

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Ukraine, Russia, and the question of Crimea

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UKRAINE, RUSSIA, AND THE QUESTION OF CRIMEA

David R. Marples and David F. Duke

The Crimean question developed as one of the major crises of the post-Soviet period among the two largest Slavic states of the former Soviet Union. It is an issue with several dimensions: the historical background; the case of the Crimean Tatars as an *ipso facto* aboriginal population deported *en masse* toward the end of the Second World War; the military-strategic question, with Crimea as the base for the Black Sea Fleet; economic and social developments; and the legality of the 1954 transfer of the peninsula from the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) to Ukraine in 1954.

This article will not deal with every aspect of the problem.[1] Indeed its focus is specific. It seeks to answer several related questions: (1) What is the historical legacy of past acts of repression against the Tatars of Crimea? (2) In this history, what steps were taken by the USSR to defuse issues? (3) Why did events reach such a crisis in 1992–1994? (4) How far have they been resolved by Ukraine? In contrast to studies that concentrate heavily on the present, this focuses on 1992 as the pivotal year, one in which military confrontation between Russia and Ukraine may have come much closer than is perhaps recognized. The historical background provides the setting for this confrontation, which in essence has involved four main protagonists: Ukraine, Russia, the Crimean separatists, and the Crimean Tatars. In short, the article is divided into two sections. The first looks at the background of the Tatars in Crimea up to the period of Ukrainian independence; the second examines the struggle between Russia and Ukraine over the Crimean issue in 1991 to 1992, with a postscript on the contemporary period.

The Struggle of the Crimean Tatars: An Historical Perspective

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the magnitude of the Soviet mismanagement of the nation's economy, environment and political system has become starkly apparent. It is similarly clear that the disintegration of the Soviet federation has not quantitatively improved the possibilities for rectification of the more egregious errors of Soviet rule. The collection of former Soviet republics which have inherited these problems is faced with difficult domestic challenges, many of which are likely to prove insurmountable unless some form of multilateral cooperation is developed among them. More problematic than these domestic problems are those which now cross international frontiers. In the case of nationalities questions, aggrieved groups are now faced with the extremely difficult task of negotiating settlements with not

just one party—the Soviet government—but with several relatively new states more concerned with the problems of survival, and often at odds with one another.

This is the situation in which the Crimean Tatars find themselves. The Crimean Peninsula, their ancient homeland, is now the subject of contention between Russia and Ukraine. In this dispute the rights and aspirations of the Crimean Tatars, who want the region to become "an independent state within a union of other states," have been marginalized.[2] Historically, however, the problem of the Crimean Tatars has not simply been a Soviet issue. The Crimean Tatars suffered persecution at the hands of the imperial Russian state as well. In order to appreciate the position of the Crimean Tatars it is appropriate to review briefly the history of this dispossessed and uprooted national group.

The Crimean Tatars were Turkic members of the Golden Horde founded by Batu Khan in the early thirteenth century.[3] Following the conquest of Crimea by the Golden Horde in the mid-thirteenth century, these Turkic groups were encouraged to settle there; they did so, displacing the indigenous Slavic population and exacting repetitive tribute from a number of Italian trading settlements located along the southern coast of the peninsula.[4] The region was ruled by a series of governors appointed by the Tatar khans based in the city of Saray on the lower Volga: until the end of the fourteenth century Crimea and its capital, Solhat, was used by the Tatar khans as a semi-neutral site for diplomatic relations between themselves and the Turkic Mamluk dynasty of Egypt.[5]

By the end of the fourteenth century, however, the Tatar governors of Crimea began to establish an independent polity, separate from the rule of the Tatar khans of Saray. An independent Crimean Tatar Khanate appeared under the Khan Haci Giray in the 1440s, but was short-lived: the region was conquered by the Ottoman Turks in the 1470s and appears to have been absorbed into the Empire as a semi-autonomous province.[6] Although it was under the dominion of the Ottomans, the Crimean Tatar Khanate nevertheless prospered in the 300 years that followed, building an economy based on trade and in particular on the slave trade.

The Crimean Tatar involvement in the slave trade was to have very significant repercussions for later Russian–Tatar relations. The source of the slaves was the Slavic-populated land to the north of the Crimean peninsula. As Alan Fisher writes, "From 1468 ... until the end of the seventeenth century, Tatar raiders made almost annual forays into Slavic agricultural communities in the north searching for captives to sell as slaves."[7] Doubly offensive to the Christian Slavs who were enslaved was the fact that their destination was usually the Moslem Ottoman Empire. Slavery nevertheless provided the means by which the Tatars created a flourishing and elaborate culture centered in Crimea, represented by and reflected in great works of architecture and literature.[8]

As Muscovite power waxed in the seventeenth century, Russian interest in the Crimean peninsula grew. This was particularly true following the Russian acquisition of Left-bank Ukraine and Kiev from Poland in the mid-seventeenth century. One of

the major stimuli toward Russian conquest of Crimea was the Khanate's involvement in the slave trade, which was held to be not merely a challenge to Russian power in the region, but an insult as well.[9] But Emperor Peter I was primarily concerned with European politics and, despite calls for action from advisors, he did not move against the Crimean Khanate. It was not until the next century in the reign of Catherine II that the Crimean problem became a focus of Russian foreign policy.

The Great War of 1768–1774 was ruinous for Ottoman influence on the north shore of the Black Sea. In 1771 a Russian force invaded Crimea and forced the Ottoman governor to flee.[10] The Treaty of Karasu Bazaar, signed between Russia and the Tatars in November 1772, created an independent Crimean state under the supervision and protection of Russia.[11] Russian "supervision and protection" extended to three more Russian invasions of the peninsula in the next ten years. Bereft of Ottoman support, the independent Crimean state was in no position to resist these incursions, which eventually led to a complete annexation of Crimea by Russia in 1783.[12]

The initial years of Russian rule established a pattern of Russian mistreatment of the Crimean Tatars which has continued into the present century. Between 1784 and 1790 it has been estimated that, out of a population of approximately one million, some 300,000 Tatars fled Crimea and settled in Turkey.[13] In addition to this semi-voluntary exodus, the Russian government forced a resettlement program on the Tatars who remained in the coastal areas, compelling them to resettle in the interior of the peninsula where, as Peter Potichnyj has observed, they could be better controlled.[14] Two more migratory waves occurred in the nineteenth century: the first, in the Russo-Turkish war of 1807–1811, saw some 30,000 Tatars leave Crimea.[15] But by far the largest emigration occurred after the Crimean War. Robert Conquest has provided evidence that immediately after the war 231,177 Tatars left the Crimean Peninsula.[16]

These mass emigrations were harmful to the agricultural economy of the region and, belatedly, the Russian government attempted to discourage further Tatar flight.[17] Thanks to the salubrious climate of Crimea, the Russian government had little difficulty in attracting settlers to the region and this, coupled with the Tatar emigrations, meant that by the end of the nineteenth century Tatars comprised only 34.1% of the total Crimean population.[18] By 1917 this figure had fallen to slightly more than 25%, with Russians comprising almost 50% of the population and Ukrainians and other nationalities the remaining 25%.[19]

Significantly, however, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, at the very time that their numbers were being depleted, the Crimean Tatars experienced an awakening of national consciousness. The leader of this movement, which encompassed everything from pan-Turkic to Crimean Tatar national aspirations, was Ismail Bey Gaspirali, an intellectual who based his conceptions of a Tatar nationalist movement on the writings of Russian Slavophiles. Gaspirali preached a twin policy of support for the tsarist government and agitation for an independent Crimean Tatar

national identity under Russian patronage. This relative moderation was attractive since it accorded with the growth of Russian liberalism, especially after the turn of the twentieth century.[20] But the reactionary laws enacted by Nicholas II after 1906 damaged Gaspirali's program for Crimean Tatar identity. By crippling the liberal institutions which appeared briefly after the Russo-Japanese war, these laws destroyed the means through which Gaspirali hoped to work for change.[21]

The result of this setback was the appearance of a new "Young Tatar" nationalist movement, more revolutionary than Gaspirali's had been. This group was less concerned with placating the Russians and more concerned with establishing a Tatar homeland completely independent of Russian control. The Young Tatars identified the difficulties of the Crimean Tatars as stemming from land hunger created by Russian overlordship:

> Our people include 50,000 peasants without land—so that the land of the vakifs [Moslem state institutions], the state, and the proprietors of the crown remain unproductive, nourishing only a few privileged ones. All these lands have in the past belonged to the Tatar people; all have now passed into the hands of others.[22]

This statement, taken from a petition from the Young Tatars to the Second Duma, indicates the degree to which the Tatar nationalists had moved away from Russian liberalism, embracing instead the increasingly radical tenets of the Socialist Revolutionary party.

