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Political Parties in Ukraine

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LIKE MOST POST-COMMUNIST STATES, Ukraine appears to have an anarchic and ineffective party system. A large number of small, ill organised and fractious political parties seemingly promote instability rather than stability, and hinder rather than help the tasks of building a stable civil society and market economy. In the interregnum between the collapse of the old regime and the formation of a new stable political order, the fear must be that if such parties cannot exercise much influence on the development of society, they are helping to create a political vacuum that may well be filled by some kind of revived authoritarianism.

This article seeks first to examine the evidence for this proposition, second, to explain the main reasons for the weakness of Ukrainian parties, third, to analyse the trends towards greater structuralisation of the party system, and finally to outline the methods by which the Ukrainian authorities are hoping to strengthen the role of political parties in the future.

A first glance at the Ukrainian party sytem confirms the impression of an 'atomised party system', seemingly characteristic of all post-communist states.[1] There are more than 20 parties (the proliferation of political parties was facilitated after September 1991, when the number of members required for official registration was lowered from 3000 to 300. At that time, only five parties had met the target). Party membership figures are low, even for the best organised parties. The largest nationalist party, the Ukrainian Republican Party (URP), has only 12 000 members and the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU) around 10 000 (it claims 30 000 but has yet to register its members formally). Moreover, for most parties membership is stagnant or falling.

Even among those parties claiming to have an all-Ukrainian structure, membership is regionally concentrated. Of the two main nationalist parties, 55% of the URP's membership and 34% of the DPU's (Democratic Party of Ukraine) are from the radical but unrepresentative Galician region.[2] Almost a third of the Green Party's (GPU) membership is in one *oblast'*—Ternopil'. On the other hand, the membership of centre-left parties such as the Social Democrats or the Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine (PDRU) is concentrated in urban East and Central Ukraine (The PDRU had 320 members in Luhans'k *oblast'*, 250 in Kharkiv and 250 in Donets'k out of a total of 3500 in spring 1992).[3] Party organisations, moreover, rarely exist outside of the local *oblast'* centres, except in Galicia.

Parties are also handicapped by minimal resource bases and limited access to the mass media. In 1992 only the URP, DPU and the ultra-radical Ukrainian National

Assembly (UNA) had proper offices in Kiev. All have minuscule budgets. Unlike Russia's Parliament, the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council) does not materially support party factions. It does not even provide them with offices. Only the UNA and URP have a regular party press, but its quality is poor.[4] The mass media remain the preserve of the supporters of President Kravchuk, although these now include elements of the former opposition (see below). An appeal for the creation of a new independent TV channel was therefore launched by the disgruntled opposition in July 1992, but with little immediate success.[5]

The interconnections between political parties and other elements of the social and political system are weak and ill-formed. The parties' ability to mobilise collective action among the public has declined spectacularly since the great wave of strikes and public demonstrations that culminated in the student hunger strikes of October 1990. The predominant public mood is now either hostile or indifferent to political parties. Rukh, for example, had a minus 32% rating (17% in favour, 49% hostile) in May–June 1992, and New Ukraine minus 19% (12% support, 31% against).[6] The number of individuals in Kiev classifying themselves as non-party or anti-party rose from 17% to 42% between mid-1990 and May 1992.[7]

In many cases, Ukrainian public opinion was simply ignorant of the activities of political parties, given their limited means of publicising themselves. In September 1991 only 18.3% of Ukrainians considered themselves 'well-informed' about the activities of the DPU, 16.5% about the URP and 7.4% about the PDRU.[8] One indication of declining public support for political parties has been the repeated failure of by-elections to elect a candidate with the required 50% participation of the local electorate. Consequently, in September 1992, 30 seats in the Supreme Council lay vacant.

Party factions in parliament are small and ill disciplined. Central party leaderships lack the means to enforce a party programme on their deputies' group. Even when the latter have some collective identity as a caucus, there is no whipping system. Caucus decisions only have recommendatory character. In a survey of Supreme Council deputies in September 1992 only 38 (out of 421) were prepared to confess a party affiliation.[9]

Analysis of voting patterns throws up abundant evidence of the lack of party discipline. On 7 July 1992, for example, various opposition groups tabled a motion calling for the resignation of the Fokin government. The URP leader, Mykhailo Horyn', abstained, but four of his colleagues voted in favour of the government's resignation. Ten members of the DPU voted for, but the leader of the party's parliamentary faction, Dmytro Pavlychko, abstained. Thirty of the New Ukraine faction (see below) voted for, six against, and six abstained.[10] Parties often issue public declarations on particular issues, but are rarely responsible for concrete legislative initiatives.

