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The Donbas between Ukraine and Russia: The Use of History in Political Disputes

Historical myths play a particularly important role in the mobilization of ethno-national movements. Elites or ‘political entrepreneurs’, that is the potential leaders of ethno-nationalist movements and their ideologues, often find that potential members of their target group are politically passive, isolated from one another, and/or more interested in private goals, and therefore difficult to mobilize politically. Historical myths, however, are an extremely effective means of firming up a target group’s collective identity, encouraging group coalescence, and stimulating political mobilization. The more effective historical myths help to provide an ethnic group with a sense of its own identity as a historical and political subject, to connect a given group with a sense of its own past (imparting powerful emotional appeal by linking the fate of present generations with that of both ancestors and descendants), and, by relating to the individual’s own sense of identity, time and space, helping to make sense of the present. In recent times Serbs have been inspired by the myth of heroic defeat at Kosovo Field as an obvious analogy with their current state of isolation, Balts have idealized their interwar ‘democracies’, while Belarus’ian nationalists have sought to compensate for their lack of a tradition of statehood by propagating the notion that the Lithuanian kingdom of the Middle Ages was really a Belarus’ian state in disguise (as its court language was Belarus’ian).

The power of a historical myth, however, has little to do with actual historical truth, whatever that may be; ‘it is historicism, rather than ethnic history itself, which is the essential base for nationalist movements’. A given group’s historical memory is a secondary phenomenon shaped by how the past is constantly being reinterpreted in the present, as much as by what ‘actually happened’ in the past. Moreover, the academics, politicians and poets

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who reinterpret the past tend to place selective emphasis on particular salient themes in a group’s ethno-history according to their present-day priorities and preoccupations, whether consciously or not. Many an academic has given greater service to a particular ethno-nationalist movement than to the principles of disinterested academic research.

Therefore the historical memory of a given ethnic group does not arrive in the world fully formed, as an objective ‘given’. Elites play a crucial role in its formation and development. That said, however, elites cannot simply ‘invent’ ethno-histories. ‘It is not assumed that elites can do whatever they wish with the cultures and symbols of the group they represent.’ Historical myths must have resonance. They must somehow connect with popular memory and experience. This linkage is most easily achieved and understood on a popular level through the creation of ‘an association with a specific homeland’, a ‘historic territory that locates a community in time and space’. Moreover, the ideologues of a given ethnic group will stake claim to their historic territory by the claim to be ‘indigenous’ — to have been historically the first group, or significant group, to occupy that particular land. The emotive notion of being ‘the first’ to occupy a given territory is then held to generate proprietary rights, regardless of all subsequent events. Ireland is still Irish even though parts have been occupied by Protestant settlers for hundreds of years, Israel is still Jewish because of the Old Testament, and Kosovo is still Serbian because it was the site of the battle of Kosovo Field, even though the local population is now 90 per cent Albanian.

Often, of course, two or more groups will claim the same territory. The dominant group in any particular state may tell one story about the territories it inhabits, while ethnic minorities tell another. Rival states will tell different stories about territories where they are in competition for control. Two or more different groups may claim a given territory as their national patrimony because, depending normally on when local history is deemed to begin, they settled on it first. Such ‘competing claims to indigenousness’ mean that ‘the same events can be retold quite differently, because they are located quite differently in myths of descent’. The Palestinian version of local history is therefore different to that of the Jews, the white Australians’ claim to have ‘settled’ their island will be disputed by native Aboriginals, while
Serbs and Croats will spill each other’s blood over rival versions of the local map.

In such circumstances, the promotion of rival historiographies takes on particular importance, especially if the competition over a given territory, as is often the case now in Eastern Europe, takes place during times of flux, when different ethno-regional groups ‘seek and find different levels of ancestry, history, culture and territory appropriate to changing circumstances and needs’. Rival groups’ ethno-histories may overlap or be difficult to distinguish, and large numbers of individuals may fall betwixt and between, their loyalties up for grabs.

The potential for historiographical rivalry to lay the basis for political conflict in such conditions is obvious, especially in contemporary post-communist Eastern Europe where examples of such disputes abound. This paper will focus on one such example: the Donbas region, historically poised between Ukraine and Russia, part of the newly independent Ukraine since 1991 but still the subject of bitter argument between the two states.

The Donbas (the area of the Don river basin, 85 per cent of which is currently within the modern-day Ukrainian oblasts of Donets’k and Luhans’k — see Map 1) is chosen for two reasons. First, it is strategically important, having been one of the leading industrial centres in both the Russian empire and the USSR. The Donbas only accounts for 9 per cent of Ukrainian territory, but for 17 per cent of its population and 21 per cent of its industrial output (much of which is admittedly now chronically inefficient). Secondly, the Donbas is the geographical lynchpin to a whole arc of Ukrainian territory from Kharkiv in the north-east to Odesa in the south-west that is hotly contested between Ukraine and Russia. More than three-quarters (9.1 million) of Ukraine’s 11.4 million Russian minority live in this arc (eastern and southern Ukraine). Moreover, 3.6 million of these are in the Donbas, where they form 44 per cent of the local population, the largest percentage in Ukraine, apart from the special case of Crimea. An even higher figure, 66 per cent, of the Donbas population stated that Russian was their ‘native tongue’ in 1989. Third, historiographical argument between Ukrainians and Russians is particularly intense over the Donbas. In Zaporizhzhia or Kharkiv there is little dispute that the two regions were once part of a historical Ukrainian or proto-
Ukrainian state.\textsuperscript{17} In Crimea, on the other hand, the peninsula’s strong historical connections with Russia are difficult to refute.\textsuperscript{18} Only in the Donbas is regional history so bitterly contested.