Interestingly, however, the Young Tatar movement was harassed by the tsarist authorities in the decade prior to the First World War not because of suspected political unreliability but because of suspected links with an emergent pan-Turkish movement based in the Ottoman Empire. In fact the Crimean Tatars were suspicious of this movement and consciously distanced themselves from it, primarily because they felt that the Tatars of Crimea were historically and culturally separate from the Turkish state on the southern shore of the Black Sea.[23]

When war broke out in 1914, the Crimean Tatars were, therefore, faced with serious problems of loyalty, caught as they were between the twin belligerents of Russia to the north and the Ottoman Empire to the south. The more radical Tatar leaders, those against Russia at all costs, fled into exile, while the majority of the Tatar people—including the more moderate nationalist leaders—fought with loyalty and skill for Russia. It was hoped that, by demonstrating their loyalty to the tsarist regime, concessions beneficial to the Crimean Tatars might be extracted from it following the war.[24]

These hopes were dashed by the fall of the tsarist government, the Revolutions of 1917, and especially by the chaos created by the Russian Civil War. Initially it seemed that the confusion of 1917 provided the Crimean Tatar nationalists with a golden opportunity: the radical nationalist leaders, returning from exile, proclaimed Crimean autonomy in May 1917, followed by the declaration of an independent Crimean Democratic Republic (CDR) in October of that year.[25] The CDR was very

short-lived, however. In February 1918 it was crushed by the Bolsheviks, but before they could contrive a replacement, Crimea degenerated into chaos as it became a major battleground for militant nationalist Tatars, the Bolshevik armies, the White Armies, and foreign troops intervening in the Civil War.

When the Whites (Baron Peter Wrangel) and other counter-revolutionary forces were finally driven from the Crimean Peninsula in 1920 the political future of the region was still unclear. On the one hand there was a great deal of Ukrainian agitation that the area should be incorporated into the new Ukrainian SSR; on the other it was advantageous for Russia to retain direct control over the peninsula in order to secure command over the northern coast of the Black Sea, and thus over Ukraine as well.[26] On October 18, 1921, Lenin personally decided on the creation of a Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) within the RSFSR, and under this arrangement, especially in the 1920s, the Crimean Tatars enjoyed a significant degree of freedom in cultural and linguistic affairs.[27]

Economically, however, in the last, chaotic years of War Communism the Crimean Tatars suffered terrible hardship. An almost total collapse of industrial production coupled with rampant inflation and food shortages threatened the basic economic fabric of the region. According to Alan Fisher, the price of a loaf of bread rose from 90,000 rubles in October 1921 to over 150,000 rubles in May 1922.[28] Statistics reported in *Izvestiya* painted a grim tale of suffering and famine: between February and April 1922 it was estimated that over a third of a million people were starving, and of these slightly more than 47,000 had died.[29]

These severe economic dislocations and the associated famine were not, of course, restricted to the Crimean Peninsula alone. The economic catastrophe of War Communism forced the Bolshevik leadership in Moscow to retreat from the program's more severe aspects, replacing them with the relative liberality of the New Economic Policy (NEP). Under the NEP, and under the direction of the pre-revolutionary nationalist leaders, who by and large survived the Revolution politically, the Crimean Tatars enjoyed a veritable cultural and economic renaissance. Under the Crimean Tatar and Bolshevik leader Veli Ibrahimov the Crimean Tatars enjoyed significant participation in and control over the government of the region. The pre-revolutionary land hunger was largely alleviated by transferring land held formerly by absentee Russian landowners to local villages for their utilization. Most importantly, however, the instruments of Tatar culture were reinstituted: Tatar schools, newspapers and cultural groups flourished, all of which contributed to a burgeoning interest in Tatar culture and history.[30]

Such development was to end abruptly by the end of the 1920s. Tatar intellectuals who had survived the 1920s were persecuted in the mass purges of the 1930s, which, in turn, as in other non-Russian areas, was followed by an intense and aggressive period of Russification designed to eradicate Tatar nationalism completely. The Cyrillic alphabet replaced the Turkic script; Tatar literature was declared non-prole-

tarian and non-Soviet; and large numbers of Tatar scientists, political leaders, and writers fell victim to the NKVD between 1936 and 1938.[31]

The national and political situation in Crimea by the start of the Second World War had become exceedingly complex. The Tatar population stood at 218,179, or 19.8% of the total population of 1,126,429. Russians composed 558,481, or 49.6%; Ukrainians, 154,120 or 13.7%; Germans, 65,452 or 4.6%; Greeks, 20,652 or 1.8%; and Bulgarians, 15,353 or 1.4%. As the war progressed, the number of Crimean Tatars thinned still further, so that by mid-1944, it constituted 19.4% of the total population.[32]

When the Wehrmacht overran the region in late 1941, it was welcomed as a liberating force, evidently by a substantial number of the Crimean Tatar population. An estimated 40,000 residents of Crimea were recruited into the Red Army. However, a number of Tatar leaders assisted the German–Romanian occupants. Thus the reconnaissance section of the 11th German Army informed the command group of Army Group South that a "large number of volunteers" had been recruited from the Tatar population: "The Tatars want to join together with the German army units and struggle against Bolshevism for the protection of their people and homeland ..." This collaboration is confirmed from the Soviet side. Thus V. S. Bulatov, the First Secretary of the Crimean party committee, pointed out that "At the start of the occupation of Crimea, through perfidious demagogy and ingratiating themselves with the Crimean Tatars ... some Tatars joined their side."[33]

In a pioneering article based on recent archival data, the historian M. F. Buhay observes that in the subunits of the German army on the peninsula were to be found some 20,000 Tatars, or about 10% of their prewar population. Given the recruitment to the Red Army described above, the figure would suggest that a significant portion of the Tatar population had effectively defected to the occupiers. By contrast, only 600 Tatars were fighting in the partisan units on the peninsula, compared to almost 2,000 Russians. The Germans exploited this anti-Soviet sentiment by forming local Tatar committees, including a principal one in Simferopol, which reportedly tried to extend its authority across the peninsula. Soviet propaganda failed to challenge that of the occupation forces.[34]

Soon after the Red Army reconquered Crimea in April 1944, Stalin ordered punitive action against the entire Crimean Tatar population, on the grounds that it had actively collaborated with the Germans. Thus on 13 April 1944, the People's Commissariats of Internal Affairs and State Security issued a joint decree: "About measures for cleansing the territory of the Crimean ASSR of anti-Soviet elements." As soon as Crimea was reoccupied, the Soviet authorities started to establish NKVD and MVD organs on the peninsula for this purpose. Some 20,000 units were dispersed over seven sectors of the peninsula, and as early as 17–20 April 1944, some 180,000 people were removed from the area, including the prominent leaders of the Tatar committees that had been established by the Germans.[35]

On the night of 8 May 1944, the NKVD rounded up and deported thousands of

Tatar families. According to V. Stanley Vardys, KGB records show that 37,750 families representing 151,242 individuals were transported to Uzbekistan from Crimea by 1 July 1944.[36] Buhay, writing more recently, provides additional details of the upheaval. He maintains that the key period of deportations was between 18 May and 21 May, and would embrace not only *over 190,000* Tatars, but also local prostitutes, and several hundred Germans, Romanians and Italians. Another Ukrainian account maintains that 228,500 persons were deported to Siberia and Central Asia from Crimea, including 191,088 Crimean Tatars.[37] In his report to Stalin of 10 May 1944, the head of the secret police, L. P. Beria, noted that as a result of the "treacherous actions of the Crimean Tatars against the Soviet people," the State Defense Committee had elaborated a plan to deport them as "special settlers" to collective and state farms and for work in industrial enterprises of Uzbekistan.[38]

A retroactive *ukaz* (decree) of 25 June 1946, justified this action officially as punishment for the treason committed by the "many" Tatar collaborationists who in turn received aid from the Tatar nationality as a whole.[39] In addition to this punishment, the *ukaz* confirmed the abolition of the Crimean ASSR and its absorption into the RSFSR as an ordinary oblast. Eight years later, in 1954, the oblast was transferred to the Ukrainian SSR as Russia's "gift" to mark the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav between Russia and Ukraine (see below).[40]

Meanwhile the Crimean Tatars continued to suffer terrible hardships. The deportation to Uzbekistan was particularly brutal and costly in terms of human life. Eyewitnesses report that on some of the actual journeys, none of which took less than 11 days, no food was provided for the deportees. Robert Conquest writes that "entire trains are reported as abandoning the journey after the death of all the deportees aboard."[41] Those that survived the journey still faced extreme hardship. They were apparently dropped off in the proverbial "middle of nowhere," a semi-desert environment with no dwellings or protection from the elements, and little or no materials available to construct places of residence. Crimean Tatar sources maintain that 46.1% of those deported died in the 18 months after deportation.[42] Even official Soviet data, from KGB sources, suggest that between May 1944 and January 1946 the deportees suffered 26,775 deaths, or approximately 18% of those deported *in toto*.[43] Although these two claims are at considerable variance with one another, it is worth pointing out, as did one defendant at a trial of prominent Crimean Tatar leaders in 1969, the KGB data present evidence of a genocidal crime.[44]

The relative thaw in the Soviet Union following Stalin's death in 1953 had a few minor benefits for the Tatar deportees. But not until 1967 did it appear that their situation was going to improve. An *ukaz* issued by the USSR Supreme Soviet on 5 September 1967, promised full political rehabilitation for Crimean Tatars on the grounds that "the facts of active complicity of a certain segment of the inhabitants of Crimea with the German aggressors were groundlessly extended to the whole Tatar population of Crimea." The *ukaz* promised full redress of this situation, and

assured the Crimean Tatars that they would fully "participate in social and political life ... and shall have radio broadcasts and newspapers in their native language, as well as other cultural institutions."[45]

The *ukaz* was unusual in comparison to similar decrees covering rehabilitation of other national groups punished by Stalin for alleged collaboration during the Second World War. In particular, the Crimean Tatars were rehabilitated individually and not as a national group. Other decrees on this subject referred to the particular nationality in question as a *national group*, and this phraseology was scrupulously observed in all cases. This was not the case in the decree concerning the Crimean Tatars, which referred to "citizens of Tatar nationality" only.[46] The only other nationality group treated in this manner was that of the Volga Germans. Furthermore, the *ukaz*, again unlike other such decrees, made no mention of Tatar repatriation to Crimea. Nevertheless, "this decision did not discourage the Tatars. On the contrary, in a display of courage and determination unequalled by the larger nationalities, the Tatars organized themselves for a long and difficult struggle aimed at resurrecting their national autonomy and returning to their Crimean homeland."[47] The Tatar organization was indeed dedicated and sophisticated, with a strong committed leadership and an unrelenting program aimed at repatriation.

