

Дискусія

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THE POLITICS OF RELIGION: THE UNION OF BREST 1596*

An act of apostasy to its detractors, and an act divinely inspired to its apologists, the Union of Brest was destined to become a landmark in the Ukrainian historiography and, even more significantly, in the life of the Ukrainian people. Henceforth, their loyalties divided between the Eastern and Western Churches, the Ukrainians became both object and active participants of religious, or, more correctly, church power play.¹ In the process they discovered and articulated sources of group identity which went far beyond the original religious considerations and provided the Ukrainians with a wider framework for cultural, social, and eventually, political activity.

The idea of a Ukrainian Church union with Rome in the 16th century originated with the Polish clergy.² Having survived the inroads of Protestantism, the reinvigorated Polish church embarked on missionary activity whose goal was to bring the Orthodox population of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth into the Catholic fold. This movement was spearheaded by the militant Jesuit Order which made its appearance in the Eastern parts of the Polish kingdom in the late 1560's.³ Emphasizing education in their work, the Jesuits organized their schools in Vilnius in 1570, and in Jaroslav five years later.⁴ From these two centers they preached in word and in writing the idea of salvation for the Ukrainian church through a union with Rome.

The first and the most outstanding work on this subject was Piotr Skarga's, *O jedności Kościoła Bożego pod jednym pasterzem*.⁵ It was followed by a less dignified and indeed offensive brochure by the Galician Jesuit, Benedykt Her-

* The author, Professor and Chairman of the History Department at Rutgers University, presented this paper at a conference sponsored by the Committee on European Studies, New York City University Graduate School, November 20, 1971.

¹ See Eduard Winter, *Byzanz und Rom im Kampf um die Ukraine, 955-1939* (Leipzig, 1942).

² O. Suszko, "Predtecha Unii: B. Herbest," *Zapysky im. T. Shevchenka* (Lviv, 1903), LIII, LV.

³ cf. St. Zaleski, *Jesuci w Polsce* (Lwów, 1900), I.

⁴ Albert M. Ammann, S. J., *Abriss der ostslawischen Kirchengeschichte* (Vienna, 1950), p. 201.

⁵ Piotr Skarga, *O jedności Kościoła Bożego pod jednym pasterzem. I o greckiem od tej jedności odstąpieniu. Z przestrożą i upominaniem do narodów ruskich, przy Grekach stojących*. (Vilnae, 1577).

best. A zealot of Catholicism, Herbest travelled 20 years from village to village preaching to the simple people the message of the "true" church.⁶ In an effort to convert the Orthodox to Catholicism, Herbest displayed the same fanaticism in attacking the Orthodox Church, its tradition, and its weaknesses in writing as he did in dealing with the simple village priests.⁷

The Jesuit criticism of the immorality and corruption that beset the Orthodox church was well founded. Indeed, there were all too many examples of bishops and even Metropolitans who were married twice and sometimes three times in violation of Canon law. The situation among the lower orders was even worse. The Ukrainian nobility was quite aware of this sad state of affairs and occasionally petitioned the high church dignitaries to observe some semblance of moral standards.⁸ The failure of these efforts favored the Jesuits in their attempts to convert to Roman Catholicism some of the most illustrious members of the Orthodox nobility.⁹

The tense religious atmosphere was particularly reflected in the controversy concerning the calendar reform of 1582.¹⁰ When the Polish Archbishop of Lviv, Sokilowski, tried to force the Orthodox to accept the new calendar, he was met with determined opposition. His use of force and the closing of the churches¹¹ merely intensified the Orthodox resolution to defend the old calendar, transforming it into a symbol of ethnic tradition. The Ukrainian church hierarchy, supported by the powerful aristocracy successfully petitioned the king to protect the religious rights of the Orthodox population.¹² The royal decree of January 1584, subsequently endorsed by the Sejm (Parliament) of 1585,¹³ afforded the Orthodox the protection they had been seeking.

This success against militant Catholicism served as a source of encouragement to the Orthodox population. Their leaders, whether of the nobility or the burghers, began to think now in terms of "organic" work, i. e., work whose objective was the improvement of church and society through education and organization.¹⁴ This turn of events within the Ukrainian church was quite

⁶ Edward Likowski, *Unia Brzeska r. 1596* (Warszawa, 1907), p. 73.

