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Poltava 2009: Deimperializing an Imperial Site of Memory

GUIDO HAUSMANN

CITY OF EXPECTATIONS AND RUMORS

AS RECENT STUDIES on historical and collective memory suggest, memory is concrete in its spatial dimension. The Ukrainian city of Poltava is a prominent place of historical memory, and in 2009, on the occasion of the tercentenary of the Battle of Poltava, it was a very special and fascinating place. Nowadays it is a provincial town in eastern Ukraine with a population of little more than 300,000 inhabitants and an administrative oblast center, which is not located on the banks of the Dnieper River, as a recent history of Sweden informs us.¹ In Ukraine's history and culture it is known as the birthplace of the modern Ukrainian vernacular and the homeland of Ivan Kotliarevs'kyi, author of *Eneida*. The city would not even have left such a mark on our mental map if not for the fact—and good or bad luck—that a battle between Sweden and Russia took place in the vicinity of the then garrison town in late June 1709. This single historical event has thus granted the city broader historical significance and cultural awareness.

The tercentenary of the Battle of Poltava was also a prism through which to examine more closely current relations between Ukraine and Russia and to obtain answers to some interesting questions. How would independent Ukraine deal with the anniversary of an event that symbolizes Russia's birth as an empire and its pride as a victorious power? During previous jubilees in 1809, 1909, and 1959, Poltava was part of tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union, but after 1991 the city became part of newly independent Ukraine. How would Ukrainian-Russian political relations after 1991—and particularly in the wake of the Orange Revolution of 2004—shape the tercentenary? What would be the Ukrainian perspective on the anniversary, and what place would be accorded to Hetman Ivan Mazepa?

The notion of *Poltava 1709* as a symbol and founding myth of Russia as a great power and empire figures prominently in the historical literature. Spe-

cialists in the history of the Russian Empire and Ukraine, such as Andreas Kappeler, have emphasized the importance of the battle in the emerging Russian national consciousness of the nineteenth century.² Military victory and glory, and particularly invincibility in decisive battles, structure the imperial narrative of Russia and the Soviet Union. The eminent military historian of the Second World War John Erickson writes, "If the battle of Poltava in 1709 turned Russia into a European power, then Stalingrad set the Soviet Union on the road to being a world power."³ Poltava and Stalingrad and Charles XII and Napoleon have often been compared in Soviet historical literature of the postwar period.⁴ Such comparisons imply that the enemy as the "other" still plays an important role in Russia's culture.

To this day the "column of glory" in Poltava's city center, which was unveiled on the occasion of the centennial in the early part of the nineteenth century, when the city was known as "little St. Petersburg," defines the urban space. The column illustrates the extent to which the city has consistently defined itself by the battle of 1709. The golden eagle at the top of the monument, not the tsarist Russian double-headed golden eagle, was removed during the Soviet period, but reinstalled later for the sake of historical correctness. Today it shimmers with new gold. The square with the column in the heart of the city is a popular gathering place in Poltava. Other monuments commemorating and interpreting the event that cemented Russia's glory are located both in the city and outside its limits; most of them were erected to mark the bicentenary in 1909.⁵ Only one monument of larger significance was inaugurated in independent Ukraine. Erected in 1994, the monument does not celebrate Russia's victory, but instead commemorates the Zaporozhian Cossacks who perished on the battlefield. The inscription on the monument does not specify for which side the Cossacks had fought and died; nevertheless, its installation marked a step in a new direction.

The Battle of Poltava is of key symbolic importance not only for Russia and Ukraine, but also for Sweden, the Baltic countries, and Poland.⁶ For Ukraine, it marks Russia as the political "other" and enemy of Ukraine, and opens up the possibility to elevate the controversial Hetman Mazepa to the status of national hero and symbol of violent resistance against Russian imperialism and of Ukrainian self-assertion. In 1998 the eminent Ukrainian American linguist Yuri Shevelov went so far as to call the Battle of Poltava a catastrophe and tragedy for Ukrainians, comparable to the importance of the Battle of White Mountain (*Bílá hora*, 1620) for the Czech people. In Shevelov's view, Poltava represented a watershed demarcating the period when Ukraine was still regarded as an autonomous political actor and the "colonial" period.⁷ After 1709 Ukraine was incorporated into the Russian Empire, and this status remained largely unchanged or led to Ukraine's further deterioration: "The Battle of Poltava marked the onset of acute and decisive changes in Ukraine's status and

condition, which lasted for centuries.”⁸ Serhii Plokyh put it slightly differently when he called the Battle of Poltava “a disaster for Ukraine.”⁹ The implications of such an assessment are clear: a catastrophe, a tragedy, or a disaster should be commemorated; a victory, however, should be celebrated.

The 1994 monument to the fallen Zaporozhian Cossacks reflects the new importance and relevance of the early modern Cossack era and of Cossackdom for contemporary national Ukrainian consciousness.¹⁰ There is plentiful evidence of Ukrainian cultural traditions in Poltava. The city boasts monuments to Kotliarevs’kyi and Hohol’/Gogol, but there is not even a sign indicating the birthplace of Symon Petliura (1879–1926), the military and political leader during the period of the Ukrainian revolution from 1917 to 1921. Petliura is a much more controversial historical figure, and, tellingly, the city fathers have thus far ignored him.

One might argue that, in contrast to Russia and Sweden, the Battle of Poltava has little relevance for contemporary Ukraine. It is difficult to imagine, however, that Ukraine could have entirely overlooked the tercentenary. Poltava was not just the site of an important campaign between two foreign powers striving for dominance. Ukrainian Cossacks fought on both sides, and to ignore Mazepa and his famous “defection” is simply unimaginable. But there were certainly various options for dealing with the anniversary of the battle. For example, Poltava could be linked to a ceremony held at the hetman’s residence in Baturyn, which was burned to the ground by Prince Menshikov and his troops in the fall of 1708, after Mazepa’s decision to side with King Charles XII of Sweden.¹¹ Recent Ukrainian literature has stressed the impact that the devastation of Baturyn had on the decision of many Cossacks not to fight alongside Mazepa. Thus, it was interesting to see how the material heritage of the memorial complex in and near Poltava was presented in 2009 and whether one could discover a more profound reinterpretation of the symbolic meaning of the Battle of Poltava.