One of the major leaders of the repatriation movement was Mustapha Jemilev who, at the age of seven months, was among the Tatars deported to Uzbekistan in 1944. When he was eighteen Jemilev became deeply committed to the Crimean Tatar cause, formulating not only a program of action but providing a moral basis for that program. Jemilev popularized and disseminated Tatar history among his compatriots in Uzbekistan, arguing that Crimea was the ancestral homeland of the Crimean Tatars.[48] This view of history was prohibited by the Soviet government, but its dissemination galvanized the Crimean Tatar repatriation movement.

The goals of the repatriation movement were simple: to gain political rehabilitation for the Crimean Tatar nationality as a whole; to regain Crimea; and to reestablish the Tatars' "status of administrative autonomy which they lost in 1944."[49] Initially, the Tatars attempted to work for these aims by petitioning the Soviet government in Moscow directly. In 1967 a delegation of Tatars met several senior government officials, among them Yuriy Andropov (then head of the KGB). The Tatar representatives were promised political rehabilitation, and hopes were apparently raised concerning the Tatars' request to return to Crimea.[50] This hope was reinforced in 1968 thanks to suggestions by Uzbek authorities that Tatar repatriation would occur, but in a planned manner to be decided jointly by the Uzbek authorities and those of the Crimean Oblast.[51]

The Uzbek promise soon proved to be hollow. By the end of 1968 only 148 Tatar families had been repatriated to Crimea, and it became apparent that the Soviet, Ukrainian, and Uzbek authorities expected that sufficient bureaucratic intransigence would hobble the Tatar repatriation movement.[52] In response the Tatars began to move back to Crimea illegally, only to be ejected by the Crimean Oblast authorities.

The Tatars then attempted to petition both the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Supreme Soviet directly, but to little or no avail.[53]

The Tatar plight did, however, attract the attention of such prominent Soviet dissidents as Andrei Sakharov[54] and Petro Grigorenko. Grigorenko in particular urged them to demonstrate openly for the right to return to Crimea. As a result the Tatar agitation shifted into a phase of active protest, involving demonstrations in Crimean Tatar ethnic areas in Uzbekistan. Such demonstrations were broken up with a considerable amount of violence by the authorities, and prominent Tatar leaders—among them Jemilev—were arrested.[55] Crimean Tatars living and working legally in Moscow were arrested and deported to Tashkent, in an apparent effort by the government to localize the Tatar threat. At the same time, the Tatar leaders arrested in both Uzbekistan and Moscow were tried, found guilty, and given harsh prison sentences or forced into internal exile.[56] This pattern—of Tatar demonstrations and attempts to return to Crimea countered not by massive government persecution but by selective punishment of Tatar leaders—lasted from the late 1960s until the mid 1980s. With the onset of the Gorbachev era, and the concomitant relaxation of government repression of nationalist protests, the Tatar campaign to return to their Crimean homeland intensified.

In December 1986, Mustafa Jemilev was released from Madagan labour camp upon completion of a three-year sentence of hard labour.[57] Jemilev, who had served a total of 15 years in labour camps, prisons, and internal exile since 1966, immediately rejoined the Crimean Tatar leadership and organized several meetings with a variety of Party and State agencies, all of which were intended to publicize the Tatars' plight.[58] When these meetings failed a series of demonstrations were organized in Moscow; these finally focused world attention on the plight of the Tatars.

The demonstrations, especially those of July 1987, had two important consequences. First, a commission under the then chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Andrei Gromyko, was appointed to investigate the Tatars' grievances.[59] Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, in announcing the creation of the Gromyko Commission the Soviet news agency *TASS* grudgingly characterized the Tatar deportations which had occurred under Stalin as "unjust."[60] At the same time, however, the *TASS* announcement, which was read in full on the prime-time television news program "Vremya," contained an inordinate amount of detail concerning the wartime record of the Crimean Tatars and hinted that perhaps a certain amount of suspicion was justified.[61] Nevertheless, the debate was finally in the public domain, inside the Soviet Union.

The evidence suggests that in the summer of 1987 the Soviet government was unsure of how to proceed on the Crimean Tatar issue. On the one hand, on 25 June, the first deputy chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, P. Demichev, guaranteed quick action on the demonstrators' demands.[62] At the same time, soon after the Gromyko Commission opened hearings, there was a government

crackdown on Crimean Tatar activities. On 1 July the Reuters news agency carried reports that twelve Crimean Tatar leaders had been arrested and deported back to Uzbekistan. A week later it was reported that the majority of the protesters in Moscow—more than 500 individuals—had been arrested and transported back to Uzbekistan as their leaders had been. At the same time, unconfirmed reports claimed that "big demonstrations" of Crimean Tatars, some as large as 5,000 protesters strong, had recently occurred in Uzbek cities.[63]

In the weeks that followed the Tatar protests intensified. A flurry of Tatar working groups and representatives were set up or elected. These groups were intended to coordinate and expand the range of Tatar protests further in order to maintain pressure on the Soviet government.[64] In a daring move, 2,000 Tatars participated in a "protest trek" to Crimea itself: intended to run from the city of Taman' to Simferopol and timed to reach the latter city on the anniversary of the creation of the Crimean ASSR (18 October), the trek was broken up by police after the marchers had gone less than five miles.[65]

The reason for this intensified protest was dissatisfaction over the apparent inactivity of the Gromyko Commission. Commission members visited Uzbekistan twice in the late summer of 1987, but only heard testimony from government-sponsored Crimean Tatar working commissions (distinctly different from those of the nationalist movement). Tatar members of these commissions apparently enjoyed the trust of the authorities and gave only platitudinous evidence.[66] The Commission produced several reports throughout the autumn of 1987 and into the spring of 1988, but all dealt with secondary issues: vague recommendations concerning the Tatars' "cultural heritage" and the importance of promoting such things as "Tatar handicrafts and concert groups" did little to alleviate the growing frustration among Tatar protesters.[67] In March 1988, the commission finally addressed the issue of repatriation: the newspaper *Pravda Vostoka* reported that Tatar families with good work and social records would be permitted to return to Crimea.[68] The announcement was immediately denounced as completely inadequate by Crimean Tatar leaders.

Finally, in June 1988, against a background of increasingly large—and increasingly militant—Crimean Tatar protests and demonstrations, the Gromyko Commission rejected Tatar demands for a reinstatement of the Crimean ASSR, arguing that "no grounds for establishing a Crimean autonomy" had been found.[69] The response of the Tatars was immediate: a wave of strikes and demonstrations broke out in Moscow, Uzbekistan and Krasnodar, all demanding the formation of a Crimean ASSR. These protests continued unabated into 1989, by which time even the Soviet press was becoming increasingly sympathetic toward the Tatar cause: in April *Moscow News* carried a story detailing the harassment and abuse that Crimean Tatar activists had suffered at the hands of the authorities and argued strongly that such incidents were completely incompatible with the spirit of glasnost.[70] By late 1989, the Soviet government had begun to bow to the Tatars pressure: Rafik Nishanov, Chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet

admitted that the Supreme Soviet had "recognized the necessity of reestablishing their autonomy."[71]

Throughout 1990 plans were made to resettle Crimean Tatars on the peninsula. However, at the very time that these firm plans were finally being formulated, the situation was complicated by political decisions of the Crimean Oblast Soviet. In September 1990 the Soviet voted to overturn the decree of 1945 which had transformed Crimea from an ASSR to an oblast. On 12 November, while Leonid Kravchuk, the chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, was in attendance, the Crimean Soviet voted to hold a referendum on the future status of the region.[72] The actual referendum, held on 12 January 1991, saw more than 80% of eligible voters turn out, and 93.3% of those approved the Oblast Soviet's proposal to restore Crimea as an ASSR.[73]

The referendum had very little to do with Crimean Tatar aspirations, however; indeed, Crimean Tatar spokespersons called for a boycott. Instead, the referendum was concerned with the fears and aspirations of the Russian population, which was in the majority in the region. The adoption of Ukraine's Declaration of State Sovereignty of 16 July 1990, alarmed the Russian inhabitants of Crimea, since they feared a "Ukrainization" of the region. It was, therefore, not surprising that the latter half of 1990 saw moves aimed at establishing Crimean autonomy: by nullifying the 1945 decree, the oblast deputies hoped to do two things. First, if the 1945 decree was nullified. then the 1954 decree transferring Crimea to Ukraine would likewise be void. Secondly, the oblast deputies likely reasoned that it would be easier for an autonomous region to make future decisions concerning its sovereignty—especially if those decisions involved a unification with Russia, as they demonstrably did.[74]

The demands of the Crimean Tatars tended to be lost in this debate; despite the fact that over 130,000 of them had returned and settled in Crimea by mid-1991, it was difficult for them to gain political recognition.[75] On 28 June, the Congress of Crimean Tatars voted overwhelmingly to declare sovereignty over the Crimean peninsula. The Congress resolved that the Tatars would work for a sovereign national state and claimed Tatar control over natural resources and holiday resorts such as the city of Yalta.[76] The Tatar spokespersons characterized the resolution as an act of defiance against foreigners presuming to speak for Crimea. Unfortunately, the resolution had more of the hallmarks of desperation than anything else.

