukrainianized Galician vernacular when they wrote for the peasantry, especially before the turn of the twentieth century, but when writing for the intelligentsia they used either a literary language that approximated Russian (with some concessions to the local vernacular and some homage to the church-Slavonic-based literary language used in Galician Rus' prior to the era of national awakening) or else, particularly in the twentieth century, standard literary Russian.<sup>38</sup> One could quickly glance at a newspaper and know to which orientation it belonged, because Ukrainophile publications generally used the phonetic orthography developed by the Ukrainian writer Panteleimon Kulish, while Russophile publications used the etymological orthography; letters like *ï* and *r* were present in Ukrainophile publications and absent in Russophile ones, while letters like *ѣ* and *ѣ* could only be found in Russophile publications. In the center of the Ukrainophiles' historical myth stood the Cossack period; even though Galician Rus' had not been Cossack territory, the myth was important

because it both expressed solidarity with the Ukrainian nation of the Left and Right Banks and served to fuel the ongoing struggle with the Poles. For the Russophiles the central historical experience was the existence of Kyivan Rus', which united all East Slavs and in which the Galician principality played a prominent role.<sup>39</sup> With regard to religion, the Ukrainophiles sought the preservation of their Greek Catholic church, which distinguished them from both Poles and Russians; the Russophiles gravitated, with varying degrees of consistency, toward Russian Orthodoxy. The two camps developed different names for the people of Galician Rus'. By the latter half of the nineteenth century, they had generated different spellings for the adjectival form "Ruthenian": the Ukrainophiles wrote *rus'kyi*, the Russophiles wrote *russkii*. In the early twentieth century the Ukrainophiles fairly consistently referred to the people of Galician Rus' as *ukraintsi*, the Russophiles referred to them as *russkie*. Thus two fully elaborated conceptions of nationality vied with each other for the loyalties of the Galician Ruthenians.

Before attempting an analysis of the political, cultural, religious, and social factors underlying the formation and determining the fate of the two conceptions, it will be useful to survey their historic fortunes over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is difficult to speak of either a Ukrainian or all-Russian orientation before the 1830s. The vast majority of the population of Galician Rus' were enserved peasants who did not think in categories of nationality. Although the peasants were aware that they were not Poles, or Jews, or Germans—peoples whom they knew from their encounters in Galicia—they would have had no (or at least little) idea of whether they were the same as the people who lived on the banks of the Dnieper or the Volga. The small, mainly clerical elite that had been formed as a result of the educational reforms of the end of the eighteenth century was heavily influenced by Polish culture. Those who had a clear idea that they were not Poles, but Ruthenians, did not yet express this in terms that fit either the Ukrainian or all-Russian conception cleanly. The traditional, preawakening attitude of the Ruthenian elite seems to have been that the Ruthenians of Galicia and the population of Right and Left Bank Ukraine were essentially the same people, different from both the Poles to the west and the Russians to the east. But this traditional, "protonational" sense of community (which was often enough

blurry around the eastern edges) was not the same thing as the Ukrainian conception that surfaced in the 1830s, even though it undoubtedly did much to prepare the ground for its reception.

Both the Ukrainian idea and the all-Russian idea were imported into Austrian Galicia from the Russian empire, and representatives of both conceptions can be identified by the 1830s. At this time, and through the revolution of 1848–49, the Ukrainophile current was stronger and more clearly defined than the Russophile current. The chief representatives of the Ukrainian idea before the revolution were the Ruthenian Triad and their associates at the Lviv seminary as well as the grammarians Iosyf Levytsky and Iosyf Lozynsky. The Ruthenian Triad consciously linked themselves with the Ukrainian literary and folkloric movement in Russian-ruled Ukraine. The Triad's greatest literary talent, Markiian Shashkevych, wrote verse in a language heavily influenced by his reading of Left Bank poets and ethnographers, verse about Cossacks, the steppe, and "native Ukraine" (*ridna Ukraina*). In their famous miscellany *Rusalka dnistrovaia* the Triad included a bibliography of the Ukrainian cultural revival in the Russian empire.<sup>40</sup> As to the grammarians, the titles of their major works identified the language they were codifying as both "Ruthenian" and "Little Russian."<sup>41</sup> During the revolution, the Supreme Ruthenian Council proclaimed that the Ruthenians of Galicia belonged "to a large nation of 15 million,"<sup>42</sup> that is, to a nation including the Ukrainians of the Russian empire, but excluding the Russians. However, this statement should not simply be interpreted as an expression of a full-fledged Ukrainophile framework, since the council in its activities focused almost exclusively on local Galician affairs, did not otherwise discuss the Ukrainian movement in the Russian empire, and did not appeal in its manifestos to the touchstone Cossack heritage. The statement could be understood as an expression of the traditional, protonational sense of "Ukrainian" community that was evident before the 1830s, albeit informed by the work of the Ukrainophile activists of the 1830s and 1840s; the statement was also, as we shall see in a moment, compatible with early expressions of Russophilism. Although some Ruthenian activists took advantage of the revolutionary possibilities to republish some of the works of the Ukrainian literary revival in Russian Ukraine, this was done on a surprisingly small scale.<sup>43</sup>

The all-Russian conception was introduced to Galicia by the Russian pan-Slavist Mikhail Pogodin, who visited Lviv in 1835 and

1839–40 and thereafter carried on an active correspondence with Ruthenian intellectuals. The main proponent of his views in Galicia was the historian Denys Zubrytsky, who became a corresponding member of the St. Petersburg Archaeographic Commission in 1842 and published, in the Russian language, a three-volume history of the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia in the 1850s. Although the all-Russian conception was weak in Galician Rus' prior to the 1850s, it seems to have had more currency than is generally admitted in Ukrainian historiography. The Austrian government, the Greek Catholic church authorities, and Polish political activists sometimes suspected or maintained that the Ruthenian national movement in Galicia was pro-Russian; some of these suspicions and claims were laughably specious,<sup>44</sup> but Ukrainian historiography has not searched very hard to see if there was indeed some fire behind the smoke.<sup>45</sup> During the revolution, some Ruthenian activists published a leaflet addressed to their "German brothers" that was quite Russophile in conception. It declared that "the Russians are ethnically related to us (*uns stammverwandt*); the same Slavic blood flows in our veins; a common history in earlier times, almost the same language, customs, etc., make our Russian brothers dear to our hearts." The leaflet threatened the Austrian Germans that if they continued to leave the Ruthenians at the mercy of their "mortal enemies" the Poles, the Ruthenians would "seek their fortune under Russia's scepter" and work to unite with their "less oppressed brothers in Russia." Interestingly, in spite of its Russophile sentiments, the leaflet declared that "we Ruthenians [are] an as yet unrecognized people of 15 million."<sup>46</sup>

In the decade of reaction that followed the revolution, the all-Russian conception made important advances in Galician Rus'. Many of the former associates of the Ruthenian Triad abandoned their previous views in favor of the vernacular language and Ukrainian identity and instead began to promote a literary language closer to Russian and an all-Russian national identity. Among the new Russophiles were some of Galician Rus's most prominent intellectuals—the poets Ivan Hushalevych and Nykolai Ustyianovych, the future journalist Bohdan Didytsky, and the future historian Antonii Petrushevych.<sup>47</sup> But undoubtedly the most important defector from the Ukrainophile position was an original member of the Ruthenian Triad, Iakiv Holovatsky. With Shashkevych dead and Vahylevych compromised by his cooperation with the Poles during the revolution, Holovatsky was the sole heir to the Triad's legacy, which he used after 1851 to promote his

newly adopted, Russophile view. Moreover, as professor of Ruthenian language and literature at Lviv University, Holovatsky was well placed to influence the younger generation of the Ruthenian intelligentsia (until 1867 when he was dismissed from the university and emigrated to Russia). During this same period, the 1850s, proponents of the Russophile conception, including the very talented Didytsky, dominated the editorial offices of the Ruthenian periodical press. The Ukrainian conception had by no means died, but it did not exhibit the same dynamism that Russophilism did in the 1850s.

In the next period, from 1860 to 1882, the two conceptions waged open intellectual war, and the Russophiles clearly constituted the stronger camp. The Ukrainophiles had regrouped in the early 1860s around a series of short-lived but explicitly Ukrainian periodicals. They consolidated their forces beginning in the late 1860s, after the introduction of the Austrian constitution: in 1867 they established the journal *Pravda*, in 1868 the adult-education society Prosvita, and in 1880 the newspaper *Dilo*. They made steady progress from the late 1860s on but did not begin to outpace the Russophiles until the mid-1880s at the earliest. The Russophiles also laid institutional foundations in this period, establishing the newspaper *Slovo* (1861), the Kachkovsky Society to promote adult education (1874),<sup>48</sup> and the Society of Russian Ladies (1879).<sup>49</sup> The popularity of the Russophile conception increased in the 1860s as a result of the constitutional rearrangements in the Habsburg monarchy, which left the Polish nobility in control of Galicia; the loyalty of the Galician Ruthenian intelligentsia to the Habsburg dynasty was firmly shaken by this disposition, and the notion of Russian irredentism began to look more attractive.<sup>50</sup>

From 1882 until the turn of the twentieth century Russophilism waned in popularity, while Ukrainophilism made rapid and irreversible progress. The turn in the fortunes of the Russophile camp came in 1882 when one of the leading Russophile propagandists, the priest Ioann (Ivan) Naumovych, encouraged the inhabitants of the village of Hnylychky to petition the government that they be allowed to change their religion from Greek Catholicism to Orthodoxy. Both the Austrian government and the Vatican had been concerned about the spread of Russophilism for some time, but the Hnylychky incident was to prove the straw that broke the camel's back. Working together, the state and ecclesiastical authorities mounted an energetic campaign to combat Russophilism among the Greek Catholic clergy and among the intelli-

gentsia at large. Measures included the forced resignation of the reigning metropolitan of Halych, a purge of his consistory, a Jesuit-led reformation of the Greek Catholic monastic order, a public trial of leading Russophiles on charges of high treason, the excommunication of Father Naumovych, the reorganization of ecclesiastical boundaries, the selection of politically reliable bishops, a closer surveillance of the movement of people and literature across the Russian-Austrian border, and the hounding of the Russophile press. The result was the creation of a climate in which Russophilism found it difficult to flourish. It is perhaps impossible to assess how much the decline of Russophilism in the late nineteenth century was specifically the result of the interventions of the Austrian state and the Vatican and not the culmination of a natural process of expansion on the part of the Ukrainophile movement. Russophilism did not, of course, disappear, but it was weaker in the late nineteenth century than it had been earlier, more localized (particularly in the westernmost Ruthenian settlements, i.e., in the Lemko region), and more of an old man's party. By contrast, the Ruthenian national movement connected with the Ukrainian orientation grew by leaps and bounds in this period, covering the countryside with a network of reading clubs and other voluntary associations,<sup>51</sup> politically differentiating into four camps (national democratic, radical, social democratic, and Christian social), establishing an academy of sciences (the Shevchenko Scientific Society), and formulating the goal of erecting an independent Ukrainian state.<sup>52</sup>

The turn of the twentieth century saw a number of changes in the situation of the Russophiles. Losing support in Galician Ruthenian society, the Russophiles began to depend much more on outside patronage. From 1898 until 1908 they enjoyed the support of two Galician lieutenants (*namisnyky*) associated with the conservative Polish Podolian party, namely Counts Leon Piniński (1898–1903) and Andrzej Potocki (1903–8). How the curious alliance between the Polish-chauvinist Podolians and the Russophiles came to be is a somewhat more complicated story, but the main point is that the Podolians had come to the conclusion that the Russophiles made a useful counterweight to the much more dynamic and socially more radical Ukrainian movement. The alliance ended when a Ukrainian student assassinated Lieutenant Potocki and Vienna decided to take the lieutenancy out of the Podolians' hands and give the post to someone who could come to an understanding with the Ukrainians. It was fortunate for the

Russophiles that the assassination of Potocki and the loss of the lieutenant's patronage occurred in 1908, the year of Austria's annexation of Bosnia. As a result of that incident, the Russian government, which had always given clandestine material support to the Galician Russophiles, redoubled its efforts. It launched a major campaign to propagate Russian Orthodoxy in Galicia (unsuccessfully) and among Galician immigrants in North America (in part successfully). It also planted articles in the British press to suggest that Galicia was *Russia irredenta*.<sup>53</sup> In this situation the Russophiles became more distinctly than ever before foreign agents of Russian czarism. Facing persecution, a number of Russophile leaders fled to Kyiv in Russian-ruled Ukraine. There they established the Carpatho-Russian Liberation Committee in August 1914. A month later the committee found itself in Lviv, where it assisted the Russian occupation authorities. The Russians held Galicia until June 1915 and returned to its easternmost portion for a year in 1916–17. Particularly during the first occupation, the Russian civil and ecclesiastical authorities attempted to suppress the Ukrainian movement and convert the population to Russian Orthodoxy. They were not very successful in accomplishing these aims, although they would have achieved more had the Habsburg government and military not undertaken preventive incarcerations and executions of thousands of real and suspected Russophiles on the eve of the Russian invasion. The main Austrian internment camp for Galician Russophiles was located in the Styrian village of Thalerhof, which became for the postwar Russophiles an important symbol of the sacrifices they had made for their cause and of the perfidy of the Habsburg government and its Ukrainian collaborators.<sup>54</sup>

Also since the turn of the century the Russophiles underwent ideological differentiation. The movement split between the youth and their elders, the so-called *novokursnyky* and *starokursnyky*, respectively. The new tendency, formalized in the establishment of the Russian National Party in Lviv in 1900, was more consistently Russian than the older Russophilism. The *novokursnyky* used Russian, unadulterated by Galicianisms and Old Church Slavonicisms, as their literary language. They openly championed Russian Orthodoxy and often converted to that faith. They traveled to Russia frequently and met with government agents there. They were the ones who founded the Carpatho-Russian Liberation Committee and placed themselves at the service of the

Russian occupation regime, which they, of course, regarded as a regime of national emancipation.

