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Voting Stability, Political Gridlock: Ukraine's 1998 Parliamentary Elections

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MUCH OF THE INITIAL COMMENT on the 1998 Ukrainian elections focused on the strong performance of the Communist Party.[1] The Communists did indeed emerge as the largest single force, with 24.65% of the list vote and 122 out of 450 seats in parliament (Verkhovna Rada). However, the real story of the elections was one of underlying stability and limited change.[2] The elections confirmed overall voting patterns that were initially apparent in the transition elections of 1990–94. Ukraine still has no real *national* party system, only a set of local systems, but the sum total of these systems now seems to produce overall results that are fairly predictable.

Although the Communists benefited from a realignment of forces within the left camp, the left as a whole won roughly the same proportion of votes and seats as in 1994 (40%), when the last parliamentary elections were held.[3] The 1998 elections confirmed that the left parties command plurality, but not majority support.[4] The nationalist or, in Ukrainian terminology, 'national-democratic' mainstream underperformed slightly on its traditional 20–25% with under 15% of the seats (Rukh, members of other rightist parties elected in single-member seats, plus independents). The far right won 2–3% of the vote, which, despite some commentators crowing at its failure to win significant numbers of seats,[5] was roughly the same as in 1994 (see Table 1). The elections therefore confirmed the strictly limited base of support for Ukrainian ethnonationalism.[6] Significant change came only in the political centre, which took the same proportion of seats as in 1994, but where proper political parties have now emerged for the first time.

This article is in five parts. First, we give an overview of the election law used for the 1998 elections, followed by an examination of the main groups contesting the poll. We then describe the voter survey designed by the authors and conducted by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology in the last two weeks of the election campaign and use its data to construct a model of party support. The voting results are then analysed in detail, before a final section discusses the process of faction formation in parliament after the elections.

The election law

In both the 1990 and 1994 elections Ukraine used the Soviet-era system of a majoritarian double ballot. In 1994 the election law added the damaging stipulation that a 'majority' in any constituency (*okruh*) required both a 50% vote and a 50%

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TABLE 1

OVERALL RESULTS, MARCH 1998 UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

	List votes (%)	*List seats*	*List seats (%)*	*SM votes*	*SM seats*	*SM seats (%)*	*Total seats (out of 450)*	*Total seats (%)*	*(1994 % of seats)*
Communist	24.65	84	37.33	13.94	38	16.89	122	27.11	(25.44)
Socialist/Village	8.56	29	12.89	4.36	5	2.22	34	7.56	(9.76)
Progressive Socialists	4.05	14	6.22	0.98	2	0.89	16	3.56	
Working Ukraine	3.06	–	–	0.53	1	0.44	1	0.22	
Other left	1.10	–	–		–	–	–	–	
Total left	40.63	127	56.44		46	20.44	173	38.44	(35.29)
Social Liberal Union (SLOn)	0.91	–	–		1	0.44	1	0.22	
Party of Regional Revival	0.91	–	–		2	0.89	2	0.44	
Soyuz	0.70	–	–		1	0.44	1	0.22	
Other Russophile									(0.59)
Total Russophile	2.52	0	–		4	1.78	4	0.89	(0.59)
Greens	5.44	19	8.44	0.94	–	–	19	4.22	
Popular Democrats	5.01	17	7.56	4.30	12	5.33	29	6.44	
Hromada	4.68	16	7.11	4.47	7	3.11	23	5.11	
Social Democrats (United)	4.01	14	6.22	1.71	3	1.33	17	3.78	
Agrarians	3.68	–	–	3.18	8	3.56	8	1.78	
Reforms and Order	3.13	–	–	1.73	3	1.33	3	0.67	
Razom	1.89	–	–		1	0.44	1	0.22	(1.18)
Forward Ukraine!	1.74	–	–		2	0.89	2	0.44	
Christian Democratic Party	1.30	–	–		2	0.89	2	0.44	(0.59)
NEP	1.23	–	–		1	0.44	1	0.22	(0.59)
Other centre	2.38	–	–		–	–	–	–	(1.78)
Total Centre	34.52	66	29.33		39	17.33	105	23.34	(4.14)
Rukh	9.40	32	14.22	6.23	14	6.22	46	10.22	(5.92)
National Front	2.72	–	–	2.59	5	2.22	5	1.11	(4.44)
Menshe sliv	0.17	–	–		1	0.44	1	0.22	
Other right	0.94	–	–		–	–	–	–	(0.59)
Total Right	13.23	32	14.22		20	8.89	52	11.56	(10.95)
Against all	5.26								
Independents					116	51.56	116	25.78	(49.12)
Invalid	3.09								

Total electorate: 37 540 092 (38 204 100 in 1994); turnout: 70.8% (74.8% in 1994).

Sources: *Uryadovyi kur"er*, 9 April 1998, p. 5; 21 April 1998, pp. 4–10; *Holos Ukraïny*, 18 April 1998, pp. 3–9; 28 April 1998, p. 3; 18 August 1998, p. 2; Mykhailo Pohrebyns'kyi & Oleksii Tolpyho, 'Narod i partiya—edyni?', *Politychnyi portret Ukraïny*, 1998, 21, pp. 29–42, at p. 31, and *Politychnyi kalendar*, 1998, 7 (April), pp. 78–88. Only partial information was available for the constituency party vote.

turnout. As a result, only 338 out of 450 seats were filled at the first attempt and, despite more than half a dozen repeat attempts, 36 were still empty on the eve of the 1998 poll. The other key criticism of the system was the handicap it placed on party formation, a problem that was exacerbated by the nomination procedures adopted for the 1994 elections, which favoured work collectives and 'groups of voters' over party assemblies.

The law adopted for the 1998 elections was based on the Russian system used in the 1993 and 1995 Duma elections (half of deputies to be elected in single mandate territorial constituencies in a single round plurality vote, and half on national party lists), with two key modifications. There was no turnout requirement, and the threshold for representation on the list vote was fixed at 4%, not 5%. There was also a switch to positive voting, although voters could still vote 'against all of the above' (5.26% eventually did so). Deputies seem to have picked on a 4% threshold via the formula 'Russia-1%' (a 3% threshold was considered, but only 165 deputies voted in favour),[7] to help assist the process of party formation in Ukraine. Ukraine is, however, significantly different from Russia in that most of its smaller political parties are located in the centre of the ideological spectrum. The new electoral system *could* have produced very different results. Although eight parties eventually cleared the threshold (three from the left, four from the centre and one from the right), three of the four centre parties were above 4% but below 5%, and the elections came within a whisker of producing an artificially polarised assembly.

Voter education about the new system was minimal.[8] Uncertainty was also engendered by the use of several different voting systems for the simultaneous local elections and by a last-minute Constitutional Court ruling that declared many aspects of the electoral law unconstitutional, including most notably the original provision that candidates were allowed to stand both on party lists and in single member constituencies.[9] The performance of the Central and local Electoral Commissions was awful. Results were promised for the night of the elections, but failed to emerge in full for several weeks, damaging the transparency of the process and allowing accusations of fraud to fester.

Contenders and issues

Thirty parties and blocs of parties were on the final ballot for the list vote.[10] The qualification criteria (200 000 signatures, including at least 10 000 in any 14 of Ukraine's 26 administrative districts) were not particularly onerous or, more exactly, were not taken particularly seriously (one report from Sumy *oblast'* claimed to have found the signatures of Leonid Brezhnev, Dzhokhar Dudaev, Boris El'tsin *et al.* all in the same block of flats).[11] Only two of 32 aspirants failed to make it onto the list. We have placed the 30 in a conventional left-centre-right classification, in so far as this was the parties' own self-description. The Russophile parties could perhaps be placed on the right with other (Ukrainian) nationalist parties, but in the Ukrainian context the Russophiles tend to make common cause with the left (see Table 2).

Several of the 30 were, however, little more than 'spoiler parties', created in the run-up to the elections largely to draw votes away from the left-wing parties, which had enjoyed a relatively clear run in 1994. The Agrarian Party was set up with state

TABLE 2

THE ELECTION CONTENDERS

*Party/bloc**	*Date of registration*	*Sitting deputies on list*
Left		
Communists	October 1993	46
Socialists/Village*		25
Progressive Socialists	July 1996	3
Working Ukraine*		2
All-Ukrainian Workers	June 1997	2
Defenders of the Fatherland	July 1997	1
Russophiles		
Party of Regional Revival	November 1997	14
Soyuz	June 1997	4
Social Liberals (SLOn)*		0
Centre		
Agrarians	December 1996	26
Forward Ukraine!*		19
Hromada	March 1994	15
Popular Democrats (NDP)	May 1996	12
NEP*		10
Reforms and Order	October 1997	7
Razom*		5
Christian Democratic Party of Ukraine	November 1992	3
Social Democrats (United)	July 1996	3
Social Democrats	November 1991	2
European Choice*		1
Party of National-Economic Development	January 1997	1
Women's Initiatives	October 1997	0
Greens	May 1991	0
Spiritual, Economic and Social Progress	June 1994	0
Party of Muslims	November 1997	0
Right		
Rukh	February 1990	23
National Front*		13
Republican Christian Party	July 1997	3
Ukrainian National Assembly	December 1994	3
Menshe sliv*		0

*All blocs were formed in the run-up to the elections. Their constituent parts were: Socialists/Village: Socialist Party (November 1991), Village Party (January 1993); Working Ukraine: Civic Congress of Ukraine (June 1993), Party of Justice (February 1993); SLOn: Interregional Block for Reforms (January 1995), Constitutional-Democrats (May 1993); Forward Ukraine!: Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party (November 1991), Christian-People's Union (March 1997); NEP: Democratic Party (August 1991), Party of Economic Revival (March 1993) (formerly the Party of Economic Revival of Crimea); Razom: Labour Party (January 1993), Liberal Party (October 1991); European Choice: Village Democrat Party (January 1991), Liberal-Democratic Party (July 1992); National Front: Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (January 1993), Republican Party (November 1990), Conservative Republican Party (July 1992); Menshe sliv: Social-National Party (October 1995), State Independence of Ukraine (March 1993).