\textbf{MAP 1}

\textit{The Donbas between Ukraine and Russia}

\textit{Source: Andrew Wilson}

Since the late 1980s, Ukrainian historians in western Ukraine and in Kiev, well aware that Ukrainian control over the Donbas is somewhat precarious, have been trying to bolster Ukraine’s historical claim to the region. On the other hand, the leaders of various regional and Russophile political parties in the Donbas have increasingly made use of the contrary historical interpretation provided by local ideologues.\textsuperscript{19} This paper therefore analyses both recent Ukrainian historiography and its counterpart among local Russophiles in the Donbas. Little use is made either of previous generations’ historiography or of historical work from further afield, as the point is simply to demonstrate how local
historians are caught up in the regional dispute in question, rather than to assess the relative merits of either version.

Nor will this paper attempt to analyse which version of local history has greater popular resonance in the Donbas (the subject of a separate paper), but it is hopefully self-evident that the outcome of the struggle for hearts and minds in the region may well tip the balance in the broader political struggle between Ukraine and Russia, and have immense consequences for political and economic stability in the region as a whole.

For the Ukrainian side, the important thing to stress is that the Donbas is natural Ukrainian ethnographic territory, that Ukrainians were ‘there first’. In other words, local Ukrainians must be shown to be the only ‘rooted people’ (korrenyi narod) in the region as ‘their formation into a nation took place on this territory. All other nationalities are immigrants.’ The first task for nationalist Ukrainian historians is therefore to establish that in previous periods of independence for Ukrainians or their ancestors their control over what is now the Donbas was secure.

Some Ukrainian historians have attempted to begin this historiographical task with the Scythians of the second to fifth centuries AD, but most are content to start with the early medieval principality of Kievan Rus’. According to one history, in the tenth and eleventh centuries the eastern boundaries of Kievan Rus’ reached as far east as ‘the upper reaches of the Volga’. According to another, Kievan Rus’ established settlements at Bila Vezha and Sharukan’ as ‘important trading centres at the mouth of the Don’ (these and subsequent place names are shown on Map 2). The same account also claims that ‘thanks to [the Rus’ fortress at] Tumutaran’ [across the Kerch straits from Crimea] the Kievan princes were able to spread their influence to Kuban’ and the Sea of Azov, and stem the encroachment of the Turkic Horde’ on the region. Such outposts ‘fulfilled the same role in the eleventh century as the Zaporizhzhian Sich [see below] in later times’ and acted as staging posts for the extension of Slavic (Ukrainian) control in the region. Moreover, the same account goes on to claim that ‘the intensification of the influence of Kievan Rus’ on the northern Black Sea coast and Crimea is demonstrated by the fact that at this time the Black Sea came to be known as the Sea of Rus’ (Rus’ke more)’ (sic). Indeed, the attempt to spread its...
MAP 2
The Donbas

Source: Andrew Wilson.
influence to the south and east was a key factor in weakening the Kievan state and causing its eventual decline.

At this time the Muscovite state was not yet in existence. If the Ukrainian nationalist case that Kievan Rus’ was in fact a proto-Ukrainian rather than proto-Russian state is accepted, then the Donbas region was under Ukrainian not Russian influence as early as the tenth and eleventh centuries.

With the definitive collapse of Kievan Rus’ in the thirteenth century and its disintegration into rival principalities (Muscovy now included), the area that is now the Donbas supposedly fell under Lithuanian, not Muscovite control (Ukrainians continued to enjoy considerable autonomy under Lithuanian rule until the Union of Lublin transferred most Ukrainian lands to Polish control in 1569). Although the border was hardly secure, even in the mid-sixteenth century Lithuanian rule reached ‘as far as the shore of the Black Sea in the south, and along the river Sivers’kii Donets in the east’. Admittedly most of what is now the Donbas was either no-man’s land or under the Tatars and/or Turks, but the Sivers’kii Donets marked the border with the expanding Muscovite state and prevented its penetrating the Donbas proper to the south.

The most important element in the Ukrainian case, however, concerns the Cossack era in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, and the relative spheres of influence of the Zaporizhzhian (Ukrainian) and Don (Russian) Cossacks. As a western scholar has pointed out,

the celebration of the Cossack past contradict[s] the Russian imperial vision of the area [eastern and southern Ukraine] as primarily the creation of Catherine II and Prince Grigorii Potemkin . . . the restoration of the memory of the Cossack past in effect claim[s] these southern lands for the emerging Ukrainian polity.

