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Author(s): BOHDAN BUDUROWYCZ

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BOHDAN BUDUROWYCZ

Poland and the Ukrainian Problem, 1921-1939

"The Polish people have to realize that their attitude towards the minorities will determine to a large extent the fate of Poland. . . . Therefore I regard all manifestations of hatred and impatience directed against the minorities as blunders for which Poland, sooner or later, will have to pay."¹

These memorable words were uttered in the Polish Sejm on 24 January 1938, not by a minority deputy or by a representative of the opposition, but by General Felicjan Sławoj-Składkowski, the Prime Minister of Poland and Minister of the Interior. Indeed, the minority problem was one of the most urgent and perplexing issues facing the Polish Republic during the interwar period.

Basically, there were two approaches to the problem of national minorities in Poland, both of them developed before the end of World War I.² The first of them, elaborated chiefly by National Democratic theoreticians and known as the programme of incorporation, was based on the slogan "Poland for the Poles." It denied the political and cultural rights of the non-Polish minorities, regarding them as second-class citizens, who were either to be Polonized (in the case of the Ukrainians and Belorussians) or (as in the case of the Jews) completely isolated from Polish society. The second conception, known as the federalist programme, later associated largely with Józef Piłsudski, favoured resolving the problem by a spirit of

1. Składkowski's speech to the Committee of Ways and Means (Komisja Budżetowa) of the Sejm, *Sprawy Narodowościowe*, XII, no. 1-2 (1938), 97.

2. For a detailed discussion of these conceptions see Roman Wapiński, "Z dziejów tendencji nacjonalistycznych: O stanowisku Narodowej Demokracji wobec kwestii narodowej w latach 1893-1939," *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, LXXX, no. 4 (1973), 817-44, and his "Endecja wobec kwestii ukraińskiej i białoruskiej," in *Słowianie w dziejach Europy* (Poznań, 1974), pp. 301-8, and *Narodowa Demokracja 1893-1939* (Wrocław, 1980); J. Lewandowski, *Federalizm, Litwa i Białoruś w polityce obozu belwederskiego* (Warsaw, 1962); and M. K. Dziewanowski, *Joseph Piłsudski: A European Federalist, 1918-1922* (Stanford, Calif., 1969). A concise summary of these two approaches is given by Andrzej Chojnowski in his excellent study, *Koncepcje polityki narodowościowej rządów polskich w latach 1921-1939* (Wrocław, 1979), pp. 18-26.

tolerance and coexistence. Assuming an identity of interests among all the nationalities of pre-partition Poland, the supporters of this idea advocated the resurrection of the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in its historic borders of 1772, but in a modernized, federalist form. The various nationalities were expected to join this federation voluntarily on the understanding that, given a democratic system, such a structure would automatically guarantee the rights of all the non-Polish nationalities.

When the Polish-Soviet conflict of 1919-20 ended in a stalemate, the hopes of the federalists had to give place to a more realistic but, in many ways, less satisfactory solution. As the results of the 1921 and 1931 censuses show, over 30% of the population of the reconstructed Polish State consisted of non-Poles.³ However, since the two largest territorial minorities—the Ukrainian and the Belorussian—were concentrated in the area east of the rivers Bug and San, the term “national minority” could, as Andrzej Chojnowski points out, have been more appropriately applied to the Polish population in that area, which amounted to only 37.8% of the total.⁴ This linguistic and ethnic diversity was, in the words of Hans Roos, “the result of a compromise between the concept of a national unitary state and a supranational federal state.”⁵ The frontier established by the Treaty of Riga in March 1921 failed to leave enough Ukrainians and Belorussians on the Polish side to warrant the creation of a federal state, but the numbers of those two ethnic groups were obviously large enough to deprive Poland of the character of a truly national state. Of course, this situation was not unique in East Central Europe, where practically all countries contained substantial national minorities; nevertheless, it was one of the main causes of the internal and external weakness of interwar Poland, since the political, cultural, social, and economic differences between the national groups impeded the process of integration and stabilization, while

3. A convenient summary of the returns of the 1921 and 1931 censuses with regard to nationality, mother tongue, and religious persuasion is given in Werner Markert (Ed.), *Polen* (Cologne, 1959), p. 37. It has been claimed that Polish official statistics of national origin are unreliable; it is equally true, however, that the figures given by some non-Polish sources (e.g., Stephen Horak in his book *Poland and Her National Minorities, 1919-1939* [New York, 1961]) tend to overstate the percentage of non-Polish nationalities, putting it as high as 39% in 1931. Most Polish scholars agree that the correct figure would be somewhere between 32 and 35%, with the Ukrainians accounting for 15-16% and the Belorussians for 4-6% (see Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki*, p. 6).

4. Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki*, p. 6.

5. Hans Roos, *A History of Modern Poland* (New York, 1966), p. 96.

the dissatisfaction of the minorities —most notably the Ukrainians—after the failure of their aspirations to independence tended to keep some parts of the country in a state of continuous unrest and agitation. It is not surprising, therefore, that some Polish politicians, supported by a considerable part of public opinion, began to demand that the Slavic minorities west of the Riga frontier be assimilated not only politically but also culturally and linguistically. Thus, the resurrected Poland was on its way to becoming, to use Roos's phrase, "a multi-national state with a uni-nationalist ideology."⁶

The legal status of national minorities in Poland was defined and regulated by provisions of the Polish constitutions of 17 March 1921 and 23 April 1935 and by several international agreements. The first of these was the Minorities Treaty of 28 June 1919, according to which Poland assumed the unilateral obligation to assure that Polish nationals who belonged to racial, religious, or linguistic minorities should enjoy full civil and political rights and receive the same treatment, in law and in fact, as the other Polish nationals.⁷ Poland agreed further that any member of the Council of the League of Nations would have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction of these obligations.⁸ The second international agreement was the Treaty of Riga, whose Article VII stipulated that all persons of Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian origin living on the territory of the Polish State were entitled to cultivate their national languages, organize and support national schools, practise their forms of religion, develop their national cultures, and establish for that purpose special associations and organizations.⁹

Among the national minorities of Poland, the Ukrainians were by far the most numerous. According to official statistics, they comprised an absolute majority in the provinces of Stanisławów (69.8% in 1928) and Volhynia (68.4%), a plurality in the province of Tarnopol (close to 50%), and a substantial proportion of the population in the provinces of Lwów (35.8%) and Polesie (17.7%). In addition, they formed a narrow wedge in the southern part of the province of Cracow and were also concentrated in

6. *Ibid.*

7. "Treaty of Peace between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, and Poland," in H. W. V. Temperley (Ed.), *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, V (London, 1921), Art. 2, pp. 439-40.

8. *Ibid.*, Art. 12, p. 442.

9. *Dokumenty i materiały do historii stosunków polsko-radzieckich*, III (Warsaw, 1964), No. 275, p. 581.

some eastern districts of the province of Lublin, forming, respectively, 2.4% and 3% of the population of those provinces. They were moreover only a part of a larger ethnic entity of more than 30 million, spreading far into Soviet territory and overflowing into Rumania and Czechoslovakia. Thus, the Ukrainian issue was not only a Polish problem, but also had significant geopolitical and international ramifications.

The Ukrainian population of Poland was not homogeneous. The Ukrainians of Galicia, who formed close to 60% of the total, led by a numerically small but politically active intelligentsia, had, under the comparatively benevolent rule of the Habsburgs, developed considerable national consciousness, which had matured during the First World War and the brief period of independence in 1918-19. The Ukrainians of Volhynia and Polesie, on the other hand, separated from their Galician kinsmen for a century and a half, remained to a great extent politically dormant; practically all of them belonged to the Orthodox Church, which was under strict governmental control, particularly with regard to its internal organization.¹⁰ The Greek Catholic or Uniate Church of Galicia was in a much stronger position, since its rights and privileges were guaranteed by the concordat concluded by the Holy See and the Polish Republic on 10 February 1925, and its clergy began to identify itself increasingly with the Ukrainian national movement.¹¹ Most Ukrainians, however, whatever

10. Originally the Polish government favoured a de-Russification of the Church's hierarchy, but later began to use the pro-Russian elements within the Church to neutralize the Ukrainian movement, which began to gain in force especially after the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Council in Łuck in 1927. The charter of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Poland, proclaimed in 1938, made that body fully dependent on the government and intensified the efforts to introduce the Polish language into its administration. For details see J. Woliński, *Polska a Kościół Prawosławny* (Lwów, 1936); Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki*, pp. 50-54, 147-55, 208-10; and Mirosława Papierzyńska-Turek, *Sprawa ukraińska w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej 1922-1926* (Cracow, 1979), pp. 100-13, 245-47, 274-75.