Sources: Hryhorii Andrushchak *et al.*, *Politychni partiï Ukraïny* (Kiev, KIS, 1998); Mykola Tomenko & Oleh Protsenko (eds), *Pravo vyboru: politychni partiï ta vyborchi bloky* (Kiev, Institute of Postcommunist Society, 1998), passim; authors' calculations from information in *Vybory '98: politychnyi kompas vybortsya (Kiev, KIS, 1998)*.

support to challenge the hitherto uncontested monopoly of the Village (Selyans'ka) Party in the Ukrainian countryside; Working Ukraine (de facto backed by the Federation of Trade Unions of Ukraine), the Party of Defenders of the Fatherland and the All-Ukrainian Workers' Party were designed to challenge the organisational foundations of the Communist vote in trade union and veterans' groups; the Progressive Socialist Party initially was rumoured to receive covert state support as a splinter group from the Socialists. We have classed the Progressive Socialists as part of a single 'left bloc', but in fact their electoral success was a great blow to left unity. The Communist and Socialist press were soon full of attacks on a party they regarded as having been created by President Kuchma.[12]

The 'spoiler' tactic, already a familiar one in many post-communist states (as for example in the 1995 Russian elections), was in a sense successful. The Progressive Socialists crossed the threshold with 4.04%, and the other 'spoiler parties' collected a total of 7.84%. The Communists were unable to sweep the board in their heartland areas as they had in 1994, as for example in the Donbas, where Working Ukraine in particular proved a more effective opponent than the local business parties (Razom), winning 16.2% in Donets'k and 6.2% in Luhans'k (always the more radical of the two *oblasti*).

Our analysis therefore focuses on four key parties which were a genuine force in the elections: the Communists representing the mainstream left; the Socialist/Village party bloc as the would-be more 'social-democratic' and patriotic leftist alternative; the main establishment centre party, the National Democratic Party (NDP); and the People's Movement of Ukraine (Narodnyi Rukh Ukraïny or NRU, normally Rukh for short), the main Ukrainian nationalist party.

The self-proclaimed 'Leninist Communist Party of Ukraine' is one of the most left-wing communist successor parties in the former Soviet bloc. Its election programme launched an uncompromising attack on the 'bandit class' in power and their 'genocide of the people', and called for a 'restoration of state and workers' control' in parallel to a 'savage war against shadow [sic] business'. On the national question, the Communists called for 'the Russian language, as the native language of one half of the population of Ukraine, to be given the status of a state language alongside the Ukrainian language' and unambiguously supported 'the voluntary creation of an equal Union of fraternal peoples' on the territory of the former USSR.[13]

The Socialist/Village Bloc was more moderate in tone, confining itself to a call for 'securing effective state control over the banking system and over strategic and highly profitable markets', and 'effective regulation of prices'. On the national issue, the two parties promised to resist all attempts to 'turn Ukraine into a colony, an appendage to NATO', but limited their Slavophile nostalgia to a call for 'good-neighbourly, fraternal economic and political relations, above all with the Slavonic world, Russia and Belarus, other states'.

Rukh avoided the grand rhetoric of liberal reform, well aware of its unpopularity, calling instead for lower taxes, 'the development of small and medium business', an anti-mafia campaign and a 'Programme for the Struggle with Poverty'. In terms of nationalist values, however, Rukh was much more unambiguous, calling for 'a return to Europe' and 'insisting on the National Idea as a guarantee of strengthening statehood, the rebirth and unification of the Ukrainian nation'. Nevertheless, Rukh

was still outflanked on its right by the National Front, whose slogan was 'Ukrainian Power in Ukraine!', and which retreated from the idea of open market economics by calling for a 'national market defended from trade and price aggression from abroad'.

The various centre parties had a less distinct image. The NDP claimed rather defensively that 'the state apparatus is not a monster' and promised prosperity through a policy of 'every citizen a property-owner. This is not a fable. Privatisation is not just for the privatisers'. In other words, the NDP stood for a continuation of reform, although this was masked by the anti-corruption rhetoric common to all parties. The NDP's media campaign stressed the virtues of experience (the party list was headed by the Prime Minister, Valerii Pustovoitenko). On the national issue the party trod the middle ground, talking vaguely of the need for cultural pluralism and balancing 'the progressive integration of Ukraine into the European and world community' with 'friendly relations with neighbouring countries, above all the countries of the CIS'.[14]

Data and methods

The determinants of party support were investigated through the analysis of a nation-wide voter survey conducted in March 1998. Our survey was administered in the last two weeks of the campaign, when a representative sample of 1742 voters was interviewed in 25 constituencies throughout Ukraine (see Appendix 3 for details of the survey). In order to explain the causal logic of voting behaviour we chose a path analysis of the various relationships between the different variables hypothesised to affect vote choice. At the first stage we located those aspects of voter identity least susceptible to subjective manipulation—age, gender, education level, ethnic group, religion, religiosity, employment situation and place of residence (region and settlement type)—on which none of the other variables in the model could reasonably be said to have an impact (for details on these variables, see Appendix 1). These are factors which have been found in previous studies to influence vote choice in Ukraine and other former Soviet states.[15]

These variables were then hypothesised to influence a series of intervening variables. The first of these was language. A number of recent studies have found that language use in Ukraine is a better predictor of vote choice than ethnic group.[16] It appears on closer inspection that the main reason for this finding is that language use is itself a composite effect of a number of other underlying factors, the most important of which are place of residence and ethnicity. When language is understood in this way as an intervening variable, it becomes more obvious why its effect on vote choice appears to be greater than that of ethnicity when the two variables are entered into models at the same level. Because language use is closer to vote choice in the 'funnel of causality',[17] it partly masks the effects of ethnicity.

The second intervening variable was economic welfare, which was modelled in terms of the socio-demographic variables referred to above and measured by the use of a three-item additive scale designed to tap both objective and subjective perceptions of welfare. The survey questions employed to this end were (1) a five-point measure of income adjusted for family size; (2) a five-point measure of perceived income adequacy; and (3) a five-point question about retrospective

TABLE 3

WHICH OF THE PROBLEMS CURRENTLY FACING UKRAINE CONCERNS YOU MOST? (ANSWERS RANK ORDERED ACCORDING TO FEQUENCY OF RESPONSE)

	n	%
The irregular payment of wages, pensions, grants	583	33.5
Unemployment	473	27.2
Corruption in official structures	165	9.5
The quality of social services, education, health care in Ukraine	127	7.3
Relations with Russia	108	6.2
Crime	76	4.3
The rebirth of the Ukrainian nation	41	2.4
Inflation	25	1.4
Ukraine as an independent state	19	1.1
Relations with the West	5	0.3
The position of the Russian language and culture in Ukraine	5	0.3
Other or none	67	3.8
Don't know or no answer	47	2.7

evaluation of recent changes in the respondent's economic situation.[18] These three measures were combined into an economic welfare scale for which the Cronbach's alpha reliability measure (which varies in theory from 0 to 1) was 0.5467.[19]

The last stage in the causal model was voter values. The general opening question placed at the beginning of our survey revealed that at the time of the elections voters were most concerned about three main issues: economic hardship, crime and corruption, and a series of issues related to ethnicity, statehood and the definition of Ukraine, which can be summed up under the rubric of nationalist issues (see Table 3).

Economic issues were clearly predominant, but only two of the three issue areas produced large differences of opinion amongst Ukrainians; crime and corruption tend to be 'valence' issues (in other words, issues that nearly all voters see as problematic). The model therefore included at the final stage variables designed to measure economic values and nationalist values.

Two questions were used to tap views on questions of nationalism. A scale of two survey items was constructed in which one item measured the external (foreign policy) dimension and one the internal (ethnic politics) aspect of this issue. The first question asked the degree to which (on a scale of 1–5) respondents agreed 'that Ukraine should be first and foremost a state of the Ukrainian nation' or 'first and foremost a state without ethnic definition'. The second question asked whether (on a similar scale) respondents thought 'Ukraine should move away from Russia as quickly as possible' or whether the two 'should once again be united in a single state'. Cronbach's alpha for this scale was 0.5650.[20] We expected nationalist values to be defined by ethnicity, region of residence and religion; with ethnic Ukrainians, those living in the west and members of the 'national' Churches banned under Soviet rule (the Greek Catholic and Autocephalous Orthodox Churches) being more likely to hold such values.

To tap economic values, respondents were asked to place their own opinion on a scale (1–5) between the extremes 'Ukraine should have a market economy' and 'Ukraine should restore a planned, state socialist economy'. We expected economic values to be determined by those factors which determine individuals' ability to

survive and perhaps prosper in the new conditions: whether they are employed, where they are employed, age, gender, education and place of residence.

Respondents were then asked to state their attitude toward each of four main parties/party blocs (the Communists, Socialists/Village Bloc, the NDP and Rukh) on a scale ranging from 'strongly dislike' to 'strongly like', with three (unspecified) intermediate positions. High values thus indicate positive evaluations of the party in question. Obviously party support is not the same as vote choice. However, there is a strong relationship between the two variables, especially in the case of the leftist parties; of those who gave the Communists a rating of 4 or 5, 84.2% declared an intention to vote for them; the corresponding figure for the Socialist/Village bloc was 81.6%, for the NDP 69.8%, and for Rukh 68.4%. Attitudes toward these parties are thus a good indicator of vote intention, but it is important not to equate the two. Attitudes toward parties are better understood as basic value orientations that may well form the basis for long-term patterns of party identification and support.

Determinants of party support

The causal patterns in question were mapped with a series of OLS regression models. The path coefficients in Figures 1–4 indicate the structure of the support base of each of the four major parties/party blocs. To simplify the diagrams, path coefficients were only included for beta values of 0.10 or greater. Full regression equations are included in Appendix 2. The models include all variables significant at the 0.05 level.