Here I will introduce the term “imperial site of memory” for *Poltava 1709* in order to single out its particular significance for Russia as an empire. In my view, this is the historically dominant perception of the site. In his distinguished works exploring French national sites of memory and their significance, the French historian Pierre Nora singles out three meanings of the word “site”: material, symbolic, and functional. According to him, these three dimensions are always interconnected.¹² Several studies devoted to national and transnational sites of memory have been published in recent years.¹³ This trend is based on the decline of national consciousness or a “sense of loss.”¹⁴ It would certainly be possible for scholars in Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet states to publish works on national sites of memory or popular (people’s) sites of memory, which would present different challenges than those faced by Western European scholars. *Poltava 1709* would have a place in such a volume on

Ukraine. However, the term “imperial site of memory” seems to be of equal or greater importance for Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet countries. It points to the fact that until recently, empires as forms of nondemocratic political rule characterized by an unequal distribution of political power between center and periphery, or borderland, were as important as nations and states for a large part of the European continent. Imperial orders have long enjoyed the loyalty of populations, voluntarily or not. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union accelerated processes of “deimperialization” as well as attempts at “reimperialization” have occurred. This important trend is a challenge and a goal of many new and old states and their societies, including Russia and its people. Imperial sites of memory are thus frequently contested sites with a transnational dimension that is not, however, their exclusive characteristic. In my opinion, it makes sense to analyze *Poltava 1709* in 2009 in this context with greater thoroughness.

A German-Ukrainian student program under my codirection scrutinized the tercentenary in June 2009 more closely.¹⁵ In the weeks before the event, Poltava was filled with rumors and expectations. Drafts of the jubilee program were circulated, broadcast on local television, and posted on special Internet sites. Some circles hoped that the king of Sweden, President Viktor Yushchenko of Ukraine, and President Dmitry Medvedev of Russia or Prime Minister Vladimir Putin would attend the jubilee in Poltava. Some people commented on the fact that the Ukrainian president had apparently downgraded the tercentenary to an event of secondary importance. The main question was: would the jubilee be commemorated or celebrated at all? As a specific form of educational activity, historical reenactments, such as those of the Battle of Grunwald (Tannenberg), the American Civil War, and the revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, are often held.¹⁶ So, what would a reenactment of the Battle of Poltava look like? How many tourists from other countries, including Russia, and other parts of Ukraine would visit the city?

COMMEMORATION AND CELEBRATION

Diverging political interests and a particular set of political power relations defined the commemorative practices in Poltava in 2009. There were some intersecting lines of political conflict, especially between the city of Poltava and Poltava oblast, and between Ukraine and Russia. As a result, the jubilee was not commemorated on a higher international political level as initially intended by Ukraine’s presidential administration in 2007. Instead, it was downgraded to an event of secondary political importance.¹⁷ In 2009 Poltava tried to do it both ways. Although the event was officially commemorated, elements of celebration were also included in the program, as is often the case with similar jubilees.

One of the principal movers behind the tercentenary celebrations in Poltava in 2009 was Mayor Andrii Matkovs'kyi (a member of BYuT, the political party led by the then Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko), who headed the local organizing committee. The event was not exclusively financed by the city: additional funds were provided by the oblast administration, the state authorities, and—above all—by private donors,¹⁸ all of whom had different ideas about the jubilee, which went beyond carrying out local infrastructure repairs and sprucing up existing memorials. Tensions between the different authorities and members of the public, not only between Ukrainian and Russian nationals, were running higher in the days before the anniversary. The mayor of Poltava cautioned against using the event for political ends and urged all local political leaders, public organizations, and citizens to be polite and respectful to all guests, calling this desirable behavior a sign of a “European attitude.” The word “guests” referred above all to visitors from Russia, but the term could be also applied to visitors from western Ukraine. When leaving Poltava, visitors should remember it “as a center of tourism and a city of high culture and spirituality,” said the mayor, who regarded the commemoration of the fallen soldiers and other victims as having central importance. Mayor Matkovs'kyi also called for self-restraint on the part of local politicians, a demand that was directed mainly against Ukrainian patriotic activists and their supporters in the oblast administration, which was headed by a Yushchenko-appointed governor: “For that very reason, in the days preceding the commemoration the members of the municipal council appealed to politicians to refrain from all political actions and maneuvers. Nevertheless, a group of activists of a nationalist orientation, with the support of the oblast administration leaders and several people’s deputies, want to carry out actions, which, in the current conditions may have unexpected consequences and provoke a second Battle of Poltava. I believe that this must be regarded as disrespect for history, for the residents of Poltava, and for our guests. Come to your senses!”¹⁹

The official observance began on the morning of 27 June with the ringing of bells, a liturgy, and a wreath-laying ceremony, culminating in the official unveiling of the Rotunda of Reconciliation, in memory of those who fell at the Battle of Poltava. Official addresses by the mayor, the chief representative of the presidential secretariat, the ambassadors of Sweden and Finland, and the chief representative of Russia’s presidential administration expressed their views of the event.²⁰ The new monument was consecrated by Orthodox Church dignitaries: a Ukrainian archbishop and his Russian counterpart. The ceremony ended with the playing of three national anthems. Surprisingly, Russia’s national anthem was played first, followed by the anthems of Sweden and Ukraine. One would have expected to hear Ukraine’s national anthem played first. This accommodating gesture toward the Russian guests was incomprehensible to the many foreign guests attending the ceremony.

Whereas Russia's representative spoke of Russia and Sweden as the two acting powers, the speakers from Ukraine and Sweden also mentioned Mazepa and the fallen Cossacks as a third social and political force. The Swedish ambassador emphasized that for Swedish society the battle is now history and has no current political implications.²¹

Two years earlier, in 2007, President Yushchenko and the members of the Poltava oblast administration had decided not to mark the event, but instead to commemorate those who fell at the Battle of Poltava and to mark the jubilee on the highest political level. But they disagreed over such questions as the role of the Cossacks, Mazepa, and the Ukrainian-Swedish alliance with members of the public as well as with the mayor of Poltava and his administration. As a result, the jubilee was not only downgraded,²² but the long-planned unveiling of a monument to Mazepa was also postponed. Before the jubilee heated public discussions took place on the local and national levels. The argument most often heard in the city was that the Mazepa monument should not provoke the guests from Russia (and, presumably, those Ukrainians who leaned toward Russia's interpretation of the Battle of Poltava). Instead, it was decided to unveil the monument after the festivities, once all the visitors had left the city.

Plans to erect a monument to Mazepa in Poltava had been discussed for years. In 2005 researchers at the Poltava Battlefield Preserve had proposed the idea to erect monuments to Charles XII and Mazepa next to the existing one of Tsar Peter I in front of the museum on the Battlefield Preserve. However, such plans were not realized. But portraits of all three historical figures were often featured in newspapers and other publications. As understandable as the idea to elevate Mazepa to the stature of the two other leaders may be, the question remains: in what respect was the Ukrainian hetman comparable to them, and why is this elevation of such importance?

