

“Icarian Flights in Almost All Directions” Reconsidered

Yaroslav Hrytsak

Among the many works John-Paul Himka has written about Habsburg-ruled Galicia, his article “Icarian Flights in Almost Every Direction” stands out as the most imaginative.¹ It is the most comprehensive attempt at bringing studies of Galicia’s Ukrainians (Ruthenians) in line with recent theories of nationalism. It also symbolizes a radical departure from the conventional scheme of nation building as a unilinear process, and it suggests a more nuanced approach to various options and unrealized possibilities. Last but not least, the article is a good example of how a complicated topic can be presented in a lucid and, to a large extent, witty manner. I have constantly included this article on the reading lists of courses I have taught both in Ukraine and abroad, and it has been unremittingly popular among students. The article was published in an influential collection on the role of intellectuals in the articulation of nations.

It is exactly because of its outstanding quality that this article deserves further reconsideration. After all, a good theory is defined not only by the number of facts it covers and explains, but also by the number of discussions it provokes ... almost in all directions.

The word “almost” in the article’s title suggests that the number of options for the evolution of Galician Ruthenian identity was unlimited. It is true that when one looks through relevant sources, one may come upon quite unexpected options. For example, there is a murky reference to a local Ruthenian belief of the early nineteenth century that St. Paul’s letters to the Galatians were actually addressed to the Galicians.² The equation of Habsburg-ruled Galicia and biblical Galilee can be found in historical sources on more than one occasion. Some Polish and Ukrainian intellectuals in the Russian Empire used it in a deprecating way to underline Galicia’s backwardness and provincialism.³ But no one was considering “Galilean” identity seriously, and thus the repertoire of identity options was not boundless.

However, there were serious discussions about a separate, multi-ethnic “Galician” identity that, according to Habsburg plans, was to emerge in Galicia in a result of bringing civilization to that backward land. The primary targets of this project were the

¹ John-Paul Himka, “The Construction of Nationality in Galician Rus’: Icarian Flights in Almost All Directions,” in *Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation*, 109–64, ed. Ronald G. Suny and Michael D. Kennedy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999). Prof. Kennedy once said to me that he considers Himka’s article the best contribution in that book.

² Ewaryst Andrzej hr. Kuropatnicki, *Geografia albo dokładne opisanie królestw [sic] Galicyi i Lodomeryi* (Lviv, 1858), 1.

³ See Ewa Wiegandt, *Austria Felix, czyli o micie Galicji w polskiej prozie współczesnej* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu, 1998), 5–12.

local Polish nobles, whom Vienna considered uncivilized and rebellious. Thus Klemens von Metternich, in a letter to Emperor Francis I in 1814, wrote that the long-term goal of Habsburg policy should be to encourage Polish nobles to become Germans. But he was against the accelerated implementation of that policy: “The tendency [of our policy] must primarily go not towards making Poles into Germans all at once, but above all first making them true Galicians—thereby halting them from perceiving themselves as Poles”⁴. It is not quite clear, however, whether this community was conceived of as a national or a supranational one, and further investigations need to be conducted to identify the intentions and perception of this experiment.⁵ One may risk a generalization that its character depended on its perception: while in Vienna’s plans it was a non-ethnic civilizational project, Polish patriots treated it an artificial nation that was being created in order to block their own national aspirations.⁶ In any case, the experiment fared rather poorly. By the 1850s and 1860s some literati did think of themselves first and foremost as “Galicians” and rejected any clear-cut ethno-national self-identification. But their number was rather small, and with the growing nationalization of the political and cultural scene they became almost extinct.⁷

Even if we to include this Galician identity in the repertoire of national identities that Galician Ruthenians could choose from, it does not dramatically increase the number of possible choices. It seems that John-Paul Himka pushed his constructivist approach too far by stating that national identification might evolve in almost all directions. Even if we drop “almost” as a metaphoric embellishment, the very idea that the Galician Ruthenians faced that many choices sounds like an exaggeration. I have never come across any hint that the Ruthenians identified themselves with the Chinese, the Finns, or the Portuguese. Their choice was rather limited, as it was in the similar cases of the Balkan ethnic groups,⁸ the Czechs (Bohemians),⁹ the Crimean Tatars,¹⁰ and the Ukrainians under Russian rule,¹¹ to give a few examples.