Language model

Where a person lives in Ukraine is a much more important predictor of the language they speak than the ethnic group with which they identify (interestingly, religion is not significant in the equation for language use). Those living in the south-east and in large cities are much more likely to speak Russian than rural inhabitants and those in the central and western regions. Ethnicity is the second major determinant of language use. Education comes a distant third; those with higher education levels are slightly—though significantly—more likely to use the Russian language than those with less education (the effect is slight enough for this relationship to be omitted from the diagrams, but see the full equation in Appendix 2).

Economic welfare model

A person's economic welfare is determined by a large number of factors. As is well known from previous studies, the better educated, urban residents, non-manual workers and men are relatively advantaged economically under post-communist conditions over less well educated, rural residents, manual workers and women. Unsurprisingly the unemployed are significantly worse off than other categories (employed and non-employed). It is interesting to note that Russian language use is also a significant and fairly substantial predictor of economic well-being, indicating that residence in the south-east and Russian ethnicity have indirect effects on welfare, whereas urban residence has both a direct effect and an indirect effect mediated through language use. Youth, private-sector employment, and affiliation with a formerly banned Ukrainian Church have secondary though significant positive impacts on economic welfare (see Appendix 2).



FIGURE 1. MODEL OF COMMIUNIST SUPPORT.



FIGURE 2. MODEL OF SOCIALIST/VILLAGE SUPPORT.



FIGURE 3. MODEL OF NDP SUPPORT.



FIGURE 4. MODEL OF RUKH SUPPORT.

Economic values model

Economic values are strongly determined by economic welfare; the better off are on the whole more sanguine about the market, whereas those in worse economic positions tend to prefer the old command economy. Yet age and education are also strong independent predictors of economic values; regardless of their material situation, the young and the better educated are more likely to support the market. Residence in the south-east is negatively associated with a pro-market stance. The west is less strongly differentiated from the centre but, all else considered, western residents are more pro-market, and men tend to be slightly more supportive of market values than women.

Nationalist values model

Like economic values, nationalist values are most influenced by region of residence: those who live in the south-east are considerably less inclined to favour nationalist positions than those who live in the central and western regions of the country. Adherence to one of the formerly banned Ukrainian Churches is, however, the strongest predictor of nationalist values, stronger even than ethnicity, while adherence to one of the Russian-oriented Churches predicts lack of (Ukrainian) nationalism. The more affluent also tend to be slightly more nationalistic, as do men, and the two extremes of the occupational categorisation—manual workers and managers/professionals. Ukrainian language users are slightly more nationalistic than Russophones, though this relationship is weaker than the direct effect of ethnicity.

Communist support model

The two strongest influences on support for the Communists were, as expected, the two sets of values located closest in the funnel of causality. In fact, none of the other variables had a direct effect on Communist support, except affiliation to a formerly banned Ukrainian Church (with which Communist support is negatively correlated). Note that economic values are a stronger predictor of Communist support than nationalist values (though less strong than nationalist values and Church affiliation combined). Nevertheless, the Communists gained extra strength from dormant but still potentially powerful ethno-linguistic issues.[21] Ethnic Russians were twice as likely to vote for the party as ethnic Ukrainians, 32.3% as opposed to 16.7%.

Socialist/Village Party model

Anti-market economic values are also the strongest determinant of Socialist/Village support; (anti-)nationalist values have only a slight (though significant) impact on attitudes toward this bloc. The other major influences in this model are geographical. As might be expected of a bloc with a Village Party component, settlement size is negatively correlated with this variable. This bloc's support base has another geographical specificity: it is stronger in the central regions of the country than either the west or the south-east. Education is the final variable that is significant in this equation; the bloc's support appears to be marginally stronger among the less educated.

TABLE 4

TOTAL EFFECT OF SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC AND GEOGRAPHICAL VARIABLES

Variable	*Communist*	*Socialist/Village*	*NDP*	*Rukh*
Education	−0.05	−0.09	0.03	0.02
Age	0.04	0.03	−0.03	−0.02
Gender	0.01	0.004	−0.004	−0.003
Unemployed	0.01	0.01	−0.008	−0.006
Manual worker	0.01	0.005	−0.004	−0.003
(Russian) Ethnicity	0.03	−0.001	−0.01	−0.07
Formerly-banned Ukrainian Church affiliates	−0.05		0.03	0.10
Settlement size	−0.01	−0.15	0.01	−0.02
Region: south-east	0.08	0.20	−0.02	−0.14
Region: west		−0.15		

NDP model

Two value variables account for the bulk of NDP support; nationalists and pro-market respondents were more favourably disposed to this party, all else considered. Other minor influences were residence in the west of the country and religiosity, while the non-employed (pensioners, students, etc.) were less inclined to support the NDP than either the employed or the unemployed. The coefficients for these variables are not of great magnitude, but these findings are nevertheless of interest. The strong historical association in the Russian empire between Church and state may account for the fact that frequent church attenders are more supportive of the party of government. Yet those most dependent on the government—the non-employed—are most hostile to the party, reflecting the general malaise in Ukraine vis-à-vis the current practice of governance.

Rukh model

As with the NDP, support for Rukh is strongest among nationalists and free marketeers, but in this case nationalist values far outweigh economic ones as determinants of support. The other major effect in this model is language use; Russophones are less inclined to support Rukh than Ukrainophones (this direct effect of language counteracts the slight indirect effect via economic welfare and economic values, which both predispose Russophones to support Rukh). Frequency of church attendance, employment in the private sector, residence in the west of the country, and male gender have secondary effects on support for Rukh.

In general, it can be said that socio-demographic factors are strongly mediated by values, especially economic values; secondary direct (unmediated) effects include Church affiliation (the Communists), place of residence (Socialist/Village support), and language use (Rukh support)—i.e. many of the same factors that determine nationalist values. This implies that nationalist values per se have a weaker mediating effect than economic values (though they are better determined by social factors than economic values—the R^2 statistic for the nationalist values equation is nearly twice as large as that for the economic values equation). Table 4 shows the relative effect of different socio-demographic and geographical variables.[22]

It can be noted from Table 4 that there is a clear divide between the left and the rest. The signs of almost all the variables are the same for, on the one hand, the Communists and the Socialist/Village bloc and the NDP and Rukh on the other. The educated, the young, men, the employed, non-manual workers and residents of the centre and west are more likely to support the NDP and Rukh, whereas those with less education, the old, women, the unemployed and residents of the south-east define the support bases of the Communists and the Socialist/Village bloc. The only exceptions to this left/centre-right divide are ethnicity (a very slight tendency for ethnic Ukrainians to support the Socialist/Village bloc, and settlement size (here the slight rural bias in the support base of Rukh is the exception). As might be expected, affiliation to one of the previously banned Ukrainian Churches is correlated with support for the NDP and Rukh, and with a disinclination to think favourably of the Communists.

The predominance of economic issues and of perceived economic hardship obviously favoured the left. In answer to our survey questions, a massive 65.5% agreed that 'the material state of you and your family' had become 'a lot worse' since the last elections and a further 16.7% claimed it had become 'somewhat worse'. Only 11.6% agreed that 'the economic sacrifices of the last four–five years' had been 'necessary for long-term positive changes in the Ukrainian economy'. However, although the Communists and the Socialist/Village bloc are all communist 'successor' parties, employment-related variables do not figure strongly in determining the structure of their support. Manual workers and the unemployed are slightly more inclined to support these parties than those of the centre and right, and not surprisingly the non-employed tend to withhold their support from the party associated with a government that has had conspicuous difficulty in maintaining social services, but these effects are slight.

Voting Results

National turnout in the elections was 70.8%, a creditable level and only marginally down on the 74.8% in the first round of the 1994 vote. Turnout was, however, up to 10 to 15 points lower in the east and south (64.5% in Donets'k, 64.3% in Crimea, as opposed to 79.7% in L'viv), which meant that left support was actually somewhat lower than it could have been.[23] The Communists topped the list vote, on which eight parties/blocs eventually passed the 4% threshold. The new voting system reduced the number of non-party deputies from a half to around a quarter, although in the constituencies the proportion was little changed.

Although left, right and centre received similar total votes to 1994, there was considerable change within each camp. On the left, the apparent success of the joint bloc of the Socialist and Village parties was only superficial. The 1998 results represented a widening of the gap between the left parties, with the Communists becoming the more dominant partner. The Communist faction eventually contained 123 deputies, against 35 for the Socialist/Village bloc. In 1994 the Communists originally had 95 deputies; the Socialists only had 14, but soon expanded to 27;[24] the Village party had 18 deputies, later a maximum strength of 52. The gap in the popular vote was also somewhat wider in 1998, with the Communists on 24.7% and the

Socialist/Villagers on 8.6%. Exact analysis of the vote in 1994 is difficult because none of the three parties put up candidates in every constituency, but amongst those who did stand the Socialists won 3.7% of the vote and the Village Party 3.2%, somewhat closer behind the Communists on 14.8% than in 1998 (that is about one-half, rather than one-third of their total vote). A similar phenomenon of Communist consolidation occurred between the 1993 and 1995 Russian elections, with the Russian Agrarians failing to clear the 5% hurdle in 1995 (there is no real Russian equivalent of the Ukrainian Socialists).[25]

In the centre, four parties won more than 4%. The Greens were a surprise package, largely because they had sold their name to business and banking interests, which paid for a slick mass media campaign. Hromada and the United Social Democrats, both led by former prime ministers (Kuchma's bitter rival Pavel Lazarenko for Hromada, his predecessor Evhen Marchuk and former president Leonid Kravchuk for the Social Democrats), joined the NDP in parliament, but no centre groups won more than 6%. Significantly, the centre-right, Ukraine's 'liberal patriots', failed to enter parliament on the list ballot, as they were fatally split between Reforms and Order and Forward Ukraine!

