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POLITICS AND HISTORY IN SOVIET UKRAINE, 1921-1933

James E. Mace

At the end of 1928 Matvyi Iavorskyi, head of historical studies in the Ukrainian Institute of Marxism-Leninism and hitherto considered a sort of court historian of Ukrainian communism, was attacked for allegedly committing "nationalistic deviations" in interpreting Ukrainian history. Iavorskyi was in no sense a "dissident" like Oleksander Shumskyi or Mykola Khvylovyi; he never, so far as is known, questioned the official Party line. Rather, he was a close associate of Mykola Skrypnyk, the political strongman of the Soviet Ukrainian regime, and the hue and cry raised against "Iavorskyism" in historial scholarship was actually an indirect attack upon Skrypnyk. It had the distinction of being the first such attack; it would not be the last.

There is yet another reason why Ukrainian historiography ought to be considered. It was along with literature the main point of contact between the non-Party national intelligentsia and the new communist intellectuals which the Party reared after the revolution. Unlike such fields as linguistics, the regime could not just confine itself to organizing conferences and leave the field to the national intelligentsia. This was so because history was crucial to the nation's sense of its own identity, and as often as not Ukraine's great historians had also been its most revered leaders. The undisputed doyen of non-Party historians working in Soviet Ukraine was Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, former president of the Central Rada and to many still the symbol of Ukrainian aspirations. There was also the fact that Marxism claims to provide the key to understanding history; this is indeed one of the doctrine's central claims. Thus the Party could not have abdicated the field of historical scholarship even if it had wished to do so. It felt the need to field its own experts, and chief among them in Ukraine was Matvyi Iavorskyi.

The specific charge leveled against Iavorskyi was that he had fallen under the influence of the school of Hrushevskyi. The reality was that no historian of Ukraine could avoid his influence to some degree, but Iavorskyi attempted to recast the findings of traditional scholarship in a Marxist mold. Besides, the official policy of cooperating with the national intelligentsia created a milieu in which some degree of mutual influence between Party-sanctioned and non-Party scholarship was inevitable. Dmytro Bahalii, one of the most talented of traditional Ukrainian historians, announced his conversion to Marxism and began to write history from a Marxist viewpoint. Osyp Hermaize, also a non-Party historian, was concerned with the origins of the modern Ukrainian revolutionary movement and thus inevitably with the prehistory of Soviet Ukraine. The 1920s were a time of intellectual ferment among historians, and amid this ferment Iavorskyi...
skyi's role was to be the voice of Party orthodoxy. Later generations have given the position he occupied an unofficial but descriptive name: ideological watchdog.

It is extremely significant that the campaign against "Iavorskyism" began in Russia rather than Ukraine. With the exception of Stalin's intervention in the Shumskyi controversy — and he wrote his 1926 letter to the KP(b)U Central Committee only after Shumskyi had appealed to him — this was the first time that Moscow actively interfered in Soviet Ukrainian cultural affairs. "Iavorskyism" was something which Moscow invented, and there is only one possible interpretation of why it did so. A decision had been made to renge on the tacit agreement upon which Soviet rule in Ukraine had hitherto been based, one which promised Ukraine considerable autonomy and its intellectual elite considerable freedom.

M. S. Hrushevskyi's Interpretation of History

As in so many other spheres of the nation's cultural life, Ukrainian historiography enjoyed a period of creativity in the twenties which gave way to complete regimentation in the thirties. Soviet Ukraine's historians were

1. There is a rich body of secondary material on Soviet Ukrainian historiography in the 1920s. See, for example, Myron Korduba, La Littérature Historique Soviétique-Ukrainienne: Compte-Rendu 1917-1931 (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972); Alexander Ohloblyn, "Ukrainian Historiography, 1917-1956," Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., V-VI (1957), pp. 307-455; Borys Krypnytskyi, Ukrainska istorychna nauka pid Sovietamy (1920-1950) (Munich: Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., 1957); Borys Krypnytskyi, "Die ukrainische Geschichtswissenschaft in der Sowjetunion, 1921-1941," Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, VI: 2/4 (1941), pp. 125-151; D. Doroshenko, "Die Entwicklung der Geschichtsforschung in der Sowjetukraine in den letzten Jahren," Mitteilungen des ukrainischen wissenschaftlichen Institute in Berlin, Heft 2 (August 1928), pp. 35-56; O. M. "Ukrainska istorychna nauka v 1920-kh rokakh," Suchasnyk, I: 1 (1948), pp. 76-84; Viach. Zaikin, "Ukrainskaia istoricheskaia literatura poslednikh let," Na chuzhoi storone, X (1925), pp. 236-251. Among Soviet Ukrainian works, the following are especially valuable: the journal Istoriografichni doslidzhennia v Ukrainskii RSR (Kiev: 1968-1971); V. A. Diadichenko, F. E. Los, V. G. Sarbei, "Razvitie istoricheski nauki na Ukraine (1917-1963 gg.)," Voprosy istorii, 1964, no. 1, pp. 3-26; N. V. Komarenko, Ustanovy istorychnoi nauky v Ukrainskii RSR (1917-1937 rr.) (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1973); N. V. Komarenko, Zhurnal "Litopys revoliutsii": Istoriografichnyi naros (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1970). It should be noted that Soviet works often suffer from politically mandated gaps which extend even to the level of journal bibliographies printed in very small editions. Except for the purpose of condemnation, those who were purged in the thirties and not rehabilitated are never mentioned, even in bibliographies, and the only way to locate the works of Marxist historians such as Matviy Iavorskyi and Osyp Hermaize is by searching the tables of contents of journals or the year-end lists of contents in the journals themselves. This circumstance is an indication of the current state of Ukrainian historiographic research in the USSR.
able to draw on a considerable body of prerevolutionary scholarship, and the non-Party historiography of the 1920s can be seen largely as a continuation of what had already been accomplished. As in Russia, the privations of the civil war had cost Ukraine many of its best scholars. Yet, within a few short years the life of the mind recovered. Compared to the restrictive policies of the autocracy and the far more restrictive intellectual straightjacket of Stalinism, the twenties appear in retrospect almost like a golden age, a time when different schools of thought could coexist, disagree, and learn from each other.

