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# COMMUNICATIONS

Letter to the Editors:

[Ed. Note: Our July 1969 issue contained Professor Hunczak's article, "A Reappraisal of Symon Petliura and Ukrainian-Jewish Relations, 1917–1921" (pp. 163–183), and "A Rebuttal" by Mr. Zosa Szajkowski (pp. 184–213). Their discussion of the issue is concluded in JEWISH SOCIAL STUDIES with their letters to the editors which follow.]

As I read Mr. Szajkowski's "rebuttal" it became evident that his interest and argument transcended history and historical evidence. It has a psychological quality which may help to explain his zeal and compelling need to find a symbol incarnate guilty of the terrible deeds against the Jewish people. Such a symbol Szajkowski obviously found in Symon Petliura.

The embarrassing pose of know-it-all creates a situation which makes a scholarly dialogue with Mr. Szajkowski extremely difficult. Yet, I feel I owe it to the readers of my article to correct his errors and tendentious statements.

To make his theses more convincing and to create the impression of being in possession of hidden truth, Mr. Szajkowski resorted to a most unorthodox method. He secured a verbal promise from me not to use, that is, to cite Tcherikower's *Di Ukrainer Pogromen in Yor 1919 (The Pogroms in the Ukraine in 1919)* as one of my sources. The importance of Tcherikower as a decisive source and an authority for Szajkowski is quite obvious.<sup>1</sup> His position was further strengthened when I was denied access to the Tcherikower archive and the other materials dealing with the pogroms at the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research.<sup>2</sup> However, while I deplore the fact that I was not permitted to study the Tcherikower archive, upon examining Szajkowski's evidence based on it, I came to the conclusion that I probably did not miss much and that Mr. Szajkowski mistook fiction and hearsay for factual information. Two examples may suffice to illustrate my contention:

1) On page 212 of his article Mr. Szajkowski invokes Tcherikower's authority to prove that Petliura promoted Otaman Yakiv Shepel, who operated in the Lityn-Chmielnik area, to the rank of general. This was Tcheri-

<sup>1</sup> While I kept my word, I must confess that I had pertinent portions of Tcherikower's book translated for me in order to find out whether it contained any decisive evidence. From these translations, I concluded that the case against Petliura in Tcherikower's book was based on pure conjecture.

<sup>2</sup> My inability to read Yiddish was the reason given for the rejection of my request to do research at the YIVO Institute. That would, I was told, prevent me from using "most of the items in the Tcherikower's archives." Shmuel Lapin to Hunczak, Jan. 20, 1969.

kower's testimony at the Paris trial. In fact it was Volodymyr Shepel, a native of Zolotonosha and no relative of Yakiv, who was promoted to the rank of brigadier general and placed in command of a cavalry division.<sup>3</sup>

2) On page 193 Mr. Szajkowski commits a gross error. Perhaps, more than anything else, it can help us explain the myth of Petliura's anti-Jewish acts. Let me quote Szajkowski:

. . . on August 30, 1918, when the Bolsheviks evacuated Kiev, its city council organized a voluntary militia. On the next day, Petliura's men occupied the city; they arrested and massacred thirty-seven Jewish militiamen. Jacob Safran, the father of one of the victims, tried for many years to do what Schwartzbard was able to accomplish in 1926.

I can state with complete certainty that except for Safran's vile intentions, nothing of the above quoted statement is true. It was a well-known fact that following the German-organized coup d'état of April 28, 1918, which placed Pavlo Skoropadskyi as Hetman of the Ukraine, Petliura retired to private life. Because of his popularity, however, he was soon elected head of the Zemstvo of the Kiev Province, a position Petliura held until his arrest on July 12, 1918.<sup>4</sup> He was kept in jail for four months during which time he had long discussions with Moisei Rafes about the possibility of Ukrainian-Jewish collaboration.<sup>5</sup> To speak of Bolshevik evacuation of Kiev on August 30, 1918, and of Petliura's men occupying the city on the following day, is to display an utter innocence of the political realities in the Ukraine; any basic book on the Ukrainian revolution will confirm this.<sup>6</sup>

Mr. Szajkowski is also guilty of misreading and quoting out of context. The treatment of Schwartzbard and the discussion surrounding the Fourth Universal are cases in point. Nowhere in my article did I make the categorical statement that Schwartzbard was a Bolshevik agent. On the basis of the evidence which I presented in footnote no. 5, I simply stated that "viewed as an avenger by some, and as a Bolshevik agent or at least a tool of a Communist conspiracy by others, Schwartzbard may well remain an eternal enigma. Whatever the truth may have been ...." (p. 164). This statement hardly amounts to a judgment. Yet Szajkowski read it as an "accusation that Schwartzbard was a Bolshevik agent ...." (p. 184). It might be interesting to note that while I merely mentioned Schwartzbard in passing, Szajkowski makes an issue of it. The reason for his preoccupation becomes obvious when Szajkowski confesses to have known Schwartzbard for many

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Oleksander Dotsenko, Litopys Ukrainskoi Revolutsii [A Chronicle of the Ukrainian Revolution] (Lviv 1923), vol. ii, Book 4, p. 260. (U). I also have a picture of Volodymyr Shepel in uniform. It might be interesting to note that Szajkowski constantly confuses Het-man with otaman. There is a basic difference between the two titles. <sup>4</sup> K. Matsievich, "Na zemskii roboti," Zbirnyk Pamyati PETLIURY [Symposium in Memory of Symon Petliura] (Prague 1930), pp. 195–202. (U). <sup>5</sup> Moisei Rafes, Dva Goda Revolutsii na Ukraine, [Two Years of Revolution in the Ukraine] (Moscow 1920), p. 133. (R). <sup>6</sup> On page 188 Szajkowski makes another fantastic revelation that "on October 16, 1918, the day after Petliura's arrival in Kiev, the Ukrainskaya Stavka (Ukrainian Headquarters) carried an attack against the Jewish bourgeoise..." Again the reader should be reminded that from July 12 to November 12, 1918, Petliura was in jail and therefore could not have led an army. led an army.

years (p. 203). It seems that even a suggestion of the possibility that Schwartzbard acted as a Bolshevik agent in assassinating Petliura opens some old wounds for Mr. Szajkowski. However, the evidence is of such a nature that a historian cannot simply dismiss it.