On the right, Rukh was more decisively ahead of its more nationalist rivals than in 1994, when it won only 6.0%, compared with 2.9% for the Republican Party, 1.4% for the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists and 0.4% for the Conservative Republicans.[26] Standing together in 1998 as the National Front, the latter three parties missed the threshold with only 2.7%. The far right was clearly handicapped by the new voting system (not only by the threshold; it was also harder for the extreme parties to win the larger territorial constituencies), but its underlying support base remained stable.

Table 5 shows the regional breakdown of the list vote by *oblast'*. Table 6 shows the result of the voting in the 225 territorial constituencies. Twenty-seven of the 225 results were subject to legal challenges, but in the end only five were overturned. Repeat elections in these five constituencies on 16 August did little to alter the overall balance of forces (one more Communist was elected and one more for the NDP, plus three independents).[27] Significantly, voting patterns in the territorial constituencies were not massively different from those on the party list. Overall support for parties was lower, given the large number of independent candidates. The Greens, and to a lesser extent, the Social Democrats, fared significantly worse, given their dependence on national TV advertising, as did the Progressive Socialists. The National Front did slightly better, with concentrated support in Galicia, western Ukraine, as did the Agrarians, with significant pockets of patronage support in the countryside (see Table 1).

Results by region

It is interesting to note that, for all parties except the NDP, the largest coefficients in our model of vote choice are those associated with place of residence. Yet residence in the west (as opposed to the centre) of Ukraine is only a major differentiator in the case of the Socialist/Village bloc; in all other cases the significant divide is between the south-east and the rest of the country. It is clear that place of residence is a much

TABLE 5

BREAKDOWN OF THE LIST VOTE BY *OBLAST'*

	Communists	*Rukh*	*Soc/Village*	*Greens*	*NDP*	*Hromada*	*PSPU*	*SDPU(U)*	*Agrarians*	*National Front*	*Others above 4%*
Transcarpathia	7.47	8.08	2.69	6.06	7.05	3.31	1.27	35.05	2.28	3.28	5.49 (R&O)
Chernivtsi	22.71	17.66	7.48	3.82	5.62	1.58	1.79	10.17	3.27	4.17	5.14 (Regional Revival)
L'viv	4.24	33.27	1.69	3.30	5.70	0.93	0.70	4.46	7.24	10.08	13.25 (R&O)
Ivano-Frankivs'k	3.24	30.20	2.19	4.53	5.52	1.66	0.62	4.30	5.60	25.71	4.70 (R&O)
Ternopil'	3.16	30.80	2.26	4.79	4.85	1.93	0.58	4.28	4.47	22.61	
Volyn'	10.47	19.61	6.79	7.14	5.77	2.35	1.31	3.72	16.85	4.27	4.44 (R&O)
Rivne	8.26	32.57	7.28	6.99	4.10	1.73	1.33	4.73	10.73	2.86	
Khmel'nyts'kyi	23.02	8.88	23.07	5.14	6.66	1.55	2.83	3.52	6.22	1.60	
Zhytomyr	25.32	11.25	16.51	6.24	5.04	1.78	3.76	3.92	5.33	0.79	4.75 (Christian Dems)
Vinnytsya	26.49	4.85	20.20	4.85	12.92	2.18	3.44	1.75	1.76	0.90	4.85 (Fatherland)
Cherkasy	20.42	8.34	27.99	5.31	5.98	1.76	4.94	3.98	2.87	0.80	
Kirovohrad	31.30	4.92	18.53	4.99	6.04	6.73	4.00	4.06	2.05	0.42	4.42 (WU)
Kiev	22.72	8.84	17.84	7.43	6.20	2.02	5.59	4.41	3.98	1.60	
Kiev city	15.76	12.38	5.17	9.57	3.55	3.30	4.95	9.35	1.70	2.90	9.57 (FU!), 5.95 (R&O)
Poltava	25.75	7.94	23.10	5.18	4.17	1.29	3.41	3.13	4.23	0.44	5.27 (FU!)
Sumy	28.25	3.93	14.49	4.74	3.93	1.75	23.21	2.82	2.63	0.63	
Chernihiv	33.22	6.58	20.76	5.77	5.26	2.16	7.51	2.26	3.00	0.69	
Kharkiv	39.59	3.69	6.62	6.11	6.76	2.78	11.10	3.90	3.22	0.42	
Donets'k	38.69	2.40	1.94	4.40	3.75	2.93	4.62	2.01	2.13	0.32	16.16 (WU), 7.31 (Razom)
Luhans'k	49.69	2.37	5.38	5.13	3.49	4.10	4.78	2.59	2.64	0.20	6.15 (WU)
Dnipropetrovs'k	27.10	5.35	3.35	5.12	3.20	37.37	1.83	2.53	1.27	0.56	
Zaporizhzhya	34.86	3.81	5.68	8.44	6.72	3.21	7.07	3.69	3.18	0.37	6.44 (R&O)
Kherson	37.10	5.19	12.16	6.97	4.65	5.35	4.52	2.85	3.54	0.65	
Mykolaïv	41.56	6.82	5.98	6.13	11.20	2.23	4.34	3.72	2.86	0.39	
Odesa	30.97	4.48	8.19	11.79	3.92	1.40	3.10	3.81	6.80	0.51	
Crimea	43.62	7.47	1.78	6.27	4.79	3.23	1.60	2.10	3.51	0.18	11.83 (Soyuz)
Sevastopil'	55.36	2.13	1.88	7.12	8.33	3.14	1.15	1.51	1.72	0.46	
National total	24.65	9.40	8.56	5.44	5.01	4.68	4.05	4.01	3.68	2.72	

Key: R&O—Reforms and Order; WU—Working Ukraine; FU!—Forward Ukraine!

TABLE 6

BREAKDOWN OF TERRITORIAL CONSTITUENCIES BY *OBLAST'*

	Communists	*Rukh*	*Soc/Village*	*Greens*	*NDP*	*Hromada*	*PSPU*	*SDPU(O)*	*Other*	*No party*	*Total*
Transcarpathia					0 (1)			3		2	5
Chernivtsi		1			0 (1)			0 (2)		3	4
L'viv		4			0 (1)				2 R&O, 1SNPU, 1 Agrarian, 1 FU!	3	12
Ivano-Frankivs'k					0 (4)				2 KUN, 1 FU!	3	6
Ternopil'		3 (4)							1 KUN	1	5
Volyn'					1 (3)				1 Agrarian, 1 URP, 1 DemPU	1	5
Rivne		3			0 (1)					2	5
Khmel'nyts'kyi	1		1 Soc		0 (4)	0 (1)			1 URP	4	7
Zhytomyr	1				2 (5)				1 Christian Democrat	2	6
Vinnytsya	1				2 (3)	0 (2)		0 (2)		5	8
Cherkasy	2		1 Village		1 (3)					3	7
Kirovohrad					0 (4)	1				4	5
Kiev		1	1 Soc		0 (3)	0 (2)			1 Agrarian	5	8
Kiev city		1			0 (2)			0 (1)	1 R&O	10	12
Poltava	3	1			0 (1)					4	8
Sumy	1			0 (2)			2	0 (1)	1 Justice	2	6
Chernihiv					1 (2)	0 (1)		0 (1)		5	6
Kharkiv	2		0 (1)		1 (9)		0 (1)		1 Agrarian	10	14
Donets'k	7				0 (9)	0 (3)			2 Regional Revival, 1 Liberal	13	23
Luhans'k	8				0 (2)	0 (1)				4	12
Dnipropetrovs'k	3			0 (1)	0 (3)	5 (8)			1 Agrarian, 1 Interregional Block	7	17
Zaporizhzhya	3 (4)				0 (1)	0 (1)			1 Agrarian	5	9
Kherson	1		1 Soc	0 (1)	0 (2)	1			1 Christian Democrat	2	6
Mykolaïv					2 (4)				1 Agrarian	3	6
Odesa	2		1 Village	0 (1)	0 (4)	0 (2)		0 (1)	1 Agrarian	7	11
Crimea	2	0 (1)			2 (4)				1 Soyuz	5	10
Sevastopil'	1					0 (1)				1	2
National total	38 (39)	14 (16)	5 (6)	0 (5)	12 (76)	7 (24)	2 (3)	3 (11)	28	116	225

Note: The first figure shows the numbers elected for each party in each *oblast'*. The figures in brackets show how many territorial deputies were in each faction by August 1998.

Sources: Authors' calculations from information in *Politychnyi kalendar*, 1998, 7 (April), pp. 78–88 and the list of factions published in *Holos Ukraïny*, 2 June 1998, p. 3.

Key: R&O—Reforms and Order: SNPU—Social-National Party; KUN—Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists; URP—Ukrainian Republican Party: DemPU—Democratic Party of Ukraine.

more important factor than any of the other variables normally associated with ethnicity—language, religious denomination or stated ethnic group. Where people live in Ukraine is more important than who they are in determining values and political attitudes, even when the other possible explanations of regional differences are controlled for—indicating that region has an *independent* effect above and beyond its ethnodemographic correlates.[28]

This finding largely confirms those who have analysed the regional dimension of Ukrainian voting patterns.[29] But the fact that region is not such a predominant factor in the model for NDP support, however, leads one to wonder whether the new crop of centrist parties that formed between 1994 and 1998 might not be cutting across the cleavage lines established prior to this election.[30] Only time will tell whether this is indeed the case, but through the 1998 elections regional divisions appear to have remained a highly significant determinant of electoral support.

None of the other centrist parties has a support base that is so clearly defined by the east–west divide as the Communists and Rukh, although the Agrarians and Reforms and Order both had a strong western tilt (see Table 5). The electoral base of the largely unsuccessful Russophile parties was obviously located in the south-east, but even there they enjoyed few real concentrated pockets of support. Interestingly, the Party of Regional Revival, which was backed by the Moscow Patriarchate, received its highest scores in the western *oblasti* of Chernivtsi (5.1%—also helped by the votes of the local Romanian minority) and Volyn' (1.8%), both traditional Orthodox regions at the sharp end of conflict with the Catholic world.