By this time, however, the Russophiles were already marginalized in Galicia and the Ukrainian conception was hegemonic. In the 1907 elections, for example, the Ukrainophiles sent twenty-two deputies to parliament (seventeen national democrats, three radicals, two social democrats); the Russophiles sent five.<sup>55</sup> The strength of the Ukrainian movement is perhaps best indicated by the political success it enjoyed in its struggle with the Poles. By the eve of World War I it had won major concessions from the Polish ruling elite: significantly increased representation in the Galician Diet and a Ukrainian university in Lviv. (The outbreak of world war and the collapse of Austria-Hungary, however, prevented these concessions from being implemented.) When the Habsburg monarchy disintegrated, the Ukrainians of Galicia proclaimed the Western Ukrainian National Republic in November 1918. After being driven from Galicia by Haller's army in the summer of 1919, the Ukrainian Galician Army joined the struggle for national independence in the formerly Russian Ukraine. At its maximum strength the Ukrainian Galician Army numbered seventy to seventy-five thousand men, including reserves. Although the Ukrainians failed to achieve independence in the aftermath of World War I, the experience of proclaiming a Ukrainian state and of waging war to retain it established the Ukrainian idea in the Galician population even more deeply and extensively than before.

There is little point in outlining the history of the Ukrainian conception after World War I, since the story is well known: Galicia became the major center of Ukrainian nationalism in the interwar era, retained its Ukrainian consciousness through the Soviet period,<sup>56</sup> and has emerged today as the greatest stronghold of nationalism in independent Ukraine.

Russophilism survived the world war, but barely. The struggle for Ukrainian independence brought youth and peasants into the Ukrainian movement who might otherwise have replenished the ranks of the Russophiles. The collapse of czarist Russia and its replacement by Bolshevik Russia was also a severe blow. There was a segment of the Russophiles, however, who were left-leaning and Sovietophile. Although they formally abjured their Russophilism to enter the Communist Party of Western Ukraine, they soon came into conflict with the Ukrainian

national Communists in the party.<sup>57</sup> Other Russophiles managed to hang on owing to the support given to Russophile institutions by the Polish government in the interwar era. Taking their example from the Podolian tactics of the early twentieth century, Polish governments deliberately fostered Russophilism in hopes of dividing the loyalties of the Galician population. This tactic had little success, however; apart from adherents in the Lemko region in the extreme west, the Russophiles in Galicia were few and aging. The Russophile movement in Galicia did not survive World War II and the Soviet period, although there was one curious attempt to rehabilitate the Russophile legacy during the years of the Thaw.<sup>58</sup>

Let us turn now to a consideration of our four factors and begin with the political, since its salience, particularly with regard to the all-Russian idea, is so evident from the foregoing sketch. With the possible exception of their emergence in the 1830s, every major turning point in the Russophiles' fortunes was connected with a political event: the failure of the revolution of 1848–49, the constitutional reorganization of the Habsburg monarchy in the 1860s, the purge of 1882, the aggravation of Austro-Russian tensions in the early twentieth century, World War I, the Russian Revolution, the Soviet annexation of Galicia. The moment of its emergence constitutes only a possible exception, since it did coincide with the decade in which Polish conspiratorial activity in Galicia was at its height.

Russophilism was also an expression of the most elementary political logic, clearly formulated, for example, in the leaflet addressed to the "German brothers" in 1848. The exact same political logic led Kyiv Metropolitan Iov Boretsky to appeal to the Russian czar in 1624 to protect the Orthodox faith in Ukraine against Polish persecution, led the leader of the anti-Polish rebellion, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, to swear loyalty to the czar at Pereislav in 1654, and brought together Russian agents and Ukrainian peasants and Cossacks in the anti-Polish *haidamaka* rebellions of the eighteenth century. (This logic also, of course, worked the other way around: in 1658, after falling out with Muscovy, Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky signed the Hadiach treaty with Poland, in 1708 Hetman Ivan Mazepa concluded an alliance against Czar Peter I with King Stanisław Leszczyński of Poland, and in 1920 the Ukrainian National Republic renounced its claims to Galicia in order to make an alliance with Poland against their common enemy, Soviet Russia.)

The political logic involved in Russophilism was so elementary and compelling that it found its counterparts even outside the Ruthenian intelligentsia, among peasants of the 1860s to 1880s who hoped that the White Czar would come to Galicia and slaughter the Polish landlords and the Jews,<sup>59</sup> and even outside Galicia, Czech Russophilism being perhaps the best-known example, although directed against the Germans rather than the Poles.

But did a political alliance with the Russians against the Poles necessarily entail the adoption of a conception of all-Russian nationality? Could the Ruthenians of Galicia have followed, say, the Czech pattern of Russophilism, that is, political orientation on Russia without submerging their own specific nationality?<sup>60</sup> Since the terms of an alliance are set by the stronger partner, in this case Russia, the same questions might be reformulated as follows: Would Russia have been interested in a pro-Russian political orientation in Galician Rus' that did not involve a sense of unity that was more than the general Slavic unity expressed in Czech Russophilism?

On the whole, it is unlikely: for most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the political and intellectual climate in Russia was not conducive to the view that Ruthenians—who worshipped in the same tongue and manner as the Russians, who made use of the same alphabet, who sprang from the same cradle of Kyivan Rus'—stood in the same relation to the Russians as the Slovaks or Czechs. Russia did find tolerable a local, Galician or Carpathian, distinctiveness; in fact the interchange of cadres between various local (Rusyn, Lemko) orientations and the Russophile orientation in Transcarpathia and the Lemko region has demonstrated historically the fundamental compatibility of a strictly local identity and an all-Russian identity. In fact, even a certain (but limited) recognition of a general "Ukrainian" distinctiveness has been acceptable even to extreme Russian chauvinists.<sup>61</sup> The development of the Ukrainian movement in Dnieper Ukraine, for example, owed much to the Russian government's russifying policies in Right Bank Ukraine in the 1830s and most of the 1840s; the government gave support to the Ukrainian movement in an effort to eradicate Polish influence in the "Southwestern Land" after the November insurrection. However, when the Ukrainian movement turned overtly political, with the establishment of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood in 1845, the government changed its attitude completely, arresting the brotherhood's members in 1847 and persecuting their successors over the next

seventy years. To make what could be a long story short: from 1850 until 1917, when Russophilism was most evident in Galicia, the dominant partner in the political alliance, Russia, could work with a pro-Russian political orientation that admitted of a certain local distinctiveness; it was absolutely not, however, prepared to make common cause with a political orientation that included an emphasis on Ukrainian distinctiveness as part of its program. Or to put it another way: generally, neither Russia nor its clients in Galicia denied the ethnographic and linguistic evidence and the historical record that pointed to both Ruthenian distinctiveness from the Russians and Ruthenian traits shared with the Little Russians of the Russian empire, but they denied and opposed the view that this distinctiveness and these shared traits had political meaning or could form the basis for a separate national culture of the "industrial" variety (the latter point will be discussed below).

To understand the appeal of Russophilism, it is important to be clear about the political advantages the Ruthenian Russophiles gained from their orientation on Russia. There were, as I see it, three. First, the Russophiles had the backing of a Great Power. Although converting the political prestige this brought into concrete advantages was not a straightforward matter, it could be done. Certainly the Austrian government had to proceed more gingerly with its Ruthenian population than it would have, had its huge neighbor not been looking over its shoulder. Feeling the power of Russia behind them also, of course, had an effect on the Russophiles' political psychology, imbuing them with confidence. Second, and much more concretely, the backing of Russia translated into considerable material support for the Russophile movement. Already in the 1850s the Russian government and Pogodin had sent money to Zubrytsky, who was old and infirm.<sup>62</sup> In the 1860s and early 1870s Russia needed the Galician Russophiles to help them depolonize, russify (and eventually convert to Russian Orthodoxy) the Uniate church in the Chełm region; in consequence of this action close to 150 Galicians settled in the Chełm region and occupied well-paying positions that would not have been available to them otherwise. In the late 1870s and 1880s, in the context of Austro-Russian tensions over the Balkans, the Russian government gave huge subsidies to the Galician Russophile press.<sup>63</sup> After Naumovych was deprived of his parish, Czar Alexander III sent him a thousand rubles.<sup>64</sup> And, of course, after Austria annexed Bosnia in 1908 the material support from Russia increased even more. Third, the Russophiles, especially in the early twentieth

century, looked to Russia to liberate the Ruthenians from Polish domination by annexing Galicia to Russia, a dream that came to fruition for some months during World War I.

So much for the political aspects of the all-Russian idea. What about the politics of the Ukrainian idea? Certainly at first glance and seen through the prism of the Russophile situation, the idea of constructing a separate Ukrainian nationality seemed politically ludicrous. Who were the Galician Ukrainophiles' allies? One might answer: a small, politically persecuted group in another country, with few material resources at its disposal and absolutely no clout. But this answer is not quite correct. For all their weakness, the Ukrainophiles of the Russian empire were not an entirely negligible ally. By social origin they were mostly descendents of the Cossack *starshyna* or officer class, and hence of gentry status, and hence also by and large of greater wealth and higher social prestige than their Galician counterparts, who were priests and priests' sons. Someone someday should make a detailed list of all the material aid that Ukrainophiles from Russia gave the Galician movement. They contributed money to publish *Pravda*, they were the main benefactors of the Shevchenko Society, they were the primary source of income of the press associated with the Ukrainophile radical current. I would not be surprised to learn that the sum total of their contributions approached that of Russia's investment in the Russophiles. As to political clout, there were those who had it. The great intellectual patron of the Galician radicals, Mykhailo Drahomanov, enjoyed some prestige in left-wing and scholarly circles throughout Europe and was able to plead the Galician Ukrainophiles' case in the Russian and European press. Volodymyr Antonovych had connections among the Polish aristocracy that he was able to use to facilitate the establishment of a chair of Ukrainian history at Lviv University, filled by his student Mykhailo Hrushevsky.

Moreover, the Ukrainophiles of Dnieper Ukraine proved to have certain advantages as allies that Russia lacked. When Russians in Russia had something important to say, they published either in their own excellent journals in Russia or, if the content would be too irritating to the czarist censorship, in equally excellent Russian-language journals published in London, Geneva, or elsewhere in Western Europe. They do not seem ever to have considered Lviv's *Slovo* or Kolomyia's *Nauka*. By contrast, the Ukrainophiles of Russia, suffering under an intermittent, but constraining, publication ban for most of the period after 1863,

frequently published their works, including some of their best works, in Galician Ukrainophile periodicals and printing establishments. Already by the 1870s this difference in the amount of exported intellectual capital had produced the paradox that Drahomanov was fond of pointing to: for all their love of Russia, the Russophiles knew the least about it and were the least influenced by its cultural-intellectual life, which was generally on a much higher plane than Galicia's; the Ukrainophiles, on the other hand, were, through the mediation of modern Ukrainian literature, au courant with all the latest Russian trends.<sup>65</sup> Related to this is the fact that the "brain drain" phenomenon worked to the advantage of the Ukrainophiles and to the disadvantage of the Russophiles. Many talented Ukrainophiles, fleeing persecution or for other reasons, emigrated from the Russian empire to Galicia; examples include Paulin Świącicki and other Ukrainophiles who participated in the Polish insurrection and settled in Galicia in the 1860s, the above-mentioned Hrushevsky, the future ideologue of Ukrainian integral nationalism Dmytro Dontsov, and many others. There were enough political émigrés in Lviv in 1914 to form the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (the pro-Austrian Ukrainophile equivalent of the Carpatho-Russian Liberation Committee). By contrast, I cannot name a single Russian of note who settled in Galicia and put his or her talents at the disposal of the local Russophile movement. I can, however, name hundreds of Galician Russophiles who left Galicia for non-Carpathian Russia, including some of the movement's most prominent leaders, such as Holovatsky and Naumovych.<sup>66</sup> In sum, the Ukrainophiles of Russia made better political allies than might at first sight appear to have been the case.

Furthermore, just as the all-Russian idea found favorable conditions for development in the complicated geopolitical constellation of the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, so too did Ukrainophilism. It took some time, but the Austrian state eventually came to realize that the Ukrainian movement could serve as an ally in the struggle with Russia and its supporters among the Ruthenians. One might distinguish three phases in the Austrian state's support of the Ukrainian movement. In the first phase, Austria had no particular intention of promoting the Ukrainian idea as such, of which it remained suspicious; it was only interested in stifling Russophilism. The persecution of the Russophiles, however, worked to the advantage of the Ukrainophiles.