In his discussion of the Fourth Universal of January 24, which proclaimed the Ukraine as an independent and sovereign republic, Mr. Szajkowski makes two rather serious mistakes. First, he falls prev to the outdated propaganda of the enemies of Ukrainian statehood, who, bent on discrediting the Ukrainian aspirations in the eyes of the Allied powers, maintained that everything the Ukrainian government did was inspired and supported by the Germans.<sup>7</sup> Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, it was the inimical attitude of the Russian Provisional Government and later, the open hostility of the Soviets, that convinced the Ukrainians that nothing short of national independence would secure their political aspirations. The proclamation of the Fourth Universal was, in effect, the final step in the realization of that basic premise. The Germans had nothing whatsoever to do with the entire matter! Perhaps Mr. Szajkowski is confusing the Fourth Universal with one of the provisions of the second Treaty of Brest-Litovsk which in effect forced Soviet Russia to recognize Ukrainian independence.8

An even more serious matter is Mr. Szajkowski's quoting material out of context. In my discussion (pp. 168-69) of the attitude of the Jewish representatives in the Central Rada toward the Fourth Universal, I paraphrased Solomon Goldelman to the effect that "the representatives of the Bund and the 'Russians' who for the most part were Russified Jews, voted against the Universal, while the representatives of the other Jewish parties abstained from voting altogether."9

Mr. Szajkowski lifts one part of the statement (the "Russians" were for the most part "Russified Jews") (p. 189) out of the context of the voting procedure concerning the Fourth Universal, disregards the source, (Goldelman), and applies it to an entirely unrelated context. This methodology of purported scholarly discussion is completely new to me, and I would seriously question its validity, unless, of course, the purpose is to confuse. I also have serious reservations regarding Szajkowski's presentation of the unsupported prejudiced opinion of Mr. Heifetz (pp. 188, 190) as reliable testimony.

Of the several problems I wish to discuss in my reply to Mr. Szajkowski's "rebuttal," the question of Bolshevism and the extent of Jewish involvement in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> An example of such a home-grown truth prepared for the gullible may be found in the report of the British Charge d'Affaires to Bucharest (Rumania) of May 2, 1919. In it he informs his government of a conversation with the Russian Minister Mr. Poklewski who ". . . was very bitter about French infatuation with [the] Ukraine. He said the very consti-

<sup>&</sup>quot;... was very bitter about French infatuation with [the] Ukraine. He said the very consti-tution of this state was a German idea, the population being mostly German Jews..." See F.O. 371/3979 Doc. No. 72130, Public Record Office, London. <sup>8</sup> The First Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed between the Central Powers and the Ukrainian Republic on February 9, 1918. On March 3, 1918 a treaty of peace was signed between Soviet Russia and the Central Powers. For details of the two treaties see John W. Wheeler-Bennet, Brest Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace (London 1956), pp. 392-408. <sup>9</sup> Solomon Goldelman, Zhydivska Natsionalna Avtonomiia na Ukraini [Jewish National Autonomy in the Ukraine] (Munich 1963), p. 35. (U). In 1968 Professor Goldelman's book was translated into English and published in Chicago. The corresponding reference can be found on p. 50. For the names of those who opposed the Fourth Universal or abstained

found on p. 50. For the names of those who opposed the Fourth Universal or abstained from voting see Dmytro Doroshenko, *Istoria Ukrainy* 1917–1923 (New York 1954), vol. i, p. 268.

the Bolshevik movement occupies a prominent position. With his usual self-assurance Szajkowski accuses me of failing "to discuss the fact that the Ukrainian independence movement was basically a local Bolshevik effort." Moreover he charges that I ignore "the fact that the pogroms were responsible for the rise of Bolshevism and anti-independence feeling among the Jews" (p. 184). Further on he reassures the reader that "it would be easy to repeat the many proofs that Bolshevism was stronger proportionally among Ukrainians and Russians than among the Jews" (p. 190).

Is it really true that the pogroms won Jewish converts to Bolshevism, that there were proportionally more Ukrainians and Russians in the Bolshevik movement than Jews, and that the Bolsheviks represented the Ukrainian movement for independence? The first part of the question cannot be answered one way or the other simply because no study has ever been made of the motivation for joining the Communist movement. This is not to deny, of course, that some Jews might have been pushed into the Communist camp in the wake of the pogroms. However, any assertion to that effect must be considered at best, an educated guess and therefore should not be couched in categorical terms.

That Jews were significantly involved in the radical movements is a matter of record. At the Fifth Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party which was held in London in 1907, the Jewish delegation was the second largest one, having twelve representatives or 11.4% of the total delegation. By contrast, the Ukrainian Bolsheviks were represented by one delegate which was equivalent to 0.95% of the total Bolshevik delegation.<sup>10</sup> During the fall of 1917, when many Mensheviks went over to the Bolsheviks, and later when the Bund did likewise, Jewish participation in Bolshevik activities became significant. Jews were prominently represented both in upper and lower echelon positions of the Bolshevik Party.<sup>11</sup> Jewish participation on the local level is perhaps best illustrated by a report forwarded from the British commanding admiral of the Black Sea area to the Admiralty on June 6, 1919. It reads:

... Bolshevism in the Ukraine is rapidly losing ground.... They [peasants and workmen] found that their own local Soviets were formed, for the most part, by the hated Jews; that these Soviets carried out their requisitions on the workers and peasants as well as the landowners; and that the Bolshevik reign was even more tyrannical than any Government they had ever suffered from. Rightly the blame is apportioned to the Jews. And there are signs of a violent anti-Jewish movement spreading all over the South of Russia. . . . This anti-Jewish movement is, in effect, an anti-Bolshevik one [as] practically all the regimental Commissars are Jews, and Jews largely predominate in nearly all the Soviets.<sup>12</sup>

The Admiralty report is supported and corroborated by other contemporary sources. It is, therefore, a reliable source.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Londonskii Syezd Rossiiskoi Soc.-Demokr. Rab. Partii: Polnyi Tekst Protokolov [The London Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party: A Full Text of Minutes] (Paris 1909), p. 449. (R).

<sup>13</sup> For details see "Political Report from the Ukraine of 3.3.20," F.O. 371/3966 Doc.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Leonard Schapiro, "The Role of the Jews in the Russian Revolutionary Movement," The Slavonic and East European Review, vol. xi (Dec. 1961), pp. 164-5. <sup>12</sup> For the details of the report see F.O. 371/3965 Doc. No. 96522, Public Record Of-

fice, London.

Mr. Szaikowski completely misrepresents the role of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks in the Ukrainian fight for independence. At no time during the period from 1917 to 1921 was the Communist Party in the Ukraine a majority party, nor, even more significantly, did it represent the Ukrainian fight for independence. The Soviet sources indicate that in March of 1917 the Bolshevik organization of Kiev had only about 200 members.<sup>14</sup> This relative powerlessness of the Bolsheviks in the capital of the Ukraine manifested itself very clearly during the elections to the Kiev City Council held on August 7, 1917, in which the Bolsheviks received only six of the total of ninety-eight seats. The situation did not change much even after the Bolshevik victory in Russia. Thus, for example, when the Bolsheviks of the Ukraine convened the All-Ukrainian Congress of Workers,' Soldiers,' and Peasants' Deputies on December 17, 1917, they discovered that only sixty of the 2,500 deputies supported the Bolshevik program.<sup>15</sup> The lack of strength of the Bolsheviks in Ukrainian political life was further demonstrated in the elections to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly held in November-December, 1917, when the Bolsheviks received 10% of the 8,201,065 votes cast, while the Ukrainian parties received 53% of the total vote.<sup>16</sup>