Nor did the parties exhibit much discipline during the autumn 1991 presidential election campaign. The PDRU had two rival candidates, and the DPU supported the non-party Volodymyr Pylypchuk instead of their own Volodymyr Yavorivs'kyi. Even the centralist URP had problems, with its maverick Deputy Leader, Stepan Khmara, supporting Leopold Taburians'kyi instead of the URP's then leader Levko Lukianenko.

Lastly, the recent conferences of many Ukrainian parties have resulted in splits,

including those of Rukh in February 1992, the URP in May 1992 and the Christian Democrats in April–June 1992, testifying to the failure to create 'broad church' parties, or parties united by common commitment to a clear platform. The radicals who split from the URP to form the Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party (UCRP) themselves split at their founding conference in June 1992.

All the above should therefore be convincing evidence for the proposition that Ukraine has still to form a stable party system of the West European type. What reasons can be advanced for this failure?

Three possible theoretical perspectives could be applied to examine the reasons for the weakness of Ukrainian political parties.

On a structuralist perspective, where primary causality is attributed to social forces, and political parties are only dependent variables, the patterning of any party system supposedly reflects the pattern of strategic 'structural cleavages' in society.[11] The UK's traditional two-party system, for example, could be interpreted as reflecting the still all-important if declining central class cleavage in society, the four main camps in Belgian politics the crosscutting socio-economic and linguistic cleavages, and so on.

As throughout the former Soviet Union, however, a post-communist society with well defined 'structural cleavages' has yet to crystallise in Ukraine. The Soviet state prevented groups from organising themselves, or even from communicating with one another and developing a sense of identity. Consequently, it is common to argue that the only significant social division is between a priviligentsia *apparat* and an amorphous 'society as a whole'.[12] Although parties may claim to speak for the interests of particular social groups, as yet they represent only activist networks or circles of friends (Max Weber's 'political clubs'). Hence there is no real pressure from social self-organisation welling up from below to channel the creation of political parties into more well defined blocs.

It might be expected that the process of market reform will encourage the emergence of more clearly defined social groups, capable of organising to promote their own interests, but clearly such a process lies in the future. Before it occurs, parties remain only proto-parties. They function horizontally by providing systems of communication and mutual support for groups of activists, but do not provide vertical linkage between social groups and the state.[13] Instead, parties' projected social bases are determined ideologically. It is unfashionable to invoke narrow working-class interests directly, and few are prepared to speak out openly for the interests of the *nomenklatura* upper stratum. Hence nearly all parties are forced into either the crowded middle ranks of society, speaking for a farmer or entrepreneurial class that has yet to come into existence, or to resort to a vague and general populism.

In addition to the bottom-up structuralist perspective, a top-down analysis emphasising the importance of political institutions and the relative autonomy of political parties as organisations[14] can also be invoked to explain the relative weakness of Ukrainian political parties. Here the key institution is the Ukrainian Supreme Council, and its key feature is the fact that political parties were largely created *after* the semi-democratic elections held in March 1990. The Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) used its then near monopoly on public political activity to prevent many of the

various 'fronts' and opposition movements of the time from putting forward candidates and establishing a presence in parliament. The main opposition movement, Rukh, which had held its first congress in September 1989, and organisations such as the ecologist 'Green World Association' were not formally allowed to stand, although a surrogate 'Democratic Bloc' was allowed to form and won approximately 25% of the seats.

This result did not seriously under-represent opposition strength at the time; rather the point is that Ukrainian deputies were not elected on a party label. Although factions were organised subsequently in the Supreme Council, Ukrainian deputies do not owe their careers to a party machine. Moreover, although the CPU was not allocated the reserved places it had enjoyed in the all-union elections of 1989, many candidates were selected through the old Soviet system of workplace nomination, rather than through a Western European-style system of open nomination in which all social groups can participate.