⁷ Benedykt Herbest, *Wiary kościoła rzymskiego wywody u greckiego niewolstwa historija dla jedności z kościelnej dłuższej historii, dla Rusi nawrucenia pisanej* (Lwów, 1586).

⁸ *Akty otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii*, III, Doc. no. 146. Henceforth cited as *Akty Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii*.

⁹ In the 1580's both of the older sons of Ostrozhkyi were already converted to Roman Catholicism. Similarly, Prince George Slutskiy converted to Catholicism of the Eastern Rite in 1583. For details see Kazimierz Chodynicki, *Kościół Prawosławny a Rzeczpospolita Polska 1370—1632* (Warsaw, 1937), p. 243; also Athanasius G. Welykiy, OSBM, ed., *Litterae Nuntiorum Appostolicum Historiam Ucrainae Illustrantes* (Rome, 1959), I, pp. 169—76, 184—86.

¹⁰ N. Sumtsov, "Istoricheskii ocherk popytok katolikov vvesti v Iuzhniu i Zapadniu Rossiu gregorianskii kalendar," *Kievskaiia Starina*, V (1888); also Jozef Tretiak, *Piotr Skarga w dziejach i literaturze unii brzeskiej* (Cracow, 1912), pp. 81—87.

¹¹ *Akty Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii*, III, Doc. no. 140.

¹² *Ibid.*, Doc. no. 139.

¹³ For the Solikowski—Balaban agreement see: *Ibid.*, Doc. no. 147.

¹⁴ Likowski, pp. 53—59.

unique. It was, essentially, a peaceful reformation from below propelled by the laity with the partial support of the Ukrainian aristocracy.

The results were truly remarkable. Schools were organized in Ostroh (1580) and in Lviv (1596)¹⁵ so that the Ukrainian youth "drinking the water of sciences in foreign tongues out of foreign wells does not fall away from its religion. Because with it," wrote the brothers of the Lviv Brotherhood, "national destruction comes very close."¹⁶ The emergence of the national element at this juncture was unmistakable, although it was still overshadowed by the religious issues.

In this work of the "first Renaissance," as Professor Hrushevskyi refers to the period 1580—1610, the role of the quasi-religious Brotherhoods can hardly be overestimated. The Lviv Brotherhood particularly distinguished itself both for its religious zeal as well as for its manifold social activities,¹⁷ which included charities, the maintenance of hospitals, the sponsoring of schools and support for poor students, and the printing of books and various cultural functions.¹⁸ The Brotherhood became particularly important, and, indeed powerful after the Patriarch of Antioch, Joachim, authorized it in 1586 to oppose any act or persons, including the bishops, whose behavior they considered anti-Christian.¹⁹

However idealistic Joachim's motives might have been, freeing the Brotherhood from episcopal jurisdiction and entrusting it with authority that rivaled that of the bishops, an act that Jeremiah II, the Patriarch of Constantinople, repeated in 1589,²⁰ was profoundly resented by Bishop Balaban and the other bishops.²¹ This was a direct challenge to their authority, particularly so, since all the Brotherhoods were to recognize the superior authority of the Lviv Brotherhood.²²

¹⁵ M. Makarii, *Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi* (St. Petersburg, 1879), IX, pp. 410—14; also K. V. Kharlampovych, *Zapadnorusskie pravoslavnie shkoly* (Kazan, 1898), pp. 237—80.

¹⁶ M. Hrushevskyi, *Kulturno-natsionalnyi rukh na Ukraini v XVI—XVII vitsi* (Vienna, 1919), p. 88.

¹⁷ cf. Fedir Sribnyi, "Studii nad organizatsieiu l'vivskoi Stavropigii vid kintsia XVI-ho do pol. XVII-ho st.," *Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva im. Shevchenka*, Vols. 106, 108, 111, 112, 114, and 115.

¹⁸ Makarii, p. 418.

¹⁹ Hrushevskyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy* (New York, Second Edition, 1955), VI, pp. 512—515.

