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Karl D. Qualls

**Accommodation and Agitation in Sevastopol: Redefining Socialist Space in the Postwar
'City of Glory'**

In late 1949 city officials stretched a banner that read 'SEVASTOPOLIANS! What have you done for the restoration of your *hometown*'¹ across one of the most heavily travelled streets in the Crimean port city of Sevastopol. It spoke volumes about the city and its transformation during the five years after liberation from a two-year Nazi occupation. To the social, psychological and physical damage caused by revolution, civil war, collectivization, industrialization and purges, war scars added one more trauma. When, after the war, the regime asked how it could repair the damage it found the answer in urban reconstruction.

The process of replanning and rebuilding cities after the devastation of the Second World War was one of many ways that the Soviet party/state attempted to repair its image in the eyes of the population after nearly thirty years of disorientation. The creation of socialist spaces was part of a larger project of creating a new system and a new society, but the process and rationale are still poorly understood. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, not only in regard to the well-known 1935 General Plan for the reconstruction of Moscow, but also for the revitalization of other cities, architects and ideologues debated the future face of Soviet urban space. Many planners wanted a socialist space that met the population's needs through communal living, eating, childcare, laundry and more. The counter view sought monumental architecture that would serve as symbols of power and representations of the Soviet state and institutions with the names and statues of Marx, Engels and other socialist luminaries prominent throughout. What transpired was a combination of pre-revolutionary and NEP-era utopian-idealist schemes for the new city all bundled up in the latest verbiage about the socialist system's concern for the population's

well being. Much as steel had become the trademark of progress in the 1930s, in the postwar decade officials used reconstructed buildings and revitalized cities as symbols of progress and economic strength. New buildings rising from and above the ruins offered more than space for housing, production, convalescence and education. Each new building represented progress, healing and recovery. The city's new planners, moreover, diverted huge sums of money to massive and ornate structures that symbolized the regime's public pronouncements of concern for the population. Theatres, cinemas, hospitals and hotels, built in neo-classical themes, became the centrepieces of the city. This feat of rebuilding, often compared to the valour and sacrifice attending the military victory, became one focus of persuasion in Stalin's last decade. Each new building was hailed as another 'victory' (rarely abandoning military terminology) for Soviet city building and for society in general.² The delayed Pyrrhic victory over Nazi Germany left numerous cities ravaged; the 'victory' of construction sought to heal those wounds.

The model settled on by the mid-1930s was carried out on a massive scale after World War II, but the vast destruction allowed for further negotiation among residents, architects and institutions of power on how cities would be raised from their ruins. With numerous military and industrial cities almost completely destroyed, the regime was willing to bend its stated policies if this would ensure rapid reconstruction and a mollified population. Five years after Sevastopol's liberation from German occupation and the beginning of reconstruction in the war-ravaged city, urban planners began to use the appeal of particular geographic places as a tool to motivate greater effort for construction of a new socialist space. However, this had not always been the case. Local citizens and officials opposed the projected future face of the city emanating from Moscow that sought to marginalize local history and tradition while centring Soviet institutions and the history of socialism and the USSR in the heart of the city. Local opposition initiated a

connection with the hometown, its tradition and heritage by preserving and resurrecting pre-revolutionary names and buildings and placing the seats of Soviet institutions in their shadows. Maintaining schools, hospitals, housing, and more remained consistent in all plans, but the socialist space was redefined from one that excluded much of the urban biography in favour of honouring the Soviet and socialist past to one that interwove Soviet history with a longer local history. Although the regime had intended the plans designed in Moscow by award-winning architects to become the blueprint for the reconstruction of other provincial cities that had suffered so much devastation during World War II, the idealistic plans conflicted with local desires to rebuild and remember a more familiar city. This process of negotiation was long and arduous, but eventually, in Sevastopol at least, local interests won out over central dictates. Socialist space became the buildings of Party and government and the occasional invocation of Lenin surrounded and intersected by sites of and monuments too pre-revolutionary lore. 'Soviet' and 'socialist' was at harmony with a selectively created and remembered past.

Accommodation and Agitation

Soviet social and political policy has sometimes been described as 'bread and circus', a duality whereby the population is both appeased and entertained. 'Accommodation and agitation' seems, however, to be more reflective of a broader set of policies.³ Accommodation represents a series of policies satisfying the basic needs and wants of a population, keeping it content and maintaining the illusion of socialism's superior humanity. The cradle-to-grave system of social welfare and services provided benefits to single mothers and their children, down-on-their-luck workers, Stakhanovites and shockworkers, widows and orphans. Agitation means a simple and popularised propagation of political, social and/or cultural messages that seeks not just to convince, but also to motivate further action.

In postwar urban reconstruction these methods took on various forms. Accommodation was an attempt to meet the immediate needs of a city and residents, but also to incorporate, and thus validate, 'local' practice and tradition. Accommodating the population's psychological needs was as important as meeting its physical demands. Agitation, on the other hand, included the discourse and practices of moulding the myths of a glorious past and the power of the Soviet present with the future promise of the great Soviet experiment. Agitation in the context of postwar urban reconstruction created an alternate reality, a mythology based on tradition and ideological aspirations for the future. Hoping to encourage further effort for reconstruction, the architects and officials who redesigned Sevastopol after World War II created an aesthetic matrix of monuments, buildings, squares and streets honouring the heroes of the 'two defences' of the Crimean War and Great Patriotic War. Using the awe-inspiring architectural forms of the city's ancient Greek heritage, designers combined images of patriotic heroes with the legendary martyrs of two revolutions and a civil war. This form of agitation through incorporating an existing set of myths was also a method of accommodating residents' desire to live in a city that was familiar to them, not one radically changed.

