The Ukrainian Left: In Transition to Social Democracy or Still in Thrall to the USSR?

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THE STRONG PERFORMANCE of the Russian left in the December 1995 elections capped a string of similar come-back victories by communist successor parties throughout the former Soviet block between 1992 and 1995.[1] In some states the successor parties were new-model social democrats, even neo-liberals (the Democratic Left Alliance in Poland, the Socialist Party in Hungary), some were only partially 'modernised', as with the Russian Communist Party. In most of East-Central Europe and in the Baltic states the new parties had dropped socialist internationalism to become national, even nationalist, parties of the left (Lithuania's Democratic Labour Party, Romania's Party of Social Democracy), but in Russia and Belarus they continued to dream of a restored USSR.

This article seeks to examine the successor parties to the Communist Party in Russia's most important neighbour, Ukraine, where the left-wing parties have controlled the largest single block of seats in parliament since the 1994 elections. Unlike states such as Poland or the Czech Republic, however, profound ethnic, linguistic and regional divisions in Ukraine have made the 'nationalisation' and/or 'social-democratisation' of the left a more complex task. The article therefore first examines the historical roots of these divisions; it then considers the successor parties themselves (Socialists, Agrarians and Communists) and their performance as a relatively united 'Left Block' in the 1994 elections, before concluding with an overview of subsequent splits and realignments. The main thesis presented is that, while the Ukrainian left currently has a broader support base than the parties of the nationalist right, it has been increasingly riven by splits between 'stand-patters' and nationally minded would-be social democrats,[2] which are likely to become even more prominent in the future as the tension between the 'legacies of the past' and the 'imperatives of liberalisation' grows.[3]

Historical roots

Ukraine has a strong native left-wing tradition. As even the nationalist politician and poet Ivan Drach was prepared to admit at the founding congress of the Socialist Party of Ukraine in October 1991, socialism has long been 'an organic part of Ukrainian society'.[4] Indeed, it could be argued that Ukraine has always been governed from the left.[5] However, the left-wing tradition in Ukraine is an ambiguous one. On the one hand, the modern left can seek legitimacy by arguing that, contrary to the claims of

Ukrainian nationalists, 'the establishment of Soviet power in Ukraine was not something fleeting or imposed from outside … socialist ideas and the longing for social justice have deep roots in the democratic, humanist traditions of the Ukrainian people'. It was therefore 'natural that socialist slogans were used at the beginning of our century' by both socialist and more nationally minded parties, and that the Bolsheviks received considerable popular support in Ukraine in 1917–20.[6] Moreover, the left claims credit for creating the first supposed true Ukrainian state, the Ukrainian SSR.[7]

The new 'national' left in Ukraine has even attempted to claim as it own many of the heroes of the Ukrainian national movement, arguing that activists such as Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841–95), Ivan Franko (1856–1916) and even the president of the Ukrainian Republic in 1917–18 Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi (1866–1934) were professed socialists who were concerned with national and social issues in equal measure.[8] Moreover, Ukrainian socialists such as Volodymyr Vynnychenko (1880–1951), Vasyl' Shakhrai (1888–1919), Mykola Skrypnyk (1872–1933) and the writer Mykola Khvyl'ovyi (1893–1933) developed a native 'national communist' tradition that flourished first during the upheavals of 1917–20 and then in the Soviet 1920s (and periodically thereafter), long before the likes of Tito or Dubček attempted to establish their own national brands of communism.[9] Even in the nationalist stronghold of western Ukraine, under Polish rule from 1921 to 1939, a strong native communist party survived until its suppression by Stalin (for 'excessive nationalism') in 1938.[10]

On the other hand, the contemporary left cannot go to the opposite extreme and claim that the Ukrainian left has always been a 'national' left. Before the 1917 revolution most Ukrainian socialists still tended to think in 'all-Russian' or global terms,[11] and from its foundation in 1918 until the 1980s the Communist Party in Ukraine always contained a powerful Russophile, even Ukrainophobe, wing.[12] This duality is reflected in the modern left. The Socialist and Agrarian parties have sought to situate themselves 'in the tradition of Vynnychenko',[13] but the born-again Communist Party, the largest of the three, has remained committed to orthodox 'Leninist internationalism'.[14]

This duality in the Ukrainian leftist tradition is also a reflection of Ukraine's complex historical legacy of ethnic, linguistic and regional divisions.[15] Support for the 'internationalist' left has always been much stronger in eastern and southern Ukraine, where Ukraine's large Russian minority is concentrated and many Ukrainians are Russian-speaking, whereas the power base of the national communists in both the 1920s and 1990s was in the countryside, Kiev and in the smaller towns of central Ukraine. In western Ukraine, by contrast, with the partial exception of Volhynia,[16] the local left-wing tradition was largely extirpated by the much stronger nationalist movement by the time of the Soviet takeover in 1940.

The last days of the Communist Party in Ukraine

Party membership

This 'dual tradition' was also evident in the more recent historical period during the last days of the USSR. Membership levels for the CPU/CPSU at the time of the

USSR's collapse suggest that the historical division between the largely Russian-speaking east and south and the nationalist heartlands of the west was already re-emerging as a factor before 1991.

Before *perestroika*, regular directed membership drives ensured that membership levels remained relatively uniform and differential patterns of geographical and social support for the Communist Party were disguised. However, the fall-off of party membership in 1989–91 helped to reveal a truer picture of underlying support. The last available figures, from January 1991 (see Figure 1), show that party membership as a percentage of the local population held up much better in the east and south, where it was around twice as high as in Galicia (the Ukrainian average was 5.71% for a total membership of 2 964 618). Support for the Communist Party in the March 1990 Ukrainian elections and in the March 1991 referendum on the preservation of the USSR was also higher in the east and south.[17] On the other hand, although regional patterns were clear and pronounced, rural–urban differences in membership levels were also significant (with Kiev city, as the republican capital, having the highest concentration of members). The rate of decline of party membership from 1989 to 1991, although strongest in Galicia, was also relatively high in urban areas of the east (the average fall in membership was − 10.2%). This rural–urban axis has continued to be a factor in determining levels of support for the left.

Party adaptation

As John Ishiyama has argued with reference to transition processes in East-Central Europe, 'the degree to which the intraparty struggle was resolved (or not resolved) in favour of the democratic reformists during the transition period, around the time of the first elections, had a major impact on the ability of the party to adapt successfully later'.[18] This observation is especially true of 'refoundation parties' in Ukraine and Russia, where the Communist Party was banned between 1991 and 1993 and the consequent diminished pressure of circumstance has allowed successor parties to continue to dream of restoring the *status quo ante*.

Unlike the communist parties in states such as Lithuania and Hungary, the Ukrainian party had not undergone significant internal reform before it was forcibly dissolved in August 1991. Several leading communists, notably the first Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk, played a key role in building bridges with the national-democratic opposition, but the main structures of the party remained under the control of orthodox, 'internationalist' conservatives, typified by the party leader Stanislav Hurenko. In 1990–91 Hurenko successfully resisted calls for internal democratisation and/or for the CPU to follow the Lithuanian model by cutting itself loose from the CPSU to become a truly national party,[19] despite the efforts of would-be reformists such as Oleksandr Moroz, then leader of the communist majority in the Ukrainian parliament,[20] and, in the first case, of Gorbachev in Moscow. The last party programme issued in 1990 showed only limited evidence of 'social-democratisation'.[21]

During the parliamentary debate which led to the declaration of Ukrainian independence on 24 August 1991, Moroz called belatedly for the establishment of a properly

FIGURE 1. MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN UKRAINE, JANUARY 1991, AS A PERCENTAGE OF LOCAL POPULATION IN EACH *OBLAST'* (WITH PERCENTAGE FALL IN MEMBERSHIP FROM 1989 TO 1991 IN PARENTHESIS).

Sources: author's calculations from documents in the Archive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (fond 1, opys 48, spravy 112, 116 and 120), and F. D. Zastavnyi, *Heohrafiya Ukraïny*, (L'viv: Svit, 1994), p. 121. The author is grateful to Sarah Birch and the University of Essex for helping to provide the former material.

independent Communist Party of Ukraine,[22] but by then it was too late. The presidium of parliament suspended all activities of the CPU on 26 August, before making the ban permanent four days later and nationalising all CPU property.