Crimea Within Independent Ukraine, 1991–1994

(a) 1954 Revisited

In 1991–1992, international attention was focused on the issue of the transfer of Crimea from Russia to Ukraine in 1954. Thus, a brief recap of the main events of that time is important for our comprehension of the issues involved. In early 1954, the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR had examined the Crimean question and resolved

that it was expedient to transfer the peninsula to Ukraine. One can make two assumptions at the outset. First, the decision would have to have been taken at a higher level. The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, K. E. Voroshilov, appears to have been apprised of events from the beginning and to have given the idea his approval, as did the Chairman of the Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, D. S. Korotchenko. Khrushchev was evidently absent from these discussions, though various rumors have surfaced about his role in the affair.[77] Second, the transfer was less meaningful than it appeared since no form of Ukrainian autonomism or self-initiative existed in 1954. Ukraine was a compliant republic of the USSR, thus the transfer was a purely internal administrative matter without, it would seem, much significance in political or economic terms.

Why would such a transfer have occurred? Ostensibly it was carried out to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav signed between Ukrainian Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Russian Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich.[78] In February 1954, the Russian government formally petitioned the Soviet government to approve the transfer, and on 19 February, all "interested parties" from Russia, Ukraine and Crimea debated the issue, including the chairmen of the Simferopol and Sevastopol city councils, and P. Lyalin, the First Deputy Chairman of the Crimean Oblast Council. Reportedly there was not a single dissenting voice on the issue. The transfer was justified by the following criteria: common economic and territorial proximity; close economic and cultural links between the Crimean Oblast and Ukraine. The decree was approved by the law of 26 April 1954, and Khrushchev evidently approved.[79]

In 1954, therefore, there appears to have been little controversy. The population of the peninsula was much reduced as a result of the wartime deportations, despite some population transfers from Ukraine and Russia; it was gradually repopulated with Russians, Russians from Ukraine, and, to a lesser extent, Ukrainians. Under Soviet rule, Crimea had been developed as a zone that was significant for several unrelated reasons: as a vacation area (particularly for high party officials); as an industrial region; and as a key military-strategic point of the Soviet military complex.

(b) First Steps After Independence

The Crimean question that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union has been described by a Western scholar as "arguably the most complex of the territorial questions facing Kiev."[80] Russiáns constitute a majority of the peninsula's population (67%), while of the 25.7% of Ukrainians in the total population, about 47% consider Russian to be their native language, and 90.5% have Russian-language fluency.[81] As soon as Ukraine declared its sovereignty in July 1990, prominent Russians suggested that if Ukraine became independent, then Crimea might separate from Ukraine, and Russia might be obliged to come to the aid of Russians living within Ukraine's borders. In January 1991, the Crimeans ended a lengthy saga on the illegality of the

1945 decision to transform the autonomous region into an oblast (initially of the Russian SFSR), when at a referendum on the question "Are you for the restoration of the Crimean ASSR as a subject of the USSR and a party to the Union treaty?" *over 93% of those who voted responded positively.*[82] The Crimean Autonomous Republic within the boundaries of Ukraine was formally "restored" by the USSR Supreme Soviet on 12 February 1991.[83]

However, only ten months later, on 1 December 1991, a surprising 54.1% of those who voted in the referendum in Crimea supported Ukrainian independence.[84] The vote was a significant one that perhaps awaits a definitive analysis. It suggests broad satisfaction among all sectors of society on the peninsula with the concept of direct rule from Kiev. In April 1992, in an address to the people of Crimea (at a time when separatist forces appeared to be in the ascendant), Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk outlined some reasons why Crimeans should be satisfied with being ruled from Kiev as an autonomous region. The comments are enlightening if somewhat partisan.

For almost forty years, Kravchuk pointed out, Crimeans had been content to live within the borders of Ukraine. Capital investment there per head of population exceeded the republican average by 15–20%. The construction of the North Crimean Canal had satisfied 85% of the peninsula's fresh water requirement, and the economy of Crimea had been developed as an integral part of that of Ukraine. Thus 75% of the peninsula's basic goods needs and 85% of its electricity requirements were provided by the mainland. Though the economy of the Crimean ASSR was in a predicament by the spring of 1992, this was hardly Ukraine's fault, in the view of Kravchuk. It was a result of many years of dominance of the Moscow administrative-command system which ruined the economies of all areas of the former Soviet Union.[85]

However, the economic development of the peninsula has not been without its tragic side, despite the somewhat rosy picture painted by the Ukrainian president. The North Crimean Canal, for example, can be termed a typical example of Soviet *gigantomania.* It was improperly lined, led to severe environmental damage to the local area, and has not begun to recoup the investment put into it. Similarly the industrialization of Crimea in the Soviet period has caused extensive pollution and the destruction of regions formerly used as vacation spots. A futile attempt to bring on line the Crimean nuclear power plant was halted in 1989 following a high-level scientific inspection in 1988 under the leadership of Evgeniy Velikhov, the Vice President of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The delays in abandoning the project incensed the local population, as did reports that the station had been constructed in a seismic zone.[86]

Economic problems aside, it has been political questions that have dominated the debate over the future of Crimea, and first and foremost, the legality of the 1954 decision to transfer the peninsula from the jurisdiction of the Russian Republic to

Ukraine. Let us examine these matters from the different perspectives of the various parties involved.

(c) The Republican Movement of Crimea (RDK)

The Republican Movement of Crimea was formed in the summer of 1991 and from the outset was opposed to Ukraine's independence and the severance of Ukraine's ties with the the Soviet Union. Its leaders maintained that the January 1991 referendum, which supported the restoration of an Autonomous Crimean Republic could not be effective without the annulment of the 1954 Act transferring the peninsula to Ukraine. Thus, even during the existence of the Soviet Union, the RDK had established an initiative group to petition for a referendum on the peninsula on the question both of annulment of the Act and the restoration of the Crimean Republic as a subject of the USSR and participant in the new Union agreement that was being drawn up by the Gorbachev regime. Yuriy O. Meshkov, the RDK leader (and future Crimean president), remained adamant that this should take place even after the notable victory for the supporters of independence on 1 December 1991. A discussion between Meshkov and a Ukrainian journalist in December 1991 is particularly enlightening on the general outlook of the RDK *vis-à-vis* the peninsula and the historical legacy of the Crimean Tatars:

> INTERVIEWER: But a considerable portion of Crimeans, especially the Crimean Tatars, are categorically opposed to a referendum, which would resolve the fate of their homeland by a simple arithmetic majority, since they have not all yet returned to Crimea.
> MESHKOV: But why is Crimea only their homeland?
> INTERVIEWER: This is the historical motherland of the Crimean Tatar people ...
> MESHKOV: Not only of the Crimean Tatars. This is the motherland of the Crimean-Ukrainian, the Crimean-Russian, and the Crimean-Jewish peoples.
> INTERVIEWER: You assert that there are such people—Crimean-Ukrainians? To me, it would appear that is a portion of Ukrainian or Russian peoples who live in Crimea and there is the Crimean Tatar people. And regarding the Crimean people, is this not as absurd as a L'viv people, or Simferopol or Poltava people?[87]

The relegation of the Tatars to a role alongside the Russians or Ukrainians in what is perceived as their historical homeland indicated a strong form of political racism among the RDK and a failure to recognize past indiscretions toward the Crimean Tatars. It also linked the RDK closely with more militant factions within the Russian parliament. Perhaps the important issue, however, is the presence of such a movement prior to Ukrainian independence and the dissemination of such views without apparent influence from Moscow. The situation became more intense once Russian involvement became manifest. In the process, the Tatar issue took a back seat to a prolonged and bitter conflict between Russia and Ukraine that focused only on overall control over the Autonomous Republic.

(d) The View From Russia

In any assessment of the published or expressed Russian perspectives on Crimea, the question arises as to how representative they are of Russian thinking generally. Russian opinion as expressed vocally has tended to be that of "patriots" and the groups now silenced, at least temporarily, by Yeltsin when he dissolved the Russian parliament in September–October 1993. However, as Roman Solchanyk has pointed out, even individuals of relatively liberal hue, such as the St Petersburg mayor Anatoliy Sobchak, urged Yeltsin to repeal the 1954 law ceding Crimea to Ukraine.[88] Yeltsin himself has sent mixed signals to Kiev. A series of meetings with Kravchuk on the issue of the Black Sea Fleet has failed to resolve this issue on a permanent basis. However, in December 1991—a period when he had some reason to be grateful for Ukrainian support in his mission to end the existence of the USSR through the creation of the CIS—he had maintained that the Crimean question was a matter for Ukraine to resolve.[89]

For representative Russian opinion on the issue, one can turn to the illuminating discussion of experts of the Russian Scientific Fund who met in conference on the Crimean peninsula on 22–29 January 1992, studied the issues and held discussions with deputies of the Crimean parliament, the Council of Ministers, political movements, journalists, and radio and television reporters. They prepared a document at the behest of the Russian government on the instructions of President Yeltsin. They noted initially three prevailing tendencies on the peninsula in early 1992. First, the social economic situation had deteriorated considerably, particularly with the introduction of the Ukrainian currency—the coupon—which had resulted in a sharp reduction of purchasing power. Agricultural and industrial output had fallen perceptibly and the consumer market had also contracted as a result of a shortage of raw material and fuel supplies.[90]

Income from health resorts had also fallen as a result of a reduction in the number of holiday-makers and "the continuing removal of the lion's share" of health resort incomes into the budget of Ukraine. The economic situation could worsen, it was prognosticated, as a result of efforts of Ukraine to use economic pressures on Crimea, such as the curtailment of electricity and water supplies. Further, the proposed introduction of the official Ukrainian currency, the *grivnya*, would effectively separate Crimea from the ruble zone and the economic space of the CIS. As the Crimean ASSR was dependent not only on the economy of Ukraine, but also that of Russia, the lack of support and protection from Russia would lead, in the view of the report, to an economic and social catastrophe on the peninsula.

