

## **Iurko Tiutiunnyk: A Ukrainian Military Career in World War, Revolution, and Civil War**

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*Iurko Tiutiunnyk was the second most important Ukrainian military figure after Symon Petliura during the Russian Civil War. However, between 1914 and 1922, he fought for a number of different masters: the tsar, the warlord Nechypir Hrybor'iev, the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee, and the Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic; in 1923 he had to reconcile himself to the Bolshevik regime after being tricked into returning to the Soviet Ukraine. In order to justify his repeated changes in loyalty, he constructed and projected several different personae. This article charts this process, suggesting that the opportunities and pressures driving Tiutiunnyk's adoption of new identities made him typical of his generation of Ukrainian military and political actors.*

### INTRODUCTION

The collapse of an *ancien régime* creates unprecedented opportunities for an empire's former subjects to forge new careers, live out new fantasies, and adopt new identities. This was the case after 1917 in Russia. The peasant conscript in the tsar's army could, in just a handful years, become a general, and the village teacher turn himself into a partisan leader. The revolution made it possible to spread ideas of national and social reconstruction, bringing them to a new audience. Under the influence of these ideas, the collapse of old

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hierarchies and expectations of behavior gave more and more people the opportunity to reinvent themselves as revolutionaries supporting doctrines with which they had had little contact before 1914 or as members of nations of which previously they had never heard. Thus, the Revolution and Civil War, in the word of Sheila Fitzpatrick, ‘tore off the masks’ and forced the subjects of the former Russian empire ‘to reinvent themselves, to create or find within themselves personae that fit the new postrevolutionary society’.<sup>1</sup>

This article examines the different personae created by a leading Ukrainian military figure in the Russian Civil War, 1917–1922: Iurko Tiutiunnyk. Tiutiunnyk had a very checkered career but rose to become the second most important commander in the Army of the Ukrainian People’s Republic after its head, Symon Petliura. Tiutiunnyk fought in the tsar’s army during the Great War, was involved in the Ukrainianization of Russian units after the collapse of the Romanov dynasty, and participated in anti-German risings in summer 1918. After the fall of the German puppet regime of Hetman Pavlo Skoropads’kyi, he served as the chief of staff of the warlord Nechypir Hryhor’iev, meaning he fought first as part of the Red Army and then rose against the Bolsheviks with Hryhor’iev. Following the dispersal of Hryhor’iev’s forces, he briefly allied with the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee, a body trying to create an independent, non-Bolshevik Soviet Ukraine. The failure of their revolt led Tiutiunnyk to join the army of the nationalist Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR) that fought the Bolsheviks until it had to abandon the country for Poland in autumn 1920. After emigrating, he supported the insurgents remaining in the Ukraine, and led the so-called Second Winter Campaign, a disastrous raid into Soviet territory, at the end of 1921. He continued to try organizing opposition to the Bolsheviks from abroad, until in 1923 the Soviet secret service (the State Political Directorate, hereafter referred to by its Russian acronym GPU) tricked him into returning to the Soviet Ukraine. He was captured, defected, and made pro-Soviet statements. Tiutiunnyk lived in the Soviet Ukraine until 1929, when he became one of the first victims of the purges of the Ukrainian intelligentsia at the end of the decade.

This history of constantly shifting loyalties was quite common among Ukrainian soldiers and politicians. An examination of Tiutiunnyk’s career, therefore, gives an insight into the personae created by Ukrainians between 1914 and 1923 in response to the changing military and political situation. Above all, his life is typical of the Ukrainian *otamany* (singular, *otaman*): independent commanders of peasant insurgents in the Ukraine who shifted their loyalties between the different warring groups in the country or, indeed, fought on their own account. Here *otaman* will be translated as *warlord* and the two terms used interchangeably.

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<sup>1</sup> S. Fitzpatrick, *Tear off the Masks. Identity and Imposture in Twentieth-Century Russia*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2005, p. 3.

The article draws on a variety of primary sources. Tiutiunyk published several accounts of his activity, some while he was an émigré<sup>2</sup> and others after he had returned to the Soviet Ukraine.<sup>3</sup> He also gave description of his life to the Soviet secret services on his arrival in the country in 1923.<sup>4</sup> Three Ukrainian archives hold materials on Tiutiunyk. The Central State Archive of Public Organisations of Ukraine<sup>5</sup> has leaflets and orders produced by Tiutiunyk while he served Hryhor'iev, as well as materials detailing the Bolshevik response to his activity. The Central State Archive of Supreme Bodies of Power and Government of Ukraine<sup>6</sup> contains agents' reports on Tiutiunyk, materials of the UNR government, and émigré biographies of insurgents. The archive of the Soviet secret services<sup>7</sup> houses the interrogations of Tiutiunyk and other Ukrainians who fought the Bolsheviks. These different sources enable a reconstruction of the different personae that Tiutiunyk constructed during the Civil War to mobilize support and in his later attempts to justify his actions, first for an émigré public and then for the Soviets.

### TIUTIUNNYK IN THE GREAT WAR

In 1923, Tiutiunyk told his GPU interrogators that he was born the youngest son of a family of middle peasants owning 6 *desiatin* (just over 16 acres) of land in 1891. He clearly felt it necessary to stress his status as an autodidact, describing how his father placed great emphasis on education; the example and intervention of Tiutiunyk's older brothers also spurred him on to improve his reading. Tiutiunyk's older brothers were involved in the Socialist Revolutionary movement. This brought official repression against his family, an experience that politicized the young Tiutiunyk. To the GPU, he portrayed this radicalization as national rather than socialist: He perceived the tsarist regime as 'Russian' and the landowners as 'foreign', and he became conscious of growing up in a region 'where the Cossack traditions of struggle for the Ukraine against the lords had been handed down from generation to generation'.<sup>8</sup> Tiutiunyk clearly wanted to convince his GPU interrogators

<sup>2</sup> I. Tiutiunyk, 'Revoliutsiina stykhiia', in *Zapyskyi heneral-khorunzhobo*, Knyha Rodu, Kyiv, 2008, pp. 18–92; 'Zymovy pokhid 1919–1920 rr.', *Ibid.*, pp. 93–210.

<sup>3</sup> I. Tiutiunyk, 'Z poliakamy proty Vkrainy', in *Zapyskyi*, pp. 211–309; I. Tiutiunyk, 'V borbe protiv okkupantov', in A. G. Shlikhter, *Chernaya kniga: Sbornik statei i materialov ob interventsii Antanty na Ukraine v 1918–1919 gg.*, Vseukrainskoe Obshchestvo sodieistviia Zhertvam Interventsii, Ekaterinovslav, 1925, pp. 210–228.

<sup>4</sup> O. Bozhko (ed.), 'Heneral-Khorunzhyi Armii UNR. Nevidoma avtobiohrafia Iu. Tiutiunyka', *Z arkhiv VUCHK-GPU-NKVD 10–11(1–2)* (1998), pp. 24–56.

<sup>5</sup> Tsentral'nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Hromadianskykh Obiednan' Ukrainy, hereafter TsDAHO.

<sup>6</sup> Tsentral'nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Vyshchych Orhaniv Vlady ta Upravlinnia Ukrainy, hereafter TsDAVO.

<sup>7</sup> Haluzevyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Sluzhby Bezpeky Ukrainy, hereafter HDA SBU, f. 6 spr. 73862, tom. 1.

<sup>8</sup> Bozhko, 'Heneral-khorunzhyi', pp. 29–31; quotation on p. 31.

of his revolutionary credentials, yet did not feel the need to express this in socialist terms.

Tiutiunnyk's military career began with his conscription in 1913. Service in the army during the First World War was significant in three respects. First, it further politicized and radicalized Tiutiunnyk by bringing him into contact with others disillusioned with the tsarist regime. He told the GPU that a land surveyor called Artiukhov, whose views of the national question were very close to the Bolsheviks, had a particular impact on him. Here, Tiutiunnyk was of course seeking to create a narrative for his interrogators that could lead to his amnesty by stressing some affinity with their views; still, the fact that Tiutiunnyk's service exposed him to people with radical views is entirely plausible. Second, the officers' treatment of the non-Russians, above all their attempts to 'de-nationalize' them, strengthened his 'hatred of the oppressors and love of his own Ukraine'. Third, it provided him with the military training and experience that he would later use during the Civil War. Tiutiunnyk particularly emphasized how he read all he could on military matters. Tiutiunnyk saw experience of the front, was wounded several times, and completed the *Voenaia shkola* ('military school'), achieving the rank of ensign (*praporshchik*) by the end of the war.<sup>9</sup>

The Great War clearly had an impact on Tiutiunnyk. However, it is also noticeable by its almost complete absence in his memoir writings. Only the autobiography he wrote for the GPU after his capture deals with it. Here he had little choice, as the GPU seems to have requested a description of his life from his childhood to his capture by the Soviet secret services. Where Tiutiunnyk could choose which topic to write about for publication, he preferred episodes from the Civil War. This is unsurprising. The 'struggle for Ukrainian independence and statehood' was the conflict he felt personally committed to, not that for the tsar. As he wrote in 1923 about his time in the tsar's army, 'It is clear that with such convictions I was an unreliable "defender of the tsar and fatherland"'. Nevertheless, Tiutiunnyk told his Bolshevik captors that 'I decided not to cross over to the German side openly, and it was not possible to escape anywhere because I did not have any connections with revolutionary organisations in either Russia or abroad'.<sup>10</sup> This suggests a certain embarrassment, at least in retrospect, that he had fought so long for a regime that he claimed to hate.