The clearest moment of this phase came in 1882. In the second phase, Austria made the conscious choice to favor the Ukrainians over the all-Russians; this was unambiguous by 1908. In the third phase, Austria supported the Ukrainian movement also with a view to partitioning the Russian empire; this phase came, of course, in 1914. In the first phase, then, Austria's attitude to the Ukrainian movement ranged from hostile to indifferent, but its actions favored it; in the second phase Ukrainophilism was viewed as at least the lesser of two evils, and in the third phase as a useful instrument.

During most of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Ukrainophiles themselves did not see Austria as much more than a lesser evil. They did not have for it the enthusiasm that the Russophiles had for Russia. They made formal declarations of loyalty, but they had already lost in the 1860s the devotion to the Austrian state and Habsburg dynasty that had marked the Ruthenians in 1848–49. Only in 1912–14, when the smell of war was in the air, did they develop a strongly pro-Austrian position, in the formulation of which political émigrés from Russian-ruled Ukraine, notably the young Dmytro Dontsov, played a prominent part.<sup>67</sup> Although subjective relations between Austria and the Ukrainian movement in Galicia were tepid until the eve of the Great War, although Russian nationalists' assertions that Austria instigated the Ukrainian movement there cannot be taken seriously,<sup>68</sup> it is nonetheless clear that the objective relation of Austria to the Ukrainian movement created a political environment in which it could flourish.

There is a subtler and more complicated point to make about a political constellation favoring the development of the Ukrainian idea in Galicia. It has gone virtually unnoticed in the literature, unless one counts the Russian nationalist assertion that the Ukrainian movement was both an Austrian and a Polish intrigue. We might introduce the point by recalling what Ivan L. Rudnytsky had to say about Russophilism as a renunciation of Polonism: "The rupture with Polish society was so difficult that the generation of Ruthenian intellectuals which had effected the break tended to lean to the opposite direction."<sup>69</sup> Indeed, many of the Russophile leaders had been Polish patriots in their youth, including Naumovych and even Zubrytsky, who served as a secretary to the pro-Napoleonic Polish forces that occupied Lviv in 1809.<sup>70</sup> Russophilism was a complete, radical break with the Polish

past; it was, in fact, the conclusion of an anti-Polish alliance with the Poles' most powerful and ruthless enemy. Ukrainophilism did not go this far.

The Russophiles always maintained that their Ukrainian rivals were covertly sympathetic to the Poles and that they themselves were the "hard Ruthenians" (*tverdi rusyny*), uncompromising in their anti-Polish politics. Although this posture became a bit embarrassing for the Russophiles by the late 1890s, when they found themselves under the patronage of the Podolians, it was based on authentic historical experience, primarily of the 1860s. During the Polish insurrection of 1863–64 in Russia, many Galician Ukrainophiles sympathized with the insurgents, while all Russophiles sympathized with the Russian government and its military. Not long thereafter, in 1869–70, some liberal Ukrainophile leaders, notably Iuliian Lavrivsky and others associated with the periodical *Osnova*, tried to reach a compromise with the Poles and end the Polish-Ruthenian struggle in Galicia.<sup>71</sup> I would identify, further, one more decade in which Ukrainophilism's anti-Polish edge was rather blunted: the 1830s. The Ruthenian Triad asserted its own cultural distinctiveness, but it did not make an issue of opposition to the Poles. Indeed, the members of the Triad relied on a Polish library for information about the Little Russian and all-Slavic world, Shashkevych penned the odd verse in Polish, and, when the moment for political action arrived, Vahylevych cooperated with the Polish camp.

If we consider the pressures of public opinion in 1830s Galicia, we might have a better understanding of why the construction of Ruthenian nationality took the Ukrainian form instead of the all-Russian form at that time. The number of intelligentsia of Ruthenian origin was still small in the 1830s and, of course, almost exclusively clerical. The tone in polite society, to which these members of the new Ruthenian intelligentsia aspired, was set by the Polish gentry. The decade opened with the Polish insurrection of 1830–31 against Russia and its brutal suppression. The climate of public opinion in Galicia was therefore strongly anti-Russian, and Polish national sensitivities were enflamed. It would have been very difficult at that time for members of the fledgling Ruthenian revival to have embraced a pro-Russian, anti-Polish program. Ukrainophilism was a form of Ruthenian nationality construction that was psychologically easier to embrace. Furthermore, in the 1830s there existed a tendency in Polish political and cultural life that allotted space for the Ukrainophile construction; this tendency was

articulated in the emergence of "the Ukrainian school in Polish literature."

In fact, a very similar situation recurred in the 1860s, the second epiphany of a relatively Polonophile Ruthenian Ukrainophilism. Again, the Poles in the Russian empire rose in revolt and were brutally crushed, and Polish patriotic feeling in Galicia ran high. By now, it is true, the Ruthenian movement had acquired a critical enough mass of adherents and had gone through enough political wrangling with the Poles during the revolution so that there were many, indeed the majority of the Ruthenian intelligentsia, who accepted the Russophile program. There were also, however, those Ruthenians who considered such a political stance indecent. And again, as in the 1830s, the Ukrainophile Ruthenians could find sympathizers in the Polish camp, since the 1860s produced the Ukrainophile *chłopomani*, primarily Poles of Right Bank Ukraine, some of whom, such as Paulin Świącicki, settled in Galicia and took an active part in the revived Ruthenian Ukrainophile movement.

The point, then, is that links with the Poles worked to promote the Ruthenian Ukrainophile construction in two of its most crucial decades, the decade of emergence (1830s) and the decade of revival (1860s).

There is one final aspect of the politics of Ukrainophilism versus Russophilism that deserves attention. Ukrainophilism was a more democratically oriented movement than Russophilism. Ukrainophilism took a positive view of the peasant vernacular and supported the liberal, democratic Ukrainophile opposition in the Russian empire. As Ivan Holovatsky wrote (disapprovingly) to his brother Iakiv in 1852, "These Ukrainians are ready for anything—for the sake of love of the people" [khakhly na vse gotovy—radi narodoliubii].<sup>72</sup> Russophilism also had some democratic tendencies (for example, the activities of Father Naumovych as publisher of popular literature for the peasantry and founder of the adult-education Kachkovsky Society). But, ultimately, it both denied that the peasant speech could form the basis of a legitimate literary language and allied itself with the most reactionary power in Europe. The founder of the movement, Zubrytsky, was so reactionary that he defended the institution of serfdom both before and after its abolition in Galicia in 1848.<sup>73</sup> From the viewpoint of midcentury, it was perhaps not clear whether Europe would evolve in the direction of democracy or not. By the turn of the century, however, the

victory of the democratic conception seemed assured. Less than two decades later the Russian autocracy would fall. Ukrainophilism was, in short, better situated to ride the wave of all-European political developments than was Russophilism.

We turn now to an exploration of the cultural dimension of the Ukrainian and all-Russian constructions. As generally presented in the Ukrainian historiography, the Ruthenians' cultural choice of a Ukrainian identity was a fully natural choice, in fact, not even a choice, but merely the expression of the preexisting cultural identity. In language, religion, folkways, historical consciousness, the Ruthenians of Galicia were basically the same as other Ukrainians, albeit with certain local variations. This is a viewpoint that cannot withstand sustained criticism, either from the theoretical side (if we accept the theoretical framework of the construction of a new "industrial" national culture) or even from the empirical side (who determines whether Lemko or Ukrainian is a dialect or a language? is the religious difference between Galician Greek Catholicism and Dnieper-Ukrainian Russian Orthodoxy so minimal as to be discounted? are not agricultural settlement patterns radically different in Galicia and Left Bank Ukraine? how common were Cossack *dumy* in Galicia?). Yet, when all is said and done, there is something to the standard Ukrainian argument, particularly with regard to the issue that the national revivals seemed to have cared most about—language. Literary Ukrainian, as it was first formulated by the writers of the Ukrainophile movement in Russian-ruled Ukraine, was almost perfectly intelligible to Galician Ruthenians, educated or not. As the Ukrainophile movement in Galicia itself developed, it contributed to the further refinement of literary Ukrainian, bringing it even closer to the vernaculars spoken in Galicia.<sup>74</sup> Russian was more distant, intelligible to those Ruthenians who had had a higher education, difficult for the rest. A similar case, although not quite as strong, could be made about the correspondence of folkways and historical consciousness (shared Polish past with the Ukrainians of the Russian empire, shared absence of old Muscovite cultural roots), and an only somewhat weaker case could be made with regard to religion (Uniatism and other westernizing tendencies within Orthodoxy as a phenomenon historically shared by Ruthenians and Ukrainians of the Russian empire, absent among the Russians). To put this all more precisely: the Ukrainian construction could accommodate more elements of the preexisting culture(s) of Ruthenian Galicia than could the all-Russian construction.

But there is a rich paradox concealed here. It can be argued that in fact the Ukrainophiles made a much more radical break with linguistic tradition than did the Russophiles, that the Russophiles were truer both to the linguistic traditions of the Ruthenian/Little Russian/Ukrainian people and to the contemporary linguistic practice of the autochthonous population of Dnieper Ukraine. For the fact of the matter is that the Rus' of Galicia and Ukraine traditionally, historically, did not use their vernacular language as a high-cultural, great-traditional linguistic vehicle. For the latter purpose the Rus' of the old Kyivan polity used Church Slavonic in the Bulgarian recension; it was adapted, of course, to the local vernacular, but this vernacular did not figure independently at that time as a written language. After the Polish and Lithuanian conquest of Galicia, Volhynia, Kyiv, and other Ukrainian territories, one finds the Rus' here using Latin, a new (Euthymian) version of Church Slavonic purified of vernacularisms, and Chancery Ruthenian, that is, a form of Belarusian.<sup>75</sup> From the mid-sixteenth century to the end of the eighteenth, the chief literary languages in use on Galician and Ukrainian territory were Latin, Polish, (Meletian) Church Slavonic, and Russian. There was some, very limited use of the written vernacular, the so-called *prostaia mova* ("simple/vulgar language"), but the overwhelming number of texts produced in this region were written in one (and often a mixture of two) of the foreign literary languages. In 1798, the year when the Ukrainian vernacular literary revival began with the publication of Ivan Kotliarevsky's *Eneida*, most Ruthenians in Galicia who had something to write did so in Polish, while their counterparts in the Left Bank did so in Russian. In short, it was traditional for the Ruthenians-Ukrainians to write in a foreign, usually related, literary language and to allot a completely subsidiary role, if any, to the vernacular as a written language. The practice of the Russophiles, who wrote for the educated either in a Russian- and Church Slavonic-influenced, highly "constructed" literary language or else in Russian pure and simple and who only wrote in the vernacular when addressing peasants, was perfectly consonant with the long-established Ruthenian-Ukrainian tradition.<sup>76</sup>

Not only were the Russophiles more consistent continuers of the cultural past than the Ukrainophiles, they were also more "Ukrainian" in their linguistic practices and attitudes. After all, as the Ukrainian historian Mykhailo Maksymovych explained to Zubrytsky in 1840, Russian is the language "in which we speak, write and think, the universal

language used in Ukraine among the educated class of the nation."<sup>77</sup> The "industrial" culture of Ukraine, with the partial exception of a small circle of Ukrainophile intellectuals, was Russian. The Galician Russophiles were thus culturally in tune with the Dnieper Ukrainian reality,<sup>78</sup> the Galician Ukrainophiles lived in a dreamworld.<sup>79</sup>

There is another, at first glance quite distinct, point to be made about the cultural, and specifically linguistic, factor in the Ukrainian/all-Russian divide. In the Russophile armament of arguments, there was one that appears quite compelling: namely, that to transform a peasant vernacular into a literary language capable of fulfilling all the functions appropriate to an "industrial" culture was an extremely difficult (in their mind: impossible) task.<sup>80</sup> Undoubtedly, this difficulty had indeed inhibited the emergence and use of the Ruthenian-Ukrainian vernacular as a literary language in centuries past. By adopting (or—outside Galicia in Dnieper Ukraine: retaining) Russian as a literary language, the difficulty disappeared entirely. Of course, the problem with this argument was that, if easier solutions were optimal, then the Galician Ruthenians should really just have continued to use Polish as a higher literary vehicle. In fact, the cultural choice here was a political choice. The Ukrainophiles chose the harder road, the transformation of the vernacular, but it was a road that most European nations had already traversed and it was a road already made straight by the Dnieper Ukrainophiles. The transformation process for the Ukrainian language was unusually encumbered by political obstacles and is still not complete, but I think it is correct to state that, at least as far as Galicia is concerned, the job had in essentials been done by the late 1880s or early 1890s. Certainly the many excellent publications of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv from the mid-1890s on testify to the elaboration of a language fully suited for modern, "industrial" usage.

We turn now to religion. In the period when the all-Russian and Ukrainian ideas clashed in Galicia, Galicia was Greek Catholic, while both Dnieper Ukraine and Russia were Russian Orthodox. The Russophile movement was, as mentioned earlier, in favor of cleansing the Greek Catholic church of Latin practices, bringing the Greek Catholic ritual as close to Russian Orthodox ritual as possible, and, often ideally and sometimes in practice, converting from Greek Catholicism to Orthodoxy, preferably to Russian Orthodoxy. (In Austria, however, Russian Orthodoxy was not recognized as a legal religion; converts to Ortho-

doxy generally had to convert to the officially recognized "Greek Oriental" church, administered out of Bukovina and limited to Austria.)