11. Details in Wiesław Mysłek, *Kościół Katolicki w Polsce w latach 1918-1939* (Warsaw, 1966), *passim*; Papierzyńska-Turek, *Sprawa ukraińska*, pp. 94-99; Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki*, pp. 55, 188-89. It should be noted that the hierarchy of the Greek Catholic Church in Poland was split, with the Metropolitan of Galicia and Archbishop of Lwów, Andrei Sheptyts'kyi, regarding it as a national Ukrainian Church, and the bishop of Stanisławów, Hryhorii Khomyshyn, maintaining that the Uniate Church represented only one of the rites of the Universal Church and should not, therefore, be used as a tool for gaining purely temporal objectives (see Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki*, pp. 188-89).

their background, viewed their Polish rulers with suspicion and indifference, if not outright hostility; thus, what was needed was an imaginative, farsighted policy that would bring them closer to the Polish State by demonstrating to them the advantages they could derive from their association with it and encouraging them to assume an active and creative role in it.

Of all the issues dividing the Poles and the Ukrainians, the most complex and intractable was that of Eastern Galicia—the territory of the short-lived Western Ukrainian People's Republic, proclaimed on 1 November 1918, and eventually taken over by Poland after a bitter struggle in July 1919. This conflict, deeply rooted in centuries of political, religious, cultural, and economic strife, had left many painful memories and deep wounds, but had at the same time reawakened in the Ukrainian people of Galicia a feeling of national pride and a conviction that they could, after centuries of foreign rule, become masters in their own house. The Poles, on the other hand, regarded Galicia as a part of their inalienable historical heritage and the recapture of its capital, Lwów, inspired the whole country. Thus, in Eastern Galicia there was little room left for any compromise solution.

In spite of the fact that, by the Treaty of Riga, the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR abandoned all rights and claims to the territories ceded to Poland,¹² the Great Powers were still reluctant to give the Poles sovereignty over Eastern Galicia. Nevertheless, having finally established their rule in that area, the Polish authorities proceeded to dismantle most of the self-governing bodies and institutions of the former Austrian crown land, including the provincial diet. In March 1920 the name of Eastern Galicia was officially replaced by that of Eastern Little Poland (*Małopolska Wschodnia*) and most traces of Polish-Ukrainian bilingualism in provincial administration were eradicated; many Ukrainians were dismissed from the provincial civil service and all Ukrainian chairs at the University of Lwów were formally abolished. The Ukrainians, for their part, tried to sabotage the Polish administration by boycotting the census of 30 September 1921 and the parliamentary elections of November 1922, which they regarded as violations of the special status of the territory. They also organized widespread terrorist activities, mostly conducted under the auspices of the newly created Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO), led by former officers of the Ukrainian armies, which culminated in an attempt to assassinate the head of the Polish State, Józef Piłsudski, during his first official visit to Lwów on 25 September 1921. These activities had serious international

12. *Dokumenty i materiały do historii stosunków polsko-radzieckich*, III, p. 577.

implications, since some foreign countries—notably Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, and later the Free City of Danzig—were used as bases for training UVO cadres; moreover, at the end of 1922 the UVO leadership established contact with the German General Staff and received material help from the Reichswehr in exchange for intelligence information.¹³

In order to win the approval of the Great Powers for the incorporation of Eastern Galicia, the Polish Sejm on 26 September 1922 passed a statute of self-government for the provinces of Lwów, Tarnopol, and Stanisławów, which approved the creation of local assemblies (*sejmiki*) in each province, consisting of two chambers, one Polish and the other Ukrainian, invested with the power to discuss and decide upon “matters of common concern” in such fields as public education, welfare, health, road construction, agriculture, and assistance to industry and commerce.¹⁴ In addition, provision was made for the establishment of a “Ruthenian university,” which was to be subject only to control by the Ministry of Education.¹⁵ The statute of self-government was to become effective “not later than in two years,” but the special order which was to announce that date was never issued and, consequently, the statute never became effective. Despite all this, when on 15 March 1923 the Conference of Ambassadors,

13. See Antoni B. Szcześniak and Wiesław Z. Szota, *Droga do nikąd* (Warsaw, 1973), p. 33.

14. *Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, 1922, No. 90, item 829; English translation in Horak, *Poland and Her National Minorities*, pp. 197-200.

15. *Dziennik Ustaw*, 1922, No. 90, item 829, Art. 24; Horak, *Poland and Her National Minorities*, p. 199. Actually, a so-called Ukrainian Secret University opened in Lwów in the fall of 1920. The existence of this institution, which at one time had 3 faculties with over 50 chairs and some 1,200 students, was well known to the Polish Police, who sometimes connived at its illegal activities and sometimes took action against its students and professors, before finally suppressing it in 1925. The Ukrainians felt that the legalization of this university would have been an ideal solution of the whole controversial issue; this, however, was unacceptable to the Polish authorities because of local hostility to the idea of harbouring an institution that was almost bound to become a hotbed of militant Ukrainian nationalism. The government played for a time with the idea of transferring the so-called Ukrainian Free University from Prague to Warsaw or of creating a nucleus for a future university under the temporary patronage of the Jagiellonian University in Cracow. Negotiations with a group of Ukrainian scholars seemed to develop rather auspiciously; Ukrainian politicians, however, proved to be adamantly opposed, claiming that the establishment of the university was a political issue and insisting that the new institution be located on Ukrainian ethnic territory. After Piłsudski's coup, the possibilities of opening a Ukrainian university in Galicia outside Lwów and of

representing France, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom, decided to vest in Poland "all administrative powers" with regard to Eastern Galicia, it did so on the understanding that "insofar as the eastern part of Galicia is concerned, the ethnographical conditions necessitated an autonomous regime" and that Poland, by signing the Minorities Treaty of 28 June 1919, had "provided for special guarantees in favor of racial, language and religious minorities in all the territories placed under Polish sovereignty."¹⁶ The decision of the Conference of Ambassadors thus conferred the official blessing of the Great Powers on a state of affairs that had existed since the signing of the Treaty of Riga.

During the period of parliamentary government, which lasted until Piłsudski's coup d'état in May 1926, the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia had no representatives in the Polish Sejm or Senate, as a result of their boycott of the 1922 elections, except for five deputies elected by the so-called Ukrainian Agricultural Party, which collaborated with the Polish government and whose leader, Sydir Tverdokhlib, was assassinated by the Ukrainian underground in October 1922; however, twenty Ukrainian deputies and six senators were elected from Volhynia, Polesie, and the province of Lublin.¹⁷ As a result of negotiations conducted by Antin Vasyl'chuk, the head of the Ukrainian parliamentary representation, with the Prime Minister, General Władysław Sikorski, the Ukrainians voted for the budget and supported the government in a vote of confidence in March 1923. At the same time, however, they called for special status within the State. As the head of the Ukrainian Club in the Sejm, Samiilo Pidhirs'kyi, said on 2 June 1923:

transferring the Ukrainian Technical and Agricultural Institute from Poděbrady in Czechoslovakia to Volhynia were discussed by Polish official circles, but no positive action was taken in either matter, although the question of the university regularly re-emerged in countless memoranda submitted by the Ukrainian parliamentarians to the government, which were routinely ignored. In 1930, however, the government did establish and provide financial support for the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Warsaw, a primarily research institution staffed with Ukrainian scholars, most of them emigres from the Soviet Ukraine. For details see Vasyl' Mudryi, *Ukrains'kyi Uniwersytet u L'vovi u rr. 1921-1925* (Nuremberg, 1948); M. Iwanicki, *Oświata i szkolnictwo ukraińskie w Polsce w latach 1918-1939* (Siedlce, 1975); Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki*, pp. 57-67; and Papierzyńska-Turek, *Sprawa ukraińska*, pp. 261-69.