Accommodation and agitation were not mutually exclusive; often they overlapped. For example, as with carefully designed buildings, architects paid close attention to the design of parks. In their purest form, green areas in cities provided space for recreation, relaxation and communing with nature and fellow citizens amidst the asphalt and concrete. Parks also occupied a central place in health maintenance (*zdravookhranenie*) plans. They provided fresh air and exercise to urban dwellers who could not escape to dachas. Moreover, parks served an important agitational purpose. Not only did they project the image of a state concerned with the health and welfare of its citizens, but also the addition of historical monuments linked those who strolled in

the present with the heroic defenders of the Motherland who had lost their lives on battlefields past. When parks and monuments were preserved or rebuilt they only furthered the local population's identification with a familiar urban biography.

As architects proposed additional spaces for recreation, leisure and entertainment, the glorious past and future of Sevastopol was seen to rise from the ashes. Agitation was meant for mass consumption as a tool for aesthetic persuasion that utilized easily understood symbols of power and strength and was devoid of abstract (and unintelligible to most) political theory more common in written propaganda, which was meant primarily to persuade rather than encourage action.⁴ Monuments, memorials and historical architecture supplied the regime with omnipresent symbols of Soviet power and a history of heroic actions around which the population could rally. Moreover, the style and monumental scale of construction represented the power, stability and economic viability of a country and system devastated by war. Accommodation in city services and housing planned to improve the standard of living of the population thereby avoiding urban unrest and, more importantly, proving that Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism could provide the best possible life for people. The revolution's true believers had not seen yet the fulfilment of the social(ist) contract: if the state provides for the population's welfare, the latter will work and sacrifice for the creation of the communist society.

For both agitation and accommodation, the city centre was most important because it was the locus of city services and the party/state institutions, it was the most visible and travelled region of the city and it contained numerous historical sites. If one lived in the city centre or travelled there to work or to conduct business with the authorities, one was brought into contact with the first stage of postwar reconstruction. Planners first looked to the urban core both because the concentrated construction was more economical and efficient, but also because

restoring the institutions of power, essential city services (e.g. water systems, hospitals, schools) and leisure activities (e.g. parks, theatres, museums) restored a sense of normalcy to a bomb-ravaged city and more quickly showed that through Soviet power a city could rise from its own ashes.

Sevastopol Before Reconstruction

Since the fifth century BCE the region surrounding present-day Sevastopol has served as a trading port for Greeks, Tatars, East Slavs and others. In 1783, Catherine established the city of Sevastopol, on the site of the ancient Greek city of Chersoneses (Khersones), as a Russian trading port and naval outpost against the Turks. But before World War II, Russians, Turks and Europeans remembered Sevastopol as the tortuous battleground of the Crimean War. The costly war of attrition against disease, as much as enemy fire, became the focal point of the city's identity. In the last decade of the nineteenth century, naval, municipal and imperial officials commissioned statues and monuments to the 'great defence' of Sevastopol. The Crimean War, although Russia suffered great losses, demonstrated the power of a strong fortress and population. Thus, Sevastopol's heroic image served as the foundation on which the Soviets later built the myth of Red Sevastopol.

As the Crimean defence was being immortalized in stone and marble, revolutionaries arose in Sevastopol. Beginning with the mutinies in the Black Sea Fleet in 1905 and 1917 and then the 1919 insurrection against General Petr Wrangel and his men, Sevastopol gained the reputation as a bastion of the revolution and defender of Soviet power. Operation Barbarossa in 1941 became yet another touchstone for fortress Sevastopol. Like the sailors who had established Soviet power in the city, their successors had to defend both Sevastopol and the nation from German invaders. After the lightning-quick and highly destructive Nazi offensive against the

home of the Black Sea Fleet in November and December 1941, mythmakers in the Soviet press began to link the heroic mid-nineteenth-century defence of the city with the battle at hand.⁵ All the themes of the Crimean war—heroism, self-sacrifice, disease and homelessness—were resurrected in the 1940s.

The scale of damage resulting from 250 days of siege and a two-year occupation in Sevastopol is simply unimaginable. Of 110,000 Sevastopolians, only 3,000 remained until liberation and 24,600 had been carried off to Germany as captive labour.⁶ Residents returning from evacuation soon found that their homes had fared little better than the city at large. Only 1,023 of 6,402 residential buildings were habitable and only seven half-destroyed buildings remained in the city centre. The long German siege and the Red Army's return to the city two years later took its toll on Sevastopol's infrastructure as well. German forces destroyed the city's water system, shelling wreaked havoc on sewers, retreating forces cut phone and telegraph lines, special battalions destroyed railroad tracks, and tunnels and Nazi rail cars hauled industrial equipment—including some of the city's electric generators—back to Germany. All told, Soviet officials claimed a loss of 25 billion rubles.⁷ So thorough was Nazi destruction, however, that little remained in the city to meet even the most basic human needs. Water and sewer systems, electrical stations, flour mills, breweries and food processing industries were ruined and human feces floated in one of the city's central bays.

Spatial Organization

<Place figure 1 near here> On and around the central hill of Sevastopol one finds remarkable examples of the process of accommodation and agitation in postwar design of a city with several loci of identification. Vladimir Cathedral, although damaged by war, remained the visual centrepiece at the highest point on the central hill. Nearby a complex of naval administrative

buildings pointed to the city's military identity. On the ring road surrounding the hill, the offices of the party and government stood near centres of entertainment such as theatres. Throughout the city were monuments and statues to admirals and heroes of socialism. The new socialist space in postwar Sevastopol was dominated by various symbols and reminders of the presence of the Soviet state, like Lenin Street. Others, like the statues honouring pre-revolutionary admirals, fit well with the re-emergence of Russian nationalism during the war and maintained the city's tradition. Despite being heavily damaged, or decapitated in the case of Totleben, these symbols of Sevastopol's heroic past were restored to their previous condition. However, another set of structures, specifically the churches that still stand so prominently throughout the urban core, were completely at odds with state atheism, even though the regime retreated from its hard line during the war. None of the places of worship in the city centre, although heavily damaged by war, were completely demolished before reconstruction because the lack of time and materials necessitated the use of all building space. They also had stood as part of the city's heritage and identity before the arrival of Soviet power. Looking at how and why some of these structures were built or restored it becomes clear that several groups were engaged in protracted conflict and negotiation to design Sevastopol's postwar socialist space.