⁴ Arthur Haas, *Metternich, Reorganization and Nationality: A Story of Foresight and Frustration in the Rebuilding of the Austrian Empire* (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1963), 167–69, as quoted in Hugo Lane, “The Galician Nobility and the Border with the Congress Kingdom before[,] during[,] and after the November Uprising,” in *Die galizische Grenze, 1772–1867: Kommunikat oder Isolation?*, 159, ed. Christoph Augustinowicz and Andreas Kappeler (Berlin: LIT, 2007).

⁵ In that respect, Larry Wolff’s *The Idea of Galicia: History and Fantasy in Habsburg Political Culture* (Stanford University Press, 2010) offers very important insights.

⁶ See, e.g., the complaints of the Polish noble and Catholic writer Maurycy Dzieduszycki (1813–77) that the Habsburgs wanted “to create some kind of non-historical Galicians” (quoted in Zbigniew Fras, *Galicja* [Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Dolnośląskie, 1999], 89).

⁷ Kazimierz Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, [t. 1], *Galicja 1843–1880*, ed., with an intro. and notes, by Antoni Knot (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich, 1951), 41, 200; and W. F., “Z okazji odbytego wiecu rabinów żydowskich i ‘cudotworców,’” *Przegląd Społeczny* (Lviv), 1887, no. 1: 76–80.

⁸ See Paschalis M. Kitromilides, “‘Imagined Communities’ and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans,” in *Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality*, 23–66, ed. Martin Blinkhorn and Thanos Veremis (Athens: Sage-Eliamep, 1990).

⁹ See Jiří Kořalka, “Tschechische Nationsbildung und national Identität im 19. Jahrhundert”, in *Nationalismen in Europa: West- und Osteuropa im Vergleich*, 306–21, ed. Uhlrike von Hirschhausen and Jörn Leonhard (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2001).

¹⁰ See Hakan Kırımlı, *National Movements and National Identity among the Crimean Tatars (1905–1916)* (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 301–33.

While the list of identities cannot be dramatically extended, some of them should be reconsidered in the light of recent studies. John-Paul Himka found it hard to find traces of a hypothetical Ruthenian identity encompassing the former Rzeczpospolita's Eastern Christians (now the Ukrainians and Belarusians).¹² However, such a concept was actually featured in the first grammar of the Ruthenian language in the 1820s and, as Michael Moser has shown recently, in the Galician Polish revolutionaries' Ruthenian writings.¹³ There are some interesting findings concerning the "*Natione Polonus, Gente Ruthenus*" identity. David Althoen has shown that this concept could be safely considered an "invented tradition" and that the usual references to the sixteenth-century political writer Stanisław Orzechowski (1513–66) as the alleged originator of this concept are groundless. This identity was coined much later, during the Revolution of 1848, and it was then that a more distant origin was ascribed to it.¹⁴

These new findings bear little relation to the main arguments of Himka's "Icarian Flights." There are, however, two exceptions: Anna Veronika Wendland, who in her monograph about the Galician Russophiles¹⁵ calls for a serious reconsideration of Himka's interpretation of the relations between the Ukrainian and all-Russian identities—Himka tends to treat them as "two very distinct and mutually exclusive constructions"¹⁶—and Paul R. Magocsi, who earlier suggested that these identities were complementary and became separate only at the end of the nineteenth century.¹⁷ Wendland basically supports Magocsi's thesis. She shows that most Russophiles did not want to accept an exclusive national identity; many of them, especially rank-and-file ones, co-operated with Ukrainophiles; some of them even changed their identity as a result; and in the end only a small group adopted a Russian orientation. The Russophiles' imagined motherland—Rus'—was an ambiguous and vague concept that could be interpreted as either Ukraine or as Russia, depending on the context. For the Russophiles, however, "Russia" sooner meant the ideal of Holy Rus', with its symbolic centres in Kyiv and Moscow, than the modern Russian empire corrupted by the West. More often than not, they were not eager to define their conception of Rus'

¹¹ See Leon Wasilewski, *Drogi Porozumienia: Wybór pism* (Kraków: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej, 2001), 66–70.