16. League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, XV (1923), No. 398, pp. 260-65.

17. Papierzyńska-Turek, *Sprawa ukraińska*, pp. 147-50.

The present situation on Western Ukrainian territories came into existence against our will and against our desires. The eastern frontiers of the Polish Republic have been determined without the consent of the interested parties. [This situation] will be rectified only if Volhynia, Polesie, Podlasie, the Chełm country, and Eastern Galicia with the Lemko country will be set apart as a legally recognized entity and granted national territorial autonomy.¹⁸

If the Ukrainian deputies had ever expected that these demands would be met, they were bitterly disappointed by their experience with the coalition governments ruling Poland during this period.¹⁹ Perhaps their greatest single reverse was the passing of the school law of 31 July 1924, which appeared originally to be fair to the national minorities, but which in the long run dealt a devastating blow to the Ukrainian public schools of Eastern Galicia and Volhynia, transforming most of them into either bilingual or outright Polish institutions.²⁰ These developments were accompanied by an almost complete Polonization of local government and the state apparatus in all ethnically mixed territories as well as by special incentives given to military colonists in the eastern borderlands by the Land Reform Act of 1925, which resulted in the redistribution of some 800,000 hectares to new settlers (many of them ex-servicemen of the Polish Army), approximately 200,000 of whom moved into Eastern Galician and Volhynian villages.²¹

The coming to power of Marshal Piłsudski did not change the situation perceptibly in spite of high hopes that his approach would be more enlightened and innovative. But it would seem that, after the failure of his grandiose federalist programme, Piłsudski retained only a marginal interest in the question of minorities and regarded it solely from the point of view of state security.²² It is noteworthy, however, that less than two weeks after Piłsudski's coup his old comrade-in-arms, Symon Petliura, was assassinated in Paris. After his death the Polish government took over the financial support of the so-called government-in-exile of the Ukrainian

18. Poland, Sejm, *Sprawozdanie stenograficzne*, Okres I, Posiedzenie 92, p. 72.

19. For a detailed account see Papierzyńska-Turek, *Sprawa ukraińska*.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 224-33; and S. Mauersberg, *Szkolnictwo powszechne dla mniejszości narodowych w Polsce w latach 1918-1939* (Wrocław, 1968), *passim*.

21. Details in Papierzyńska-Turek, *Sprawa ukraińska*, pp. 271-74; Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki*, pp. 45-48; and C. Madajczyk, *Burżuazyjno-obszarnicza reforma rolna w Polsce 1918-1939* (Warsaw, 1956), *passim*.

22. See Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki*, pp. 71-73.

People's Republic.²³ But this was not so much a gesture aimed at the Ukrainian minority in Poland as an indication of Warsaw's preparedness to play the Ukrainian card in any future conflict with Moscow.

One interesting experiment that took place under Piłsudski's auspices, however, was the appointment of Henryk Józewski, a former Deputy Minister of the Interior in Petliura's government, as governor of Volhynia in 1928, where he remained, except for one brief interval, until 1938.²⁴ Under his rule, Volhynia became, as Andrzej Chojnowski puts it, "an enclave of the ideology of 1920."²⁵ Józewski saw no contradiction between the concept of an independent Ukraine and Polish rule in Volhynia. Accordingly, he surrounded himself with Ukrainian emigres and Poles from the Dnieper Ukraine, who advocated a relentless struggle against Communism and an aggressive policy towards the Soviet Union, while the local Ukrainians had to recognize that only unswerving support of Warsaw's sovereignty over Volhynia could win any concessions from the Polish authorities, notably in the fields of culture and religion; thus, what was sometimes referred to as the "political assimilation" of the Ukrainian population in Volhynia was to be accompanied and made more palatable by a limited cultural autonomy.²⁶ Simultaneously, Józewski tried to seal the frontier between Galicia and Volhynia in order to prevent any undesirable political and cultural influences penetrating his fief. In time, however, his repeated references to the "programme of 1920" became embarrassing to the Polish government and he was transferred to the less sensitive position of the governor of the Łódź province. After his departure, most of his achievements were quietly dismantled and the aggressively anti-Ukrainian attitude of the newcomers from Western Poland, whom he had tried to neutralize, received official blessing.

In March 1928, Ukrainian deputies and senators from Galicia, representing two major political parties—the Ukrainian National Demo-

23. On the activities of this "government" which was headed by Andrii Livyts'kyi, one of the signatories of the Treaty of Warsaw, see Ivan Kedryn, *Zhyttia—podii—liudy* (New York, 1976), pp. 206-17; see also Mariia Livyts'ka, *Na hrani dvokh epokh* (New York, 1974).

24. A concise account of Józewski's activities in Volhynia is given by Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki*, pp. 97-102. Many interesting details are provided by Józewski himself in his memoirs, "Zamiast pamiętnika," *Zeszyty Historyczne*, No. 59 (1982), pp. 3-163; No. 60 (1982), pp. 65-157.

25. Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki*, p. 99.

26. *Ibid.*

cratic Union (UNDO) and the Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party— as well as some splinter groups, entered the Polish parliament for the first time.²⁷ The strongest of these parties, the UNDO, with 25 seats in the Sejm and 9 in the Senate, represented an attempt to perpetuate the old Ukrainian Galician establishment that controlled most Ukrainian economic institutions and moulded public opinion through the Ukrainian press, especially the influential daily *Dilo*.²⁸ The legal Ukrainian parties, while pledging their support for the idea of Ukrainian statehood, were at the same time prepared to negotiate with the Polish government on the basis of existing political realities. Their influence was being constantly eroded, however, by the nationalist underground, which rejected any accommodation with Warsaw and vowed to continue an all-out revolutionary struggle against what it considered to be an illegal Polish occupation of the Western Ukraine.

The man who exerted the most profound influence on the development of the nationalist movement was undoubtedly Dmytro Dontsov.²⁹ An Eastern Ukrainian by birth, a brilliant writer and journalist, Dontsov

27. These groups included the pro-Soviet Ukrainian Peasants' and Workers' Socialist Organization and the Ukrainian Peasants' and Workers' Socialist Union, popularly known as Sel-Rob and Sel-Rob Union. Counting the deputies from Volhynia elected on the list of the government bloc (BBWR), the Ukrainians had 46 seats in the Sejm (out of 444) and 11 in the Senate (out of 111). For a detailed discussion of Ukrainian political parties in Poland see Jerzy Holzer, *Mozaika polityczna Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej* (Warsaw, 1974), pp. 241-53 and 531-51, and M. Feliński, *The Ukrainians in Poland* (London, 1931), pp. 76-105.

28. Actually, the UNDO was the continuation, under a slightly changed name, of the prewar National Democratic Party, later known as the Ukrainian People's Labour Party. Since its formation in July 1925, it had split into three groups, one of them favouring some form of autonomy for Ukrainian ethnic territories within the Polish State, another opposed to any attempts at Polish-Ukrainian cooperation but advocating closer relations with the Soviet Ukraine, and a third rejecting any compromise with either Poland or the Soviet Union and proclaiming its allegiance to the idea of an independent Ukrainian State. The pro-Soviet group was, in fact, in ascendance and maintained rather intimate ties with the Soviet consulate in Lwów until approximately 1929, when the experiment of the "Ukrainization" in the USSR came to an abrupt end; later, its popularity declined sharply as the autonomist faction gained the controlling influence in the party.

29. The most thorough discussion of Dontsov and his ideology is provided by Mykhailo Sosnovs'kyi in *Dmytro Dontsov: politychnyi portret* (New York, 1974); see also Alexander Motyl, *The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism 1919-1929* (Boulder, Col., 1980).

settled after World War I in Lwów, where, with the financial help of the UVO, he succeeded in obtaining the control of one of the most respected Ukrainian journals—*Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*—and proceeded to make it the platform for an extreme and intolerant brand of nationalism, which, as John A. Armstrong puts it, “was largely expressed in advocacy of terrorism, led to extreme glorification of illegality” as such and “enhanced the natural tendency of integral nationalism to rely on youth and reject the moderation of its elders.”³⁰ It was Dontsov rather than any political or religious leader who transformed Ukrainian nationalism into a cult and profoundly influenced the Western Ukrainian youth of the late 1920s and '30s, and indeed even later. While Dontsov himself regarded Russia as the chief enemy of the Ukraine and never made any explicitly anti-Polish statements, his writings provided a justification for activities that were directed primarily, if not exclusively, against Poland.