The most important event in early Soviet Ukrainian historiography was Mykhailo Hrushevskyi's return from exile in 1924. The doyen of Ukrainian scholars, leading prerevolutionary spokesman for Ukrainian aspirations, and first president of the Ukrainian People's Republic, his role in Ukrainian history invited comparison with that of the Czech scholars and political leaders Palacky and Masaryk. He has been called "not merely the child but the personified symbol of the Ukrainian people." His return was a major political event in the history of Soviet Ukraine, bestowing on the regime a much-needed aura of national legitimacy at a crucial juncture in its history.

Hrushevskyi returned on the understanding that he would eschew politics and devote himself to scholarship. Upon returning, he immediately threw himself into the work of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (VUAN) and reorganized its historical section. At times he acted almost like a lobbyist for the Academy: soon after the Russian Academy of Sciences was renamed Academy of Sciences of the USSR he publicly deplored the tendency to treat Russian institutions as Union ones. Union scholarly institutions could only be federations of republic institutions, he insisted, and VUAN had been treated like a poor relation. If the Russian Academy was to be considered a Union institution, VUAN should also; if the Russian Academy received Union funds, so should VUAN.

Hrushevskyi’s major influence, however, stemmed from his historical scholarship, particularly his ten-volume *History of Ukraine-Rus*, the first volume of which was published in the 1890s and the last in the 1930s. Even his critics could not help but be influenced by it. It was and is the centerpiece of Ukrainian historical writing.9

Hrushevskyi was no Marxist. In exile he even published a critique of the theorists of primitive society revered by Marxists and offered his own genetic (developmental) sociology.10 He was, as a colleague of his put it, a pluralist in his rejection of single causes in history.11

Hrushevskyi’s most important idea was the integrity and continuity of Ukrainian national history, and he insisted upon marking Ukrainian history off from that of neighboring peoples. He expressed this most clearly and concisely in a 1904 lecture, “the traditional Schema of ‘Russian’ History and the Problem of the Rational Organization of the History of the Eastern Slavs.” In this lecture, as in his other work, he challenged the traditional presentation of Russian history which shifts its geographical focus from Kiev to Vladimir-Suzdal to Moscow. He argued that this madelittle sense, since the descendants of the medieval Kievan were Ukrainians, not Russians. What would later become Muscovy had been colonized by Kievan Rus but was not really an integral part of it. Kievan laws and culture were transplanted there much like Roman laws and customs had in ancient Gaul. The traditional schema ignored the process of this transplantation and thereby left Russian history without a beginning and rendered the histories of the other East Slavs unintelligible. He maintained that the Galician principalities of Halych and Volodymyr as well as Lithuania were the real heirs of Kievan political and cultural traditions. He concluded that the best way to straighten out the confusion inherent in the old schema was to look for the beginnings of Great Russian history on Great Russian soil and distinguish among the histories of the three East Slavic nations.12

Hrushevskyi won for his idea of separating Russian and Ukrainian history some notable supporters among Russian historians. Presniakov, for example, took Hrushevskyi’s thesis as the starting point for his own attempt to trace the origins of the Great Russian state. Even the Bolshevik historian M. N. Pokrovskii, who was usually less than generous in this appraisal of “bourgeois” historians, held Hrushevskyi’s work in high esteem for its refutation of the traditional schema. In his lectures on historiography, Pokrovskii called him “one of the freshest and most European of historians,” recommending the first volume of The History of Ukraine-Rus as the best possible source for finding out what was known about Kievan Rus.

In later years, Hrushevskyi would come under attack by Marxist historians for allegedly manufacturing the notion that the Ukrainian people had never produced a national bourgeoisie. There were, of course, occasions when Hrushevskyi did make statements to this effect. But it would be misleading to credit Hrushevskyi with the creation of a theory of “Ukrainian bourgeoislessness.” Rather, it was a matter of simple observation. In any case, those who professed to see a Ukrainian bourgeoisie usually referred to the “kulaks” rather than any traditional commercial or industrial class.

Hrushevskyi’s historical work was not without political as well as scholarly importance. He himself was well aware of the intimate connection between Ukrainian historiography and political consciousness. As he once wrote, “It must not be forgot that our historiography is at the same time the history of Ukrainian political thought; Ukraine’s great historians were its great ideologues and gave direction and tone not only to the historical but also to the social and political consciousness of our society.” By placing Ukrainian history on a firm scholarly basis, Hrushevskyi asserted the national distinctiveness and aspirations of his people.

15. An admirable collection of such statements may be found in M. A. Rubach, “Buzhuzhno-kurkuliska nationalistychna ideologya pid mashkaroiu demokratii ‘trudovoho narodu’ (Sotsialno-politychni pohliady M. S. Hrushevskoho),” Chervonyi shliakh, 1932, no. 5-6, 122-128.
The Fellow Travellers

Before the creation of a regimented "historical front" the lines between Marxists and non-Marxists were not so sharply drawn that they could not influence each other and even win converts without coercion. Perhaps the most striking example of the situation is provided by the case of D. I. Bahalii. Like Hrushevskiy, Bahalii came from a humble background and studied history at Kiev University with V. B. Antonovych. He became one of the old empire's most respected scholars, before the revolution serving twice as rector of Kharkiv University and its representative in the Council of State. When the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was established in 1918, he was named head of its historical section. In the early twenties he became one of the first scholars to announce his conversion to Marxism and wrote his later works from a Marxist standpoint.17

One of the most revealing moments in early Soviet Ukrainian historiography occurred in 1923 when Iavorskyi published his Narys istorii Ukrainy which attempted to interpret the whole of Ukrainian history in the Marxist framework.18 Bahalii published a critique in Chervonyi shliakh, pointing out that Iavorskyi's dogmatic attempt to force the nation's past into Marxist categories did violence to the facts of history and that Iavorskyi really did not understand what Ukrainian historians of the past had tried to do. For example, Iavorskyi's charge that past historians had concentrated primarily on princes, hetmans, and the upper classes simply was not true of Ukrainian historians like Hrushevskiy or much of Bahalii's own work. He also pointed out that Iavorskyi, unlike such Russian Marxist historians as M. N. Pokrovskii and N. A. Rozhkov, showed little familiarity with primary sources and almost completely ignored such vital aspects of the historical process as culture and ideology. It also seemed rather strange that a Marxist historian would divide Ukrainian history into periods without ever mentioning feudalism. In short, Professor Iavorskyi had a few things to learn about history.19

Iavorskyi published a reply, full of phrases like "fetishism of science" and citations from Marx and George Lukacs. Bahalii, in turn, published a

rebuttal.\textsuperscript{20} It was clear that the elder of the two polemicists got the better of the exchange, and Iavorskyi seemed to have learned from it. When several years later he published his major work, \textit{Narysy z istorii revoliutsiinoi borotby na Ukraini}, Iavorskyi clearly kept his fondness for terms like "hegemony" and "totality" borrowed from Gramsci and Lukacs, but he also made copious references to primary sources.