The Russophiles often had important links to the Russian Orthodox clergy and hierarchy; for instance, the chaplain of the Russian embassy in Vienna, Father Mikhail Raevsky, was the main intermediary between Russian pan-Slavists and government circles, on the one hand, and Galician Russophiles, on the other, in the 1840s to 1880s,<sup>81</sup> and the Russian Orthodox bishops of Volhynia and Chełm and the archimandrite of the Pochaiv monastery were deeply involved in supporting Russophile agitation in Galicia in the several years preceding World War I.<sup>82</sup> The Galician Ukrainophiles had no links to speak of with clerics in Dnieper Ukraine or Russia. The Dnieper Ukrainophiles did not, by and large, have much of an interest in religion, and relations between the official church and the Ukrainian movement in the Russian empire were cool. The most prominent representatives of the Dnieper Ukrainian movement were either anti-Catholic and heterodox (Taras Shevchenko) or anti-Catholic, anticlerical, and agnostic (Mykhailo Drahomanov). Some of the Dnieper Ukrainophiles' anticlericalism rubbed off on their Galician counterparts (especially on the radicals). The religious program of the Galician Ukrainophiles was the development of the Greek Catholic church as a national church, free of both Polish and Russian influence.<sup>83</sup>

Since I have presented the argument in so much detail elsewhere,<sup>84</sup> here I will restrict myself to a brief conceptual summary of why the Greek Catholic church eventually became the patron of the Ukrainophile orientation. The key to this lay in Rome, which succeeded in reasserting more direct control over the Greek Catholic church in the period 1882–99. Rome's viewpoint was very similar to that of Vienna's, with which it cooperated closely in regard to Ruthenian affairs. Like Vienna, Rome was generally cool to Ukrainophilism, but it considered Russophilism the greater evil. Both tendencies, in the assessment of the Vatican and its closest collaborators and supporters among the Galician clergy and hierarchy, suffered from the error of viewing a divine institution, the Church, instrumentally, as a national institution. They put the interests of the nation before those of God's Church. Russophilism, moreover, exposed the Ruthenians to the dangers of schism, Ukrainophilism exposed them to religious indifference and even agnosticism. In Rome's judgment, the former danger seemed greater, probably

because of the conjuncture (Rome was moved to intervene at a time when Russophilism was the dominant orientation), strategic considerations (agnostics and their children could be won back to the church more easily than defectors who ended up in a different confessional structure), and the calculation that pro-Orthodox sympathies were more inherent in Russophilism than religious indifference was in Ukrainophilism. Very telling was the position of the reformed Basilian order, which was instituted to promote the Vatican line in Galician Rus'; although it shunned demonstrations of Ukrainian patriotism and stayed away from Ukrainophile politics, it consistently employed the Ukrainian language and in other ways was culturally close to the Ukrainophile orientation.

The social differences between adherents of the all-Russian idea and adherents of the Ukrainian idea were not substantial, nothing on the order of the social difference that separated the Polish gentry and burghers from the Ruthenian clergy and peasants. Both movements consisted of a leadership of clerical and secular intelligentsia and a mass following of peasantry. However, there may have been important nuances of difference that only detailed prosopographic analysis of lists (membership in representative organizations, subscribers to periodicals) would reveal.<sup>85</sup>

As to larger social factors influencing the outcome of the struggle between Russophilism and Ukrainophilism, I would single out as pre-eminent the emancipation of the peasantry in 1848 and its subsequent transformation (particularly its adoption of an "operational" cognitive style).<sup>86</sup> This certainly aided the Ukrainophile movement, which relied heavily on developing a mass base of support in the countryside, but was less important for the irredentist, and socially more conservative, Russophiles.

It is appropriate to conclude this survey of the rivalry between the two most viable constructions of nationality in Galician Rus' by offering some larger, if somewhat speculative, perspectives on the issue. The exploration undertaken above suggests that there was no inevitability in the victory of the Ukrainophile orientation in Galicia and, in particular, that there was no inevitability based simply on the preexisting culture of Galician Rus', that is, that this particular ethnics had to develop into this particular nation. Rather, many contingencies were at work, although some loomed larger than others. Elsewhere I have played with historical might-have-beens and suggested that had

Russia occupied Galicia in 1878 (in connection with the international crisis over the Balkans) the Ukrainian game would have been over not only for Galician Rus' but for Dnieper Ukraine as well.<sup>87</sup> Here I will suggest what I think is an even more compelling scenario: imagine if, as a result of the territorial reshuffling in eastern Europe between 1772 and 1815, Russia had ended up not with the Congress Kingdom of Poland, but with Eastern Galicia. This is not such a far-fetched idea, since Russia did acquire southeastern Eastern Galicia (Ternopil circle) temporarily during the Napoleonic period (1809–15). What would have happened then? We can surmise much of it: no enlightened-absolutist-sponsored centralized education to create a national intelligentsia rapidly, the abolition of the Greek Catholic church and its integration into Russian Orthodoxy, an extra decade of serfdom, the prohibition of the Ukrainian vernacular with no "Galician Piedmont" to help save the day, less primary education and that strictly in Russian, no constitutional framework and civil liberties, effective Russian state support in the struggle against the local Polish gentry, no distant Vienna or Rome to rule occasionally in favor of the Ukrainian orientation—the list could go on. I find it difficult to imagine that the innate Ukrainian spirit of the Galician Ruthenians was so irrepressible that Ukrainophilism would have been able in such conditions to carry the day. Ultimately, I think, the crucial factor in the victory of Ukrainophilism in Galician Rus' was the Austrian state. In other words, a major determinant in the cultural choice of national identity emanated from the political sphere.

***Hypothetical Constructions: "Rusynism"  
and "Ruthenianism"***

The final section of this study concerns two hypothetical constructions of nationality for Galician Rus', one actually more hypothetical than the other, which I will call Rusynism and Ruthenianism. By Rusynism<sup>88</sup> I mean a conception of Galician Rus' nationality that was narrowly local, either limited to Galicia alone or to Galicia and the other Ruthenian-inhabited territories of the Habsburg monarchy (Bukovina and Transcarpathia/Subcarpathia/Hungarian Rus'). By Ruthenianism I mean a construction that would include Galician Ruthenians in a nationality composed of those Eastern Slavs who had lived in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the early modern period, that is, today's Ukrainians and Belarusians (the Russians would be excluded). We will

examine the two constructs in turn, again filing our observations under categories labeled political, cultural, religious, and social.

The less hypothetical of the two is Rusynism, which has existed and indeed has received a new lease on life since 1989 in Transcarpathia and (to a lesser extent) in the western, Lemko regions of Galicia.<sup>89</sup> In Eastern Galicia Rusynophilism never crystallized into an orientation *für sich*, although certain Rusynophile tendencies in the Galician-Ruthenian national movement emerged from time to time. One might, for instance, characterize the behavior of the Ruthenian national leadership in 1848–49 as Rusynophile *an sich*. After the revolution, highly placed clerics within that national leadership formed a loose grouping known as the Old Ruthenian or St. George party.<sup>90</sup> The Old Ruthenians were, in some respects, analogous to the Rusynophiles of Transcarpathia, although they were not very locally oriented; for example, they were vague about the ultimate national allegiance of the Galician Ruthenians rather than insistent (as the Rusynophiles of Transcarpathia are) that the Carpathian Rus' people constitute a fourth East Slavic nationality and they never tried (as the Transcarpathian and Lemko Rusynophiles do) to create a new literary language based on local dialect(s). But they did reject both the Russophile and Ukrainophile constructions, the latter more decisively than the former. As a distinct tendency, they lasted into the 1870s, but were eventually absorbed into the Russophile and Ukrainophile camps. The left-wing Dnieper Ukrainophile Mykhailo Drahomanov discerned a strong undercurrent of what I am calling Rusynism and he called *rutenshchina* in Galician Ruthenian society of the mid-1870s, that is, the proliferation among the intelligentsia of what he termed "individuals of the Austro-Seminarian-Ruthenian nationality" (*individuummy avstro-bursako-russkoi narodnosti*).<sup>91</sup> It is a current little in evidence thereafter, having evaporated in the heat of the polemics between proponents of the all-Russian and Ukrainian ideas.

Why did Rusynism fail to crystallize in Galicia, or at least in Eastern Galicia? The most effective way to answer that question is to look less at Eastern Galicia than at the territories where it did in fact crystallize. But *caveat lector*. The subject of Rusynism among the Transcarpathians and Lemkos is a highly controversial one at the moment.<sup>92</sup> Certainly scholars have reached no consensus; so far what has been achieved is that two camps have been clearly delineated (pro-Rusyn and pro-Ukrainian). Normally one would steer clear of mined terrain

like this in a scholarly investigation not directly concerned with the specific topos of the current polemics, but I think there is no choice if we want to explore the intellectual territory we have set out to explore. I recognize that the interpretation I will offer of Transcarpathian and Lemkian Rusynism will dissatisfy many who are engaged in the current debate. It is not intended to be a full explanation of the phenomenon in those places where it took root; the point here is only to identify factors that might explain its absence in Galicia.

The major reason I see for the emergence of Rusynism where it did emerge is political. Ukrainophilism was weak, almost nonexistent in these territories until after World War I. Instead, the dominant national orientations among the intelligentsia here were the Magyarone orientation (*natione Hungarus, gente Ruthenus*; that is, Hungarian as far as political consciousness and high culture was concerned, with some room for an oral Ruthenian vernacular, colorful ethnographic peculiarities, and *Lokalpatriotismus*) in Transcarpathia and the Russophile orientation in both Transcarpathia and the Lemko region. Both of these orientations were anti-Ukrainian. Russophilism was, so to speak, structurally anti-Ukrainian, while the anti-Ukrainian edge of Magyaronism developed by the turn of the century as a result of the Hungarian concern over the danger of Galician Ukrainophile influences spreading to Transcarpathia, especially via Transcarpathian immigrants in the United States. Both Magyaronism and Russophilism, however, suffered a major political defeat at the end of World War I when both Greater Hungary and the Russian empire collapsed. The new political situation allowed the Ukrainian idea to make some inroads into these territories, particularly into Transcarpathia. However, an anti-Ukrainian sense of Ruthenian identity, with both Magyarone and Russophile roots, continued to exist and now took the form of Rusynophilism, that is, a localism produced by the exclusion of preferred wider alternatives and by the rejection of the one wider alternative left.

Although I consider what has been sketched in the preceding paragraph to be the crucial factor in the crystallization of Rusynism, I will also mention two subsidiary political factors. First, in the interwar era, the governments ruling these territories found it in their interests to promote local national identities. The Lemko region passed under Polish rule after the collapse of Austria-Hungary. The Polish government deliberately fostered national division among its large Ruthenian-Ukrainian minority, establishing the so-called Sokal border to prevent

Galician Ukrainian influences from penetrating into Volhynia and Polissia, cultivating the local consciousness of the Ukrainians and Belarusians of Polissia (*tutejsi*), and funding the lingering Rusophile/revived-Old-Ruthenian institutions in Galicia. It also nurtured a consciousness of separate Lemko identity, pressuring the Vatican to establish a separate Lemko Apostolic Administration in 1934 and introducing the Lemko dialect into primary schools. The government of Czechoslovakia, which inherited Transcarpathia (both Transcarpathia proper and the Prešov region) from Hungary, did not meddle so obtrusively in the debate over national identity, but by the mid-1930s it too was favoring Rusynophilism as the orientation more consistent with the interests of the Czechoslovak state, especially in the context of increasingly pro-German attitudes in the Ukrainian nationalist camp.

The second subsidiary political factor working in favor of Rusynophilism was that the Ukrainian orientation was imported into Transcarpathia by some strange bedfellows who came to be viewed with distaste by large sections of the population: Communists and Galician Ukrainian nationalists. The role of Communists in promoting the Ukrainian idea in Transcarpathia was twofold: first, beginning in the era of Ukrainization and *korenizatsiia* (the 1920s) Soviet Communists insisted that Communists in Transcarpathia, where the party was quite influential, promote a Ukrainian national identity; second, when Stalin annexed Transcarpathia (excluding the Prešov region) in 1945, he placed it in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and imposed upon it an official socialist-in-content, but Ukrainian-in-form culture. The association of the Ukrainian national identity with Communism and with Communist methods of promoting it discredited it in the eyes of some, particularly after 1989. As for the Galician nationalists, they swooped down into Transcarpathia during the Munich era and tried to move too much too fast. Moreover, as the experience of the Galician and Transcarpathian communities in the United States of America has shown, each of these communities has its own particular cultural style, and they do not take to each other very well.

To rephrase the main political point with reference to Galicia: Rusynism did not crystallize there because the Ukrainophile current had already become hegemonic before the interwar era, when the circumstances of international politics became favorable to Rusynism.