Even more critical to the issue was the national composition of the Bolshevik Party of the Ukraine and its relevance to the Ukrainian political aspirations. Unfortunately, prior to 1922 there are no reliable statistics on the ethnic composition of the Communist Party of the Ukraine. From various sources, we can infer, however, that it was non-Ukrainian in spirit and composition. The national makeup of the CPU in 1922 was: Russians (53.6%), Ukrainians (23.3%), Jews (13.6%), and others (9.5%). Only in 1926 could the CPU boast of having attained 43.9% Ukrainian membership in the party organization.<sup>17</sup> Prior to that time, the Ukrainians were a distinct minority in the CPU rank and file. The non-Ukrainian character of the CPU can be seen in microcosm when we consider the membership of the Bolshevik city committee of Kiev elected at a conference held in May, 1917. Of the fifteen members elected, only one, Volodymyr Zatonskyi, was of Ukrainian origin. The other members of the committee were: G. Piatakov, A. Horvits, M. Zarnitsvn, E. Bosh, I. Kreisberg, R. Farbman, M. Kugel, a Mr. Liber, a Mr. Nusbaum, V. Primakov, a Mr. Loginov (Pavel), S. Shreiber, M. Reut, and a Mr. Dovnar-Zapolskii.<sup>18</sup>

No. 187175; Secret Report of the War Office on the British Military Mission, South Russia, Oct. 8, 1919, pp. 50-51, F.O. 371/3979 Doc. No. 157024; Report of Major H. B. Mockett of the British Military Mission in Poland on operations against the Bolsheviks in the neighborhood of Lida (Sept. 29, 1920), F.O. 371/5398 Doc. No. 196/196/55; Report of the British Military Mission, South Russia (Ekaterinodar, July 4, 1919) W.O. 106/1190 Doc. No. 3591.

<sup>14</sup> I. Kulyk, "Kievskaia organizatsiia ot fevrala do oktiabria 1917 goda," Letopis Revolutsii [A Chronicle of Revolution] (Kharkiv) No. i, 1924, p. 189. (R).
 <sup>15</sup> Pavlo Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materialy do istorii Ukrainskoi Revolutsii, 1918–1920
 rr. [Notes and Materials on the History of the Ukrainian Revolution 1917–1920] (Vienna

17. [Notes and Materials on the History of the Okrainian Revolution 1917–1920] (Vienna 1921), vol. ii, p. 69. (U).
 <sup>16</sup> For details see O. H. Radkey, The Election to the Russian Constituent Assembly of 1917 (Cambridge 1950), p. 161.
 <sup>17</sup> Jurij Borys, The Russian Communist Party and the Sovietization of Ukraine (Stockholm 1960), p. 155.
 <sup>18</sup> Kulyk, op. cit., p. 191.

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The same political anomaly that we find in the Ukrainian capital was further reflected in the predominantly non-Ukrainian composition of the Central Committee of the CPU as well as in the fact that Piatakov, Kviring, Molotov, Kossior, Kaganovich, and Postyshev, the First Secretaries of the CPU, were also non-Ukrainian.19

In view of the non-Ukrainian ethnic make-up of the leadership and members of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, and the centralist orientation of the Russian Communist Party, the indifference and even hostility toward the Ukrainian national movement becomes more readily understandable. Serhii Mazlakh and Vasyl Shakhrai, two leading Ukrainian Bolsheviks, have most graphically portrayed the allegedly "Ukrainian character" of the Communist Party of the Ukraine.20

Mr. Szajkowski's blatant attack upon Rev. Klodnyckyi, equating him with Otamans known for their anti-Jewish excesses, is both unfair and unjustified. Certainly, his imposition of a contribution upon the civilian (Jewish) population was an extra-legal act. As a representative of the army he had no right to do it, yet he felt compelled to do so in order to help the needy Jews who were suffering from all kinds of privations. His noble motivation and the equitable distribution of funds for the various needs of the Jewish population, a fact Szajkowski himself recounts (pp. 209-210), could not possibly place Rev. Klodnyckyi in the ranks of bandits and extortionists, as Mr. Szajkowski suggests.

The evidence that we have from the Jews of Chmielnik contradicts completely Mr. Szajkowski's assertion. In a document of May 13, 1920 signed by over one hundred Jews, Rev. Klodnyckyi is praised for his concern for the well-being of the people, "regardless of their nationality."<sup>21</sup> This testimony has been supported by Mrs. Golda Liebeskind, an inhabitant of Chmielnik until 1921, who wrote that Rev. Klodnyckyi always "displayed a profound concern for all people, regardless of their nationality or religion. . . . For his concern for the Jewish people and his efforts to improve their lot," continues Mrs. Liebeskind, "Rev. Klodnyckyi gained [the] respect and genuine confidence of the Jewish community of Chmielnik and Lityn." Mrs. Liebeskind ends her letter by praising the B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League for giving Rev. Klodnyckyi the Torch of Liberty Award as "a well deserved reward, for in a time of crisis he proved himself a truly good human being."22

Important corroborating testimony on behalf of Rev. Klodnyckyi has been rendered by a most unimpeachable source, Chief Rabbi Bilik of Chmielnik. As spiritual leader of his community, Rabbi Bilik expressed the sentiments of his people when he referred to Klodnyckyi as a man "who distinguished himself for

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Borys, op. cit., p. 142–153. <sup>20</sup> See Serhij Mazlakh and Vasyl Shakhrai, Do Khvyli: Shcho dietsia na Ukraini i z Ukrainoiu [On the Current Situation: What is Happening in and to the Ukraine] (Saratov 1919; 2nd ed., New York 1967) particularly pp. 97–99, 107, 162, 165, 168, 191–192, 242. (U).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Rev. Klodnycky has the original document.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Liebeskind to Hunczak, Nov. 19, 1969. The author is in possession of a copy of the letter—the original was sent to the B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League in New York City to complete their file on the subject.

his great spirit, love of truth, and love for the Jewish people." As a representative of the Ukrainian military authority in the county of Lityn, Rev. Klodnyckyi not only "saved all the Jews of the area from the sword and looting," but also "organized hospitals, homes for the aged, took care of the poor and provided bread and firewood for them." Rabbi Bilik paid the ultimate compliment to Klodnyckyi's humanity when he said that Klodnyckyi could be entrusted with "the leadership of the sons of Jakob in their pilgrimage to God's mountain."<sup>23</sup>

Certainly Mr. Szajkowski should have considered Rabbi Bilik's testimony before embarking upon a campaign of unjust accusation and character assassination. But then, the method employed by Szajkowski is not confined to his treatment of Rev. Klodnyckyi alone. Relying on the unfair judgment of Vladimir Tiomkin, Mr. Szajkowski denigrates Arnold Margolin, a noble man and a life-time servant of the Jewish community, as a "weakling." In the days of severe tsarist reaction, Margolin courageously acted as defense counsel in many anti-Jewish trials. The most spectacular of these was the Mendel Beiliss trial in which Arnold Margolin alone challenged the tsarist machinery of persecution. For this he was disbarred, but Beiliss was acquitted and the good name of the Jews was vindicated before the whole world.<sup>24</sup>

Mr. Szajkowski in general seems rather fond of hasty judgments. Thus B'nai B'rith committed an act of "sheer stupidity" by presenting the Torch of Liberty Award to Rev. Klodnyckyi, the Jews engaged in the Ukrainian-Jewish dialogue "represent only themselves," and, besides, are not of "Schechtman's stature." Does Mr. Szajkowski feel that he is called upon and qualified to pronounce such cavalier opinions?