The first part of the Ukrainian case is that the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks were an entirely different ethnic group from the neighbouring Don Cossacks, who were in the last analysis merely agents of Moscow, having ‘accepted the authority first of local princes and then of the Tsars in Moscow’. Although ‘perhaps at the beginning of the Cossack era there were no sharp differences between the Zaporizhzhian and Don Cossacks’, the two groups had different origins and distinct political and social traditions. Although the Zaporizhzhians, like the Don Cossacks, were Ortho-
dox, the former were loyal to Kiev rather than Moscow. The Zaporizhzhians were also mainly runaway serfs from central Ukraine, who, contrary to the version of local history propagated by Russian historians since the time of Mykola Karamzin (1766–1826), spoke a version of old Ukrainian. Finally, the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks merged key elements of Renaissance and Reformation culture (creating, for example, their own architectural style, Ukrainian Baroque), with their own democratic self-governing traditions, allowing Ukrainian nationalist historians to assert that ‘the [Zaporizhzhian] Cossack state marked the border of European culture’. Beyond lay ‘Asiatic’ Russia.

For Ukrainian historians from Mykhailo Hrushevsky onwards, most of what is now the Donbas was under the control of the Zaporizhzhians, not the Don Cossacks, although admittedly ‘the Zaporizhzhians never fixed their borders exactly’. In Ukrainian historiography, naval expeditions by the Zaporizhzhians supposedly brought most of the Black Sea littoral and its river system under Ukrainian control, reaching as far as the river Don. ‘At its fullest extent’ the Zaporizhzhians occupied ‘the east of what is now the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, ‘almost all of Donetsk and Luhans’k’ and even ‘the southwestern part of what is now the Russian oblast of Rostov’. Moreover, relatively good relations with the Crimean Khanate to the south allowed the Zaporizhzhians to settle in territory loosely controlled by the Khans. Zaporizhzhian control over the whole region from the Dnieper ‘to the Don’ was supposedly sanctioned by a document signed by the Polish king Stefan Batorii in 1576, that granted the Zaporizhzhians all the land ‘from the source of the river Orel to that of the Kal’mius, and from there to the mouth of the river Don . . . as natural borders to wash the Zaporizhzhians’ domain’.

After the rebellion of local nobleman Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi in 1648 and the subsequent establishment of a Cossack-Ukrainian state, the Zaporizhzhians were at last able to police the region themselves without requiring the approval of the Polish Commonwealth. Even after Khmel’nyts’kyi swore allegiance to the Tsars in 1654, clear boundaries marked off the Don and the Zaporizhzhian spheres of influence. According to Ukrainian historians, a decree signed by Khmel’nyts’kyi in 1655 claimed the whole region up to the river Don for his newly established Cossack state. Unfortunately, no original of this decree exists. A secondary case, however, is often derived from the map of the region produced...
by a French traveller in 1751, D. de Bokset, which showed the region of Mala Tatariia, equivalent to the southern half of what is now Donets'k oblast, as definitively under the Zaporzhzhians’ control. Folklorists have backed up this argument by claiming that many of the popular songs and Dumi (epic poems) of the Donbas, or at least parts thereof, can also be found in the Zaporozhzhian region, evidence of their common origin.

Only in 1746 was the Zaporizhzhians’ sphere of influence artificially limited by Tsarina Elizabeth’s decree, which ‘granted the steppe to the east of the river Kal’mius [the river divides what is now Donets’k oblast] to the Don Cossacks, regardless of the fact that the Zaporizhzhians farmed and fished as far as the Mius river’ (closer to the modern border between Ukraine and Russia). Formal Zaporizhzhian control over their now diminished domain was only ended by force, after Catherine II dissolved their Sich headquarters in 1775. However, the consequent dispersal of the Zaporizhzhians to the east and the south only underlines the fact that Ukrainian ethnographic territory supposedly extends into much of what is now Russian territory, rather than vice versa, embracing a good part of the steppes and foothills of the north Caucasus. Until the twentieth century (as late as the 1930s), there were still ethnic Ukrainian majorities in large swathes of the Don territories and the Kuban’.

In short, therefore, the Ukrainian version of history is that the ‘Zaporizhzhian territories belonged neither to the Tatars or to the Tsars, but to the Sich, and therefore to the Ukrainian people’. The Ukrainians were there first. It was only from the late eighteenth century onwards that Tsarist immigration policy began the attempt to Russify the region artificially. ‘By settling the steppes with Serbs, Moldovans, Russian dissenters, Greeks, Jews, Germans, and serfs from Muscovite [i.e. Russian] guberniias, the Tsarist authorities attempted to resettle those vulnerable to assimilation and form from them New Russians, believers in the Romanovs’ throne.’ At the same time, when peasants from the crowded central Ukrainian guberniias attempted to migrate in search of land (and millions were so tempted after the 1861 emancipation), they were encouraged to move to the Urals and Siberia rather than to Ukraine’s own ethnographical territory in eastern and southern Ukraine. However, despite the destruction of the Sich and the creation of the artificial administrative concept of Novorossiia (‘New Russia’) in 1764, the Tsars’ success was limited, and
Russian immigration into the region remained limited until the industrial take-off of the late nineteenth century.49

Therefore for Ukrainian historians, for whom it is important to date Russian immigration as late as possible, Russian domination of the region is a wholly recent phenomenon. In the first half of the nineteenth century colonization had not yet succeeded in turning the region into a mere ‘imperial province’. Immigration from Russia proper and from Greece and the Balkans was balanced by those incoming central Ukrainian peasants who did not seek land further afield.50 The countryside of the region was therefore still dominated by Ukrainians or non-Russians (Germans, Greeks, Serbs, etc.). The Katerynoslav gubernia was still 71.5 per cent Ukrainian in 1857.51 It was only with mass industrialization and urbanization from the 1860s onwards that the region began to take on a pronounced Russian character. Hence Ukrainian historians talk about the subsequent period as one of artificial ‘Russification’ or ‘de-Ukrainianization’ of what remains a natural part of Ukrainian ethnographic territory.