When President Yushchenko's agenda for the commemoration of *Poltava 2009*—including the unveiling of the Mazepa monument—failed, he decided to scale back the entire jubilee. But during a talk at Freiburg University in late 2010, the Ukrainian leader explained the background of his political decision to downgrade the tercentenary. President Putin had approached him some time before 2009 with a suggestion to pay a joint visit to Poltava in 2009. According to Yushchenko, he agreed under certain conditions. His most important proposal was that both he and his Russian counterpart first should visit the hetman's residence at Baturyn, which had been reconstructed. Alternatively or in addition, he suggested that Putin could present Ukraine with the so-called Baturyn Archive, which had been discovered recently in Russia's archives, or that those documentary materials could be unveiled during a special exhibition in Kyiv. Putin rejected the proposals, leading to Yushchenko's decision to downplay the official handling of the tercentenary of *Poltava 2009*.

It is thus possible to distinguish different political options and approaches

to the tercentenary. President Yushchenko wanted to commemorate the event as a tragedy and was in favor of elevating Mazepa to the status of national hero. Without a doubt, Russia's president would have opted for a ceremony along with a celebration of the military victory, but with some provisos. The mayor of Poltava, who was keen on holding a tourist event, wanted to sideline all political implications of the event. Both options, Yushchenko's and the mayor's, implied a break with existing traditions in the handling of the anniversaries of *Poltava 1709* as an imperial site of memory.

The plan to present Poltava chiefly as a tourist destination was a more recent development. A Swedish delegation first approached the Poltava city fathers in the early 1990s with the idea to reenact the battle. At the time, the idea struck the municipal authorities as odd, and they rejected it as inappropriate. But by 2009 the times had changed, and the local elite were now aware of the popularity of historical battle reenactments in the Western world and realized the lucrative potential. Poltava wanted to join the world of modern cultural consumerism, and before the tercentenary the city launched a special program promoting Poltava as a tourist destination. Thus, by the time the anniversary rolled around, history-themed shops had opened in the city center, selling food and Cossack-related souvenirs, chocolates imprinted with Mazepa's portrait, plastic shopping bags depicting old and new monuments, and postcards, including those illustrating historical themes. For people who were still habituated to the Soviet past, this new trend was clearly provocative. The local public sphere was shaped by economic considerations and ambitions, and it had lost its function as a space to promote the sole correct historical narrative.

The official program featured two highlights designed for those members of the public with a more limited interest in the event's political dimension. To attract the younger generation, a fashion show featuring historical costumes (billed as "300 Years after the Battle of Poltava") was planned for the eve of the anniversary on the square in front of the theatre in the city center, although it was rained out by a heavy thunderstorm. On the anniversary day a reenactment featuring about 200 actors took place near the Poltava Battlefield Preserve. Tens of thousands of spectators attended the early evening event, which was much shorter than expected. It highlighted the Swedish attack on Russia's defense system (the redoubts) and the battle between the Swedish and Russian armies, but it did not depict the military victory.²³ A traffic jam prevented many people from arriving on time at the site. Clearly, celebration—not commemoration—was the dominant form in Poltava. The transformation of the tercentenary into a holiday that should be celebrated met many expectations, as it was much more in line with tradition.

Inasmuch as the political situation in Ukraine has changed radically since 2009, it would be worthwhile here to discuss the position of the Party of Regions, the main opposition force in Ukraine's parliament at the time. Mykola

Azarov, who was one of the party's key leaders and is now Ukraine's prime minister, issued a (Russian-language) statement on the occasion of the anniversary of Poltava, pointing out the potentially negative consequences of a Swedish victory and the positive effects of Russia's victory: "In essence, Ukraine's fate was decided by the Battle of Poltava. A country emerged then in order to be ultimately formed within today's boundaries in the late twentieth century. This is precisely the epochal result of that battle. Imagine if Charles XII had been the victor and the Russian state was smashed and beaten back to the north. Charles had an unpredictable nature, and it is difficult to say how he would have conducted himself further. But there is no such thing as a vacuum in geopolitics: the territory liberated by Charles would have been instantly occupied by other powerful Western European states, and it is easy to imagine what would have happened to this territory on which you and I are now living, to our people, to our Orthodox Church, to our culture and traditions. They may not have been preserved. But this way they were safeguarded. And in this lies the great significance of the Battle of Poltava for Ukraine and for the entire world. This is an event with many aspects. This was not a concrete battle in the small and insignificant town of Poltava but a turning point in world history."²⁴

Azarov's statement reflected a position that was much closer to the official views of the late Soviet period and the traditional imperial narrative. Mobilizing fears of Western influence and contradicting Ukraine's independent political interests, his statement sought to place Ukraine in Russia's orbit by emphasizing the cultural commonalities between the two countries. Above all, it demonstrated a complete lack of political self-awareness. It is more than astonishing that such a view could be expressed by a future prime minister of Ukraine.

LOST IN A MUSEUM

The Poltava Battlefield Preserve, a major institution located a few kilometers outside the city, is devoted to the commemoration of the battle. The first museum devoted to the battle was founded in the late tsarist period, on the occasion of the bicentenary.²⁵ It was closed in the early Soviet period, with most of its exhibits moved to the local regional history museum, but garnered renewed attention after the Soviet victory over Germany in the Second World War. By the time it was opened as the State Museum of the History of the Battle of Poltava in 1950, the military museum perfectly fit the Soviet state's agenda of integrating imperial Russia's military glory into the Soviet Union's postwar propaganda of patriotism and Russian nationalism. The museum's official booklet, which was issued in 1954, shortly after Stalin's death, defined Russia's military victory in 1709 as the common victory of the Russian, Ukrainian,

and Belarusian peoples and, in particular, of the Russian army.²⁶ The booklet focused on the geopolitical situation of Russia, Tsar Peter I and King Charles XII, the heroic qualities of Russian troops, Russia's self-assertion, and its new political status in Central Europe and on the Baltic Sea after 1709. Hetman Mazepa is mentioned as a traitor, and emphasis was placed on the unity of the Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian peoples standing victoriously against the Swedish army and Mazepa.²⁷ Thus, the museum booklet promoted the Soviet nationalities policy of the time, as exemplified by the narrative of the Battle of Poltava.

In the 1950s Swedish experts contacted the museum with a proposal to collaborate and initiate an exchange of museum items. However, the Soviet government banned all contacts and exchanges with the Swedes. Official contacts with Swedish organizations interested in the history of the battle were established only in the 1990s: e.g., with the Society of the Friends of Military History at the Swedish Royal Military History Library in Stockholm. Swedish delegations began visiting Poltava on a regular basis,²⁸ and they attended the tercentenary celebrations in Poltava in 2009.