²⁰ Hryhor Luznytskyi, *Ukrainska tserkva mizh skhodom i zachodom* (Philadelphia, 1954), p. 235.

²¹ Even after the union the unpleasant memories of Patriarch's preferential treatment of the Brotherhoods lingered on. Thus during the Seim session of 1600 Potii had the following to say: "They gave to the simple people in the Brotherhoods a bishop's authority, and the peasants in their simplicity claimed for themselves authority which has regard, for neither the bishops nor the aristocracy." Cf. Zaleski, II., p. 59.

²² Julian Pelesz, *Geschichte der ruthenischen Kirche mit Rom* (Vienna, 1880), II, pp. 77—90; see also Ia. D. Isaievych, *Bratstva ta ikh rol v rozvytku ukrainskoi kultury XVI—XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 1966), pp. 38—41.

The conflict, therefore, between Bishop Balaban and the Lviv Brotherhood was not merely a local quarrel as it has been frequently represented. It seems rather to have been a struggle between the vested interests of the nobility of the robe and the rising middle class whose members filled the ranks of the Brotherhood, and came ultimately to dominate it.²³ The former sought the pre-1586 status quo while the latter pursued the objective of church reform from below with the blessing of the Orthodox Patriarch himself. On several occasions the Patriarch intervened directly in Ukrainian church affairs causing confusion and alienation among the Ukrainian clergy as a result of his heavyhanded actions, pitting the bishops against the Brotherhoods. This interference was especially significant to those who supported the union with Rome.²⁴

The social implication of the controversy is clearly suggested by the disparaging remarks that Archbishop Potii is reported to have made in reference to the Brotherhoods. He thought that "common and simple people, artisans, who abandoned their trade (cobbler's thread, scissors, and awl) and having usurped priestly authority, proceeded to distort and falsify the Holy Scripture."²⁵

There can be little doubt that the above considerations determined the bishops' decision in favor of union with Rome. As early as 12. XII. 1589 Balaban pleaded with the Polish Archbishop of Lviv "to liberate the bishops from the slavery of the Patriarchs of Constantinople."²⁶ That the high-handed behavior of the Patriarchs and the growing power of the Brotherhood caused a profound anxiety among the high church dignitaries is most clearly stated in Archbishops Terletskyi's letter to Potii. He wrote:

"... The Patriarchs will go frequently to Moscow... and on their way back will not bypass us. Jeremia has already deposed one metropolitan, established Brotherhoods which will and already are hounding the bishops... They may even succeed in deposing anyone of us from our bishoprics — judge for yourself what a disgrace that would be! The king invests with benefice for the duration of life and does not reclaim it except for criminal acts while the Patriarch defames and deprives [the bishop] of office even on unfounded denunciations — judge for yourself, what a slavery. When, however, we submit to the Pope of Rome then we shall not only retain our bishoprics for life but will also be seated on the senatorial benches together with the Latin bishops and will [thus] more easily regain possessions taken away from the church."²⁷

Considerations of personal interests, as well as of social and political privileges, though camouflaged at times by religious verbiage, permeated all

²³ This middle class character of the Lviv Brotherhood was emphasized, for example, in Jeremiah Mohyla's, the hospodar of Moldavia, letter to the Brotherhood of May 18, 1603, in which he addresses them as "Gentlemen burghers, the Lviv Brotherhood." For details see: *Akty Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rosii*, Vol. I, Part 21, No. 222.

²⁴ Hrushevskyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, V, p. 549.

²⁵ See Studynskyi, p. 122; also *Russkaia Istoricheskaia Biblioteka*, Vol. VII, pp. 116-17.

²⁶ Hrushevskyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, VI, p. 525.