Second, the population of the peninsula was exhibiting its broad dissatisfaction with the policies of the present leadership of Kiev, and had displayed an "anti-Ukrainian mood." This had been caused by efforts to "Ukrainize" the population: the persistent introduction of radio and television stations from Kiev, with a concomitant curtailment of programs from Russia; the publication of official

documents and surveys in the Ukrainian language. Administrative control from Kiev, it was maintained, was an effort to dictate the tempo and character of economic transformation in Crimea. Pressure was being exerted on the armed forces deployed on the peninsula to take an oath of loyalty to Ukraine, and to position the Ukrainian guard at key strategic points there.

Ukraine, it was alleged, was trying to play the "Tatar" and "German" cards, *i.e.*, the Kiev leadership was using the question of the return of deported peoples for its own political interests. It was maintained that the Ukrainian government wished to change the ethnic make-up of Crimea by importing large numbers of Tatar and German families without prior approval by the Crimean authorities. Ukraine's moves away from CIS jurisdiction, it was claimed, did not meet with approval in Crimea and was causing some apprehension among the Russophone population.

Third, it was stated, one could expect aggravation of the internal political situation as a result of disillusionment with rule from Kiev. A mass political movement had emerged, namely the Republican Movement of Crimea (RDK), which had virtually no serious opposition and dominated political life in Simferopol and Sevastopol,[91] in Kerch and on the south bank of the peninsula. The RDK resolutely backed the sovereignty of Crimea and its separation from Ukraine, while it supported the notion that the Crimean Autonomous Republic (CAR) join the CIS or Russia. It also supported the full transfer to the CIS or Russia of questions of defense, internal politics, finances, border and customs administration, while preserving for Crimea the functions of administration, economy, economic self-government and the status of a free economic zone.

The researchers noted that the RDK was involved in collecting signatures to support the conducting of a referendum on the independent status of Crimea, and that the required total of 180,000 was already being approached.[92] The RDK also proposed to form "units for citizens' self-defense" composed of former Afghan veterans in the event of force being used on the part of Ukraine. The RDK supported pre-term elections to a new parliament after the referendum and backed the elevation of the Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Kasatonov. It was noted, however, that the RDK contained some weak features, most notably its poor organizational base, the absence of an authoritative or popular leader, and its lack of experience in political and organizational work.[93]

How did the investigators perceive Ukraine's attitude to the Crimean question? In general, it was regarded as negative, as one of trying to ignore the complex historical, economic, cultural and legal aspects of the problem, while denying the presence of the "independent citizens' movement" for republican sovereignty. Ukraine had also caused problems and raised tension, it was reported, by attempting to involve foreign states (Germany was cited) in its decision to approve the return of deported peoples. The envisaged separation of Crimea from Ukraine was but part of a chain reaction in various parts of Ukraine, claimed the document, involving the territorial and state

disintegration of Ukraine. Kiev, in the commission's view, had only three alternatives with respect to Crimea.

These were: (a) partial concessions, *i.e.*, an attempt to buy off the recalcitrant Crimeans with concessions; (b) confrontational tactics, including economic sanctions, administrative repression, and even military force; and (c) a compromise agreement with Russia on Crimea (which would be included as part of a general package agreement on the Black Sea Fleet), while conducting a policy of "vodka and the whip" in Crimea.[94] This last compromise, the document stated, could best be effected by a dual Russian–Ukrainian protectorate over Crimea with the formal elimination of the *de jure* composition of the Crimean Republic in Ukraine. Such a solution it was alleged, however, would hardly satisfy the strategic interests of Russia.

As for Russia, the investigators concluded that Crimea was of vital historical, cultural-ethnic and economic importance, though the strategic significance outweighed everything in view of the "activization of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan" in this region. Russia also required the Black Sea for external trade and a warm water port for year-round trading. They resolved that the first step toward a solution was the annulment of the 1954 agreement, followed by three-way discussions on the question between Russia, Ukraine and the Crimean authorities. Russia also, it was declared, had to offer its protection to the citizens of Crimea.

The document is revealing. It manifests perhaps an extreme form of Russian chauvinism, but certainly one that is recognizable from the recent past. Moreover, the decision of the Russian parliament to hold a formal debate on the legitimacy of the 1954 transfer of Crimea to Ukraine demonstrates that the report represented more than a hypothesis. In February 1992, the Ukrainian parliament rejected Russia's claim to Crimea. Such a claim, it was held, was in violation of various Russian–Ukrainian agreements, and contravened Article 5 of the Minsk agreement on the formation of the CIS (December 1991).[95] Nevertheless, the debate was held, and the 1954 law was declared invalid. Several Russians were particularly outspoken on the issue, and Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi appeared to thrive in his position as the figurehead leader of the movement to "restore" Crimea to Russia.

Prior to the debate in the Russian parliament, a group of Russian deputies visited the peninsula, including S. Baburin and N. Pavlov. In an interview to the newspaper *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, Pavlov stated that the act of transferring Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 was carried out with violations of the Constitution. Pavlov, on the other hand, addressed a meeting of several thousand Crimeans in Sevastopol and remarked that whereas the Black Sea Fleet could be either under joint Ukrainian–Russian or purely Russian ownership, the same did not apply to the peninsula, which could only be Russian. He went on to declare that under a sovereign Ukrainian state, the matter of border re-examination was only a matter of time. "Crimea was never Ukrainian and never will be; it was, and remains, Russian."[96]

Baburin was even more forthright. He declared that the annulment of the "illegal" act of 1954 could establish stability in Crimea and proposed that a referendum be arranged through which the residents of the peninsula would resolve the question concerning *reunion with Russia*. If at that time Crimeans indicated a desire to remain part of the Ukrainian state, then this wish would be recognized. He maintained that the previous referendum (December 1991) was "unconvincing" and "expressed doubts" about its validity.[97] Russia had thus become an active player of the Crimean card, both in Moscow and through the auspices of the RDK on the peninsula, and the psychological impact of this sudden overt intrusion into Ukrainian affairs caused a shock wave in Kiev.

The RDK's protests and outspoken statements were supported fully by the newspaper *Krymskaya pravda*, which began to exacerbate the intensity of feelings on the peninsula with some inflammatory articles. In 1991, after the failed putsch in Moscow, the newspaper in theory became independent. But before long, it had begun to publish highly partisan articles, including one by Viktor Mezhak entitled "Return Crimea to Russia," and to demand a re-examination of the territorial status of the autonomous republic. Subsequently, it amended this demand with one for an independent Crimea that would formally separate from Ukraine. It also "exposed" the misdeeds of Ukrainian nationalists and warned of the dire results of Ukrainization that would occur unless Crimea changed its present status. It also refused to publish in other than abbreviated forms the appeals or statements from the Ukrainian president, whereas addressed of the RDK were always published in full. It was, therefore, for this slanted editorial policy that the newspaper was picketed in the spring of 1992 by the Rukh, the Ukrainian Republican Party, the Prosvita organization, and the Union of Officers of Ukraine.[98]

Though the array of regional forces against Kiev and backed by Moscow (though not openly by the Russian president) appeared to be overwhelming, the situation was less clear-cut than it appeared. First of all, the Tatars clearly had more to gain from rule by Kiev than from Moscow, and the Ukrainian president was an able advocate of their cause. The Tatars' concerns assured that a world audience would not immediately take the side of the Russian parliament on the Crimean issue, whether or not Ukraine was being castigated for its attitude to nuclear weapons; the signing of the START-1 Treaty; and the Black Sea Fleet. Second, even in areas of key RDK support, there appeared to be significant opposition. Thus in a survey taken in Sevastopol in mid-April 1992, while 50% of those asked supported the referendum, a solid 42% were opposed to it.[99] Further, in Crimea as a whole, one survey revealed that 22% of those surveyed supported both a referendum and separation; 18% opposed separation and a referendum, and 12% favored a referendum but opposed separation. The remaining 48% were undecided.[100] Thus, there was no sweeping and clear-cut mandate for an independent Crimea that was discernible even at the very height of the Crimean crisis.

