

2 National history and national identity in Ukraine and Belarus

This chapter seeks to examine the relationship between historiography and the nation as an 'imagined community' in Russia's two east Slavic neighbours, Ukraine and Belarus. The focus of the analysis is on the mythic¹ structures of national historiography as a key influence shaping evolving national identities, and on the tug on identities exercised by rival narratives of the past, here classified for convenience's sake as 'Ukrainophile'/'Belarusophile' and 'Russophile' or 'pan-Slavic'.² The former have come to the fore since independence in 1991, but Russophile myths have proved powerful and persistent, particularly in Belarus but also amongst the half of the population of Ukraine that is either ethnic Russian or Russian-speaking (see chapter 6). The historical, or historiographical, component of national identities in the region is therefore in transition. The single narrative of the Soviet era has given way not to monolithic new national alternatives, but to a fluid situation characterised by competing myths and dissonant voices. Whereas a potentially strong, if controversial, historiographical mythology is under construction in Ukraine, a key reason for the relative weakness of the Belarusian national movement to date has been its inability to displace hegemonic Russophile myths and anchor a new Belarusian identity firmly in a rival historiography.³

Russophile historiography, on the other hand, has so far failed to address seriously the fact of Ukrainian and Belarusian independence, and has remained content to recycle the myths of the tsarist and Soviet eras. Although this provides the ideological ammunition for postures of denial, it does not help promote a politics of practical engagement. Moreover, it has granted Ukrainians at least more of an ideological space for 'nation-building' than they enjoyed in 1917–20, and has left the large potential middle ground (largely Russophone Ukrainians) ill equipped to adjust to their new status.

The chapter begins by providing an analytical taxonomy of the key myths that form the building blocks of the rival historiographies. The Ukrainophile and Belarusophile versions of history are then examined in

detail before being compared to the rival Russophile conception.⁴ The chapter concludes with an analysis of the potential comparative strength of the three strands.⁵

The mythic structure of Ukrainophile and Belarosophile historiography

The way a nation describes its origins reveals a lot about its modern-day priorities. The search by nationalist historians for proof of national uniqueness tends to begin with the identification of an ethnic substratum that encapsulates the modern nation in embryonic form. For the Belarussians this is the Krivichian people who dominated what became the north-western marches of the early medieval Kievan state; for the Ukrainians it is the Polianians of the same era. The nation's pre-history is then told as a *myth of ethnogenesis*, which begins a narrative of separate development and myth of national character, serving to liberate both peoples from the myth propagated in the Soviet era that they shared a common origin with the Russians as a single 'old Rus' nation'.⁶

Homeland myths are closely tied up with notions of ethnogenesis. They tend to be of two main types. Either the eponymous group is deemed to have occupied its given national territory since time immemorial, or, if it arrived as a result of migration or land seizure,⁷ then those whom it displaced are depicted as marginal peoples who left no claim on the land they fleetingly occupied. The main task of homeland myths is therefore the fixing of a given bounded territory as the national patrimony, which is always imagined at its greatest supposed historical extent. The subsequent loss of national territory to other groups or polities does not change its eternal status. Thus a 'Greater Ukraine' would include areas such as the Kuban' in the north Caucasus and Lemko Poland, a 'Greater Belaruss' the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius (Vil'nia), Bialystok (Belastok) in Poland and even the Smolensk region in Russia. On the other hand, contrary claims, such as the Russian assertion that Crimea and the Donbas are historically Russian territories, are rejected by seeking to demonstrate the regions' long, unbroken connections with the eponymous nation.

Foundation myths serve to sanctify the national myth of descent by providing a concrete beginning that announces the arrival of the national group on the historical stage. 'Foundation' is normally dated to the first significant polity established on national territory, even if alternative histories have ascribed that polity to an alternative national group or mocked its claims to statehood. For the Ukrainians, their national history therefore formally begins with the foundation of Kievan Rus' in the ninth century AD. For the Belarussians the lack of a resonant starting point is a serious problem. Hence the history of Rus' is rewritten to claim that its

north-western territories were really the autonomous kingdom of Polatskaia-Rus'.