One of the most interesting of the so-called fellow traveller historians of the 1920s was Osyp Hermaize, a Marxist who was in charge of the section of methodological and sociological fundamentals and led a seminar in Marxism-Leninism in Hrushevskyi’s Ukrainian history department (\textit{katedra}) in Kiev.\textsuperscript{21} Hermaize's most important work was a monograph on the history of the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (RUP) intended as the first volume in an ambitious survey of the development of revolutionary Marxism in Ukraine. In it he completely ignored the role of Russian socialist parties, portraying the Ukrainian revolutionary process as something completely distinct from what was happening in the Russified cities.\textsuperscript{22} Indeed, this is probably the reason why no succeeding volumes appeared. Hermaize attempted to show that the Ukrainian revolutionary movement consisted of a peasant constituency and a national intelligentsia of high culture which had overcome its provincialism, that is, to show that the Ukrainian movement was in no way inferior to its Russian counterpart.\textsuperscript{23} Iavorskyi criticized Hermaize for a number of errors: failing to take into account Russian influence on the Ukrainian revolutionary movement, excluding from his work all groups which were not exclusively Ukrainian, and portraying the Ukrainian people as an amorphous ethnographic mass. This, Iavorskyi claimed, ignored the class struggle and substituted Hrushevskyi’s approach to history for that of Marx.\textsuperscript{24} In fact, Hermaize was to become something of a whipping boy for Iavorskyi as the decade drew to a close. Hermaize last appeared at the 1930 show trial of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, where he was accused of being one of the principal conspirators in that alleged conspiracy.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{21} Z. Hurevych, “Psevdomarksyzm na sluzbhi ukrainskoho natsionalizma (Do ostannikh vystupiv O. Hermaize),” \textit{Bilshovyk Ukrainy}, 1929, no. 9, p. 55.
\item \textsuperscript{22} O. Hermaize, \textit{Narysy z istorii revoliutsiinoi rukhu na Ukraini}, Tom I. \textit{Revoluutsiina Ukrainska Partiia (RUP)} (n. p.: Knyhospilka, 1926).
\item \textsuperscript{23} See especially Osyp Hermaize, “Desiatylittia Zhovnevoi revolutsii i ukrainska nauka,” \textit{Ukraina}, 1927, no. 6, pp. iii-iv.
\item \textsuperscript{24} M. I. Iavorskyi, “Suchasni techii sered ukrainskoj istoriohrafii,” in \textit{Kryza suschasnoi burzhuaznoi nauky ta marksysm: Zbirnyk} (Kharkiv: DVU, 1929), pp. 33-34.
\end{itemize}
Party Historiography in Soviet Ukraine

While the traditional scholars were working in VUAN and institutions of higher education, the Party was building its own cadres of historians under the auspices of the Commission for the Study of the History of the October Revolution and the Communist Party (bolshevik) of Ukraine — Istpart, for short. Russian Istpart was founded in 1920, and its Ukrainian counterpart came into existence the following year in accordance with a decision of the Soviet Ukrainian government. Later, Ukrainian Istpart was subordinated to the KP(b)U Central Committee in conformance with Russian practice. In 1923 the work of Ukrainian Istpart was criticized at an all-Russian conference of Istpart sections. The reason its work was found wanting stemmed less from any political heterodoxy than simple neglect.

During its first years, Istpart seemed more like a club than a bureaucracy. It published mostly memoirs. The central bureau had difficulty overseeing the work of local organizations, and even a plan of work was not drawn up until 1925. While Istpart was dominated by Russians and its organ, Letopis revoliutsii (Chronicle of Revolution), was published in Russian until 1929, there was room for a broad range of views. Arnold Rish, for example, considered the Spilka, a Ukrainian group allied with the


27. At the beginning of 1924 M. Ivanov complained that the conditions under which Istpart worked in both Kharkiv and the provinces were “not entirely favorable” and that many comrades did not realize how important Istpart work was. Shortly thereafter Medvedev, a secretary of the KP(b)U Central Committee, sent out a circular letter to all provincial Party committees stating that the work of Letopis revoliutsii was extremely important and should be included in libraries, clubs, Party schools, and read by Party members. In 1925 it was reported that the Poltava Istpart section was assigned only 100 rubles by its Party committee, while Chernihiv received only 200 rubles, and the Donbas gubkoms decided not to create (i.e., abolish) the provincial Istpart and use those who had worked in it elsewhere. See Letopis revoliutsii, 1924, no. 1, p. 278; 1924, no. 3, p. 238; 1925, no. 3, pp. 238-243.

28. “Plan raboty Istparta TsK KP(b)U i Gub-Istpartov na 1925 god,” Letopis revoliutsii, 1925, no. 4, p. 233. At the first All-Ukrainian Conference of Istparts, various local delegates sharply criticized the center (i.e., Kharkiv) for trying to stifle local initiative, while the center accused the local organizations of not paying attention to it and trying to go their own way. “Vseukrayinskoe Soveshchanie Istpartov,” Letopis revoliutsii, 1925, no. 3, 225-236; 1925, no. 4, 165-174.
Mensheviks, to have been an ancestor of the KP(b)U and published a survey history of the Spilka in *Letopis revoliutsii.* When such “liberalism” came under criticism in 1926, the editor of *Letopis revoliutsii* replied that the discontinuities in the history of Bolshevism in Ukraine made it imperative to discuss the important revolutionary movements of the past even if they opposed the Bolsheviks. As he put it, “There were only two alternatives: either not deal with this or that period because at that time the Bolsheviks were weak, or describe the mass revolutionary movements, what these organizations did, how things were. . . One had to talk about the Mensheviks.”