It was in 1929 that the fateful decision was taken to transform the paramilitary UVO into a mass movement, consisting to a large extent of secondary-school and university students, with a liberal sprinkling of peasant and working-class youth.³¹ The new illegal party, known as the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), was led by the former commander of the UVO, Colonel Ievhen Konovalets', regarded by some as a national hero and by others as a sinister individual in the pay of foreign intelligence services,³² who until his death in 1938 exercised supreme authority over the Ukrainian underground in Poland and thus perhaps more than anyone else on the Ukrainian side affected the course of Polish-Ukrainian relations in those years. Like any terrorist underground, it was a largely negative force, which began eventually to use strong-arm tactics within the Ukrainian community itself to coerce its leaders into abandon-

30. John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 2d ed. (New York, 1963), p. 22. One of the most astute and level-headed Ukrainian journalists, Osyp Nazaruk, predicted as early as 1927 that Dontsov's nationalism, once it gained acceptance among the Ukrainians, would “transform men into beasts,” bringing “internal discord, ruin and death”—see his *Natsionalizm Dontsova i inshi myshugizmy* (originally published in 1927, reprinted in Lwów in 1934), p. 7, as quoted by Ivan Lysiak-Rudnyts'kyi [Ivan L. Rudnytsky] in “Nazaruk i Lypyns'kyi: istoriia ikhn'oi druzhby ta konfliktu,” in *Lysty Osypa Nazaruka do Viacheslava Lypyns'koho* (Philadelphia, 1976), p. lii.

31. For details see Motyl, *The Turn to the Right*; Volodymyr Martynets', *Ukrains'ke pidpillia vid UVO do OUN* (n.p., 1949); and Petro Mirchuk, *Narys istorii Orhanizatsii Ukrains'kykh Natsionalistiv*, vol. 1, 1920-1939 (Munich, 1968).

32. See *Lysty Osypa Nazaruka*, No. 138 (28 January 1928), p. 447.

ing their search for a settlement with the Polish government.³³ Obviously, such a large body could not be always effectively restrained by its leadership, but it could be easily infiltrated by the agents and informers of the Polish police.

At the same time, the leaders of the legal Ukrainian parties could not ignore the fact that the policy of seeking confrontation with the Polish regime was rapidly attracting the younger generation while their own platforms were becoming largely irrelevant. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that they maintained regular contacts and in some instances even tried to coordinate their activities with the nationalist underground. As Ivan Kedryn put it, the Ukrainian leaders “realized that it was necessary to conduct towards Poland a policy on two parallel tracks: the legal and the illegal.”³⁴ Both groups were merely waiting for an international configuration that would permit them to realize their aspirations to nationhood; the Poles were, of course, aware of this and so tended to regard the irredentist movement as the true expression of Ukrainian feelings and all attempts to reach an accommodation as insincere and opportunistic.³⁵

The views of the various Polish parties on the Ukrainian problem were subject to some variations but their basic attitudes remained largely unchanged.³⁶ The parties of the Right, notably the National Democrats, reorganized since 1928 into the National Party (SN), favoured legal differentiation between the Polish and non-Polish populations, with certain rights being reserved exclusively for the Poles, and advocated the radical curtailment of minority rights as well as the gradual Polonization of the eastern provinces. The attitude of the peasant parties was somewhat ambivalent: the PSL “Piast,” while paying lip-service to the rights of all nationalities within the Polish State to full cultural and economic development, was in favour of restricting some of their electoral privileges and supported the idea of Polish colonization of the eastern borderlands; at the same time, such groups as PSL “Wyzwolenie” and the Peasant Party (Stronnictwo Chłopskie) and, after their amalgamation in 1931, Stronnictwo Ludowe, supported at least in theory the national aspirations of the

33. See Kedryn, *Zhyttia—podii—liudy*, pp. 144-45 and 288-90.

34. “Zhadaimo velykykh Dmytriv,” *Svoboda* (Jersey City), 13 November 1982, p. 2.

35. *Wiek Nowy* (Lwów), 30 December 1938, as quoted in *Dilo*, 31 December 1938, p. 8.

36. A concise account is provided by Chojnowski in *Koncepcje polityki*, pp. 125-28; see also Holzer, *Mozaika polityczna, passim*.

Ukrainians and Belorussians, including their demand for territorial autonomy. The Polish Socialist Party (PPS) went even further: in October 1931 it formally submitted in the Sejm a bill proposing territorial autonomy for the three southeastern provinces of Lwów, Stanisławów, and Tarnopol, as well as for Volhynia and a part of Polesie.³⁷ As for the illegal Communist Party, it stressed the right of both the Ukrainians and the Belorussians to self-determination, including separation from Poland.

In addition, there were various groups, not necessarily connected with any political party, that took a keen interest in the Ukrainian problem and even advocated the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state east of the Riga frontier. While their influence in Polish society was marginal they performed an important function by popularizing the Ukrainian issue and discussing it at a higher level of sophistication than the daily press. These circles established close ties with the so-called Promethean movement, an emigre organization that purported to represent the "oppressed peoples of the USSR" and included among its members some former Russian citizens, mostly of Ukrainian and Georgian origin, serving as officers in the Polish Army. Of special significance for the Ukrainian problem were the periodicals *Bunt Młodych* and *Polityka*, published and edited by Jerzy Giedroyc, and the weekly *Biuletyn Polsko-Ukraiński*, which appeared under the editorship of Włodzimierz Bączkowski from September 1932 until December 1938. Although the initiative for the latter came from the Second Division of the General Staff of the Polish Army, in close cooperation with the Nationalities Branch of the Ministry of the Interior and the Eastern Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,³⁸ it cannot be regarded as an official or semi-official publication: rather, it represented those groups in the ruling camp that subscribed to the Promethean conception. Even so, the Polish "Prometheans" were criticized by the National Democrats, who maintained that Poland, threatened by an implacable enemy in the West, could not afford the luxury of provoking Russia. As the Lwów daily *Słowo Narodowe* observed, "whoever is breeding Ukrainian bacteria to harm Russia should remember that he is also breeding them against Poland."³⁹

One of the few fresh and constructive programmes for the solution of the Ukrainian problem in these years was developed by Piotr Dunin-Bor-

37. Poland, Sejm, Kadencja III, *Druki sejmowe*, No. 365.

38. Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki*, p. 193.

39. *Słowo Narodowe*, 19 February 1939, as quoted in *Dilo*, 22 February 1939, p. 3.

kowski, governor of Lwów province in 1927-28.⁴⁰ He regarded the Ukrainian question as an issue obscured by emotionalism and nationalistic propaganda on both sides, but also as a serious threat to the future of Poland. In his opinion it was unrealistic to expect the Galician Ukrainians to redirect their national aspirations towards the Soviet Ukraine, since their nationalism was basically oriented towards their own native province. He was, however, opposed to concluding a formal agreement between the Polish State and the Ukrainians, which would only encourage the latter to make new political demands. What was needed, in his opinion, was the removal of some economic grievances and the establishing of personal contacts that would help, in due course, to put an end to isolationist attitudes and enable both sides to agree on common measures. According to Borkowski, Warsaw's final objective with regard to the Ukrainians was to be their political or state assimilation, but this could be achieved only if the authorities succeeded in satisfying their legitimate aspirations and demands within the boundaries of the Polish State. As a step in this direction, Borkowski proposed the creation of a separate territorial unit out of the provinces of Lwów, Stanisławów, Tarnopol, and Lublin, in which both nationalities would be approximately equal in numbers—a solution that would presumably ease the apprehensions of the Poles about the numerical superiority of the Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia. Public offices and institutions in all areas where the Ukrainian population amounted to at least 20% would be bilingual, and Ukrainian could be used as the sole language of administration in all localities and districts with a Ukrainian majority. Similar privileges were to be extended to the Ukrainian minority in the field of elementary and secondary education. In Borkowski's opinion, the granting of cultural autonomy to the Ukrainians would speed up the process of their political assimilation, and he appealed to the government to initiate the necessary measures during what he called "the calm before the storm." The tempest of which he was afraid was, however, to descend on Eastern Galicia the very next year in the form of the so-called "pacification."

In order to appreciate the significance of the "pacification" of 1930 and its impact on Polish-Ukrainian relations, it is necessary to realize that it followed a widespread terrorist campaign launched by the OUN, directed primarily against Polish private and public property in Eastern Galicia: according to official data, 191 acts of terrorism (chiefly arson and dis-

40. The subsequent account is based on Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki*, pp. 102-6.

ruption of telephone, telegraph, and railway communications) took place during the second half of 1930.⁴¹ With Polish vigilantes threatening to retaliate, the situation was getting out of hand, and the danger of an insurrection seemed to be quite real. Under these circumstances, Prime Minister Marshal Piłsudski personally decided that “acts of arson, sabotage, and terrorism should not be treated as an uprising but rather as violations of law and order and, as such, should be dealt with by means of repressive police measures.”⁴² Between 16 September and 30 November punitive expeditions, consisting of military and police detachments, were sent into some 450 villages in 16 districts;⁴³ Ukrainian sources claim, however, that over 700 villages were affected, 250 of them seriously.⁴⁴ Corporal punishment was frequently applied and buildings, especially those housing Ukrainian cultural institutions and community stores, were damaged or destroyed.⁴⁵

General Sławoj-Składkowski, the Minister of the Interior entrusted with carrying out Piłsudski’s orders, claims in his memoirs that the “pacification” was a bloodless operation,⁴⁶ but Ukrainian writers put the number of deaths at between 7 and 35.⁴⁷ In any case, the “pacification” proved to be costly to the OUN, for its commander in Galicia, Captain Iulian Holovins’kyi, was arrested and killed by the police “while trying to escape.”⁴⁸ In related developments, 30 former Ukrainian deputies of the Sejm were arrested and five of them were sent to the military prison in Brest-Litovsk, where they joined some Polish opposition leaders;⁴⁹ in addition, the Ukrainian scouting movement “Plast” was disbanded and several secondary schools were closed because of the involvement of some of their students in underground activities.