The regional definition of parties such as Hromada, the Social Democrats (United), and possibly the Progressive Socialists (23.2% in Sumy) was more clearly based on administrative divisions and probably linked to *oblast'*-level bases of political power. This may be indicative of a new form of regional mobilisation—not on cultural grounds but rather on the basis of political patronage structures. As Table 5 shows, Hromada was above 4% only in Lazarenko's home territory of Dnipropetrovs'k, where it won a massive 37.4%, and in the neighbouring *oblasti* of Kirovohrad and Kherson (plus Luhans'k). The Social Democrats (United), despite running a professional media campaign,[31] were forced to rely on massive support in the western fringe *oblasti* of Transcarpathia (35.1%) and Chernivtsi (10.2%) to squeeze past the 4% threshold. Three out of five constituency deputies in Transcarpathia and two out of four in Chernivtsi also eventually joined the party. Other parties which were little more than fronts for regional interests were similarly concentrated, such as Razom, representing producer groups in the Donbas. In contrast, the Greens, without such local pockets of support and heavily dependent on national TV advertising, scored evenly throughout Ukraine and were almost invisible in the constituency elections (see Table 1).

The Communists are the closest thing to a true national political party in Ukraine. The party was weak only in the three western regions of Galicia, Transcarpathia and Volhynia, where its vote fell under 10%. Everywhere else it was consistently over 20%, except for Kiev city, although its 15.8% in the capital was a considerable improvement on 1994 (see the section on Rukh below). Its highest scores of 49.7% in Luhans'k and 55.4% in Sevastopil' were not remotely matched by any other party. (The Communist Party of Crimea was also the largest party in the Crimean Soviet,

winning 36 seats out of 100. This was a much stronger performance than in 1994, when the Crimean elections were dominated by the local 'Russia Bloc'.[32] This time, the main successor party to the Russia Bloc, Soyuz, won only four seats.[33] Unlike in 1994–98, the same party therefore now dominates Crimean representation in Kiev and local politics in Simferopil'.)

The main national-democratic party Rukh was not only well behind the Communists overall, but was unable to spread out from the west in the same way the Communists spread out from the east. Rukh's total number of seats went up from 25 to 46, but support for the right as a whole fell back, largely because Rukh was the only rightist party to clear the 4% threshold. Support in Galicia was consistent at just over 30%, but way short of the appeal by Rukh leader V'yacheslav Chornovil for the 'support you gave me in 1991' (during his campaign for Ukraine's first presidential election),[34] which was between 80% and 85% in Galicia. Rukh failed to build up the big scores in west Ukraine (its highest score was in L'viv, 33.3%) that the Communists were able to win in the east and south (four totals over 40%, 11 over 30%).

In the far west, Rukh was still weak in Transcarpathia (8.1%), but then so were the Communists (7.5%). Chernivtsi, on the other hand, was the only *oblast'* in Ukraine where support for Rukh (17.7%) and the Communists (22.7%) was both high and comparable. In its other traditional strongholds, support for Rukh in Rivne matched that in Galicia (32.6%) and was not far behind in Volyn' (19.6%), but only in one central Ukrainian *oblast'* was it over 10% (11.3% in Zhytomyr). Support for Rukh's main rightist rival, the National Front, was even more regionally concentrated. It ran Rukh close in Galicia (25.7% in Ivano-Frankivs'k, 22.6% in Ternopil'), but in the rest of the west it was far behind. Nowhere east of Khmel'nyts'kyi *oblast'*, apart from Kiev, was its vote over 1%.

Particularly disappointing was Rukh's 12.4% in Kiev city—barely above its national average. Outside of west Ukraine, the capital has usually been Ukrainian nationalists' most fertile ground. However, in 1998 the right did considerably worse than 1994's admittedly incomplete results. In 1994 only five out of 23 seats in Kiev were filled at the first attempt, but all the winners were national-democratic candidates, who also won 58.7% of the total second round vote.[35] In the same year, the national-democrat bloc Stolitsya (Capital) won 38 out of 69 seats on the city council (16 were members of Rukh), compared with four for the Communists and one for the Socialists.[36] In 1998, on the other hand, the Communists returned as the largest party on the list vote (15.8%, and 22.7% in the surrounding *oblast'*), beating Rukh into second place (12.4% and 8.8%). Kiev's territorial constituencies returned a high number of independents (10 out of 12).

In eastern and southern Ukraine, as in 1990 and 1994, Rukh had few successes, and even lost ground in places. Its hope that hidden reserves of support would be revealed by the semi-proportional system was disappointed. Rukh's highest score was a mere 6.8% in Mykolaïv. Only two of the 16 constituency deputies who had joined the Rukh faction by June 1998 came from outside the west or Kiev. One (Oleksandr Kulyk) was from Poltava; the other was Refat Chubarov, deputy leader of the Crimean Tatar parliament (Qurultay). Ten of the 16 were from three western *oblasti*—L'viv, Ternopil' and Rivne. The elections were a last hurrah for Chornovil,

with his brand of romantic nationalism now under strong pressure from younger and more pragmatic politicians such as Oleksandr Lavrynovych and Yurii Kostenko (Rukh duly split in February 1999 before Chornovil met an untimely death in a car crash in March). The decision to place foreign minister Henadii Udovenko and regional leaders such as Bohdan Boyko, head of Ternopil' *oblast'* council, high on the Rukh list (at numbers three and seven) had the effect of blurring the distinction between Rukh and the authorities. In an election where negative sentiment towards the powers-that-be was the paramount factor, this was undoubtedly a serious mistake.

Rukh's high vote of 7.5% in Crimea was boosted by the support of the Crimean Tatars. Rukh had placed Mustafa Jemiloglu, the leader of the Qurultay, at number nine on its list, and in return the Crimean Tatars had voted for Rukh en masse. The deal may well have been mutually beneficial. As Rukh's total national list vote of 2 494 381 won it 32 deputies at 77 695 votes a deputy, the approximately 90 000 eligible Crimean Tatar voters could well have added an extra deputy to the Rukh total in return for the election of Jemiloglu.[37] On the other hand, there is no evidence as to the indirect effect that Rukh's close association with the Tatars may have had on its overall vote, either in Crimea or in Ukraine as a whole. The Qurultay itself did not participate directly in the elections (though leading members Nadir Bekirov and Ilmy Umerov won 4.7% and 10% in Simferopil'). Last-minute calls for some kind of special representation had not been heeded. The fact that the so-called 'Muslim Party' was actually based in Donets'k was demonstrated by its meager 1.7% of the vote in Crimea.

The elections threw a harsh spotlight on the issue of representation of the Crimean Tatar minority (still only around 11% of the population of the peninsula). The abolition of the PR element in the local elections deprived the Tatars of their 14 seats.[38] In the national vote, Jemiloglu was joined by his deputy Chubarov, who sneaked a surprising win in Krasnohvardiis'kyi *raion* with 17.8% of the vote, as his opponents were divided. The Crimean Tatars now at least had a two-man 'lobby' in Kiev, but neither was elected by a method that would guarantee long-term representation.

As argued above, the Socialist/Village bloc was less effective than the sum of its original parts. On the other hand, it fulfilled hopes expressed in 1994–97 that the two parties' more moderate and more 'national' image would allow them to reach areas of Ukrainian-speaking central Ukraine where the Communists were weaker.[39] The Socialist/Village bloc was indeed ahead of the Communists in Cherkasy (28% to 20.4%) and Khmel'nyts'kyi (23.1% to 23%), and close behind in other central *oblasti*, including Kiev and Poltava. On the other hand, in the constituency elections the bloc only managed to pick up a further five seats, scattered all over Ukraine (one each in Kiev, Khmel'nyts'kyi, Cherkasy, Kherson and Odesa). The Socialists arguably emerged from the elections the dominant partner in the bloc, but the election of Village Party leader Oleksandr Tkachenko as chairman of parliament led to a recrudescence of the latter's ambition, and in September 1998 the predicted break-up of the faction into its two constituent parts.[40]

The performance of the main establishment party, the National Democratic Party (NDP), in the list vote was poor, even compared with its rough equivalent Our Home is Russia's 10.1% in the 1995 Russian Duma elections—despite the NDP being the

top-spending party and dominating the mass media. Even in Kiev the NDP won only 3.6% (Our Home is Russia won 19.4% of the vote in Moscow in 1995). The NDP had pockets of obvious patronage power (12.9% in Vinnytsya, 11.8% in Mykolaîv), but most local big-wigs only chose to join the party after the elections (see below). The NDP was, however, originally established by a merger of smaller parties. 'New Wave' in L'viv, which won four seats in 1994, helped the party to 5.7% in 1998; the old Party of Democratic Revival, based in Kharkiv, contributed towards a vote of 6.8% for the NDP in the eastern *oblast'*. Neither score was particularly impressive, however, and there were signs of tension after the elections as the NDP's constituent parts began to question the wisdom of being too closely associated with the existing powers.[41] This diversity was also reflected in the variety of alliances that regional branches of the NDP formed during the elections (normally with other centre parties, but with Rukh in L'viv, and even with some Russophiles in the east).

Faction formation

Finally, a brief word is necessary about the process of faction formation after the elections. The new factions were all originally based on the eight successful list parties/blocs (itself important progress in achieving more transparency and accountability in the representation process), but political manoeuvring brought about considerable change, particularly amongst the centre parties and amongst the constituency deputies (the figures in brackets in Table 6 show the development of each party faction amongst the latter up to August 1998).[42] Although 116 of the 225 constituency deputies were originally elected as independents, by the summer only 37 of them had failed to join one of the eight factions. Many deputies elected from parties that failed to meet the 4% threshold had also joined factions (although three each from the Agrarians, Reforms and Order and the National Front, two from Forward Ukraine! and one each from Soyuz, the Christian Democrats and Menshe sliv continued to sit as independents). The left parties gained hardly any ground with the inrush. Nor did the Greens (only five) or Rukh (two). The Social Democrats were moderately successful in adding eight new members, but the real contest was between the two main patronage parties—Hromada and the NDP.