It seems to me that Mr. Szajkowski's criticism of Arnold Margolin and Dr. Joseph Lichten, Director of the Department of Intercultural Affairs of B'nai B'rith, is directly related to what Szajkowski may consider to be the "danger" of a Jewish-Ukrainian dialogue. He conveys unmistakably his preoccupation with the Jewish-Ukrainian dialogue assuring us that a Ukrainian *mea culpa* and an open condemnation of Petliura are a *sine qua non* for any discussions. Dr. Lichten, in contrast to Mr. Szajkowski, always favored and actively participated in the Jewish-Ukrainian dialogue which he considered to be a necessary precondition for a lasting understanding. To be sure, his interest in the Ukrainian-Jewish understanding is but one aspect of his many-sided activities whose goal is a better relationship between the gentiles and the Jews in the Diaspora.

I would like to assuage Mr. Szajkowski's anxiety as to the purpose of my article. My principal, indeed my sole objective in undertaking the study of this controversial topic, was not to effect a change in Jewish attitudes through my findings, but rather to discover the truth and to disseminate it. My role as a historian is different from that of a publicist or a political partisan. Although it is one of my most cherished hopes that Jews and Ukrainians, who shared a com-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> For the complete text of the certificate see Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 9th Congress, Second Session (Washington, July 13, 1966), no. iii, pp. A3654-A3655.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> For the details of the Beiliss case see Arnold Margolin, *The Jews of Eastern Europe* (New York 1926), pp. 155–247, and Maurice Samuel, *Blood Accusation* (Philadelphia 1966).

mon history for one thousand years, would finally seek and achieve a muchneeded understanding. However, as a historian, I cannot change the past to fit the exigency of the situation, that is, I shall not sacrifice Petliura, or any other individual, whom I know to be innocent, or for that matter my own intellectual integrity, on the altar of a Jewish-Ukrainian understanding, as Mr. Szajkowski demands.

To conclude, one may well ask, what, if anything, has Mr. Szajkowski proven? An unsubstantiated harangue cannot be taken seriously. I stated in my article that there were pogroms for which Petliura's army was responsible.<sup>25</sup> What is crucial for the entire issue is the fact that no positive evidence was found that would establish Petliura's responsibility. Mr. Szajkowski stated himself that the evidence against Petliura was "not sufficient for a criminal court of law" (p. 195).<sup>26</sup> Under these circumstances, to disregard Petliura's proclamation against the pogroms and all of the positive measures he took against their perpetrators, and to base the thesis of Petliura's culpability on prejudiced opinion, is to do violence to history.

TARAS HUNCZAK.

### Letter to the Editors:

Two weeks before Dr. Joseph B. Schechtman died (on March 1, 1970). his wife asked me to call him at the hospital in connection with Solomon I. Goldelman's book<sup>1</sup> which he had been asked to review for *Jewish Social Studies*. Schechtman had criticized me for having accepted the invitation of Jewish Social Studies to write a rebuttal to Mr. Hunczak's pro-Petliura article.<sup>2</sup> However, I explained to Schechtman that a detailed and honest review of Goldelman's book would, in my opinion, entail nothing less than a rebuttal of another pro-Petliura study. Moreover, in spite of my strong anti-Communist feelings, I dislike the pseudoscientific activities of Ukrainian institutions based in West Germany; Goldelman's book had been published in 1963 by the Munich Institute for the Study of the USSR. On this occasion Schechtman urged me not to engage in any further discussion with Hunczak. I had always deeply admired Schechtman for his honest appraisal of the Ukrainian events and his active role in the defense of Sholem Schwartzbard. I again explained to him that I had originally advised against publishing Mr. Hunczak's paper, but since it was bound to be published anyway,

<sup>25</sup> Throughout history one can discover, even in the most disciplined armies, some units whose activities did not represent the social and political ideals of the army. Such is the nature of violence. The reported American atrocity at Song My in March 1968 may well be a case in point. See *Newsweek* Dec. 1, 1969, pp. 35–37. <sup>26</sup> Mr. Szajkowski feels, however, that the evidence "was sufficient for a political trial."

This double-standard is completely artificial and juridically untenable, for without reliable evidence the question of innocence or guilt cannot possibly be resolved.

1968). <sup>2</sup> Dr. Joseph Schechtman, "A Reappraisal of Symon Petliura," *Midstream*, vol. xv, no.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Solomon I. Goldelman, Jewish National Autonomy in Ukraine 1917-1920 (Chicago

someone had to defend the honor of Ukrainian Jewry. Now, in retrospect I do not regret it. It was worthwhile doing if only in order to elicit Schechtman's strong reaction against the defenders of Petliura.

Incidentally, has anyone written a critique of Goldelman's book, a defense of Petliura? It was written by a Jew and it was originally published in Yiddish, in a volume edited by honest and scholarly Jews; moreover it was praised in the Yiddish press as "fascinating, factual and objective."<sup>3</sup> My own impression is that the editors did not even read the study. Has anyone ever protested against the B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League for presenting an award to a Ukrainian who, according to his own statement, had forced the Jews of a Ukrainian community to pay him a forced contribution of a million karbovantsi?

It is also my opinion that it is a mistake to publish Mr. Hunczak's present reply to my rebuttal in a scholarly Jewish journal. The principle of journalistic ethics and politeness cannot be applied by a scholarly Jewish journal in the case of a reply written with a distinctly antisemitic overtone. Hunczak's constant use of the Jew-Bolshevik canard is, at the least, insulting to readers of a Jewish journal. However, since his reply is being published, a rebuttal must again follow.

Mr. Hunczak tries to present himself as a victim of my "unorthodox method" in securing from him a verbal promise not to use Elias Tcherikower's book, Di Ukrainer Pogromen in Yor 1919, about the 1919 pogroms. I have met Hunczak only once, long after I had already submitted to Jewish Social Studies my rebuttal to his defense of Petliura. He told me of his work and how glad he was that I would participate in the discussion. I told him frankly that I was not participating in a discussion with him, that I submitted a rebuttal to his arguments. Then I asked him if he knew Tcherikower's book. His reply was: "No, but if you will give me the title I will read it and make the necessary changes in my paper." My reaction was that I was not interested in collaborating in his defense of Petliura; I had submitted a rebuttal and would not change it after his further research on the basis of my remarks. Then he asked that his paper and my rebuttal remain as they had been originally submitted. As for the YIVO Archives, why did Mr. Hunczak wait until January 1969, long after my rebuttal had been submitted, to ask permission for their use? Did he, again, expect me to change my rebuttal on the basis of his future research?