Myths of antiquity and *myths of descent* are another important means of establishing that the eponymous nation is more than just an artificial construct. National history is therefore stretched as far back in time as possible, and discontinuities in national history are bridged by the construction of a continuous narrative through the centuries (or even the millennia). Where necessary, periods, individuals and events that traditionally belonged to other narratives are reclaimed to create *polity myths* that assert the nation's long and continuous tradition of statehood. A rich and fulsome chronology thereby replaces tsarist and Soviet historiography, with its long gaps and silences during which the Ukrainian and Belarusian peoples were deemed not to act as historical subjects at all. Ukrainophile historians fill in the lacunae between the decline of Rus' in the thirteenth century and the Cossack 'revival' four centuries later by arguing that Ukrainian traditions, even statehood, persisted into the Galician and Lithuanian periods. The Belarusians have to make do with hyphenation, reinventing the medieval Lithuanian-Belarusian kingdom as an ersatz Belarusian polity, whose Belarusian essence supposedly survived both dynastic (the Union of Krevo in 1385) and eventual political union with Poland (the Union of Lublin in 1569). Remnants of both Belarusian and Ukrainian statehood supposedly persisted right up to the final annexation of national territory by Russia in the late eighteenth century.

'National revival' in the present is normally predicated on the restoration of past glories. *Myths of a 'Golden Age'* therefore invoke the embodiment of the national genius at its zenith to provide proof that the nation can rise again in the present. The establishment of a 'Golden Age' serves to refute the assertions of detractors that the eponymous nation is somehow lacking in tradition or culture, or is an artificial construct of nationalist ideologues. Ukrainians therefore point to the Kievan and Cossack periods as times when their nation was at a peak of cultural creativity and a leading member of the European concord of states. The Belarusian Golden Age came between the Unions of Krevo and Lublin, when Belarusian language, culture and legal and political traditions held sway over the largest state in eastern Europe.

For Ukrainophiles and Belarusophiles their nations possess a distinct and glorious heritage. *Myths of national character* and *myths of the other* are therefore a vital means of delineating a separate past and providing boundary markers to distinguish the eponymous nation from its neighbours.⁸ The three most common character myths in both Ukrainian and Belarusian historiography are that their nations are democratic, demotic and European. Their democratic character is supposedly exemplified by the tradition of popular assembly and sturdy individualism. Their demotic

nature lies in the manner in which national character was preserved by the local peasantry despite the (often forcible) assimilation of national elites. Finally, it is argued that natural intercourse with (the rest of) Europe was rudely and unnaturally severed by Russian occupation. Both nations therefore see themselves at the dawn of the twenty-first century as *returning* to Europe and to their associated democratic traditions.

These myths also constitute boundary markers to distinguish Ukrainians and Belarusians from Russians, the main traditional 'other', who are portrayed as natural despots and imperialists, with an 'Asian' political culture that is even in crucial respects non-Slavic. Subsidiary stereotyping casts Poles as perfidious aristocratic interlopers, Lithuanians as pagans civilised by the Belarusians and so on. *Myths of aggression* and *exploitation* and *myths of empire* replace the traditional narrative of the 'Great Friendship' of the east Slavic peoples. The Pereiaslav 'reunion' between Russia and Ukraine in 1654 is reinvented as a contract of convenience subsequently betrayed, while Russian attempts to 'liberate' Belarus from the Polish-Lithuanian yoke are painted as a series of bloody wars of aggression. Subsequent relations are characterised via *myths of colonialism* and *myths of suffering* that depict the nation as the hapless victim of systems of imperial rule.

On the other hand, *myths of national resistance* and *myths of revival* are designed to prove that the nation retained its character under occupation, and demonstrate its existential urge towards freedom from foreign rule. The achievement of statehood in 1991 is therefore legitimated by presenting it as the result of a long, arduous and heroic period of struggle, rather than historical accident or the self-interested manoeuvrings of politicians. National history under foreign 'occupation' is reinterpreted retrospectively as a teleological struggle towards inevitable national revival, and different narratives obscured or occluded. For the Belarusians (and the Lithuanians) the great Polish national hero Adam Mickiewicz was actually a fighter for Belarusian (or Lithuanian) national rights. For Ukrainians, Gogol was a true patriot, despite the fact that he wrote in Russian. Moreover, national revival is always the restoration of the Golden Age and the reaffirmation of the national character, the 'rediscovery' of submerged tradition rather than the invention of national intellectuals. Independence in 1991 was the natural culmination of these processes.