Sevastopolians received their first indication that their city was to be reborn on 9 August 1944. Boris Rubanenko, deputy chair of the Committee on Architectural Affairs (KA), sent a brief note to one Sud'bin of the navy's Central Planning Bureau informing him that a closed competition for the city plan of postwar Sevastopol must be completed by 15 November.⁸ The KA directed two prominent Moscow architects to compete for the honour of designing Sevastopol's new face. Moisei Ginzburg (1892-1946), once the leading theorist of constructivism and designer of Crimea's southern shore in the 1920s, represented the Academy

of Architecture. Grigorii Barkhin (1880-1969), professor of architectural planning and adviser to graduate students at the Moscow Architecture Institute, spoke for the navy. Despite years of experience and intimate knowledge of the city, Georgii Lomagin, Sevastopol's prewar municipal architect, was not included in the competition. In all prominent Soviet cities like Sevastopol, only the best practitioners from Moscow received commissions for planning competitions. These were men who had survived the relatively bloodless purge of the architectural community in the 1930s and therefore could be trusted to follow the official line.⁹ Lomagin's exclusion from the competition showed that the regime initially believed that such an important task could not be left to local officials. This soon changed as retaining local tradition took precedence.

Ginzburg's plan for Sevastopol's new face echoed one of the prominent practices in postwar Soviet architecture—the creation of outdoor museums. When the Council of People's Commissars created the KA on 8 April 1943 it invested the new organization with the 'architectural and planning work for the restoration of cities and other populated areas of the city type destroyed by the German invaders'.¹⁰ As a sign of the importance of non-war-directed construction and preservation, of all the structures mentioned in the decree Sovnarkom elaborated only on the rubric of architectural structures: 'triumphal arches, obelisks, columns and others.' The emphasis on memorial and monumental architecture underscored the regime's desire to recreate a mythology for the cities under construction while continuing to strengthen political and economic power. For older cities like Novgorod, Pskov and Smolensk, this meant preserving the architectural heritage.¹¹ Ginzburg's variant for the relatively young Sevastopol created a city of monuments to war and revolutionary heroes. He proposed a four-point program:

1. Maximal utilization and opening of Sevastopol's landscape peculiarities. 2. Maximal utilization of material valuables preserved in Sevastopol. 3. Rational solution for all vital functions of the city as an organism. 4. Opening of the city's artistic form as a hero-city, as a city of Russian glory.¹²

Of this limited program, Ginzburg developed only the last point. Rather than highlight the benefits for the city's inhabitants, Ginzburg proposed a plan of architectural symbolism; agitation was more important than accommodation. His plans were rejected, for the most part, because he provided little detail beyond ensemble sketches of his plans and he failed to include any analysis of space needs for housing, recreation, municipal services and more and proposed no budget.

The main thrust of Ginzburg's effort was to memorialize the war, highlight naval interests and glorify Stalin. At the site of the Crimean War Panorama, he wanted to add a war museum, thus creating a square of the 'two defences'. For added effect, he proposed an 'Obelisk of Victory' nearby. At 80m high it was to be the termination point for a line of statues beginning at Count's Pier, ascending the central hill to a 'monumental sculpture of Stalin dominating over this part of the city,'¹³ and on to the Square of the Two Defences. The creation of this new pantheon of victors was accompanied by the preservation and restoration of monuments to heroes past. On the central hill, near Stalin's likeness, Ginzburg planned an ensemble for the naval command as well as for the Party and government offices. In his presentation, he made sure to note that Stalin's statue and the Obelisk of Victory could be seen from the shore and nearly every part of the city. Armed with research on monuments from around the world, Ginzburg sought to satisfy the population's psychological need to remember and the regime's

desire for a new pantheon of heroes. Atop the central hill, all important symbols of socialism and heroism would meet in one great outdoor display of power. Ginzburg sought to accommodate Moscow's need to project its power rather than local physical needs or desires to maintain tradition.

<Place figure 2 near here> Barkhin's design for the city centre, however, proposed a new spatial organization that greatly differed both from Ginzburg and the city's past, and Barkhin included much more detail than his opponent. In his July 1945 revision, Barkhin explained his use of the artistic device of triangulation. He used three monuments to the Crimean War as the points of intersection. The segments drawn from Historical Boulevard in the Central Region to Malakhov Kurgan in the Shipyards Region to the Fraternal Cemetery in the Northern Region created the boundaries of the triangle. The focus, at the triangle's centre, was Sevastopol's central hill. The former Cathedral of St. Vladimir occupied centre stage. The navy's most important buildings surrounded what was once known as Vladimir Square, and damage to the enormous naval library and other buildings left architects free to replan the city's centrepiece. Bounding the central hill was a ring road composed of three streets and four squares that housed all the government, party and military headquarters in addition to the main leisure facilities for residents. Barkhin, like Ginzburg, also located most major symbols in the city centre. Utilizing one of the oldest concepts in urban design, Barkhin and the experts who reviewed his plans and provided advice on corrections sought to place the most important buildings and monuments where they could be seen from many places (on hills and squares and at the junctions of important streets). Various plans placed statues of Lenin or Stalin or a war museum at the peak of the central hill, on the square of Vladimir Cathedral. Naval clubs, libraries, Party and government buildings and the naval staff were all to be located at the intersections of the city's

three main streets around the central hill. Barkhin's design sought to marginalize the Crimean War to the vertices of his triangle, which surrounded his centrepiece: the Soviet institutions. This would clearly have been a Soviet space with pre-revolutionary images pushed to the background.