The origins of the 1994 'Left Block'

(a) The Socialist Party of Ukraine

The Ukrainian communists had therefore been unable to adapt and survive, and were simply overwhelmed by events. Most of the old leadership went into 'hibernation' and the initial campaign to create some kind of successor party was therefore led by Moroz's reformist minority.[23]

Their original intention was to create a 'supra-party', a 'left-centrist' organisation that would have a 'more modern and more neutral' image.[24] At a preparatory meeting held as early as September 1991 and in an appeal published in the Ukrainian press the names 'Party of Social Progress' or 'Social Justice' (of Ukraine) were therefore suggested.[25] However, most of the rank-and-file who answered the appeal were seeking to circumvent the ban on the CPU and recreate the Communist Party in all but name. One senior left-winger admitted at a private meeting in 1992 that their purpose was 'to (re)form the Communist Party, but under a different name ... as the ideological, political and organisational, if not the financial-material or legal successor to the CPU'. The same source estimated that '90% of existing members of the [by then] Socialist Party are communists who temporarily find themselves in the Socialist Party and who are struggling for the [Communist] Party to exist once more'.[26]

Would-be social democrats were therefore as yet thin on the ground,[27] making any rethink of principles difficult. Moreover, the strongest branches of the embryonic party were in eastern regions such as Luhans'k, where many of the five hundred local members were simultaneously activists in Nina Andreeva's hardline All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and were seeking a vehicle to express their ardent opposition to Ukrainian independence.[28]

The party leadership therefore chose the label 'Socialist Party of Ukraine' (SPU) as a compromise when the party's founding congress was held in Kiev in October 1991 (Moroz was elected leader 'unanimously').[29] The new party was disappointingly elderly. Only 42 out of 287 delegates (14.6%) were under 35. On the other hand, the leadership's hopes to create a party 'based more in the technical intelligentsia' than the old CPU were partly realised;[30] only 74 delegates were workers or collective farmers, while 212 were described as 'intelligentsia and administrators'.[31] According to later information about party membership as a whole, 24% were workers and 5% collective farmers, but 20% were engineers and economists, 27% were employed in education, 6% were lawyers and 3% doctors and health workers (on the other hand, the average age of party members remained 49, only 2% were under 30 and 15% were pensioners).[32] By the time of the third party conference in February 1996, 81% of delegates had higher education.[33]

Nevertheless, the rank-and-file tended to be more radical than the leadership. Moroz had to sidestep demands for the new party to declare itself the legal successor

to the CPU, although the congress condemned the ban on the party as an 'anti-con-stitutional' absurdity, given that 'the nearly three million members of the party who did not support the coup' [*sic*] 'could not be made to answer for the unsanctioned criminal acts of unaccountable individuals'.[34] Moreover, the first session of the party's Political Council after the congress ruled 'that those communists who, during the ban on the CPU, wish to become members of the Socialist Party, until a [proper] legal decision on the fate of the CPSU-CPU, will also enjoy the status of members of the CPU'.[35] The new party statute made no mention of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' and declared that the party would 'conduct its affairs by constitutional methods'. However, an element of democratic centralism was maintained; members had 'the right to unite in platforms', but not in formal factions. Moreover, the party attempted to continue the Leninist tradition of party organisation in the workplace, describing itself as organised on both 'the territorial and collective principle'.[36]

The party also adopted a compromise line on the national issue. Moroz was able to block calls to boycott the December 1991 referendum on Ukrainian independence, although delegates called for the Russian language to be granted some kind of special status in Ukraine 'during the transition period'.[37] The party declared itself in favour of Ukrainian statehood, but condemned 'the destructiveness of the isolation of Ukraine from the other republics of the former USSR', and argued that a 'free and independent Ukraine has no real perspective without full forms of unity between those states which were created under the auspices of the former Union'.[38] The ambiguity in the new party's stance resulted in Moroz withdrawing from his original intention to run for the Ukrainian presidency in the December 1991 election.[39]

In the party's early years, therefore, it was forced to steer a middle course between communist revivalists and would-be social democrats.[40] Although the party had originally hoped to present a more moderate face, the pressure of events and the short-term absence of any alternative pushed it into the forefront of opposition to the authorities' economic and 'nationalising' policies, and its declarations of loyalty to the principle of Ukrainian statehood went unnoticed.[41] Nationalist groups called for the party to be banned. Nevertheless, party membership rose steadily from 29 000 in 1991 to between 60 000 and 80 000 in 1994, making the party the largest in Ukraine. While the Communist Party remained underground, some 30 to 40 deputies in the Ukrainian parliament were 'supporters', although only three (Moroz, Volodymyr Marchenko and Ivan Musiyenko) took an active part in the SPU leadership.

However, after acting as midwife to the rebirth of the Communist Party in 1993 (see below) the Socialists suddenly seemed lost for a role. In the 1994 elections the left-leaning electorate preferred the Communists' simplistic nostalgia politics and outright hostility to 'the restoration of capitalism' to the SPU's more measured opposition,[42] and they could only win a disappointing 14 seats compared to the Communists' 95 (although Moroz was elected as chairman of parliament). The SPU had to 'borrow' an additional 12 deputies to form a parliamentary faction (the minimum number required was 25), six of whom were originally elected as Commu-nists. Moreover, a senior source later admitted that 'in 1994 we lost almost half our members to the Communists'.[43] The SPU's difficulties were further illustrated by Moroz's 1994 campaign for the Ukrainian presidency, when he was eliminated after a disappointing first round score of 13.1%.[44]

(b) The Agrarian Party of Ukraine

The second communist successor party to appear in Ukraine was the Agrarian Party of Ukraine (*Selyans'ka partiya Ukraïny* or SelPU),[45] which held its first conference in January 1992 in Kherson and founding congress in December 1993 in Kiev. Serhii Dovhan' was elected party leader, and the party was officially registered in March 1992 when it claimed 65 000 members.[46] Like their counterparts in Russia, the Agrarians were an offshoot of the main rural organisation of the Soviet era, the Agrarian Union of Ukraine, which claimed a massive 1.6 million members on the dissolution of the USSR.[47] In fact, between elections the SelPU was something of a phantom party, with little in the way of formal organisation to distinguish it from the Agrarian Union.

Outside of western Ukraine, the SelPU had virtually no political competition in the countryside, where the vast majority of the population remained socially, economically and psychologically dependent on the collective farm system. Two attempts by Ukrainian nationalists to form first a rival Peasant-Democratic Party and then a Party of Free Agrarians to represent the nascent farmers' movement were largely stillborn.[48] The SelPU therefore tended to dominate the large caucus of rural deputies in the Ukrainian parliament almost by default (76 deputies supported the Agrarian faction in the 1990 parliament, a maximum of 52 in the parliament elected in 1994).[49]

Although the SelPU was first and foremost the party of the (ex)communist rural elite (collective farm chairmen, heads of agro-industry), its leaders therefore liked to claim that 'our party is not ideological'.[50] Like the Socialists and Communists, the SelPU bemoaned 'the rupture of economic links with the near abroad and, as a consequence, the loss of the great economic space and market' [of the former USSR], and condemned 'the possible rebirth of any form of totalitarianism, including in national-independent colours'. Nevertheless, the party's programmatic documents had a different flavour from those of the CPU and even SPU, stressing the need to 'support Ukrainian sovereignty' and legislators' moral 'responsibility for the fate of the Ukrainian state'.[51] In part this was because the Agrarians, like the Socialists, were a more ethnically Ukrainian party than the Communists (see below), at least in parliament (in July 1994 32 out of the 36 deputies in the Agrarian faction were ethnic Ukrainians and 22 out of 25 Socialists).[52] The SelPU was nominally in favour of privatisation, but declared that 'the land belongs only to those who till it'. Privatisation should mean the conversion of all existing state and collective farms into true cooperatives; large units should not be broken up as 'world experience teaches that large and medium farms, not tiny, make more effective use of agricultural land'. The land, 'the national riches of Ukraine', should not be sold to outsiders, or to 'criminals or foreigners'. Nor should Ukrainians, the party suggested emotively, be allowed to 'become *arbeiter* on their own native land'.[53] In principle 'the SelPU support[ed] the idea of a farmers' [economy], but at the same time [saw] that in current conditions the necessary basis for such a sharp transition' simply did not exist. Instead, every farm worker should receive an equal share of the resources of the old state and collective farms, as well as the kind of appropriate government support enjoyed 'in all civilised states', a 'free choice of any form of property and agricultural management' and financial assistance from special 'agricultural banks and credit unions with

a branch in every *oblast'* of Ukraine'. Land could be 'bought and sold within the ranks of the cooperative'.[54]

The 'phantom' SelPU originally secured the election of 18 deputies in the 1994 elections (and one more in the summer repeat elections), but by the end of the year 52 had joined the 'Agrarian' faction established by the party.[55]

(c) The Communist Party of Ukraine

While plans were being laid for the formation of the SPU in Autumn 1991, the last plenum of the old CPU on 26 August 1991 had already decided to set up a semi-secret committee, empowered 'to represent [the party's] interests' during 'the period of temporary suspension of the activity of the party structures of the CPU', and to work to overturn the ban on the party.[56] The revival campaign came out in the open in June 1992, with the public support of the SPU and SelPU,[57] and in early 1993 some 40 communist sympathisers formed the faction 'For Social Justice' in the Ukrainian parliament, under the leadership of Borys Oliinyk, after his victory in a December 1992 by-election.

However, as in Russia, the campaign for full restoration was only partially successful.[58] In May 1993 the presidium of parliament issued a decree (*postanova*) which declared that 'citizens of Ukraine who share communist ideas may establish party organisations in accordance with the laws of Ukraine', but stopped short of re-legalising the old CPU.[59] (A subsequent attempt to do so in October 1994 failed because of procedural irregularities.) Therefore, when the CPU was reborn at a two-stage congress in Donets'k in March and June 1993, it was formally as a new party, although the congress was described as the party's '1st (29th)' (the last, 28th, congress of the old CPU having been in 1990).[60] The party's east Ukrainian roots were reflected in the choice of the safe but uncharismatic Petro Symonenko, former second secretary of the old CPU in Donets'k, as party leader.