In the wake of the 1917 Russian revolution, the Ukrainians made several attempts to win independence in the period 1917–21. The Ukrainian National Republic (UNR), proclaimed in 1918, claimed all of Katerynoslav to the Kal’mius (with an administrative centre at Dnipropetrovs’k), Donets’s’k (Slavians’s’k), Zaporizhzhia (Berdians’s’k), and Azov (Mariiupil’).52 The later Hetmanate government was even more ambitious, attempting to establish a border just east of Rostov-on-Don. Moreover, according to the Ukrainian version of history, the separatist Donets’s’k-Kryvyi Rih republic of 1918 that refused to recognize the UNR’s authority in the region was an artificial Bolshevik creation, inspired by the fear that Russian domination of the Donbas was relatively skin-deep and by the desire to isolate the local population from a potentially popular Ukrainian nationalist message emanating from Kiev. Therefore it soon collapsed when the Bolsheviks changed their tactics and attempted to accommodate Ukrainian national sentiment.53 When the boundaries of the Bolshevik Ukrainian SSR finally stabilized in 1921, they included all of modern-day Donets’s’k. Indeed, until borders were adjusted in 1924, the regions of Shakty and Tahanrih (Taganrog), in what is now the Russian oblast of Rostov, were also a part of the Ukrainian SSR.54

The superficial nature of Russian domination of the Donbas in the pre-revolutionary period was supposedly demonstrated by the
rapid inroads made by the Ukrainianization policies introduced in the region in the 1920s. By 1924 there were 158 Ukrainian schools in the Donbas; by 1930 44 per cent of the ‘industrial apparat’ was Ukrainian-speaking while the percentage of the working class who considered themselves Ukrainian supposedly rose from 40.6 per cent in 1926 to 70 per cent in 1929 (the overall population of the Donbas was 60 per cent Ukrainian in 1926). According to Ukrainian nationalists, therefore, Russification of the region stems from the reversal of the policies of the 1920s in 1932–3, and is largely a postwar phenomenon.

Russification was achieved first and foremost through the physical inflow of huge numbers of Russians in the years after 1945. Their numbers grew from 0.77 million in 1926 to 2.55 million in 1959 and 3.6 million in 1989. In percentage terms the number of Russians grew from 31.4 per cent in 1926 to 44 per cent in 1989 (see Table 1). Ukrainians meanwhile continued to leave the Ukrainian SSR in large numbers. A total of 6.8 million was living elsewhere in the USSR in 1989 according to the last official Soviet census.

**TABLE 1**

<table>
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<th>Ethnic Composition of the Donbas in the Twentieth Century</th>
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<td>1926</td>
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Secondly, Russification of the region proceeded through limiting access to Ukrainian schools, mass media and culture. In the interwar period a majority of the region’s schools were Ukrainian. Even after the formal end of Ukrainianization in 1933, 63.6 per cent of local pupils still studied in Ukrainian. The decline of the Ukrainian school only began in the 1950s, as the new schools that opened to cater for the postwar repopulation of the Donbas and subsequent reindustrialization were almost exclusively Russian. The 1959 Language Law that gave parents free choice over the language of their children’s education dealt the final blow to Ukrainian schools in the region. ‘Free choice’ existed in name only, and most local Ukrainians were more or less compelled to educate their children in Russian. By 1989 a mere 2–3 per cent of local children in Donets’k were studying in Ukrainian (all in rural
areas or small towns). Local TV and press became almost exclusively Russian-language, and Ukrainian cultural expression was confined to supposedly safe ‘folklorist’ areas — dance troupes, ethnographic museums and the like. As a result, the proportion of local Ukrainians who considered their ‘native tongue’ (see note 16) to be Russian rose steadily from 17.9 per cent in 1959 to 38 per cent in 1989.

According to Ukrainian historiography, however, the domination of Russian language and culture in the Donbas is only skin-deep, because only a generation or two old. Gentle pressure to ‘re-Ukrainianize’ the region should bring it back quickly into the fold.

Local Russophile historiography not surprisingly contradicts the Ukrainian version of Donbas history at almost every point. Like the Ukrainians, Russians claim to have settled the area ‘first’, although some make a more subtle argument that the region has always been multi-ethnic rather than Ukrainian. Some even take the more radical position that the Ukrainian nation as such does not exist, and that there is therefore no need to contradict its putative historiography.

The argument of prior Russian settlement first of all asserts that ‘there is no evidence at all that the territory of the Donbas was ever a part of Kievan Rus’’. Kievan Rus’ was in any case only a loose agglomeration of princely fiefdoms that had nothing more than expeditionary contact with the largely uninhabited Donbas region, then known as Dike pole (‘wild field’ — Dikoe pole in Russian), a kind of no-man’s land between Slav and Tatar civilization. Settlements such as Bila Vezha were isolated outposts, a long way from the Kievan heartland. Similarly, ‘the Lithuanian Kingdom may have reached the Black Sea, but only for an extremely short historical period (1392–1430)’ before the Tatars once again regained control over the steppe. Even during this period Lithuanian territory was far to the west of the Kal‘mius, comprising basically the area between the Dnipro and Dnister rivers. Lithuania never controlled the Donbas.