Contested Spaces: Shaping the Cityscape

<Place figure 3 near here> Contestation was not limited, however, to the two architects appointed by Moscow. In the years following the Barkhin and Ginzburg plan, local officials and residents intervened at nearly every stage to protect and project their image of the new Sevastopol. The 'dialogue' that emerged between Moscow and Sevastopol significantly altered the initial postwar plans and created a renewed Sevastopol that, while still Soviet, focused primarily on the city's pre-revolutionary Russian and local heritage, often at the expense of Soviet images.

Given the prohibitions on religion and the consensus behind a need for agitational space, how can we account for the dispute that arose after Barkhin suggested that all the buildings on the central hill, including Vladimir Cathedral, be razed?¹⁴ A local review committee composed of naval and civilian representatives that included architects, engineers, a physician, the head of the city planning bureau, air defence and fire control met at the end of 1945 and argued vehemently against Barkhin's plan.¹⁵ Asserting that the Cathedral was central to Sevastopol's heritage and aesthetic uniqueness, the committee argued that it should be restored and not pulled down and that Barkhin's planned ensemble would overshadow the Parthenon-like Peter and Paul Cathedral adjacent to proposed construction.¹⁶ Only after this local input was a plan to preserve the cathedral articulated. Barkhin reversed himself and criticized a similar plan radically to rebuild the central hill saying that Vladimir Cathedral was a 'monumental memorial of the first defence of Sevastopol in which the four hero admirals were interred.' He labelled the

competing, but equally destructive plan, as ‘vandalism and an unpardonable attitude toward the historical past of the Russian people’.¹⁷ What is most telling is that despite the fact that over one third of the committee membership came from the navy, it rejected plans to enlarge a naval complex at the expense of Vladimir Cathedral.¹⁸ Local naval and civilian officials were able to alter the plan of the Moscow architect selected to redesign Sevastopol and promote a mutually shared image of Sevastopol as a long-time naval bastion. It appears that image and tradition were more important to the navy than expanding its own administrative facilities, and in the closing days of the war the navy held considerable power of persuasion.

Although there are numerous reasons why the committee might have chosen to restore the cathedral, its historical significance is most instructive. Municipal and naval authorities, as Barkhin noted in his retraction, sought to direct the local community toward a particular history that highlighted heroism, sacrifice and defence of the city and country. The ‘four hero admirals’ that Barkhin noted included E. I. Totleben, V. I. Istomin, V. A. Kornilov and P. S. Nakhimov, who were central to Sevastopol’s founding as a naval city and its defence against invaders of superior power. This mythology resonated with a population that had just emerged from war against the mighty Nazi forces. Rather than destroy a religious building as Moscow’s architect had desired, local officials argued for and won the preservation of a monument to the city’s heritage. Accommodating the local population’s desire to retain its history was well within the bounds of postwar socialist space because defence of the Motherland and a renewed sense of Russian history had become more important than Marxism during the war, and the nineteenth-century admirals represented the city’s heroic fighting spirit.¹⁹ ‘Soviet’ space could be many things to many people, and creating tradition was a complicated process of contestation and negotiation that resulted in a selective ‘writing’ of the city’s past.

Sevastopol's history before World War II was rich and heroic, but new policy dictates forbade recognition of its Tatar and Jewish heritage. With Crimean Tatars banished to Siberia and Central Asia, municipal officials set about removing all visual reminders of their earlier presence.²⁰ In addition to the Tatar people, the most prominent visual representation of their culture was the beautiful, turn-of-the-century mosque near the central ring road. Like nearly all buildings in the city centre, the mosque fell prey to artillery and bombs; yet, in this case, the exterior structure remained intact. Photos from 1944 and 1946 showed that the central dome and minaret still towered over nearby buildings much as they had done before the war.²¹ Numerous organizations asked municipal officials for the authority to rebuild the structure, but no one wanted to reopen it as a mosque. The city and *oblast* (province) governments, as well as the Council on Religious Cults, approved initial plans for the mosque's resurrection as a cinema/club for the Sevastopolstroi construction trust.²² Yet, when the better-connected navy heard that the building was under consideration, it submitted its petition to renovate the building as the city's new naval archive.²³ But not even these organs could spare labour and materials to start anew. Gorispolkom (the Municipal Executive Committee) approved the navy's request,²⁴ but chief city architect Iurii Trautman warned the navy not to waste money trying to 'cleanse' the building of the last vestiges of its former owners. He limited them to three points: 'Remove all quotations both Arabic and Russian...remove emblems of half-moons, tear down the minaret.'²⁵ After the restoration, little remained of the Tatar shell. The new naval archive was a testament to the postwar rewriting of history. The facades were 'erased' and quotations from the Koran, dissonant with the building's new image, were expunged.²⁶ The archive came to represent the navy, the city's most powerful institution. At the same time it 'nationalized' and unified the city and simplified its past by removing the vestiges of a non-Slavic group and its faith. Whereas the navy

was central to preserving a Russian Orthodox Cathedral instead of expanding its purview on the central hill, it had no qualms with significantly changing a mosque to suit its needs.

Many other religious buildings were transformed into clubs, cultural centres and museums. The Karaimskaia kenasa, a Jewish prayer hall along the city's main ring road and in the shadow of Vladimir Cathedral, also suffered from the rewriting of history with urban space. Although the Karaite Jewish building survived 1941 with little damage, by liberation in 1944 only three heavily shell-pocked walls remained standing.²⁷ The roof's destruction obliterated the interior and allowed further damage from the elements. The demand for usable space in the city centre forced the kenasa's resurrection as the Spartak sports club. The façade, lacking any noticeable religious symbols, was rebuilt and restored to its original condition during the 1950s. Like the Tatars, although for different reasons, Jews were excluded from the postwar histories of the war. The chief architectural symbol of Judaism was co-opted, this time for leisure space and named for one of history's first revolutionaries: Spartacus.