Consequently, it is difficult to establish how far Tiutiunnyk's experience of the Great War was representative. As with Tiutiunnyk, other warlords described the First World War simply as a prelude to the more important conflict of the Civil War. It is impossible to determine any commonalities regarding what they went through on the front or in battle. Judging by his

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 31–32; quotation on p. 31. See also I.v Tynchenko, *Ofitsers'kyi korpus armii Ukrain's'koi Narodnoi Respubliky (1917–1921)*. *Knyba I*, Tempora, Kyiv, 2007, p. 446.

<sup>10</sup> Bozhko, 'Heneral-khorunzhyi', p. 31.

memoirs, Iurii Liutii-Liutenko, who under the *nom de guerre* Gonta was one of the leading *otamany* in the Kholodnyi Iar region, barely saw any military action between 1914 and 1917.<sup>11</sup> By contrast, Il'ko Struk claims to have been wounded three times, albeit in an account distinguished by its untrustworthiness.<sup>12</sup> Nevertheless, Tiutiunnyk's military career did resemble that of other Ukrainian military figures in one respect: He, like many others, achieved the rank of ensign in the tsarist army. This rank was below that of a commissioned officer, usually held by cadets who had graduated recently. As Ziemke argues, it provided one with military experience greater than that of a non-commissioned officer, yet did not hold the stigma attached to being an officer.<sup>13</sup> It was the perfect training for a future career as a leader of a band of peasant insurgents. Former ensigns staffed many of the armies of the Civil War period. The Bolsheviks turned to them as one source of officers for the Red Army,<sup>14</sup> as did the army of the Ukrainian People's Republic.<sup>15</sup> Another typical aspect of Tiutiunnyk's early life was the connection of education with political and national consciousness. Many later *otamany* were educated peasants, a large number of whom (including Struk) had been village teachers before the Great War.

#### TIUTIUNNYK DURING THE REVOLUTION AND CIVIL WAR

By contrast to the missing years of the Great War, Tiutiunnyk's memoirs treat the February Revolution as a turning point full of opportunity. He tells how two soldiers gave him the news that the 'tsar is no more':

It was a little surprising. Just a few days ago, these very same 'uncles in greatcoats' tried to talk only in Russian, called me 'your honour', and sang 'God Save the Tsar' every evening, but now, when talking with one another and with me, they spoke their native Ukrainian language and did not hide from me their feelings on the occasion of the extraordinary situation that 'the tsar is no more'.<sup>16</sup>

While Tiutiunnyk was still a soldier (stationed in Simferopol), his initial activity was in the military sphere. He joined a Ukrainian military club that in May 1917 created a Ukrainian regiment of the same name from three

<sup>11</sup> I. Liutii-Liutenko, *Vobon' z kholodnobo iaru. Spobady*, Hamtrack Printing, Detroit, 1986, pp. 17–18.

<sup>12</sup> Manuscript, 'Otaman povstantsiv Il'ko Struk. Zi sliv Ot. Struka zapysav M.O.', TsDAVO f. 3504 op. 1 spr. 2 ark. 34zv-35zv.

<sup>13</sup> E. F. Ziemke, *The Red Army 1918–1941: From Vanguard of the World Revolution to US Ally*, Frank Cass, London, UK/New York, NK, 2004, p. 351.

<sup>14</sup> R. R. Reese, *Red Commanders. A Social History of the Soviet Army Officer Corps, 1918–1991*, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 2005, p. 24.

<sup>15</sup> For examples, see Tynchenko, *Ofitsers'kyi korpus*, passim.

<sup>16</sup> Tiutiunnyk, 'Revoliutsiina stykhiia', p. 18.

local reserve regiments with supposedly 5,811 soldiers and 36 officers.<sup>17</sup> Tiutiunnyk's émigré depictions of this event naturally presented this as a flowering of Ukrainian consciousness among the soldiers,<sup>18</sup> but later scholars have argued convincingly that many soldiers joined Ukrainian regiments in the belief that this would prevent them being sent to the front and allow them to go home quickly.<sup>19</sup> Tiutiunnyk soon became involved in national politics, serving as a delegate to both the Second All-Ukrainian Military Congress and the Central Rada,<sup>20</sup> the Ukrainian body that brought together Ukrainian nationalists and sought to present itself as the representative of the lands it claimed were Ukrainian.

Yet it was as a local actor that Tiutiunnyk began his rise to prominence. The war between the Central Rada and the Bolsheviks had forced the Ukrainian nationalists to turn to the Central Powers for assistance. The latter ejected the Red Army from Kyiv in exchange for the promise of grain deliveries from the Ukraine. After the arrival of the Central Powers, Tiutiunnyk returned to his home of Zvenyhorodka. According to his account for the GPU, he did so out of protest against the Central Rada's invitation of the Central Powers to the Ukraine,<sup>21</sup> while in the émigré narrative he claimed that he returned to lead the local Free Cossacks<sup>22</sup> against the Red Army.<sup>23</sup> In June 1918, the peasants of Zvenyhorodka rose against the German brigades trying to take the grain promised them. The poorly armed peasants attacked rail lines and sentries, pulling back into the forests when threatened by larger punitive detachments; as soon as the latter left, they emerged again to wreak havoc on the attempts to take grain from the countryside. In July, the Germans could not guarantee the safety of the rail line between Khrystanivka and Tsvitkove. However, by the end of August, the occupying powers had put down the revolt by using cavalry units to draw the insurgents out into open battle and through the stationing of permanent garrisons.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>17</sup> O. Shatailo, *Heneral Iurko Tiutiunnyk*, Svit, L'viv, Ukraine, 2000, pp. 8–10.

<sup>18</sup> For example, see Tiutiunnyk, 'Revoliutsiina stykhiia', pp. 20–21, 29–30.

<sup>19</sup> R. A. Mark, 'Revolution und Nationsbildung: Die Ukrainische Volksrepublik 1917–1921', in A. Kappeler (ed.), *Die Ukraine. Prozesse der Nationsbildung*, Böhlau Verlag, Cologne, 2011, p. 306.

<sup>20</sup> Shatailo, *Heneral Iurko Tiutiunnyk*, pp. 11–12.

<sup>21</sup> Bozhko, 'Heneral-khorunzhyi', p. 35.

<sup>22</sup> This was a volunteer militia that emerged in several parts of the Ukraine and fought for the Central Rada against the Bolsheviks. They styled themselves after the Zaporozhian Cossacks, whom Ukrainian nationalists saw as the early modern precursors of their nation. For a history of the movement, see V. Lobodaiev, *Revoliutsiina stykhiia. Vil'nokozatskyi rukh v Ukraini 1917–1918 rr.*, Tempora, Kyiv, Ukraine, 2010.

<sup>23</sup> Tiutiunnyk, 'Revoliutsiina stykhiia', p. 70; Manuscript, 'Ukrains'ki Povstansi. Otaman Iurko Tiutiunnyk' [Based on the Words of the Otaman, Vynnytsia 1920]; written down by M.O., TsDAVO f. 3504 op. 1 spr. 2 ark. 27.

<sup>24</sup> For two very different accounts of the Zvenyhorodka rising, see W. Dornik and P. Lieb, 'Die militärischen Operationen', in W. Dornik et al., *Die Ukraine zwischen Selbstbestimmung und Fremdberrschaft 1917–1922*, Leykam, Graz, Austria, 2011, pp. 226–232; and F. Schnell, 'Ukraine 1918: Besatzer und Bestetzte im Gewalttraum', in J. Baberowski and G. Metzler (eds.), *Gewalträume. Soziale Ordnungen in Ausnahmestand*, Campus Verlag, Frankfurt, Germany/New York, NY, pp. 1561–1566.

It is unclear what role Tiutiunnyk actually played. One participant identified Tiutiunnyk as the leader of the rising, whereas the Germans believed the revolt's figureheads to be the former commandant of the town Zvenyhorodka, ensign Pavlovs'skyi, and the Shevchenko brothers from the village of Kyrylovka.<sup>25</sup> Tiutiunnyk ascribed himself an important position, especially in enabling the insurgents to get their hands on weapons, but also claimed that he had promised one of the Shevchenko brothers to stay in the background.<sup>26</sup> This uncertainty indicates that the revolts were local and disparate, with no individual commanding a unified revolt. Tiutiunnyk escaped arrest during the rising itself, but, he claimed, under pressure from the German authorities went to Kyiv where he was involved in underground activities against Pavlo Skoropads'kyi, whom the Germans had installed in power in the place of the Central Rada. For this, he was arrested. Consequently, he did not take part in the rising against Skoropads'kyi of more left-leaning nationalists led by Symon Petliura in the name of a Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR). According to both his published émigré accounts and his autobiography for the GPU, after a month's imprisonment, Tiutiunnyk, alongside other inmates, overpowered the guard and was able to participate in the city's capture by anti-Skoropads'kyi forces in mid-December 1918.<sup>27</sup>

When the Directory took power, Tiutiunnyk was connected to the left wing of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (UPSR). These were known as the *borot'bisty* after the journal they published. They supported the soviets as a system of government, criticized the nationalism of other Ukrainian parties, opposed state borders, and wanted peace between the brother workers of Russia and the Ukraine. In May 1918, they left the UPSR to form their own party, which cooperated with the Bolsheviks and eventually merged with them in March 1920.<sup>28</sup> The *borot'bisty* sent Tiutiunnyk to work with the Nechypir Hryhor'iev. At the time, Hryhor'iev commanded a Red Army brigade in the south of the Ukraine. However, like Tiutiunnyk, Hryhor'iev had served many other masters already. He had been in the Russian army during the Russo-Japanese War and then the First World War, rising from the rank of ensign to that of staff captain by 1917. Later that year, he fought against the Bolsheviks for the Central Rada. Under Skoropads'kyi,

<sup>25</sup> Shatailo, *General Iurko Tiutiunnyk*, p. 20.