However, as with the Ukrainian case, the Cossack era is crucial in refuting ‘the myth that Russians only appeared [in the region] after the 1917–21 civil war when it became necessary to rebuild the mining industry’. In fact, ‘colonisation by Russians from the sixteenth century onwards’ came in a pincer movement from
both the north and east. From the north the first settlers were ‘fugitives from the Kursk and Orlov districts [who] forced their way across the river Severskii Donets [Sivers’kii Donets], then the border of the Muscovite state, and settled on the hills and adjoining steppes, that is in what is now the Donbas’ (the fixing of the border on the Sivers’kii Donets means that northern Luhans’k at least has been part of the Russian sphere of influence since the fifteenth century). Despite the temporary boost given to eastward Ukrainian emigration by the 1654 Pereiaslav treaty, most Ukrainian peasants resettled in Kharkiv or Slobid’ska Ukraine. Few penetrated the Dike pole (moreover, restrictions were imposed on the movement of Ukrainians after 1736).

Formal Russian settlement in the region began with the founding of the town of Tsareborisov (named after Boris Godunov) at the junction of the Oskil and Sivers’kii Donets rivers in 1599 or 1600. Further settlements to the south-west of the Sivers’kii Donets appeared in the early sixteenth century, including those at Tor (the modern city of Slovians’k) and Bakhmut (now Artemivs’k). The Sviatohirs’k (Sviatogorsk) monastery, first mentioned in documents in 1624 but supposedly founded in the late sixteenth century, was also a key outpost of the Muscovite state in the region, although in the Ukrainian version of local history it was probably founded by ‘monks from the Dnipro or Hetmanate’ regions (the monastery, restored in the 1970s, is near the modern town of Slovianohirs’k). It was only the onset of the Time of Troubles that prevented Muscovy from continuing its push across the Sivers’kii Donets into the region. Once the Romanovs restored order in Moscow, the push to the south began anew, and ‘Russian assimilation of the Dikoe pole was continued’.

The second line of Russian settlement came from the south-east as the Don Cossacks penetrated the region. In the Russophile version of local history the Black Sea coast and its river system were settled almost simultaneously by the Zaporizhzhian and Don Cossacks, but the Zaporizhzhians had much less influence in the east and south of what is now the Donbas. As supposedly established by nineteenth-century Russian historians such as Mykola Karamzin and Sergei Soloviov (1820–79), ‘the lower reaches of the river Don were the property of the Don Cossacks’ alone. Moreover, the Don Cossacks, acting as Russia’s advance guard, settled far into what is now the Donbas, claiming control over all the rivers that flow into the Azov sea up to the Berda, therefore
including both the Mius and Kal’mius (their capital was between the Mius and Kal’mius at Novoazivs’k, formerly Stanitsy). The Don Cossacks also established a key settlement at Kuteinikove, named after a Don Ottoman, which is now just south-east of Donets’k.

On the other hand, the ‘eastern boundary’ of the Zaporizhzhian Host was not particularly far to the east of Zaporizhzhia itself, as the Zaporizhzhians’ main route for trade and military expeditions was the river Dnipro further to the west. In any case, the Zaporizhzhians were divided into several loosely federated groups, and were never an integral unit as the Don Cossacks were. The Zaporizhzhians could therefore never plausibly claim to have established control over the region. It is only ‘the Zaporozheans’ [Zaporizhzhians] modern advocates who lay claim to those lands which even the Zaporozheans themselves did not claim’. The so-called ‘documents’ of 1576, 1655 and 1751 prove nothing. The first could have no validity, as ‘one can contest the right of the Polish king to hand out lands which had never belonged to the Polish crown’ in the first place. Secondly, Khmel’nyts’kyi’s supposed decree of 1655 has not survived in its original form, if it ever existed. It is only the circular argument of Ukrainian nationalist historians quoting themselves that maintains the belief that it ever did. Lastly, de Bokset’s map of 1751 was designed to show the border between the Russian and Ottoman empires, not that between the Don and Zaporizhzhian Cossacks. Moreover, the map contradicts the decree of Tsarina Elizabeth in 1746 that settled the boundary between the two Cossack groups at the Kal’mius (this decree, however, did not recognize an existing geographical status quo. Rather it was simply an artificial device to keep the two groups apart and the best means of settling contradictory territorial claims). According to the Russophile argument, therefore, the Donbas was already subject to creeping Russification before formally becoming part of the Russian empire in the late eighteenth century.

An alternative Russophile argument is to stress that the population of the Donbas has always been multinational, with its roots going back to the various tribes that inhabited the region in the pre-modern era. According to one contemporary Russophile group in the region,

the Donbass has since antiquity served as home to dozens of peoples. The
territory of what is now the Donbass has been part of the Khazar Khanate, the Golden Horde, the Crimean Khanate, the Russian empire, the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Republic and [finally] the Ukrainian state... the Donbass is the centre of a unique multinational culture.

The southern coastal region in particular always had a pronounced multi-ethnic character even after it was captured from the Tatars and Turks in the second half of the eighteenth century.