As for the cultural sphere, we must again underscore the fact that Ukrainophilism was very weak or absent in these territories before

World War I. Transcarpathia, moreover, which had known Hungarian rule for close to a millennium, even lay outside the Polish-Russian environment, in the confrontation with which Ukrainophilism worked out its self-definition. As a result, Transcarpathia (and Russophile Lemkovina as well) did not participate in the cultural construction of the Ukrainian nationality. This was work begun at the initiative of Left Bank and Sloboda Ukraine (Kharkiv), with their recent Cossack heritage, and continued with the participation of the Right Bank and (Ukrainophile) Galicia. Transcarpathia and the Lemko regions were objects, but not subjects of the construction process.<sup>93</sup> Unlike Galicia, they had no input into the formation of the standard literary Ukrainian language.<sup>94</sup> No Transcarpathian or Lemko entered the Ukrainian national pantheon anywhere near at the levels attained by Galicians such as Ivan Franko or Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky. The most famous awakeners of Transcarpathia, Father Aleksandr Dukhnovych and Adolf Dobriansky, were too closely associated with Russophilism to even gain entrance to the courtyard of the national temple. In short, Eastern Galicia did, but Transcarpathia and the Lemko region did not, take part in the construction of the Ukrainian identity during the main period of its construction. The apparition of Carpatho-Ukraine in 1938–39 and the activities of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in the Lemko region at the end of and after World War II do figure rather prominently in Ukrainian nationalist mythology, but they came, as is said in Eastern Europe, like mustard after dinner. In essence, the Galicians were stakeholders in the Ukrainian construction, the Transcarpathians and Lemkos were not.

Mention should also be made of a "technical," objective cultural difficulty with Rusynism that seems to have inhibited its development: apparently, it is very difficult to work up a Rusyn literary language. As has been noted, the Galician Old Ruthenians did not even attempt to write in dialect.<sup>95</sup> The Rusynophiles of Transcarpathia are struggling with the formation of a literary language to this very day. Undoubtedly, this is a technical problem on the road to solution, but the time and the form the solution is taking suggests that the Rusynophile activists are running up against a particularly tricky version of the problem of developing a standard language out of variegated vernacular dialects.<sup>96</sup> A glance at a dialectological map suggests why.<sup>97</sup> Over most of Ukraine there are a few dialects spread over fairly large expanses of territory. For example, in the area covered by the Steppe

dialect one could fit several Galicias. But in the Carpathian region alone there are more dialects than in the rest of Ukraine combined. Perhaps here is a technical cultural reason for the attraction of Ukrainophilism: it presents a simplified, but intelligible linguistic system.

I do not see any particular religious factor contributing to the development or lack of development of Rusynism. It is interesting to note, however, that the common Uniatism of the Carpathian region (excluding Bukovina) was rarely invoked as a rallying point for a common Rusyn identity. Responsible for this absence, I suspect, are the Russophile roots of Rusynism and also the (related) circumstance that Rusynophilism emerged and consolidated during and immediately after a period when many Ruthenians in emigration in North America and at home in Polish Lemkovina and Czechoslovakian Transcarpathia were abandoning the Greek Catholic church for Orthodoxy.

Of social factors I have even less to say, except that Galicia and Transcarpathia developed at different rates. There was a proportionately much larger Galician than Transcarpathian Ruthenian intelligentsia, and the Galician peasantry underwent a much more fundamental political and cultural transformation before World War I than did the Transcarpathian peasantry.

Our last case, that of "Ruthenianism," is completely hypothetical, and we cannot compare it to any existing "Ruthenianism" outside Galicia. The name I have chosen to represent this hypothetical Ukrainian-Belarusian construction may be a bit confusing, considering that I have been using the term *Ruthenian* in a somewhat different sense, as a neutral term to designate the East Slavic population of Galicia. But *Ruthenian* in the Ukrainian-Belarusian sense has also entered English-language scholarship to designate the peoples of the Eastern Christian churches and the churches themselves within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. It therefore seems like the least artificial, and hence most appropriate, name to use in reference to a conception that would have re-created "Ruthenians" in that second sense. In order to avoid confusion, I will, for the remainder of this section, replace *Ruthenian* in the first sense with *Galician-Ruthenian*; when using the term in the second sense I will place it within quotation marks.

In order to propose a hypothetical construction of nationality, it is first necessary to demonstrate that there is a certain reasonableness about it. The fundamental elements of both Belarusian and Ukrainian culture developed in the course of their shared history within the

Kyivan Rus' polity. The same can be said of Russian culture, but in the mid-fourteenth century the Belarusians and Ukrainians went along one historical path, the Russians along another. Belarus and most of Ukraine passed under Lithuanian rule, Galicia under Polish rule, at a time when the Polish and Lithuanian states were entering into a close partnership (Union of Krevo [Krewo], 1385). The ancestors of the Ukrainians and Belarusians under Lithuanian rule shared a common literary-administrative language, the Belarusian-based Chancery Ruthenian. Even after all Ukrainian lands were transferred to the Polish part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, as a result of the Union of Lublin in 1569, the Ukrainians and Belarusians, or "Ruthenians," "were viewed as one cultural-linguistic-religious community."<sup>98</sup> The "Ruthenians" of both branches accepted the Union of Brest, 1595-96, that is, the church union with Roman Catholicism, although the Belarusian branch did so more fully than the Ukrainian branch. Both branches participated in the "Ruthenian" cultural revival of the sixteenth century. Many prominent figures in East Slavic religion and culture of the early modern era worked in so "Ruthenian" a context that it is difficult to establish to which of the later much more clearly differentiated Ukrainian and Belorussian cultural spheres they belonged: St. Iosafat Kuntsevych was born in Volhynia but made his ecclesiastical career in Vilnius and Polatsk; his close collaborator Metropolitan Iosyf Rutsky was born in Belarus, became metropolitan of Kyiv, died in a monastery in Volhynia, and was buried in Vilnius; Simeon Polotsky was born in Belarus, studied in both Kyiv and Vilnius, worked mainly in Moscow, and felt most at home intellectually in the company of Ukrainian churchmen. By the end of the eighteenth century, both Belarus and most of Ukraine again found themselves in one polity, the Russian empire. Here the Belarusians and Ukrainians shared the same problem of national differentiation vis-à-vis the Poles to the west and the Russians to the east. The Belarusians and Ukrainians are closely related linguistically. Both are East Slavic languages that, unlike Russian, were heavily influenced by Polish. There is a dialectical region transitional between Ukrainian and Belarusian.<sup>99</sup> Both of their standard literary languages followed the same pattern of development, that is, the transformation of an oral vernacular into a literary vehicle (unlike Russian, which developed from a foreign literary language, Church Slavonic, that gradually incorporated more and more elements of the vernacular).<sup>100</sup> I think, then, that it would have been logical to construct

a national identity that fell between the all-Russian and Ukrainian construction, a "Ruthenian" identity that embraced both the Belarusians and Ukrainians (including the Galician-Ruthenians). Yet I have never encountered so much as a trace of such a "Ruthenian" conception in the writings of Galician-Ruthenians.

Why not? A number of things that happened in the early modern era, and particularly the Khmelnytsky uprising, seem to have determined the ultimate differentiation of the Ukrainian and Belarusian nations.<sup>101</sup> But for our purposes, the question has to be looked at from the perspective of the Galician-Ruthenians in the era of national construction.

In the political category, the predominant fact is that the Belarusians were a political nullity. Their national movement began decades after that of the Galician-Ruthenians and was always weak, politically and in other respects. One of the important consequences of the Cossack uprising led by Khmelnytsky was the emergence of a Cossack polity, the hetmanate, which generated a Little Russian gentry, which was able to inaugurate a relatively dynamic national movement a generation earlier than even the Galician-Ruthenians were.<sup>102</sup> The Dnieper Ukrainophiles, as has been argued earlier, represented a political force, not a political force of the Russian or even Polish magnitude, but a force nonetheless; the Belarusians constituted no political force at all.

There were some cultural obstacles to the elaboration of a common "Ruthenian" nationality, although not as great as those which adherents of the Russophile nationality had to overcome. None of the potential foci of unity were free of problems. Let us take language as an example. It is conceivable that just as a Czechoslovak literary language might have come into existence on the basis of a Moravian dialect so too a "Ruthenian" literary language could have emerged on the basis of a transitional dialect spoken in Polissia. In actual fact, the central dialects of Belarusian and the southeastern dialects of Ukrainian formed the basis of the respective literary languages.<sup>103</sup> Central dialects in Belarusian bridged the divergences between the northeastern and southwestern dialects; the southeastern dialects of Ukrainian were spoken in the former hetmanate (Left Bank Ukraine) and Sloboda Ukraine where the Ukrainian national revival started. Hypothetically again, had the Cossacks somehow been based in Polissia instead of in the steppe, the chances of forming a common "Ruthenian" language (and

nation) would have been improved. However, the phonetic evolutions of Belarusian and Ukrainian are really quite diverse—where the Belarusians soften, the Ukrainians harden, while the Belarusians change many Common Slavic *o*-sounds to *a*, Ukrainians change many to *i*. Even without the formation of separate literary languages, in other words, the two groups of dialects have followed very different paths of linguistic evolution. One can imagine overcoming the differences by devising special characters that could be pronounced both ways and one can also imagine that on the level of the new high culture the new “Ruthenians” could have overcome their folk prejudices against the way the others spoke, but the solutions would have been cumbersome and taken time.

The common history of Uniatism could have served as an important religious bond between Galician-Ruthenians and Belarusians if attachment to the church union had been less ambivalent in Galicia and, I think more importantly, if the timing of certain events had been more propitiously synchronized. The Belarusians accepted the union in 1595–96, the Galician-Ruthenians about a century later (depending on the particular locality and institution); more decisively, the union was abolished in Belarus in 1839, that is, very early in the development of the Galician-Ruthenian national movement.

Finally, as to social factors, one must note an even greater disparity in the transformation of the two societies, Galician-Ruthenian and Belarusian, than was the case for the Galician-Ruthenians and Transcarpathian Ruthenians. The Belarusians had even a smaller educated class and a peasantry even less affected by modern cultural and economic change than the Transcarpathians.<sup>104</sup>

### **Conclusions**

There were in Galician Rus', as the subtitle of this article states, Icarian flights in almost all directions. The highest Icarian flight was that of the Russophiles; flights in the direction of Rusynism and “Ruthenianism” were not undertaken; the flight of the Ukrainophiles proved not to be Icarian at all. As this exploration of the alternative constructions of nationality in Galician Rus' indicates, the reasons for the choice of one construction over another were manifold and the interrelationships among them complex. Do any factors seem to emerge as primary?

The Galician Ruthenians were not, of course, the only people of

East Central Europe to confront the problem of alternative national constructions. One has only to recall Illyrism and Yugoslavism among the South Slavs, Czechoslovakism, and the contest between the all-German and Austrian ideas to realize that the phenomenon was relatively widespread. A moment's reflection on these same examples would also seem to confirm a point that I think suggests itself as well from the detailed investigation of the Galician Ruthenian situation: that, in spite of the complexity and variety of factors entering into the process, the primary determinant of the construction of a national culture was political.

#### NOTES

1. E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 1–5.

2. Emil Niederhauser, *The Rise of Nationality in Eastern Europe* (Gyoma: Corvina Kiadó, 1981).

3. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983).

4. A locus classicus of the old literature: "A nation is a historically evolved, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture." J. Stalin, *Marxism and the National Question* (Calcutta: New Book Centre, 1975), 11.

5. From the foreword to the landmark publication of the Ruthenian cultural revival of the early nineteenth century: "We too had our bards and our teachers, but tempests and storms came upon us; our bards and teachers went dumb, and our people and our literature nodded off for a long time." *Rusalka Dnistrovaia: Ruthenische Volks-Lieder* (Buda: Pys'mom Korol. Vseuchylyshcha Peshtanskoho, 1837), iv.

6. "Awakeners? Yes. Because they set out in the firm belief, which can be verified in hundreds of manifestos, that the 'nation'—which always existed, or at least for centuries—still existed, but was asleep, people who made up this as yet subject nationality as a whole had not yet become conscious of its existence. They had to be awakened, everyone had to be made aware that they were part of a distinct nationality. Once awake, they could not fail to discover the truth about themselves, that they were indeed everything that the 'awakeners' had already known and proclaimed."

"Today, of course, we fully realize that things were very different. The sense of nationality, as they imagined it, or as they saw it elsewhere, was only just emerging. It had not slumbered in Eastern Europe; it had not existed!" Niederhauser, *Rise of Nationality*, 43–44.

7. "The basic deception and self-deception practised by nationalism is

this: nationalism is, essentially, the general imposition of a high culture on society, where previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the majority, and in some cases of the totality, of the population. . . . That is what really happens.

"But this is the very opposite of what nationalism affirms and what nationalists fervently believe. Nationalism usually conquers in the name of a putative folk culture. . . . If the nationalism prospers it eliminates the alien high culture, but it does not then replace it by the old local low culture; it revives, or invents, a local high (literate, specialist-transmitted) culture of its own, though admittedly one which will have some links with the earlier local folk styles and dialects." Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 57.

8. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

9. "Admittedly, nationalism uses the pre-existing, historically inherited proliferation of cultures or cultural wealth, though it uses them very selectively, and it most often transforms them radically." Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 55.

10. Descriptions of the tradition can be found in Robert T. Anderson and Gallatin Anderson, "Ukrainian Night Courting," *Anthropological Quarterly* 35, no. 1 (1962): 29–32. Owing to methodological weaknesses, the article underestimates the prevalence of night courting in the Ukrainian village. For a corrective, see Z. A. Hurevych and A. I. Vorozhbyt, *Stateve zhyttia selianky* (n.p.: DVOU, Medvydav, 1931), 41–52.

11. "Indeed, more often than not the discovery of popular tradition and its transformation into the 'national tradition' of some peasant people forgotten by history, was the work of enthusiasts from the (foreign) ruling class or elite, such as the Baltic Germans or the Finnish Swedes." Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 104.