I will not try to discuss the "confusions" found by Mr. Hunczak in my rebuttal; for example, the question of whether a leader of a pogromist army was a "hetman" or "otaman." We are probably both confused on such and similar details, including first names. One day the Ukrainian army leaders proclaimed themselves as chieftains and the next day as chiefs. Perhaps Robert Lansing, United States Secretary of State, was correct when he told a Jewish delegation which interceded for the defense of Ukrainian Jewry: "The heads of their armies

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Solomon Goldelman, "National Jewish Autonomy in the Ukraine," in Yidn in Ukraine [Jews in the Ukraine] edited by Philip Friedman, Abraham Kin, Jacob Lestchinsky, and Mendl Osherovitch, vol. i, (New York 1961). pp. 118–62; Ephraim Auerbach, in the Tog-Morgen Zhurnal [The Day-Morning Journal], Dec. 17, 1961; section 2, p. 10; Israel Knox, in the Tsukunft [Future], Feb. 1962, p. 87.

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seem to be more of the medieval type."<sup>4</sup> If Hunczak wants to disqualify Elias Tcherikower as a historian because of a mistaken first name, let him do so. It did not, however, prevent Hunczak from trying to misuse, in his first article, one of Tcherikower's books, as I have pointed out in my rebuttal. Let Hunczak also label Professor Heifetz's opinion "unsupported" and "prejudiced." I do not even mind Mr. Hunczak's statement that "even a suggestion" of the possibility that Schwartzbard acted as a Bolshevik agent in assassinating Petliura "opens some old wounds for Mr. Szajkowski." This is quite true. These are the wounds of a man belonging to a victimized people, not those of a man defending pogromists. Mr. Hunczak writes that I "confesses to have known Schwartzbard for many years." "Confess?" One "confesses" to something of a criminal nature. I, however, am proud of it, and I will always cherish the fact that Sholem and Anna Schwartzbard had befriended me; likewise I will always be proud of the fact that I later saved Schwartzbard's personal archives from possible destruction.

According to Mr. Hunczak, my "blatant attack" upon Mr. Volodymyr Klodnyckyi is "unfair and unjustified." In my rebuttal I only retold Klodnyckyi's story in his own words. However, since Hunczak continues to propagate the idea of Klodnyckyi's "noble motivation" in forcing the Jews of Chmielnik to pay him a forced contribution of one million karbovantsi. I must refer to the testimony of Baruch Etkis of Chmielnik, written on October 18, 1921, in Poland, where he lived as a refugee. According to Etkis, Shepel's gangs killed the Jew, Motl Perlmuter, and the rabbi's daughter, raped seven women, and forced the Jews in Chmielnik to give a contribution of half a million Kerensky-rubles. The gang occupied Chmielnik for two weeks, they were followed by the Bolsheviks who stayed there four weeks. The Jews organized a self-defense unit under the leadership of Zalman Shternglas and Berl Roisman and they received 600 rifles from Kiev. During an attack by Shepel's gang against Chmielnik, the Jewish self-defense killed fifty bandits and burnt a village which Shepel's gangsters had used as a refuge. After Klodnyckyi occupied Chmielnik, he was given a large sum and the killing of Jews stopped for a while. Then Shepel and his gang arrived. Shortly afterwards two Jews were killed. Because the peasants of the destroyed village demanded large compensation, the Jews gave to the commandant, Klodnyckyi, the sum of two million rubles. In return, he wrote out a statement saying that it was the Bolsheviks, not the Jews, that had destroyed the village.<sup>5</sup>

Mr. Hunczak prefers to believe Klodnyckyi's testimony; I consider Etkis' testimony the more reliable. However, in view of the conflicting evidence, Mr. Klodnyckyi should send back the award presented to him, or else the B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League should take the necessary steps to recall it.

In reply to my statement that the pogroms spurred the Jews toward Bolshevism, Mr. Hunczak writes that this may have been the case of "some Jews," but that my assertion must be considered at best an educated guess. On April 16, 1919, Sergei D. Sazonow, the former Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, told

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Minutes of the meeting of Dec. 10, 1919, Elias Tcherikower Collection at the archives of the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research. Hereafter cited as E.T. <sup>5</sup> E.T.

Oscar Straus, prominent American Jew and chairman of the League to Enforce Peace, that: "Russia's cruel treatment of the Jews under the Czar's Government was an indefensible wrong and doubtless contributed to driving some of those who had suffered most into the ranks of the Bolsheviki."<sup>6</sup> A similar statement was made by a Ukrainian military leader, Mikitko, who served with the first Galician Army Corps in the Ukraine. During the Vinnitsa period he published an appeal to the Jews to abandon the Bolshevik movement. In his appeal Mikitko stated: "... we know that the terrible pogroms against Jews pushed many of you in the ranks of the Bolsheviks."7

Mr. Hunczak's assertion that "Jews were significantly involved in the radical movement is a matter of record" is particularly in poor taste. The pioneering influence of Ukrainian radicalism on the Jewish labor movement-including the founding of the Bund-and the later influence of the Jewish labor leaders on their Ukrainian comrades are, I assume, unknown to Mr. Hunczak. These facts are, however, common knowledge; it would be naive to repeat them here. Further, one wonders what the 1907 London Conference has to do with the Ukrainian pogroms of 1919? Why not go back even further and reproach the Jews for the Jewish origin of Karl Marx's father? Or even earlier to the Jewish influence on Utopian Socialism?

One should perhaps note the large number of Ukrainians in the Communist Party of the United States. It is well known that the Ukrainian Federation of the Socialist Party played an important role in the formation of the Communist Party, and that in May 1919 it was expelled by the right-wing National Executive Committee of the Socialist Party.8

Mr. Hunczak continues to rely on pro-Petliura Jewish witnesses. The wellknown Yiddish writer, S. An-sky (Solomon Rappaport) once called them "yidishe meshorsim [Jewish servants] who were eager to whitewash Petliura of [having spilled] Jewish blood."9 An-sky, it should be noted, was ideologically a partisan of the Socialist-Revolutionairies. One historian has called Petliura's Jewish representatives abroad "intellectual prostitutes and self-seekers."10

Anyway, even in the writings of Jews who had defended Petliura one can easily find anti-Petliura statements. In his first article Mr. Hunczak cited Israel Zangwill's defense of the Ukrainian Directory, but in January 1920 Zangwill wrote:

It is as Bolshevists that the Jews of South Russia have been massacred by the armies of Petliura, though the armies of Sokolow have massacred them as partisans of Petliura, the armies of Makhno as bourgeois capitalists, the armies of Grigoriew as Communists, and the armies of Denikin at once as Bolshevists, capitalists, and Ukrainian Nationalists. It is Aesop's old fable.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Oscar S. Straus, Under Four Administrations (New York 1922), p. 417.
<sup>7</sup> undated, printed in Vinnitsa, E.T.
<sup>8</sup> Theodore Draper, The Roots of American Communism (New York 1957), p. 18.
<sup>9</sup> S. An-sky, in the Yiddish daily Moment (Warsaw), Nov. 14, 1919, p. 5.
<sup>10</sup> George Spiro, Workers Democratic World Government Versus National-Bureaucratic 'Soviet' and Capitalist Regimes (New York 1951), p. 811.
<sup>11</sup> The Jewish Chronicle (London), Jan. 23, 1920, p. 14.