In the words of another author, ‘the multinational structure of the modern-day population of the Donbass developed historically in the course of its settlement and economic development’, rather than as a result of Russian and Soviet immigration policy. In fact, the colonization of the region has ‘much in common with the colonisation of the Wild West in North America’. In both regions settlers from many different ethnic backgrounds displaced their predecessors militarily (‘here we had a war with Turkey and the Tatars [not Ukrainians], there with Mexico and the Indians’), and found it natural to converse amongst themselves in the most convenient lingua franca (Russian in Novorossiia, English in North America). This influx of settlers from far and wide continued throughout the nineteenth century. In the first half of the century they came to settle the open steppes of the region, after industrialization of the Donbas began in earnest in the 1860s they came to work in its mines and factories. Local Ukrainians, on the other hand, largely continued to work on the land, as they distrusted the factory and the alien urban environment. As a result, the whole of what is now south-eastern Ukraine became something of a ‘New Europe’ or ‘European California’ as much as a ‘New Russia’.

The region’s pronounced Russian character therefore developed as the result of conscious free choice rather than administrative ‘Russification’. ‘The population of “New Europe” or the “European California” in what is now south-eastern Ukraine’ was a multiethnic mass which began to Russify itself. The Russian language became the language of social interaction and of business by a natural route. Because of this, so called ‘Russification’ took place long before 1917. Therefore it was not necessary for the Ukrainian SSR to impose it.

In other words, at the time of the formal absorption of the Donbas into the Russian empire in the late eighteenth century, the region was either Tatar, empty, subject to creeping
Russification or multi-ethnic, depending on a given historian's emphasis, but it was never Ukrainian. It is only a part of the modern Ukrainian state as a result of 'a gift from Lenin' in 1921. According to one Russophile author, the Donbas

only became a part of the territory of modern 'Ukraine', which is itself a completely new historical phenomenon, at the beginning of the twentieth century [i.e. with the formation of the Ukrainian SSR]. Before then the concept of 'Ukraine' never embraced these territories.88

The various Ukrainian nationalist governments of 1917–21 in Kiev had little support in the Donbas.89 When the Provisional Government of St Petersburg recognized the authority of the would-be Ukrainian National Council in July 1917, the Donbas (the Tsarist guberniia of Katerynoslav) was specifically excluded from the area of its authority. Moreover, the short-lived Donets'k-Kryvyi Rih republic formed in spring 1918 demonstrated the determination of the local population to have no truck with Ukrainian nationalism, and was a genuine expression of the desire of local inhabitants to remain part of Greater Russia. The Donbas gave its support to the Bolsheviks, the Whites and even Nestor Makhno's Anarchists, but not to the nationalists in Kiev.

The Donbas was then included by the Bolsheviks in the Ukrainian SSR, but local communists consistently opposed the campaign by 'national communists' in Kiev and Kharkiv (the capital of the Ukrainian SSR until 1934) to create a truly national republic. The Donbas was the rock on which the Ukrainianization campaign of the 1920s floundered after its initial success in central Ukraine. In fact, the very need to Ukrainianize the Donbas, 'something that it is only necessary to do with “foreigners” ', merely demonstrated the region's tenuous historical connections with Ukraine.90

Whereas Ukrainian nationalist historiography sees the Ukrainianization period as an attempt to restore normality in the region, and the periods of Russification that preceded and succeeded it as abnormal, for local Russophiles it is the 1920s which were the exception rather than the other way around. The 'so-called Russification of the postwar period was in fact only overcoming the consequences of the artificial Ukrainianization of the 1920s'.91

The regions' schools and urban culture were mainly Russian before 1917,92 and only began to convert to Ukrainian in the 1920s (temporarily) as the result of administrative pressure from Kiev.
Postwar ‘Russification’ therefore merely restored the status quo that existed in 1917.

Local Russophile historiography also places great emphasis on the two-year German occupation of the Donbas in 1941–3, and on liberation in autumn 1943 as a heroic feat of Soviet arms.93 The spilling of so much Russian blood to recapture the region sanctified it anew as part of Russia’s patrimony. Ukrainian nationalist historiography, on the other hand, largely skips over this period, preferring to concentrate on events further to the west.94

Postwar immigration, therefore, was first and foremost the result of wartime depopulation, and secondly a natural consequence of reindustrialization and urbanization. In neither case was there any deliberate attempt to ‘Russify’ the region. Although the Russian share of the local population rose somewhat in percentage terms, this was mainly the result of the decline of the largely Ukrainian countryside. On the other hand, the cities of the region were of course now largely Russian or Russian-speaking, but then, apart from the 1920s, they always had been. Local Russophiles do not therefore dispute the figures cited from postwar Soviet censuses by Ukrainian nationalists as evidence of ‘Russification’, as they are wholly in keeping with the region’s long-established traditions.