The NDP grew spectacularly. By June its ranks amongst the constituency deputies had expanded from 12 to 76, allowing the party to treble the size of its overall representation from 29 to 93—second only to the Communists' 123 and the closest thing to a national faction, with deputies from 22 out of 24 *oblasti*, including nine from both Donets'k and Kharkiv, four from Ivano-Frankivs'k, four from Crimea, and almost a clean sweep in Right Bank Ukraine. The NDP also had three out of five deputies in Volyn', four out of six in Mykolaîv and four out of 11 in Odesa.

In the main, the NDP's new 'catch-all' status was a reflection of the power of patronage and the continuing comparative advantage of state power in Ukraine's only partially privatised economy. A telling example was in Donets'k, where Prime Minister Pustovoitenko leant on the local authorities to support the NDP in the run-up to the elections, demanding '40%' of the vote.[43] This had little effect on the list result (38.7% for the Communists against 3.8% for the NDP), but in the constituencies the NDP was ahead by nine to seven, although none of those nine had originally stood

on the NDP ticket. In the very different rural *oblasti* of the Right Bank the NDP originally secured only six deputies, but 20 eventually joined the party faction—mainly leaders of local authorities and businessmen dependent on state favour. The NDP also swallowed many of the smaller parties—three of the eight deputies elected for the Agrarian Party, two Christian Democrats, one Democratic Party deputy, one MBR and both members of the Party of Regional Revival.

Hromada, on the other hand, added an extra 17 members to expand from seven to 24, gathering its new supporters mainly from south-east Ukraine (11 out of 17), plus a handful of businessmen alienated from the current regime, such as publishing magnate Mykhailo Brods'kyi from Kiev (and even a defector from the nationalist Republican Party, Mykhailo Pavlovs'kyi). The regional bias was significant, but also indicated that Hromada was able to expand out of its power-base in Dnipropetrovs'k. The authorities therefore stepped up their campaign against the party after the election (Hromada leader Lazarenko was arrested in Switzerland in December 1998 and fled to the USA before being deprived of his deputy immunity the following February, whereafter Hromada split in two). Adding together the list and constituency deputies, the overall balance of forces in parliament in August 1998 was as shown in Table 7.[44]

The new factional balance left parliament deadlocked. So long as Rukh and the majority of the centre parties (the NDP, Greens and Social Democrats) continued to vote together they had a slight edge over the left (189 to 175), usually bolstered by the handful of far right deputies sitting as independents, but the rough parity of forces meant that neither side could obtain the 225 votes necessary to elect a chairman of parliament and begin work. Kuchma seized the opportunity to resume his criticism of the Rada, and in June began attempting to impose economic measures by decree.

The penultimate (18th) attempt to elect a speaker gave Oleksandr Bondarenko of the NDP 222 votes, only three short of the necessary majority. However, the growing strength of Hromada (40 deputies) and its tactical alliance with the left finally

TABLE 7

OVERALL FACTIONS: ORIGINAL AND AUGUST 1998

	Original	*August 1998*	
Left			
Communists	122	123	
Socialists-Village	34	35	
Progressive Socialists	16	17	Total left: 175
Centre-left			
Hromada	23	40	Total left & Hromada: 215
Centre			
Popular Democrats	29	93	
Social Democrats	17	25	
Greens	19	24	
Right			
Rukh	45	47	Total centre & right: 189
Independents	116	40	

Sources: *Politychnyi kalendar*, 1998, 7 (April); *Holos Ukraïny*, 2 June and 18 August 1998. Six deputies were not included in the faction list published in *Holos Ukraïny*, 2 June 1998.

produced a majority at the 19th time of asking on 7 July, when Oleksandr Tkachenko, leader of the Village Party and deputy chairman in the last parliament, was elected chairman by 232 votes to 27. The left's victory was confirmed by the election of the Communist Adam Martinyuk as first deputy chairman and Viktor Medvedchuk of the Social Democrats as his deputy. Six committees went to the Communists, five to the NDP, four to Hromada, three to Rukh, two to the Socialists/Village bloc and one each to the Social Democrats and Greens.[45]

Conclusions

The vote models derived from our survey results did not produce any startling new facts but helped to confirm earlier hypotheses. We expected association with Ukrainian nationalist values to divide support for Rukh and the Communists, though, as in previous elections, Rukh's support base is only a regional sub-set of the ethnic Ukrainian electorate. Negative economic experiences since 1994 and anti-market values were associated with support for the left parties, the opposite with support for the NDP and, to a lesser extent, Rukh. Support for the NDP was not expected to be associated with Ukrainian nationalist values. As there in fact turned out to be a small positive correlation, this was probably due to the NDP's close association with liberal patriotic forces in west Ukraine. A slight differentiation between the Communists and the Socialist/Village bloc was expected and found. Supporters of both were anti-market, but the support base of the latter was more ethnically Ukrainian.

Despite some movement within party camps, the new parliament has much the same balance of forces as in 1994. The new speaker Tkachenko, like his predecessor Moroz, was chosen from the same moderate leftist camp, but, even after the increased structuring of the political centre, no stable overall majority exists. Finally, however, although changes in faction size and composition after the elections had little to do with original voting patterns, there can be little doubt that, when first elected, the Rada reflected the Ukrainian electorate—a leftist plurality outweighing a rightist minority on either extreme and a substantial middle ground. Instability in parliamentary politics cannot be attributed to turbulence in the electorate's voting behaviour. Rather, it can be attributed to instability in the party system at the elite level.

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Appendix 1: Definition of variables

(A) Primary variables

Age was defined in numbers of years.

Gender was entered in the equations as a dummy variable, with 1 = female and 0 = male.

Education was measured on a six-point scale, where 1 = less than 4 years, 2 = 4–6 years, 3 = 7–9 years or 7–8 years plus vocational training; 4 = 10–11 years; 5 = 10–11 years plus vocational training; 6 = higher (at least 3 years).

Ethnicity in Ukraine is best conceived as a continuum; the vast majority of Ukrainian citizens locate themselves somewhere along a spectrum ranging from pure Ukrainian to pure Russian. For this reason ethnicity was measured on a five-point scale, where 1 = 'Ukrainian only', 2 = 'more Ukrainian than Russian', 3 = 'equally Ukrainian and Russian', 4 = 'more Russian

than Ukrainian', and 5 = 'Russian only'. This method of operationalising ethnicity captures many of the nuances of subjective ethnic identification in Ukraine; it has the disadvantage, however, of excluding all those who belong to ethnic groups other than Ukrainian or Russian. Yet this group comprises only 73 of the 1742 respondents in the present sample, or 4.2%.

It is worth noting that, in statistical terms, this variable is a measure of 'Russianness', as high values indicate a stronger Russian-oriented identification.

Religion: Recent years have witnessed a number of divisions within the Churches that have traditionally existed in Ukraine. Given the close ties between religious politics and questions of nationalism, it was decided to divide religious affiliation into three main categories: first, those who belong to the two Ukrainian Churches banned during the Soviet period, the Autocephalous Orthodox and Greek Catholic Churches; second, those who claim adherence to either the Russian Orthodox Church or its Ukrainian incarnation, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate); and, finally, the would-be 'national' Orthodox Church, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kievan Patriarchate). The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kievan Patriarchate) was used as a baseline for comparison, and the other two categories entered as dummy variables. This classification excludes only that small number of respondents (2.5%) who belonged to other religious denominations.

Religiosity was measured on a five-point scale of frequency of church attendance, ranging from attendance 'once a week or more' to 'never', with intermediary categories designated as 'once a month', 'only on religious holidays', and 'once a year or less'.

Employment: Three aspects of employment were included in the analysis, and in all cases dummy variables were used to designate different categories. The variables were firstly, employment situation: unemployed, non-employed and employed, with employed serving as the baseline for comparison; secondly, budgetary sector: private *versus* state, and state-owned; thirdly, occupational stratum: manual workers; clerical, technical and service; managers and professionals, with the intermediary category serving as the baseline.[46]

Settlement size was conceptualised as a measure of 'urbanness', with 1 = village, 2 = town ('settlement of an urban type' in Soviet parlance); 3 = city of less than 200 000 inhabitants, 4 = city of between 200 000 and 500 000, and 5 = city of more than 500 000.

Regional divisions were understood according to historical divides. The country was broken down into three large areas, the west (Galicia—L'viv, Ternopil' and Ivano-Frankivs'k; Volhynia—Volyn' and Rivne; Transcarpathia and Chernivtsi); the centre (the Right Bank *oblasti* of Khmel'nyts'kyi, Vinnytsya, Zhytomyr, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy and Kiev, plus Kiev city; and the Left Bank *oblasti* of Poltava, Sumy and Chernihiv); and the south-east (Odesa, Mykolaîv, Kherson, Zaporizhzhya, Dnipropetrovs'k, Luhans'k, Donets'k and Kharkiv *oblasti*, and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea). Dummy variables were created to designate the west and south-east, with the centre serving as the baseline category.

(B) Intervening Variables

Language use in Ukraine is, like ethnicity, best understood as a continuum rather than a series of discrete categories. The measure employed to operationalise this variable was a scale derived from the interviewers' initial enquiry as to language preference. Respondents were first asked whether they would prefer to speak Ukrainian or Russian, and if they indicated that they could speak either, they were further probed to determine which language to conduct the interview in. This process generated a six-point scale, ranging from an unequivocal preference for Ukrainian to a similar preference for Russian. As with ethnicity, this measure can be understood statistically as an indicator of predilection for Russian language use, as high values indicate a stronger preference for Russian.

(C) Questions for Intervening Variables

Nationalist Values: (i) 'Some people think that Ukraine should be first and foremost a state of the Ukrainian nation. Others think that Ukraine should be first and foremost a state without ethnic definition. Using the scale on this card (SHOW CARD), where ONE means that Ukraine should be first and foremost a state of the Ukrainian nation, and FIVE means that that Ukraine should be first and foremost a state without ethnic definition, where would you place *your position* with regard to this question?'