The party was dominated by 'stand-patters', particularly in its east Ukrainian heartland.[61] The possibility of a new name was not even discussed. The new CPU declared that it would 'act within the constitution and the existing laws of the [Ukrainian] state', but would 'use both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary methods'.[62] (In practice, the Communists still 'saw themselves as a vanguard party'.)[63] Like the Socialists, they opposed 'the forcible capitalisation of all spheres of [Ukrainian] life', but expressed unambiguous nostalgia for the USSR, which, they argued, 'could have successfully dealt with [all its problems] within the limits of socialist society, without the destruction of the united Union state' by nationalist intrigue and the consequent 'social shock and the impoverishment of the people'.[64] The party therefore condemned the 'counter-revolutionary, anti-socialist coup' of August 1991 and the December 1991 Belovezhskaya agreement as leading to 'a disastrous course of self-isolation and the rupture of economic, scientific and cultural ties with Russia and the other states that have appeared on the territory of the Soviet Union'.[65] The party had few kind words for the new Ukrainian state, seeing it as dominated by 'the threat of fascism', 'the falsification of history', 'the affirmation of bellicose nationalism and anti-communism in state ideology and political practice', and the attempt to place 'the interests, rights and specific traits of one nation [i.e.

Ukrainians] above those of other nations and nationalities'.[66] Like their counterparts in Russia, the CPU resisted all moves to create a 'presidential republic' and supported 'the restoration of soviet power':[67]

The party's alternative prescription was the restoration of a command economy, the adoption of dual [Ukrainian-Russian] citizenship, 'the status of a second state language' for Russian, and 'the rebirth on a new and exclusively voluntary basis of a union of the fraternal peoples of the independent states formed on the territory of the USSR'.[68]

Unlike the Russian Communists, the CPU were therefore from the very beginning staunch anti-nationalists. The party was an active participant in the first and second 'Congresses of the Peoples of the USSR', held in September 1993 and December 1994, and attended the 30th congress of the Union of Communist Parties-CPSU in 1995 in support of the latter's claim to be the direct successor of the old CPSU.[69] The CPU supported the UCP-CPSU campaign to organise referenda throughout the FSU asking the question 'Do you support the abrogation of the Belovezhskaya agreement and the creation of a Soviet Union of States in accordance with the will of the Soviet peoples as expressed in the referendum of 17 March 1991?'[70] The then Ukrainian minister of justice Serhii Holovatyi ruled the campaign illegal in early 1996, but the CPU continued regardless.[71] The party welcomed the denunciation of the Belovezh-skaya agreement by the Russian Duma in March 1996 as a useful 'publicity gesture', and were confident that they and their allies would gather sufficient strength at the next elections in Russia and Ukraine to place the 'integration' question properly on the agenda.[72] The CPU maintained close and regular contacts with the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), periodically exchanging delegations to discuss common strategy and providing one another with material and technical assistance.[73] The Ukrainian party's congratulatory telegram to the CPRF after the December 1995 Russian elections spoke of 'wishing you further success in our common goal—workers' power, the restoration of a socialist path of development for the Motherland (*Rodina*) and the revival of an equal union of fraternal peoples'.[74]

CPU radicals were the main force behind the establishment of the Soyuz group in the Ukrainian parliament in October 1995, which called openly for the restoration of the Soviet state (24 of its 34 deputies were Communists).[75] Although the CPU leadership thought the move was unnecessarily provocative (or premature), they failed to condemn it. Predictably, Ukrainian nationalists reacted furiously, accusing Soyuz of a 'lack of respect for the Ukrainian people' and siding with 'Russian imperialism' and the 'Russian Messianic idea', and called for the group to be banned (it was denied formal registration in parliament).[76]

Despite its radical stance, the new CPU soon took over most of the support base of the SPU, quickly becoming once again the largest political party in Ukraine (although Symonenko tended to take second place to Moroz, given the latter's higher profile as chairman of parliament). In addition to their comparative advantage in terms of reviving Soviet-era patronage networks, the Communists' name-recognition made them the natural vehicle both for popular discontent with the growing economic crisis and for Russophone opposition to the supposedly 'nationalising' policies of the Ukrainian state.[77] The CPU therefore gained extra strength as a proxy party of ethno-linguistic 'minority' protest, giving a special character and impetus to the

TABLE 1

MEMBERSHIP IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF UKRAINE,
JUNE 1993

Region	Percentage of CPU members	Percentage of Ukrainian population
East Ukraine	35.0	33.6
South Ukraine	11.2	10.1
Crimea	7.0	4.9
Left Bank	9.8	8.8
Kiev	9.5	8.8
Right Bank	14.9	14.9
West	12.7	18.9

Sources: Author's calculations from *Partiya Kommun-istov vozrozhdaetsya...*, pp. 39–40, and *Zastavnyi*, p. 121.

left-wing revival in Ukraine, in comparison with states such as Romania or rump Yugoslavia, where communist successor parties attempted to cloak themselves in the nationalism of the eponymous nationality. Moreover, the amorphous and ill-defined nature of national identities in the in many ways still 'Soviet' social climate of east Ukraine meant that the Communist Party was a more natural vehicle for Russophone protest than more overtly 'ethnic' parties such as the Civic Congress of Ukraine.

The CPU secured the election of 95 deputies in the original 1994 elections, but immediately loaned 11 to the other left factions. A further 11 Communists were elected in subsequent repeat elections in 1994–96, making the party faction, with, again, 95 out of a total parliamentary complement of 424 in spring 1996 (two later died), the largest by far (the nationalist Rukh faction had a mere 27 deputies). Significantly, the CPU's representation was closely correlated with patterns of Russophone settlement in Ukraine; 51 were from eastern Ukraine, 14 from the south and 12 from Crimea; 11 represented Right Bank constituencies and seven were from the Left Bank, but none was from Kiev or the west (see Table 2).[78] Thirty-one of the party's 84 deputies in July 1994 were ethnic Russians and 47 ethnic Ukrainians, but most of the latter were Russophone.[79]

When the CPU was officially registered in October 1993 it claimed a membership of between 130 000 and 140 000. Again, the party's strongest branches were in Russophone areas in eastern Ukraine (35% of all members), and it was weakest in the west (only 12.7%); but the party had respectable representation throughout Ukraine, including, surprisingly, the largely Ukrainophone, but rural, Right Bank region (see Table 1). The powerful Communist Party of Crimea joined the CPU in 1993.

By 1995 the party had a confirmed membership of 160 000 (the main nationalist party Rukh had only 50 000).[80] However, party leaders admitted that '75% to 80% of our members are pensioners and war veterans',[81] while the leftist intelligentsia tended to gravitate to the SPU.

The party also had less success with establishing flanking organisations. The Ukrainian Komsomol was revived at a special '28th' congress in Donets'k in January 1993, but failed to re-establish itself as a mass organisation (the original Komsomol

had transformed itself into the 'Union of Youth Organisations of Ukraine' at its 27th congress in September 1991).[82] At its December 1995 congress the new Komsomol, now led by CPU deputy Oleh Bozhenko, could only claim 4000 members in 16 *oblasti*.[83] The CPU also had good links with the 'Union of Veterans of War, Labour and the Armed Forces of Ukraine',[84] but its relations with trade unions were more problematical. Although many union leaders and members obviously sympathised with the left, the official Federation of Trade Unions was still part of official power structures, while the independent unions were suspicious of all political agitators. Although the SPU and CPU backed the establishment of an 'All-Ukrainian Workers' Union' in December 1994 under the leadership of Aleksandr Bondarchuk of the SPU, it remained a fringe group, despite limited success in radicalising workers' demands in eastern Ukraine.[85]

(d) Other Leftist groups

On the whole, the new CPU was extremely traditionalist, 'backward-looking' even,[86] in many ways even further to the left than the Russian CPRF. Significantly, the Ukrainian Communists had no real rivals to their left, unlike the CPRF, which faced a strong challenge in the 1995 elections from Viktor Anpilov's Russian Communist Workers' Party, whose 4.5% of the vote was only just below the 5% hurdle for Duma representation. Ultra-leftist groups did exist on the fringes of Ukrainian politics. Nina Andreeva's All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks began operations in Ukraine as early as 1990–91.[87] A Union of Communists of Ukraine, led by Yurii Solomatin, was established in January 1993, and registered the following March, when it claimed 2000 members in 13 *oblasti*.[88] The stronghold of both groups was in Luhans'k, where many members also belonged to the CPU, helping to make the local party the mainstream Communists' most radical branch, but none of the extreme left groups was a significant rival to the CPU as a whole.[89] In other words, as of 1996 the CPU had still to undertake even the limited 'modernisation' undergone by the CPRF, which opened up the political space for Anpilov's hardline neo-Bolshevism.