¹² Himka, "The Construction of Nationality," 152.

¹³ Mikhael Mozer [Michael Moser], *Prychynky do istorii ukrainskoi movy*, ed. Serhii Vakulenko (Kharkiv: Kharkivske istoryko-filolohichne tovarystvo, 2008), 337–38, 567, 587n.

¹⁴ David Althoen, "That Noble Quest: From True Nobility to Enlightened Society in the Polish – Lithuanian Commonwealth, 1550–1830." (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 2000); and idem, "*Natione Polonus* and the *Narod Szlachecki*: Two Myths of National Identity and Noble Solidarity," *Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung* 52, no. 4 (2003): 475–508.

¹⁵ Anna Veronika Wendland, *Die Russophilen in Galizien: Ukrainische Konservative zwischen Österreich und Russland, 1848–1915* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2001).

¹⁶ Himka, "The Construction of Nationality," 112.

¹⁷ Paul R. Magocsi, "Old Ruthenianism and Russophilism: A New Conceptual Framework For Analyzing National Ideologies in Late-Nineteenth-Century Eastern Galicia", in *American Contributions to the Ninth International Congress of Slavists, Kiev 1983*, vol. 2: 305–24, ed. Paul Debreczeny (Columbus, Ohio: Slavica, 1983); repr. in his *Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism: Galicia as Ukraine's Piedmont* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 99–118.

clearly, and even when they did they did not think such a definition should imply Ukrainian or Russian irredentism.

Unlike Magocsi, Wendland considers Russophilism to have been a stage in the evolution of the Ukrainian national movement and argues that the victory of the Ukrainian orientation among Galicia's Ruthenians was prepared by the Russophiles' cultural work in the 1860s, 1870s, and 1880s. She even suggests taking a further step, namely, treating the Russophiles as the conservative wing within the Ukrainian camp. According to Wendland they played a role similar to that of the so-called *malorossy* (Little Russians) in the Russian Empire: both were recruited from among the lower gentry (in the Galician case, from among the Greek Catholic clergy, which was a quasi-gentry); both combined their *Landpatriotismus* with a loyalty to a ruling house; and both displayed conservative attitudes. If one is to stick to the metaphor Himka has suggested, then the Russophiles were not the equivalent of Icarus—rather they resembled Icarus's father, the skilful and proficient Daedalus, who made his son's wings.

Icarian Flights?

Most contentious is the final part of Himka's article, in which he ponders why some constructions failed and the Ukrainian project succeeded. It is an exemplary exercise in counterfactual history: Himka carefully weighs various factors in a "what if?" way, eliminating those he considers less important and underlining those that, in his opinion, played a crucial role in the final (Ukrainian) solution of the Galician Ruthenians' identity crisis. Since, as he believes, Polish identity had little chance of winning over the hearts and minds of Galician Ruthenians and the Rusyn and Ruthenian identities were of a purely hypothetical character, he focusses on the rivalry between the Ukrainian and Russian identities. In a nutshell, his point can be presented as follows: it was the Habsburgian repression of the Russophile movement in the early 1880s that sealed the Russophiles' fate and brought about their failure. Vienna saw this movement—rightly or wrongly—as Russian irredentism and could not tolerate it in the atmosphere of the growing Austrian-Russian tensions portending war. "The result was the creation of a climate in which Russophilism found it difficult to flourish....Ultimately, I think, the crucial factor in the victory of Ukrainophilism in Galician Rus' was the Austrian state," Himka writes.¹⁸ Conversely, if the Russophile movement had been left on its own, it would have most probably won over the Ukrainophiles. If this had happened, then Galicia would have become another Russian land, and consequently the map of Central and Eastern Europe would look quite different today.