The 2009 exhibition at the Poltava Battlefield Preserve sought to reflect on the political changes of the past twenty years. For example, the local and regional background and Hetman Mazepa's life and achievements are displayed in separate rooms of the museum. What is astonishing, however, is that the museum did not make a more radical break with the Soviet-era practice of presenting and interpreting the battle. It still depicted it, above all, through the eyes of Russia, placing Peter I at the center of events, as he waited for the Swedish army and its wounded commander, Charles XII. It may have been too much of a challenge for the museum staff to introduce a more profound and new perspective on this historical event and to treat it in a more thorough fashion—for example, through the eyes of the region's inhabitants or of the Hetmanate as a victim of and actor in a great power struggle. A new perspective would have focused less attention on military glory and more on the devastation and defeat, and could have raised the question of the costs of militarism or the historical functions of heroes, heroism, and processes of heroization.

Another option would have been to concentrate on the Ukrainian Cossacks and Mazepa as a social force and political actor. Such a perspective could have addressed very openly the political fragmentation and conflict on the Ukrainian side, an issue with many implications for contemporary Ukraine. None of these topics were specifically raised, and the museum is still significantly shaped by the experiences and interpretations of the Second World War.²⁹ The museum thus missed a great opportunity in 2009. It came as no surprise, then, that the monument of Peter I remained standing in front of the museum, where it had been installed in the 1950s—alone, without Charles XII and Mazepa. The museum collection remains traditional not only in terms of its content

but also its form: it has retained the character of a classical military museum, performing primarily a didactic task. It neither integrates the visitor into an active dialogue nor is it spatially integrated into the battlefield area.

In addition, the museum collection demonstrates that the entire discourse on the Battle of Poltava is still very much confined to a Ukrainian-Russian or Russian-Ukrainian mindset, despite the fact that Swedish and Polish experts have joined recent scholarly debates on this topic. It is high time to open up the topic and place it in a broader European perspective. Some comparative perspectives should be introduced, such as the issue of how major or decisive battles of early modern European history are commemorated or celebrated elsewhere.³⁰

The city of Blenheim (Ger. Blindheim) and the Battle of Blenheim lend themselves to a comparative perspective on the Battle of Poltava. Today, the cities of Blenheim and Poltava are known primarily for the decisive battles that took place in their vicinity in the early eighteenth century. The small Swabian city of Blenheim, located in Bavaria on the Danube River, was the site of two battles that were fought in 1703 and 1704 during the War of Spanish Succession. When Charles II, the Austrian king on the Spanish throne, died without an heir, France put forward its claim to the Spanish throne, which led to the formation of an anti-French coalition. The Battle of Blenheim in 1704 saw the defeat of seemingly invincible France (led by Marshal Tallard) and Bavaria (led by Maximilian II Emanuel). Bavaria was seeking great-power status, but was roundly defeated and then occupied by Austria. During the period of the Great Northern War Sweden was also regarded as invincible, and the Hetmanate under Mazepa's leadership sought greater political autonomy from Russia. Great Britain began to rise to the status of a great power after its victory at Blenheim under the noted general the Duke of Marlborough (with support on the battlefield from Austria's Prince Eugene of Savoy [1683–1736] and military detachments of the Holy Roman Empire). Thus, both battles left a mark on power relations in Europe: Blenheim led to the rise of Britain's power, while Poltava saw the rise of Russia as a European and an imperial power. Both battles became myths of origin, and today Blenheim is better known in Britain than in Germany. Both Maximilian II Emanuel and Ivan Mazepa abandoned their former allies before their respective battles, and the political status of Bavaria and the Hetmanate shrank as a consequence of defeat. Therefore, at least some constellations are similar, although in other respects (e.g., political traditions and cultures) differences between both events may be emphasized.

How have these two battles been commemorated? Over time, numerous monuments have been erected both in Blenheim and Poltava, where museums have preserved the memory of the battles that were fought in the vicinity of both these cities. As late as the tercentenary Poltava celebrated and glorified Russia's victory. A more decisive change occurred here only with the opening

of the Rotunda of Reconciliation in 2009. In 2004 the Battle of Blenheim was marked by a reenactment, a procession of people dressed in traditional costumes, and the unveiling of a stone book of history calling for peace, reconciliation, and friendship.³¹ But the new Blenheim monument did not represent a radical shift. The very first monument dedicated to the fallen soldiers of all nations who fell in that battle was unveiled on the 250th anniversary in 1954. Less than a decade had passed since the end of the Second World War, and with (Western) European integration still in its infancy, official speeches called upon the public to overcome hate, live in peace, and cooperate in Europe. Germany's defeat in the Second World War ended that country's imperial ambitions on the European continent. The shrinking power status of Great Britain and France, together with the spread of democracy and the rise of new global powers, the US and the USSR, opened up a space for reconciliation in Western Europe. The increased great-power status of the Soviet regime and its repressive nature did not, however, lead to the opening of a similar space in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union after 1945. Instead, in 1959, the 250th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava, the Soviet Union presented itself as a victorious, if not imperial, power surrounded by numerous enemies and ready to fight them. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and Soviet socialism in 1991, the political situation changed radically. The opening of the Rotunda of Reconciliation in 2009 symbolized Ukraine's cultural integration into Europe as that post-Soviet country began to adopt the forms and expressed values that Europeans (or the Western world, for that matter) still claim for themselves.

The museum in Blenheim, attractively located in a castle, features a confusing array of items illustrating the complex history of early modern power relations and, in particular, the relationships among the principal actors. But it has several positive aspects. First, it addresses the topic of "eternal peace," which connects enlightened thinking of the eighteenth century in the aftermath of the battle (e.g., Immanuel Kant) with the twenty-first century. Second, it emphasizes the effect of great-power struggle in a specific location; and third, it invites visitors to take a seat at a table to negotiate a peace treaty to end the War of Spanish Succession, thereby actively engaging visitors. The museum is also integrated into the territory of the battlefield by means of a path of remembrance. Thus, it is less of a military museum than is the museum at the Poltava Battlefield Preserve.

The most striking difference between the commemorative practices of Blenheim and Poltava is that the tercentenary of Blenheim in 2004 was far more devoted to history *per se*, whereas in 2009 Poltava was, to a significant extent, still about politics. Clearly, this is the result of Ukraine and Russia having gained independence and statehood only in 1991. Since then both countries have vacillated between the political ambitions of deimperialization and reimperialization. In addition, the 2009 practices in Poltava are not the result

of a larger consensus in society and the state, whereas in Blenheim in 2004 such a consensus clearly existed.