41. For details see Polski Instytut Współpracy z Zagranicą, *Sabotaż ukraiński i akcja pacyfikacyjna* (Warsaw, 1931); Feliński, *The Ukrainians*, pp. 158-73; and Mirchuk, *Narys istorii*, pp. 232-44.

42. Felicjan Sławoj-Składkowski, *Strzepy meldunków* (Warsaw, 1936), p. 233.

43. Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki*, p. 158.

44. See Michael Yaremko, *Galicia-Halychyna: From Separation to Unity* (Toronto, 1967), p. 241.

45. *Ibid.*

46. *Nie ostatnie słowo oskarżonego* (London, 1964), p. 198.

47. The former figure is given by Mirchuk in *Narys istorii*, p. 253, the latter by Horak in *Poland and Her National Minorities*, p. 162, and Yaremko in *Galicia-Halychyna*, p. 241.

48. For details see Mirchuk, *Narys istorii*, pp. 247-50.

49. *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia*, I (Toronto, 1963), p. 843.

The “pacification” received wide coverage in the Western press and thus, in a way, internationalized the Ukrainian issue, for, as an application of the doctrine of collective responsibility, it seemed to run counter to the principles of international law. As *The Manchester Guardian* wrote on 14 October 1930, “The ‘pacification’ of the Ukraine by means of these ‘punitive expeditions’ is probably the most destructive onslaught yet made on any of the national minorities and the worst violation of a minority treaty.”⁵⁰ Numerous petitions from Ukrainian representatives and prominent individuals of other nationalities, including 62 members of the British Parliament, reached the League of Nations, and were studied there by the Committee of Three, consisting of representatives of Italy, Norway, and the United Kingdom.⁵¹ The Polish government, for its part, declared its willingness to reach an internal settlement of the issue, including compensation for damages suffered by the Ukrainians; this had to be preceded, however, by a withdrawal of Ukrainian petitions and a declaration of loyalty to Poland by Ukrainian parliamentary representatives—something that the Ukrainians refused to consider.⁵² Eventually, after long deliberations and attempts at conciliation, on 30 January 1932 the Council of the League of Nations came to the conclusion that “Poland does not carry on any policy of persecution against the Ukrainians,”⁵³ thus effectively disposing of the Ukrainian complaint.

The final act in this drama occurred some two and a half years later. With the Soviet Union about to enter the League of Nations and receive a permanent seat on its Council, Warsaw decided to deprive Moscow of the opportunity of using it as a platform for attacking the treatment of the Ukrainians and Belorussians in Poland. On 13 September 1934 the Polish Foreign Minister, Józef Beck, informed the General Assembly of the League that in future his government would decline to cooperate with any international bodies “in the matter of the supervision of the application by Poland of the system of minority protection” until a uniform scheme for dealing with that question was adopted by all countries.⁵⁴ While Beck’s declaration was criticized by some foreign diplomats and a part of the Polish opposition press, it was generally welcomed by Polish public opinion.

50. Quoted in Horak, *Poland and Her National Minorities*, p. 164.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 165.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 166.

53. League of Nations, *Official Journal*, XIII (Geneva, 1932), p. 513.

54. League of Nations, *Official Journal*, Special Supplement No. 125 (Geneva, 1934), p. 43.

On the whole, the “pacification” proved to be counter-productive: it alienated even further the Ukrainian population and tarnished Poland’s international reputation without bringing any perceptible benefits in return. At the same time, the nationalist underground expanded its activities, increased its membership, and launched a series of retaliatory acts of terror, expropriatory actions against post offices, mail coaches, and banks as well as personal attacks against individuals who were deemed to have been responsible in some way for the “pacification.” A particularly senseless crime was the assassination in August 1931 of Tadeusz Hołowko, the former chief of the Eastern Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose attitude towards the Ukrainian problem had been comparatively enlightened.⁵⁵ However, the most spectacular deed of the OUN was the assassination in June 1934 of Bronisław Pieracki, the Minister of the Interior.⁵⁶ The immediate consequence of this was the opening of the only concentration camp in Poland in Bereza Kartuska, which had a majority of Ukrainian inmates from the very start.⁵⁷ Pieracki’s murder was followed only a few weeks later by that of Ivan Babii, the principal of a respected Ukrainian gymnasium in Lwów, for his alleged collaboration with the Polish police.⁵⁸ This action provoked a scathing denunciation of the activi-

55. The forthcoming publication of a monograph on Hołowko by Iwo Werschler (*Z dziejów obozu belwederskiego: Tadeusz Hołowko — życie i działalność*) was announced in *Zapowiedzi Wydawnicze*, No. 27/28 for 1982, item 7. Some of the circumstances of Hołowko’s murder remain obscure even today: Kedryn is of the opinion that “it was planned by some Polish chauvinist clique and staged with the help of the Polish police, who availed themselves of agents inside the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists;” he also claims that the commander of the OUN, Colonel Konovalets’, was “shaken” by the news of the assassination (*Zhyttia—podii—liudy*, pp. 220-30; see also Zynovii Knysh, *V sutinkakh zrady: ubyvstvo Tadeusha Holufka na tli zrady Romana Baranovs’koho* [Toronto, 1975], *passim*). However, according to Mirchuk, Konovalets’ expressed his *post-factum* approval of Hołowko’s killing (*Narys istorii*, p. 285).

56. A comprehensive account of this assassination and its aftermath is given in Władysław Żeleński, *Zabójstwo ministra Pierackiego* (Paris, 1973); see also Mirchuk, *Narys istorii*, pp. 373-86; Ryszard Torzecki, *Kwestia ukraińska w polityce III Rzeszy* (Warsaw, 1972), pp. 138-40; and Marian Wojciechowski, *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie 1933-1938*, 2d ed., rev. (Poznań, 1980), pp. 228-33.

57. See Volodymyr Makar, *Bereza Kartuz’ka: spomyny z 1934-35 rr.* (Toronto, 1956), *passim*.

58. For details see Mirchuk, *Narys istorii*, pp. 368-71.

ties of the Ukrainian underground from the Metropolitan of Galicia, Andrei Sheptyts'kyi, who condemned the terrorists as “madmen,” “criminals,” and “enemies of the people.”⁵⁹

The natural consequence of such activities was a continuous series of political trials throughout the two decades of Polish rule in Eastern Galicia and Volhynia, which, in the words of Ivan Kedryn, must be regarded as “the most striking events or rather phenomena of the '20s or '30s in the Western Ukraine.”⁶⁰ Reports from these trials, often revealing the use of illegal methods of interrogation by the Polish police, filled the pages of the Ukrainian press and helped to fan and intensify anti-Polish feelings. Indeed, some of these trials—notably one in Lwów in December 1932, at which an emergency tribunal handed out three death sentences, two of which were immediately carried out—were traumatic experiences for the whole Ukrainian community in Eastern Galicia.

In spite of this bitterness, however, the possibility of an eventual Polish-Ukrainian agreement could not be completely ruled out, at a time when the centralizing tendencies in the USSR, the end of the policy of “Ukrainization” in the Soviet Ukraine, the collectivization drive of 1932-33, and finally the famine of 1933 seemed to threaten the very existence of the Ukrainian people. Under these circumstances, a policy of accommodation with Poland appeared more attractive and promising.⁶¹ At first, the Polish government seemed reluctant to engage in any negotiations. Marian Zyndram-Kościałkowski stated on 14 February 1935 to the

59. *Dilo*, 5 August 1934, p. 3. The Metropolitan also bitterly condemned the leaders of the OUN, who, acting from their foreign hideouts, “are using our children to kill their parents.” Interestingly, Sheptyts'kyi's pastoral letter is not mentioned in Mirchuk's detailed account of Babii's assassination.