<sup>26</sup> Bozhko, 'Heneral-khorunzhyi', pp. 38–39; Tiutiunnyk, 'Revolutsiina stykhiia', pp. 76, 87.

<sup>27</sup> Bozhko, 'Heneral-khorunzhyi', p. 40, Manuscript, 'Ukrains'ki Povstansii. Otaman Iurko Tiutiunnyk', TsDAVO f. 3504 op. 1 spr. 2 ark. 28–28zv.

<sup>28</sup> For an overview, see J. E. Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918–1933*, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, Cambridge, MA, 1983, pp. 53–62. A classic account by a participant is I. Maistrenko, *Borot'bism. A Chapter in the History of the Ukrainian Revolution*, 2nd ed., *ibidem*-Verlag, Stuttgart, 2007. Serhii Hirik has written a series of useful articles dealing with the positions of the *borot'bisty* on various matters. Of particular interest for this article is his 'Problema viis'kovoio budnivytsva v USRR i Ukrains'ka komunistychna partiia (borot'bystiv)', *Naukovi zapysky. Zbirnyk prats' molodykh vchenykh ta aspirantiv* 25 (2012), pp. 457–467.



he commanded a unit of the 6th Poltavan Corps, until summer 1918, when he rose in revolt against the German puppet. He became the leader of one of the largest partisan bands in the south of the Ukraine and acknowledged the power of the Directory of the UNR under Symon Petliura. However, after war broke out again between the Ukrainian nationalists and the Bolsheviks, he switched sides and joined the Red Army in February 1919.<sup>29</sup>

On arriving at Hryhor'iev's camp, the warlord made Tiutiunnyk chief of his staff. In this capacity, Tiutiunnyk participated — as a member of a Red Army unit — in Hryhor'iev's successful campaign in the south of the country against the interventionist forces that culminated in the capture of Odesa from the French in April 1918. Throughout this campaign, Hryhor'iev maintained a high level of independence, absorbing other Red units into his command, taking wagonloads of supplies for his own use, issuing grandiloquent declarations in his own name, and ignoring orders of the central command. At the end of April and beginning of May, tensions between the *otaman* and the commander of Red forces in the Ukraine, Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko, increased as reports flooded in of pogroms by Hryhor'iev's troops and other acts of ill-discipline; at the same time, the soldiers passed resolutions condemning the Bolsheviks' persecution of the Socialist Revolutionaries, calling for fair treatment of the peasants and demanding a united socialist front that included all parties standing on the Soviet platform. After over a week in which Hryhor'iev's loyalties were entirely unclear, the *otaman* publicly declared his revolt against the Bolsheviks. He issued a *universal* — the word for a decree of the Zaporozhian Cossacks on whom many Ukrainian nationalists styled themselves — in which he set out the supposed goals of the rising. This was a peculiar mix of peasant romanticism expressed in religious terms, modern political rights, opposition to Bolshevik dictatorship (and to all the other governments that had appeared in the country), and the desire for a Soviet government of the laboring people. As chief of staff, Tiutiunnyk was one of the signatories to the *universal*.<sup>30</sup>

The revolt was bloody yet doomed. Hryhor'iev split his forces in five directions. Initially, these moved quickly, as there were few Bolshevik forces in the rear to oppose them. When they captured cities, they committed deadly pogroms against Jews, Bolsheviks, and Soviet workers. Indeed, Hryhor'iev's were the most murderous of the period, on average claiming more than double the number of victims than those of the Whites. The Bolsheviks withdrew their troops from other fronts, and at the end of May, they inflicted a decisive defeat upon Hryhor'iev's main force. Hryhor'iev's

<sup>29</sup> A. E. Adams, *Bolsheviks in the Ukraine: The Second Campaign, 1918–1919* Kennikat Press, Port Washington, NY/London, UK, 1963; V. Horak, *Povstantsi otamana Hryhor'ieva (serpen 1918–serpen 1919 rr. Istorychne doslidzhiennia*, Polifast, Fastiv, Ukraine, 1998.

<sup>30</sup> Adams, *Bolsheviks in the Ukraine*; Horak, *Povstantsi otamana Hryhor'ieva*. For a copy of the universal, see Leaflet, 'Universal', TsDAHO f. 57 op. 2 spr. 398 ark. 2.



army broke down into small bands and scattered. Hryhor'iev himself remained in the southern Ukraine, attacking small Bolshevik detachments and positions and destroying lines of communication.<sup>31</sup>

Tiutiunyk led Hryhor'iev's forces in the east. Following the defeat of Hryhor'iev's main force, Tiutiunyk moved north to Kyiv province with 150 partisans. Here, another rising against the Bolsheviks by independent Ukrainian forces was already underway. In March and April, a group of *otamany* had tried to surround the city of Kyiv and march on it from all sides. The Bolsheviks had managed to disperse them, yet failed to capture the leaders. In June, the same commanders led a new rising. One further actor in this was the left wing of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party, the *nezalezhnyky* or 'Independentists.' They sought to create an independent Ukrainian Soviet republic free of Bolshevik domination in a revolt led by an All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee. They hoped to win the *otamany* to this cause; many of the independent commanders had indeed adopted slogans that called for the Soviet form of government and presented themselves as the representatives of the laboring classes. The *nezalezhnyky* set up a Main Insurgent Staff headed by the Independentist Iurii Mazurenko to coordinate the various commanders, yet it had very little practical influence over them. When Tiutiunyk arrived in Kyiv in province with his forces, the Staff saw the appearance of these new, anti-Bolshevik forces as an opportunity to strengthen the rising. It entered into negotiations with Tiutiunyk about subordinating his troops to their command.

Tiutiunyk later claimed that in summer 1919 he no longer believed in an independent Ukrainian Soviet republic. He disliked Mazurenko, seeing him as a politician, not a military leader. He only formally accepted the leadership of the Main Insurgent Staff in order to establish links to other insurgent leaders before joining the Directory. According to Tiutiunyk, he received command over forces under two other *otamany*, Diiachenko and Zalizniak, both of whom were happy to pillage and commit pogroms but were militarily unreliable. After establishing contact with the Staff in mid-June, Tiutiunyk captured Zvenyhorodka. However, a Bolshevik counterattack forced him to retreat, and in the middle of July he decided to take what remained of his forces west to join up with the UNR in Vinnytsia district.<sup>32</sup>

While Tiutiunyk was in the emigration and trying to portray himself as a constant proponent of Ukrainian nationalism, the period serving the Bolsheviks was an embarrassment. However, the fact that Hryhor'iev changed loyalties one more time and rose against the Bolsheviks allowed

<sup>31</sup> Adams, *Bolsheviks in the Ukraine*, pp. 307–312, 349–358; Horak, *Povstantsi Otamana Hryhor'ieva*, p. 144 ff., p. 176 ff. On the statistics for the pogroms, see H. Abramson, *A Prayer for the Government: Ukrainians and Jews in Revolutionary Times, 1917–1920*, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, Cambridge, MA, 1999, p. 116.

<sup>32</sup> M. Koval'chuk, 'Rol' vseukrains'koho revkomu ta holovnoho povstans'koho shtabu v anty-bil'shovys'komu povstans'komu rusi', *Pam'iat' stolit'* 5 (2000), pp. 101–105.

him to present his service in the Red Army as a mere prelude to this event. In one émigré account, he claimed that he had accepted the post with Hryhor'iev rather than a command offered him by Petliura as he was convinced that it was necessary to fight the Bolsheviks 'from the inside'. From the outset, supposedly, he had hoped to turn the *otaman* against the Bolsheviks: He had put Ukrainian officers into responsible positions within Hryhor'iev's band and after one and a half months had so brought the *otaman* under his influence that Hryhor'iev was willing to turn against the Bolsheviks.<sup>33</sup> By contrast, in his GPU autobiography, Tiutiunnyk sought to distance himself from Hryhor'iev's insubordination while a Red commander. He claimed that the *otaman* had turned against the Bolsheviks and published the *universal* without informing anyone. He left the warlord's staff to command the forces in the east as a principled protest at the warlord's insubordination against the Bolsheviks and pogroms. Tiutiunnyk admitted foreseeing the possibility of the rising. He, nevertheless, continued to serve Hryhor'iev because he had always considered himself a *national* revolutionary who had served the Ukrainian Soviet regime of workers and peasants because it was *Ukrainian*. Closer acquaintance with that state had caused him to doubt this Ukrainian nature.<sup>34</sup>

Both narratives are clearly aimed at rationalizing an incident that did not match the story he was trying to deliver to his audience. Indeed, many episodes in Tiutiunnyk's life did not fit neatly into either the nationalist or Bolshevik versions. Certainly, Tiutiunnyk never tried hiding from the Bolsheviks that he viewed the events of the revolution from a national perspective. Yet even this candidness does not necessarily mean that in 1919 he took exactly this stance. By looking at the proclamations Tiutiunnyk issued during the Hryhor'iev and Independentist risings, one can, however, reconstruct how the public depiction of his political goals changed at the time.