The first systematic treatment of the history of the KP(b)U was published in 1923 by Moissei Ravich-Cherkasskii, a frequent contributor to *Letopis revoliutsii.* Before the revolution he had been an agitator and something of a theoretician in the Jewish Bund in the Cherkasy region under the name Moisei Rabinovich. He joined the Bolsheviks in 1917 and published articles on a number of topics in the twenties but was best known for his historical work. His *Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi Partii (b-ov) Ukrainy* was for several years the sole officially sanctioned textbook on the subject.

Ravich-Cherkasskii was later accused of inventing a theory that the KP(b)U had grown up from “dual roots,” that is, from non-Bolshevik Ukrainian sources as well as Russian Bolshevism. What this consisted of was the idea that the KP(b)U was an amalgam of different currents, and the Ukrainian current arose from the process by which Ukrainian “revolutionaries” overcame their “chauvinism” and split from the mainstream of the movement to form their own groups more in the spirit of the international socialist movement. This process, as he saw it, began with the withdrawal of the Spilkists from the RUP shortly before the revolution of 1905, and continued with the secession of the Borotbisty and Upkapisty from the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries (USDRP).

The Russian current of the revolutionary movement in Ukraine meanwhile went through a somewhat similar process of wandering in the wilderness, since up to 1912 the history of the RSDRP in Ukraine was mainly the history of its “opportunistic” Menshevik wing. These two currents coalesced in the Bolshevik-Borotbist merger of 1920. As he put it,
Actually, the merger of the Borotbists with the Communist Party is the end of the road along with the two revolutionary currents (stikhii) in Ukraine travelled separately for twenty years. One from the RUP to the KPU and the other from the first circles of the RSDRP to the KPU.\(^34\)

By presenting the history of the KP(b)U as a process in which indigenous currents merged with the Bolsheviks, Ravich-Cherkasskii not only gave those non-Bolshevik groups a historical revolutionary legitimacy, he also presented the KP(b)U as a separate party with its own unique historical tradition and mission. Ravich-Cherkasskii's presentation of the Party's history was designed to emphasize its Ukrainian heritage and mission, to show that Soviet Ukraine and the KP(b)U were not "a masquerade, a fiction, or playing at independence."\(^35\) It was as much a historical justification for Ukrainization as a Party history.

The first real political intervention in historiography occurred when the Shumskyi affair made Ravich-Cherkasskii's emphasis on the Party's indigenous antecedents politically embarrassing. In 1927 his "dual roots" thesis was denounced as the basis of the national deviations committed by Shumskyi and Khvylovyi and castigated as a theory of "the philistine (mishchansko) ancestry of the KP(b)U." His ideas were found to contradict the idea of proletarian hegemony as represented by the Bolsheviks and therefore misrepresented the Party's very nature.\(^36\)

Little is known of Ravich-Cherkasskii's subsequent fate. In 1930 he published an article on literature, and an editorial note indentified him as minor cultural functionary.\(^37\) In 1932 he was purged from the Party and declared a counterrevolutionary.\(^38\)

Ravich-Cherkasskii's history was replaced in 1928 by N. N. Popov's Narys istorii Komunistychnoi Partii (bilshovykiv) Ukrainy. Popov joined the Bolsheviks in 1919 and ultimately held such high posts as KP(b)U Central Committee secretary and candidate membership in the All-Union Party Central Committee. His history of the Russian Communist Party went through sixteen editions before Stalin's Short Course replaced it, and Popov was, as the formula goes, "defamed, illegally repressed, and killed."\(^39\)

\(^{34}\) Ibid., p. 165.
\(^{35}\) Ibid., pp. 5-6.
\(^{38}\) Entsyklopediia Ukrainoznavstva, I, 2431.
\(^{39}\) Sovetskaia istoricheskaia entsiklopediia, XI, columns 410-411.
Popov's Ukrainian Party history began by assailing his predecessor's work not only for "the mistakes and inaccuracies of this history but also for the very spirit in which it was written." Popov argued that the KP(b)U was and always had been a part of Bolshevism and that its only legitimate ancestors were those it shared with the Russian Bolsheviks. He claimed that the "dual roots theory" was refuted by the fact that the RUP and USDRP had produced a number of anti-communists while Bolshevism had produced such Ukrainian leaders as Skrypnyk and Hryhorii Petrovskyi. Could parties which produced anti-communists lead to the KP(b)U?

Why did Comrade Ravich-Cherkasskii commit such gross errors? It seems to me that he had good intentions. He wanted to somehow project Ukrainization on our Party's past and did so, undoubtedly in order to provide yet another justification and support for our present nationality policy. I state that our nationality policy does not need such a justification created only by altering the facts of the revolutionary movement and history of our Party.40

While Popov was not nearly so generous to his predecessor in later editions as he was in this first version, he nevertheless rather obviously, if implicitly, misconstrued his opponent's argument, which was that the KP(b)U's Ukrainian heritage stemmed from those who repudiated the "chauvinism" of the RUP and USDRP, left those groups, and evolved toward Ukrainian Bolshevism.

Popov's eagerness to provide a unilinear ancestry for the KP(b)U led him to completely disparage any historical contributions made by Ukrainian populists like Drahomanov, the RUP, the USDRP, or the national movement. He referred to the Old Hromada as "the so-called Hromada" and emphasized Drahomanov's late evolution toward liberalism. He portrayed the RUP as a group of confused chauvinists who fomented pogroms. Despite the broad rural support of the Central Rada in 1917, Popov saw the Russified workers as the basic revolutionary force in the country. While the Bolsheviks had been guilty of some errors in the nationality question, Ukrainian groups did nothing to correct them. Ukrainians who joined the Bolsheviks contributed nothing of value from their own revolutionary heritage; they had become good communists only to the extent that they had overcome their past prejudices and embraced undiluted Bolshevism.41

Popov's radical departure from hitherto accepted view was briefly challenged by V. Sukhyno-Khomenko, a Ukrainian Party historian and former student of Iavorskyi's. Sukhyno-Khomenko published a discussion article in Bilshovyk Ukrainy combining praise for refuting Ravich-

Cherkasskii with criticism of Popov's neglect of the Ukrainian movement's historical contribution. Sukhyno-Khomenko pointed out a number of inaccuracies and distortions in Popov's work, especially the fact that Popov falsely implied that all the followers of Mykhailo Drahomanov, who founded Ukrainian socialism in the 1870s, had become liberals when actually some prominent Drahomanovites joined the RSDRP. The Ukrainian side of the revolutionary process had actually made an extremely important contribution to Russian Social Democracy and the KP(b)U, but Popov had ignored it. 42 Popov did not need to reply, since his critic would soon have his own troubles.