(ii) 'Some people consider that Ukraine should move away from Russia as quickly as possible. Other people think that Ukraine and Russia should once again be united in a single state. Using the scale on this card (SHOW CARD), where would you place *your position* with regard to this question?'

Economic values: 'Some people consider that Ukraine should have a market economy. Other people think that Ukraine should restore a planned, state socialist economy. Using the scale on this card (SHOW CARD), where would you place *your position* with regard to this question?'

Appendix 2: Regression models

1. DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LANGUAGE USE

Variable	*b*	*Beta*
Education level	0.1125[c] (0.0305)	0.0630
(Russian) ethnicity	0.2922[c] (0.0262)	0.1986
Settlement size	0.3346[c] (0.0270)	0.2187
Region: west	−0.5310[c] (0.1134)	−0.0875
Region: south-east	2.3601[c] (0.0936)	0.4977
Constant	0.4243 (0.1474)	

$N = 1657$
adjusted $R^2 = 0.5500$
[a]$P < 0.05$; [b]$P < 0.01$; [c] $P < 0.001$; standard errors are in brackets.

2. DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ECONOMIC WELFARE

Variable	*b*	*Beta*
Language use	0.1193[c] (0.0215)	0.1386
Education level	0.2370[c] (0.0387)	0.1546
Age	−0.0086[b] (0.0032)	−0.0719
Gender	−0.4546[c] (0.0973)	−0.1100
Unemployed	−1.2721[c] (0.1510)	−0.2056
Manual worker	−0.6519[c] (0.1321)	−0.1217
Private sector employment	0.5600[c] (0.1481)	0.0907
Affiliate of a formerly banned Ukrainian Church	0.4160[a] (0.1968)	0.0495
Settlement size	0.2803[c] (0.0333)	0.2114
Constant	4.8189 (0.2928)	

$N = 1598$
adjusted $R^2 = 0.2007$
[a]$P < 0.05$; [b]$p < 0.01$; [c]$p < 0.001$; standard errors are in brackets.

3. DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ECONOMIC VALUES

Variable	*b*	*Beta*
Economic welfare	0.1662[c] (0.0200)	0.2129
Education level	0.1753[c] (0.0334)	0.1405
Age	−0.0147[c] (0.0025)	−0.1542
Gender	−0.1809[a] (0.0792)	−0.0562
Region: west	0.3650[b] (0.1191)	0.0838
Region: south-east	−0.3893[c] (0.0881)	−0.1218
Constant	1.9174 (0.2446)	

$N = 1409$
adjusted $R^2 = 0.1533$
[a]$P < 0.05$; [b]$P < 0.01$; [c]$P < 0.001$; standard errors are in brackets.

4. DEPENDENT VARIABLE: NATIONALIST VALUES

Variable	*b*	*Beta*
Economic welfare	0.0903[b] (0.0295)	0.0739
Language	−0.0907[b] (0.0340)	−0.0852
Ethnicity	−0.2198[c] (0.0407)	−0.1391
Gender	−0.2431[a] (0.1221)	−0.0476
Managers and professionals	0.7059[c] (0.1940)	0.0863
Manual labourers	0.3628[a] (0.1588)	0.0552
Affiliate of a formerly banned Ukrainian Church	2.6617[c] (0.2414)	0.2660
Affiliate of a Russian-oriented Church	−0.7263[c] (0.1771)	−0.0959
Region: south-east	−1.2752[c] (0.1528)	−0.2522
Constant	5.8093 (0.2205)	

$N = 1321$
adjusted $R^2 = 0.3069$
[a]$P < 0.05$; [b]$P < 0.01$; [c]$P < 0.001$; standard errors are in brackets.

5. DEPENDENT VARIABLE: COMMUNIST SUPPORT

Variable	*b*	*Beta*
Economic values	−0.2606 (0.0307)	−0.2735
Nationalist values	−0.1233 (0.0200)	−0.2022
Economic welfare	−0.0746 (0.0219)	−0.0998
Age	0.0069 (0.0028)	0.0738
Unemployed	−0.3507 (0.1367)	−0.0753
Affiliate of a formerly banned Ukrainian Church	−0.7298 (0.1868)	−0.1171
Constant	4.6437 (0.2344)	

$N = 972$
adjusted $R^2 = .2444$
[a]$p < 0.05$; [b]$P < 0.01$; [c]$P < 0.001$; standard errors are in brackets.

6. DEPENDENT VARIABLE: SOCIALIST/VILLAGE SUPPORT

Variable	*b*	*Beta*
Economic values	−0.1580[c] (0.0292)	−0.1910
Nationalist values	−0.0477[a] (0.0202)	−0.0893
Education	−0.0771[b] (0.0354)	−0.0720
Settlement size	−0.1252[c] (0.0287)	−0.1442
Region: west	−0.5249[c] (0.1239)	−0.1487
Region: south-east	−0.4445[c] (0.0994)	−0.1666
Constant	4.7251 (0.1939)	

$N = 901$
adjusted $R^2 = 0.1225$
[a]$P < 0.05$; [b]$P < 0.01$; [c]$P < 0.001$; standard errors are in brackets.

7. DEPENDENT VARIABLE: NDP SUPPORT

Variable	*b*	*Beta*
Economic values	0.1433[c] (0.0282)	0.1823
Nationalist values	0.0556[b] (0.0185)	0.1108
Non-employed	−0.1756[a] (0.0842)	−0.0685
Religiosity	0.0817[a] (0.0386)	0.0745
Region: west	0.2840[a] (0.1188)	0.0860
Constant	1.7254 (0.1355)	

$N = 859$
adjusted $R^2 = 0.1001$
[a]$P < 0.05$; [b]$P < 0.01$; [c]$P < 0.001$; standard errors are in brackets.

8. DEPENDENT VARIABLE: RUKH SUPPORT

Variable	*b*	*Beta*
Economic values	0.1019[c] (0.0235)	0.1271
Nationalist values	0.1814[c] (0.0163)	0.3560
Gender	−0.1747[a] (0.0717)	−0.0674
Private sector employment	0.2197[a] (0.1005)	0.0595
Religiosity	0.0766[a] (0.0333)	0.0695
Language	−0.0591[c] (0.0166)	−0.1084
Region: west	0.2448[a] (0.1061)	0.0715
Constant	0.9204 (0.1462)	

$N = 1010$
adjusted $R^2 = 0.2913$
[a]$P < 0.05$; [b]$P < 0.01$; [c]$P < 0.001$; standard errors are in brackets.

Appendix 3: The survey

The survey was carried out by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology under the supervision of Professor Valerii Khmel'ko and Ihor Yaroshenko. Interviewing was conducted in 25 constituencies selected through stratified random sampling (see Table A3.1).

TABLE A3.1
CONSTITUENCIES SAMPLED

Number	*Administrative centre*	*Number*	*Administrative centre*
10	Simferopil'	112	Stanychno-Luhans'ke
20	Luts'k	135	Odesa
24	Dnipropetrovs'k	138	Bilyaîvka
30	Dniprodzerzhyns'k	150	Karlivka
34	Zhovti Vody	173	Kharkiv
43	Donets'k	192	Kam"yanets'-Podil's'kyi
46	Artemivs'k	194	Starokostyanytyniv
58	Slov"yans'k	202	Chernivtsi
65	Berdychiv	207	Chernihiv
83	Polohy	218	Kiev city
89	Nadvirna	222	Kiev city
92	Myronivka	225	Sevastopil'
101	Znam"yanka		

The survey employed a multi-stage clustered probability sample design. The population sampled consisted of adults 18 years or older on 29 March 1998 (the day of the elections). The primary sampling units were the 25 constituencies described above. Within each constituency, postal catchment areas were selected, and within these, blocs of contiguous addresses. Respondents were selected, within these blocs by the random route method (approximately 10 per postal catchment area). Within each constituency 82 respondents were selected, for a total sample size of 2050. No substitutions were allowed.

The questionnaires were translated into Russian and Ukrainian, and the translations checked by the project researchers. Both questionnaires were pre-tested between 17 and 27 February. Interviewing took place between 14 and 28 March. The vast majority—83.3% of the interviews—were conducted in the six day period between 17 and 22 March. All interviews were conducted face-to-face. Respondents were interviewed in their homes. The average length of the interviews was 50.1 minutes. All interviewers were fluent in both Russian and Ukrainian. The choice of language of interview was made by the respondent. The response rate was 1742 or 84.98%. The data were weighted to compensate for under-representation of the western region in the achieved sample.

Further details of the survey design and execution are available from the authors upon request.

Appendix 4: Survey questions employed in the construction of the scale of economic welfare

What is the overall (total) average monthly income of your family (including all payments and any other income in cash or kind)? (SHOW CARD)

(a) 1–80 hryvnya	1
(b) 81–150 hryvnya	2
(c) 151–300 hryvnya	3
(d) 301–600 hryvnya	4
(e) more than 600 hryvnya	5
(f) no income	6
D/K	88
N/A	99

How many members are there in your household? (INTERVIEWER TO RECORD) Taking account of the number of people in your family, which of the descriptions on this card describes how adequate your family income is? (SHOW CARD)

(a) We don't even have enough money to buy food	1
(b) We have enough money to buy food, but it's difficult to buy clothes or shoes	2
(c) We have enough money for food and clothes, and we can put some aside, but not enough to buy things like, for example, a refrigerator or a television.	3
(d) We can buy a few expensive things (like, for example, a television or a refrigerator), but we cannot have everything we want.	4
(e) We can buy anything we want.	5
D/K	88
N/A	99

Please tell me, how has the economic position of you and your family changed over the past four or five years? Has it

—got considerably worse	1
—got somewhat worse	2
—not changed at all	3
—got somewhat better, or	4
—got considerably better?	5
D/K	88
N/A	99

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[1] Katya Gorchinskaya, 'Ukraine Joins the Party', *Transitions*, 5, 5, May 1998, pp. 54–59; *Economist*, 4 April 1998, p. 46; *New York Times*, 14 April 1998, p. 1; *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 5 April 1998; Jan Maksymiuk, 'Kuchma Faces Hard Times after Elections', End Note, *RFE Newsline*, 2, 83, Part II, 30 April 1998.