This line of argument calls for counterarguments. If the Russophiles' failure can be attributed to state repression, then why did the Ukrainian movement in the Russian Empire—which faced similar, if not worse, repression as an "Austrian/Polish/German intrigue"—succeed? If an explanation lies in the fact that Ukrainian patriots from the Russian Empire moved the centre of their activity to Austrian-ruled Western Ukraine and managed to create their own "Galician Piedmont" there, why then did the similar efforts of the Galician Russophile émigrés in the Russian Empire

¹⁸ Himka, "The Construction of Nationality," 129, 145.

produce poor results? After all, the Galician Ukrainian socialists of the 1870s and 1880s suffered no less repression under the Habsburgs than the Russophiles did, but, unlike the Russophiles, they nonetheless found ways to flourish in 1890s.

Arguments and counterarguments of that kind are of somewhat limited value. As Tony Judt wrote, the trouble with counterfactual history is that "[i]t takes the last move in a sequence [of historical events], correctly observes that it might have been different, and then deduces either that all the other moves could also be different, or else they don't count."¹⁹ Therefore I suggest a different approach: to confront the texts that articulated the alternative national identities with their social perception. So far historians of Habsburg Galicia have focussed on what has been written and by whom, but they rarely analyze who read what was written.²⁰ This is rather odd: after all, reading is the most crucial factor in the imagining of a nation. To put it another way, "nations are book-reading tribes."²¹

Consequently let us turn to data, which I came across while working on my biography of Ivan Franko, regarding literary production in the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires in the early 1880s—the period Himka sees as crucial for the rivalry between the Ukrainophile and Russophile orientations. They were painstakingly compiled by a Polish bibliographer in Lviv who was concerned about the prospects of Polish nationalism vis-à-vis other national movements in the Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and German empires.²² Therefore he organized his analysis according to ethno-linguistic groups, and the main criterion was the number of periodicals per capita. These statistics (in the table below) reveal that the Poles were doing relatively well in the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires. Although in the German Empire their situation was rather alarming, it was a far cry from the modest production of the Habsburg-ruled Ruthenians, who had the fewest of publications in their own language. Franko's joke that before 1840s it would only take a few wheelbarrows to gather all Ruthenian publications in one place testifies to the paucity of Ruthenian literary production.²³ Between the 1840s and the 1880s the situation changed dramatically. With the liberal imperial reforms of the 1860s and the introduction of autonomy for Galicia (1867), a vibrant public space emerged, with numerous newspapers and journals among other venues for publication. By that time Franko had become a dominant figure in Ruthenian/Ukrainian cultural production and one of the most productive and widely read Ukrainian authors in both the Habsburg and the Russian Empire. But his reading public never exceeded 1,000–1,500 persons at best—the maximum number of subscribers that Ruthenian (both Russophile and Ukrainophile) periodicals could boast (usually there were fewer than 1,000). This

¹⁹ Tony Judt, *Reappraisals: Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century* (London: Penguin, 2009), 190.

²⁰ John-Paul Himka's *Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth Century* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1988) is a rare exception.


²¹ Yuri Slezkine, *The Jewish Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

²² See Korneli Heck, "Bibliografia Polska z r. 1881 w porównaniu z czeską, węgierską i rossyjską," *Przewodnik naukowy i literacki: Dodatek miesięczny do «Gazety Lwowskiej»*, 1882, no. 10: 1096.

²³ Ivan Franko, "Metod i zadacha istorii literatury," in his *Zibrannia tvoriv u p'iatdesiaty tomakh*, vol. 41, *Literaturno-krytychni pratsi (1890–1910)*, ed. P. Y. Kolesnyk (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1984), 21.

number was a drop in the bucket, if one compares it with, say, the 185,000 Ruthenian students in Galicia in the 1880s or, for that matter, with the Polish press, which at that time had three to six times as many titles as the Ruthenian press and a print run that was seven to eight times greater.²⁴

Periodicals per capita, 1881



Given these modest statistics, the Galician Ruthenians' nation-building efforts appear more like crawling than "Icarian flights." We may split hairs over the issue of which national orientation was more or less successful,²⁵ but we do so at the risk of

²⁴ Yaroslav Hrytsak, *Prorok u svoii vitchyzni: Franko i yoho spilnota* (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2006), 369–75.