(e) The Ukrainian Response

In the face of what was perceived as flagrant provocation on the Crimean question, the Ukrainian authorities reacted angrily. In April 1992, Kravchuk maintained that "certain irresponsible forces" supported by separatists in the Crimean parliament and backed by some commercial outlets were striving in every possible way to destabilize the situation in Crimea, and to aggravate relations between the people of Crimea, the Republic of Crimea and Ukraine. He declared that the demand for a referendum contravened the Constitution, the Helsinki Agreement and the Paris Charter. Crimea, he pointed out, was attached irrevocably to the economy of Ukraine, and any reorientation of its economic links to "other states" would bring about a dramatic fall in the living standards of Crimeans. He supported both a "free economic zone" and the right of Crimeans to self-determination, "but only when it corresponds to the general normatives of international law and is accomplished by civilized methods."[101]

Kravchuk was particularly scornful about some of the claims made by the separatists. Ukrainization, for example, in his view, was little more than a joke in that the 600,000 Ukrainians on the peninsula live in "unequal status" with other nations. There were, he declared, no Ukrainian schools and not a single newspaper on the peninsula is published in the Ukrainian language. The Ukrainian minority was being protected like any minority in a democratic nation. Kravchuk's constant refrain had been the inviolability of Ukraine's present borders. Ukraine had been recognized, he pointed out, as an independent country that includes Crimea within its borders. Therefore, any attempt to change this territorial integrity and the sovereignty of Ukraine would be regarded by the highest authorities in Ukraine "and all the civilized world" as a "vile violation of the *status quo* in Europe, international norms and agreements."[102]

Kravchuk had staked his presidency on the survival of his country within its existing borders. Parliamentary and other spokespersons, however, focused on the weaknesses of Russia's actions and claims to the peninsula. The first response was the clear definition by the Ukrainian and Crimean parliaments of the status of Crimea in response to the news that the Russian parliament was to debate the issue (first announced in January 1992). At the stage of the draft of this law, matters were further inflamed when a delegation of Russian leaders headed by Rutskoi arrived in Crimea, along with Yeltsin's advisor Sergey Stankevich and General Boris Gromov. Rutskoi's comments in particular angered the Ukrainian side, specifically his statement that Crimea was an integral part of Russia.[103]

In the meantime, the Ukrainian parliament met to discuss the draft law on the delineation of powers between Ukraine and Crimea, which went through a first reading on 22 April, having been approved earlier by the parliament of Crimea. The document outlined that the territory of the Republic of Crimea could not be altered of transferred to the composition of another state or administrative-territorial model

without the prior agreement of the Crimean population. The Republic was confirmed in its authority over spheres of its economy; environmental protection; and social-cultural spheres. Ukraine guaranteed the Republic of Crimea's sovereignty within the branches of its competence above, and this competence, and any kind of change to the authority of Ukraine could not be changed without the express consent of the "highest legal organs" of Ukraine and Crimea. A final reading was accepted by the Ukrainian parliament one week later, but in a form that was more forthright in its description of the relative lack of power of the peninsula *vis-à-vis* Ukraine. Solchanyk notes that the final form of the document "was extensively altered to the detriment of Crimea."[104]

Ukraine's response had thus been prompt and firm; but matters were now running ahead of Ukrainian lawmakers. The Presidium of the Crimean parliament had on 22 April decided to hold a 5 May session on the question of a referendum on the peninsula in response to the collection of some 250,000 signatures on the issue.[105] In mid-May, the Crimean parliament declared its independence from Ukraine, pending a referendum on the question scheduled for August 1992. Meanwhile, the Russian parliament was to conduct its own debate on the Crimean question. In this parliament in late May 1992, Russia proposed that discussions regulating the future status of Crimea be held between Russia, Ukraine and the republic, while emphasizing that Russia had no territorial claims to Crimea.[106]

On each separate issue, Ukraine moved swiftly to reassert its authority. An inter-parliamentary commission was put together on the question, headed by V. Durdinets, and including parliamentary deputies O. Kotsyuba, V. Yavorivsky and A. Matvienko. This commission attended the debate of the Russian parliament and formulated a response on behalf of Ukraine. Yavorivsky was already an international figure as the Chairman of the Ukrainian parliamentary committee on problems created by the Chernobyl disaster. He pointed out that logically, if the 1954 Act was unconstitutional, then so also was the transformation of autonomous Crimea into a Russian oblast at the end of the war. He noted also that one Russian deputy had claimed that matters had reached a crisis only because the Ukrainian parliament was not "humble enough" and "more compliant," *i.e.*, he implied that Russia was playing a game of power politics over Crimea.[107]

A conservative Russian-language Ukrainian newspaper, *Pravda Ukrainy*, pointed out drily that the parliament of Russia had written yet another "historical" page in its legal creativity.[108] It was also pointed out in Ukraine that the debate had ignored Boris Yeltsin's December 1991 statement that Crimea was a question for Ukraine to decide. Kravchuk, whose presence in the United States in April 1992 may have also been a factor in the heightening of tensions—he was not on hand to defuse issues—informed NATO officials in Kiev that Russia's obvious territorial claims on Ukraine would lead to a worsening relations between the two countries. Some Ukrainian deputies and academics treated the issue from the reverse and discussed Ukraine's potential claims to territory on Russia. It was pointed out by one

newspaper that Ukraine's "territory" in Russia amounts to 113,400 km^2 of area and a population of 6.4 million, including territories in Belgorod region, Kursk, Voronezh, and the Don and Kuban.[109]

Literaturna Ukraina cited an article published earlier in the year by Professor V. Butkevych, who had asked the pertinent question why the Russian parliamentarians had focused solely on the 1954 Act pertaining to Crimea. Other acts taken in the same era had increased the territory of the RSFSR and in the process swallowed up entire republics. On 16 July 1956, for example, the Karelo–Finnish republic had been joined to Russia; and on April 20 of that same year, parts of Kazakhstan had been transferred to Russia. On 31 October 1957, an Ukaz had redefined the border between Russia and Estonia. Altogether, through such amendments, the territory of the Russian Federation had been increased by 237,000 km^2 of territory.[110] In this way, Ukrainian spokespersons cast doubts on the credibility of the actions of the Russian parliament.

The Crimean effort to declare independence at such a critical stage was also quashed by Kiev. The Presidium of the Ukrainian parliament declared that the document violated the Constitution of Ukraine, the integrity of Ukraine's territory, and the law about the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The Ukrainian government's view was that the Crimeans had severely impeded the work of the previous months. Some groups were prepared to go further. Rukh activists, who demonstrated outside the Ukrainian parliament against Crimea's decision, advocated the immediate annulment of the Act of independence of Crimea; an extraordinary referendum on the question in all of Ukraine; the dissolution of the Crimean parliament; the introduction of presidential rule directly from Kiev for the peninsula; and the "bringing to justice" of the chairman of the Crimean parliament, Mikhail Bagrov, for his "anti-state" activities. It was also pointed out that the declaration acted against the interests of the Crimean Tatars.[111]

Officially, the response from Kiev was equally rigorous. The Ukrainian parliament met in full session on 13 May and declared the Act of independence unconstitutional, giving the Crimeans one week to annul the resolutions. Though Crimea did back down on the resolution of independence, it did not officially revoke the declaration itself. Nonetheless, the issue had reached its climax and, thereafter, the two sides—Ukraine and the Republic of Crimea—began to seek forms of cooperation and accommodation. On 1 June, when the presidiums of both parliaments met in Yalta, it was agreed that the Crimea, as part of Ukraine, would be permitted to have special legal and political rights, including social, economic and cultural links with other countries. On 30 June 1992, the Crimean parliament accepted a new law, "On the Delineation of Power between the Organs of State Rule of Ukraine and the Republic of Crimea." Before the law was accepted as valid on Kiev, the Crimeans were asked to call off the referendum. Again a compromise situation was reached and a moratorium on the referendum, rather than its complete abandonment, was imposed.[112]

In September 1993, when Kravchuk met Yeltsin at Massandra, the Ukrainian president appeared to have given way on Russian ownership of the Black Sea Fleet, but Kravchuk regained his composure upon his return to Kiev to be faced by angry parliamentary deputies. At best one can say that the Black Sea issue has been shelved, while the Crimean question evolved in a less militant pattern over the following months.