In many ways, the restoration of religious buildings helped to define the new socialist space as atheist, primarily Russian and military. Vladimir Cathedral accommodated the need for tradition and symbols of heroism, the mosque became one of many emblems of naval power in the city, and the kenasa provided a place for recreation for the city's inhabitants. All three structures, however, rewrote the past and highlighted the city's heroic and Russian heritage, which was wholly consistent with the contemporaneous martial and national character of the Soviet Union. Because the city was predominately Slavic after the war, the removal of the last vestiges of Tatars and Jews - whom the regime and press chided respectively as Nazi collaborators and non-participants in the war - further enhanced the dominant population's view that Sevastopol was a locale of Russian glory and therefore first among equals in the USSR.

Beyond religious buildings, symbols of institutional authority and power abounded in postwar Sevastopol. Plans from both Moscow and municipal architects placed the city's party and government headquarters in the city centre, usually on one of the chief squares that functioned as intersections for major streets. This gave the regime a physical presence in the very heart of the city. In addition to these grandiose building projects, all planners realized that urban space allowed for a more agitational use of naming and labelling. The streets and squares of Sevastopol's urban core became a battleground for competing visions of the city's identity as central planners looked to highlight the regime and locals clamoured for greater recognition of the city's history.

The 1944 decree on municipal architects stated that they held sole 'responsibility for planning, construction and architectural organization of the city,' but many groups consistently infringed on this power.²⁸ The first infringement was the appointment of Moscow-based architects like Barkhin to create general plans. In Sevastopol, the navy also had great power to influence the development of various planning details, and even the general population raised objections to various projects emanating from Moscow or the chief municipal architect in Sevastopol. For example, in 1945 Vice-Admiral F. S. Oktiabrskii, commander in charge of Sevastopol's defence, recommended 'the naming of squares and main streets of Sevastopol take into account the historical events and names of the organizers and heroes of the two defences of Sevastopol'.²⁹ This emboldened local planners to attack Moscow's version of Sevastopol's heritage as first and foremost a Soviet socialist city.

Barkhin clearly wanted to define the new space as Soviet and socialist and he marked it as such on new city maps. The principal streets ringing the central hill took names familiar to any Soviet citizen: Lenin, Marx and Frunze. Likewise, most of the main squares along the ring road

evoked Soviet socialism: Commune, Revolution and Parade. Lenin connected Parade and Commune and then Marx led from there to Revolution, which emptied into Frunze and back to the Square of Parades. The author of the Soviet Union's ruling ideology, the father of the Soviet state and the man who established Soviet power in Crimea were all connected by squares marking significant moments in the history of socialism. The Square of Parades is the obvious exception to this formula, but Barkhin had planned to use its prewar name, Third International, before naming it for its function. The city centre, which housed all the institutions of power and most of the leisure activities and city services (not to mention a significant proportion of housing) was thus prescribed by a history of socialism in street signs. One could not escape this lesson either; while walking the streets or giving directions to someone, the symbols of socialism's past were invoked.

Local planners, led by Iurii Trautman, wanted to design a socialist space that was more than merely another city dominated by symbols of Soviet power, but rather a city that took into account the residents' material needs and desire to 'remember' a familiar and glorified pre-revolutionary history. Trautman was neither bold nor stupid enough to try to change the name of Lenin Street or have it revert to its pre-Revolutionary Catherine Street. However, the names of most other main streets and squares were transformed. Marx and Frunze reverted to their pre-1917 Big Naval and Nakhimov streets. The Square of Parades was also renamed for Nakhimov (although Lenin was toyed with for a while), and Nakhimov's statue replaced the rubble of Lenin's. Commune Square was renamed for Admiral Ushakov and Revolution Square eventually took the name of the founder of the Black Sea Fleet, Lazarev. In the post-Barkhin plans, Sevastopol's centre was marked by its naval heritage with Lenin as the sole exception. The naming of socialist space did not have to directly invoke socialism and its founders; rather, the

ideal Soviet city was based on its willingness to sacrifice for and participate in the protection of the Motherland.³⁰ Local officials marked the new socialist space with the names that they thought best exemplified Sevastopol, not just Soviet Sevastopol. Moscow likely acquiesced because reviving the city's pre-revolutionary past did not preclude Sevastopol from being 'Soviet'; rather, a greater focus on a century of military valour strengthened Sevastopol's principal role within the USSR and allowed the population to feel part of something familiar.

Primorskii Boulevard, which, from the late-nineteenth century to the present has been the most attractive and appealing leisure space in Sevastopol, also marked the naval heritage of the city. Initially restricted to the city's elite, after the revolution it became a space for the masses as well. Strolling, fishing and summer theatres were just some of the entertainments available in the lush green area on the bay near the opening to the sea. For this reason, Barkhin's initial plans to expand the nearby Square of Parades at the expense of Primorskii drew the ire and consternation of locals. Whether out of a genuine desire to glorify Stalin, or as a strategy to get his plan approved, Barkhin used the parks and squares of the city for blatant agitational purposes. On the Square of Parades, Barkhin unleashed all his talent for symbolic architecture. This square, on a small peninsula where the oldest street of the city met its first wharf and Primorskii Boulevard, Barkhin designed a complex of naval buildings and a military museum with three sides of the square open to the bays. Over the entire square and in front of the 'Forum' garden park with memorials to the heroes, Barkhin proposed an enormous statue of Stalin—'the great organizer and inspiration for victory'.³¹ But even Stalin was to be no match for the 110m Tower of War with its four triumphal arches adorned with heroic sculptures. In order to illustrate the effect of his plan, Barkhin included a description of a parade route which began on Karl Marx Street, continued along Frunze Street, flowed into the square and past monuments and the memorial to

Stalin and finally emerged onto Lenin Street to South Bay or down the incline to Count's Pier to the sea. For Barkhin's opponents, the current square already satisfied the city's parade needs and as a centre for demonstrations. For them, it was more important to preserve the city's traditional place of leisure than it was to eliminate green space for gaudy monuments.