²⁷ Cited by Sergei M. Soloviov in his *Istoriia Rossii z drevneishikh vremen* (St. Petersburg, 1849), X, p. 1425.

the important secret and public decisions concerning the union with Rome. That was true of the first conspiratorial meeting of the Ukrainian bishops in 1590²⁸ and subsequent meetings at which the question of union was under discussion. Thus, after requesting that the Eastern Rite and other traditional usages be respected and guaranteed by the Pope, the bishops invariably demanded special guarantees for themselves, including a place in the senate.²⁹ The last draft of the agreement which became the basis of the Union of Rome of 1595 also reflects the preoccupation of the Ecclesiastics with secular interests.³⁰

After four years of secret proceedings the conspiracy came partially into the open in January of 1595 when Bishop Balaban called a diocesan synod and declared himself in favor of the union.³¹ This forced the bishops to complete their work before the expected opposition had time to develop. Now even Metropolitan Michael Rohozha, who previously had stayed away from the conspiring bishops, became involved and called a synod to meet at Brest on June 12, 1595 whose only business was to legalize what had already been predetermined in private discussions and negotiations. Here the bishops composed two almost identical letters embodying their profession of a new loyalty, as well as religious and secular demands, which were to be delivered to Pope Clement VII and the Polish King Sigismund III.³²

The bishops, uncertain of the reaction of their plans, sought again to enlist the support of the most powerful Orthodox magnate, Constantine Ostrozkyi. Potii sent him the conditions of union which he hoped would be favorably received by the prince.³³ He was to be bitterly disappointed. Ostrozkyi, realizing that he was faced with an accomplished fact, answered that he was strongly opposed to union and that he no longer considered Potii a priest.³⁴ Bent on opposing the union, the old prince sent at the same time an appeal to the clergy, nobility, and common people, urging them to oppose the bishops, who, according to him, not only betrayed the Church of Christ but also, without the knowledge of the faithful, tried to lead them to damnation.³⁵

The die was cast. Now both sides girded themselves for a battle. Potii and Terletskyi, the emissaries of the conspiring hierarchy, left for Cracow. They arrived there on July 17 and presented the Synod's conditions to Sigismund III and the Papal Nuncio Malaspina. Having reached an understanding with both dignitaries, the bishops departed for Rome, where they arrived seven weeks later,

²⁸ cf. *Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka*, XIX, 55–57.

²⁹ *Akty otnosiashchiesia k istorii Zapadnoj Rossii*, IV, nos. 54, 55. Henceforth cited as *Akty Zapadnoi Rossii*. See also Luzhnytskyi, pp. 256–63.

³⁰ For details see Oscar Halecki, *From Florence to Brest, 1439–1596* (Rome, 1958), pp. 290–92; also *Akty Zapadnoi Rossii*, IV, No. 54.

³¹ *Akty Zapadnoi Rossii*, IV, No. 58.

³² cf. Pelesz, I, pp. 522 ff.

³³ *Akty Zapadnoi Rossii*, IV, No. 70.

³⁴ Hrushevskyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, V, p. 582; also *Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka*, XIX, p. 632.

³⁵ *Akty Zapadnoj Rossii*, IV, No. 71. See also Soloviov, op. cit., pp. 1438–39.

on November 15th. After thorough examination of various theological and administrative problems, an act of union was formally proclaimed on December 23, 1595.³⁶ Potii and Terletskyi remained in Rome until March 9, 1596 when they left for home. For all practical purposes, the union with Rome was an accomplished fact; what remained was to make it a reality through an act of ratification.

The situation deteriorated badly and as a result, the prospects of an orderly and peaceful consummation of the union became very dim. The position of the opposition was strengthened when Balaban and Kopystenskyi, bishop of Peremyshl, declared themselves against the union.³⁷ Particularly useful to the opposition was their declaration that the other bishops falsified the documents dealing with the union.³⁸ This testimony, coming from the former initiators of the union, was used skillfully by the dissenters to discredit the bishops who supported it.

Ostrozkyi's determination to fight the union was unmistakably demonstrated when the prince sent a member of his court to the Protestant Synod at Torun (August 21—26) with a message urging the Protestants to act jointly with the Orthodox in defense of religious freedom. In order to achieve this objective, he offered to mobilize fifteen to twenty thousand horsemen who, together with the forces that could be organized in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, would force the government to make some concessions.³⁹ Ostrozkyi's gesture seems to have been unrealistic since the Protestant nobility was not ready for such a radical act. It did, however, indicate the prince's readiness to form new alliances in order to achieve his objective. This was obviously a purely political act.