In recent years much has been written in Europe about the different cultures of remembrance with respect to the Second World War. The focus on that war, however, seems to be much too narrow, and there are ample reasons for integrating the nineteenth century and the early modern period more thoroughly into a history of European cultures of remembrance. There are, of course, other battles in the Poltava/Blenheim period worth considering for opening up more comparative perspectives, e.g., the Battle of the Boyne in Ireland (1690) and the Battle of Culloden (1746).³² But even on a modest level of comparing the cultures of remembrance of two early modern battles, it becomes clear that the aim of such a comparative perspective cannot be the artificial homogenization of cultures of remembrance.

Since 1991 new forms of national and international integration of battlefields as memorial complexes have emerged. In the 1990s Russia created an Association of Battlefields of Russia (*Assotsiatsiia ratnykh polei Rossii*) with the aim of preserving the military glory of Russia and the Soviet Union (Kulikovo, Borodino, and the Battle of Kursk, with the Battle of Prokhorovka at its core). The Poltava Battlefield State Preserve was invited, along with other battlefield memorial complexes in the former Soviet republics with historical significance for Russia, to join the association.³³ To date, the Poltava state memorial complex is the only Ukrainian member of the international organization of military-historical museums within the framework of UNESCO.³⁴ Which new forms of organizational integration will be successfully implemented remains an open question. In this respect, it would be worthwhile to forge closer contacts between Poltava and Western Europe.

TRACES OF HISTORY IN POLTAVA BOOKSHOPS

What kinds of books on the Battle of Poltava were on sale in local Poltava bookshops in the summer of 2009? There are few such shops in this city, and those that exist have small sections devoted to local culture and history. Obviously, booksellers had not reckoned on welcoming tourists with an interest in history. Even the Poltava Regional History Museum, which is located in an impressively large building that once housed the city council, did not boast a more substantial collection of books on various aspects of local history.

On a recent visit to the city, two books were found in local shops. One was a reprint of a book written in 1908 by Ivan Frantsevich Pavlovskii (1851–1922), a local historian and teacher at the local cadet school. This slender volume, one of several publications by Pavlovskii devoted to the Battle of Poltava, was published originally in honor of the bicentenary in 1909.³⁵ It offers a rather

personalized perspective on the battle and the two great powers at the center of the story. Mazepa is hardly mentioned. The reason why Pavlovskii's books were reprinted in 2009 is easily explained: he was an important figure in local cultural life at the turn of the nineteenth century and one of the initiators of the museum on the Battle of Poltava. Pavlovskii's family, which was mostly likely of Polish origin, moved from their native city of Poznań to Russia's Kaluga region, and then to the Poltava region, finally settling in the city itself.³⁶ Pavlovich grew up in Poltava, graduated from St. Volodymyr University in Kyiv, and then returned to his home town. The Battle of Poltava ranked high among this historian's scholarly pursuits. He also published a book on the Ukrainian writer Ivan Kotliarevs'kyi, who was the focus of Ukrainian national life at the turn of the century (a monument to him was unveiled in Poltava in 1898). The recent reprint of Pavlovskii's works in a series entitled "The Historical Legacy of Poltava" is an acknowledgment of the local intellectual and cultural traditions. However, Pavlovskii's books present the classical imperial narrative, and Poltava's historical and cultural significance is viewed through the prism of Russia's imperial glory.

The other book found for sale was a school textbook entitled *A New History of the Poltava Region: Second Half of the XVI–Second Half of the XVIII Centuries*, offers a different perspective. Both the city and the region are described as random victims of the great power struggle: "The Poltava region was de facto occupied by the Swedish and Russian armies," and its population suffered particularly from "tsarist terror."³⁷ Hetman Mazepa is neither a traitor nor an evil individual in any other regard; he is portrayed as an important political and military figure, who strove to unite "the Ukrainian lands" and was on an equal footing with Peter I and Charles XII. The 1994 *Monument to the Fallen Cossacks* is reproduced, but the destruction and the thousands of victims who were massacred in Baturyn are not mentioned.³⁸ The battle is accorded some, but not extraordinary, importance, and it is integrated into the broader framework of the history of Ukraine as a national history.

Several other books on various aspects of this historical battle were published in the city before 2009, but more or less independently of the jubilee.³⁹ However, the interests of the Ukrainian public and Ukrainian historians are generally either more narrowly focused on the controversial hetman as a key cultural and political figure of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries in Ukraine (particularly Mazepa's negotiations with Charles XII and the Polish king, Stanisław Leszczyński, after 1705), or on integrating the Battle of Poltava into the Cossack era, starting in the mid-seventeenth century. But books on Mazepa written by writers based outside of Poltava, such as the Chernihiv journalist Serhii Pavlenko,⁴⁰ and the highly praised, balanced biography of Mazepa by the Russian historian Tatiana Tairova-Iakovleva, could not be found for sale.⁴¹ These books may be circulating among experts in the

city, but they are not widely available. The same is true of important recent works by Ukrainian historians of the Hetmanate, such as Viktor Horobets' and Taras Chukhlib.⁴²

The works of some Russian historians, particularly of the older generation, are focused much more on the battle itself.⁴³ They not only still describe Mazepa's "defection" as an act of treason,⁴⁴ but, more importantly, they do not tell the reader much about the historical background of the Hetmanate or the traditions of Ukrainian autonomy or independent political acts of the Ukrainian leadership. Mazepa's motivations are not analyzed, but merely explained with the aid of stereotypical references to his allegedly negative personal qualities. Thus, these books are of limited interest. Many Russian textbooks that have been published in the past twenty years argue more or less in the same vein, with the notable exception of some textbooks that appeared in the mid-1990s.⁴⁵ Often, Mazepa himself is held responsible for the destruction of Baturyn and the death toll, and hence the town's fate is not interpreted as "an anti-Ukrainian action."⁴⁶ No connection is made between the fate of Baturyn and the decision of many Cossacks to side with Peter I in the Battle of Poltava. Among the most interesting recent Russian publications on *Poltava 1709* are a book on captured prisoners of war, a Swedish-Russian collaborative effort, and a special section on the website of the Moscow Public Library.⁴⁷

It goes without saying that in 2009 Poltava bookshops did not offer any Western publications on the battle, such as the classical military study by Peter Englund, recently translated into Ukrainian, or the collection of articles on the age of Mazepa edited by the Italian scholar Giovanna Siedina.⁴⁸ It is to be hoped that ten or twenty years from now bookshops in Poltava will be carrying two books that have not yet been written: one that would have a thoroughly regional-national perspective, taking into account all the relevant Ukrainian, Russian, and Western historical literature on the Battle of Poltava and emphasizing defeat, catastrophe, conflict, and resistance; the other book could focus on *Poltava 1709* as a site of memory—imperial, national, and regional.⁴⁹ Books shape the ascribed symbolic meanings of a site of memory, although this may be a romantic conclusion. In Poltava in 2009 coverage by daily papers, radio, television, and the Internet was certainly more important. An informative multilingual (Ukrainian, Swedish, Russian, English, and German) website on the Battle of Poltava, the result of international collaboration, was launched on the occasion of the tercentenary.⁵⁰ At this time it is difficult to assess the impact of such a portal, but referring to it allows this author to end on a positive note.