During Hryhor'iev's revolt, Tiutiunnyk issued Order No. 1, addressed to his partisans and the citizens of the city of Katerynoslav. The copy in fond 5 of TsDAHO is in Russian; it is undated but part of a collection of documents captured from Hryhor'iev's staff following his defeat at the end of May. The proclamation described a struggle by the Ukrainian people against oppression. In this, Tiutiunnyk and his followers were simply the executors of the people's will. The Ukrainian people, claimed the leaflet, had opposed the Germans and Petliura successfully. They had risen against Petliura because he had humiliated the Ukrainian people by entering into negotiations with the 'imperialist great powers of the Entente for his own personal gain. The new enemies of the Ukrainian people were the political speculators and

<sup>33</sup> Manuscript, 'Ukrains'ki Povstantsi. Otaman Iurko Tiutiunnyk', TsDAVO f. 3504 op. 1 spr. 2 ark. 28zv–29.

<sup>34</sup> Bozhko, 'Heneral-khorunzhyi', pp. 42–44.

looters calling themselves Communists, who had taken power in the Ukraine on the back of the Ukrainian people's heroic and victorious struggle against imperialism. The Bolsheviks held power with the support of the Cheka, through bribery and the help of Latvians, Chinese, and Hungarians, as well as other nationalities. They punished those who thought differently, subdued the free expression of the people's will, and spilled innocent blood behind the cover of fighting the bourgeoisie. The Ukrainian people, however, loved freedom too much and so rose against this power. Tiutiunyk made it clear that he was fighting under left-wing slogans. He declared: 'The highest right of a man is his right to the products of his labor. Only the laborers have the right to eat.' He denied that the partisans were counterrevolutionaries or bandits. Their struggle against the White general Anton Denikin, alongside their discipline and good order, proved that they were 'honest revolutionaries'. Tiutiunyk also called upon the citizens of Katerynoslav for help by creating their own freely chosen soviets. He promised them freedom of speech and thought.<sup>35</sup>

While there is certainly a national element to this proclamation, the socialist aspect is more striking. The text talks of the 'Ukrainian people', but this is as much a socioeconomic category as an ethnic one, as indicated by the repeated reference to the 'Ukrainian *laboring* people'. Their enemies are certainly in part defined ethnically, although not exclusively. Indeed, unlike other *otamany*, Tiutiunyk did not include Jews among his list of 'foreigners' helping the Bolsheviks, nor did he describe the Bolsheviks as Russians.<sup>36</sup> Certainly, the description of the Ukrainian people as freedom-loving might be a reference to a nationalist trope popular among the Ukrainian intelligentsia since the 19th century. Nevertheless, the text's anti-imperialist, anti-bourgeois, pro-Soviet, and pro-labor stance presents the partisans as a leftist Ukrainian alternative to the pseudo-communist Bolshevik speculators.

Tiutiunyk's Ukrainian-language Order No. 2, directed at the people of Zvenyhorodka province during his short-lived alliance with the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee, strikes a very different note. Above all, it identifies the ethnic identity of the Bolshevik enemy as 'our eternal enemy the Great Russians and their assistants the Jews'; elsewhere, the Jews are referred to as the Great Russians' 'blood brothers', while Trotsky is referred to as Bronshtein in order to emphasize his 'Jewishness'. The enemies described in the text are therefore primarily defined by ethnicity or nationality. He did, however, threaten to punish the perpetrators of pogroms. The text's more

<sup>35</sup> Extract from Order No. 1 Signed by Otaman Tiutiunyk, Commander of the Forces in the East, TsDAHO f. 5 op. 1 spr. 267 ark. 129–130.

<sup>36</sup> Other texts by Tiutiunyk also refer to the enemies of the Ukrainian people but again do not employ the canard of Jewish Bolshevism. For example, in a telegram to the Peasant *S'ezd* of Kherson, Tiutiunyk wrote that he was fighting 'Chinese, Latvians, Hungarians and other hired oppressors of the people', while in another to Aleksandriia he talks of 'Latvians, Chinese and other scum'. Typed copies of the telegrams are available at TsDAHO f. 5 op. 1 spr. 267 ark. 124.

nationalist tone is also evident elsewhere. It talked of the Ukrainian people spending almost 300 years under the Muscovite yoke and criticized the Bolsheviks for renegeing on the promise of offering self-determination up to independence. The Ukraine, claimed the leaflet, could build a new life for itself without help from outside, i.e., from the Russian Bolsheviks, as the Ukrainian people had expelled the tsar, the Germans, and the Entente themselves. The rulers of the Ukraine must be Ukrainian. This call for the Ukraine to recreate itself with its own forces became a commonplace among the far right in the interwar Ukrainian emigration. In addition, the text is more obviously directed at the peasant audience, decrying requisitioning and the violence used against the village. The civil liberties promised to the urban population of Katerynoslav in Order No. 1 are not mentioned. The claim that only those who work should eat is also not present. Nevertheless, Tiutiunnyk did call on the peasants to create their own soviets and described himself as fighting for an 'Independent Soviet Ukrainian Republic'.<sup>37</sup> Thus, the later leaflet still presented Tiutiunnyk as a leftist alternative to the Bolsheviks, but it certainly adopted a more stridently nationalist position.

Certainly, the Russian-language Order No. 1 was possibly intended for an urban readership and the Ukrainian-language Order No. 2 for a rural audience. The differences do indicate that Tiutiunnyk may genuinely, as he later claimed, have moved from the belief that one could only mobilize the Ukrainian people through nationalism rather than socialism.<sup>38</sup> The fact that this more nationalist position also entailed a more openly anti-Semitic stance underlines how anti-Semitism and pogroms were closely connected to Ukrainian nation-building during the Civil War.<sup>39</sup> Indeed, the proclamations issued by Hryhor'iev underwent a similar change. Hryhor'iev's uprising was always associated with murderous anti-Semitic violence. However, his proclamations in May muted their anti-Semitism slightly (although he did employ the canard of Jewish Bolshevism in at least one).<sup>40</sup> By contrast, his leaflets in June, following the defeat of the larger part of his force, were more stridently and obviously anti-Semitic.<sup>41</sup>

Tiutiunnyk, unsurprisingly, later denied that he personally, or the Ukrainian movement in general, was responsible for pogroms and claimed that he had punished those who committed them. Yet, at the very moment of refuting his guilt, he revealed his own prejudices and suspicions of the Ukraine's Jewish population. In an émigré account of the 1920 campaign

<sup>37</sup> Order No. 2 signed by Otaman Tiutiunnyk, 15 June 1919, TsDAHO f. 5 op. 1 spr. 154 ark. 174–176.

<sup>38</sup> Bozhko, 'Heneral-khorunzhyi', pp. 46–47.

<sup>39</sup> This provides some empirical support for the claims made in U. Herbeck, *Das Feindbild vom 'jüdischen Bolschewiken'. Zur Geschichte des russischen Antisemitismus vor und während der Russischen Revolution*, Metropol Verlag, Berlin, Germany, 2009, pp. 262, 265–266.

<sup>40</sup> Leaflet, 'Universal', TsDAHO f. 57 op. 2 spr. 398 ark. 2; Order No. 2, 20 May 1919, TsDAHO f. 5 op. 1 spr. 265 ark. 31–34.

<sup>41</sup> Leaflet, 'Seliane rabochie i krasnoarmeitsy', 11 June 1919, TsDAHO f. 5 op. 1 spr. 264 ark. 116–118.

against the Bolsheviks, he insisted that talk of the Petliurists' pogroms were tales made up by Jewish Chekists and commissars. Jews in general preferred to trust the Russians (even though they had committed pogroms under the Red general Budennyi and the White commander Shkuro) rather than the Ukrainians they lived among. The Russian Bolsheviks used this: More Jews served in their government than in any other, he alleged. Because the Jews did not have their own armed forces, they joined the Red Army. They thereby became a Russian weapon in the Ukraine. The Jews had also supposedly sought to defend themselves by 'screeching': Whereas the Ukrainians whose villages were burned down joined the partisans, the Jews who lost their homes went from town to town telling everyone of their woe, making false accusations against the Ukrainians.<sup>42</sup> Later in the same account, Tiutiunyk expressed his approval of a program adopted by a group of *otamany* from Derenkovets'kyi region in Cherkasy that called for the removal of Jews from governmental positions. This was an entirely understandable demand, he wrote, because 99 percent of Jews serving the Bolsheviks were Chekist executioners. Any possible future anti-Semitism among the Ukrainian people, he argued, was a product of the role played by young Jews during the war.<sup>43</sup> If Tiutiunyk had indeed held such views during the Civil War, it would not be surprising if he had inflicted pogroms on Jews as a form of collective punishment.