Pan-Slavic or Russophile myths

However, local nationalist narratives are far from being the only historical discourse available. National identities are not necessarily *tabulae rasae*

awaiting the imprint of new national myth-making; in both Ukraine and Belarus the *myths of the tsarist and Soviet eras* persist and enjoy deep-rooted popularity. Furthermore, they are not just external in origin – that is, the product of the ideologues of a potentially revanchist Russian state – but are also the work of historians and publicists in Ukraine and Belarus themselves. In particular there is considerable resistance to attempts to disentangle Ukrainian and Belarusian history from that of Russia and to depict Russia exclusively as the imperial ‘other’.

Pan-Slavic or Russophile historiography has its own mythic structure. First and foremost is the persistent *myth of the common origin* of the three east Slavic peoples, reinforced by *myths of separation* that claim that their divergence between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries was solely the result of artificial political divisions and, in any case, was only skin-deep. Second therefore are *myths of reunion* in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, alongside *myths of common Orthodoxy* and the consequent existence of a community of fate as the main inspiration for reunion. It is denied that only ‘empire’ brought the three peoples together.

The Ukrainian and Belarusian national revivals of the nineteenth century are explained away via *myths of foreign intrigue*. The true ‘other’ for all the east Slavs is depicted in myths of the Tatar, Polish, German/Habsburg or papal threat, and *myths of common endeavour* are built around the joint resistance of all three peoples to such outside dangers. The final myth is the idea that whatever statehood Belarusians and Ukrainians now enjoy is in fact a product of their joint labours in the Soviet period.

The above short outline demonstrates the potential for wholesale contradiction between rival versions of east Slavic history. The analysis now turns to a detailed examination of the alternative mythologies, starting with the Ukrainophile/Belarusophile dimension.

The local version of Ukrainian and Belarusian history

National history has a much longer pedigree in Ukraine than in Belarus. In Belarus, despite limited work by a handful of predecessors,⁹ the first truly ‘national’ historians were Vatslaŭ Lastoŭski (1883–1938) and Usevalad Ihnatoŭski (1881–1931),¹⁰ although even Ihnatoŭski has been criticised for his Marxist-influenced approach and for his failure to carry the narrative of separate Belarusian development past the Union of Lublin in 1569 (see p. 35, n. 76). Moreover, after a brief flowering in the 1920s, the ‘national’ historiographical school was suppressed with much greater thoroughness than its equivalent in Ukraine.¹¹ Ihnatoŭski was therefore unable to establish a canon of national historiography in the

manner of Franciszek Palacký in the Czech lands or Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi in Ukraine (see below).

The roots of Ukrainian national historiography, on the other hand, go back at least to the Cossack chroniclers of the eighteenth century, such as Samiilo Velychko (1670–1728) and Hryhorii Hrab'ianka (1670?–1738).¹² However, early historians such as Mykola Kostomarov (1817–85) were still influenced by theories of the common origins and joint development of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples.¹³ It was left to Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi (1866–1934)¹⁴ to establish a complete schema of Ukrainian ethnohistory, which was developed and refined by his disciples in the Soviet 1920s, in western Ukraine between the wars and in the Ukrainian emigration. The 'Hrushevs'kyi school' has been the single most powerful influence on modern Ukrainian historiography, although certain emphases and aspects have been added in the 1990s.

On the other hand, the historical bifurcation of Ukrainian culture between Ukrainophones and Russophones (see chapter 6) has been a factor preventing the Ukrainophile schema from becoming hegemonic. Whereas historiography in Belarus is polarised between Belarusophiles and Russophiles, in Ukraine there are many historians and archaeologists who have attempted to combine moderate Ukrainian patriotism with elements of traditional Russophile historiography, and indeed those from all points of the spectrum who have attacked the tendency of nationalism to displace scientific method.¹⁵

Myths of origin: Ukraine

The key premise of the Ukrainophile myth of origin is that 'the Ukrainian people are autochthonous (aboriginal) on their native land. This means that they have lived on the very same territory [the lands of the middle Dnieper] since the beginning of their existence.'¹⁶ Whereas Hrushevs'kyi tended to begin his narrative of Ukrainian 'ethnogenesis' with the main precursor of the Polianians – the Antes tribal federation of the fourth to seventh centuries AD – many modern Ukrainian archaeologists and historians have gone back much further into the pre-Christian era (ironically the Ukrainians have been able to take over earlier tsarist/Soviet myths of the autochthonous origin of the local Slavs),¹⁷ arguing that the Ukrainian ethnos developed through the mixture of early proto-Slavic and a succession of Iranian and Ural-Altai (mainly Turkic) elements.