For local Russophiles, therefore, it is Galicia (the three former Habsburg oblasts in western Ukraine that are the stronghold of Ukrainian nationalism) rather than the Donbas whose path of development has been exceptional. According to one Russophile author, ‘in the Donbass local Ukrainians are much closer to Russians or local Greeks than to their ethnic cousins from L'viv’.95 Instead of Ukraine in general and the Donbas in particular suffering from ‘Russification’, it is the Donbas which is facing the threat of ‘Galicianization’ (Galitsizatsiia).96 As in the 1920s, an alien elite supposedly now governs in Kiev and is using ‘Ukrainianization’ as a tool to displace the existing political class in the Donbas with Ukrainian nationalist outsiders.97

Similarly, the state symbols of the new Ukrainian state are Galician imports wholly foreign to the Donbas. Contrary to the Ukrainian nationalist argument that the blue and yellow flag was used both in Kievan Rus’ and by the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks,98 the flag first appeared in L'viv in 1848, and ‘its first appearance in the Donbass was in 1918 on the bayonets of the German-Haidamack [Ukrainian nationalist] army that bloodily destroyed the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog republic which fought under the red flag’
(the true flag of the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks was supposedly also red). In 1994 ‘our visiting guests from the west [i.e. Galicia] are perfectly entitled to brandish the blue and yellow flag — it’s their regional symbol, but it is blasphemy to the inhabitants of the Donbass’. 

Similarly, the attempt to impose the Ukrainian language on the Donbas would fly in the face of history. According to local Russophiles, ‘the existing contemporary dual language situation in Ukraine did not arise because of the Russification policies of Tsarist bureaucrats, but has deep historical roots’. The use of the Russian language in the Donbas is just as natural as the use of Ukrainian — even for many Ukrainians (which explains why 38 per cent of local Ukrainians cited Russian as their mother tongue in 1989). The Ukrainian nationalist argument is that in times gone by we all spoke a single language here — Ukrainian. Then thanks to the forcible annexation of Ukraine to the Muscovite state, Tsarist bureaucrats . . . undertook so-called ‘Russification’, that is the forcible imposition of the Russian language on the population of Ukraine.

However, in truth there was no one single demotic language in Kievan Rus’, while the literary language of the court was Old Slavonic rather than Old Ukrainian. Russian language and culture in the Donbas is therefore not an artificial import from Moscow that arrived with the industrialization and immigration of the late nineteenth century, but as organic a part of the heritage of Kievan Rus’ as Ukrainian language and culture. If anything it is the Ukrainian language, formed mainly as a result of Polish and Turkish imports into Kievan Rus’ dialects, which is the more ‘foreign’ in the Donbas.

This is tantamount to the old nineteenth-century argument that Ukrainian is not a separate language from Russian at all, and that ‘Ukraine’ itself is a wholly artificial concept. Not all local Russians would go that far, but the fact that the argument is made shows the gulf between the two sides’ positions.

It should now be abundantly clear that Ukrainian and Russophile historiographies of the Donbas region are mutually contradictory at almost every point. Nearly all the Ukrainian works cited above are from the late perestroika (1988–91) and Ukrainian independence (1991–4) periods, when the humanist intelligentsia in Kiev
and western Ukraine enthusiastically propagated the Ukrainian version of Donbas history in the attempt to give ideological underpinning to Ukrainian control of the region and forestall the growth of potential separatist movements. In 1988–91 it was largely left to the increasingly discredited Soviet establishment to uphold the official Russocentric version of events. Therefore, the collapse of the USSR left the Donbas somewhat disoriented and demobilized in 1991–2, especially as the region lacks a real humanist intelligentsia of its own. Since late 1992, however, local elites have recovered their self-confidence and begun to reassert their own version of local history in opposition to the nationalist historiography emanating from Kiev and western Ukraine.

From the Ukrainian point of view, the Donbas is part of the modern Ukrainian state because it is an integral part of Ukrainian ethnographic territory and Ukrainians’ historical patrimony. Unfortunately, local Ukrainians are ‘denationalized’, and easy prey for local demagogues (it is significant that western Ukrainians often refer to eastern Ukrainians as mankurty or yanichari, after the denationalized soldiers of the Ottoman empire, taken from their own villages as children and later to return to fight against their own kith and kin), but history should take precedence over the wishes of postwar immigrants and the false consciousness of local Ukrainians.

Russophile historiography, on the other hand, has created the ideological basis for a movement for regional autonomy or even separatism in the Donbas. The key point in Russophile historiography is that Russians are not ‘immigrants’ in the Donbas, but a ‘rooted [or indigenous] people’. The implication, therefore, is not that Russians should flee the region, but that Kiev should recognize the special status of the Donbas or even that it should revert to Russia. Either way, the potential for conflict with Kiev is obvious.

Notes

The author would like to thank the British Academy for funding his last trip to Ukraine.


11. Ibid., 68.


16. Ibid., 25 and 27 (in Kharkiv region the percentages are 33 and 48, in Zaporizhzhia 32 and 49, in Odesa 27 and 47). The figure for ‘Russian-speakers’ refers to those who cited Russian as their ‘native tongue’ (*ridna mova or rodnoi yazyk*), a highly ambiguous term that could refer to parents’ language, language at birth, language of identification, language of preferred use or a myriad of other possibilities. Russian is the near universal language of everyday speech in the Donbas.

18. The Ukrainian nationalist version of Crimean history can nevertheless be found in Yaroslav Dashkevich, ‘Ukrainsci v Krimu’, Suchasnist’, 4 (April 1992), 96–104.