A change of loyalty accompanied the new, more nationalist persona. After the dispersal of the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee, Tiutiunyk marched his troops south-west to join up with the UNR army. In a declaration of 20 June, he justified this new allegiance with the claim that the struggle against the Communists had shown that the insurgents needed a centralized leadership. Certainly, the partisans knew that in fighting for 'the power of the laboring people, peasants and proletariat', they possessed different principles to the UNR. However, the changed circumstances meant that they were willing to give up this slogan in order to strengthen Ukrainian statehood and fight for social and economic independence.<sup>44</sup> This might be an admission that the political and military context determined changes in ideological goals. Alternatively, one could see the statement not as a description of the insurgents' motivations but rather a call to action — as an attempt to convince those who had previously fought for leftist beliefs that they could only continue the struggle against the Bolsheviks by compromising

<sup>42</sup> Tiutiunyk, 'Zymovyi pokhid', pp. 183–185. For Tiutiunyk's denial of personal responsibility for the pogroms during Hryhor'iev's rising, see Bozhko, 'Heneral-khorunzhyi', p. 44; for his claim to have punished the perpetrators of pogroms during the risings against the Bolsheviks in summer 1919 in Kyiv province, see p. 46.

<sup>43</sup> Tiutiunyk, 'Zymovyi pokhid', p. 194.

<sup>44</sup> Report No. 37 of the Information Section of the Tsk KPU, 12 November 1919, TsDAHO f. 1 op. 20 spr. 39 ark. 126–127.

these views and allying with the UNR. Either way, the declared move from non-Bolshevik Soviet ideals to nationalist ones was explicit.

In July, his insurgents were reformed as a regular unit, and Tiutiunnyk himself became commander of the UNR's Kyivan army group.<sup>45</sup> Tiutiunnyk now had to deal with independent *otamany* who were unwilling to recognize centralized military authority. An account of the Kyivan group written for the UNR tells how Tiutiunnyk received several proposals to overturn the UNR government: on the one hand from his former Independentist and SR allies, on the other from a notoriously independent *otaman* named Iukhym Bozhko.<sup>46</sup> Tiutiunnyk refused. The account ends by quoting Tiutiunnyk's personal view that 'the current psychology of the masses demands command and not endless meetings'.<sup>47</sup> While clearly intended to stress Tiutiunnyk's loyalty, the telling of the episode also indicates that this was in question at the time: After all, several groups seem to have seen the commander as a potential usurper. Even Tiutiunnyk's call for strong military command over politics is a reminder that Tiutiunnyk was a poacher turned gamekeeper: He himself had only come to recognize the central authority of the UNR relatively late.

After joining the UNR, Tiutiunnyk remained loyal to Petliura for over a year and a half. Circumstances forced the Ukrainian government to fight a war of constantly shifting alliances and enmities. This created a situation that Tiutiunnyk knew well from his own period as an independent *otaman*. During summer 1919, both the UNR and the Whites pushed back the Red Army. They agreed on a line of demarcation, but in September war broke out between the two anti-Bolshevik forces. The following month, Tiutiunnyk with a number of Left SRs approached the anarchist leader Nestor Makhno to discuss a possible alliance against the Whites, without success. By the beginning of 1920, facing two enemies, lacking supplies, and struck down by typhus, the Ukrainian forces faced a resurgent Red Army and had to retreat to the west. In April 1920, the UNR allied with Poland. Together they captured Kyiv in May, at which point Petliura appointed Tiutiunnyk as chief of staff with the rank of major general (*beneral-khorunzhyi*). After the Polish-Bolshevik ceasefire, Tiutiunnyk's Kyiv division stayed with the rest of the UNR army in the strip of land between Poland and the Soviet Ukraine, where they fought a losing battle against the Red Army alone. On 21 November 1920, the Ukrainian forces, finding themselves in an impossible position, crossed the Zbruch River into Poland, where the Polish authorities interned them.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Shatailo, *General Iurko Tiutiunnyk*, pp. 30–32.

<sup>46</sup> Tynchenko, *Ofitsers'kyi korpus*, p. 50.

<sup>47</sup> On the History of the Insurgency. *Otaman* Iurko Tiutiunnyk, 10 November 1919, TsDAVO f. 1077 op. 4 spr. 2 ark. 9–11; quotation on ark. 11.

<sup>48</sup> Shatailo, *General Iurko Tiutiunnyk*, pp. 32–34, 36–49, 54–57.



## TIUTIUNNYK'S EXILE AND RETURN TO THE SOVIET UKRAINE

Exile did not end Tiutiunnyk's military career. In February 1921, Petliura appointed Tiutiunnyk as head of the newly created Partisan Insurgent Staff (PPSh). Its goal was to contact, supply, and supervise insurgent bands still in the Ukraine in order to prepare the ground for a general uprising against the Bolsheviks. The PPSH hoped to start a rising at harvest time, as this would also coincide with the collection of the tax in kind when, they believed, peasant discontent with the Bolsheviks would be at its greatest. However, the Ukrainian military kept postponing the rebellion, in part due to the Bolsheviks' success in combating the insurgents and the underground organization that sought to work with them. Indeed, the Bolsheviks had successfully penetrated the émigré organizations and were well informed of developments in the PPSH. Consequently, the revolt only began at the end of autumn. The PPSH's plan was an invasion of the Soviet Ukraine from Poland and Rumania with small forces that would gain in strength as Ukrainian peasants and insurgents flocked to their cause; partisan groups throughout the country would, at the same time, attack the Soviet infrastructure and military. On 26 October, the first group crossed into the Ukraine from Polish Podolia (525 men with only 200 rifles); on 3 and 4 November, a larger and better armed force of 216 officers and 663 soldiers, envisaged as the core of a staff for a future army, left Volhynia. Both rushed eastwards, trying to capture Soviet horses and munitions, destroy Soviet infrastructure, and instigate a general uprising; they planned to meet up with each other nearer Kyiv. The two groups certainly grew slightly as some partisans and peasants joined them, but there was never any danger of a general uprising breaking out. At the village of Mali Myn'ky, Red Army troops surrounded the Volhynian group. The staff, including Tiutiunnyk, took the available horses and darted back to the Polish border; their men were either killed during the battle (about 250) or captured and summarily executed in the town of Bazar (359). The southern group from Rumania only entered the Ukraine on 19 November, after which the two northern groups had been dispersed.<sup>49</sup>

As head of the Insurgent Staff, Tiutiunnyk signed leaflets to be distributed in the Ukraine in order to encourage a general rising against the Bolsheviks. These reveal his new slogans for mobilizing the peasant

<sup>49</sup> There is a large and ever-growing body of literature on the PPSH and the winter raid. Some of the more concise contributions based on good archival material: I. V. Sribniak, 'Dial'nist' partyzans'kopovstans'koho shtabu pry holovnii komandi viis'k UNR u 1921 r.', *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zurnal* 5 (2001), pp. 107–120; V. Vasylenko, 'Pidhotovka antybil'shovyts'koho povstannia v Ukraini u 1921 r. (za dokumentamy HAD Sluzhby bezpeky Ukrainy)', *Z arkhiviv VUChK-GPU-NKVD-KGB* 30–31(1–2) (2008), pp. 138–197; idem 'Pivdenna hrupa viis'k UNR u pidhotovtsi antybil'shovyts'koho povstannia v Ukraini (1921 r.)', *Z arkhiviv VUChK-GPU-NKVD-KGB* 37(2) (2011), pp. 94–125. On the ignominious escape of Tiutiunnyk and his staff, see the account by a participant written in Rivno on 11 March 1922, TsDAVO f. 1078 op. 2 spr. 210 ark. 105–106.



population of the Ukraine. One called for a ‘people’s [*narodnia*] war’ against the Bolsheviks as an infallible method of defeating them: ‘There is no force that can defeat a people’, Tiutiunnyk claimed. Everyone, including women and children, is a Cossack (i.e., combatant) in a people’s war; all should recognize their leader and fulfill his commands without question. The enemy must be destroyed entirely, wherever he may be. For a people’s war, one does not need many weapons; rather one has to do everything to burn down or sabotage the enemy’s infrastructure and lines of communication, especially at night. Tiutiunnyk saw a Ukrainian historical precedent for this guerrilla warfare, quoting ‘Bat’ko Khmelnyts’kyi’, the head of a 1648 Cossack rising against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, as saying ‘The night is the Cossack’s mother and the moon the Cossack’s sun’.<sup>50</sup> Tiutiunnyk’s slogans had, therefore, become strictly national and adopted the language of uncompromising struggle, strict discipline, and the leadership principle. These values became a commonplace in the far-right movements of the Ukrainian emigration, with which Tiutiunnyk became associated.