60. Kedryn, *Zhyttia—podii—liudy*, p. 218.

61. In this connection see a rather revealing statement made by the Greek Catholic bishop of Stanisławów, Hryhorii Khomyshyn: “What are we to do? Should we remain passive and wait for our own demise? Or should we adopt an attitude of negation and provocation? Should we continue to conduct a terrorist action until our heads are bashed in and we fall into an abyss? No! The first step on our part should be a loyal attitude towards the state in which we live. This is a matter of common sense. Even if we gain no positive results and advantages, we shall tie the Poles' hands in such a way that they will have no reason to oppress and persecute us. This, in turn, will give us a chance to recover and revive” (Grzegorz Chomyszyn, *Problem ukraiński* [Warsaw, 1933], pp. 101-2, as quoted by Papierzyńska-Turek, *Sprawa ukraińska*, p. 96).

Ukrainian deputies in the Sejm, "You, gentlemen, are demanding from us, the representatives of the Polish State, declarations and promises, but you yourselves have so far never declared that you were loyal and faithful citizens of the State."⁶² Unofficial discussions, however, started in the spring of 1935 and an attempt was made to reconcile Poland's security concerns with the legitimate aspirations of the Ukrainian minority. The Ukrainian negotiators presented a series of memoranda listing their most urgent grievances and demands, including an immediate freeze on Polish settlements in Eastern Galicia and Volhynia, some concessions in the field of elementary, secondary, and higher education, increased opportunities for employment of Ukrainians in local and central administration, and an amnesty for political prisoners. Kościółkowski promised to take all these demands into consideration and at the same time suggested an electoral compromise by which the Poles and the Ukrainians would elect their own deputies in each of the 15 electoral districts of Eastern Galicia. Although the Ukrainian Radical and Social Democratic parties rejected this offer, the Central Committee of the UNDO decided to accept it, in spite of the fact that it was limited to Eastern Galicia and that the government reserved for itself the right to disqualify individual Ukrainian candidates.⁶³

As a result of this agreement, generally known as the "normalization," 14 Ukrainian deputies and five senators were elected to the Polish parliament, as well as five deputies and one senator from Volhynia elected on the government list. The new leader of the UNDO, Vasyl' Mudryi, became Deputy Speaker of the Sejm, an amnesty for political prisoners was approved, and certain credits were extended to Ukrainian economic institutions. In return, the Ukrainian deputies voted for the budget and either ceased or moderated their criticism of the government's policies. At the same time, however, their hopes for bilingualism, greater participation in local administration, and concessions in the field of education remained unfulfilled. As time went on, the chances for regularizing Polish-Ukrainian relations began to decrease, for the Polish government never regarded the agreement of 1935 as more than a purely tactical move.⁶⁴ In addition, forces opposed to any concessions to the national minorities were begin-

62. *Sprawy Narodowościowe*, IX, no. 1-2 (1935), p. 57. Having served as Minister of the Interior in the governments headed by Leon Kozłowski and Walery Sławek (June 1934-October 1935), Kościółkowski himself became Prime Minister of Poland on 13 October 1935.

63. Kedryn, *Zhyttia—podii—liudy*, pp. 253-54.

64. Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki*, p. 205.

ning to gain ascendancy after the death of Marshal Piłsudski, especially when the coolly pragmatic “dove,” Zyndram-Kościałkowski, was replaced as Prime Minister in May 1936 by a well-intentioned but unimaginative and heavy-handed martinet, General Sławoj-Skłodkowski, whose government was dominated by General (and after November 1936 Marshal) Edward Śmigły-Rydz. Moreover, the attempt to transform the nation into a fully authoritarian, unitary state on the basis of the constitution of April 1935 and the emergence of a new pro-governmental bloc, the Camp of National Unity (OZN), whose platform seemed to reduce even further the role of the national minorities, did not augur well for the future of Polish-Ukrainian relations.⁶⁵

Particularly ominous was the establishment in December 1935 of a special Committee on Nationality Affairs, consisting, in addition to the Prime Minister, of the ministers of the Interior, Foreign Affairs, Military Affairs, Religious Denominations and Education, and Agriculture.⁶⁶ The Committee was reluctant to make any but minor concessions to the Ukrainians, and showed much more energy and initiative in supporting projects and schemes that were clearly undermining the principle of “normalization.” Some of these projects were aimed at weakening Ukrainian unity by encouraging the regionalism of such tribes as the Lemkians and the Hutsuls, by preventing contacts between the Galician and Volhynian Ukrainians, and by lending official support to the Old Ruthenian movement in Galicia as a potential counterpoise to Ukrainian nationalism.⁶⁷ The Committee also endorsed the project of colonizing the sparsely

65. See Tadeusz Jędruszcak, *Piłsudczycy bez Piłsudskiego: Powstanie Obozu Zjednoczenia Narodowego w 1937 roku* (Warsaw, 1963), *passim*.

66. Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki*, p. 207.

67. The Old Ruthenians were a once influential group, whose effectiveness after World War I was practically negligible. Based on their two main strongholds—the National Home and the Stauropagian Institute in Lwów—and maintaining some strength in a few rural areas (notably the Lemko country), they engaged in acrimonious debates with the Ukrainian press through their newspaper, *Russkii Golos*, while at the same time closely cooperating with the Russian ethnic group and Russian emigres in Poland. Their loyalty to the Polish State was generally beyond reproach, though their left wing became associated in the mid-'twenties with the so-called Sel-Rob, or the Ukrainian Peasants' and Workers' Socialist Union, which, because of its pro-Communist sympathies, was eventually banned by the Polish government. In 1930, two of the representatives of their right wing were elected to the Polish Sejm from the list of the governmental bloc BBWR. It is

populated eastern regions, such as Polesie, and of strengthening the Polish element in such strongly Ukrainian areas as Eastern Galicia.⁶⁸

These developments were influenced to a great extent by the attitude of the Polish population of the eastern borderlands, who regarded the “normalization” as harmful to Poland in general and themselves in particular. Rejecting any accommodation with the Ukrainians imposed from above, in November 1935 the Poles of Eastern Galicia received official encouragement to set up the so-called Coordinating Secretariat of Polish Social Organizations in Eastern Little Poland (Sekretariat Porozumiewawczy Polskich Organizacji Społecznych w Małopolsce Wschodniej), an umbrella group of Poles of different political persuasions, but united by their militant anti-Ukrainianism. Its initiators claimed that the Poles were the autochthonous population of Eastern Galicia and that practically the whole civilization of that area was the product of Polish thought and Polish toil.⁶⁹ The activities of the Secretariat were strongly supported—indeed, often initiated—by the army, which fully endorsed the so-called “programme of revindication,” aimed at reclaiming individuals and groups of Polish origin.⁷⁰ In addition, of course, there were Polish authorities at all levels, generally not concerned with any ideologies and not following any political theories in their day-to-day contacts with the Ukrainians, but simply trying to fit them into the Procrustean bed of official decrees and regulations.⁷¹

difficult to estimate their numerical strength, but in 1939 the so-called Ruthenian Audit Union included about 250 cooperatives, while their cultural association, the Kachkovskii Society, had in 1936 close to 6,000 members (*Encyklopedia Ukrainoznawstwa*, II/5, p. 1654, s.v. “Moskvofil’stvo,” by S. Ripets’kyi).

68. See P. Stawecki, *Następcy Komendanta: Wojsko a polityka wewnętrzna II Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1935-1939* (Warsaw, 1969), pp. 138-40.

69. Quoted by Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki*, p. 214.

70. For details on this programme see *ibid.*, pp. 226-32, and Stawecki, *Następcy Komendanta*, *passim*. As part of this programme many allegedly unused Orthodox churches and chapels in the Chełm region were destroyed or transferred to the Roman Catholic Church, while in some districts of Volhynia conversion from Orthodoxy to Catholicism was openly encouraged and sometimes forcibly carried out under the auspices of such military units as the Corps of Frontier Guards (KOP).