CONCLUSIONS

Monuments and sites of memory do not speak for themselves. Their meaning is the result of ascriptions and social practices. Ritual ceremonies and interpreting stabilizers, such as museums and publications, create, confirm, and change meanings. If one defines *Poltava 1709* as an imperial site of memory by its tradition, then in 2009 a step was taken in a new direction, toward deimperialization of an imperial site of memory. However, and more importantly, Ukraine (and Russia) missed a great opportunity to take an even larger step in that direction. Changes were introduced to the material elements of the memorial site, and the official ceremony of the unveiling of the Rotunda in honor of the fallen soldiers of all three nations signified a clear shift in the functional and symbolic meanings of *Poltava 1709*. *Poltava 2009* was certainly less the result of an open dialogue between Ukraine and Russia in the interests of mutual understanding and finding common ground.

In 1909 one of the slogans of the day was "Poltava is awaiting the tsar!"⁵¹ On the occasion of the bicentenary Tsar Nicholas II visited the battlefield and the main monuments in the city of Poltava, including the Column of Glory. The practices of 1909 confirmed the site as an imperial site of memory. The Russian victory was also celebrated in 1959.⁵² In the hundred years since the bicentenary no political ruler or state leader visited Poltava, which signified an unambiguous step toward the depoliticization of the site. *Poltava 2009* was not a site of memory of Russia's glory but a place commemorating the victims of all sides by speaking out for universal human values. However, it remains unclear to what extent the new official interpretation is accepted by the public. In contrast to its status in 1909, Ukraine is now a political actor, and state- and nation-building processes affected the tercentenary beyond the mere political downgrading of the jubilee. Starting in 1989, counterdemonstrations by various Ukrainian groups challenged the official Soviet and imperial Russian celebrations of the event, pointing to alternative narratives and preferring to "celebrate the heroism of the Cossacks and to reclaim the battle as a nationalist uprising that in spite of bravery and military acumen, was unfortunately defeated."⁵³ However, *Poltava 2009* did not become a nationalized site of memory. A considerable body of scholarly and popular literature on Hetman Mazepa has been published in Ukraine in the past twenty years. But it appears that no mythologizing of Mazepa has taken place either in Ukrainian society or among historians and politicians (Kuchma ignored Mazepa; under Yushchenko the hetman reappeared in the official discourse, but only as one of many figures).⁵⁴ In many European countries Mazepa would probably be a much-discussed historical figure, and even celebrated as a hero. He is certainly a rich and controversial historical personality.

It is also likely that politicians will be tempted to instrumentalize such a figure in order to legitimize the state and that some historians will present him as a hero. In *Poltava 2009* Mazepa became the subject of debates, but he was not labeled a hero, at least not officially, although indications that he would be placed on the same footing as Peter I and Charles XII were apparent. Those who are interested in turning him into a hero should answer the question of whether modern nations and societies need heroes.

Without a doubt, one of the specific features of *Poltava 2009*, as compared to similar sites in Europe, was the fact that the political implications of the jubilee were much more evident than elsewhere in Europe, with the exception of Northern Ireland. At the same time, the city of Poltava sought to transform the battle anniversary into a tourism-oriented event at a historical site. However, such a pragmatic strategy did not signify a decisive step in the direction of changing the cultural or political meaning of this site of memory; rather, it was a strategy to avoid frank discussions of a controversial issue.

Analyzing *Poltava 1709* as an imperial site of memory is a suitable approach for a critical analysis of imperial, national, and local narratives and traditions. Recently, some historians have singled out the mythical dimension in national (and, one might add here, imperial) narratives. The exploration and deconstruction of these dimensions and narratives are important for processes as Europeanizing histories.⁵⁵ Most importantly, such an approach gives due consideration to the concept of place, whereas for many imperial and national narratives place is simply a subordinated function. Where *Poltava 2009* is concerned, it is apparent that a process of Ukrainian nationalization, in which different layers of remembrance intersect and overlap, has not fully reached the city. The recent political changes in Ukraine will bring about new changes in the interpretation of *Poltava 1709*. The political context presents a particular challenge for any historian studying *Poltava 1709* as a site of memory. Despite this, the approach suggested above may open up new possibilities for sketching out something that might be called a historical and cultural topology of Ukraine.

NOTES

1. See Neil Kent, *A Concise History of Sweden* (Cambridge, 2008), 92.
2. For a discussion of Pushkin's *Poltava*, see Andreas Kappeler, *Great Russians and Little Russians: Russian-Ukrainian Relations and Perceptions in Historical Perspective*, Donald W. Treadgold Papers in Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies 39 (Seattle, 2003). See also Lina Steiner, "My most mature poem: Pushkin's *Poltava* and the Irony of Russian National Culture," *Comparative Literature* 61, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 97–127.

3. John Erickson, *The Road to Berlin: Stalin's War with Germany*, vol. 2 (London, 1983), 43.
4. For a critical reassessment of Soviet military historiography on the Battle of Poltava, see Jörg-Peter Findeisen, "Poltava: Zu sowjetischen Betrachtungen dieser welthistorischen Schlacht," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 40, no. 2 (1992): 151.
5. For a recent Russian perspective, see Galina Ulianova, *Natsional'nye torzhestva (1910–1913 gg.) v Rossii v nachale XX veka* (Moscow, 2002), 542–76, esp. 549–51.
6. See, e.g., Jerzy Lukowski and Hubert Zawadzki, *A Concise History of Poland* (Cambridge, 2001), 83–84.
7. "Although this may be an exaggeration, it may be said that prior to Poltava, despite sufferings and contradictions, Ukraine was still proceeding along its own trajectory. The Poltava watershed sharply demarcated the pre-colonial period and the colonial period" (Перебільшено, але можна сказати, що до Полтави, хай у муках і суперечностях, Україна йшла все-таки власною траєкторією. Полтавський вододіл різко розмежував добу доколоніальну і добу колоніальну). See Iurii Shevel'ov, "Do pytannia periodyzatsii istorii ukrains'koï mowy," in *Ukraina: kul'turna spadshchyna, natsional'na svidomist', derzhavnist'*, vyp. 5 (Lviv, 1998), 691.
8. "Від Полтавського бою почалися різкі й рішучі, на віки остаточні зміни в статусі й стані України." *Ibid.*, 690.
9. Serhii Plokhy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus* (Cambridge, 2006), 254.
10. See, e.g., Frank Sysyn, "The Reemergence of the Ukrainian Nation and Cossack Mythology," *Social Research* 58, no. 4 (Winter 1991): 845–64; and Jana Bürgers, "Bohdan Chmel'nyts'kyj und der Kosakenmythos in der postsowjetischen Ukraine," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 50, no. 1 (2002): 62–85. For a more general discussion, see Serhii Plokhy, *Ukraine and Russia: Representations of the Past* (Toronto, 2008).
11. For more details on Baturyn, see V. H. [Viktor Hennadiiovych] Kyrkevych and V. D. [Volodymyr Denysovych] Virots'kyi, *Het'mans'ka stolycia Baturyn* (Kyiv, 2007).
12. Pierre Nora, "Entre Mémoire et Histoire: la problématique des lieux," in *La République*, vol. 1 of *Les Lieux de mémoire* (Paris, 1984), xxxiv.
13. See, e.g., *Deutsche Erinnerungsorte*, ed. Etienne François and Hagen Schulze (Munich, 2001); Antoine Marès, ed., *Lieux de mémoire en Europe centrale* (Paris, 2009).
14. Henry Rousso, "History of Memory, Policies of the Past: What For?" in *Conflicted Memories: Europeanizing Contemporary Histories*, ed. Konrad H. Jarausch and Thomas Lindenberger; in collaboration with Annelie Ramsbrock (New York, 2007), 28.