²⁵ In Himka's words, "The highest Icarian flight was that of the Russophiles; flights of Rusynism and "Ruthenianism" were not undertaken; [and] the flight of the Ukrainophiles proved not to be Icarian at all" ("The Construction of Nationality," 153).

failing to see the forest for the trees—namely, that that success was rather dubious and in no way absolute. At the time the Ukrainians (“Little Russians”) of the Russian Empire had no journals whatsoever: this illustrates vividly the fact that the Ukrainian movement there was arrested in its development. But the empire’s ethnic Russians, whose cultural production was never suppressed, did not fare much better. They might have had a great national literature, but its distribution was very modest, to say the least. Indeed, the empire’s Swedes, Germans, and Finns fared much better in that regard. Even when periodicals in Russian were freely allowed in Galicia, they would hardly help to create a “Russian” nation there,—and the local Russophiles’ literary production was also insufficient for that purpose.

I do not have such statistics for a later period. However, data regarding literacy during the years 1897–1910/26 seem to confirm a similar tendency: the Ruthenians in the Hapsburg Empire and the Little Russians in the Russian Empire were among the less literate ethnic groups in Europe, and the Russians did not fare much better. Data regarding literary production and literacy in those empires cluster together rather neatly according to religious affiliation: the most literate communities were the Protestants and the Jews; the Roman Catholics stood somewhere in the middle; while the Eastern Christians (the Armenians, Georgians, Romanians, Russians, Ruthenians, and Ukrainians) lagged far behind, outstripped only by the Muslims.

Applying Benedict Anderson’s theory, one may conclude that until the very beginning of the twentieth century the Eastern Christians in the Habsburg and Russian empires remained pre-national and largely illiterate “sacred societies” rather than modern national “imagined communities.” To a large extent these statistics confirm Arno Mayer’s earlier conclusion about the persistence of the old regime throughout Europe until the very beginning of the First World War,²⁷ with an important qualification that Eastern Europe and the Eastern Christians were among the most persistent “sacred societies.”

In that context, John Armstrong’s scheme of nation building in that historical region deserves special attention. In his opinion, the national identities of local ethnic and religious groups were largely indistinguishable. Most of them spoke a mutually comprehensible patois, had a diffuse historical memory of their common descent, and a more acute sense of religious distinction than those who did not belong to their denomination (i.e., the Western Christians, Armenians, Jews, and Muslims). Only gradually, under the centrifugal influences of large cultural centres such as Kyiv, Lviv, and Vilnius did distinctive national identities emerge.²⁸ At first glance, there is nothing specifically “regional” about this scheme: it could be applied elsewhere. Armstrong himself suggests the Mediterranean world of Romance languages as a close parallel. Another comparison that comes to mind is the large German-speaking area of Central Europe, even though, as some philologists suggest, the German dialects’ differences

²⁶ Hrytsak, *Prorok u svoii vitchyzni*, 544.

²⁷ Arno J. Mayer, *The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981).

²⁸ See John A. Armstrong, “Myth and History in the Evolution of Ukrainian Consciousness,” in *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter*, 129–30, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj et al (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1992).

were much more pronounced than was the case among the numerous Slavic dialects in Eastern Europe.²⁹

What was specific was that in the latter region, owing to the mixing of Eastern Christianity with local political traditions,³⁰ pre-modern identities and intellectual practices proved to be extremely persistent. They were symbolized by the perseverance of “Rus’,” a vague notion of the Eastern Christian community characterized by its use of Church Slavonic, whose cultural achievements were rather poor by Western standards. Under these circumstances, local nation builders had no choice but to deconstruct this community, rejecting some of its elements (like Church Slavonic) and modernizing others. By the end of the nineteenth century Lviv was one of the most crucial centres where such deconstruction was occurring. Judging by the intensity of its cultural production in the 1880s, it compared favourably with St. Petersburg and Warsaw, leaving Moscow, Kyiv, Vilnius, and other cities that had a large share of Eastern Christians far behind.³¹