Under these circumstances it would have been unrealistic to anticipate that the Synod of Brest, which was to meet on October 16, 1596, would heal the schism which had been growing since June 12, 1595. Indeed, the charges of apostasy against the bishops and other bitter attacks against them by the Brotherhoods and individuals made reconciliation extremely difficult. This was attested to by the fact that prior to the Synod of 1596 both sides were preparing for a showdown rather than for reconciliation. Therefore, when the Synod met and ratified the Union of Rome, it formalized, in effect, the division of the Ukrainian church into two warring camps.⁴⁰

The Uniates found themselves in a better position than the dissenting Orthodox. They had a hierarchical structure which enjoyed the support of the powerful Roman Catholic Church. Even more significantly, the union was supported by King Sigismund III who, in order to achieve religious and political unity in his realm, encouraged and supported the Uniate effort since the Synod

³⁶ Pelesz, I. p. 540.

³⁷ cf. *Arkhiv Iugozapadnoi Rossii*, I-1, No. 109 and A. Prochaska, "Z dziejów unii brzeskiej" *Kwartalnik Historyczny* (1896), X, p. 569.

³⁸ For details see *Arkhiv Iugozapadnoi Rossii* (Kiev, 1859), I (1), Nos. 104, 109.

³⁹ *Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka*, XIX, 642-654; Hrushevskyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, V, pp. 593-94.

⁴⁰ For details see Halecki, pp. 361-85.

of 1590. Towards this end he issued numerous decrees supporting the Uniates and granting them special privileges before and after the Union of Brest.⁴¹

The Orthodox, conversely, left with only two bishops, had the support of the extremely active Brotherhoods, of the lower clergy, the Ukrainian nobility, and of the rest of the population which was always the strongest pillar of tradition.⁴² Critical to the Orthodox posture was the firm commitment of Prince Constantine Ostrozkyi to the preservation of traditional Orthodoxy.⁴³ A man of great wealth, power, and prestige,⁴⁴ Ostrozkyi was in a position to effect the outcome of the religious controversy. This was well realized by the king who, in a personal message to Ostrozkyi, admonished the prince to support the union with Rome.⁴⁵ Similarly, Ipatii Potii, the prime mover of the Union, wrote a lengthy exhortation urging the prince to accept the Union because, as he said "... everybody looks only at you, whatever you will do so will they."⁴⁶ These efforts were to no avail. Ostrozkyi remained loyal to Orthodoxy.⁴⁷

Henceforth, the struggle was carried also to the Diets where the Orthodox nobility, with some support of the Protestants, demanded that Orthodoxy be treated on an equal legal basis with the Uniates. After a protracted struggle the Orthodox nobility succeeded. In 1607 the Diet legalized the Orthodox church, a decision that was to have far-reaching consequences for the Ukrainian Orthodox population. More specifically, the government agreed to remove the uniates from the Orthodox benefices and replace them with Orthodox noblemen and high ecclesiastics who recognized the authority of the Patriarch.⁴⁸

Certainly the most important intellectual consequence of the religious controversy was the development of polemical literature. Beginning with Herasym Smotrytskyi's *Kliuch Tsarstva nebesnoho* (1587) which was written in defense of the calendar and other eastern church practices, the literature grew in volume, if not in sophistication, reflecting the intensity, passion, and dedication that religious issues have a tendency to produce.⁴⁹

⁴¹ For details see *Akty Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii*, I (2), No. 202; II, Nos. 9, 11, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 33, 39, 44; *Arkhiv Iugozapadnoi Rossii*, I (1), No. 114, Nos. 134, 139.

⁴² cf. Soloviov, p. 1443.

⁴³ Athanasius G. Welykyi, OSBM, ed., *Documenta Unionis Berestensis Eiusque Auctorium*, 1590–1600 (Rome, 1970), pp. 82–87, 306–307.

⁴⁴ Ostrozkyi owned 35 towns and c. 1000 villages. He also was a patron of 1000 churches and two bishoprics; cf. Likowski, p. 69.

⁴⁵ *Akty Zapadnoi Rossii*, IV, No. 76.

⁴⁶ *Akty Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii*, I, No. 224.