The raid, however, had been suicidal. Only in the realms of fantasy could just over 1,000 men expect to conquer a country the size of the Ukraine. Nationalism could not mobilize the peasants, for all their dissatisfaction with the Soviet regime. Discussions as to why the raid failed — for example, the delay from summer to autumn, the Bolsheviks’ infiltration of the émigré organizations, and the lack of support from Poland and Rumania<sup>51</sup> — miss the point entirely, as they imply that there was ever any chance of it succeeding. Indeed, as the Bolsheviks noted afterwards, the PPSH had actually managed to overestimate the strength of Soviet forces by two and a half.<sup>52</sup> This underlines the foolhardiness of the undertaking: Even despite this inaccuracy, the Bolsheviks had more than enough troops under their command to resist the raid, yet Tiutiunnyk undertook it believing that the Red Army was much stronger than it really was.

One must therefore ask why Tiutiunnyk and the UNR leadership ever considered initiating the raid. Tiutiunnyk certainly had a skewed view of what was happening in the country. One captured Ukrainian agent responsible for maintaining contacts between the émigrés and the underground in the country described this extreme optimism to his GPU interrogators:

As he [Tiutiunnyk] put it, the rising must begin everywhere at the same time. Tiutiunnyk thought that for this he only had to move his finger over the map and give an order and that was sufficient. There abroad, several

<sup>50</sup> Leaflet, ‘Zapovidi. Narodnoi povstanches’koi viiny’, TsDAHO f. 57 op. 2 spr. 266 ark. 3.

<sup>51</sup> See, for example, ‘Pidhotovka antybil’shovyts’koho povstannia’, pp. 145, 149, 154.

<sup>52</sup> Minutes of the Military Soviet of the Ukraine, 26 November 1921, TsDAVO, f. 3204 op. 1 spr. 4 ark. 16–16zv.

people are convinced that it is only enough to begin the attack and the whole peasantry will go with them. This is how Tiutiunnyk thinks. The majority of those sitting there certainly do not believe it; Petliura himself does not believe it.<sup>53</sup>

UNR agents in the Ukraine were sending numerous reports describing the peasant dissatisfaction with Bolshevik agricultural policies, which the émigré nationalists interpreted as support for the UNR. Some of these came from active insurgents desperate for support from abroad.<sup>54</sup> On the one hand, any belief given to these reports was a sign of desperation. On the other, Ukrainian nationalists had repeatedly placed their trust in spontaneous risings of the peasantry throughout the Civil War; Tiutiunnyk's leaflet on a people's war was but an extreme example of this faith in the people. He had some reason for doing so, as such an event had once brought the UNR to power: Its most successful moment was at the end of 1918, when the Directory captured Kyiv on the back of a rural revolt against requisitioning that overthrew the German puppet ruler Skoropads'kyi.

In addition, Tiutiunnyk's optimism about the rising compared to Petliura was probably connected to the personal struggle between Tiutiunnyk and Petliura to represent the UNR army. One captured Ukrainian leader, for example, described how émigrés unhappy with Petliura wanted to hand power over to Tiutiunnyk. Consequently, Petliura was hesitant to put Tiutiunnyk in charge of the PPSH, as any success might lead to the latter replacing him as leader of the UNR.<sup>55</sup> The Bolsheviks' well-informed intelligence reports noted that Tiutiunnyk, the figurehead for those who wanted to continue the armed struggle, kept his preparations secret from Petliura.<sup>56</sup> Thus, perhaps Tiutiunnyk aimed to go ahead with the rising in the belief that it would aid his struggle against Petliura by presenting himself as the more active fighter for Ukrainian independence.

Certainly, Tiutiunnyk sought to establish contacts with other émigré military groups and right-wing thinkers to continue the struggle against the Bolsheviks. He met leaders of the Ukrainian Military Organization that conducted a terrorist campaign against the Poles in Eastern Galicia to discuss spreading their activity to the Soviet Ukraine.<sup>57</sup> Tiutiunnyk also worked with the rabidly anti-Russian Dmytro Dontsov, an émigré from the former Russian empire who developed a doctrine that called upon Ukrainians to

<sup>53</sup> Interrogation of Fedor Nakonechnyi, 22 July 1921, HDA SBU f. 6 spr. 74760 tom. 3 ark. 37.

<sup>54</sup> See, for example, the Report for the Supreme *Otaman* of Ukrainian Republican Forces by Symon Parubchenko, Representative of the Peasants and Insurgents of Southern Kyiv Province, TsDAVO f. 1078 op. 2 spr. 210 ark. 57.

<sup>55</sup> Minutes of the Interrogation of the Commander of the Southern Group of the UNR Forces Hulyi-Hulenko, HDA SBU f. 5 spr. 66646 tom. 13 ark. 29.

<sup>56</sup> Bulletin for Rakovskii by the Foreign Section of the VChK 'Petliurovshchyna', TsDAVO f. 3204 op. 1 spr. 12 ark. 150b-16.

<sup>57</sup> Shatailo, *General Iurko Tiutiunnyk*, pp. 84-85.

forsake the moderate politics and socialism of past generations, put aside party differences, and take up a radical struggle for a united, independent state unrestrained by moral qualms. Between the wars, this form of integral nationalism became ever more attractive to Ukrainians, especially among the young and those who had fought for the ZUNR and UNR.<sup>58</sup> Tiutiunnyk published several of his memoir accounts in Dontsov's journal *Zabrava*. His letters show that he advocated many of the central tenets of Dontsov's nationalism: For example, he wrote to Iosyp Pshonnyk, one of the leaders of the southern group of the Winter Raid, calling for all Ukrainians to unite to fight for the fatherland; their socio-political convictions were unimportant as long as they were patriots; it was only important to avoid espousing an ideology that came from the Ukraine's national enemies. The Ukraine must be created from below, and it was better to fight and be defeated than not to fight at all — a maxim that he explicitly related to the failed Winter Raid.<sup>59</sup>

Tiutiunnyk's association with the emerging far right ended dramatically: Less than a year after the aforementioned letter to Pshonnyk, the *otaman* was in the Soviet Ukraine calling on Ukrainian émigrés to make peace with the Soviet regime and go home. There was nothing in itself unusual about émigré Ukrainians who had opposed the Bolsheviks during the Civil War stating the need for such reconciliation and return. Many leading members of Ukrainian social and political life had taken up such a position, most prominently Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, head of the Central Rada and father of Ukrainian historiography. However, often these were figures on the left. They had published journals and pamphlets arguing that Ukrainians should support the Bolsheviks because they were the leaders of the international revolution or that the Soviet Ukraine met the national needs of the Ukrainian people. In 1923, the Bolsheviks introduced the policy of *korenizatsiia* ('indigenization'), which sought to combat Great Russian chauvinism by promoting non-Russians to party and state posts. In the Ukraine, this was understood as Ukrainianization, which also included the promotion of Ukrainian culture.<sup>60</sup> Before 1923, Tiutiunnyk had dismissed compromise with the Bolsheviks. In one letter, he even wrote that Andrii Hulyi-Hulenko (a participant in the Winter Raid who had been caught by the Bolsheviks while working undercover in the Ukraine, was made to confess, and sentenced to 10 years hard labor) should have chosen death rather than kneel to the Soviet regime.<sup>61</sup> The Bolsheviks, too, had seemed to rule out Tiutiunnyk's

<sup>58</sup> F. Golczewski, *Deutsche und Ukrainer 1914–1939*, Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn, Germany, 2010, pp. 512–520.

<sup>59</sup> Tiutiunnyk to Iosyp Pshonnyk, 14 January 1923, in V. F. Verstiuk, V. V. Skal'skyi and Ia. M. Faizulin (eds.), *Iurii Tiutiunnyk: vid 'Dviiky' do GPU. Dokumenty i materialy*, Dukh i litera, Kyiv, Ukraine, 2011, pp. 82–83.

<sup>60</sup> C. Gilley, *The 'Change of Signposts' in the Ukrainian Emigration. A Contribution to the History of Sovietophilism in the 1920s*, *ibidem*-Verlag, Stuttgart, Germany, 2009), passim.