(f) The Crimean Question in 1993

The year 1993 saw a further collapse of the Ukrainian economy, measured in terms of national income, production of goods, and labor productivity. According to the Ukrainian Minister of the Economy, R. Shpek, when compared to the same period of 1992, Ukraine's national income in the first nine months of the year had fallen by 12%; its total volume of industrial output by 7.8%; and the production of consumer goods by 19.5%. Ukraine's currency had fallen dramatically against both the US dollar and Russian ruble, and President Kravchuk declared the abandonment of free market "monetarist" principles in the country. They were to be replaced with a mixed economy with strong state intervention in crucial areas of the economy.[113]113 In short, the country faced a situation that was described frankly by the president as "catastrophic." Moreover, he perceived a real threat to national security in the present economic and social malaise.[114]

How did this predicament affect the Crimean question? To some extent, the economic crisis relegated Crimea to a secondary position. On the other hand, the supporters of an independent Crimea used the situation to their advantage in a number of small but significant ways. On 19 October 1993, for example, Bagrov signed a new Protocol with President Kravchuk which recreated a Crimean Republican Bank, a Crimean Bank for Hard Currency Exchange and a one-channel taxation system, so that taxes collected would remain on the peninsula. Crimea also gained the right to register representatives of foreign firms which conduct business in the Autonomous Republic. All these measures took effect on 1 December 1993. Thus Crimea appeared to be approaching independence through what might be termed a "quiet route."[115]

From the Ukrainian perspective, these results were no less disturbing than the openly confrontational tactics of 1992. The development of autonomist or federalist movements in Ukraine may divide the fledgling nation, while more militant and national solutions in Western Ukraine may see that region adopt a path somewhat different from other parts of the state. The Tatars continued to return to their homeland, and were guaranteed 14 seats in the new Crimean parliament that was formed after the elections of 27 March 1994; these took place concomitantly with elections to the parliament of Ukraine (see below).[116] The Tatars reclaimed a voice in Crimean affairs and indeed continued to protest against actions of the Crimean parliament considered detrimental to their interests.[117] However, their influence

remained limited by their numbers in that they continued to constitute only a small minority of the population. In the 1989 census, for example, the Crimean Tatars constituted only 1.6% of the total population; currently the figure may be somewhat higher, perhaps 15–16%.[118]

Perhaps the consolation for Ukraine in late 1993 was the triumph of Boris Yeltsin over the more hard-line factions of the Russian parliament in October of this year. The ostensible demise of Rutskoi, for example, removed one of the most provocative and outspoken supporters of the pan-Russian viewpoint on Crimea. Indeed the internecine struggles in Russia totally eclipsed the issue of the peninsula, at least temporarily. Kravchuk also reiterated his policy of guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Ukraine, a policy which formed part of his unsuccessful platform for re-election as Ukrainian president in 1994.[119] These hopeful omens from the Ukrainian perspective were, however, offset by the unexpected success of the hard-line Russian nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky and his deceptively named "Liberal-Democratic Party" in the December 1993 elections to the Russian parliament.

(g) Afterword—1994, New Tensions and New Presidents

The year 1994 saw further tensions on the peninsula following the election of Yuriy Meshkov, RDK leader, as the Crimean president in the January elections, who was standing as part of the "Russia" block. Of the six candidates who stood for the presidency, only the incumbent, Mikhail Bagrov, supported Crimea's future as part of Ukraine. The fact that the formerly troublesome Bagrov had now become a moderate in Crimean politics illustrates the polarization that had occurred in Crimean politics. The other presidential candidates were all separatist-minded, demanding at the least the independence of the peninsula, and in most cases its "reunion" with Russia. Both the Kiev government and the Crimean Tatar Mejlis had strong reservations about the entire electoral process, which appeared to contradict the principles of the Ukrainian Constitution, a point mentioned by the deputy chairman of the Mejlis, Refat Chubarov, on Crimean television after the first round of voting. Chubarov also stated that the Tatars themselves. were disposed to boycott the elections, but had decided to participate to try to restrict the powers of "extreme chauvinist forces."[120]

After the first round of voting, Meshkov had a clear lead over Bagrov and the other candidates. In a high electoral turnout, he received 541,766 votes (38.5%) compared to 245,544 for Bagrov (17.0%). Two Communist candidates, Sergey Shuvanikov and Leonid Grach followed close behind Bagrov, and thus Meshkov's ultimate victory appeared to be inevitable.[121] On 30 January, he was duly elected president, winning 73% of the vote. He at once announced that the peninsula would

hold a referendum on independence on 27 March, the date of the Ukrainian elections, and that Crimea would seek to provide a bridgehead between Ukraine and Russia.[122] After his election, the press service of the "national-democratic forces" of Ukraine issued an appeal, which observed regarding the election of Meshkov that Ukraine belonged to those states of the world in which the Constitution was ignored by many political forces. The Crimean elections, it added, had taken place in an atmosphere of acute Ukrainophobia, which, together with Ukraine's weak economic status, had led to the victory of Meshkov.[123] Thus both forces in Ukraine and the Crimean Tatars had made common cause against Meshkov's ambitions.

The referendum was never held. Though it was announced again by Meshkov on 10 March, President Kravchuk annulled it officially five days later, while the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs entered into discussions by appealing to the Crimean public on local television not to cause internal conflict by participating in a referendum. Meshkov and his supporters maintained that Ukraine was threatening to use force against the peninsula, and indeed, though a military threat was exaggerated, there were certainly small western Ukrainian-based military groups that were ready and willing to participate in such a venture.[124] In the absence of any firm agreement with Russia to intervene, and with the continuing opposition from the Tatars (and even pressure from the United States on behalf of Ukraine's territorial integrity), the Meshkov regime backed down from its resolve.

The future of the peninsula remains a volatile issue, however, and problems are being exacerbated by Ukraine's poor economic performance in comparison with a partial economic recovery in Russia. In turn, events in the Autonomous Republic may be influenced by the political stability and instability of Russia, and Yeltsin's personal control over events. In Ukraine in March 1994, the Leftist groups (the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Socialist Party of Ukraine, and the Agrarian Party of Ukraine) formed the largest bloc in the new parliament with at least 118 deputies out of 333 elected.[125] In political orientation, these groups appeared to be similar in outlook to the separatist Russian forces in Crimea and in general they oppose economic reform and the development of democracy in Ukraine. The July 1994 presidential election in Ukraine with the victory of an eastern Ukrainian and largely Russophone leader, Leonid Kuchma, may ease tensions temporarily. (Certainly one could have anticipated a future clash between a Kravchuk presidency and the Meshkov regime.)

In conclusion, it should be stressed that the independent Ukrainian state did not create the problems it faces in Crimea today, and it may be impossible under the present economic, social and political situation to resolve them fully. The turbulent history of this small geographical entity thus continues unabated in the post-Soviet period. Future discussions on Ukraine's Crimean question may involve four parties: Ukraine, the Crimean government, Russia, and the Crimean Tatars. Arguably, Russia should be eliminated from the group; the Tatars, who are returning to their homeland

in ever greater numbers, cannot be ignored. Ultimately, they may once again have the decisive voice in the future of the peninsula which they view morally and historically as their own.

(October 1994)

NOTES

1. The Black Sea Fleet issue, for example, represents a related but complex problem that merits a separate treatment.
2. Tamara Tershakovec, "An interview with Crimean Tatars: We deserve our homeland back," *Ukrainian Weekly*, LX (21), p. 4 (24 May 1992).
3. Alan W. Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), p. 2.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
6. The Crimea *appears* to have been absorbed into the Empire, but the evidence for this conclusion is by no means definitive. The status of the Khanate and the independence of its leaders under the Ottomans is a hotly debated historiographical issue. *Ibid.*, pp. 8–16.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 28–30; see also John Parkinson, *A Tour of Russia, Siberia, and the Crimea, 1792–1794*, William Collier, ed. (London, 1971), pp. 193–195, for a description of the architecture of the Khanate.
9. Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, pp. 49–50.
10. Alan W. Fisher, *The Russian Annexation of the Crimea, 1772–1783* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 82–84.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 49–51.
12. Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, pp. 61–69.
13. Peter J. Potichnyj, "The Struggle of The Crimean Tatars," *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, 17 (2–3), p. 302 (1975). Potichnyj bases his estimate on information contained in *Bol'shaia Sovietskaia Entsiklopediia*, first edition, XXXV (1937), pp. 279–234. Significantly, however, Alan Fisher's estimates of Tatar emigration in this period are only one-tenth of Potichnyj's, namely, some 20,000–30,000 individuals. Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, p. 78.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 303.
15. Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, p. 88.
16. Robert Conquest, *The Nation Killers* (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 57.
17. Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, p. 89.
18. V. Stanley Vardas, "The Case of The Crimean Tatars," *Russian Review*, 30(2), p. 101 (April 1971).
19. Potichnyj, "The Struggle of The Crimean Tatars," p. 303
20. Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, p. 104.
21. *Ibid.*
22. A. Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, *La presse et le mouvement national chez les musulmans de Russie avant 1920*, (Paris, 1964), p. 141.
23. Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, p. 110.
24. *Ibid.*
25. Potichnyj, "The Struggle of The Crimean Tatars," p. 304.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 304–305.
27. Edige Kirimal, *Der nationale Kampf der Krimtürken* (Emsdetten: Lechte, 1952), p. 282.
28. Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, p. 137.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 138.
30. Edige Kirimal, "Mass deportations and Massacres in the Crimea," *Cultura Turcica* 1(2), p. 256 (1964).
31. *Ibid.*
32. M. F. Buhay, "Deportatsiya Kryms'kykh Tatar v 1944g," *Ukrainsk'yi istorychnyi zhurnal*, No. 1, p. 29 (1992).
33. *Ibid*, p. 30.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 32–33.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
36. Vardys, "The Case of The Crimean Tatars," p. 102.
37. *Robitnycha hazeta*, p. 3, (14 February 1992).
38. Buhay, p. 35. The Tatars were transferred to a number of remote areas of the former USSR, including Kazakhstan, Kemerovo Oblast, Gorkov Oblast; Ivanovo Oblast, and others. Within Uzbekistan, the largest numbers were transported to Tashkent and Samarkand regions (about 87,000 persons in total). See Buhay, p. 38.
39. *Ibid.*
40. Potichnyj, "The Struggle of The Crimean Tatars," p. 307. A detailed discussion of this transfer follows in the second section of this paper.
41. Conquest, *The Nation Killers*, p. 162.
42. Potichnyj, "The Struggle of The Crimean Tatars," p. 308.
43. Conquest, *The Nation Killers*, p. 161–62.
44. Peter Reddaway, ed., *Uncensored Russia: Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union* (New York: American Heritage Press, 1972), p. 262.
45. Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: *Edict on Citizens of Tatar Nationality Who Lived in Crimea*, 5 September 1967. Reprinted in Edward Allworth, ed., *Tatars of the Crimea: Their Struggle for Survival* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988), p. 145.
46. *Ibid.*
47. Potichnyj, "The Struggle of The Crimean Tatars," p. 310.
48. Ludmilla Alexeyeva, "Mustafa Jemilev, His Character and Convictions," in Edward Allworth, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 57–58.
49. Potichnyj, "The Struggle of The Crimean Tatars," p. 311.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 312.
51. *Ibid.*
52. Vardas, "The Case of The Crimean Tatars," p. 105.
53. *Ibid.*
54. In his memoirs Sakharov writes: "In 1971, I became interested in the tragedy of the Crimean Tatar people. On May 18, 1944, Stalin had ordered the deportation of all Tatars living in the Crimea, and since most of the younger men were in the Soviet army, it was mainly women and children, and old people who were jammed into freight cars by special KGB troops under the command of Bogdan Kobulov. Many died on their way into exile in Central Asia (they could not even be buried according to Islamic custom), and tens of thousands died of hunger and disease in the first year of exile. Nearly half the Crimean Tatar population was lost as a result of the deportation—an act of genocide." Andrei Sakharov, *Memoirs*, trans. Richard Lourie (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), p. 331.
55. Potichnyj, "The Struggle of The Crimean Tatars," p. 315.
56. *Ibid.*
57. *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin (RLSB)*, RL 476/86, p. 11 (19 December 1986).