Since March 1990 the Supreme Council has done little to stimulate the formation and consolidation of political parties from above. As stated earlier, factions have little organisational or ideological cohesion. Deputies may in fact belong to two factions. (That said, two seemingly more purposeful factions were created in September 1992, a Rukh faction of 46, and the 42 belonging to the Congress of National Democratic Forces. New Ukraine had a faction of 52 in summer 1992. For an explanation of these groupings, see below).

Election campaigns have yet to play their traditional role in stimulating party formation. The 1989 and 1990 elections came too early, whereas the referenda of March and December 1991 and the presidential campaigns had a mixed effect. The independence referendum of 1 December 1991 did little to sharpen individual party identities, as every significant political force campaigned for independence, whereas the Union Treaty referendum of 17 March 1991 and the presidential vote on 1 December 1991 produced as many divisions within as between the political parties. The URP was admittedly perhaps an exception, as it strengthened its organisation and public profile in the presidential campaign (and also earned the enmity of its rivals for splitting the opposition vote). New parliamentary elections, due in 1995 but probable in 1994, would of course be different.

A third theoretical perspective might focus on Ukrainian political culture, or rather the lack of it. Post-communist Ukraine is in effect attempting to create a political culture from scratch. Unlike the Baltic or Central and East European states with their, albeit limited, memories of independent political parties and civil society in the inter-war period, Ukraine cannot draw on a rich historical political tradition. The fundamentals of a civil society did develop in Galicia under Habsburg rule before 1918, and Polish rule until 1939, but Galicia contains only 10.4% of the contemporary Ukrainian population.

Political parties did begin to appear in tsarist Ukraine from 1900 but, although able to expand their influence after the 1905 revolution, they could never mobilise the population in significant numbers, proved highly fractious in 1917–20 and were crushed by the imposition of Soviet rule in 1920. The major Ukrainian political organisation of the 20th century was in fact the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists set up in 1929, a terrorist group that is hardly an appropriate example for modern

political conditions. The only domestic political traditions available as opposition activity began to flourish in the *glasnost'* era were those of the tiny dissident circles of the 1960s and 1970s. Such groups by definition, however, had no experience in forming mass political parties.

Nor in general have Ukrainian parties been able to organise around ready-made indigenous ideologies bequeathed from the past. Liberals may occasionally quote Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841–95), the URP the conservative philosopher Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi (1882–1931), and the ultra-rightists the Nietzschean Dmytro Dontsov (1883–1973), but their works are not well known. Even amongst the highly ideologised ultra-right, which tends to revere Dontsov, its more important groups, such as the Ukrainian National Assembly, are clear that they would prefer to formulate their own ideology more in tune with contemporary political conditions.[15] Poets tend to get more space in party publications.

Post-Soviet political culture in general is not free of its birthmarks under the *ancien régime*. The Soviet regime did little to foster the principles of open dialogue, tolerance and acceptance of mutual dependence and compromise on which the creation of broad-based political parties depends. Most Ukrainian parties have extremely low tolerance levels for internal dissent.

Mykhailo Horyn', leader of the URP, has for example complained of 'extreme [neo-] Bolshevik intolerance towards our political opponents, especially when we are trying to work out common strategy'.[16] However, the URP itself purged dissenters on the eve of its 1991 and 1992 congresses; whilst Rukh effectively split at its third congress in February 1992: the Ukrainian Christian Democrats split into *three* factions in 1992; whilst the Social Democrats managed to split at their *founding* congress in 1990, and again after attempts to reunify the party in summer 1992. On the other hand, those parties which have a loose and open structure, such as the Green Party, have been debilitated by internal anarchy.

Open political activity has only been possible in Ukraine since 1990. It will take many years to develop the habits of collective action, accommodation and compromise that are the cement of an effective party system.

That said, it is apparent that five key political blocs are beginning to consolidate in Ukraine, and are likely to form the battlelines for parliamentary elections in 1993 or 1994. A *sixth* bloc, of *regional* parties, is also beginning to appear, but is not considered in this article. The five blocs may be classified as follows:

- Ultra-nationalist;
- National-democratic;
- Liberal-democratic;
- State-bureaucratic;
- Socialist.