15. The program, codirected by Romea Kliewer, was part of Geschichtswerkstatt Europa and financed by the Stiftung Erinnerung, Verantwortung, Zukunft (EVZ), the History Seminar of Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg (Germany) and the Robert-Bosch Foundation. Its goal was to analyze processes of national and European identification in Ukraine after 1991 by exploring various layers of remembrance with respect to the Battle of Poltava. The program brought together fourteen students from Poltava's State University of Consumer Cooperatives in Ukraine and the History Seminar of Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg. The following students participated: Julia Kalish, Tetyana Komar, Malte Liewerscheid, Anastasya Malyenko, Petr Marchenko, Maria Martensen, Kristina Offterdinger, Laura Ritter, Yulia Rybachok, Sebastian Sparwasser, Clara-Louise Sutterer, Julian Voelke, Neele Wulff, and Anna Zub. The program resulted in the publication of *Wie ein Schwede bei Poltawa: Die Erinnerung an die Schlacht von Poltawa 1709 und ihre Bedeutung für die Identitätssuche der Ukraine in Europa*, ed. Romea Kliewer and Guido Hausmann (Felsberg, 2010). The present article is based on the results of the program. I am grateful to all the participants, and especially to Dr. Olena Kobzar, who teaches at the Poltava University of Consumer Cooperatives in Ukraine.
16. Reenactments of Cossack battles and similar festivities have taken place in Ukraine since 1999. See Sysyn, "Reemergence," 846; the 1700 siege of Narva was reenacted in 2000.
17. See Olena Kobzar, "Politische Kämpfe um die Schlacht bei Poltawa—300 Jahre danach," in *Wie ein Schwede bei Poltawa*, 95–97.
18. See *Vechirnia Poltava*, 24 June 2009, 1.
19. *Ibid.*, 2.
20. Russia sent the largest delegation to Poltava, which included Viktor Chernomyrdin, the former Ambassador of Russia to Ukraine, several deputies of the State Duma, and a number of businessmen.
21. See Nadiia Didenko, "Cherez 300 rokiv na Poli Poltav's'koi bytvy hovoryly movoiu dobra i vzaiemopovahy. A harmaty ta rushnytsi zamyly na holubiv myru," *Vechirnia Poltava*, 1 July 2009, 2.
22. Ukaz Prezidenta Ukraïny no. 955/2007 at: www.president.gov.ua/documents/6798.html (19 June 2009); <http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/9102.html> (19 June 2009). For the Poltava oblast administration's view as formulated by its press service, see Tetiana Aleksandrova, "Hetmana Ivana Mazepu na Poltavshchyni vshanovuiut', iak velyt' sovist'," *Vechirnia Poltava*, 24 June 2009, 3.
23. Didenko, "Cherez 300 rokiv," 1.
24. *Kievskii telegraf*, 26 June–2 July 2009, 9.
25. See Ivan F. Pavlovskii, *Katalog muzeia Poltavskoi bitvy na shvedskoi mogile* (Poltava, 1910). This museum catalog contains a list of exhibits, most of which are duplicates of originals from the Hermitage in St. Petersburg.
26. *Putevoditel' po ekspozitsii muzeia, istoricheskim mestam i pamiatnikam Poltavskoi bitvy* (Kharkiv, 1954), 3.

27. Ibid., 21–32.
28. See, e.g., L. Shendryk, “Poltava i Shvetsiia z perspektyvy s’ohodennia,” *Krai*, 21 July 2005, 4.
29. For a more general discussion, see Wilfried Jilge, “The Politics of History and the Second World War in Post-Communist Ukraine (1986/1991–2004/2005),” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 54, no. 1 (2006): 50–81; Wilfried Jilge, “Von der Perestrojka zur orangefarbenen Revolution: Geschichtspolitik und national-staatliche Symbole in der Ukraine (1990/1991–2004),” unpublished manuscript, 8–12.
30. For a discussion of more decisive battles, see Gerd Krumreich, “Einleitung: Schlachtenmythen in der Geschichte,” in *Schlachtenmythen: Ereignis—Erzählung—Erinnerung*, Europäische Geschichtsdarstellungen, 2, ed. Gerd Krumeich and Susanne Brandt (Cologne, 2003), 1–7; on the battle, see Charles Spencer, *Blenheim: Battle for Europe* (London, 2004). On the aftermath of the battle, see Laura Ritter, “Höchstädt 1704 und Poltawa 1709: Zwei europäische Schlachten im Erinnerungsvergleich,” in *Wie ein Schwede bei Poltawa*, 113–15.
31. See <http://www.blindheim.de/schlacht1704/>; *1704–2004: The Battle of Blenheim, ein Dorf gedenkt seiner Geschichte*, produced by Gerd Pecher, DVD.
32. See Malte Liewerscheidt, “Boyne 1690 und Poltawa 1709—vergleichbar?” in *Wie ein Schwede bei Poltawa*, 111–12.
33. See *Kulikovo pole i ratnye polia Evropy: proshloe i nastoiashchee: Materialy Mezhdunarodnogo kongressa “Kulikovo pole sredi ratnykh polei Evropy”*: Moskva–Kulikovo pole, 31 maia–2 iunია 2000 g., ed. A. N. Naumov (Tula, 2002).
34. L. Shendrik and A. V. Ianovich, “Istoriia sozdaniia kompleksa pamiatnikov na pole Poltavskoi bitvy,” in *Kulikovo pole*, 97–100.
35. Ivan Frantsevich Pavlovskii, *Poltavskaia bitva: 27 iunია 1709 g.* (Kharkiv, 2008); see also his *Bitva pod Poltavoi 27-go iunია 1709 goda i ee pamiatniki* (Kharkiv, 2009); and *Zapiski o Poltave i ee pamiatnikakh* (Kharkiv, 2009).
36. For more information on Ivan Pavlovskii, see V. Mokliak, introduction to *Bitva pod Poltavoi*.
37. Oleksandr Andriiovych Bilous’ko and Volodymyr Oleksandrovych Mokliak, *Nova istoriia Poltavshchyny: Druha polovyna XVI–druha polovyna XVIII stolittia* (Poltava, 2003), 193.
38. Ibid., 195 (the monument) and 199–200 (biographies).
39. See, e.g., Valerii F.Voloskov, *“Bylo delo pod Poltavoi...”: nauchno-khudozhestvennoe izdanie* (Poltava, 2009). A history of the city, published in honor of the 1100th jubilee, is still in print: V. Ie. Loburets, *Poltava: Istorychnyi narys: Poltava* (Poltava, 1999); this book is arguably the authoritative history of the city. On the Battle of Poltava, see 62–70. See also L. K. Shendryk and O. V. Ianovych, *I. S. Mazepa: Doslidzhennia portretiv hetmana*, 4th ed. (Poltava, 2007). For an international academic collaborative publication, see *Karl XII: postat’ na tli epokhy: Materialy naukovooho seminaru (22–24 kvitnia 2002 r.)* (Poltava 2002).
40. Serhii O. Pavlenko, *Mif pro Mazepu* (Chernihiv, 1998); see also his *Otochennia*