[2] See also the detailed analysis by Peter R. Craumer & James I. Clem, 'Ukraine's Emerging Electoral Geography: A Regional Analysis of the 1998 Parliamentary Elections', *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics*, 40, 1, January–February 1999, pp. 1–26. Melvin J. Hinich, Valeri Khmelko and Peter C. Ordeshook, 'Ukraine's 1998 Parliamentary Elections! A Spatial Analysis', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 15, 2, April–June 1999, pp. 149–85.

[3] On the 1994 elections, see Dominique Arel & Andrew Wilson, 'The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 3, 26, 1 July 1994, pp. 6–17; and Sarah Birch, 'Electoral Systems, Campaign Strategies, and Vote Choice in the Ukrainian Parliamentary and Presidential Elections of 1994', *Political Studies*, 46, 1, March 1998, pp. 96–114.

[4] Andrew Wilson, 'The Ukrainian Left: In Transition to Social-Democracy or Still in Thrall to the USSR?', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 49, 7, November 1997, pp. 1293–1316.

[5] Mykola Tomenko, 'Osoblyvosti natsional' noï vyborchoï kampaniï', *Politychnyi portret Ukraïny*, 1998, 21, pp. 6–17, at p. 12 (also in *Politychna dumka*, 1998, 2). In 1994 the far right parties won 2.9% of the vote. In 1998, as with the left, a bigger share went to the main rightist group, the National Front, with 2.7%, though some of its members straddled the national-democrat/far right divide. Other far right groups won only 0.57%.

[6] Andrew Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[7] *Politychnyi kalendar*, 1997, 1, 20 August–20 September, p. 9.

[8] Authors' interview with André Bouchard, head of the International Fund for Electoral Systems (IFES) in Kiev, 23 March 1998.

[9] The Court's rulings can be found in *Holos Ukraïny*, 5 and 28 March 1998.

[10] Details of all the parties and their programmes can be found in *Vybory '98: politychnyi kompas vybortsya* (Kiev, KIS, 1998); Mykola Tomenko & Oleh Protsenko (eds), *Pravo vyboru: politychni partiï ta vyborchi bloky* (Kiev, Institute of Postcommunist Society, 1998); and Hryhorii Andrushchak *et al.*, *Politychni partiï Ukraïny* (Kiev, KIS, 1998). Two good earlier analytical studies are Valentyn Yakushyk

(ed.), *Politychni partiï Ukraïny* (Kiev, Kiev-Mohyla Academy, 1996) and Vasyl' Yablons'kyi, *Suchasni politychni partiï Ukraïny* (Kiev, Leksykon, 1996).

[11] Tomenko, 'Osoblyvosti', p. 6.

[12] *Komunist*, 1998, 12 and 15 (April); *Tovarysh*, 1998, 38 (September).

[13] From the party election programme; *Vybory '98*, p. 10.

[14] From the party election programmes in *Vybory '98*, at pp. 50–51, 13, 55 and 17–18.

[15] William L. Miller, Stephen White & Paul Heywood, *Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe* (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1998); Sarah Birch, *Elections and Democratization in Ukraine* (Basingstoke, Macmillan, forthcoming for 2000); Valerii Khmel'ko, 'Politicheskie orientatsii izbiratelei i itogi vyborov v Verkhovnyi Sovet (mart-aprel' 1994 goda)', *Ukraina segodnya*, 1994, 5; Jon H. Pammett & Joan DeBardeleben, 'The Meaning of Elections in Transitional Democracies: Evidence from Russia and Ukraine', *Electoral Studies*, 15, 3, 1996, pp. 363–381.

[16] Dominique Arel & Valeri Khmelko, 'The Russian Factor and Territorial Polarization in Ukraine', *The Harriman Review*, 9, 1–2, 1996, pp. 81–91; Valeri Khmelko & Andrew Wilson, 'Regionalism and Ethnic and Linguistic Cleavages in Ukraine', in Taras Kuzio (ed.), *Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation* (New York, M. E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 60–80; Miller, White & Heywood, *Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe*. Cf. Craumer & Clem, 'Ukraine's Emerging Electoral Geography'.

[17] Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller & Donald Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York, John Wiley, 1960).

[18] For precise question wording, see Appendix 3.

[19] For a technical explanation of Cronbach's alpha, see Marija J. Norusis, *SPSS/PC + Professional Statistics, Version 5.0* (Chicago, SPSS, 1992), pp. 141–143.

[20] The exact wording of these questions can be found in Appendix 1.

[21] See Wilson, 'The Ukrainian Left'.

[22] The total effect of a variable is a combination of all its direct and indirect effects on the dependent variable (party support). The effects are calculated in terms of standardised regression coefficients (Betas).

[23] Turnout figures by *oblast'* can be found in Craumer & Clem, 'Ukraine's Emerging Electoral Geography', p. 17.

[24] The Socialist group rose to 27, two more than the 25 deputies then required to form a faction, only because the Communists 'lent' them six deputies.

[25] Russia's Socialist Labour Party played a similar holding role in 1991–93 but then rapidly faded from the scene. See Joan Barth Urban & Valerii D. Solovei, *Russia's Communists at the Crossroads* (Boulder, Westview, 1997), pp. 21–23.

[26] Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, p. 137.

[27] *Holos Ukraïny*, 18 August 1998.

[28] This argument implicitly rejects the view that the impact of region of residence on voting behaviour can be reduced to the geographical distribution of individual-level attributes. We are considerably more sympathetic to political geographers who stress the importance of contextual factors than to certain political scientists who would trivialise or deny them. For an overview of debates on this subject, see Adam Przeworski & Henry Teune, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* (Malabar, FL, Kreiger, 1970), chapters 1 and 2; R. J. Johnston, 'Spatial Continuity and Individual Variability', *Electoral Studies*, 2, 1, 1983, pp. 53–68; and the debate between John Agnew, 'Mapping Politics: How Context Counts in Electoral Geography', *Political Geography*, 15, 2, 1996, pp. 129–146, and Gary King, 'Why Context Should Not Count', *ibid.*, pp. 147–158.

[29] See for example Sven Holder, 'Torn Between East and West: The Regional Factor in Ukrainian Politics', *Post-Soviet Geography*, 36, 2, 1995, pp. 112–132; Lowell Barrington, 'The Geographical Component of Mass Attitudes in Ukraine', *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics*, 38, 10, 1997, pp. 601–614; Craumer & Clem, 'Ukraine's Emerging Electoral Geography'; and Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, chapter 5. See also note 15 above.

[30] See also Craumer & Clem, 'Ukraine's Emerging Electoral Geography', pp. 9–10.

[31] See for example the assessment in *Den'*, 31 March 1998.

[32] Andrew Wilson, 'The Elections in Crimea', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 3, 25, 24 June 1994, pp. 7–19.

[33] *The Rukh Insider*, 4, 4, 4 April 1998.

[34] Rukh election leaflet, March 1998.

[35] Arel & Wilson, 'The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections', p. 16.

[36] See Olena Haladzhii & Leonid Safonov, *Deputaty Kyyeva* (Kiev, Ukraïns'ka perspektyva, 1996).

[37] For estimates of the size of the Crimean Tatar electorate, see Andrew Wilson, 'Politics in and around Crimea: A Difficult Homecoming', in Edward Allworth (ed.), *The Tatars of Crimea: Return to*

the Homeland (Durham, NC and London, Duke University Press, 1998), pp. 281–322, at pp. 288, 302–303 and 322, note 135. The official Crimean Tatar electorate in 1994 was 134 834, but this figure included many non-citizens. Kiev took a tougher line on voting rights in 1998.

[38] In the 1994 local elections the Crimean Soviet had 98 members. Thirty-two were elected by PR: 14 on the Crimean Tatar list; one each on a list for Armenians, Bulgarians, Germans and Greeks; and 14 on a list for the rest, the general 'Slavonic' population. The remaining 66 seats were elected from territorial constituencies where any elector could vote. See Wilson, 'The Elections in Crimea'.

[39] As argued by Socialist Party leader Oleksandr Moroz in *Novyi kurs Ukraïny* (Kiev, Socialist Party, 1998), pp. 13–15.

[40] Once the break was made, in mid-October 1998, the Socialist/Village faction was left with 25 deputies, and Tkachenko's supporters had 15. As with the Village split in 1996, this augmented the centre at the expense of the left. *Reuters*, 16 November 1998.

[41] For example the interview with Taras Stets'kiv in *Den'*, 18 September 1998.

[42] Sources: authors' calculations from information in *Politychnyi kalendar*, 1998, 7 (April) and the list of factions and members in *Holos Ukraïny*, 2 June 1998, p. 3. Deputies moving in and out of factions were originally mainly those elected in territorial constituencies. Only a handful of deputies elected on party lists had changed faction by September 1998.

[43] *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 2 December 1997. See also *Donetskii kryazh*, April 1998, passim.

[44] In autumn 1998 the Constitutional Court undermined faction stability by deciding that new factions or groups could be formed other than the original eight. By March 1999 Hromada, the NDP and Rukh had all split and three new centre factions (Reforms and Order, Fatherland and Regional Revival) had emerged as a result. See Kataryna Wolczuk, 'In Search of a Role: The Ukrainian Legislature in the Political System of Ukraine', paper presented at the Annual Conference of BASEES, Cambridge, 27 March 1999.

[45] *Jamestown Monitor*, 1 July 1998.

[46] This last tripartite classification is designed on the basis of the International Labour Office. *International Standard Classification of Occupations: ISCO-88* (Geneva, ILO, 1990). The categories were created by conflating ISCO groups 1 and 2, groups 3, 4 and 5, and groups 6–9. This classification is broadly intended to reflect differentials in skill level associated with the occupations in question.