The 1994 elections: a plurality but not a majority

The 1994 elections demonstrated that the parties of the left enjoyed a clear comparative advantage over the nationalist right, but also showed the limits to their support.

For the parliamentary elections in the spring the three main left parties formed a loose alliance called Trudova Ukraïna ('Working Ukraine'), although there were several high-profile cases of direct competition between the SPU and CPU.[90] The left won 147 of the 338 (out of 450) seats filled at the first attempt (43.5%),[91] as against only 92 (27%) for the right. The 'Left Block' was made up of 95 Communists, 18 Agrarians and 14 Socialists; the others were originally independents. Moroz was elected chairman of parliament by 171 votes to 103, and Oleksandr Tkachenko, who, as minister of agriculture in 1992 played a leading role in establishing the SelPU, became one of his two deputies. Furthermore, the left parties controlled 12 out of 26 seats on the powerful presidium of parliament, and 10 of its committees, including

those for defence, foreign affairs, finance and local government. Even after the splits in both the SelPU and SPU in 1995–96 (see below), the left still controlled 150 (35%) out of 424 seats as of May 1996 (95 Communists, 27 Socialists and 28 Agrarians).

The left was therefore in a strong position to wage a long campaign of attrition against the Ukrainian president and government. Whereas the Russian Communists talked darkly of renationalisation, the CPU was largely able to prevent large-scale privatisation taking place at all (at least in 1994–96); while the Russian left railed against El'tsin's 'presidential republic', their Ukrainian counterparts were able to frustrate Leonid Kuchma's plans to build a similar system in Ukraine, even after the adoption of a new constitution in June 1996.[92] Moreover, there was no equivalent in Ukraine of El'tsin's decisive move against the Russian parliament and his leftist opponents in October 1993.

The elections also demonstrated the left's comparative advantage over the right in terms of geographical appeal. Table 2 shows the regional origin of leftist deputies in May 1996, by which time successive rounds of repeat elections had brought the total number of seats filled to 424 out of a possible 450.

The main support base for the left was in Russophone areas in eastern and southern Ukraine, especially in Crimea, the Donbas (Donets'k and Luhans'k) and Zapor-izhzhya. Only the Agrarians had any seats in western Ukraine or in Kiev city and *oblast'*. Nevertheless, support for the left was more broad-based than that for the right, which was lopsidedly concentrated in western Ukraine and in Kiev, with the left picking up considerable support in the key region of central Ukraine (Left and Right Bank).

A more detailed picture can be derived from additional, albeit incomplete, data on the vote for the left-wing parties in each *oblast'* (see Table 3 and Figure 2) and from the results of the local elections held in summer 1994.

The information shown in Table 3 is only partial; because so many candidates (of both the left and the right) stood as 'independents', the vote for formal party candidates is both 'lumpy' and probably an underestimate of underlying support. In particular, the figures for the SelPU should be regarded with caution, as so many members of its parliamentary faction declared themselves after the elections. How-ever, the general trend is clear. The left easily outscored the nationalist parties both in absolute terms (21.8% of the total vote compared to the nationalist parties' 13.8%) and in terms of geographical reach (only in the west, Kiev and parts of the Right Bank did the right win over 10%).[93] The figures also partially support the SPU's claim to a broader appeal in some areas of central Ukraine and Volhynia,[94] but overall the more 'national' Socialists were heavily outscored by the Communists (3.7% to 14.8%). The left clearly had some capacity to expand out of its heartlands, but there were clear geographical limits to its support.

Table 4 shows a similar pattern in the summer 1994 local elections (local elections in Crimea were held a year later in June 1995, when the Communists emerged as the largest single party),[95] in particular the penetration of the left into the key central Ukrainian region and the position of the CPU as the dominant party on the left. Once again, support for the nationalists was largely confined to the west. Of the three largest parties, Rukh won only 965 seats, and 635 of these (66%) were in Galicia; the

FIGURE 2. TOTAL PERCENTAGE VOTE FOR THE THREE LEFT PARTIES, 1994.

TABLE 2

REGIONAL BREAKDOWN OF LEFTIST DEPUTIES

Region/Oblast'	Seats (May 1996)	CPU [faction]	SPU [faction]	SelPU [faction]	Agrarians for Reforms
East					
Luhans'k	25	16 [16]	1 [2]	–	–
Donets'k	47	22 [21]	3 [6]	1 [2]	–
Zaporizhzhya	18	7 [8]	1 [1]	1 [1]	[1]
Kharkiv	22	5 [5]*	2 [2]	0 [4]	–
Dnipropetrovs'k	34	1 [1]	1 [1]	3 [2]	–
Crimea	24	11 [12]*	–	–	[1]
South					
Odesa	21	5 [5]	0 [1]	2 [5]	–
Mykolaïv	11	5 [5]	0 [1]	1 [1]	[1]
Kherson	10	5 [4]	1 [2]	1 [2]	–
Left Bank					
Chernihiv	12	3 [3]	–	1 [0]	[1]
Sumy	11	4 [3]	3 [3]	1 [1]	–
Poltava	16	2 [1]	0 [1]	1 [0]	[1]
Kiev city	11	–	–	–	–
Kiev *oblast'*	16	–	1 [0]**	1 [0]	[5]
Right Bank					
Kirovohrad	11	4 [3]	0 [1]	0 [2]	–
Cherkasy	13	2 [2]	–	3 [4]	[1]
Zhytomyr	12	3 [2]	0 [2]	1 [0]	[4]
Vinnytsya	16	1 [2]	0 [2]	–	[1]
Khmel'nyts'kyi	13	1 [2]	2 [2]	1 [2]	[3]
West					
Chernivtsi	8	–	–	0 [1]	–
Zakarpattya	10	–	–	–	[1]
Volyn'	8	–	–	1 [1]	[3]
Rivne	10	–	–	–	[2]
Ivano-Frankivs'k	12	–	–	–	–
L'viv	23	–	–	–	–
Ternopil'	10	–	–	–	–
All Ukraine	424	97 [95]	15 [27]	19 [28]	25

Sources: Author's calculations from election information in *Holos Ukraïny*,12 July, 16 and 30
August, 7 December 1994, 1 and 22 February 1996; *Daily Express*, 9 April 1996.
Note: The first figure in the columns for each party shows the number of deputies elected on the
party ticket, the subsequent figure in brackets shows the number who eventually joined the party
faction. Movement between the three factions was substantial.
*Mykola Kashlyakov (Kharkiv) and Heorhii Shevchenko (Crimea) subsequently died.
**Chairman of Parliament Oleksandr Moroz.

Republican Party won 428 seats (80% in Galicia), and the Congress of Ukrainian
Nationalists 297 (95%).[96]

Realignment

The 1994 elections were nevertheless something of a watershed for the left, particu-
larly for the Socialists. At the party's post-election congress in April 1994 Moroz

TABLE 3
VOTE FOR THE THREE MAIN LEFT PARTIES BY *OBLAST'*, SPRING
1994 (FIRST ROUND)

Region/Oblast'	All 3 parties	CPU	SPU	SelPU
East				
Luhans'k	43.29	40.09	3.20	–
Donets'k	38.77	31.98	5.13	1.66
Zaporizhzhya	36.46	24.64	5.35	6.47
Kharkiv	24.08	18.57	5.51	–
Dnipropetrovs'k	18.16	8.61	3.41	6.14
Crimea	17.92	17.30	0.62	–
Sevastopil'	29.67	27.28	2.39	–
South				
Odesa	23.19	17.73	1.36	4.10
Mykolaïv	27.67	15.82	2.10	9.75
Kherson	31.74	22.41	3.65	5.68
Left Bank				
Chernihiv	23.95	15.96	1.70	6.29
Sumy	38.95	18.09	14.43	6.43
Poltava	26.27	14.20	3.26	8.81
Kiev city	11.64	7.60	4.04	–
Kiev *oblast'*	15.36	5.49	4.59	5.28
Right Bank				
Kirovohrad	31.92	28.77	3.09	0.06
Cherkasy	26.98	12.61	2.78	11.59
Zhytomyr	16.07	11.53	1.90	2.64
Vinnytsya	9.76	6.42	2.75	0.59
Khmel'nyts'kyi	27.14	7.91	15.05	4.18
West				
Chernivtsi	6.08	5.30	0.78	–
Zakarpattya	2.30	–	0.41	1.89
Volyn'	11.24	4.59	1.78	4.87
Rivne	8.06	3.21	3.00	1.85
Ivano-Frankivs'k	17.58	6.28	5.25	6.05
L'viv	2.88	0.91	0.72	1.25
Ternopil'	1.03	–	1.03	–
All Ukraine	21.78	14.84	3.70	3.24

Sources: Author's calculations from analysis of the official
election results provided by the Slavonic Centre, Kiev.

attacked what he termed the misguided feeling of 'mission accomplished' that led
many SPU rank and file 'to attempt to transfer the party organisation over to the
Communists', now that a successful holding operation had been completed on their
behalf.[97] On the contrary, Moroz argued that, free of its ersatz communists, the
Socialist Party could now adopt the more centrist strategy it had flirted with in 1991,
a policy also dictated by his tactical position as chairman of parliament and the
consequent need to compromise on occasion with the government and presidential
administration.