The *Ultra-nationalist* bloc is represented by the Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth, the Federation for Ukrainian Statehood and Independence, plus the Ukrainian Nationalist Union and other similar groups united in the Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA). The latter has a paramilitary wing, the Ukrainian National Self-Defence Forces, who have gained notoriety for participating in the fighting in the breakaway

'Dniester republic' and other controversial acts, such as issuing a notorious condemnation of separatism in the Crimea, namely that it should be 'either Ukrainian or depopulated'[17] (the statement was backed up by a rabble-rousing trip to the Crimea in the company of Stepan Khmara in spring 1992).

The maverick radical deputy, Stepan Khmara, who departed from the URP with a group of supporters to form the Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party in June 1992, aspires to the leadership of the ultra-nationalists, but its best organised faction remains the UNA, with which Khmara will need to make some accommodation.

The ultra-right stand for the priority of the interests of the nation, and the building of a strong state and powerful armed forces. They support the notion of a 'nuclear Ukraine within [her] ethnic borders'.[18] If Khmara's desire to make territorial pretensions on Russia is not shared by all in the ultra-nationalist camp, his emphasis on the importance of retaining nuclear weapons certainly is.

The prospects for the creation of an elitist party of the ultra-right, however, are hampered by such parties' lack of a social base apart from the socially marginal elements attracted by their populist, neo-socialist economic rhetoric.[19]

On the other hand, there are good prospects for the creation of an influential conservative/Christian democratic bloc supporting national statehood and private property on the basis of the national-democratic parties and political groupings—Rukh, the Ukrainian Republican Party (URP), and the Democratic Party of Ukraine (DPU). Its main driving force is the URP, which since the presidential elections and the departure of Khmara has tried to transform itself into a 'party of respectable conservatism'.[20]

The URP now seeks to attract more intelligentsia members, in order to become a 'school for the preparation of state cadres', as, in the words of former leader Levko Lukianenko,

> since 24 August [1991, the Declaration of Ukrainian Independence] we have had in Ukraine not an occupation administration, but a Ukrainian state. If before 24 August we were prepared to attack her [the state] from the bunker, now we must raise ourselves up to her level, cooperate with her, and defend her from external enemies and fifth columns.[21]

Consequently the URP has actively supported the institution of presidential prefects in the localities, and has participated in the formation of new local administrations under the prefects, often in competition with Rukh. The URP clearly hopes to become 'the natural party of government'. However, if it is to achieve such an ambition it must sort out the contradictions in its programme between claming to be the party of free enterprise (and therefore low taxes) and the party of strong national defence and social support of the population.[22]

Increasing tensions have become apparent between the URP and Rukh. The triumvirate elected at the third Rukh congress in February 1992 to paper over the divisions between the URP's Mykhailo Horyn', his supporter Ivan Drach, and their opponent Viacheslav Chornovil did not last long. Chornovil's anti-communist populism, in many ways reminscent of Lech Walesa's in Poland, strikes more of a chord with the remaining Rukh rank and file (Chornovil claims a re-registered membership of 60 000) than Horyn' and Drach's hobnobbing with President Kravchuk. Ukraine is of course much less of a homogeneous nation-state than Poland, and it is unlikely that

the anti-communist tide that Chornovil seeks to ride to power will sweep across the whole country as it did for Walesa.

Opinion polls indicate that the national-democrats could expect around 30% in new elections, but the animosities between Chornovil and the pro-Kravchuk wing make it extremely unlikely that a cohesive pre-election bloc could be formed.[23] Rather, the logic of the unfolding divisions between the two points to a split between a conservative party of national statehood based around the pro-president URP and an anti-communist Chornovil-led party similar to Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia, which will be likely to cooperate with the liberal centrists.

Accordingly, on 2 August 1992, the 'presidential' wing of Rukh, the URP, DPU, Union of Ukrainian Students and other smaller organisations formed the Congress of National Democratic Forces (CNDF) on a platform of 'unitary statehood, departure from the CIS, support for national industry and the building of [strong] armed forces'.[24] Two days before Chornovil had formed the rival Congress of Democratic Forces on the basis of 'struggle with the authoritarian tendencies of the pro-communist structures of power'[25] along with a 'Referendum' committee to campaign for the collection of the three million signatures necessary to force early parliamentary elections.