⁴⁷ The explanation usually advanced by the Catholic historians concerning Ostrozkyi's motives in opposing the union dwells on the prince's alleged excessive pride, i. e., he opposed the union because he was not consulted beforehand. It seems, however, that one could advance at least an equally justified argument that Prince Ostrozkyi was genuinely concerned with the preservation of the traditional church practices.

⁴⁸ Hrushevskiy, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, V, p. 618.

⁴⁹ Smotrytskyi's work can be found in *Arkhiv Iugozapadnoi Rossii*, VII, pp. 232–266. For a literary analysis of the polemic writings see Dmytro Čizevsky, *Istoriia ukrainskoi literatury* (New York, 1956), pp. 229–41.

The first serious publication was in reply to Piotr Skarga's history of the Union of Brest which appeared in the spring of 1597. Publishing his *Ekthesis*,⁵⁰ the editor provided the Orthodox with an authoritative and meticulously prepared documentary rebuttal to the Catholic, particularly to Skarga's partisan treatment of the Union of Brest. Much more important was Martin Broniewski's *Apokrisis*⁵¹ which argued effectively against both hierarchical absolutism and the bishop's right to conclude union without any previous consultation with the laity. In Broniewski's view, the church belongs to all the people, therefore, all faithful should participate in church affairs, not just the bishops, as Skarga would have it.⁵²

Quite apart from these arguments stands another anonymous work, entitled *Perestoroha*, whose author treats the problem in a wider historical context. For him the union was a result of an intellectual and cultural stagnation that prevailed in the 16th century prior to the 1570's. During this decline, when native schools were non-existent, the youth of the Ukrainian aristocracy went to Polish schools with the result that gradually, through education and assimilation, many were lost to the Polish nation.⁵³ The author's concern with both cultural and structural assimilation makes him unique among the polemicists of the period. We find only an indirect echo of this concern in a later work, italics, in which the church laments the apostasy of her sons, recounting the great families that had already been Polonized by the time the book was written.⁵⁴

The most prominent as well as the most talented polemicist supporting the union was one of its organizers, Adam-Ipatii Potii.⁵⁵ He was quite prolific, writing both in Polish and in the "common" language. However, the author's preoccupation with the Union and his apology of the measures and individuals involved limits the scope and the historical value of his writings.

Above all the authors of the period, however, there towers Ivan Vyshenskyi.⁵⁶ His treatment of the various religious and social problems was both

⁵⁰ The full title of the book was *Ekthesis abo krótkie zebranie spraw, które się działy na partykularnym, to jest pomiasnym soborze v Brzesciu Litewskim*.

⁵¹ The book published in 1597 was entitled *Apokrisis abo odpowiedz na związki o synodzie brzeskim, imieniem ludzi starożytnej religiji greckiej przez Christophora Philaleta na porywacza dana*.

⁵² See Hrushevskiyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, VI, pp. 545–50. These works, i. e. Skarga's history, *Ekthesis*, *Apokrisis*, as well as the anonymous defense of Skarga entitled *Antirrisis* were published in the *Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka*, VII, pp. 939–1820 and XIX, pp. 183–376, 477–982.

⁵³ *Akty Zapadnoi Rossii*, IV, No. 149. Kyrilo Studynskiyi, *Perestoroha: Ruskyi pamiatnyk pochatku XVII vika* (Lviv, 1895), p. 15.

⁵⁴ The full title of the book is *Trenos to jest Lament iedynej s. Powszechniej Apostolskiej Wschodniej Cerkwie z obiasnieniem dogmat wiary, pierwiej z graeckiego na slowenski, a teraz z slowińskiego na polski przelozony przez Theophila Orthologa, tezy swietey Wschodniej Cerkwie Syna*.

⁵⁵ For his role in the establishment of the Uniate Church see N. Tripolskii. *Uniat-skii Mitropolit Ipatii Potii* (Kiev, 1878).