71. E.g., under the law of 7 July 1936 it was expressly forbidden to sell or transfer without special permission any land within the so-called border belt, which was 30 km wide and covered some 28% of the territory of the Polish State. This af-

The Ukrainian side viewed all these developments with considerable apprehension. A growing number of UNDO members began to question the policy of their leadership, claiming that “normalization,” far from improving Polish-Ukrainian relations, had achieved the opposite, since the Polish government had interpreted Ukrainian cooperation as a sign of weakness.⁷²

The failure of “normalization” was a disappointment for those Ukrainians who had hoped that Poland, possibly in alliance with Germany, would revive Piłsudski’s and Petliura’s old dream of an anti-Soviet crusade. On February 1935, only a few days after one of Göring’s famous “hunting trips” to Poland during which he had offered Ukraine to the Poles,⁷³ Dmytro Levyts’kyi, the leader of the UNDO group in the Sejm, urged the Polish government to take an active part in the “political reorganization” of Eastern Europe and help the Ukrainians achieve independence from Soviet rule;⁷⁴ not surprisingly, both the government and the opposition parties denounced the proposal.⁷⁵ This synchronization of German and Ukrainian efforts was probably purely coincidental, though it

affected Ukrainian peasants especially and they were often denied the right to buy land in their own area. At the same time, individuals who were considered troublesome or suspected of anti-state activities could be expelled from the border region. Even the name of Poland’s largest national minority remained a matter of controversy, while Ukrainian newspapers were sometimes censored for employing the historical name “Galicia” instead of the official term “Little Poland,” or even for using the word “autonomy.”

72. Especially revealing in this respect was the series of articles in response to a questionnaire which appeared in *Dilo*: e.g., the contributions by Dmytro Levyts’kyi (*Dilo*, 11 July 1937, pp. 3-4), Hryn’ Terhakovets’ (*ibid.*, 15 July, p. 3), Kost’ Levyts’kyi (*ibid.*, 18 July, pp. 3-4), Volodymyr Starosol’s’kyi (*ibid.*, 29 July pp. 3-4), Oleksa Iavors’kyi (*ibid.*, 12 August, pp. 3-4), and Volodymyr Kuz’movych (*ibid.*, 12 September, pp. 3-4; 15 September, pp. 3-4; 18 September, pp. 4-5; and 23 September, pp. 3-4).

73. Poland, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, *Official Documents Concerning Polish-German and Polish-Soviet Relations, 1933-1939* (London, 1940), p. 26; S. Strzetelski, *Where the Storm Broke: Poland from Yesterday to Tomorrow* (New York, 1942); S. Mackiewicz, *Colonel Beck and His Policy* (London, 1944), pp. 25-26.

74. Poland, Sejm, *Sprawozdanie stenograficzne*, Okres III, Posiedzenie 128, p. 31.

75. See, e.g., the speech by Kazimierz Czapiński, *ibid.*, Posiedzenie 133, p. 32.

is possible that Levyts'kyi, through his contacts with the Ukrainian underground, was aware of Berlin's hopes of persuading Poland to join the anti-Soviet expedition, while the Ukrainian press in Poland, with only a few exceptions, was declaring that there were no territorial or other disputes separating the Germans from the Ukrainians, and applauding Hitler's dismantling of the system of Versailles. As *Dilo*, the mouthpiece of the UNDO, commented: "obviously, we are not delighted with everything that is taking place within the Third Reich. . . . However, like all nations of the world, we are watching with admiration that gigantic work of revival that is being conducted for the German nation by the present leader of the German people and of the Third Reich."⁷⁶

The Ukrainian problem was revived briefly in October 1938 when the creation by Prague of an autonomous Subcarpathian Rus' was regarded by many observers as a step towards establishing an independent Ukrainian State. Czechoslovakia, and especially her easternmost province, provided a convenient jumping-off point for any campaign against the Soviet Union or Poland. Thus, the threat of German aggression from the south and the spectre of an independent Ukraine could be used against Poland as an effective bargaining-counter for Danzig and the "Corridor."

It is not surprising, therefore, that the annexation of Subcarpathian Rus' by Hungary seemed to be an ideal solution from both Budapest's and Warsaw's point of view. While the Hungarians were interested in reclaiming their ancient province, the Poles felt that a German base in the south could have become a permanent menace to their security. They were even

76. "Za samostiiny ukrains'kyi pidkhyd do inshykh narodiv," *Dilo*, 14 August 1938, p. 2. It should be noted that Ukrainian nationalists looked upon Germany as their natural ally, whose objectives in Eastern Europe—the destruction of the Soviet regime and the dismemberment of the USSR— basically coincided with their own. They foresaw economic domination of Ukraine by Germany, but were ready to pay that price for the sake of political independence. The Germans, on the other hand, never seriously entertained the idea of a partnership, and while they were ready to use the Ukrainian nationalists as a tool to undermine Poland and the Soviet Union, they were always prepared to exchange or sacrifice them in order to gain more immediate political advantages. This led to many disappointments for the Ukrainian nationalists, since almost any improvement in relations between Germany on the one hand and Poland or the USSR on the other, no matter how short-lived, took place at their expense. For details see Torzecki, *Kwestia ukraińska, passim*, and Roman Ilnytzyk, *Deutschland und die Ukraine, 1934-1945*, vol. I, 2d ed. (Munich, 1958).

less inclined to tolerate its becoming a centre for a Ukrainian irredentist movement, and events in Eastern Galicia seemed to demonstrate that their apprehensions were well-founded. In October and November 1938, Ukrainian crowds in Lwów and several other places staged anti-Hungarian and anti-Polish marches and demonstrations, which in turn led to counter-demonstrations and pogroms of Ukrainian institutions and commercial enterprises. This exacerbation of Polish-Ukrainian relations enabled the OUN to rebuild its tarnished reputation and to regain the support of the Ukrainian population in Eastern Galicia for its policy of confrontation.⁷⁷ The Polish government reacted to these developments by taking a series of repressive measures, which recalled the “pacification” of 1930.

It was at this inauspicious moment that, on 9 December 1938, the Ukrainian deputies in the Sejm presented a bill providing for the establishment of an autonomous “Galician-Volhynian Land,” enjoying full rights of self-government except in foreign policy and military and financial matters. It was to have its own legislature and a government, whose premier and leading ministers were to be members of the Polish Cabinet. Both Polish and Ukrainian were to be recognized as official languages of this territory, which, with some 40,000 square miles and a population of 9 million, would have comprised approximately one-fourth of the whole area of the Polish Republic.⁷⁸ The bill was modelled on the home-rule law granted by the Prague parliament to Slovakia and Subcarpathian Rus’, but it also re-

77. During the period between 5 September 1938 and 15 March 1939, when the tension over Czechoslovakia and the Carpatho-Ukrainian problem was at its peak, the Ukrainian underground engaged, according to official statistics, in 397 illegal demonstrations, 47 acts of sabotage, and 34 terrorist attacks (Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki*, p. 235). At the same time, on the Polish side, an increasingly aggressive role was played by the paramilitary organization “Strzelec” and above all by the university students of Lwów, largely under the influence of National Democratic ideology, whose anti-Ukrainian and anti-Semitic excesses made them notorious throughout Poland. The tense atmosphere which gripped the southeastern provinces of Poland impelled Msgr. Felipe Cortesi, the papal nuncio in Warsaw, to visit the Roman and Greek Catholic bishops of Eastern Galicia and to issue an appeal for reconciliation, which was duly published in the Polish and Ukrainian daily press (see *Dilo*, 16 December 1938, p. 4).

78. See “Polish Ukrainian Demands: Autonomy Bill Introduced,” *The Times* (London), 10 December 1938, p. 11. The demand for a territorial autonomy of Ukrainian ethnic regions in Poland was included in the resolutions adopted by the General Committee of the UNDO on 7 May 1938: “Whereas all the areas inhabited by the Ukrainian people in Poland form one geopolitical and economic whole, and

called the demands put forward by Konrad Henlein and his Sudeten German Party that had led to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. While such proposals had been voiced in the Polish Sejm as early as 1922, the attempt to revive the issue at a time when Poland's international situation was becoming increasingly insecure was bound to produce deep-seated resentments and indignation even among those groups that usually showed some sympathy for the Ukrainian minority.⁷⁹ As the popular Lwów daily, *Wiek Nowy*, put it,

We have now obtained the certainty that the thread which binds the Ukrainians to our state is very thin indeed. . . . We are not sure what advantages they are going to get from a Transcarpathian Rus' under German protectorate, but it is possible even today to calculate the losses. The fact that our ways are parting and that the slogans of cooperation are being replaced by those of conflict represents a definite loss for Poland; [the Ukrainians], however, are also going to be losers—and they have chosen their path quite consciously, recklessly, and with a complete disregard of the lessons of history.⁸⁰

In fact, many Ukrainians in Poland were convinced that the Czechoslovak debacle was not the end but rather the beginning of a new historical upheaval that would realize, in one form or another, their aspirations to statehood and independence: thus it is unlikely that they would have been ready to revise their attitude towards Warsaw even if the Polish government had accepted their demands for territorial autonomy. To accept any benefits of Polish rule implied the acceptance of Polish rule itself and this was disagreeable to many Ukrainians.⁸¹

In the meantime, international events had begun to move inexorably towards war, for Poland's refusal to ally herself with Germany was

whereas the national conditions there require a special arrangement, the Central Committee of the UNDO demands the introduction of a territorial autonomy for all these regions" (quoted from *Dilo*, 10 May 1938, p. 7). The formal presentation of the autonomy bill in the Sejm was preceded by an attack on the policies of the government towards the Ukrainian minority (Poland, Sejm, *Sprawozdanie stenograficzne*, Kadencja V, Posiedzenie 3, pp. 48-51).