12. In *Nations and Nationalism*, 58–62, Gellner works on the theoretical side of this question by developing the model of the Ruritanians and the Megalomanians. Although based on the concrete case of the Romanians and Hungarians of Transylvania, the model applies in essentials also to the case of the Ruthenians and Poles of Galicia.

13. See Frank Sysyn, "The Problem of Nobilities in the Ukrainian Past: The Polish Period, 1569–1648," in *Rethinking Ukrainian History*, ed. Ivan L. Rudnytsky (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1981), esp. 29–30, 55, 65.

14. John-Paul Himka, "The Conflict between the Secular and the Religious Clergy in Eighteenth-Century Western Ukraine," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 15, nos. 1–2 (1991): 35–47.

15. In 1900, 29,327 inhabitants of Lviv were Catholics of the Greek rite, but only 15,159 were Ukrainian-speaking. The Greek rite was a marker of Ruthenian ethnicity that could only be altered with some difficulty, since change of rite was regulated by the ecclesiastical authorities. Language, however, could be changed at will. The statistics thus indicate the tremendous assimilative power of the Polish urban environment. *Gemeindelexikon der im Reichsrat vertretenen Königreiche und Länder. Bearbeitet auf Grund der Ergebnisse der Volkszählung vom*

31. *Dezember 1900*, herausgegeben von der k.k. statistischen Zentralkommission, vol. 12: *Galizien* (Vienna, 1907), 2.

16. E. Kossak [Prawdolub], *Odpowiedź na historię "o unii kościoła grec. kat. ruskiego" przez Michała Malinowskiego, kanonika świętojurskiego we Lwowie, w 1862 r. wydana* (Lviv: Z drukarni M.F. Poremby, 1863), 29–30.

17. In 1827 a Greek Catholic pastor donated sixty-three books to his parish library. Rather typically, thirty-one of the books were in Latin, twenty-six in Polish, and only four in Ruthenian or Old Church Slavonic (one was in Czech, one in German). Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukrainy v m. L'vovi, f. 201, op. 1a, od. zh. 182, 68–69.

18. Jan Kozik, *The Ukrainian National Movement in Galicia: 1815–1849*, ed. Lawrence D. Orton (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986), 344.

19. Peter Brock, "Ivan Vahylevych (1811–1866) and the Ukrainian National Identity," in *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism: Essays on Austrian Galicia*, ed. Andrei S. Markovits and Frank E. Sysyn (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1982), 143.

20. The address goes on to make the point that in the cities "the Ruthenian language is never used. . . . the [urban] population, without regard to descent and religion, exclusively uses the Polish language." *Die Revolutionsjahre 1848/49 im Königreich Galizien-Lodomerien (einschliesslich Bukowina)*, ed. Rudolf Wagner (Munich: Verlag "Der Südostdeutscher," 1983), 59.

21. John-Paul Himka, "German Culture and the National Awakening in Western Ukraine before the Revolution of 1848," in *German-Ukrainian Relations in Historical Perspective*, ed. Hans-Joachim Torke and John-Paul Himka (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1994), 29–44.

22. Only three were to be found among the 275 individuals who belonged to the fairly representative Ruthenian voluntary association Prosvita in 1868–74: Władysław Walenty Fedorowicz, Teofil Merunowicz, and Paulin Święcicki. "Chleny towarzystwa 'Prosvita,'" *Spravozdanie z dilanii "Prosvity" vid chasu zaviazania towarzystva—26. Lystopada 1868 roku, do nainoviishoho chasu* (Lviv, 1874), 26–32.

23. Kasper Cięglewicz, *Rzecz czerwono-ruska 1848 roku* ([Lviv:] W drukarni nar. Im. Ossolinskich, [1848]), 5.

24. Wagner, *Die Revolutionsjahre 1848/49*, 59.

25. An authentic exception is the case of the Albanians, who include both Roman Catholics and Orthodox. However, this is a group so linguistically distinct from all surrounding peoples that it includes not only Christians of both heritages, but even Muslims, who in fact constitute the majority of the nationality. There are also Hungarians and Poles of the Greek rite, although in both cases the vast majority is linked to the Western Christian tradition. Unlike the Albanian case, these cases represent the assimilation into the traditionally dominant national culture of elements from the traditionally subjugated national groups (Romanians and Ruthenians); the erection of a Hungarian Greek Catholic eparchy in the early twentieth century was inspired by Hungarian nationalism. On the latter, see James Niessen, "Hungarians and Romanians in

Habsburg and Vatican Diplomacy: The Creation of the Diocese of Hajdúdorog in 1912," *Catholic Historical Review* 80, no. 2 (1994): 238–57.

26. I have dealt with the impact of centralized education (in its Gellnerian conceptualization) on the Ruthenian clergy and on Ruthenian society in general and also have estimated the size of the Ruthenian secular intelligentsia over the course of the nineteenth century in "Stratificazione sociale e movimento nazionale ucraino nella Galizia dell'Ottocento," *Quaderni storici* 28, no. 3 (84) (1993): 657–78.

27. Moreover: "The marginal position of priests' sons in a semi-feudal society which provided no special niche for *Catholic* clerical families constituted an obvious social-psychological incentive for asserting separate ethnic identity." John A. Armstrong, "Myth and History in the Evolution of Ukrainian Consciousness," in *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter*, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj et al. (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, University of Alberta, 1992), 133.

28. There is a vast, largely antiquated and polemical, literature on the liquidation of the Chełm Uniate eparchy. A relatively recent, scholarly treatment is Luigi Glinka, *Diocesi ucraino-cattolica di Cholm (Liquidazione ed incorporazione alla Chiesa russo-ortodossa (Sec. XIX)*, Analecta OSBM, series 2, sectio 1: Opera, 34 (Rome: PP. Basiliani, 1975). New work is being done: Theodore R. Weeks, "The 'End' of the Uniate Church in Russia: The *Vozsoedinenie* of 1875," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 44, no. 1 (1996): 28–40.

29. Volodymyr Okhrymovych, "Z polia natsional'noi statystyky Halychyny," *Studii z polia suspil'nykh nauk i statystyky* (Lviv), 1 (1909): 67.

30. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, ed. Volodymyr Kubijovyč and Danylo Husar Struk, 5 vols. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984–93), s.v. "Armenians" by B. Struminsky.

31. Atanasii V. Pekar, *Narysy istorii tserkvy Zakarpattia*, vol. 1: *Ierarkhichne oformlennia*, Analecta OSBM, series 2, sectio 1: Opera, 22 (Rome: PP. Basiliani, 1967).

32. This is from a list of books that the three of them borrowed from the Ossolineum Library in Lviv from December 1, 1832 to October 8, 1836: "*Rusalka Dnistrova*": *Dokumenty i materialy*, ed. F. I. Steblii et al. (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1989), 18–51.

33. John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 90.

34. Well summarized in Kozik, *Ukrainian National Movement*, 29–50.

35. Brock, "Ivan Vahylevych," 119.

36. Brock, "Ivan Vahylevych," 143.

37. Roman Szporluk, "Ukraine: From an Imperial Periphery to a Sovereign State," *Daedalus* 126, no. 3 (1997): 85–119.

38. A comprehensive exposition of the Russophile viewpoint on language is [Ioann Naumovych], "Iz Stril'cha. (O vnesenii O. Iakymovycha na poslidnem zasidanii Matytsy russkoi chto-do vybora odnogo diialekta russkogo dlia vysshoi lyteratury)," *Slovo* 10, nos. 82–85, 87 (1870).

39. The most representative "all-Russian" historical surveys produced

from the Russophile perspective are [Bohdan Didytskii,] "Narodnaia istoriia Rusy," serialized in *Halychanyin: Naukovo-beletrystychnaia pryloha do "Slova"* in 1867–70 (and also published separately), and Roman Surmach [Ieronym A. Lutsyk], *Narodnaia istoriia Rusy ot naidavniishykh vremen do nynishnykh dnei* . . . (New York: Ivan Hr. Borukh, 1911). The major Russophile interpretation of Galicia and Bukovina during the Austrian period is Filipp Ivanovich Svistun, *Prikarpatskaia Rus' pod vladeniem Avstrii*, 2d ed. (reprint, Trumbull, Conn.: Peter S. Hardy, 1970).

40. *Rusalka Dnistrovaia*, iv–vi.

41. Levytsky's grammar, published in 1834, was entitled *Grammatik der Ruthenischen oder Klein Russischen Sprache in Galizien*; Lozynsky's, published in 1846, was entitled *Gramatyka języka ruskiego (małoruskiego)*.

42. Proclamation of August 25, 1848, reprinted in Wagner, *Die Revolutionsjahre 1848/49*, 51.

43. Ivan Hushalevych published a bit of Mykola Kostomarov and Kotliarevsky in his periodicals *Novyny* and *Pchola* respectively. Ivan Borysikevych published Kvitka-Osnovianenko's *Marusia* separately. Kyrylo Blonsky planned to publish Kotliarevsky's *Eneida*, but did not. That was the sum total of such activity in 1848–49. Several plays by Ukrainian authors were, however, staged in Galicia in the revolutionary years. Ivan Em. Levyts'kyi, *Halytsko-ruskaia bybliohrafiia XIX-ho stolittia s uvzhliadnenniim ruskykh izdaniï poiavyshykhsia v Uhorschyni i Bukovyni (1801–1886)*, 2 vols. (Lviv: Stavropyhiiskii instytut, 1888–95), 1:30–50; Kozik, *Ukrainian National Movement*, 320–21.

44. The most amusing instance was the confusion of Markiiian Shashkevych's pseudonym "Ruslan" with the German word for Russia, *Russland*. [Kyrylo Studyns'kyi,] *Prychynky do istorii kul'turnoho zhytia Halyts'koi Rusy v litakh 1833–47*, Vidbytka z XI i XII tomu Zbirnyka fil'ol'ogichnoi sektsii Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka (Lviv, 1909), xv–xvii, cxxvi.

45. There is a very recent exception, confirming, on the basis of newly discovered archival materials and a closer examination of publications, that the popularity of Russophilism during the revolutionary period was much greater than has been hitherto thought: Oleh Turii, "Halyts'ki rusyny: mizh moskvofil'stvom i ukrainstvom (50-i—poch. 60-kh rr.)," typescript. (Turii intends to publish a series of articles on this theme under a similar title in the yearbook of the Institute for Historical Research in Lviv; letter from Turii to the author, January 13, 1995.)

46. The leaflet was entitled "Deutsche Brüder!" dated August 23, 1848, and signed "Allgemeine Stimme der Ruthenen in Galizien." It is reprinted in Wagner, *Die Revolutionsjahre 1848/49*, 44–47.

47. See *Korespondentsyia Iakova Holovats'koho v litakh 1850–1862*, ed. Kyrylo Studyns'kyi; *Zbirnyk fil'ol'ogichnoi sektsyi Naukovoho tovarystva imeny Shevchenka 8–9* (Lviv, 1905), iii–x.

48. Paul Robert Magocsi, "The Kachkovs'kyi Society and the National Revival in Nineteenth-Century East Galicia," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 15, nos. 1–2 (1991): 48–87.

49. Oksana Rybak, "Pershi zhinochi orhanizatsii u Skhidnii Halychyni i

Pivnichnii Bukovyni," *Ukraina v mynulomu 1* (Kyiv-Lviv: Akademiia nauk Ukrainy, Instytut ukrains'koi arkhеоhrafii, 1992), 102-3.

50. Often cited, less frequently read, the most important Russophile statement on the political implications of Austria's constitutional rearrangement was Ioann Naumovych [Odyn imenem mnohykh], "Pohliad v buduchnost'," *Slovo* 6, no. 59, July 27 (August 8) 1866, 1-2.

51. John-Paul Himka, *Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth Century* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies; London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's, 1988).

52. John-Paul Himka, "Young Radicals and Independent Statehood: The Idea of a Ukrainian Nation-State, 1890-1895," *Slavic Review* 41 (1982): 219-35; Iaroslav Hrytsak, "'Molodi' radykaly v suspil'no-politychnomu zhytti Halychyny." *Zapysky NTSh* 222 (1991): 71-110.

53. See David Saunders, "Britain and the Ukrainian Question (1912-1920)," *English Historical Review* 103 (January 1988): 45-48.

54. See *Voennye prestupleniia Gabsburgskoi Monarkhii 1914-1917 gg.* (Trumbull, Conn.: Peter S. Hardy, 1964). This includes a reprint of *Talergofskii al'manakh. Propamiatnaia kniga avstriiskikh zhestokosti, izuverstv i nasilii nad karpato-russkim narodom vo vremia vsemirnoi voiny 1914-1917 gg.* (Lviv, 1924-32).

55. S. Petliura, "Z zhyttia Avstriis'koi Ukrainy. Ukrains'ki posly v Viden-s'komu parlamenti," *Ukraina. Naukovyi ta literaturno-publitsystychnyi shchomis-iachnyi zhurnal* 1, vol. 4 (October 1907), pt. 2, 6.

56. Roman Szporluk, "West Ukraine and West Belorussia: Historical Tradition, Social Communication, and Linguistic Assimilation," *Soviet Studies* 31, no. 1 (1979): 76-98.

57. Janusz Radziejowski, *The Communist Party of Western Ukraine, 1919-1929* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, 1983), esp. 83-88, 140-44.