In 1950, the head of Sevastopol's new government, Sergei Sosnitskii, submitted a modest request to Moscow that the planning for Primorskii Boulevard, one of the oldest places in the city, not be changed because the 'citizens of Sevastopol are very accustomed to the present layout, they will love [it] and be thankful if it remains in the present condition'.³² When Viacheslav Shkvarikov, chairman of the Russian Federation's Administration on Architectural Affairs, suggested that more advisers from Moscow take part, the city's chief planner, Tamara Alëshina, argued that the 'boulevard must preserve its historically complex arrangement'. That included replanting chestnut trees destroyed during the war.³³ Local officials had grown weary of Moscow not recognizing the need for accommodating the population. Primorskii remained relatively untouched and Sevastopol's leaders got their wish although, as Sosnitskii's remarks made clear, local officials knew that Moscow could decide all things. However, it appears that appeals such as this from the periphery to the centre showed officials in Moscow that local morale - essential in a military city - would be much higher if the city's heritage and traditions were preserved right down to the last chestnut tree.

In addition to places for strolling, an important locus for cultured leisure was the theatre. During Sevastopol's reconstruction, the planning of the new Lunacharsky Drama Theatre, replacing the old one that had been bombed to rubble, became the battleground for public and private contestation of space. In November 1948, chief municipal architect Iurii Trautman released his plans to complete the reconstruction of Sevastopol in 'three to four years,' per

Stalin's decree.³⁴ Part of this plan included the placement of the new, ornate theatre opposite Vladimir Cathedral. Trautman was following the recommendations that the Committee on Architectural Affairs in Moscow had given Barkhin.³⁵ Renowned Moscow architect I. V. Zholtovskii's proposed theatre, despite the over 17 million ruble price tag which ballooned to 21.1 million rubles before the plan was scrapped and handed to Trautman, had been approved by a group of experts that preferred a site on the central hill where the theatre could be seen from anywhere in the city. The variant plan had placed it along the ring road below.³⁶

When Trautman made the plans public nearly two years later, the local population was furious at not being consulted properly and at what it perceived as the destruction of tradition. The local population countered, noting that the theatre would only accommodate the needs of the population if it was accessible. Both the theatre administration and audience were enlisted to level criticism against the planned location.³⁷ The published letters echoed much of the sentiment of the unpublished: building must take place near a central square with trolleybus stops so as to eliminate the dangerous winter climb up stairs to the hilltop. Unpublished letters from the workers and administrators at the State Khersones Museum wanted the theatre placed near its prewar location on Primorskii Boulevard. Moreover, the unpublished letters provided sketches of a new facade that represented a style closer to south shore Crimean traditions.³⁸ The amount of detail in the unpublished letters surely excluded them from *Slava Sevastopolia* because they countered the new policy of centralism that began to re-emerge in 1948. Moreover, the drawings challenged prevailing aesthetic trends, taking localism too much to heart.³⁹ However, local input carried the day as Trautman's theatre was placed back on the perimeter of Primorskii Boulevard between the ornate Corinthian facades of Trautman's new Sevastopol Hotel and the House of Pioneers (the prewar Sechënov Institute of Physical Therapy) in nearly the exact same spot that,

two years earlier, the Committee on Architectural Affairs had rejected in favour of the central hill. The theatre was now bounded by the main ring road along the bus route, the waterfront of Artillery Bay and residents' favourite park, thus accommodating both the need for leisure and tradition.

Conclusions

Defining socialist space in the reconstruction of Sevastopol after World War II was not easy and it strayed in many ways from more accessible definitions of 'socialist.' There was no discussion of class, the means of production, the evils of capitalism or social justice. The socialist space in postwar Sevastopol was in step with Russian and local traditions and history that could be incorporated into a larger and newly defined type of Soviet socialism. Glorification of Russia and Russians replaced the ethnic heterogeneity of internationalism as Tatar and Jewish heritage was erased from the city map. The new socialist space was marked as often by heroes who had defended the Russian Empire from France and Great Britain, as by those who had fought against Hitler's forces, and frequently they were placed in graves next to each other as sites of mourning and remembrance for the ritualised visits of schoolchildren. Heroism and a willingness to sacrifice for the defence of the Motherland was the trait most prized, whether before or after the Revolution. The new space accommodated the need to remember and be recognized as a unique part of something larger. Acquiescing to local needs for a familiar space created less dissension than Moscow's reconceptualization of the space would perhaps have done in a vitally important part of the USSR's Cold War machine. Likewise, the renewed Sevastopol contained the services necessary for the population. In addition to places of leisure and recreation discussed here, hospitals, schools, water facilities and more were all restored over the first postwar decade. In the end, the regime, through consultation with local officials and residents, arrived at a new

definition of socialist space that recognized the material needs of the population, respected its tradition and still maintained the veneer of authority by reserving the right to approve all plans. The new socialist space as it emerged in Sevastopol after the Second World War was one steeped in its own history of heroic defence of the Russian/Soviet Motherland, which respected the city's traditions and needs. Power was diffuse in the Soviet system and in cases where one industry (or in this case the navy) dominated, that fiefdom could often alter policy. It is not coincidental that the Sevastopol that emerged after WW II was more centred on its naval heritage; naval officials were an integral part in the redesign process and the most prominent institution in the city. Although other local studies like this have not yet been written, some scant material in Moscow's central archives shows that Sevastopol was not alone in proposing an urban biography quite different from that envisaged by appointed architects from the centre. Further local studies may well bring this to light. Throughout four turbulent decades of dramatic destruction and change, the Soviet regime simply could not operate as a monolith, and reconstruction was no exception. After the unprecedented freedoms of wartime, during which the military gained significant prominence, the regime chose to accommodate the needs of local residents and institutions rather than waging a costly internal battle as the Cold War emerged.