79. See, e.g., the editorial "Shum dovkola vymohy avtonomii" in *Dilo*, 9 December 1938, pp. 1-2.

80. *Wiek Nowy*, 9 December 1938, as quoted in *Dilo*, 10 December 1938, p. 2.

81. As the German consul in Lwów stated in one of his reports, "the Ukrainians would regard an autonomy statute only as a tactical gain, and not as a final solution"—see Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, Series D, VI (Washington, 1956), No. 763, p. 1054.

to unleash Hitler's vengeance upon her. The Ukrainian issue became irrelevant to him as he had decided to collude with the Soviet Union in the destruction of Poland. Thus, having enjoyed brief prominence as an international issue, the Ukrainian problem was temporarily shelved in March 1939, when the Polish-Hungarian frontier was re-established for what turned out to be a period of only six months. Rejoicing in Budapest was sincere, but celebrations in Warsaw were tinged with bitterness and frustration, and Beck's triumph was marked by a foreboding of coming disaster. His apprehensions were well-founded, for the disappearance of Czechoslovakia from the map of Europe proved to be merely a first step towards the fourth partition of Poland.⁸²

These dramatic events shocked the Ukrainians in Poland, and their high hopes that had been fanned rather irresponsibly by sections of the local Ukrainian press collapsed. This traumatic experience led to a temporary disenchantment with Germany and an attempt to renew the dialogue with Warsaw.⁸³ On 25 March 1939, Dr. Iosyf Slipyi, the rector of the Greek Catholic Theological Academy in Lwów, paid a courtesy call on Jan Szembek, Under-Secretary of State in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to sound out the views of the Polish government on whether it would be possible to start Polish-Ukrainian conversations "on an internal platform;" however, nothing seems to have come out of this initiative, which was duly reported to Beck and apparently aroused his interest.⁸⁴

In the meantime, Warsaw proceeded to take measures to enhance the defence capabilities of the state in the face of imminent war. A decree drafted early in 1939 proposed to strengthen even further the Polish element in the eastern provinces, particularly Eastern Galicia, and to encourage the internal migration and emigration of local Ukrainians.⁸⁵ The aim was to Polonize the state administration completely, to increase the

82. As the Warsaw correspondent of *Dilo* reported from the Polish capital, "the enthusiasts of the common frontier with Hungary are today less than delighted. Their joy over the common frontier is marred by their awareness that the [Polish] frontier with Germany has been extended far beyond the Tatra Mountains" ("Bez entuziazmu," *Dilo*, 19 March 1939, p. 4). For a selection of editorial opinion in the Polish press see *ibid.*, 19 March, p. 5; 20 March, pp. 4-5; 21 March, p. 2.

83. It is noteworthy that for a moment the pro-Soviet orientation, once represented by a faction within the UNDO, seemed to regain some of its popularity—see "Nebezpeka novykh mirazhiv," *ibid.*, 24 March 1939, p. 2.

84. *Diariusz i teki Jana Szembeka (1935-1945)*, IV (London, 1972), pp. 530-31 (Rozmowa z ks. Slipyjem) and 536 (Rozmowa z min. Beckiem).

85. Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki*, pp. 237-38.

cadres of Polish technicians, teachers, and other professionals in the nationally mixed areas, and to expand the network of Polish schools and of social and paramilitary organizations.⁸⁶ Needless to say, this ambitious, long-range project represented an admission of the failure of official policy towards the minorities in general and the Ukrainian population in particular. It is significant that one of the last acts of Piłsudski's successors was to adopt unreservedly the so-called incorporation programme of the National Democrats, and abandon the last vestiges of the federalist scheme.⁸⁷ In June 1938 Governor Józewski was recalled from Volhynia and later in the year the weekly *Biuletyn Polsko-Ukraiński* was closed.⁸⁸

Hitler's territorial demands and the threat of war finally persuaded the Ukrainian politicians to keep a generally low profile in order not to antagonize the Poles during their hour of trial.⁸⁹ The Nazis were, of course, quite anxious to use the Ukrainian underground in Poland as a fifth column and the German consul in Lwów assured his superiors on 2 August 1939 that the Ukrainians had "regained their faith in Germany and her Führer" and would, in the event of an armed conflict between the Third Reich and Poland, "rise as one man."⁹⁰ These hopes came to naught, however, since, with the exception of a few isolated incidents, the OUN leadership refused to initiate any large-scale anti-Polish action, which, in the long run, would have proved futile and even suicidal.⁹¹ In fact, the fears that Polish doubts over Ukrainian loyalties might provoke a mass anti-Ukrainian action either officially or unofficially led the head of the Ukrainian parliamentary representation and Deputy Speaker of the Sejm, Vasyl' Mudryi, to make a declaration of loyalty to the Polish Republic during the extraordinary session of 2 September 1939; a similar statement was made by a Ukrainian representative in the Senate.⁹² By then, however, it was too late; both the Poles and the Ukrainians were rapidly descending into the abyss of the Second World War.

86. *Ibid.*, p. 238.

87. *Ibid.*, p. 239.

88. Actually, *Biuletyn Polsko-Ukraiński* was superseded by a monthly, *Problemy Europy Wschodniej*, which continued to uphold the "Promethean" conception, but approached it from a broader viewpoint—see Torzecki, *Kwestia ukraińska*, p. 176.

89. Kedryn, *Zhyttia—podii—liudy*, p. 318.

90. *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, Series D, VI, pp. 1053-54.

91. Mirchuk, *Narys istorii*, pp. 584-86.

92. Sławoj-Składowski, *Nie ostatnie słowo*, pp. 257-58; Kedryn, *Zhyttia—podii—liudy*, p. 318.

As Józef Łobodowski has observed in his review of this period: “the seeds of the future massacres were sown during those twenty years”⁹³—years, one might add, in which both the Polish and the Ukrainian sides were found wanting in prudence and foresight, in political realism and in common sense. If the Polish authorities frequently showed a lack of statesmanship and imagination, and the Polish community in the eastern borderlands was adamantly opposed to granting the slightest concessions, the Ukrainian leadership oscillated between timidity and intransigence, indecisiveness and opportunism, and at critical moments displayed a lack of practical judgement. At the same time, the terrorist underground did more harm to the Ukrainian community than to the Polish State by provoking mass reprisals and seriously impeding the legal activities of Ukrainian social, cultural, and economic institutions.⁹⁴

The Poles and the Ukrainians should not be judged too harshly, however, for a settlement of the problem had defeated many generations of their ancestors. With nationalism in its most virulent form in ascendancy and totalitarian ideologies officially enshrined by Poland’s neighbours to the east and west, it is perhaps not surprising that the two societies proved unable to withstand the pressures of those fateful years. In such circumstances, even the drastic solution by territorial adjustment and population exchange that followed the end of World War II seems justified.⁹⁵ Will this solution prove to be beneficial and permanent, or will the Poles and Ukrainians, according to the trite phrase, be condemned to repeat their history? Only time will tell—and a discreet historian should know better than to engage in futile speculations.

93. Józef Łobodowski, “Przeciw upiorom przeszłości,” *Kultura* (Paris), No. 2/52 - 3/53 (February-March 1952), p. 57.

94. See Kedryn, *Zhyttia—podii—liudy*, pp. 144-47.

95. According to official data, the exchange of population affected 1,530,000 Poles as well as some 520,000 Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Lithuanians. Roos claims that “those who had fled in 1939-40 and 1944-5 swelled the number of Poles from the east to be found on Polish soil in 1950 to about 2,180,000” (*A History of Modern Poland*, p. 212). The returns of the Soviet census of 1979 indicate that 1,151,000 Poles were left on the Soviet side of the frontier, while Polish statistics show that in 1970 there were 180,000 Ukrainians and 165,000 Belorussians still living in Poland.