TABLE 4
REPRESENTATION OF LEFT-WING PARTIES IN THE 1994 LOCAL ELECTIONS

Region/Oblast'	All councils	CPU	SPU	SelPU	Oblast' Council	CPU	SPU	SelPU
East								
Luhans'k	5494	465	18	–	75	22	4	–
Donets'k	6730	484	12	17	75	16	1	–
Zaporizhzhya	4846	215	12	82	70	17	2	1
Kharkiv	7308	383	18	2	70	12	1	–
Dnipropetrovs'k	6588	159	53	163	75	2	2	2
Crimea	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Sevastopil'	247	17	2	–	50	3	1	–
South								
Odesa	7099	265	26	49	73	13	2	1
Mykolaïv	5026	138	24	108	60	3	2	–
Kherson	4841	247	3	64	59	12	–	1
Left Bank								
Chernihiv	8266	301	15	8	60	8	1	2
Sumy	6097	220	20	82	58	8	3	2
Poltava	7786	201	32	245	75	7	1	4
Kiev city	443	11	6	1	69	4	1	–
Kiev *oblast'*	9333	45	16	–	74	3	–	–
Right Bank								
Kirovohrad	5732	241	34	16	60	10	2	1
Cherkasy	7634	198	14	39	60	5	2	1
Zhytomyr	9144	107	14	–	75	9	1	–
Vinnytsya	10870	88	9	–	75	3	1	–
Khmel'nyts'kyi	7492	155	36	13	54	5	2	—
West								
Chernivtsi	4153	8	3	2	50	1	–	–
Zakarpattya	4797	1	–	–	59	–	–	–
Volyn'	5458	47	–	41	60	2	–	6
Rivne	4825	6	8	–	60	2	2	–
Ivano-Frankivs'k	6008	1	–	–	49	–	–	–
L'viv	8849	1	2	–	74	1	1	–
Ternopil'	7379	1	1	–	54	–	–	–
All Ukraine	162445	4005	378	932	1673	168	32	21

Sources: Author's calculations from a report by the Secretariat of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, 'Zvedenyi statystychnyi svit pro sklad deputativ, vykonavchykh komitetiv i postiinykh komisii mistsevykh Rad narodnykh deputativ Ukraïny vybory 26 chervnya 1994 roku'.
Note: The first half of the table shows the overall number of deputies elected to local councils at all levels, the second shows the 24 *oblast'* councils, the main tier of local government in Ukraine.

His supporters therefore began to talk of copying the 'Polish strategy' and building a 'political organisation of a new type', 'a wide coalition not only of the left, but of other democratic and progressive-patriotic forces in [Ukrainian] society', including, crucially, Ukrainian social democrats (the SPU had good links with Poland's Democratic Left Alliance, whose victory in the September 1993 elections provided the example Moroz had in mind).[98] Furthermore, Moroz argued that the SPU could provide

'intellectual leadership' for such an alliance (an implicit rebuke of the 'primitive' Ukrainian Communists),[99] and by emphasising its credentials as a more 'Ukrainian' party, broaden its appeal in those areas of central Ukraine which the CPU could not reach. The party therefore adopted a relatively flexible line after the launch of Ukraine's first market reform programme in October 1994, which the Communists opposed root-and-branch. The SPU accepted the 'principle of private ownership … in services and the retail trade' if not in 'large enterprises', where it supported the Communist view that only 'control by the workers' collective' was an acceptable alternative to state ownership.[100]

However, Moroz's informal 'new course' soon began to strain relations with the Communists and with their still numerous sympathisers in his own party, who preferred to look to the example of the left's victory in the 1995 Russian elections to argue that a 'Russian' rather than 'Polish' model of a Communist-dominated left alliance was still appropriate to Ukraine.[101] The dispute led to a formal split in autumn 1995, when two rebel Socialist deputies, Nataliya Vitrenko and Volodymyr Marchenko, were expelled from the party after calling on Moroz to resign his post and become formal 'leader of the opposition'.[102] However, the episode seemed to leave Moroz somewhat chastened, especially as Vitrenko's supporters founded a rival Progressive Socialist Party in April 1996 to oppose the left's drift towards 'national-liberalism'.[103] A special SPU conference in February 1996 reverted (perhaps temporarily) to a relatively hard line, and the 'opening to the centre' was de-emphasised.[104]

Nevertheless, the party continued to develop a more flexible stance than the CPU, particularly in international affairs. While the Communists made no secret of their nostalgia for the USSR (see above), the Socialists stressed that only 'confederation' was possible within the CIS,[105] and tried to carve out their own international role by founding the Eurasian Socialist Congress in June 1995 with 10 other like-minded parties, many of which came from outside the former Soviet block.[106] Moroz was elected chairman of the Congress, which had its headquarters in Kiev, and announced plans to cooperate with the (largely West European) Socialist International, despite the reservations of many Socialists that it was an 'opportunist' and essentially 'bourgeois' organisation.[107]

Similar tensions within the Agrarian Party led to a formal split amongst the party's parliamentary faction in June 1995.[108] Twenty-six (later 25) deputies who broadly supported President Kuchma's reformist course renamed themselves the 'Agrarians for Reforms' and effectively detached themselves from the Left Block, while the remaining 29 (28) became the faction of the SelPU.[109] Significantly, the split was largely on regional lines. Twenty of the 'Reformists' represented seats west of the river Dnieper, 18 of the SelPU faction came from further east (see Table 2).[110] Moreover, it remained possible that the SelPU itself might split at a later date; 10 of the party's deputies joined the SelPU faction, but six joined the 'Reformists'[111] (the party congress scheduled for 1995–96 was therefore repeatedly postponed). According to the leaders of the 'Reformists', the difference between the two sides was that 'our group stands full-square for the independence of Ukraine, and is against structures such as the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly, whereas some in the SelPU are more flexible [on the national issue] … every nation has a right to be master in its own house'. The SelPU were also 'supporters of traditional collectivism' in the

countryside, whereas the Agrarians for Reforms claimed to be 'in favour of all forms of property'.[112] In November 1996 the 'Reformists' formed their own Agrarian Party (*Ahrarna partiya Ukraïny*), with reported support from Kuchma and Prime Minister Lazarenko.

The key to overall realignment of the left, however, remained the CPU. Factionalism within the party, however, was limited, despite the sheer size of the party group in parliament.[113] Potential Communist 'modernisers' were to be found, such as Leonid Anisimov, who defied the party line to vote in favour of the June 1995 Constitutional Agreement that expanded President Kuchma's powers, but he could only persuade two colleagues to vote with him and soon left the party for the centrist 'Social Market Choice' faction. Twenty-two Communists voted for the final approval of the new Ukrainian Constitution a year later in June 1996.[114] The party promptly expelled five of them.[115]

Perhaps two dozen so-called 'national communists' were grouped around Borys Oliinyk, who chaired the parliamentary foreign affairs committee after 1994, but Oliinyk was too ill to lead any challenge to party conservatives.[116] If anything, the CPU's centre of gravity was on the left, dominated by the Donbas 'caucus' led informally by Volodymyr Moiseyenko from Donets'k, which overlapped substantially with the Soyuz group. Significantly, many Communist (or Communist-dominated) factions on local councils in eastern Ukraine chose to label themselves Soyuz (18 deputies out of 72 on Luhans'k *oblast'* council, 15 out of 65 in Kharkiv).[117]

In other words, there were few signs of any challenge to the party's 'stand-patters'. In fact, the necessity of 'modernisation' simply did not occur to most of the party leadership, who assumed they were sufficiently well-embedded in Ukraine's nostalgic electorate.[118] Without fundamental change in the Communist line, however, it would be difficult to reorient the left as a whole.

Conclusions

Opinion polls in Ukraine tend to confirm that only a minority remains strongly committed or opposed to market reforms, while the majority of the amorphous middle ground leans towards the state paternalism and welfarism espoused by the parties of the left.[119] Moreover, unlike the left in Russia, in the short-term the CPU drew a certain strength from being the main anti-nationalist force in Ukraine. The leaders of the CPU therefore believed that the plurality of seats won by the left in 1994 would undoubtedly 'become an absolute majority at the next elections', not least because Ukraine's first serious economic reform programme and much of the consequent pain of transition was only launched in October 1994, *after* the elections. The CPU took comfort from being the only party to be consistently successful in all the rounds of repeat elections to parliament in 1994–96, and believed there was no need for 'an opening to the centre' because the 'Left Block' could win on its own.[120]

El'tsin's victory in June 1996 dealt a severe blow to such expectations. It also began to induce changes within the CPRF that in the long-run would have repercussions in Ukraine. Moreover, the partial successes of President Kuchma's economic programme and the gradual consolidation of Ukrainian statehood meant that the time for root-and-branch opposition to reform might have passed by 1998 or 1999.