<sup>61</sup> Tiutiunnyk to Pavlo Hotsuliak, 29 August 1922, *Tiutiunnyk vid 'Dviiky' do GPU*, p. 39.

return: The amnesty issued on 12 April 1922 by the Ukrainian Politburo to encourage UNR soldiers to go back specifically named him as one of the generals who would not be pardoned.<sup>62</sup>

Indeed, Tiutiunyk's return was not voluntary. The Ukrainian historian Iaroslav Fauzlin has studied this event in detail. In early 1922, the Bolsheviks started developing plans to capture Tiutiunyk. A key figure in this was K. Zaiarnyi, a courier between the PPSH and one of the leading insurgent leaders in the Ukraine at the time, Iuliian Mordalevych, captured in July 1921. Zaiarnyi sought to convince Tiutiunyk that an underground organization called the *Vys'cha viis'kova rada* (the Supreme Military Council, hereafter VVR) existed in the Ukraine with connections to all insurgent groups. Tiutiunyk sent several emissaries to the country to meet the group; indeed, a number of meetings, at which money for Tiutiunyk also changed hands, took place to convince them of the VVR's real existence. One envoy caught by the Bolsheviks became a double agent, while others were arrested. The Bolsheviks took advantage of three of Tiutiunyk's weaknesses: his belief that the struggle was still possible and necessary, the émigré need for funds, and Tiutiunyk's desire to be seen as the leader of the Ukrainian movement. On 16 June 1923, Tiutiunyk re-entered the Ukraine in order to meet the VVR himself, whereupon the GPU promptly captured him. A debate now ensued between Moscow and Kharkiv: Felix Dzerzhinskii wanted Tiutiunyk shot, while the Soviet Ukrainian government preferred to turn him and use him to discredit the Ukrainian national movement. The latter won, and Tiutiunyk received the chance to repent publicly.<sup>63</sup>

Tiutiunyk certainly had little choice: Either he accepted the opportunity to rehabilitate himself or faced probable execution. He claimed that the information from the Soviet press on the practical measures taken to combat the repression of the former oppressed nations and his personal acquaintance with several members of the Soviet Ukrainian government had shaken his belief that the Soviet regime was anti-Ukrainian; he was increasingly coming to the conviction that oppressed peoples had found a powerful ally in the Soviet Union. By comparison, the situation of Ukrainians in Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia was much worse; no Ukrainian patriot should therefore support the West in its struggle against the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, he refused to apologize for his earlier resistance to the Bolsheviks: Fighting under the national flag against the Soviets had been justifiable so long as the legacy of imperialism continued in the Bolsheviks' denial of the existence of the Ukrainian nation and while their nationality policy contradicted their own communist principles; it lost its sense when this imperialism disappeared.

<sup>62</sup> *Nakanune* 27 (28 April 1922).

<sup>63</sup> I. Fauzlin, 'Iurko Tiutiunyk i operatyna rozrobka orhaniv DPU "Sprava No. 39"', in V. F. Verstiuk, *Studii z istorii Ukraïns'koi revoliutsii 1917–1921 rokiv: na poshanu Ruslana iakovs'ycha pyroba. Zbirnyk naukovykh prats'*, Instytut istorii Ukrainy, Kyiv, Ukraine, 2011.

If the Communist Party held to its policy toward the national question, this would cause a revolution of no less importance than the social revolution, although he admitted that it would not be easy and require a lot of time.<sup>64</sup> Thus, even for his confession Tiutiunnyk refused to deny that he continued to see the nation as the greatest good. Indeed, we know that Tiutiunnyk's reconciliation involved imposture to save his life. His personal notes written after 1923 state that he saw the Soviets as an occupying regime.<sup>65</sup>

Tiutiunnyk's arrival in the Ukraine was seen as a great opportunity by the Soviet authorities to discredit the UNR government in emigration and bring about the dissolution of its army held in internment camps. In November 1923, an appeal from Tiutiunnyk to the interned UNR soldiers was circulated among the Soviet representatives for distribution among the emigration.<sup>66</sup> The plea, also published in the pro-Soviet, Ukrainian-language journal *Nova bromada*, called upon the soldiers to return to the Soviet Ukraine. Tiutiunnyk commended their heroic struggle for a united Ukraine but wrote that it had now led them to misery in the Polish camps and into slavery under Polish imperialism. The only true bearer of the idea of Ukrainian unity was the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, to which the people of Galicia and Volhynia looked for their liberation. Clearly, the appeal itself was directed more toward the national aspirations of the internees. However, Tiutiunnyk's letter to the editor of *Nova Hromada*, which was published alongside this declaration, praised the Soviet Ukraine in both national and socialist terms. Though it emphasized the Soviet Ukraine's role in unifying the Ukrainian lands, it also talked of a coming clash between bourgeois and proletarian dictatorships and argued that the Ukraine benefited more from the latter because it was a land of workers.<sup>67</sup> Nevertheless, it is perhaps astounding that the KP(b)U distributed a document that spoke so favorably of the UNR army's struggle. The party's willingness to make such a concession is perhaps an indication of the importance that they attached to the dissolution of the military camps.

Back in the Soviet Ukraine, Tiutiunnyk hoped to remain politically active. He still wanted to influence the emigration. He believed that the VVR—the front organization that had been used to entice him back — could be used as an émigré group to counter Petliura and promote the idea of return. He wrote to his associates abroad to convince them that Soviet policy in the Ukraine genuinely benefited Ukrainian national interests and that they had nothing to fear in returning to the country. Tiutiunnyk predicted the coming of a general European conflagration that the Soviet Ukraine could use to reunite the Ukrainian lands currently in Poland, Rumania, and

<sup>64</sup> Bozhko, 'Heneral-khorunzhyi', pp. 54–56.

<sup>65</sup> I. Faizulin, 'Iuryi Tiutiunnyk i radians'kyi orhany derzhbezpeky', *Problemy vyvchennia istorii Ukrain's'koi revoliutsii 1917–1921 rr.* 9 (2013), pp. 297–298.

<sup>66</sup> Shlikhter to M. Levytskyi and Kaliuzhnyi, 24.11.1923, TsDAVO f. 4 op. 1 spr. 615 ark. 83–84.

<sup>67</sup> *Nova bromada* 3–4 (October–November) (1923), pp. 152–154.

Czechoslovakia. Preparatory work was needed, however, before this could happen. To this aim, the VVR — with the help of the virulently anti-Russian Dmytro Dontsov, with whom Tiutiunnyk had had contacts in the emigration — should organize a declaration by émigré officers and civil officials that would reveal to the emigration Petliura's Polonophilia. Tiutiunnyk preferred not to sign this for what he called political reasons, perhaps meaning that he realized his return to the country had discredited him among the emigration and any declaration with his name on it would be treated with skepticism.<sup>68</sup> Nothing seems to have come of this proposed endeavor.

Tiutiunnyk's hatred of Petliura and the Poles<sup>69</sup> provided one area of common ground with the Bolsheviks. After reviewing Tiutiunnyk's archive, which he had given up to the GPU, the Bolsheviks judged that these documents were not particularly useful for intelligence. However, they did see the papers as good material to discredit the emigration and prove the link between the Poles and insurgency in the Ukraine. Rather than publish individual documents, the Soviet authorities decided that Tiutiunnyk should — under supervision — write his memoirs of the anti-Bolshevik insurgency as propaganda against Poland and the UNR.<sup>70</sup> The result was his Ukrainian text *With the Poles against the Ukraine*, an extended attack on both Petliura and his Polish backers.<sup>71</sup> While he also sought to discredit the insurgent *otamany* active in the Soviet Ukraine by presenting them as a group of Polish lackeys only interested in payment,<sup>72</sup> he did try to defend the Ukrainian regular army by presenting it as opposed to the Polish cause.<sup>73</sup> The book was supposed to capitalize on anti-Petliura moods in the emigration among interned soldiers; an attack on the Ukrainian regular army would have undermined its efficacy as propaganda for the Bolsheviks — but this did align with Tiutiunnyk's continued belief that the Ukrainian army's campaign had been just.

Tiutiunnyk also wrote a piece called *Under the Flag of Revolution and Democracy*, which appeared in Russian. It sought to expose Polish repression in the Western Ukraine and the bankruptcy of moderate nationalism. The only way to oppose this was a joint national and social revolution that would lead to union with the Soviet Ukraine. The author of the forward, M. Liubchenko, emphasized that Tiutiunnyk's past as a nationalist opponent of the Soviet regime made his words on the superiority of the Bolsheviks' emancipatory nationality policy over the Poles' repressive one particularly

<sup>68</sup> See the letters to Iosyp Dobrotvors'kyi, Oleksandr Udovychenko, and Mykhailo Dzikovs'kyi from the second half of 1923 in *Tiutiunnyk vid 'Dviiky' do GPU*, pp. 217–218, 224, 226, 230, 236–237.

<sup>69</sup> See the letters to Pavlo Hotsuliak (11 August 1922) and Mykhailo Palii-Sydorians'kyi (6 September 1922), *Tiutiunnyk vid 'Dviiky' do GPU*, pp. 28, 47.

<sup>70</sup> Reports from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, 21 August 1923 and 21 December 1923, TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.615 ark. 3–6, 127.

<sup>71</sup> Tiutiunnyk, 'Z poliakamy proty Vkrainy', pp. 211–309.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 253–257.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 216, 226.



important.<sup>74</sup> It was precisely Tiutiunnyk's past opposition to the Bolsheviks that made him such a useful tool in their propaganda.

Indeed, the Civil War continued to shape Tiutiunnyk's career in the Soviet Ukraine. From 1924, he taught at the Red officers' school in Kharkiv. When the Soviet diplomat Grigorii Besedovskii asked Tiutiunnyk what he was doing, the former *otaman* replied that he was teaching 'banditry'.<sup>75</sup> More strikingly, Tiutiunnyk played himself in the film *PKP: Piłsudski kupil Petliuru* ('Piłsudski bought Petliura'), shot in 1926. It recounted the Ukrainian-Bolshevik confrontation from the Polish-Soviet war of 1920 to the Winter Raid of 1921. The picture portrays the Ukrainians as simple yet venal dupes of the nefarious Poles; Petliura, in particular, appears as a comic villain. By contrast, Tiutiunnyk seems to be acting in a different film entirely. He issues orders to his followers with a decisive look upon his face and has lines that would not be out of place in a patriotic movie. On meeting the leaders of the interned army (about 25 minutes into the film), he tells them, 'Gentlemen officers, you are being sent to do difficult and dangerous work on which depends the fate of our homeland'.<sup>76</sup> There could be no better time for a propaganda film exposing the nefariousness of the Polish-Ukrainian alliance: Made in 1926 and screened in Paris and Berlin in 1927, it coincided with the trial in the French capital of Samuel Schwarzbard for fatally shooting Petliura and appeared shortly after Piłsudski's coup in Poland.