When, exactly, did Petliura completely lose the last vestiges of organizational ties with a Jewish group and when did people who represented no one but themselves became his Jewish advisers or defenders? At a very, very early stage, even before the terrible Proskurov pogrom of February 15, 1919. By then, even Abraham Revutsky [Revusky], Minister for Jewish Affairs, did not represent his Labor Zionist Party (Poale Zion) but only himself. According to Revutsky's memoirs, on January 29, 1919, he had pursued the Directory apparatus which, confronted by the Bolshevik advance, had evacuated Kiev and settled in Vinnitsa. The next day he returned to Kiev in order to assist at a conference of Poale Zion. which had been scheduled for January 25 but was postponed. Revutsky advised his comrades that he had resigned as Minister but remained at his post until a new man could be appointed. To this the conference had agreed-according to Revutsky's memoirs—without any opposition from the delegates. If the conference had ordered him not to follow the Directory, he would not have again returned to Vinnitsa, he wrote.<sup>12</sup> However according to V. Averbuch's testimony, the Poale Zion conference was not postponed, it was held on January 25 and "a resolution for a recall of all our comrades from the government and a prohibition against support of the Directory were adopted." On January 26, Revutsky told his party's leadership that the Directory had asked him to take care of the Jewish Ministry until another Minister could be found. The Party "explicitly refused to allow him to remain even another day [at the Ministry] and threatened to exclude him from the Party if he should remain." On the next day, the Directory left Kiev for Vinnitsa and so did Revutsky. According to Averbuch, this made a "terrible" impression upon the delegates to the conference; by then, he stated, "the Poale Zion Party had already officially and completely broken relations with the Directory." According to a statement of Jacob Vigdorsohn, chairman of Tseirei Zion in Vinnitsa, Revutsky suggested that a man of that party should become Minister. However, Tseirei Zion decided not to collaborate with the "pogromist Directory." Only then did Revutsky finally resign and the Ministry was taken over by Pinchas Krasny, who represented only himself.<sup>13</sup>

Vinnitsa, one should note, was then a center of the demoralized military and civilian leaders of the Directory who were interested more in having a good time than in fighting the Bolsheviks. It was there that Isaac Giterman, representative of the committee to help the victims of the Zhitomir pogrom, was invited by Revutsky to attend a meeting with Ukrainian leaders. Among them was V. Palienko, the man responsible for the Zhitomir pogrom. Giterman was so disgusted that he initially refused to accept Revutsky's financial aid for the victims of the pogrom.14

Frankly, the 1919 British Intelligence reports about Jewish Bolshevism are, in my opinion, not very reliable. I wonder whether Mr. Hunczak is really serious when he tries to establish the role of Jews in the Bolshevik movement by

<sup>12</sup> Abraham Revutsky, In di Shvere Teg oyf der Ukraine [In the Difficult Days in the Ukraine] (Berlin 1924), pp. 227-30.
<sup>13</sup> Testimony by Averbuch and Vigdorsohn, E.T.
<sup>14</sup> Giterman's testimony, June 18, 1919, E.T.

citing the 1920 report of a British mission in Poland detailing operations against the Bolsheviks in the neighborhood of Lida. Then and there the Jew-Bolshevik scare was used by Poles as an excuse for murdering Jews. If Mr. Hunczak is serious, then his use of such a source is nothing less than an insult to the readers of Jewish Social Studies. Great Britain was then a center of antisemitic propaganda of the lowest level connected with the Jew-Bolshevik scare. The following are but a few of many facts.

The British military intelligence reports about Jewish Bolshevism are about as reliable as the following famous note of August 1919 for "personnel volunteering for service with the British military mission in South Russia": "All women were forced to report to a 'commissariat of free love,' where they may be selected by any man, and had no right to refuse."15 Most of the information was supplied by Russian reactionaries. The Manchester Guardian of January 15, 1920, wrote: "We were told that Bolshevism was run by a little gang of Jews. That was found to be untrue. . . . It will not do."

On August 1, 1919, Sir Eyre Crove, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, commented that the Bolsheviks were "all organized and directed by Jews."<sup>16</sup> On May 25, 1919, Felix Frankfurter complained to Justice Louis D. Brandeis about the British attitude "in the present state of Bolshevik-phobia in the world."17 Colonel Edward M. House, President Wilson's close adviser, noted in his diary: "Someone told him [Lord Balfour] and he is inclined to believe it, that nearly all Bolshevism and disturbance of a like nature, are directly traceable to the Jews of the world. They seem determined either to have what they want or to upset the present civilization."18 On January 3, 1920, Winston Churchill,-the man who had warned Denikin to stop the pogroms-stated that the Bolsheviks "believe in the international Soviet of the Russian and Polish Jews."<sup>19</sup> The British military authorities in the non-Soviet parts of Russia were responsible for the accusation that Jews were the prime movers in the assassination of the Czar and his family.<sup>20</sup> In 1919, Captain Jacob Albert Harzfeld of the American Expeditionary Force in Northern Russia and Siberia told Lucien Wolf, the British Jewish leader, that the British Forces at Archangel and Murmansk were actively engaged in antisemitic activities. They had actually issued and distributed appeals in Russian and English containing statements that Bolshevism was a Jewish creation and calling upon the Red soldiers to free themselves from "your Jewish provocateurs,"

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Norman Hapgood, *The Advancing Hour* (New York 1920), pp. 109–10.
 <sup>16</sup> Richard A. Ullman, *Anglo-Soviet Relations*, 1917–1921 (Princeton, N.J. 1968), vol.

ii, p. 219. <sup>17</sup> Felix Frankfurter to Brandeis, Jacob de Haas Papers, at the Zionist Archives and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> House's diary, Dec. 31, 1918, at Yale University Library; minutes of a meeting be-tween Balfour, Brandeis, Frankfurter and Lord Eustace Percy in Paris, June 24, 1919, de Haas Papers; *The London Times*, Jan. 5, 1920; E. Malcolm Carroll, *Soviet Communism and Western Opinion* 1919–1921 (Durham, N.C. 1965), p. 13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> On Churchill's warning to Denikin against pogroms, see Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis: The Aftermath (London 1929), p. 255; Ullman, op cit., vol. ii, pp. 218–19. <sup>20</sup> A Collection of Reports on Soviet Russia. Abridged Edition of Parliamentary Papers, Russia, no. 1, 1919 (London 1919), p. 48; The Assassination of the Tsar: Correspondence with His Majesty's Government, etc. Presented to the Jewish Board of Deputies and the Council of the Anglo-Jewish Association, October 1920 (London 1920).