Matvyi Iavorskyi and Soviet Ukrainian Historiography

Although his work is not noteworthy for either scholarly rigor or brilliant interpretations, Matvyi Iavorskyi was the premier communist historian of Ukraine. As head of Ukrnauka, the Ukrainian counterpart of Glavnauka in charge of supervising all science and scholarship, as well as head of the historical section of the Ukrainian Institute of Marxism Leninism (UIML), Iavorskyi was as much an apparatchik as a historian, a scholar-bureaucrat whose role in Ukraine closely paralleled that of M. N. Pokrovskii in Russia. 43

Though not primarily known as a Party historian, Iavorskyi's views on the historical nature of the KP(b)U are helpful in attempting to understand his general conception of Ukrainian history. A brief but fact-filled survey of the Party's history, which he published in 1922, contains his basic ideas on the subject, showing him to occupy a position midway between the arguments later made by Popov on the one hand and Ravich-Cherkasskii on the other. As Iavorskyi saw it,

The Communist Party of Ukraine, although it is a regional organization of the RKP and its history a part of the RKP's history, part of the history of the Proletarian Revolution within the borders of the former empire, nevertheless has its own past and distinctive traits of development which reflect so clearly the peculiarities of the revolution in Ukraine from 1917 on. In it the imprint of the par-

42. V. Sukhyno-Khomenko, "Problemy istorii KP(b)U (M. M. Popov — Narys istorii Komunistychnoi Partii (bilshovykiv) Ukrainy)," 
43. For biographical information on Iavorskyi, see Bolshaiia sovetskaia entsiklopediia (1st ed., Moscow: Izdat. Kommakademii, 1931), LXV, column 328. Although this and other secondary accounts do not mention his work with Ukrnauka, a number of press accounts and interviews cite him in this role. See "Na shliakhakh orhanizatsii ukrainskoi nauky (Rozmova z zav. Ukholovnaukoiu M. I. lavorskim)," Visti VUTsvK, February 5, 1924, p. 2.
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Thus, in his view, the KP(b)U simultaneously fit into the general history of the Russian revolutionary movement and was the product of distinctively Ukrainian conditions and processes. In his later work he concentrated upon delineating the Ukrainian revolutionary movement and process. Although this later research did not deal directly with the KP(b)U, it was, in fact, an attempt to provide a set of historical antecedents for the distinctiveness of the Soviet Ukraine's Party and state.

Iavorskyi's most ambitious work was his *Narysy z istorii revoliutsiinoi borotby na Ukraini*, published in two parts in 1927 and 1928. Despite the fact that the campaign against Iavorskyism prevented the publication of its final portion such that the narrative breaks off in the 1880s, what remains is an attempt to reinterpret Ukraine's whole history as a process culminating in Ukrainian communism. Ukrainian communism was, in turn, the product of a revolutionary movement which was not just a struggle for socialism but also for national liberation. While Iavorskyi rejected the idea that the Ukrainian nation was a homogeneous peasant mass, he was well aware that the long-felt lack of a Ukrainian proletariat presented special difficulties in tracing which class led the evolving movement. Iavorskyi saw this problem in terms of class hegemony, and had little choice but to emphasize the role of the peasantry.

Iavorskyi's views on the nature of the Ukrainian revolution were expressed in a major article published in two installments in *Chervonyi shliakh* in 1927, "The Problem of the Ukrainian National-Democratic Revolution in 1917, Its Historical Bases, and Its Motive Forces."

For Iavorskyi, the central question was that of hegemony. Which class was the hegemon of the Ukrainian revolution? Which class led it? The central Ukrainian demand in 1917 was economic and political autonomy, later independence. Iavorskyi viewed this as a platform of the petite bourgeoisie and kulaks but refused to abstract the movement's class content from its program and insisted upon "concrete Leninist historical analysis." He believed that the demand for independence was really the outgrowth of a long historical process:

The tendency of the national movement in Ukraine in the direction of the economic and political liberation of a dismembered nation is

as old as capitalism in Ukraine. This tendency made itself manifest as soon as the first elements of this capitalism took shape, and along with it the first embryonic beginnings of this nation. We see the first indications of the birth of this idea already in the beginnings of the so-called “rebirth” of Ukrainian culture at the end of the eighteenth century.46

Iavorskyi compressed the stages of the revolutionary movement’s development such that the first stage extended from the start of the Ukrainian cultural revival with Kotliarevskyi to the language ban of 1876 and attributed it to the beginnings of a Ukrainian internal market and capitalist development. The second stage, dominated by Drahomanov, coincided with the beginnings of a kulak stratum in the villages and an urban proletariat, but Drahomanov’s ideology was still, in his view, a revolutionary program without revolutionary tactics which was based on the peasantry as a whole. The Poltava jacquerie of 1902 demonstrated the revolutionary instincts of the peasantry, but as a class it was by its nature petit-bourgeois and incapable of becoming a self-conscious social force or even a class in itself. The peasant class became even more deeply divided against itself with the Stolypin reform, and the more prosperous “farmer” stratum became hegemone of the peasantry as a whole.47

In 1917, the Ukrainian movement was thoroughly petit-bourgeois. As Iavorskyi put it, “only the Ukrainian petite bourgeoisie with its program of a national democratic and bourgeois revolution remained to build Ukrainian nationalism.”48 The party leaders were all members of the Narodnik intelligentsia unable to see beyond the bourgeois democratic revolution. They all called themselves socialists, “but this socialism was only a fashionable little word which covered a program which was bourgeois by nature.”49 The national revolution led by the Central Rada was, in Iavorskyi’s words, “a revolution of the farmer bourgeoisie.” The main issue dividing the movement was whether to follow a more feudal “Prussian” model of agricultural development of the Rada’s petit-bourgeois utopia of a free agrarian Ukraine. The Rada was supplanted by the aristocratic Hetmanate because “this Ukrainian nationalism, petit-bourgeois by nature and seeing itself standing on its own feet, inevitably had to seek an ally in the absence of a ready bourgeois class of its own.” This ally, needless to say, was the army of the German Kaiser.50