Tiutiunnyk wrote in private notes the he did not doubt that the Bolsheviks hoped the film would be the last nail in the coffin of the Ukrainian struggle for liberation. For all the heroism he seems to have tried to bring to his role as himself, he described appearing in the film as a personal humiliation. In his private writings, he seemed to justify it with a rant against the Ukrainian people:

Many-headed, stupid, blind crowd, do you understand, do you feel our national tragedy? You carried us, and me in particular, in your arms, crawled around [my] leg like a dog. If your leaders show themselves to you as clowns, who will you applaud, who will you welcome: your leaders or your all-powerful oppressors?<sup>77</sup>

It is unclear how Tiutiunnyk answered this last question himself. Did he think that by appearing in the film he would awaken the Ukrainian people to their national tragedy by revealing how far their leaders had sunk? Of course, we should not dismiss the simple pecuniary opportunity represented by the

<sup>74</sup> I. Tiutiunnyk, *Pod flagom demokratii i natsionalizma. Avtorizovannyi perevod s ukrainskoi rukopisi*, Izdatel'stvo UVO 'Chervona Zbroia', Kharkiv, 1924.

<sup>75</sup> Shatailo, *General Turko Tiutiunnyk*, p. 104.

<sup>76</sup> The film can be viewed online at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b3vf01KVDlw> (accessed 20 March 2014).

<sup>77</sup> Faizulin, 'Tiutiunnyk i radians'ki orhany', pp. 293–297; quotation on p. 297.



film, or that the main targets of *PKP* were Tiutiunnyk's two old enemies, Petliura and the Poles.

Tiutiunnyk's role during the Civil War and his continued unapologetic stance on it meant that he was one of the first to experience the repressions against the Ukrainian intelligentsia that accompanied the end of Ukrainianization at the end of the 1920s. On 12 February 1929, the Soviet secret services interrogated Tiutiunnyk, accusing him of having anti-Soviet beliefs and maintaining links with underground, counterrevolutionary organizations. The *otaman* adhered to the position he had used back in 1923, presenting himself as a supporter of the Soviet Ukraine for national reasons. Nevertheless, many of his responses were ambiguous. He praised the Soviet regime's cultural policy for strengthening Ukrainian national culture and allowing Ukrainian national forces to develop. At the same time, he argued that the nation's interests were not only served by cultural affairs. An independent Ukraine could only be bourgeois, as the Soviet system was against independence. Oppressed nations could only free themselves under a national dictatorship.<sup>78</sup> In the interrogation of 19 February, the secret police asked Tiutiunnyk how he could reconcile these positions with being a Soviet citizen. The accused answered that the Soviet regime, as a particular form of implemented social policy, is outgrowing itself, and clearly a time would come when it would have to take on new forms.<sup>79</sup>

During the interrogation of 12 February, Tiutiunnyk claimed to be at the disposal of the Soviet regime and be doing everything to gain its trust. However, he felt that the Soviet regime did not view him as a citizen of that state. Tiutiunnyk did not deny knowledge of the illegal organizations mentioned to him. Instead he claimed that he had refused to take part in them and warned those approaching him against participating in any activity against the Soviet regime. Nevertheless, despite his stated belief that such underground groups were dangerous, he had refused to inform the Soviet authorities of these groups as it contradicted his sense of honor.<sup>80</sup> On 19 February, the interrogator confronted Tiutiunnyk with apparently anti-Soviet statements he had made and contacts he had with those accused of secret activity against the state. Tiutiunnyk, again, did not deny these, but presented them as consistent with his claim of being a Soviet citizen, albeit not in all cases. For example, when asked about telling a group of student that 'We did our part; now it's your turn', Tiutiunnyk answered that he had never renounced his activity during the Civil War, but the call on young people to work in the Ukraine was exclusively in the cultural area.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> Interrogation of Iurko Tiutiunnyk, 12 February 1929, HDA SBU, f. 6 spr. 73862, tom. 1, ark. 6–7.

<sup>79</sup> Interrogation of Iurko Tiutiunnyk, 19 February 1929, HDA SBU, f. 6 spr. 73862, tom. 1, ark. 8.

<sup>80</sup> Interrogation, 12 February 1929, HDA SBU, f. 6 spr. 73862, tom. 1, ark. 6–7.

<sup>81</sup> Interrogation, 19 February 1929, HDA SBU, f. 6 spr. 73862, tom. 1, ark. 8–8zv.

His interrogators may well have used violence or the threat of it in the interrogation, but these interrogations do not read like the forced and fabricated confessions one finds later.<sup>82</sup> Tiutiunnyk sought to maintain the image of loyalty to the Soviet regime on the national grounds that he had used to justify his repentance in 1923 (and they had employed to legitimate their forgiveness). While he confessed to some of the accusations made against him, he consistently sought to adapt his admissions to that image. There was no outright statement of culpability, and Tiutiunnyk did not adopt an unequivocally pro-Soviet stance merely to appease his captors. As in the interrogation in 1923, Tiutiunnyk presented Ukrainianization as part of an unfinished process. Certainly, by contrast, he did not then mention at all the idea that the Soviet regime would have to transform into something else to meet the Ukraine's national needs. Nevertheless, while Tiutiunnyk's defense remained more or less the same, the situation was now entirely different. There was no place for those who supported the Soviet system in the Ukraine merely for national reasons. Tiutiunnyk was charged on 4 March with propagating fascism, concealing counterrevolutionaries, and having ties with counterrevolutionary organizations. He remained in captivity for the rest of the year, as the GPU sought to gain more information from him on the PPSH. Despite a decision to have him shot on 3 December 1929, the sentence was not carried out until almost a year later.<sup>83</sup> Tiutiunnyk was thus one of the first victims of the wave of repression against the Ukrainian intelligentsia and national communists that caught up many of whom, like Tiutiunnyk, had returned to the Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s.

## CONCLUSION

During and after the Russian Civil War, Iurko Tiutiunnyk created several personae for different audiences. At the time of the Hryhor'iev rising, he presented himself as a leftist Ukrainian alternative to the pseudo-communist Bolsheviks. After the dispersal of the warlord's forces, he increasingly adopted the identity of a Ukrainian nationalist and, when he became a commander in the UNR army, of an adherent of strict military discipline. While in exile, Tiutiunnyk argued that he had always fought for an independent, non-Soviet state, despite the obvious evidence to the contrary, and sought to depict himself as the most radical opponent to the Bolsheviks within the

<sup>82</sup> See, for example, H. Kuromiya, *Conscience on Trial. The Fate of Fourteen Pacifists in Stalin's Ukraine, 1952–1953*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, ON/Buffalo, NY/London, UK, 2012.

<sup>83</sup> Shatailo, *General Iurko Tiutiunnyk*, pp. 118–122. See also: On 3 April 1929, Tiutiunnyk wrote for the GPU the Scheme of the Organization and Work of the PP Staff, HDA SBU, f. 6 spr. 76862 tom. 1 ark. 26–29. On Tiutiunnyk's execution, see the Extract from the Minutes of the Sitting of the Collegium of the OGPU, 3 December 1929, HDA SBU, f. 6 spr. 76862 tom. 1 ark. 44 and the note from the head of the OGPU statistical section, 3 February 1932, HDA SBU, f. 6 spr. 76862 tom. 1 ark. 57.

émigré Ukrainian camp. This latter position brought him into conflict with Petliura, creating a tension with the self-image as a follower of military hierarchy. Tiutiunnyk's involuntary return to the Ukraine forced a new identity upon him, namely that of the *national* revolutionary willing to support the Soviet Ukraine because it had reconsidered its nationalities policy. During his interrogation in 1929, he maintained this persona in his defense, yet the shift away from Ukrainization meant that it was no longer enough to save his life. Certainly, some of these personae were impostures: In the 1920s, Tiutiunnyk still considered the Bolsheviks to be at the head of an occupying regime. On the other hand, even after 1923, he continued to maintain that he considered the national question to be the most important. We cannot know in most cases whether his shifts in loyalty were a product of new personae or whether he adapted his personae to his new allegiances. Either way, the projection of a particular image always had an instrumental aspect — for example, to mobilize support or find accommodation with a potential ally or with the Bolsheviks.

Clearly, Tiutiunnyk was a nationally conscious Ukrainian. However, within this identity there was room for many different allegiances. Such people could fight for Hryhor'iev, the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee, or even the Bolsheviks and still consider themselves Ukrainians. Thus, while Tiutiunnyk may have adopted new personae in the context of the changing political and military situation, the sheer breadth of political loyalties possible within a Ukrainian identity extended the options open to him. This was fatal for the UNR, which did not automatically command the loyalties of nationally conscious Ukrainians, let alone the allegiances of those living in the Ukraine who were not.

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