Ukrainian civilisation is therefore deemed to be one of the oldest in the world. Some historians have even made the hyperbolic claim that the lost Arcadian "Golden Age" [or "second Babylon"] described by the ancient Greeks most probably was neither in Egypt nor in muddy Mesopotamia,

but on the territory of Ukraine', thanks to 'its warm climate, fertile black earth, flat fecund steppe, the clean waters of its rivers and its masses of wild animals'.¹⁸ The first group deemed to have created a more or less settled society to take advantage of these natural riches was the neolithic Trypol'ean (in Ukrainian Trypillian) pottery culture which existed from around 4000 BC to approximately 2700 BC. As well as being the first true 'substratum of the Ukrainian people, which provided the basis for our national worldview', the Trypillian culture is held to have been 'the most developed civilisation [of the time], not only in Europe but in the whole world', whose achievements included the first domestication of the horse.¹⁹ It has even been claimed that an early Trypillian state, 'Arrata', existed on the middle Dnieper,²⁰ and that it served as the cradle of all subsequent Indo-European civilisation. Ukraine, then as warm as 'today's Africa', was 'the original Indo-European home', and 'Kiev the oldest city of the people of the White race [sic]'.²¹ Much of the canon of classical (Greek) mythology was allegedly derived from the Trypillian store of myths and legends.²²

As Trypillian culture was not literate, however, most of this is pure speculation, based on the methodologically dubious discipline of 'cultural-historical archaeology', that is, the practice of imputing ethnic and/or linguistic identities from the 'evidence' of pottery or grave sites.²³ In the absence of proper written records there has been little to restrain such flights of fancy.

The Trypillian culture eventually declined, but Ukrainophiles claim that its traditions were preserved amongst the local population, who re-emerged as first the little-known Cimmerians (? to 700 BC), and then the Scythians (750 to 250 BC). Contrary to the claims of other historians,²⁴ it is argued that only one part of the polyethnic Scythian mix were Iranian migrants from the east; most were the direct descendants of the Trypillians and therefore 'proto-Slavs'.²⁵ Once again, it is claimed that the Scythians, 'our ancestors', established 'the most cultured country in Europe' of the time.²⁶

Natural limits to this ethnic melting pot were provided 'from the Belarusians by the Pryp'iat' marshes, and from Russian terrain by massive forests';²⁷ a decisive pattern of separate local development was therefore already set. When the Scythians were succeeded in turn by the Sarmatians (second century BC to second century AD),²⁸ this was once again a case of renaming and re-emergence rather than wholesale replacement (although again with an Iranian influx), as was the emergence of the Antes federation in the fourth century AD. The Antes federation is described (following Hrushevs'kyi) as the first true 'eastern Slav political union', even 'the first Ukrainian state', 'upon whose ruins' Kievan Rus'

eventually arose in the ninth century.²⁹ The final link in the chain is the direct successors of the Antes, the Polianians (*poliany*), who were to play 'the leading role in establishing the old Rus' state'.³⁰

The Ukrainophile myth of origin therefore claims a long and continuous path of indigenous development over several thousand years. Some have even asserted that 'the Scythians–Ukrainians are the oldest nation in Europe, and possibly in the world'.³¹ In addition, it is argued that 'since ancient times each new wave of migrants, traders and other displaced peoples on Ukrainian territory has somehow merged into the stream of previous cultures . . . providing their own elements' to the Ukrainian character, but never displacing that which came before.³² Alternative theories of Gothic influence in the region are emphatically rejected.

Myths of origin: Belarus

For Belarusophiles there is a similar need to disentangle a myth of national ethnogenesis from Russophile historiography in order to provide a separate starting point for their myth of national descent. In essence the Belarusophile myth of origin is a variant of the 'substratum' theory shared with most Ukrainophiles,³³ according to which different groups of Slavic tribes mingled with local non-Slavic elements to create the basic ethnic characteristics of the three east Slavic peoples. In the same way as the Iranian admixture created Ukrainians and Finno-Ugric blood the Russians, the 'symbiosis of Slavic and Baltic cultures became in turn the basis for the formation of Belarusian culture'.³⁴ Belarusians have consequently always had one foot in the Western world. (In the 1920s Lastoŭski and others even argued that Dacian and Getic elements formed part of the Belarusian ethnic substratum.)³⁵