Unfortunately, the Ukrainian left was not well-positioned to trim back to the centre. Despite Moroz's musing about a 'Polish road', although a centrist electorate undoubtedly existed in Ukraine, Ukraine's various centrist and left-centre parties were organisationally weak. They only won 13 seats at the 1994 elections, and the three most important, the Labour Party (the party of east Ukrainian industrialists) and the Popular Democratic and Liberal Parties (founded respectively by entrepreneurs in Kharkiv and the Donbas) were unlikely to make common cause with the left. A stronger performance by such parties in 1998 or 1999 would be likely to be at the expense of the left. Furthermore, in the longer term a movement towards the centre would mean a move towards the more 'national' line espoused by the SPU and the Agrarians for Reforms, especially if the left sought to expand in its key target area of central Ukraine. In such circumstances the 'Left Block' might break up and new left-wing parties emerge, but for as long as the CPU continued to block 'realignment', the progress of economic and constitutional reform in Ukraine was likely to remain difficult, and attempts by Russian leftists and nationalists to denounce the dissolution of the USSR were likely to find an echo in Ukraine.

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    [1] On Communist successor parties in East-Central Europe, see Alison Mahr & John Nagle, 'Resurrection of the successor parties and democratization in East-Central Europe', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 28, 4, 1995, pp. 393–409; Michael Waller, Bruno Coppieters & Kris Deschauwer, *Social Democracy in a Post-Communist Europe* (Ilford, Frank Cass, 1994); Richard Rose, 'Ex-Communists in Post-Communist Societies', *The Political Quarterly*, 67, 1, 1996, pp. 14–25; and Michael Waller, 'Adaptation of the Former Communist Parties of East-Central Europe: A Case of Social-democratization?', *Party Politics*, 1, 4, 1995, pp. 473–490.
    [2] See John T. Ishiyama, 'Communist Parties in Transition. Structures, Leaders and Processes of Democratization in Eastern Europe', *Comparative Politics*, 27, 2, 1995, pp. 147–166.
    [3] Beverly Crawford & Arend Lijphart, 'Explaining Political and Economic Change in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: Old Legacies, New Institutions, Hegemonic Norms and International Pressures', *Comparative Political Studies*, 28, 2, July 1995, pp. 171–199, at p. 172.
    [4] *Holos Ukraïny*, 30 October 1991.
    [5] James Mace, 'Socialist Models of Ukrainian Statehood', *Political Thought* (Kiev), 1996, 1, pp. 200–212.
    [6] *Prohrama Sotsialistychnoï partiï Ukraïny* (Kiev, Party publication, 1995), pp. 5 and 4. On the true extent of Bolshevik support in Ukraine in 1917–20, see, *inter alia*, I. L. Hoshulyak, 'Pro prychyny porazky Tsentral'noï Rady', *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1994, 1, pp. 31–44.
    [7] Petro Symonenko (leader of the Ukrainian Communists after 1993), ' "Natsional'na ideya": mify i real'nist', *Holos Ukraïny*, 21 March 1996.
    [8] Viktor Drozd, 'Prezident, ili Zametki o nesostoyavsheisya "revolyutsii" ', *Tovarysh*, 1994, 13 (March).
    [9] On the intellectual history of the Ukrainian left, see Ivan L. Rudnytsky, *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History* (Edmonton, CIUS, 1987), pp. 91–141, 203–298 and 417–436.
    [10] Janusz Radziejowski, *The Communist Party of Western Ukraine* (Edmonton, CIUS, 1983).
    [11] Heorhii Kas'yanov, Ukraïns'ka intelihentsiya na rubezhi XIX–XX stolit': sotsial'no-politychnyi portret (Kiev, Lybid', 1993), pp. 69–96.
    [12] James E. Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918–1933* (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1983). On Ukrainophobes in the CPU, see T. O. Komarenko, ' "Teoriya borot'by dvokh kul'tur" i shlyakhy rozv"yazannya natsional'noho pytannya v Ukraïni (berezen'-kviten' 1923 r.)', *Problemy istoriï Ukraïny: fakty, sudzhennya, poshuky*, 1994, 3, pp. 84–90.

[13] Author's interview with Rostyslav Chapyuk, deputy head of the Agrarian Party, 23 November 1995.

[14] After 1993 the press of the revived CPU was full of traditional Soviet historiography, particularly on 1917 and World War II. See, for example, E. V. Krasnyakov, 'Istoriya—eto ne tol'ko pamyat'...', *Komunist*, 1995, 50 (December); 'Kommunisticheskaya partiya—organizator i vdokhnovitel' velikoi pobedy', *Kommnist*, 1996, 29 (October); and the hagiography of Lenin, who adorned the paper's masthead, in *Komunist*, 1996, 2 and 3 (January).

[15] This article divides Ukraine into seven main historical and ethno-linguistic regions: Crimea, the east and south had relatively weak historical connections to the Ukrainian heartlands of the centre and west before falling under Russian rule in the 18th century; central Ukraine is divided into the region east of the Dnieper (Left Bank) that came under Russian control after 1654, and the western or Right Bank, that was only absorbed into the Russian empire in 1793–95 (Kiev, the capital, is treated separately); west Ukraine is itself divided into four sub-regions, Chernivtsi (Bukovyna), Transcarpathia, Galicia and Volhynia, only one of which (Volhynia from 1795 to 1917) was ever under Russian rule before World War II. Russophones predominate in Crimea, the east and the south; Ukrainophones in the west and centre.

[16] Although Volhynia lay outside the Russian sphere of influence before 1795 and again in 1917–40, the local population is Orthodox rather than Uniate Catholic. Conservative Russophile sentiment was a powerful force in the region before 1917, as was rural socialism between the wars. See Don C. Rawson, *Russian Rightists and the Revolution of 1905* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 92–95.

[17] Dominique Arel, 'The Parliamentary Blocs in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet: Who and What Do They Represent?', *Journal of Soviet Nationalities*, 1, 4, 1990–1991, pp. 108–154.

[18] Ishiyama, p. 159.

[19] See chapter 4, 'National Communism', in my *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s; A Minority Faith* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[20] As Moroz records in his memoir collection of speeches and documents, citing a letter to Hurenko in April 1991 and a note to the Ukrainian Central Committee dated 'summer 1991'; Oleksandr Moroz, *Kudy idemo?* (Kiev, Postup, 1993), pp. 111 and 115.

[21] *Materialy XXVlll z"izdu KPU, 13–14 hrudnya 1990 roku (druhyi etap)* (Kiev, Ukraïna, 1991).

[22] *Holos Ukraïny*, 28 August 1991.

[23] On the whole the new party was supported by figures of the second rank. More senior figures, such as Hurenko and the poet and former Gorbachev adviser Borys Oliinyk, kept their distance. See the interview with Hurenko in *Vechirnii Kyïv*, 12 February 1992.

[24] Author's interview with Volodymyr Kyzyma, 6 February 1996. Kyzyma drew up the original party programme.

[25] *Radyans'ka Ukraïna*, 5 October 1991. See also the interview with Moroz in *Vechirnii Kyïv*, 19 September 1991. For the appeal, see *Demokratychna Ukraïna*, 19 October 1991.

[26] Speech of Adam Martynyuk (head of the organisation bureau of the SPU and former first secretary of the L'viv city CPU) to the Veterans' Union of Ukraine on 6 April 1992, in documents collected by the Narodna Rada (then the national-democratic opposition group in parliament), 'Ye taka partiya', April–May 1992, pp. 1–14, at pp. 2–3.

[27] Tiny social democratic groups in fact appeared as early as 1988, but the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine contrived to split in two at its founding congress in May 1990; Volodymyr Lytvyn, 'Suchasni sotsial-demokratychni partiï Ukraïny', *Polityka i chas*, 1991, 8, pp. 44–49.

[28] *Luganskaya pravda*, 28 November 1991. On the left in Luhans'k, see Yurii Yurov, 'Dva polyusy Luhans'koho politykumu (istoryko-politolohichnyi narys)', *Heneza*, 1994, 1, pp. 198–204.

[29] *Materialy ustanovchoho z"izdu Sotsialistychnoi partiï Ukraïny* (Kiev, Party document, 1991); Oleksa Haran', 'From Drahomanov to Moroz?', *News from Ukraine*, 1991, 45; and Rostyslav Khotyn, 'Reanimatsiya natsional-komunizmu', *Slovo*, 1991, 21.

[30] Author's interview with Kyzyma.

[31] Volodymyr Lytvyn, 'Sotsialistychna partiya Ukraïny', *Polityka i chas*, 1991, 17–18, pp. 80–92, at p. 83.

[32] *Sotsialist Ukraïny* (Dnipropetrovs'k), 16 December 1995.

[33] *Tovarysh*, 1996, 8 (February).

[34] 'Zayava ustanovchoho z"ïzdu SPU pro antykonstytutsiinist' zaborony Kompartiï Ukraïny', *Materialy ustanovchoho z"ïzdu SPU*, pp. 19–20, at p. 19.

[35] Martynyuk, p. 2.

[36] 'Statut SPU', *Materialy ustanovchoho z"izdu SPU*, pp. 6–13, at pp. 11, 7 and 8.