Regarding the formula by which this deconstruction was undertaken in Lviv, Wendland’s monograph provides some important insights. In her opinion, controversies between the Galician Russophiles and Galician Ukrainophiles can be rendered as opposition(s): as Orthodox Ruthenian (Rus’) civilization vs. “European” Ukraine, conservative vs. democratic, old ways of defining the culture of Rus’ vs. new ways (e.g., the etymologic vs. the phonetic system of writing). Or, as a leading Galician Russophile put it, “Ukrainian identity [*ukrainizm*] is the result of a new trend in the spiritual life of Europe that grew slowly, starting from the second half of the eighteenth century, from west to east until it reached Russia and made a revolution in the worldviews of the educated classes of the Russian people. In the field of science it gave birth to empiricism, in belles lettres, to realism, and in political and social relations, to the idea of personal liberty and equality of all people.”³²

My claim is that before 1914 nowhere else was the concept of Rus’ as radically unmade as it was in Habsburg-ruled Galicia. This unmaking occurred as that crownland underwent a dramatic transformation from a provincial corner of the largely cosmopolitan German cultural space to a leading centre of the national(izing) Polish space as a result of its new autonomous status (from 1867). As I tried to show in my biography of Franko, Ukrainian national identity was strongly affected by this transformation. It became more sophisticated and articulate on the one hand, and more exclusive on the other. In the final result it was more attuned to modern culture and mass politics, and that largely determined its victory by the turn of the twentieth century.

²⁹ G[eorge] Y. Shevelov, “Language,” in *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, 3: 36 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993).

³⁰ On these topics see George Schoepflin, “The Political Traditions of Eastern Europe,” *Daedalus* 119, no. 1 (Winter 1990): 55–90; and Ihor Ševčenko, *Ukraine between East and West: Essays on Cultural History to the Early Eighteenth Century* (Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1996).

³¹ Korneli Heck, “Bibliografia polska z r. 1881 w porównaniu z czeską, węgierską i rosyjską,” *Przewodnik naukowy i literacki: Dodatek miesięczny do «Gazety Lwowskiej»*, 1882, no 10: 1096.

³² F[ylyp] S[vystun], *Chim est dlia nas Shevchenko? Krytychnoe rozsuzhdenie* (Lviv: Yzdanie redaktsii “Novoho Proloma,” 1885), 24.

However, the victory was not absolute: the Russophile movement was still relatively strong. The Russophiles' fate was finally sealed by the First World War, when, because their ideology and symbols were deeply entrenched in conservative thinking, they lost their legitimacy and appeal with the demise of the old regime.

Conclusions

John-Paul Himka conceived his article as an attempt "to explore the utility and the limitations of the new thinking [i.e., since the 1980s] on nationalism." While he succeeded brilliantly with the first part ("utility"), he did not do so in the second part ("limitations"). When Himka was working on his article, modernist theories of nationalism were still going strong. But, as frequently happens, at the height of its might the modernist paradigm showed some signs of its subsequent decline. Since the 1990s there has emerged a new, fierce, and, I would say, reasonably well substantiated attack on what is now called "modernist orthodoxy." These new critics do not necessarily reject what is the strongest part of modernist theories of nationalism—namely, the emphasis on the social construction of nationality and national cultures. Instead they focus on the role of other factors that have not been taken sufficiently into account, such as religion, wars, and the international context.³³

It is against this new background that I believe the Galician case should be tested. It would, however, be unfair to blame John-Paul Himka for his failure to show the "limitations" of modernist theories. All of us who were raised to view things from a Marxist perspective can easily agree with Lenin's dictum that persons should be judged not by what they have not done, but by what they have achieved. It is hard to imagine that the currently flourishing state of nineteenth-century Galician Ukrainian studies could have occurred without John-Paul Himka's innovative and substantial scholarly contributions of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Since the 2000s his focus has shifted elsewhere. But all of us who continue working on the history of Habsburg-ruled Galicia cherish the hope that he may one day return to our fold.

³³ See Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); "Subjecthood That Happens To Be Called 'Citizenship,' or Trying to Make Sense of the Old Regime on Its Own Terms: Interview with Peter Sahlins," *Ab Imperio*, 2006, no. 4: 39–58; and Wilfried Spohn, "Multiple Modernity, Nationalism and Religion: A Global Perspective," *Current Sociology* 51, nos. 3–4 (May–July 2003): 265–86.

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