The *liberal-democratic* spectrum is represented primarily by the *Nova Ukraïna* (New Ukraine) organisation, a union of political parties—the Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine (PDRU) (the ex-Democratic Platform of the CPU), the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine and the United Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (SDPU and USDPU), and some sections of the Green Party, along with business structures—the Ukrainian League of Businesses with Foreign Capital, the Confederation of Industrialists of Ukraine and the Union of Cooperative Workers.

The main aim of New Ukraine is 'the creation of appropriate social conditions, and a coalition between politicians, state bureaucrats, businessmen and skilled workers for the introduction of radical reforms and the building of a socially-oriented market economy and a well-developed civil society in Ukraine'.[26] Unlike the URP, Rukh and the national-democrats, New Ukraine does not call for Ukraine's departure from the CIS, and supports the maintenance of good neighbourly relations with Russia.

Arguments within the PDRU between supporters of liberal and social democracy, and between more or less fervent supporters of President Kravchuk have however carried over into New Ukraine. The movement is also handicapped by the preference of its target group of supporters to maintain traditional links with the old economic structures rather than gambling on the uncertain dividends of market economic reform. Moreover, New Ukraine has found itself squeezed between the national-democrats and the national communists, attacked for its anti-patriotic 'pro-Russian stance' and for its forthright opposition to the government for its foot-dragging on questions of economic reform. Its main standard-bearer in government, the pro-Western Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Privatisation and Economic Reform, Volodymyr Lanovyi, was unceremoniously sacked by Kravchuk in July 1992.

Hence New Ukraine's future prospects depend on its creating a loose coalition of political forces rather than a new political party, and on winning the backing of the directors of large state enterprises who have to date sided with Kravchuk's conservative economic approach. If it can overcome such hurdles, opinion polls suggest a

potential support base of 20–24% of the electorate. Once the processes of privatisation and demonopolisation have created appropriate social bases of support, it may then be natural to expect the formation of both a liberal-democratic and a social-democratic party from the ranks of New Ukraine.

The first congress of New Ukraine, held in a sanatorium outside Kiev on 26–28 June 1992, elected People's Deputy and Secretary of the Parliamentary Commission on Human Rights Volodymyr Filenko as the movement's leader. He also leads a parliamentary faction of 52. Other prominent members include Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council and chief spokesman for the Russian-language population in Ukraine Vladimir Griniov, ex-Deputy Prime Minister and sponsor of Ukraine's privatisation reforms Volodymyr Lanovyi, and the head of the legal section of the presidential advisory *Duma* (council), Oleksandr Emets'.

As stated above, opinion polls have indicated more public dissatisfaction with Rukh (– 32% rating), given its longevity since its founding congress in September 1989, than with New Ukraine (– 19%).[27] More people have a negative opinion of Rukh (49%) than of New Ukraine (31%), reflecting the unpopularity of Rukh's nationalism in the industrial regions of eastern and southern Ukraine. More electors are indifferent or as yet undecided towards New Ukraine (57% compared with 34% for Rukh), indicating some potential for growth.

New Ukraine achieves its highest positive ratings amongst target groups such as students (20%), skilled workers (17%) and teachers (13%), its lowest amongst collective farmers (3.5%). Its highest regional ratings are in areas such as Luhans'k in East Ukraine—at 30%. Rukh's traditional support base, now split amongst Chornovil and the CNDF, was in the cultural intelligentsia (20% positive), average workers (21% positive) and throughout the nationalist stronghold of Galicia.[28]

Against this must be set the fact that higher social groups seem to give higher negative ratings in general, and such generally poor levels of support for all political groups reflect the disillusionment with all political activity that is characteristic of all post-communist states living through a pre-marketisation period of falling living standards.

The prospects of the *state-bureaucratic* bloc are the most difficult to analyse. The so-called party of power, the ex-communist *apparat* led by President Kravchuk into support of the national cause, has no real formal party structure. This is natural enough, as it is not in the interests of either the President, the leaders of the military–industrial complex, the heads of the collective farms, or those who work in the government executive to associate themselves with any party. The banning of the CPU has given them a useful anonymity with which to deflect direct public criticism, compared with both the opposition parties and with their communist past.