⁵⁶ Most of Vyshenskyi's twenty known works appeared in *Akty Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii*, II, p. 205 ff; *Arkhiv Iugozapadnoi Rossii*, VII, and *Kievskaia Starina*, 1889, No. 4 and 1890, No. 6.

contemporary and timeless. Vyshenskyi's arguments went beyond the ephemeral personal issues which occupied such a prominent place in the writing of other polemicists of the period, and led the reader into a more abstract and sophisticated controversy. Admonishing the faithful with the pathos of a prophet, Vyshenskyi emphasizes the eschatological questions of the human race.⁵⁷

Vyshenskyi's ideal was his version of *City of God*, in which the Christian virtues, particularly the ideal of Christian brotherhood, would help man attain his ultimate objective — salvation. He recognized the nobility of the soul and inner perfection as the most desirable attributes of man. True nobility, according to Vyshenskyi, proceeds from the soul and not from the title.⁵⁸

The Orthodox-Uniate confrontation in all of its manifestations coincided with an unprecedented growth of the Cossack movement. It was inevitable that the more socially oriented leaders of this movement would become involved in the controversy. Their struggle against the Polish authorities and the struggle of the Orthodox Church for survival enabled them to join forces against a common enemy. The protracted polemics of both camps, moreover, invariably emphasizing the importance of tradition in the life of the people, also helped to develop a more conscious sense of ethnic identity at whose very core was the Orthodox Church.

The following passage from a letter to Ipatii Potii will illustrate the point:

"You have transgressed the boundaries layed down by your forefathers and violated their ancient faith. You have squandered your forefathers' inheritance and distorted their legacy. You have ravaged the graves of your ancestors, you have disturbed the bones of your fathers, you have scorned their religion, you have tarnished their honorable and holy rites, you have trampled their paths and dimmed the light of their glory."⁵⁹

This newly generated national consciousness found its strongest response among the Cossacks who already appear as a significant political factor in Eastern Europe in the first decade of the 17th century. Indeed, by 1610 the Cossacks were sufficiently committed not only to declare themselves ready "...to lay down their lives in defense of Orthodox Christianity,"⁶⁰ but also to defend the Orthodox population against the violence of the Uniates.⁶¹

Henceforth, the Cossacks, together with burghers and the remaining Orthodox church hierarchy, joined in one common cause — the reestablishment of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. This was particularly true when Peter Sa-

⁵⁷ The most useful summaries of Vyshenskyi's writings together with lengthy excerpts can be found in Mykhailo Hrushevskiy, *Istoriia Ukrainskoï Literatury* (New York edition, 1960), V, pp. 284–352.

⁵⁸ For an excellent brief treatment of Vyshenskyi's writings see Dmitry Čizevsky, "Ivan Vysenskyi," *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U. S.* (New York, 1951), I, No. 2, pp. 113–26.

⁵⁹ "Reply of Kleryk Ostrozkyi to Ipatii Potii" (1598), *Russkaia Istoricheskaia Biblioteka*, XIX, p. 406.

⁶⁰ *Akty Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii*, II, No. 41.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, II, nos. 36–37.

haidachnyi (1616—22) was Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host. Educated at the Ostroh Academy, Sahaidachnyi was quite naturally more sensitive to the religious issues than any of his predecessors had been. Using his resources skillfully, Sahaidachnyi succeeded in helping to reestablish in 1620 the Ukrainian Orthodox hierarchy which was placed under the Host's military protection. In a dramatic move Sahaidachnyi and the Host joined the Kiev Brotherhood.⁶²

If viewed, therefore, from a historical perspective it is clear that the controversy over the establishment of the Uniate Church was not and could not remain exclusively, or even predominately, a religious issue, since religion was an integral part of the total socio-political structure. It generated a heated debate which went far beyond the original issues and divided the Ukrainians into opposite and warring camps.⁶³ In the process this controversy stimulated, on both sides, the development of a feeling of group identity at the very core of which was the ideal of ancestral tradition. It was this heightened feeling of identity that provided a sense of cohesion for the Ukrainian masses when, under the leadership and the inspiration of the Cossacks, the first glimmerings of national consciousness began to manifest itself in overt political acts.

⁶² V. Kliuchevsky, *Kurs Russkoj Istorii* (Moscow, 1908), III, p. 144.

⁶³ Ivan Franko, "Z dziejów synodu brzeskiego 1596," *Kwartalnik Historyczny* (Lwów, 1895), IX, p. 1.