58. V. Malkin, *Russkaia literatura v Galitsii* (Lviv: Izdatel'stvo L'vovskogo universiteta, 1957). See also the response: Andrii Brahinets' et al., "Domysly i perekruhennia pid vyhliadom nauky," *Zhovten'* 2 (1959): 132-45.

59. John-Paul Himka, "Hope in the Tsar: Displaced Naive Monarchism among the Ukrainian Peasants of the Habsburg Empire," *Russian History* 7 (1980): 125-38.

60. Excellent material on pro-Russian pan-Slavism among the Czechs and other Slavic nations can be found in *Die slavische Idee: Beiträge am Matija Majar-Ziljski-Symposium vom 6. bis 10. Juli 1992 in Tratten/Posisce, Kärnten*, ed. Andreas Moritsch; *Slovanské štúdie*, special issue 1 (Bratislava: Slovak Academic Press, 1993).

61. The Russian nationalist intellectual Oleg Platonov referred to "certain linguistic or ethnographic distinctions of Ukraine and Belorussia" that "are explainable by the special features of their historical development under the many-centuries-long Polish-Lithuanian occupation." In Platonov's view, though, these distinctions are not enough to amount to "a distinct nation," and "the creation of the 'states' of Ukraine and Belorussia has an artificial and temporary character." Cited in Roman Szporluk, "Reflec-

tions on Ukraine after 1994: The Dilemmas of Nationhood," *Harriman Review* 7, nos. 7–9 (1994): 4.

62. *Korespondentsyia Iakova Holovats'koho*, cliv.

63. As a Russian official put it in 1881: "In connection with the political conditions that have arisen since the Treaty of Berlin, it is an urgent necessity that we follow vigilantly all that happens in the border regions of neighboring states, and one of the most important means of receiving useful information is the local Slavic press, especially organs devoted to us, which follow every hostile step of our opponents. Of such organs, . . . the most patriotic, influential and best organized are the Lviv paper *Slovo* and the Turčiansky Svätý-Martin paper *Národné Noviny*." The Russian government gave *Slovo* 2,000 Austrian gulden a year beginning in 1876; in 1881 the sum was tripled; in 1882 *Slovo* received 4,000 gulden, and a new Russophile organ, *Novyi prolom*, received 2,000; in 1884 and 1885 *Slovo* received 3,500 and *Novyi prolom* 2,500; in 1886 the total subsidy was raised to 12,000. Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv SSSR, Leningrad, f. 776, op. 1, d. 17, 13–16; d. 18, 9–10; d. 20, 9; d. 21, 3; d. 22, 1–4. I am citing from notes originally made by Iaroslav Dashkevych, to whom I am grateful for putting them at my disposal.

64. K. P. Pobedonostsev, *K. P. Pobedonostsev i ego korrespondenty. Pis'ma i zapiski*, 2 parts (Moscow: Gosudarsvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1923), 309, 331.

65. See John-Paul Himka, *Socialism in Galicia: The Emergence of Polish Social Democracy and Ukrainian Radicalism (1860–1890)* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1983), 48.

66. A contributor to *Slovo* in 1868 expressed concern over the mass emigration to the Chełm region, fearing that it would drain talent from the Russophiles and leave Galicia at the mercy of the Poles and Ukrainophiles. Iaroslav Hordyns'kyi, *Do istorii kul'turnoho i politychnoho zhytia v Halychyni u 60-tykh rr. XIX v.*, *Zbirnyk Fil'ol'ogichnoi sekcii NTSh*, 16 (Lviv: NTSh, 1917), 120.

67. Kost' Levyts'kyi, *Istoriia politychnoi dumky halyts'kykh ukrainsiv 1848–1914 na pidstavi spomyniv* (Lviv: Nakladom vlasnym, Z drukarni oo. Vasyliian u Zhovkvi, 1926), 634–35; Mykhailo Vozniak, *Ukrains'ka derzhavnist'* (Vienna: Z drukarni Adol'fa Hol'tshavzena, 1918), 123–24; Dmytro Dontsov, *Suchasne politychne polozhenie natsii i nashi zavdania. Referat vyholoshenyi na II. vseukrains'kim students'kim z'izdi v lypni 1913. roku u L'vovi* (Lviv: "Moloda Ukraina," Vydavnytstvo Ukrains'koho students'koho soiuzu, 1913).

68. See John-Paul Himka, "Ukrainians, Russians, and Alexander Solzhenitsyn," *Cross Currents: A Yearbook of Central European Culture* 11 (1992): 193–204.

69. Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "The Ukrainians in Galicia under Austrian Rule," in Ivan L. Rudnytsky, *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History*, ed. Peter L. Rudnytsky (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, 1987), 330.

70. *Korespondentsyia Iakova Holovats'koho*, l.

71. Alexey Miller, "Galicia after the Ausgleich: Polish-Ruthenian Conflict and the Attempts of Reconciliation," *Central European University History Department Yearbook* (1993): 135–43.

72. *Korespondentsyia Iakova Holovats'koho*, lvii.

73. *Korespondentsyia Iakova Holovats'koho*, 1.

74. George Y. Shevelov [Iurii Sherekh], *Halychyna v formuvanni novoi ukrains'koi literaturnoi movy* (Edmonton: Department of Slavic Languages, University of Alberta, 1971).

75. "If one disregards the very few early records which had a Ukrainian tinge, the language was Belorussian based on the spoken language of the Vilna region." George Y. Shevelov, "Evolution of the Ukrainian Literary Language," in Rudnytsky, *Rethinking Ukrainian History*, 219.

76. From the point of view of nationalism, this tradition is understood as a flaw or, more defensively, as the unfortunate result of national oppression. There are, however, more positive ways to understand this tradition, just as there are more positive ways to understand Ukrainian "nonhistoricity." These and other related problems in Ukrainian cultural history require rethinking; the work of Mircea Eliade on religious culture might suggest fruitful points of departure for such a reconsideration.

77. Cited in Kozik, *Ukrainian National Movement*, 158.

78. "In Ukraine, with the exception of a few individuals, no one is thinking about creating a new literary language and new nationality." Svistun, *Prikarpataska Rus'*, 364.

79. The Ukrainophile national populist leader Ievhen Olesnytsky left this account of his visit to Kyiv in 1894: "I can't describe Kyiv. . . . It would captivate anyone, let alone a Ukrainian, who connects so many historical memories with it, who searches here for them, who would like to take delight in them. . . . In only one respect was I disappointed. The external character of Kyiv was not then Ukrainian, but Muscovite. Everywhere there were Muscovite signs, the Muscovite language on the street, in stores, in restaurants and cafes, and when we said that we cannot speak or understand Muscovite, they immediately tried to speak Polish. Perhaps some peasant from the village or some poor worker spoke Ukrainian here and there. This made a very painful impression. . . . My faith in the power and future of Ukraine was undermined by this. Where is that Ukraine, where is that people, to whom we fly with our hopes and upon whom we base our national ideal?" Evhen Olesnyts'kyi, *Storinky z moho zhyttia*, 2 parts (Lviv: Nakladom vydavnychoi spilky "Dilo," 1935), 2:68–70.

80. Of course, the Russophiles did not formulate the argument exactly in these terms, but they came close. Severyn Shekhovych in 1853: "The subjects not treated in our periodical [*Lada*] so far require many technical words, new for Galicia . . . and we should not and cannot make up new words" (cited in *Korespondentsyia Iakova Holovats'koho*, lxxv). Bohdan Didytsky in the same year (as paraphrased by Kyrylo Studynsky): "We, . . . and with us the other Slavs, had been enthusiastic about the language of our people, and we wrote stories and tales and composed songs, and at that time our vernacular language provided us with sufficient expressions. . . . But when we undertook to translate scholarly works, then we came to realize that we do not have enough words for more elevated concepts, that our language lacks scientific terms" (*Korespondentsyia Iakova Holovats'koho*, xciii). "Galician Rus' became convinced in 1848 that the establishment of a separate Galician Russian or Little Russian literary

language is a futile waste of time and retards the cultural progress of Austrian Rus'" (Svistun, *Prikarpat'skaia Rus'*, 364).

81. Kornylo N. Ustianovych', M. T. Raievskii i rossiiskii panslavyzm. *Spomyny z perezhytoho i peredumanoho* (Lviv: Nakladom K. Bednarskoho, 1884); *Zarubezhnye slaviane i Rossiia. Dokumenty arkhiva M.F. Ravevskogo 40–80 roky XIX veka* (Moscow: Nauka, 1975).

82. Austrian State Archives, Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv, Ministerium des Innern, Präsidiale, 22 Russophile Propaganda, K. 2085–86.

83. Characteristically, a group of Galician Ukrainophiles (national populists) in 1867 called for the creation of a patriarchate for the Ruthenian Greek Catholic Church with the right to convoke a "people's council" (*narodnyi sobor*) to elect the patriarch and bishops. M. P. Dragomanov, "Literaturnoe dvizhenie v Galitsii," in Dragomanov, *Politicheskaia sochineniia*, ed. I. M. Grevs and B. A. Kistiakovskii, vol. 1: *Tsentry i ukrainy* (Moscow: Tipografiia T-va I.D. Sytina, 1908), 368n.

84. John-Paul Himka, "The Greek Catholic Church and Nation-Building in Galicia, 1772–1918," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 8, nos. 3–4 (1984): 426–52, "The Greek Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Nation in Galicia," in *Religious Compromise, Political Salvation: The Greek Catholic Church and Nation-Building in Eastern Europe*, ed. James Niessen, Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, no. 1003 (Pittsburgh: Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1993), 7–26, "Sheptyts'kyi and the Ukrainian National Movement before 1914," in *Morality and Reality: The Life and Times of Andrei Sheptyts'kyi*, ed. Paul Robert Magocsi (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1989), 29–46, and *Religion and Nationality in Western Ukraine: The Greek Catholic Church and the Ruthenian National Movement in Galicia, 1867–1900* (Kingston, Ontario: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999).

85. As a model for this type of research I have in mind Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). For a very preliminary study in this direction, see the section "The Membership of the Popular Education Society Prosvita, 1868–74," in John-Paul Himka, "Polish and Ukrainian Socialism: Austria, 1867–1890," Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1977, 126–42.

86. Gale Stokes, "Cognition, Consciousness, and Nationalism," *Ethnic Groups* 10, nos. 1–3 (1993): 27–42. See also Himka, "Stratificazione sociale," 672–75.

87. Himka, "Ukrainians, Russians," 201–2.

88. The name derives from the word *rusyn*, which I and most scholars of the region translate (via the Latin *ruthenus* and more immediately via the German *Ruthene*) as "Ruthenian." However, Paul R. Magocsi has popularized the use of the term "Rusyn" in English to refer to the Ruthenians of Transcarpathia and western, Lemko Galicia and specifically to distinguish them from Ukrainians. Magocsi also coined the word "Rusynophilism," analogous to Rus-sophilism and Ukrainophilism, to refer to the national orientation that saw the Ruthenians of the Carpathian region as a separate nationality.

89. There is a vast literature on Rusynism. For the historical background, see Paul Robert Magocsi, *The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus', 1848-1948* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978); Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "Carpatho-Ukraine: A People in Search of Their Identity," in Rudnytsky, *Modern Ukrainian History*, 353-73. On the current situation, see Paul Robert Magocsi, "The Birth of a New Nation, or the Return of an Old Problem? The Rusyns of East Central Europe," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 34, no. 3 (1992): 200-223; Paul Robert Magocsi, "Carpatho-Rusyns: Their Current Status and Future Perspectives," *Carpatho-Rusyn American* 16, no. 2 (1993): 4-9, with commentaries by L'udovít Haraksim, Mykola Mušynka (*Carpatho-Rusyn American* 16, no. 3 [1993]: 4-8), Andrzej Zięba, and response by Magocsi (*Carpatho-Rusyn American* 16, no. 4 [1993]: 4-9).

90. Kubijovyč and Struk, *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, s.v. "Old Ruthenians" by J. P. Himka and O. Sereda. Ivan Khymka, "'Apolohiia' Mykhaila Malynovs'koho: do istorii kryzy u hreko-katolyts'kii tserkvi 1882 roku i kharakterystyky pohliadiv 'sviatourtsiv,'" *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva imeni T. Shevchenka*, vol. 225: *Pratsi istorychno-filosofs'koi seksii* (1993), 365-92. Radically different views are expressed in Paul R. Magocsi, "Old Ruthenianism and Russophilism: A New Conceptual Framework for Analyzing National Ideologies in Late 19th Century Eastern Galicia," in *American Contributions to the Ninth International Congress of Slavists: Kiev, September 1983*, vol. 2: *Literature, Poetics, History*, ed. Paul Debreczeny (Columbus, Ohio: Slavica, 1983), 305-24. Magocsi summarizes his "new conceptual framework" thus: "Before the 1870s, there were only Old Ruthenians among the Galician Ukrainian intelligentsia. Beginning in the late 1860s and early 1870s, one group, known as populists, split off. They eventually accepted the idea of identification with a distinct Ukrainian nationality. The Old Ruthenians, however, continued to exist. In the late 1890s, another group split off, known as Russophiles, who from the very beginning identified unequivocally with the Great Russian nationality. It should be remembered that despite this second split, the Old Ruthenians continued to survive, albeit in ever decreasing numbers" (309). From the previous section of the present essay ("The Ukrainian and All-Russian Ideas") some of the reasons for my rejection of these views should be clear.