- het'mana Mazepy: Soratnyky ta pribichnyky* (Kyiv, 2004); and *Ivan Mazepa iak budivnychyi ukrains'koï kul'tury* (Kyiv, 2005). For a more popular work, see Ol'ha Kovalevs'ka, *Ivan Mazepa u zapytanniakh ta vidpovidiakh*, 2nd rev. ed. (Kyiv, 2008).
41. Tat'iana Tairova-Iakovleva, *Mazepa*, Zhizn' zamechatel'nykh liudei, vyp. 1241 (1041) (Moscow, 2007); in other Russian studies, even those written by scholars of the younger or middle generations, Mazepa's decision to switch sides is still termed treason. See, e.g., N. M. Rogozhin and G. A. Sanin, "Rossiia i Ukraina v XVI–XVIII vekakh," in *Istoriia russko-ukrainskikh otnoshenii v XVII–XVIII vekakh (k 350-letiiu Pereiaslavskoi Rady)*, Biulleten' Institut Rossiiskoi istorii RAN, vyp. 2, ed. L. P. Kolodnikova (Moscow, 2006), 8–16, here 13.
 42. See, e.g., Viktor Horobets', *Volymo tsaria skhidnoho: Ukrains'kyi Het'manat ta rosiis'ka dynastiia do i pislia Pereiaslava* (Kyiv, 2007) and Taras Chukhlib, *Het'many i monarkhy: ukrains'ka derzhava v mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh: 1648–1714* (Kyiv, 2003).
 43. Vl. [Vladimir] Lapin, *Poltava—rossiiskaia slava: Rossiia v Severnoi voine 1700–1721 gg.* (St. Petersburg, 2009); Iurii V. Pogoda and Iaroslav G. Ivaniuk, *Poltavskaia bataliia: kreposti i geroi* (Moscow, 2009), esp. on the Russian general, Aleksei Kelin; Vladimir A. Artamonov, *Poltavskoe srazhenie: K 300-letiiu Poltavskoi bitvy* (Moscow, 2009).
 44. On Mazepa, see Nikolai I. Pavlenko and Vladimir A. Artamonov, *27 iiunia 1709* (Moscow, 1989), 177–82; Nikolai I. Pavlenko, *Petr Velikii* (Moscow, 1990), 261; Artamonov, *Poltavskoe srazhenie*, 339.
 45. Notably, Evgenii V. Anisimov and Aleksandr B. Kamenskii, *Istoriia Rossii 1682–1861* (Moscow, 1996), 66–68.
 46. Artamonov, *Poltavskoe srazhenie*, 393.
 47. T. Toshtendal'-Salycheva and L. Iunson, eds., *Poltava: sud'by plennykh i vzaimodeistvie kul'tur* (Moscow, 2009); <http://vvpb.shpl.ru> (accessed on 20 February 2011).
 48. Peter Englund, *Poltava: Berättelsen om en armés undergång* (Stockholm, 1988); *Mazepa e il suo tempo: storia, cultura, società / Mazepa and his time: history, culture, society*, ed. Giovanna Siedina (Alessandria, 2004).
 49. For more detailed discussion, see Carl Horst et al., eds., *Kriegsniederlagen: Erfahrungen und Erinnerungen* (Berlin, 2004); Ronald G. Asch et al., eds., *Frieden und Krieg in der Frühen Neuzeit*, vol. 2 of *Der Frieden: Rekonstruktion einer europäischen Vision*, ed. Klaus Garber and Jutta Held (Munich, 2001); Peter Gray and Kendrick Oliver, eds., *The Memory of Catastrophe* (Manchester, England, 2004).
 50. See <http://www.battle.poltava.ua> (accessed 2 November 2011). The site is based on an idea suggested by Oleh Besverkhnyi and is supported by the Swedish Society of Military History and the Kulturamt Leinfelden-Echterdingen.
 51. M. D. Pletnev, *Dni Poltavskikh torzhestv* (Moscow, 1909), 19.

52. Vadym Diadychenko, ed., *250 rokiv Poltavskoi bytvy, 1709–1959: zbirnyk statei* (Kyiv, 1959).
53. Catherine Wanner, *Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine* (University Park, Penn., 1998), 148.
54. For an analysis of the daily and weekly press, see Claudia Neubert, *Nationsbildung in der Ukraine und die Figur Ivan Mazepas: ein moderner Mythos zur Konstruktion kollektiver Identität?* (Vienna, 2008), esp. 86–87; a different view is proposed by Taras Kuzio, “Post-Soviet Ukrainian Historiography in Ukraine,” in *Internationale Schulbuchforschung* 23 (2001): 27–42, here 34.
55. See Konrad H. Jarausch and Thomas Lindenberger, “Contours of a Critical History of Contemporary Europe: A Transnational Agenda,” in *Conflicted Memories*, 10–11; Stefan Berger, “On the Role of Myths and History in the Construction of National Identity in Modern Europe,” *European History Quarterly* 39, no. 3 (2009): 490–502.