58. Ann Sheehy, "Crimean Tatars Demonstrate for Restoration of Autonomous Republic in Crimea," *RLSB*, RL 305/87, p. 4 (27 July 1987).
59. *RLSB*, RL 294/87, p. 11 (24 July 1987). Other members of the committee included Gromyko's deputy, Petr Demichev, CC CPSU secretary Aleksandr Yakovlev, Ukrainian SSR Party first secretary Vladimir Shcherbitsky, and KGB chairman Viktor Chebrikov. Ann Sheehy, "Crimean Tatar Commission Works Against Background of Continuing Protests," *RLSB*, RL 405/87, p. 3 (13 October 1987).
60. *Ibid.*
61. Ann Sheehy, "Crimean Tatars Demonstrate ...," pp. 5–6.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
63. *RLSB*, RL 320/87, p. 2 (7 August 1987); Ann Sheehy, "Crimean Tatar Commission ...," p. 6.
64. See, for example, *RLSB*, RL 320/87, p. 7 (7 August 1987); *RLSB*, RL 366/87, p. 11 (11 September 1987).
65. *The Guardian*, 13 October 1987.
66. Ann Sheehy, "Crimean Tatar Commission ...," p. 4.
67. *RLSB*, RL 414/87, p. 11 (15 October 1987).
68. *RLSB*, RL 108/88, p. 10 (10 March 1988).
69. *RLSB*, RL 247/88, pp. 12–13 (9 June 1988).
70. *Report on the USSR*, RL 190/89, v. 1:16 (9 April 1989).
71. *Report on the USSR*, RL 570/89, v. 1:51 (13 December 1989).
72. *Report on the USSR*, RL 396/90, v. 2:38 (8 September 1990); Report on the USSR, RL 486/90, v. 2:47 (12 November 1990).
73. Kathleen Mihalisko, "The Other Side of Separatism: Crimea Votes for Autonomy," *Report on the USSR*, v. 3:5, p. 36 (1 February 1991).
74. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
75. *Report on the USSR*, RL 236/91, v. 3:26 (19 June 1991).
76. *Report on the USSR*, RL 242/91, v. 3:27 (28 June 1991).
77. See, for example, *Robitnycha hazeta*, p. 3, (14 February 1992).
78. For a discussion of the events of 1654, see John Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1982).
79. These issues are discussed in *ibid.*
80. Roman Solchanyk, "The Politics of State Building: Center-Periphery Relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies*, 46(1), p. 50 (1994).
81. *Ibid.*, and USSR State Committee of Statistics, *Natsional'nyy sostav naseleniya SSSR: po dannym vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1989g* (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1991), p. 82.
82. Solchanyk, p. 51.
83. The Ukrainian parliamentary deputy and lawyer, Serhiy Holovaty, has pointed out the judicial discrepancies of this decree. He indicates that the first article of the February 1991 law decided to restore the Crimean ASSR within Ukraine. However, he notes one can only restore that which existed previously, and for the entire period of Ukraine's existence, it never contained within itself a Crimean autonomous republic. In 1921, the Crimean ASSR was part of Russia, which in 1945, transformed it into an oblast of Russia. The entire process, therefore, never pertained in any legal sense to Ukraine. *Literaturna Ukraina*, No. 19, p. 2 (5 May 1992).
84. Peter J. Potichnyj, "The Referendum and Presidential Elections in Ukraine," *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, XXXIII(2), pp. 124–25 (June 1991).
85. *Demokratychna Ukraina*, p. 1 (21 April 1992).

86. See David Marples, "New Calls to halt work on Crimean Nuclear Power Plant," *Report on the USSR*, v. 1:6 (10 February 1989).
87. *Molod' Ukrainy*, p. 1 (12 December 1991).
88. Solchanyk, p. 54.
89. Reported, for example, on *Mayak*, 1900 (20 April 1992).
90. This and the following comments are based on the account published in *Literaturna Ukraina*, No. 19 (14 May, 1993).
91. The two cities are about the same size—between 330,000 and 350,000 in population—and together comprise about 29% of the total population in Crimea. The third largest city, Kerch, has approximately half the population of Simferopol, *i.e.*, 168,000. See USSR Central Statistical Administration, *Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 1984g* (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1985), pp. 22, 24.
92. By April 1992, some 250,000 signatures had been collected, which supported a plebiscite on the question: "Are you for an independent Republic of Crimea in union with other states?" *Radio Ukraina*, 2210 (22 April, 1992).
93. *Literaturna Ukraina*, (14 May, 1993), & ff.
94. This is an unfortunate phrase, coined by Erich Koch, the former Reichskommissar of Ukraine during the Nazi occupation of 1941–44. Koch had claimed that Ukrainians needed to be controlled by a combination of "vodka and the whip" and proceeded to develop a brutal occupation regime in Ukraine.
95. Solchanyk, p. 53.
96. Cited in *Robitnycha hazeta*, p. 2, (14 February 1992).
97. *Ibid.*
98. *Radio Ukraina*, 2150 (23 April 1992).
99. *Radio Rossiya*, 2100 (17 April 1992).
100. *Pravda Ukrainy*, p. 1 (27 May 1992). This same article also pointed out the substantial support on the peninsula for the Democratic Crimea movement, which boasted 23 parliamentary deputies in the republic, and substantial support in the cities of Yalta, Feodosiya, Kerch and the northern regions of the Crimea. The party supported the presence of Crimea within Ukraine on a federative basis, something akin to the role of Bavaria in Germany.
101. *Radio Ukraina*, 2215 (20 April 1992).
102. *Demokratychna Ukraina*, p. 1, (21 April 1992).
103. See Solchanyk, pp. 53–54.
104. *Ukrinform*, (22 April 1992); and *Radio Ukraina*, (29 April 1992).
105. *Radio Ukraina*, (29 April 1992).
106. *Literaturna Ukraina*, May 28, 1992, p. 2.
107. *Ibid.*
108. *Pravda Ukrainy*, p. 1 (27 May 1992).
109. *Literaturna Ukraina*, p. 2 (28 May 1992).
110. *Ibid.*
111. *Izvestiya*, p. 1, (13 May, 1992).
112. Roman Solchanyk, "The Crimean Imbroglio," *RFE/RL Research Report*, 1(33), pp. 15–16 (21 August 1992). The author comments that the crisis was "defused" rather than "resolved."
113. *Holos Ukrainy*, p. 2 (21 October 1993).
114. *Robitnycha hazeta*, p. 1 (21 October 1993).
115. *Holos Ukrainy*, (19 October 1993).
116. *Holos Ukrainy*, pp. 1,4 (16 October 1993).

117. For example, the Tatars picketed the parliament buildings in July 1992; *Radio Ukraina*, 1800 and 2200, (14 July 1992). For an account of the return of Tatars to their homeland in the recent period, see *Ukraina*, No. 26, p. 16 (1991).
118. *Natsiona'nyy sostav naseleniya SSSR*, p. 82.
119. *Robitnycha hazeta*, p. 1 (26 October 1993).
120. *Holos Ukrainy*, p. 1(22 January 1994).
121. *Holos Ukrainy*, p. 4 (18 January 1994).
122. *Uryadovyi kur'yer*, No. 19–20, p. 1 (3 February, 1994); and *The Ukrainian Weekly*, p. 2 (6 February 1994). For a detailed account of these events, see Roman Solchanyk, "Presidential elections and continuing tensions in Crimea," *The Ukrainian Weekly*, p. 2 (27 March 1994).
123. *Visti z Ukrainy*, No. 5, p. 1 (27 January–2 February 1994).
124. *Respublika* (1 February 1994).
125. For a detailed breakdown of the various factions in the Ukrainian parliament, see *Holos Ukrainy*, pp. 3–4 (12 July, 1994); and the thoughtful analysis by Dominique Arel and Andrew Wilson, "The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections," *RFE/RL Research Report*, 3(26), pp. 6–17 (1 July 1994).