[37] 'Rezolyutsiya ustanovchoho z"ïzdu SPU pro vsenarodnyi referendum i vybory Prezydenta Ukraïny', *Materialy ...*, pp. 21–22.

[38] 'Postanova ustanovchoho z"ïzdu SPU pro politychnyi moment i naiblyzhchi zavdannya partiï', *Materialy ...*, pp. 16–18, at p. 17.

[39] See the interview with Moroz in *Holos Ukraïny*, 26 October 1991.

[40] See for example the documents from the party's June 1992 'theoretical' conference published in *Tovarysh*, 1992, 5–7 (July). For the party's second congress, see 'Dokumenty II s"ezda SPU', *Tovarysh*, 1992, 13 (December); and *Programma i ustav Sotsialisticheskoi partii Ukrainy (prinyaty ll-m s"ezdom SPU, 28–29 noyabrya 1992 goda)* (Kiev, Party brochure 1993).

[41] See the articles by Moroz in *Holos Ukraïny*, 2 April and 24 June 1992.

[42] 'Predvybornaya platforma SPU', *Tovarysh*, 1994, 6 (February).

[43] Author's interview with leading Socialist deputy Serhii Kiyashko, 9 February 1996. At the party's third conference in February 1996 membership was 29 370; *Tovarysh*, 1996, 8 (February).

[44] Moroz's election programme. 'Vil'na, demokratychna, protsvitayucha Ukraïna', was published in *Tovarysh*, 1994, 24 (June).

[45] *Selyans'ka* is derived from *selo*, meaning 'village'.

[46] *Holos Ukraïny*, 29 January and 14 February 1992.

[47] *Sil's'ki visti*, 8 June and 2 October 1990; *Uryadovyi kur"yer*, 1992, 31 (July).

[48] As of April 1996 there were only 34 800 private farms in Ukraine, tilling only 1.8% of the land; *Nash chas*, 19 April 1996.

[49] Serhii Bilokin' *et al.*, *Khto ye khto v ukrains'kii politytsi* (Kiev, Tovarystvo Petra Mohyly, 1993), p. 221. In 1990–94 deputies could belong to up to two factions, so many 'Agrarian' deputies were also active elsewhere.

[50] Author's interviews with Chapyuk and Oleksii Chernyavs'kyi, SelPU deputy from Sumy, 23 November 1995.

[51] 'Peredvyborcha platforma Selyans'koï partiï Ukraïny (proekt)', *Materialy l z"ïzdu SelPU* (Kiev, Party document, 1993), pp. 9–13, at pp. 9 and 10; 'Meta i zavdannya partiï', *Prohrama i statut SelPU. Priinyata Ustanovchoho konferentsiyeyu SelPU 25 sichnya 1992 roku v m. Khersoni* (Kherson, Party document, 1992), pp. 4–8, at p. 4.

[52] Author's calculations from information provided by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, Kiev, and in *Holos Ukraïny*, 12 July 1994. Moroz was now formally non-party.

[53] 'Peredvyborna platforma SelPU—Lystivka (proekt)', and 'Peredvyborcha platforma SelPU (proekt)', *Materialy I z"ïzdu SelPU* (1993), pp. 15, 10 and 11; the German term was used in the original.

[54] *Ibid.*, pp. 10, 11 and 15. See also the common declaration of the SPU, CPU and SelPU on agrarian policy published in *Tovarysh*, 1995, 51 (December).

[55] *Holos Ukraïny*, 12 July 1994; *Vseukrainskie vedomosti*, 22 October 1994.

[56] 'Postanova plenumu TsK Kompartii Ukraïny', in the collection of documents edited by Stanislav Hurenko *et al.*, *Kommunisticheskaya partiya Ukrainy: khronika zapreta* (Donets'k, Interbuk, 1992), pp. 50–51, at p. 51 (the full protocol of the plenum is on pp. 38–50); author's interview with Yevhen Marmazov, second CPU secretary, 10 February 1996.

[57] *Vechirnii Kyïv*, 14 July 1992; *Tovarysh*, 1992, 4 (June).

[58] For a detailed study of the Communist Party in Russia, see Joan Barth Urban and Valerii D. Solovei, 'Russia's communists at the Crossroads' (Boulder, Westview. 1997).

[59] *Holos Ukraïny*, 18 May 1993.

[60] *Donetskii kryazh*, 25 June–1 July 1993. See also the debate between Serhii Pravdenko and Oleksandr Kotsyuba, 'Komunizm: real'nist' chy utopiya?', *Holos Ukraïny*, 30 April 1993. Information on the revival of the CPU is derived from *Partiya Kommunistov vozrozhdaetsya. Dokumenty i materialy vtorogo etapa Vseukrainskoi konferentsii kommunistov i s"ezd KPU* (Kherson, Party document, 1993).

[61] The party in Luhans'k called for 'the restoration of the USSR, [albeit] with guarantees of the sovereignty of Ukraine and each republic', and a 'campaign to recognise the illegality of the Belovezhskaya agreement as a first step towards the reunion of the peoples of Ukraine and Russia'; 'Predvybornaya platforma Luganskoi oblastnoi organizatsii Kompartii Ukrainy', *Vybor*, 1994, 16, The Kharkiv CPU's election appeal, 'Za sotsializm, sovetskuyu vlast', za soyuz narodov!', used similar language.

[62] 'Ustav KPU', *Partiya Kommunistov vozrozhdaetsya ...*, pp. 43–58, at p. 43; 'O pozitsii KPU v otnoshenii Soyuza kommunisticheskikh partii—SKP-KPSS', *ibid.*, pp. 72–73; and 'Zadachi kommunistov Ukrainy v nyneshnei politicheskoi situatsii', *ibid.*, p. 31.

[63] Author's interview with Kyzyma.

[64] 'Prohrama KPU', *Komunist*, 1995, 12 (March), pp. 4–5. See also the CPU's attack on Ukraine's market reform programme introduced in October 1994; *Komunist*, 1994, 29 (October).

[65] Symonenko's speech to the 1993 congress, 'Zadachi kommunistov Ukrainy v nyneshnei politicheskoi situatsii', *Partiya Kommunistov vozrozhdaetsya ...*, pp. 11–33, p. 12.

[66] *Ibid.*, pp. 13 and 23; 'Programmnoe zayavlenie s"ezda KPU', *ibid.*, pp. 59–71, at p. 59.

[67] Petro Symonenko & Heorhii Kryuchkov, 'Ne mozhna nekhtuvaty volyu narodu. Chomu komunisty ne mozhut' pidtrymaty novyi proekt Konstytutsiï?', *Holos Ukraïny*, 26 December 1995. See also A. Yushchik, 'Partiya i Konstitutsiya', *Tovarysh*, 1995, 49 and 51 (December), 1996, 2 (January) and 5 (February). The draft constitution for a 'Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic' unveiled by the left in March 1996 envisaged the abolition of the presidency, the supremacy of national and local soviets, the adoption of both Russian and Ukrainian as state languages and the return of the state (Ukrainian SSR) symbols of the Soviet era, but only received the support of 207 deputies; *Kievskie vedomosti*, 26 March 1996; *Tovarvsh*, 1996, 14 (April).

[68] 'Za sotsial'nuyu spravedlivost' i spasenie dukhovnosti, za real'noe narodovlastie i dostoinuyu cheloveka zhizn'. Platforma KPU na vyborakh v Verkhovnyi Sovet Ukrainy', *Komunist*, 1994, (February); 'Prohrama KPU', *Komunist*, 1995, 12 (March), pp. 4–5. For general reports on the second CPU congress in March 1995, see *Komunist*, 1995, 11 (March).

[69] A.G. Mel'nikov, 'Obnovlennomu soyuzu sovetskikh narodov byt'!', *Komunist*, 1995, 52 (December). The CPU even resisted the call by the CPRF to rename the group as some kind of broader and blander 'Communist International'.

[70] *Komunist*, 1995, 49 (December). See also the commemorations of the fifth anniversary of the 1991 referendum in *Kommunist Donbassa*, 1996, 2 (April).

[71] *Komunist*, 1996, 6 (February). The June 1995 Constitutional Agreement placed a year's moratorium on referenda, but the Communists ignored it (as they had voted against), and claimed to have collected 2.3 million of the necessary 3 million signatures by March 1996. Nationalist parties countered by trying to organise a referendum to ban the CPU.

[72] Author's interview with Marmazov.

[73] *Ibid.*

[74] 'Telegrama Tsentral'nomu Komitetu Kommunisticheskoi partii Rossiiskoi Federatsii', *Komunist*, 1995, 51 (December).

[75] Tat'yana Mel'nichuk, 'Kto i dlya chego sozdal "Soyuz"?', *Vseukrainskie vedomosti*, 12 October 1995.

[76] 'Nepovaha do svoho narodu. Zayava deputats'koï hrupy "Derzhavnist" Verkhovnoï Rady Ukraïny', *Literaturna Ukraïna*, 19 October 1995.