91. Mykhailo Petrovych Drahomanov, "Try lysty do redaktsii 'Druha,'" *Literaturno-publitsychni pratsi u dvokh tomakh*, 2 vols. (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1970), 1:413.

92. See, for example, Iaroslav Dashkevych, "Fal'shyvi etnichni menshyny v Ukraini: Pidkarpats'ki rusyny," *Ratusha* (Lviv), July 13, 1993, 2.

93. Drahomanov at the very end of his life in 1895 rued that he had always wanted to do something about Transcarpathian Ukraine, to integrate it "into our national democratic and progressive movement," but had not. He begged his followers to succeed where he had failed (Rudnytsky, "Carpatho-Ukraine," 363). They did not.

94. "The Transcarpathian variant of the literary language with a local dialectical base did not take a noteworthy place in the process of establishing

the all-national Ukrainian literary language." I. H. Matviias, *Ukrains'ka mova i ii hovory* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1990), 155.

95. To my, admittedly, limited knowledge, the only serious attempts to write in dialect emanated from the Ukrainophiles, from radicals such as the Pavlyk sisters, Anna and Paraska, as well as from the Metropolitan of Halych, Andrei Sheptytsky. In both cases the very distinctive Hutsul dialect was employed.

96. In November 1992 the First Congress of the Rusyn Language was held in Slovakia. "The participants accepted the 'Romansch model,' that is to allow the development of four standards based on dialects in the countries where Rusyns live: Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia, and Yugoslavia. One standard, Vojvodinian Rusyn in Yugoslavia, already exists; the three others . . . need to be codified. The participants also agreed to meet periodically to exchange views on their own codifying work as well as to agree on as many principles as possible that will form the basis of an eventual 'fifth' Rusyn literary standard, or *koiné* that would be common to all regions." Paul Robert Magocsi, "The Rusyn Language Question Revisited," in *A New Slavic Language Is Born: The Rusyn Literary Language of Slovakia* (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs distributed by Columbia University Press, 1996), 37-38.

97. There is one in Matviias, *Ukrains'ka mova i ii hovory*, 124. Another is in *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, s.v. "Dialects" by G. Y. Shevelov.

98. Frank E. Sysyn, "The Khmelnytsky Uprising and Ukrainian Nation-Building," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 17, nos. 1-2 (1992): 146.

99. For a clear, useful discussion of dialectical overlap and differences, see Ivan Sydoruk, *Problema ukrains'ko-bilorus'koi movnoi mezhi*, *Slavistica*, Pratsi Instytutu slov'ianovoznavstva Ukrains'koi vil'noi akademii nauk, 3 (Augsburg: Nakladom Tovarystva prykhyl'nykiv Ukrains'koi vil'noi akademii nauk, 1948).

100. A. Šachmatov and G. Y. Shevelov, *Die kirchenslavischen Elemente in der modernen russischen Literatursprache*, Slavistische Studienbücher, 1 (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1960).

101. Sysyn, "Khmelnytsky Uprising," 146-47, 152-53.

102. See the reflections on this in Andreas Kappeler, "A 'Small People' of 25 Million: The Ukrainians circa 1900," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 18, nos. 1-2 (1993): 85-92.

103. N. T. Vaitovich, *Da pytannia ab farmiravanni natsyjional'nai literaturnai belaruskai movy (ab suadnosinakh litaraturnai movy i dyialektau)* (Minsk: Vydavetstva Akademii navuk BSSR, 1958); Matviias, *Ukrains'ka mova i ii hovory*, 141-60.

104. Ryshard Radzik, "Prychyny slabas'tsi natsyiatvorchaha pratsesu belarusau u XIX-XX st.," *Belaruski historychny ahliad* 2, no. 2 (1995): 195-227.

## *My Past and Identities*

*Detroit was booming when I was born there in 1949, and it attracted immigrants from all over the eastern half of America: from the Delta, the Appalachians, and the moribund little coaltowns of Pennsylvania. My father was part of the anthracite emigration, as was my mother. I grew up in an extended family in which Polish, Ukrainian, Slovak, and Italian were tossed about by the older generation, above the heads of the monkey-in-the-middle younger generation to which I belonged. It was after the war, most of the men had seen service, everyone was too busy being American to imagine that there was any point to teaching us young 'uns the old languages, which hardly any of them could read or write in any case. The food was a mixture of city chicken, hot dogs, ravioli, and goląbki (or holubtsi, depending on who was doing the talking). The older they were, the more old-country they were. My father and mother were the babies of their families and among the most assimilated. Still, there was a constant buzz of ethnicity in the air, even if none of the family had heard the word back then.*

*There was also my grandmother. My birth mother had passed away when I was a baby, and some years were to go by before my father remarried. In the meantime, I was raised by my grandmother, who came to live with us. She had left the old country in 1909 but had never really gotten a handle on English. When she came to raise me, though, she made a choice that both of us later regretted: she would improve her English by raising me in that language. I later had to learn her native language, and we switched to that as our medium of communication. It would be an understatement to say that I loved my grandmother very, very much, and I spent much of my childhood trying to figure her out. Where did she come from? She said Lemberg, Austria, but it wasn't on the map. Eventually I found it in a historical atlas in my father's library and matched the location on a modern map: it was now Lvov, Russia. By about age twelve I had many things figured out, including that Grandma was Ukrainian, but Grandma was going to be constantly setting puzzles for*

*me to solve, even long after she passed away. Many of the things she told me just didn't make sense in terms of the Ukrainian history I subsequently read and was taught. Long before I could express it, I understood that there was an important distinction to be made between the national codification of Ukrainian history and the actual past that was experienced by people who are counted as part of the Ukrainian nation.*

*The big jump in my consciousness came when I was fourteen. I wanted to become a priest and left home for a minor seminary, St. Basil's, in Stamford, Connecticut. I had been baptized in the Roman Catholic Church, attended a Roman Catholic school, sang in Latin in Our Lady of Sorrows' boys' choir, served as an altar boy at a Roman Catholic summer camp, and heard Sunday mass at the local Roman Catholic parish. But the discoveries of the previous few years had revealed to me that, in spite of this Roman Catholic upbringing, I was nonetheless canonically a member of an Eastern rite and that if I wanted to be a priest, I needed a special dispensation to enter the Roman priesthood. But by then I was all keen to enter Grandma's exotic church, as I thought of it, and off I went to the Ukrainian-rite seminary.*

*I received an incredible education at that institution over the next five years, taught by remarkable men. My teacher of Latin had done his doctorate with Moses Hadas at Columbia and had written his thesis in Latin; my music teacher was probably the most prominent conductor of the Ukrainian diaspora; my Ukrainian teacher has recently been named to succeed to the metropolitan throne of Lviv, that is, to assume leadership of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic church worldwide. Most of the teachers had doctorates and great erudition in complicated fields like patristic anthropology. Quite a few had serious academic publications to their credit. Devoted to their church and nation, they lavished their knowledge on us ingrate boys instead of making proper careers. We made fun of them all the time, but they inspired us to learn. We played sports, but we also followed the example of our preceptors, each according to his talents: arranging the sacred choral music of our church, painting icons, writing the lives of the saints, studying the traditions of the other Eastern churches.*

*Aside from this formal education, I learned a great deal about Ukrainians, particularly two kinds of Ukrainians: those whose parents had come after World War II and who were themselves born abroad (in other words: DPs) and those whose grandparents had immigrated before World War I, as mine had. These two groups accounted for the overwhelming majority of the seminarians, and there was always tension between them. Most of the first-immigration kids came from Pennsylvania and from an environment that retained much more of its Ukrainian character than mine had. I fit in well with these guys, from*

*whose number my closest friends were drawn. But I was also impressed by the postwar immigrants: completely fluent in Ukrainian, possessing a worked-out nationalist worldview, tough-minded. With time, I was to gravitate more strongly toward them and to assimilate more of their culture. After I left the seminary, I always sought the company of this postwar immigration and eventually married into it.*

*My vocation was no match for the spirit of the times. At the end of the 1960s I left the seminary and plunged into the radical culture and radical politics of the outside world. At the University of Michigan, where I continued my education, my life consisted of militant demonstrations against the war, against racism, and against capitalist exploitation, as well as of lectures and seminars.*

*Michigan was an excellent place to continue my interest in things Ukrainian and develop a deeper interest in all things East European. Once again I had remarkable teachers, and peers. I came under the tutelage of Roman Szporluk, now Mykhailo Hrushevsky Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University. I also studied Balkan history with John Fine and Russian history with Horace Dewey. Close friends of my Michigan years included Roman Solchanyk and Patrick Moore, now prominent analysts of Ukrainian and Balkan affairs respectively, as well as Robert Donia, the Bosnian specialist, and Marian Krzyzowski, longtime editor of Studium Papers. In these years I also met the scholars connected with the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute; later I was to spend time with them at their home institution, and some of them were to end up with me in Edmonton.*

*During this period I had to reconstruct my own Ukrainian identity. The religious underpinnings had been shattered. Moreover, I needed a Ukrainian identity that could accommodate the extreme leftism that I now espoused. My grandmother and one of the teachers at the seminary had already left me with some clues that I followed until I came upon the rich traditions of the Ukrainian socialist movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. And Professor Szporluk guided me to the Ukrainian socialist thinkers that exercised the largest influence on me for many years thereafter: the father of Ukrainian radicalism, Mykhailo Drahomanov, and the Marxist historian and interpreter of Capital and the Grundrisse, Roman Rosdolsky. I eventually was to write my doctoral dissertation (and first book) on the history of the socialist movement in Galicia and translate one of Rosdolsky's books into English.*

*I was not the only one trying to reconcile a Ukrainian identity with the radical North American zeitgeist. I came across the journal New Directions from New York and, really much more exciting for me at the time, the journals*

*coming out from the Ukrainian New Left in Toronto: Meta and Diialoh. Later I was to move to Canada and marry Meta's coeditor.*

*Before that, however, in 1974–76 I embarked on my first trip to Eastern Europe, spending a year in Cracow, six months in Leningrad, and a month each in Lviv and Kyiv. It was my first encounter with the other Ukrainians, the ones who had not left for the West. In Cracow the Ukrainians were similar to the postwar Ukrainians I knew back home: well versed in Ukrainian lore, nationalist, religious, antisocialist. We got along well in spite of many differences of opinion. In Leningrad I encountered greater variety: displaced Galicians with the nationalist worldview; other displaced Ukrainians who, like the national poet Taras Shevchenko over a century earlier, found that the alienation they experienced in the northern Russian metropolis only led them to a deeper appreciation of their roots, although, unlike Shevchenko, they did not know as much about these roots; others yet who could still remember some words of the Ukrainian language but had basically melted into "the Soviet people."*

*Ukraine itself offered me even more variety. On that first trip and on many other trips over the next twenty-some years, I engaged in close encounters with mighty and fledgling scholars, illiterate peasant women, enraged dissidents, sympatico and obnoxious Russians (whether one or the other, their days in authority were numbered), writers, artists, stamp collectors, crooks, saints, and biznesmeny on the make. Over the years I watched my friends rewrite their autobiographies, redefine their present and past selves, and reconstruct their identities (I should add: as I myself am perforce doing in this essay).*

*In 1977 I left the United States for Canada, where I was offered a contract position at the University of Alberta. Again, I was fortunate in the company I encountered. The professor of Ukrainian history was one of the great luminaries of the diaspora, Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky. We became close friends, even though he was a conservative and by this time I was an orthodox Marxist. Until his death in 1984, he continually gave me things to read and engaged me in discussion and debate, turning our friendship and working relationship also into a seminar. In Edmonton I was able to join the editorial board of Diialoh, which had moved there from Toronto. We had a slogan that captured our politics perfectly: "For socialism and democracy in an independent Ukraine." (Most of us later settled for the partial fulfillment of our program that history offered.) We published a journal in Ukrainian and, spicier yet, set up a modest smuggling and intelligence network in Eastern Europe and Ukraine. In addition to the deeply conspiratorial Diialoh, we also established a left-wing*

*Ukrainian cultural society, Hromada, which in turn gave birth to the Hromada Housing Co-operative, where some of the old stalwarts (myself included) still live. In the late seventies/early eighties life was intense, all cigarettes and public forums and layouts and debates. Key figures in the milieu included Bohdan Krawchenko, whom we nicknamed "Captain Ukraine" and who later became director of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies and still later an adviser to the independent Ukrainian government; Myrna Kostash, author of All of Baba's Children and later head of Canada's writers' union; Halyna Freeland, founder of "Common Woman Books" and presently executive director of the Ukrainian Legal Foundation in Kyiv; and many, many others, not least of whom was my wife Chrystia Chomiak, an indefatigable activist in many progressive Ukrainian causes.*

*In the later 1980s things began to change, most dramatically on the international scene, but also in my personal life. Chrystia and I had children, and I also ended up in the position formerly occupied by Professor Rudnytsky, with all the responsibilities that entailed. I managed to finish my second book, on the impact of the Ukrainian national movement on the Galician countryside, the most consistently Marxist work in my oeuvre. I decided that for my third monograph, I would write a study of the Greek Catholic church, in its relationship to the nationality question. It took me about ten years to write that book, during which time I reexamined and reevaluated many of the premises I had been working with hitherto. It has been a time extremely fertile in ideas and, especially, doubts, one fruit of which is the study of national identity published in this volume.*

John-Paul Himka