47. Ibid., pp. 93-116.
49. Ibid., p. 103.
50. Ibid., pp. 96, 104-110, Quotations from pp. 104, 110.
The Ukrainian declaration of independence, the Rada's Fourth Universal, was an act of counterrevolution, in spite of the fact that so much history had pointed to Ukrainian independence, because it was directed against Soviet Russia rather than against the autocracy. The decision to turn to Germany was really a turning against the masses, a betrayal of their agrarian aspirations:

In this way the leading problem of the national democratic revolution in Ukraine, the self-determination of national capital along the path of bourgeois revolution in the land question, was lost at the very moment of its emancipation. Together with it, the political formula of this self-determination was also lost, lost at the exact time that was the most favorable moment for its temporary realization.  

Ukraine went over to imperialism against the proletarian revolution, and after the October Revolution vestiges of the old ruling classes offered their services and advice on "orientations." By siding against the Bolsheviks, lavorskyi argued, the Rada had to reconstitute itself as a counterrevolutionary force, and this altered the very content of national self-determination. Ukrainians split into proletarian and bourgeois camps, and at Brest the Ukrainian petite bourgeoisie decided to lean upon the big bourgeoisie of Germany and Austria. The land law of January 1918 was irrelevant, he declared, a maneuver which the sound of Bolshevik shrapnel convinced the Rada to adopt. The Fourth Universal was by the time of its adoption only a way of legalizing the German-Austrian occupation, and Ukrainian nationalism "went bankrupt at the very moment of its emancipation." There could by then be no middle course between revolution and counterrevolution, and as a result the Rada gave way to the Hetmanate. The Hetman was supported by those who had denounced the Rada for having violated the rights of property and was opposed by the Ukrainian workers, peasants, and petite bourgeoisie.

The forces formerly associated with the Rada were implacable in their hostility to the Hetman and launched a war of revanche the moment the Armistice reduced his allies to impotence. By then, however, it was too late for the petite bourgeoisie, and the result was the Red occupation of Kiev rather than the Rada's revival. This was the decisive turning point, the discrediting of the Ukrainian national bourgeoisie:

To build a bourgeois Ukraine with petit-bourgeois hands in a period of social revolution was already no less "zu spät" than it was to renew it with the hands of a feudal parasite, even if he were dressed up in the garb of the old cossackdom which his two-faced

51. Ibid., p. 112.
Ukrainian nationalism tried under the flag of the "Agrarian Demo-
crats" after the failure of the "socialist" posters of bourgeois
democracy. Ukraine could henceforth be built only by those who
were themselves emancipated from their nationalism and
chauvinism and had suppressed not only national oppression but
also the class rule of man over man and had liberated labor from
exploitation.\textsuperscript{52}

By presenting Soviet rule as a result of the defection of Ukrainian elements
from a bankrupt national movement, he gave perhaps the most convincing
historical justification of Ukrainian communism ever attempted.

Iavorskyi's grand conception of the Ukrainian national historical pro-
cess was a noteworthy attempt to fit the whole of his nation's history into
the Marxist framework and present it as a process culminating in the
establishment of Soviet Ukraine. Unlike Ravich-Cherkasskii, Iavorskyi did
not firmly distinguish between Russian and Ukrainian revolutionary cur-
rents but lumped them together in a single scheme of the development of the
revolutionary movement in Ukraine. This enabled him to avoid the politi-
cally dangerous course of relying too heavily on purely Ukrainian groups,
while still allowing him to present Soviet Ukraine with its own heritage.
Like Hrushevskyi, he treated Ukrainian history as a separate national
historical process, influenced by the histories of neighboring nations but
distinct from them. He treated Ukrainian history as a whole regardless of
the political boundaries cutting one part of Ukraine off from the other. A
native Galician, he considered the history of Galician Ukrainians an integral
part of Ukrainian history and gave much weight to events there. He did not
deny outside influence: he traced the influence of Russian radicalism on
Ukrainian social thought without hesitation, but he counterbalanced it by
also noting the influence of the West.\textsuperscript{53} The point is that if the history of the
peoples of the USSR was to mean anything other than a single "Soviet"
history, a revival of the old "all-Russian" schema under a new name and set
of terms, then Iavorskyi's work should have remained permissible. The fact
that it was repudiated is decisive evidence of the new turn of affairs that
began to become apparent at the end of the 1920s.

Iavorskyi was, in a sense, the victim of a turn of affairs he had himself

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., p. 116.

\textsuperscript{53} He devoted an article to the problem of Western influence on the Ukrainian
revolutionary movement: Iavorskyi, "Westeuropäische Einflüsse auf die Ideen-
gestaltung der sozialen Bewegung in der Ukraine im zweiten und dritten Viertel
des XIX. Jahrhunderts," in Otto Hoetzsch, ed., \textit{Aus dem historischen
Wissenschaft in der Sowjet-Union: Vorträge ihrer Vertreter während der
"Russischer Historikerwoche,"} veranstaltet in Berlin 1928 von der deutschen
88-97.
helped create, for Iavorskyi served as Soviet Ukraine's leading guardian of ideological orthodoxy. When he surveyed the achievements of post-revolutionary Ukrainian historiography for foreigners, he expressed pride in the achievements of non-communist scholars such as Hrushevskyi and Bahalii. When he was in the Soviet Union, his punctiliousness in pointing out the ideological errors of his colleagues was without peer. At the First All-Union conference of Marxist-Leninist Scholarly Research Establishments sponsored by the Communist Academy in March 1928, he interjected attacks on virtually every leading Ukrainian historian into a discussion on planning scholarly research. The fact that he made such remarks at a time when they were uncalled for indicates that Iavorskyi rather enjoyed the role of ideological watchdog. At the All-Union Conference of Marxist Historians held over the Christmas holidays in 1928-29, he read a report on the pseudo-Marxism of Ukrainian historians, denouncing Bahalii as a "pseudo-Marxist," Osyp Hermaize for tracing the origins of the KP(b)U to the old Revolutionary Ukrainian Party, and the economic historians Ohloblyn and Slabchenko for smuggling hostile nationalist ideology into their studies of the pre-revolutionary Ukrainian economy. Back home in Soviet Ukraine, he lectured on contemporary trends in Ukrainian historiography, declaring that every single trained scholar who had attempted to become Marxist had failed. Since he and his students were the only officially sanctioned historians, this implied that he was head of the only ideologically orthodox Ukrainian school of historians.