et cetera. British officials at the Paris Peace Conference stated that these appeals were authentic.<sup>21</sup> General William S. Graves, Commanding Officer of the American Expeditionary Forces, strongly criticized the antisemitic behavior of his British colleagues.<sup>22</sup>

Since Mr. Hunczak does rely on reports of the British Intelligence, I would like to remind him that these same reports constantly warned against "Petliura whose troops are not very reliable."23 On March 17, 1919, French Marshall Ferdinand Foch urged that the Allies equip Polish and Rumanian forces in order to counteract the threatened seizure of Lemberg by the armed forces of Petliura's Directory.<sup>24</sup> The French dislike of Petliura's regime is common knowledge. According to one French author, an anti-Bolshevik, Petliura had adopted all the Bolshevik methods of dictatorship and repression and also much of the Bolshevik social program. However, he could not find the enthusiasm of the Bolsheviks among the Ukrainian masses; nor did the revolutionary honesty of Lenin's commissars exist among Petliura's own bureaucratic ministers and other high officials.<sup>25</sup> In November 1919, Major George H. Ryden, reporting on his mission for the American Red Cross in Southern Russia, declared that both the French and the British were not too happy with the help given Petliura. Ryden added: "Many responsible Jews are as bitterly opposed to the Bolshevists as other Russians."26 No wonder, then, that Westerners both gentiles and Jews, had little confidence in Petliura's regime. In October 1919, William Rosenblat, who had travelled in Russia as an agent of the Train Corporation, told Major R. Tyler of the American Red Cross that only "German money and the motto 'Kill the Jews' ... have kept Petliura on his feet."27

In October 1919, Sir Alfred Mond spoke to British Prime Minister Lloyd-George about the pogroms in the Ukraine. Mond was assured that Denikin had received very strong representations from the British Government to restrain his troops and that Denikin had given solemn assurances that he would do so. According to the British military reports-Sir Alfred Mond was told-this "furnished an opportunity for Petliura to rouse the feeling of the bitterly anti-Jewish Ukrainians against [Denikin's] Volunteer Army which he [Petliura] proclaims to be the protector of the Jews."28

One should bear in mind that the Allies did not favor an independent Ukraine. Thus, on December 10, 1919, Secretary of State Robert Lansing told a Jewish delegation which came to seek protection for Ukrainian Jewry: "I do not wish to see Russia dismembered."29

Mr. Hunczak concludes with a statement that I disregarded "Petliura's proc-

<sup>21</sup> Lucien Wolf's diary, 1919, at the General Historical Jewish Archives, Jerusalem.

<sup>24</sup> Ullman, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 138.
 <sup>25</sup> Jean Xydias, L'Intervention Française en Russie 1918-1919 (Paris 1927), pp. 38-45.
 <sup>26</sup> National Archives, RG 59,861.00/5949.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> William S. Graves, America's Siberian Adventure 1918-1920 (New York 1931), pp. 110-11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> "British Military Intelligence Summary no. 16," May 1919, National Archives (Washington, D.C.), RG 256, 861.00/633.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Ibid., /5613.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Memorandum of Oct. 1919, E.T.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Minutes of the meeting, E.T.

lamations against the pogroms and all the positive measures against their perpetrators." I can only stand by my criticism (p. 194 of my rebuttal) of Petliura's proclamation because it was issued too late. As for the "positive measures," I would advise Mr. Hunczak to re-read my rebuttal.

Petliura had often tried to coerce Jews to admit that his regime was democratic and that Jewish Bolshevism was something to be dealt with in a special way. On June 3, 1919, Kamenets Podolski was taken over by Petliura and his government settled there. Petliura asked the authorities under his control to dispatch Jewish propagandists to communities where they should propagate against Bolshevism. The local authorities refused. Such Jewish propagandists, they said, would only be murdered together with other Jews. Then Petliura suggested that in order to gain the sympathy of the army, his Jewish Minister, Pinchas Krasny, publish a statement that all Jews had openly rejected Bolshevism. Krasny called a meeting of representatives of the Jewish political parties and defended Petliura's suggestion; he urged publication of such a declaration, but the representatives rejected it. Such a declaration, they stated, would endanger the lives of Ukrainian Jews under Soviet rule. Instead, they suggested, that Petliura's government issue a statement declaring that Jews were not Bolsheviks. Petliura did not give up. A few days later, the Jews were called to a meeting at the main synagogue at Kamenets, where a representative of Petliura, a Jewish convert to Christianity, insulted the Jews for not helping Petliura's regime. A Zionist leader replied that it was scandalous to ask the Jews to help their murderers.. The duty of the Jewshe said—was not to help the bloody pogromists but their victims.<sup>30</sup>

Petliura's proclamation of August 1919 was criticized precisely for its contents which hinted about the role of Jewish Bolshevism. However, one of Petliura's Jews did publish a proclamation. In August 1919, at the same time when Petliura published his proclamation, the Jewish Minister Pinchas Krasny and Boris Martos, Chairman of Petliura's Cabinet, published an appeal "To the Jewish Citizenry and Labor," praising the democratic and anti-pogrom character of the Petliura's regime and its help for the victims of pogroms; it called upon Jews to put an end to the Bolshevik dictatorship. However it also repeated Petliura's false statement that the entire "Jewish democracy, headed by the Bund, Faravnikte, Poale Zion and Folkspartay supports the people's government" of Petliura, and that they all had their respresentatives at the council of the Jewish Ministry and at responsible positions in other ministries.<sup>31</sup> It is, however, well known that even much earlier the only collaboration of responsible Jewish parties and agencies with the Jewish Ministry consisted in using its administrative facilities in order to assist the victims of pogroms. Krasny represented no one but himself. As already noted in my earlier rebuttal. Krasny was later sent by Petliura on a peace mission to the Bolsheviks; he was imprisonned, and eventually became a Bolshevik himself, but was never trusted by the Jews who rejected the idea of calling him as a witness for the defense of Schwartzbard.

Denikin, like Petliura, also tried to obtain a Jewish declaration against

- <sup>30</sup> Testimony by S. Niepomnishts, July 20, 1919, E.T.
   <sup>31</sup> Printed appeal in Yiddish and Ukrainian, E.T.

Bolshevism. The question was often discussed at the so-called "Klayne Natsionale Farzamlung" (Small National Assembly) of Ukrainian Jews.<sup>32</sup>

Later, on October 11, 1920, Petliura published another proclamation which ordered the punishment of those responsible for murdering Jews.<sup>33</sup> Again, on March 18, 1921, he published a proclamation which contained the following characteristic statements: The Bolsheviks were propagating the idea that the Ukrainian insurgents were trying to exterminate the Jewish population; however, he, Petliura, could not believe it, because he knew the Ukrainian people; they were incapable of oppressing another people who were also suffering from Bolshevism. For the first time Petliura openly acknowledged that Jewish Bolsheviks were alien to the Jewish people:

The Jewish population, the small merchants, artisans and workers—those, who like all others gain their bread by hard work, are also oppressed and robbed by the Bolshevik system. Their merchandise is being taken away for the communes. Is this not the economic ruin of the Jewish population? How could the Jewish population, plundered and hungry, sympathize with Bolshevik robbers. No. Like the peasants, the Jewish population, too, is impatiently waiting for liberation from Communist robbers.