In the end, Sevastopol's planners had reached a compromise. Soviet institutions of the party, government, NKVD, navy, and more had prominent headquarters in the city centre; however, the dominant theme that emerged in the postwar decade was reverence for the city's Russian Imperial history. No longer did the urban space remind residents of the city's heterogeneous ethnic and religious heritage. Moreover, although in 1957 a statue of Lenin again stood in the city, this time high on the central hill, it was the only monument to Soviet power in the city centre and was surrounded by reminders of another past. Vladimir Cathedral and the

crypts of the four admirals remained directly opposite his statue on the central hill, and on the square below a statue to Admiral Nakhimov was erected where Lenin's statue had stood before the war.

Notes

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1 *Slava Sevastopolia* (hereafter *Slava*), 4 November 1949, 1. The translation of *rodnoi gorod* as ‘hometown’ masks a more intimate relation. *Rodnoi* implies a deep, personal and affectionate relationship. Moreover, it is the only word on the banner written in script and not block letters, thus drawing attention to its significance.

2 The non-martial use of military terminology was not an invention of the postwar years. After the civil war and especially during the 1930s, every campaign for production, whether industrial or agricultural, was couched in similar terms. See Hiroaki Kuromiya, *Stalin's Industrial Revolution: Politics and Workers, 1928-1932* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Lewis H. Siegelbaum, *Stakhanovism and the Politics of Productivity in the USSR, 1935-1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Stalin's Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village After Collectivization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Lynne Viola, *The Best Sons of the Fatherland: Workers in the Vanguard of Soviet Collectivization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

3 Stephen Kotkin, in his detailed history of the construction of Magnitogorsk, defined ‘bread’ as ‘state supply,’ and ‘circus’ as ‘the entire panoply of political propaganda and organized amusement.’ These definitions, however, are less than adequate when explaining the construction of socialist spaces because too much focus is placed on economics and entertainment. Stephen Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization* (Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1995): 238-279; quote p. 276. See Vera Sandomirsky Dunham, *In Stalin's Time: Middleclass Values in Soviet Fiction*, enlarged and updated ed. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990) for a similar process that she calls the 'big deal'.

4 Timothy Dunmore described agitation as 'political education of the masses through such media as radio, daily newspapers and books.' See his *Soviet Politics, 1945-1953* (New York: St. Martin's, 1984): 104. Architecture, although he does not include it as an agitational medium, is meant for mass consumption and does not rely on abstract theory (a principal tool of propaganda) as a persuasive force. For a further discussion see Peter Kenez, *The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization, 1917-1929* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

5 The most accessible source of press material on the battles for Sevastopol remain the collection of articles translated for foreign consumption: *The Heroic Defence of Sevastopol* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1942); *Sevastopol: November, 1941-July, 1942: Articles, Stories and Eye-witness Accounts by Soviet War Correspondents* (London: Hutchison, 1943). These are adequate translations of the original articles that appeared in *Pravda*, *Krasnaia Zvezda* and other newspapers.

6 [Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv goroda Sevastopolia, hereafter GAGS](#), f. R-79, op. 2, d. 20, ll. 12-14 and *Sevastopoliu 200 let, 1783-1983: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov* (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1983): 259-266.

7 *Istoriia goroda-geroia*, 289-290; GAGS f. R-359, op. 1, d. 7, l. 23; GAGS f. R-359, op. 1, d. 10, l. 18.

8 Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv ekonomiki, hereafter RGAE, f. 9432, op. 1, d. 243, l. 1.

9 A short list of architects and their cities would include: Georgii Gol'ts (Smolensk), Boris Iofan (Novorossisk), Aleksei Shchusev (Istra), Lev Rudnev (Voronezh) and V.N. Semenov (Rostov on Don). For more on the purges see Hugh Hudson, *Blueprints and Blood: The Stalinization of Soviet Architecture, 1917-1937* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). On a similar purge starting in 1948 see K. Alabian, 'Arkhitekturnaia praktika v svete reshenii TsK VKP(b) o literature i iskusstve,' *Arkhitektura i stroitel'stvo* (henceforth *AiS*) 14 (1947): 1-4; G. A. Simonov, 'Vazhneishie zadachi sovetskikh arkhitektorov,' *AiS*, 3 (March 1948): 1-4; 'Na sobranii aktiva moskovskikh arkhitektorov,' *AiS*, 4 (April 1948): 13-16; 'O lozhnoi kontseptsii knigi 'Gradostroitel'stvo',' *AiS*, 4 (April 1948): back cover; 'Za marksistskuiu nauku ob arkhitekture,' *AiS*, 9 (September 1948): 1-3. A brief overview can be found in Karl D. Qualls, 'Raised from Ruins: Restoring Popular Allegiance Through City Planning in Sevastopol, 1944-1953,' (Ph. D. Diss., Georgetown University, 1998): ch. 6. Peter Blake, 'The Soviet Architectural Purge,' *Architectural Record* 106 (September 1949): 127-29 provides a limited evaluation of this bloodless purge

10 RGAE f. 9432, op. 1, d. 3, l. 54.

11 V. A. Lavrov, 'Istoricheskie pamiatniki v plane vosstanavlivaemykh gorodov,' *PSG* 1 (1947): 10-17; N. Voronin, 'The Destruction of Old Russian Cities,' *VOKS Bulletin* 4 (1943): 14-21; V. A. Lavrov, 'Vosstanovlenie velikogo Novgoroda,' *AS* 9 (1945): 9-15; G. Gol'ts, 'Smolensk: k proekty vosstanovleniia goroda,' *AS* 10 (1945): 3-6; V. A. Lavrov, 'Puti vosstanovleniia Pskova,' *AS* 13 (1946): 3-7.