Of course, the public condemns obvious targets for its current misfortunes. Interestingly, the rating of President Kravchuk, however, compared with that of the government (down 18%) and that of the Supreme Council (down 32%), rose by 10% between January and June 1992 to stand at + 14%. A relatively high 44% of the population supported his policies, in the expectation of social peace and relative stability of life.

Although amongst the liberal opposition the 'party of power' is reviled for its breaking of the process of democratic reform, Kravchuk at least still commands

considerable support amongst a public worried that an 'atomised party system' is too reminiscent of Russia in 1917, Germany in 1933 or Georgia in 1991. The notion of a strong 'apolitical' president has strong appeal to at least half of the population.

The structuralisation of the 'party of power' into a formal political party would, however, have many positive aspects, not least by giving concrete sense to the idea of an 'opposition'. An 'opposition' can scarcely exist without a ruling party or coalition to oppose. Moreover, such a structuralisation will obviously become necessary in the face of the practical demands of the expected parliamentary election campaign.

Lastly, there is the *socialist* bloc, represented by the Socialist Party of Ukraine and its rural counterpart, the Peasants' Party of Ukraine. Both parties stand accused of 'social demagogy' and are treated as pariahs by the rest of the political spectrum. The two parties' simple slogans against price liberalisation, in favour of restored state control, and for 'socially just privatisation' strike a chord amongst those elements of the population, who see market reforms wholly in terms of higher prices. The socialist bloc can expect 10–15% at the forthcoming elections (as in the 1991 elections to the Polish Sejm) but its prospects should not be exaggerated. The majority of the former party-economic *nomenklatura* has not joined its ranks, but has found it more convenient to remain in the non-party 'party of power'.

Overall, Ukraine's 'atomised party system' is clearly developing into a 'system of polarised pluralism' similar to that of the French Fourth Republic of 1946–58.[29] That is, a party system with five main blocs has a 'destructive opposition' on both the extreme left and extreme right (as with the PCF and the Gaullists under the Fourth Republic), with the national-democrats, liberal-democrats and the 'party of power' in the centre. As in France, the prospects for political stability as a whole will depend on the stability of coalitions in the centre. This in turn will depend on how much of the centre is prepared to work together, and on the centre's power to resist encroachment from the flanks.

Paradoxically, strong political parties are only likely to appear in Ukraine as the end result of radical economic reforms and the structuralisation of material interests that the latter will produce, whereas the initiation and fulfilment of such reforms requires the firm political leadership that the parties are not as yet able to provide. However, the experience of many European states in similar situations, such as Germany and Italy in the late 1940s or Fifth Republican France, shows how legal and constitutional measures can help artificially to assist the formation of political parties. Ukraine too is therefore considering such an approach.

First, in June 1992 the Ukrainian Supreme Council passed a law on citizens' associations (*obiednannia hromadian*).[30] The law divides such associations into two categories; political parties, which will have the right directly to nominate candidates in parliamentary elections and the right of legislative initiative, but will not be allowed to participate in commercial economic activities; and civil organisations (*hromads'ki orhanizatsii'*) such as unions, movements and societies (*tovarystva*), which, on the contrary, will be able to engage in commercial activity, but not to nominate candidates directly for election.

Second, the draft law on parliamentary elections drawn up by the Association of

Young Political Scientists and Politicians in association with the corresponding committees of the Supreme Council and the presidential *duma* envisages a mixed, majoritarian-proportional electoral system.[31] One part of the deputy corpus will be elected from single mandate electoral districts and the rest from party lists, where electors will not vote for concrete individuals but for a party or coalition of parties (parties may add non-party candidates to their lists). The number of mandates received would then be proportional to the number of votes received on the lists (as in Germany).

Given the small size and lack of influence of existing parties, it is envisaged that parties or coalitions must not only be registered but also must collect 100 000 signatures of support before they can be added to the general list. (This is likely to be an extremely tough obstacle. A similar provision existed for the 1 December 1991 presidential elections in Ukraine, when only the six candidates backed by the strongest organisations managed to collect the necessary 100 000 signatures. The *apparat* successfully collected for Kravchuk, Rukh for Chornovil, the URP for Lukianenko, the PDRU for Iukhnovs'kyi and Griniov, and the (obscure) Peoples' Party for Taburians'kyi. The candidates of the Greens, the UNA and the DPU all fell short). Candidates for individual districts will require the signatures of 500 electors.