When you find Jews among the Communists, then remember that they are traitors to their people; they abandoned the faith of their fathers, like the traitors from our own ranks who have joined the Communists; it is wrong to blame the entire Jewish people, just as it is impossible to make the entire Ukrainian people responsible for our own Communist traitors. I know that the honest Jewish citizenry reject these traitors and brand them as outcasts from their people.<sup>34</sup>

The pogroms, Petliura continued in his proclamation, were being organized by the Bolsheviks and for this he ordered severe punishment of "the Communists and other bandits which are organizing pogroms," and promised to defend the innocent Jewish population. Pogromists would be punished by military courts as enemies of the Ukraine and agents of its enemies.<sup>35</sup>

In 1919, the Jews demanded, even begged Petliura and his collaborators to publish such a document. Why—for God's sake, why—did Petliura wait until March 1921 to acknowledge that Ukrainian Jewry was not to be blamed for Bolshevism? Was it, because he was then playing his last card, with the help of foreign military forces, and was afraid that another outcry in the West against a second wave of Petliura pogroms would be fatal to his plans? Is not this proclamation overwhelming proof of Petliura's responsibility for the pogroms of 1919 as well as his dishonesty?

Let the readers of this second rebuttal judge for themselves.

The belated anti-pogrom proclamations were published during an exceptionally sad period in Ukrainian history. In September and October 1919 the Directory simultaneously conducted negotiations with Moscow, with Denikin, and with

 $<sup>^{32}</sup>$  E.T. When Denikin entered Odessa he urged a Jewish delegation to influence Jewish youth to change its political orientation. "This way you would help us to fight pogroms," he told the delegation. Messager de Crimée (Sebastopol), Sept. 11, 1919.  $^{33}$  F.T.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> E.1. <sup>34</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> *Ibid*.

Poland, and it was also seeking help from the Allies. In May 1920 the Ukrainian Social-Democratic government imposed Polish rule in the Ukraine and delivered Galician Ukraine and part of Volhynia to Poland. Such moves were not too popular among the Ukrainians, nor did all Allied politicians approve of such tactics. Thus, one had to be careful not to become compromised in the West by new pogroms.

Even then however Petliura's men organized pogroms. Attacks on Jews were conducted by the Polish army; various Ukrainian bands assisting the Polish army; Red Army units consisting in part of former Petliura and Denikin units; and Belachovitch-Perenikin-Petliura followers (after the peace treaty). During this last period Petliura's official policy was to avoid pogroms. In addition to Petliura's above noted proclamations, Mordalevitch and Dereshtchuk, his military aides, also published similar appeals. However, the Ukrainian military commanders Grizlo, Holi, Tsvetkovsky, and many others, still continued to organize pogroms. The nationalist Ukrainian Medvina uprising against the Soviets was accompanied by terrible pogroms. Nokhum Shtif, author of a detailed history of this period-written before the Schwartzbard trial but as yet unpublished-came to the conclusion that nationalist Ukrainian leaders had no illusions. They must have known, according to Shtif, that their previous pogromist policy could not be changed overnight by a few proclamations. Such proclamations simply constituted nothing other than a whitewash attempt prepared in advance.<sup>36</sup>

Was Petliura really and always a hero? Was he one even in his dealings with the Germans, before and at Brest-Litovsk? Was he a hero in July 1918, when he suggested to Skoropadski that the Cadets be excluded from the Government (a step opposed by the Germans)? At various times Petliura tried to deal with the Bolsheviks, the Russian monarchists, the Germans, and the Allies. He obtained help from Galician Ukrainians and made a pact with the Poles, who were regarded as the enemies of the Ukrainian people.

It is also worthwhile to remind Mr. Hunczak that only at the insistence of the Labor Zionists (Poale Zion) did the Germans permit Petliura to occupy Kiev. A conference of Poale Zion, the Military Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee, and the Council of German Soldiers approved a detailed plan for the occupation. Some Ukrainian bands were not allowed to enter the city, but even the "good" Ukrainian units inaugurated the occupation of Kiev by killing thirty-seven Jewish militia men.<sup>37</sup> The Bundist Moisei Rafes called upon Petliura to prevent pogroms and when the latter refused, Rafes addressed the Ukrainian soldiers, risking his own life. The situation was saved by the Germans.<sup>38</sup> Incidentally, Rafes was attacked when he went to welcome Petliura.<sup>39</sup>

It would be desirable to investigate the history of the Red Army units that organized pogroms in the Ukraine. Were they not in many cases former units of Petliura's army? In Teofipol the Jewish self-defense unit was urged by the Ukrain-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Ibid.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Averbuch's testimony, E.T.
 <sup>38</sup> Tsvi Zylburg, "Who Are the Leading Political Adventurers of the Ukraine?" Der Tog, June 7, 1919, p. 4.
 <sup>39</sup> B. Slutski's testimony, E.T.

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ians to help them disarm a Red Army unit. The Bolsheviks sent a repressive expedition consisting of the 5th regiment of the Tarashtshansky Division, which had been originally organized by Petliura's men near Kiev and had later joined the Bolsheviks. In Teofipol on July 28-29, 1919, the former Petliura men, now Red soldiers, murdered fifty-eight men, fourteen women, and four children, wounded thirty-five other Jews and burned 176 Jewish houses; but they did not punish any Ukrainians. The Soviet authorities later shot a few of the pogromists.<sup>40</sup> Vladimir Tiomkin once stated that in places where the Bolsheviks were victorious, Petliura's soldiers quickly changed their green-white ribbons for red ones, ready to form a new society. As soon as Petliura or other anti-Bolsheviks returned, the same soldiers changed their colors and resumed their attacks on the Jews 41

Schwartzbard's act was not the first of its kind. Earlier, on March 15, 1921, Solomon Taylirian, an Armenian student, shot and killed Talaat Pasha, a former Turkish Minister of the Interior, for his role in the anti-Armenian pogroms. On June 2-3, 1921, a Berlin court found the student not guilty. Many aspects of this trial were similar to the later Schwartzbard trial. "I am not guilty because my conscience is clear. I killed a man but I am not a murderer"-the Armenian stated.42

I sincerely hope that Jewish Social Studies will cease to be a forum for Mr. Hunczak.

ZOSA SZAJKOWSKI.

<sup>40</sup> Salomon Blatman, "The Tragic History of the Teofipol Republic . . .," Der Tog, Oct. 31, 1920, p. 6. <sup>41</sup> Ibid., July 12, 1920, pp. 5, 8. (Interview with Vladimir Tiomkin). <sup>42</sup> Der Prozess Talaat Pasha (Berlin 1921).