Unfortunately for Iavorskyi, he was brought low at the very moment of his most vehement attacks on his "pseudo-Marxist" colleagues.

The Attack on Iavorskyi

Although Iavorskyi was attacked by Volodymyr Zatonskyi in 1926, simultaneously with the attacks on Shumskyi and Ravich-Cherkasskii, no concerted attempt to discredit him or his work can be discerned until the

end of 1928. In that year his former student Sukhyno-Khomenko published an article in *Litopys revoliutsii*, the newly Ukrainized Istpart organ, arguing along the same lines as Iavorskyi to the effect that the Ukrainian revolution was not just a part of the Russian revolution but a distinctive national event which was the product of a distinctive Ukrainian historical process. This view was soon challenged when the December issue of the journal carried attempts at refutation. M. Harin took issue with a number of facts in Sukhyno-Khomenko's article. More importantly, I. Redkina challenged his basic argument. Redkina maintained that, although Ukraine had been a colony of Russia, it had not entered the Soviet Union as a separate country but as an integral part of the old empire. In this analysis, there was no such thing as a Ukrainian revolutionary process; the Ukrainian revolution was merely a part of the Russian revolution. This line of argumentation constituted a denial that Ukrainian history had any distinctive characteristics. The question was whether this was an aberration, a "spontaneous" instance of resistance from what had long been a preserve of Russian Old Bolsheviks or the beginning of a reversal of the whole course of Soviet Ukraine's national political development. Events were soon to demonstrate that the latter was the case.

At the end of 1928, Pavel Gorin, a rising star in the firmament of the communist historical establishment in Moscow, attacked Iavorskyi at the All-Union Conference of Marxist Historians. Iavorskyi had just portrayed himself as valiantly struggling for the purity of Marxism in the midst of anti-Marxists and pseudo-Marxists surrounding Hrushevskyi. Gorin agreed on the generally hostile ideological character of Ukrainian scholarship, but launched a diatribe against a number of heresies in Iavorskyi's work, accusing Iavorskyi of attributing a positive role to kulaks and other capitalist elements in the Ukrainian revolutionary process. Gorin charged that Iavorskyi had borrowed far too freely from pre-revolutionary Ukrainian

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58. In a June 1926 speech to the Ukrainian Komsomol, Zatonskyi attacked Iavorskyi for preaching revisionism in his lectures at UIML by claiming that most members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia were not in fact kulak ideologists and that the Central Rada was not an organization of a kulak character. V. Zatonskyi, *Nationalna problema na Ukraini* (Kharkiv: DVU, 1927), pp. 68-72.


61. I. Redkina, "Do pytannia pro osoblyvostyi proletarskoi revoliutsii na Ukraini," *Litopys revoliutsii*, 1928, no. 6, 333-350. Sukhyno-Khomenko, like many other historians, made occasional forays into literary criticism and was also attacked in 1928 by the critic Koriak for allegedly being a nationalist. See V. Koriak, "Iak marksyst Sukhyno-Khomenko 'vziav' marksysm Lenina," *Krytyka*, 1928, no. 6, pp. 99-110.
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historiography. It was far less a frontal assault on Ukrainian historiography than that which Sukhyno-Khomenko faced at the same time — Gorin maintained that he had no intention of denying any distinctive features of Ukrainian historical development — but it was still an attack on the emerging paragon of Ukrainian communist historiography. Gorin’s position was given the highest official sanction when Pravda published a brutal review by him of Iavorskyi’s History of Ukraine in Its Briefest Outline on February 10. Iavorskyi published a reply in Prapor marksyzmu, the UIML organ, and even a limited confession of error in the daily Komunist, but when Istorik-marksist (All-Union Society of Marxist Historians’ organ) published Gorin’s rejoinder, it was clear that the campaign against Iavorskyi was backed by the Union historical establishment. Gorin charged that Iavorskyi had denied the hegemony of the proletariat in the Ukrainian revolution, slighted the RSDRP’s role and overemphasized that of Ukrainian nationalists, falsely considered the kulaks the hegemon of the revolution of 1905 in Ukraine, and overemphasized the progressive role of the cossacks in earlier centuries.

To make the hopelessness of Iavorskyi’s case even more apparent, the issue of Istorik-marksist which carried Gorin’s letter also published a review of Iavorskyi’s book by T. Skubitskii, who used Gorin’s arguments as a starting point for an assault on Ukrainian historical scholarship as such. In what was to become an oft-quoted indictment of Iavorskyi and of Ukrainian historiography as such, the critic wrote:

The basic error of Comrade Iavorskyi’s book is that it portrays the history of Ukraine as a distinct process. Comrade Iavorskyi sees the nationality question as a factor dominant over the class struggle, eclipsing more genuine considerations.

If portraying Ukrainian history as a distinct process is an error, it thus also becomes erroneous to consider Ukrainians a distinct nationality requiring their own brand of socialism. The implications were ominous, to say the least.

64. P. Gorin, “Pismo v redaktsiiu,” Istorik-marksist, XII (1929), pp. 334-335. Iavorskyi’s defense, published in Prapor marksyzmu, 1929, no. 2, has not been available to me, but it was cited by Gorin who dismissed it as mere “literary polemics.” Iavorskyi’s limited confession of error has also been unavailable to me but is cited by Korduba, Litterature Historique Sovietique-Ukrainienne, p. 166.
In May 1929 a discussion was held in UIML to denounce Iavorskyi's heresies. Of the participants, only Sukhyno-Khomenko attempted to take issue with the idea that Ukraine's history and revolution were merely part of Russia's. In September, even he recanted in the form of a long critique of his teacher's work published in *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*. Taking Gorin's criticism as his starting point, Sukhyno-Khomenko expressed complete agreement with Skubitskii and charged that Iavorskyi had *de facto* adopted Hrushevskyi's theory of Ukrainian "bourgeoislessness" even though he had criticized it. In December the Kharkiv okrug Party committee officially endorsed the campaign against "Iavorskyism" and portrayed UIML as a hotbed of national deviations. The resolution held that Ukrainian nationalism had to be fought as well as Russian chauvinism and demanded "consolidation," i.e., uniformity of views in strict conformity with the Party line. At the beginning of 1930 even Skrypnyk, who must have been aware that the implications of the campaign boded ill for the policies he had long championed, published "The Errors and Corrections of Academician M. Iavorskyi" in the form of corrections to a manuscript which Iavorskyi had given him in his capacity as head of UIML. While Skrypnyk found plenty of errors, his article was written less in the tone of a polemic than that of a teacher correcting a student.