12 RGAE f. 9432, op. 1, d. 243, ll. 9-11ob.

13 RGAE f. 9432, op. 1, d. 243, ll. 11.

14 G. Barkhin, 'Proekt budushchego: pochetnoe zadanie,' *Slava* (18 May 1945): 1; GAGS f. R-79, op. 2, d. 30-a.

15 For a further discussion of the dynamics between 'local' and central officials see Karl Qualls 'Local-Outsider Negotiations in Sevastopol's Postwar Reconstruction, 1944-53' in Donald J. Raleigh, ed., *Provincial Landscapes: The Local Dimensions of Soviet Power* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001).

16 *Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, hereafter GA RF, f. A-150, op. 2, d. 52, ll. 1-10; GA RF f. A-150, op. 2, d. 52, ll. 1-10.

17 RGAE f. 9432, op. 1, d. 241, ll. 15-25; quote l. 21.

18 GA RF f. A-150, op. 2, d. 52, ll. 32-35. This document also shows that the City Architectural Commission met on 15 May 1945 to discuss the general plan with municipal and naval organizations after the 16 April city-wide viewing. On 13 October the Architectural Council of Crimea and City Architectural Commission met to discuss the plan further. Two days later the commander of the Black Sea Fleet called an interdepartmental commission together to discuss the plan with Barkhin and the city commission.

19 Many of these admirals and others had been 'created' heroes in the late nineteenth century, despite less than valorous activity during the Crimean War. See Serhii Plokhy, 'The City of Glory: Sevastopol in Russian Historical Mythology,' *Journal of Contemporary History* 35 (2000): 369-383.

20 See Alexander Nekrich, *The Punished Peoples: The Deportation and Fate of Soviet Minorities at the End of the Second World War*, translated by George Saunders (New York: Norton, 1978); Robert Conquest, *The Nation Killers: The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities*

(London: Macmillan, 1970); V. N. Zemskov, 'Spetsposeleentsy (po dokumentatsii NKVD-MVD SSSR)' *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia* 11 (1990): 9.

21 GAGS photos 6411 (1939), 1-11807a and 1-12028 (1944), 3424 and 3332 (1946) and 12483 (1914).

22 GAGS f. R-79, op. 2, d. 56 (Gorispolkom Protocol 35/44); GAGS f. R-79, op. 1, d. 51, l. 20 (*oblast'* decision); GAGS f. R-79, op. 2, d. 63, l. 11 (Council approval). The *oblast'*'s decision noted that 70-75 per cent of the building had been damaged, but since 'at the present time Sevastopol has no believers of the Muslim creed' there was no reason to preserve the building as a mosque.

23 Throughout 1946 various administrations exchanged letters, petitions and evaluations. Sevastopol's leaders mediated the debate, made rulings and overturned themselves. GAGS f. R-308, op. 1, d. 24, l. 23; GAGS f. R-308, op. 1, d. 20, l. 85; GAGS f. R-308, op. 1, d. 31, ll. 187-188ob; and GAGS f. R-308, op. 2, d. 5.

24 GAGS f. R-79, op. 2, d. 57.

25 GAGS f. R-79, op. 2, d. 131, l. 88.

26 GAGS photo 3394 (1951) of the nearly completed archive.

27 GAGS photos 5221 (1941) and 5222 (1944).

28 For the full text of Sovnarkom resolution 1384 and appended instructions see GAGS f. R-308, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 7-10 and RGAE f. 9432, op. 1, d. 6 from 13 October 1944.

29 GA RF f. A-259, op. 5, d. 279, ll. 16-18.

30 Amir Weiner, likewise, argues that one's role in the war, not class or ethnicity, became the marker of status for the postwar generation. This seems equally true when discussing the hierarchy of cities in the national myth and the presentation of cities in urban planning. See

Weiner's 'The Making of a Dominant Myth: The Second World War and the Construction of Political Identities within the Soviet Polity,' *Russian Review* 55 (October 1996): 638-660 and *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

31 GAGS f. R-79, op. 2, d. 30-a, l. 9.

32 GA RF f. A-150, op. 2, d. 254, ll. 30-48. Stenogram of the 1 March 1950 evening session. Quote ll. 35-36.

33 GA RF f. A-150, op. 2, d. 254, ll. 38-39.

34 'Vosstanovym rodnoi Sevastopol v 3-4 goda! Novoe v proekte tsentra goroda,' *Slava*, 26 Nov 1948, 1.

35 RGAE f. 9432, op. 1, d. 50, l. 27. The full text of the discussion is found in ll. 1-31 and RGAE f. 9432, op. 1, d. 243, ll. 191-205. The protocol for the meeting is in RGAE f. 9432, op. 1, d. 154, ll. 300-301.

36 RGAE f. 9432, op. 1, d. 243a, ll. 9-14; GAGS f. R-308, op. 1, d. 21, ll. 22-27.

37 B. Gorskii and B. Bertel', 'Stroit'² teatr na udobnom meste,' *Slava*, 27 Nov 1948, 1; 'Zriteli o stroitel'²stve novogo teatra,' *Slava*, 3 Dec 1948, 1.

38 Four letters have been preserved in the central archives noting the reservations of various groups (~~RGAE f.~~RGAE, f. 9432, op. 1, d. 154, ll. 263-68). Workers at the State Khersones Museum, the archaeological museum for ~~2500-year-old~~2500-year-old Greek ruins, would obviously have a bias toward tradition and preservation.

39 For a more thorough investigation of the discrepancies between the official press and unreleased materials see Donald J. Raleigh, 'Languages of Power: How the Saratov Bolsheviks Imagined Their Enemies,' *Slavic Review* 57, no. 2 (1998): 320-49.