Moreover only those parties receiving more than 3% of effective votes will be allowed representation. Lastly, the requirement that 50% of electors must participate in any given election for it to be effective will be abolished.

Taken together, these measures should go a long way towards assisting the emergence of a more professional Parliament, and one in which, through the power of parties to include or not to include deputies on their lists, parties can be expected to have much more cohesive parliamentary factions, loyal to the party platform. Thereafter, a more stable party system will help to underpin the stability of the political system as a whole. However, it remains to be seen whether the Supreme Council will approve these measures, as most former communist deputies will prefer to be elected as 'non-party' individuals.

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[1] Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*, Vol. 1 (Cambridge, CUP, 1976), pp. 125–128.
[2] Taras Kuzio & Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence* (London, Macmillan, 1993), chapter 7.
[3] Information supplied by the PDRU's Volodymyr Filenko in February 1992.
[4] The URP publishes *Samostiina Ukraïna* with a circulation of 50 000. The UNA's (technically the Ukrainian Nationalist Union) *Zamkova hora* has 10 000 and *Ukraïns'ki obriï* 1000.
[5] *Narodna hazeta*, 28 July 1992.
[6] V. E. Khmel'ko, 'Komu my doviriamo?', *Ukraïns'kyi ohliadach*, 7, 1992.
[7] *Respublika*, 2, 19–25 June 1992.
[8] Ukraïnsk'kyi nezalezhnyi tsentr sotsiolohichnykh doslidzhen', 20–24 September 1991.
[9] *Holos Ukraïny*, 25 September 1992.
[10] *Vechirnii Kyïv*, 9 July 1992.
[11] Sein Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignment* (New York, The Free Press, 1967).
[12] See for example Viacheslav Chornovil, 'Shcho dali?', *Za vil'nu Ukraïnu*, 24 January 1992.
[13] Kay Lawson, *Political Parties and Linkage* (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1980).

[14] See Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organisation and Power* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988) for political parties as *organisations*.

[15] Viktor Mel'nyk, 'OUN: sproba povernennia', *Ukraïns'ki obriï*, 6, 1992.

[16] Speech at the CNDF congress on 2 August 1992, *Samostiina Ukraïna*, 31, August 1992.

[17] *Ukraïnsk'ki obriï*, 8, 1992.

[18] Dmytro Korchyns'kyi, 'Iakoiu maie buty natsionalistychna orhanizatsiia?', *Napriam*, 4, 1991, p. 33.

[19] 'Partiia Khmara—partiia radykaliv?', *Molod' Ukraïny*, 88, 1992.

[20] URP leader Myhailo Horyn' at the press conference after the URP's third congress, 2 May 1992.

[21] Levko Lukianenko, 'URP na suchasnomu etapi', *Samostiina Ukraïna*, 5, January 1992.

[22] 'Natsional'ni demokraty maiut' obiednatysia', *Khreshchatyk*, 65, 1992.

[23] See note 6.

[24] See note 20. The main speeches at the congress, its documents and declarations can be found in *Samostiina Ukraïna*, 31, August 1992.

[25] 'Komitet "Referendum" utvoreno', *Vechirnii Kyiv*, 166, 1992.

[26] 'Nova Ukraïna—shliakh u maibutnie?', *Molod' Ukraïny*, 95, 1992.

[27] See note 6. The research was carried out among 1900 electors over the age of 18 in May–June 1992 by the scientific-practical centre of the Sociological Association of Ukraine together with the research institute of Radio Liberty and the International Research Institute in Social Changes, Nion, Sweden. Margin of error, ±2.6%. 17% expressed support for Rukh, 49% hostility, and 34% indifference; 12% expressed support for New Ukraine, 31% hostility, and 57% indifference.

[28] *Ibid*.

[29] See note 1.

[30] Passed on 16 June, published in *Holos Ukraïny*, 18 July 1992.

[31] Artur Bilous, 'Bahatopartiini vybory: Iakym buty zakony pro nykh?', *Holos Ukraïny*, 45, 1992.