The vigor with which the Union historical establishment pursued the campaign against Iavorskyi bordered upon violation of Soviet Ukrainian sovereignty. On March 1, 1930 the History Institute of the Union Communist Academy passed a resolution declaring that "M. Iavorskyi over the course of many years cloaked himself with the name of KP(b)U member and Marxist historian of Ukraine so as to carry on ideological wrecking and discredit Marxist historical science in Ukraine."

The resolution went on to state that this was a "difficult fact," but the KP(b)U and Ukrainian Marxist historians should spare no effort in fighting this ideological wrecking. The KP(b)U leadership must have bristled at the spectacle of Russian historians telling them how to clean house ideologi-
cally, and on April 6, Stanislav Kossior, KP(b)U First Secretary, published a letter to the editor of Pravda in response to the Communist Academy's action, informing Iavorskyi's Russian critics that Ukrainian historians were doing quite well in criticizing Iavorskyi, who had meanwhile been purged from the Party.71

The campaign against Iavorskyi did not lag in Ukraine. The Eleventh KP(b)U Congress in June 1930 denounced “the anti-Marxist theory of Iavorskyi” in a revolution which equated it with the past national deviations of Shumskyi, Khvylovyi, and Volobuev.72 Andrii Khvyla, in an authoritative book on solving the nationality question in Ukraine, accused Iavorskyi of having fallen under the pernicious influence of Hrushevskyi and portraying the Central Rada as a socialist barricade against the Hetman and declared that fighting Iavorskyism was the main task of the historical front in Ukraine.73 In June 1931 the KP(b)U denounced UIML for shielding deviations, most notably Iavorskyism, and ordered it broken up into autonomous research institutes.74 Not least of the casualties of the Iavorskyi campaign was this institution which had been headed by Skrypnyk himself and was his main outpost in the ideological realm.

The campaign against Iavorskyi took place at the time of far-reaching changes in Soviet scholarship, the transformation of the humanities and social sciences into outposts on “the ideological front.” The murky world of the so-called cultural revolution cannot be fully explored here, but certain characteristics peculiar to history should be noted. The campaign against Iavorskyism in history was part of a larger effort to replace national histories with a history of the USSR. At the same time the campaign against Iavorskyi, Russian “bourgeois” historians as well as non-Russian historians were attacked.75 In Soviet Ukraine, however, attacking traditional scholarship was secondary to the campaign against the developing communist cadres around Iavorskyi. One anti-Iavorskyi polemic written by T. Skubitskii and published in Istorik-marksist compared the views of

74. Kulturne budivnytstvo v Ukrainskii RSR, 1, pp. 540-544.
Hrushevskyi and Hermaize with Iavorskyi's in an attempt to relegate the latter to the camp of the "class enemy" and charge the Ukrainian cultural establishment with having exercised insufficient ideological vigilance:

Having compared the statements of Hrushevskyi, Hermaize, and Iavorskyi, it is not difficult to become convinced that M. Iavorskyi's works in general never had anything in common with Marxism and remained wholly under the influence of the school of Hrushevskyi. It must be mentioned, however, that despite their pseudo-Marxist character M. Iavorskyi's textbooks were for many years basic reading in our schools, widely published by the Ukrainian Commissariat of Education, and met with a sympathetic response from some of our Party organs as well. All this demands the serious attention of Communist historians and necessitates the broad unmasking of lavorskyism, a fact which Ukrainian Marxist historians have still not sufficiently realized. The growth of genuinely Marxist cadres of Ukrainian historians, who struck a serious blow against Iavorskyism in the May 1929 discussion, appears to hold the promise of success in rooting out of the arsenal of Marxist science the many positions defended by Iavorskyi and his students (Sukhyno-Khomenko, Svidzynski, and others), positions which never had anything in common with Marxism.76

It was only after the anti-Iavorskyi campaign had run its course that attention was turned to "bourgeois" Ukrainian historians. In 1931 a nebulous underground organization, the Ukrainian National Center, was "discovered" by the KGB to include virtually every one of Hrushevskyi's former political associates. Hrushevskyi himself was transferred to Moscow where he had to report regularly to the OGPU (KGB) but was able to continue historical research. At the same time, vicious attacks on his "bour-
geois-kulak nationalist ideology" appeared in Soviet Ukraine. Ukrainian "bourgeois" historians who escaped earlier purges were arrested by the end of 1933, and Hrushevskyy himself was removed to Kislovodsk and died in 1934. Iavorskyi was arrested in March 1933, charged with membership in an underground military organization, and never heard from again. Other Ukrainian Marxist historians were branded as counterrevolutionaries and for the most part arrested within the next few years. Meanwhile, the history of the peoples of the USSR gave way to a schema indistinguishable from the old Russian nationalist presentation of the nineteenth century, albeit dressed up with some superficial borrowing from the vocabulary of Marxism. After the purge of M. N. Pokrovskii's followers in Russia in the mid-thirties, Soviet patriotism became the watchword of historical scholarship, and under this rubric Russian imperial history was rehabilitated, tsars and all. Soviet Ukrainian historical studies simply ceased to exist, save for the odd book or article designed to justify some new policy or declare eternal loyalty for Ukraine's "elder brother," the Russian nation. Only after Stalin's death could even a chastened and tightly controlled Ukrainian historical scholarship reappear. The name of Matvyi Iavorskyi, the true father of Ukrainian Soviet scholarship, remains unmentionable in Soviet Ukraine.