[77] On the Russophone backlash against what were perceived as 'Ukrainianisation' policies under Kravchuk see Dominique Arel, 'Ukraine: The Temptation of the Nationalizing State', in Vladimir Tismaneanu (ed.), *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (New York, M. E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 157–188.

[78] The CPU's equal strength in the two halves of central Ukraine (Left and Right Bank) is probably better explained by rural and small-town patronage networks than by ethno-linguistic factors (the Left Bank is more Russophone).

[79] As note 52 above. Information about deputies' ethnicity was only available for those elected in spring 1994. The author had no exact information about deputies' language use, although Yevhen Marmazov confirmed that most party meetings were in Russian (author's interview).

[80] Information supplied by CPU Secretariat, as of June 1995.

[81] Author's interview with Marmazov.

[82] *Donetskii kryazh*, 23 January 1993.

[83] *Komunist*, 1995, 51 (December), p. 1.

[84] On the second congress of the Veterans' Union in February 1996, see *Holos Ukraïny*, 1 March 1996. The Union claimed over 13 million members (5.5 million war veterans, 7.3 million pensioners and 600 000 former members of the Ukrainian armed forces).

[85] See the Union's journal *Rabochii klass*, 1996, 1 and 2, and the article by Bondarchuk, *Komunist*, 1995, 50 (December), on the demonstrations (supposedly in 270 towns throughout Ukraine) organised by the Union in December 1995.

[86] Author's interview with Kyzyma.

[87] *Vechirnii Kyïv*, 16 June 1992; *Holos Ukraïny*, 16 and 17 February 1993; *Donetskii kryazh*, 26 February 1993; *Bol'shevik: Obshchestvenno-politicheskaya gazeta kommunistov-bol'shevikov*, 1994, 14.

[88] *Sil's'ki visti*, 6 January 1993. Having played a role in the campaign to re-establish the CPU in 1992–93, Solomatin's supporters were largely kept out of the new party, which they then criticised as too moderate (*sic*).

[89] See note 28 above. A Ukrainian branch of the All-Union Party of Communists met in Luhans'k in June 1992; *Vechirnii Kyïv*, 16 June 1992.

[90] *Robitnycha hazeta*, 30 June 1993. In the Radyans'kyi district of Kiev, Nataliya Vitrenko of the SPU fought Volodymyr Martynyuk of the CPU, resulting in the loss of the seat to the Rukh candidate Myroslav Horbatyuk (Vitrenko was subsequently elected in a repeat election). In Pechers'kyi district the second round was a straight run-off between Oleksandr Bozhko, head of the Kiev SPU, and Valentyn Tryzna for the CPU, but neither could obtain the necessary 50% majority. The fourth SPU congress in April 1994 was marked by some bitter criticism of the CPU for its failure to coordinate election tactics.

[91] The election law required a '50% plus one' turnout for elections to be valid, *and* that a candidate receive '50% plus one' of the votes cast.

[92] Nevertheless, the new constitution, which enshrined the right to private property and downgraded the powers of local soviets, was a significant setback for the CPU.

[93] The left therefore campaigned for a mixed list system, as used in Russia in 1993 and 1995, to be adopted for the 1998 elections, as they thought it would help exaggerate their comparative lead over the parties of the right and centre in terms of organisation and geographical reach, and make better use of their support in Right Bank and western Ukraine (author's interview with Marmazov).

[94] 'On the left in Volyn', see Vladimir Danilyuk, 'Est' li budushchee u levykh Volyni?', *Kievskie vedomosti*, 2 March 1996.

[95] The Communist Party of Crimea (CPC) won 290 seats, their nearest rival, the centrist Party of Economic Revival of Crimea, a mere 37; *UNIAN*, 30 June 1995.

[96] *Source:* Author's calculations, as Table 4.

[97] Oleksandr Moroz, 'Vybory: mizh mynulym i maibutnim' (speech to the 1994 SPU congress), *Vybir* (Kiev, Postup, 1994), pp. 143–150, at p. 146.

[98] Interview with Kyzyma, *Tovarysh*, 1995, 46 (November); Oleksandr Moroz, 'Rik mynuly … Rik pryideshnii!', *Tovarysh*, 1995, 52 (December); and 'Pro stratehiyu i taktyku SPU na suchasnomu etapi', *Tovarysh*, 1996, 8 (February), p. 4. Moroz was also courting Yevhen Marchuk, prime minister until May 1996.

[99] Author's interview with Kyzyma.

[100] *Ibid.*

[101] Leaders of the CPU complained about Moroz's underhand tactics; claiming that 'he was afraid to make a move [to the right] in public, as [if he did so] he would lose most of his [party's] members to the CPU' (*sic*); author's interview with Marmazov.

[102] *Tovarysh*, 1995, 51 and 52 (December). Kyzyma claimed that 'only a handful' spoke in their support (author's interview). On the other hand, many rank-and-file Socialists sympathised with the rebels; see the report on the party in Odesa in *Daily-express*, 7 March 1996.

[103] From the party's journal, *Bat'kivshchyna*, 7 May 1996, p. 3. See also *Zerkalo nedeli*, 27 April 1996. Vitrenko's projected model for the new party was the French socialist 'think-tank' CERES. In practice, her welfarest populism served to constrain the GPUs' drift to the centre.

[104] *Tovarysh*, 1996, 8 and 9 (February).

[105] Author's interview with Kyzyma.

[106] The Congress grouped socialist and social democratic parties from Russia (the Socialist Party of the Working People), Armenia, Georgia, Spain (the United Left), Kazakhstan, Moldova, Serbia, Tajikistan and (from October 1995) Belarus and Romania. The French PCF and German PDS had observer status. Significantly, amongst the founding principles of the Congress were both 'internationalism' and 'patriotism', defined as 'love for the fatherland, respect for national traditions and preparedness to apply all one's strength to [promote] the prosperity and peaceful existence of the people'; 'Deklaratsiya Evraziiskogo Sotsialisticheskogo Kongressa', document supplied to the author by Serhii Kiyashko. See also the article by Kyzyma, 'Proekt vo vneshnepoliticheskom deyatel'nosti SPU', *Tovarysh*, 1996, 6 (February).

[107] 'Ispolkomu Sotsialisticheskogo Internatsionala', letter dated 7 June 1995 from Kiyashko's private files. According to Kyzyma, who after 1994 was head of the SPU's international department, many members of the party's Political Council still possessed 'Soviet-era stereotypes' about the Socialist International (author's interview).

[108] Author's interviews with Chapyuk and Chernyavs'kyi. The authoritarian leadership style of Serhii Dovhan' was also a factor.

[109] The 'Reformists'' only managed to form a faction by attracting four independents and one defector from the SPU, after a certain amount of prompting by the Kuchma administration.

[110] Author's calculations from 'Spysok deputats'kykh hrup i fraktsii u Verkhovnii Radi Ukraïny za stanom na 1 lystopada 1995 roku', document supplied by the Ukrainian parliament, pp. 6–7.

[111] Author's calculations from information provided in Mykola Tomenko *et al.*, *Verkhovna Rada Ukraïny: paradyhmy i paradoksy* (Kiev, Ukraïns'ka perspektyva, 1995), issue 2, pp. 47–52.

[112] Author's interview with Chapyuk. See also his article 'Zbankrutuye selo—zahyne derzhava', in *Holos Ukraïny*, 2 November 1995.

[113] See the point made by Rose that 'the larger [the successor party] the broader and more heterogeneous the coalition of values and interests that it must represent', (Rose, 'Ex-Communists ...', p. 14.

[114] The vote gave the first indication of a possible incipient regional split in the CPU (although some Communists claimed their votes had been 'falsified'). Amongst Communists representing Right Bank constituencies three were against and four in favour, four abstained or did not vote; five from the Left Bank were against and two in favour; 26 from the east were against (24 of whom were from the Donbas), 12 in favour (mainly from Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhya), three abstained or did not vote; in Crimea and the south the figures were four against, four in favour and 12 abstaining or not voting (several Communists were absent); author's calculations from *Komunist*, 1996, 28 (July). The party showed greater solidarity when eighty deputies initially refused to take the oath of loyalty to the new constitution.

[115] *Segodnya*, 21 September 1996.

[116] The best guide to Oliinyk's views is his memoir, *Dva roky v Kremli* (Kiev, sil's'ki visti, 1992).

[117] Author's private information, obtained from *oblast'* councils. Some seats were vacant (and the CPU in Luhans'k had lost some members), so numbers do not tally exactly with Table 4.

[118] Author's interview with Marmazov.

[119] Valerii Khmel'ko, 'Referendum: khto buv "za" i khto "proty" ', *Politolohichni chytannya*, 1992, 1, pp. 40–52; and 'U svidomosti ukraïntsiv perevazhaye syndrom utrymans'koï psykholohiï', *Demoz*, 1995, 5, pp. 23–24; Arthur H. Miller, William Reisinger & Vicki L. Hesli, 'Understanding Political Change in Post-Soviet Societies: A Further Commentary on Finifter and Mickiewicz', *American Political Science Review*, 90, 1, March 1996, pp. 153–166.

[120] Author's interview with Marmazov.