20. Place names have been transliterated from Ukrainian rather than Russian (therefore ‘Donbas’ not ‘Donbass’, ‘Tahanrih’ not ‘Taganrog’, etc.) as Ukrainian is the language of official state administration, except where such names occur in Russian-language publications. Many of the controversies referred to in this article are, of course, about place names, so the author should not be presumed to be taking sides.


22. The present work deliberately concentrates on modern Ukrainian historiography. For a review of the founding fathers of Ukrainian historiography of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Stephen Velychenko, National History as Cultural Process (Edmonton 1992), part III. It is not assumed that all Russian and Ukrainian writers adopt a nationalist position, but the works referred to below are representative.


26. Ibid.

27. See, for example, Hrihorii Pivtorak. Ukraïntsii: zvidky my i nasha mova? (Kiev 1993); V.S. Hors’kyi, Narysy z istorii filosofs’koї kul’tury Kyivs’koї Rusi (Kiev 1933); and P. P. Tolochko, ‘Yazychestvo i khristianstvo na Rusi’, in Tamara Sanko-vych (ed.), Istoriiia i kul’turа slov’ian (Kiev 1993), 5–11.


29. On the Zaporizhzhians, see Yurii Kosenko (ed.), Zaporozhtsi (Kiev 1993); M. Novychenko, Zaporoz’ka sich (Kiev 1992); V.A. Smoli, ‘Ukraïns’ka kozats’ka derzhava’, Ukraïns’kyi istorichnyi zhurnal, 6 (June 1991), 3–23; and N. M. Yakovenko, Ukraïns’ka shliakhta z kintsia XIV do seredyny XVII st. (Kiev 1993). D.I. Yavornys’tskyi, Istoriiia zaporozh’s’kykh kosakov, 3 vols. (Lviv 1990) was mostly written in the Soviet period, and does not really make the Ukrainian nationalist case.


32. Volodymyr Molodyk, ‘Tak khto zh my ye naspravi’d’, Skhidnyi chasopys, 13, 6 July 1993. Molodyk’s article is a direct reply to that of Zheleznyi (see note 101 below).


34. Leonid Zalizniak, ‘Ukraïna i Rossiia: rizni istorychni doli’ Starozynyti’ 19


42. As does Lavriv in his article, ‘Karta kazatskoi Ukraïnshchyny’, *Gorod*, (Donets'k), 24–30 June 1991.


47. Ibid., 2.


49. Lavriv (1992, op. cit.), 64, 80 and 84.

50. Ibid., 83–4.

51. Ibid., 100.


56. Lavriv (1992, op. cit.), 117. The figures cited by Lavriv could just as easily be used to confirm Ukrainization’s lack of progress.

57. Lavriv (1993, op. cit.), 105. Lavriv, however, contradicts himself on the same page (1992, op. cit.), 117, claiming that the Ukrainian percentage of working class was ‘70 per cent in 1929’ and ‘51.5 per cent in 1930’.

58. See the litany of complaints in *Nashe slovo*, a Ukrainian nationalist paper published in Artemivs'k, Donets'k oblast, after July 1992, passim.
59. On the history of more or less forced Ukrainian emigration, see Ihor Vynnychenko, ‘Do pytannia rozselennia Ukraïntsiv v derzhavakh kolyschnoho SRSR’, Ukraïns’ka diaspora, 1, 1 (1992), 18-29.

60. Lavriv (1993, op. cit.), 107. Lavriv (1992, op. cit.), 5, gives substantially different figures for 1926, namely 1,897,000 Ukrainians (64.1 per cent) and 773,000 Russians (26.1 per cent).


62. Ibid., 127.

63. Author’s calculations from Lavriv (1992, op. cit.), 132-4.

64. The term ‘Russophile’ is here used in preference to ‘Russian’ to help indicate that most of the works quoted below were published in the Donbas itself rather than in Moscow.


66. See the maps of Kievan Rus’ in the tenth and eleventh centuries in Nikolai Gumilev, Drevniaia Rus’ i velikaia step’ (Moscow 1993), 276-7; and Ot Rusi k Rossii (Moscow 1992), 71.


70. Founding editorial, Donetskii kriazh, 1, 22 January 1993. See also Nikolai Gumilev, Drevniaia Rus’ i velikaia step, op. cit.

71. Interview with Dmitrii Kornilov, 14 July 1993.


85. See for example the following comment by Theodore H. Freidgut: ‘Until the Soviet regime brought him by force majeure, the Ukrainian peasant was least inclined to enter the mines or factories as a hired worker, and the first to leave it
at time of crisis. His ties to the village were strong and directly at hand. The Donbass [Donbas] thus remained within the Ukraine but not of it. The aspirations of the workers, even of the revolutionaries among them, remained focused on Russia, while in the countryside and in traditional urban centres such as Kharkov [Kharkiv], the currency of Ukrainian nationhood was very much in circulation', *Luzovka and Revolution. Volume 1: Life and Work in Russia's Donbass, 1869–1924*, (Princeton, NJ 1989), 4, 193–230 and 331.

86. Mamutov (1993, op. cit.).
87. Ibid., emphasis added.
88. Ibid.
90. Mamutov (1993, op. cit.).
91. Interview with Dmitrii Kornilov, 14 July 1993.
93. See the series of celebratory articles on the 50th anniversary of the liberation in *Donetskii kriazh*, 31, 10–16 September 1993.
100. Ibid.
102. Ibid.
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