In contrast to the traditional Russophile view, Belarusophiles therefore claim that the various tribes that made up the east Slavic world of the second half of the first millennium were already highly differentiated. The main proto-Belarusian tribe, the equivalent to the Polianians for the Ukrainians, was the Krivichians (*kryvichy*), along with the Drehovichians (*dryhavichy*) and Radmichians (*radzimichy*). Archaeological studies and the evidence provided by local toponyms and hydronyms demonstrate that their culture, although kindred to that of neighbouring tribes, was nevertheless unique.³⁶

Foundation myths: Ukraine

For both Ukrainophiles and Belarusophiles, national history proper begins with Kievan Rus'. However, while Ukrainians have sought to

invert traditional Russian historiography by claiming the entire tradition of Rus' as their own, Belarusians have challenged the conception of Rus' as a centralised state and argued that the north-western territories inhabited by the Krivichians were autonomous and in a more or less constant state of warfare with Kiev. Both, however, seek to refute the myth prevalent in tsarist and Soviet times that all three east Slavic peoples were originally one (the different versions of this myth are examined in greater detail in the section on Russophile historiography below, p. 43).³⁷

The Ukrainophile claim is that, in the words of the 1991 declaration of Ukrainian independence, the Ukrainians have a 'thousand-year tradition of state-building', beginning in the ninth century AD.³⁸ As in Russophile historiography, the 'Normanist theory' that Rus' was in fact established by Viking envoys, is rejected as a German invention.³⁹ However, it is further argued that the ancestors of modern-day Ukrainians played a dominant and the ancestors of contemporary Russians a marginal role in the foundation and governance of Rus'.⁴⁰ Rus' was founded by the Polianians and therefore embodied the local cultural traditions in development since Trypillian times.⁴¹

The culture, religion and spoken language of Rus' were all therefore in essence proto-Ukrainian. Following the theory first developed by Mykhailo Maksymovych in the nineteenth century, many Ukrainian nationalists argue that the original east Slavic (proto-) language had already split into three branches by the middle of the first millennium AD (most historians would date linguistic differentiation no earlier than the fourteenth or fifteenth century),⁴² and that 'proto-Ukrainian' existed as a language even before the monks Cyril and Methodius introduced their alphabet in 863 AD. Although 'Church Slavonic or Old Bulgarian' were used for literary and ecclesiastical purposes, supposedly 'the basic conversational language of the people who lived from Transcarpathia to the Don and from the Pryp'iat' [marshes] to the Black Sea steppe was Ukrainian', albeit not 'of course the Ukrainian of today' but still fundamentally recognisable as the same tongue.⁴³

As regards the Russians, some Ukrainians have even suggested that they are not true Slavs at all, but linguistically adapted Ugro-Finns.⁴⁴ Alternatively, it is argued that the formation of a separate Russian nation began only after the northern regions lost cultural contact with Kiev in the thirteenth century,⁴⁵ when the north-eastern inhabitants 'went native' amongst the local population until Kiev reacquainted them with its traditions in the seventeenth century. Above all, the idea that there was a single 'Old Rus'' nationality is decisively rejected.⁴⁶ 'We' and 'they' already existed and were often in conflict, as when Andrei Bogoliubskii's northern armies sacked Kiev in 1169.

The idea of Rus' as a (proto-) Ukrainian state is not, however, uncontested. Some of Ukraine's most distinguished scholars have continued to emphasise the multiethnic, or anational, character of Rus' history and culture,⁴⁷ and have argued that 'it [would be] premature to speak of Ukrainians, Russians or Belarusians in the ninth to thirteenth century', and 'scientifically incorrect to attempt to "present" the Old Rus' heritage to only one of these modern peoples'.⁴⁸ Viewed in such a light, Kievan Rus' could serve as a model exemplar for a modern-day multiethnic Ukrainian society and broaden the mythological foundations of the state. The narrower ethnographic conception, however, appears to be winning ground.

Foundation myths: Belarus

For Belarusian nationalists, just as the Polianians founded Kiev, so the Krivichians founded the city, later principality, of Polatsk. Moreover, the north-western territories of Rus' that were under the control of Polatsk were 'not dependent, either politically or economically, either on Novgorod or on Kiev'.⁴⁹ There was not one single Rus' therefore, but several. Belarusophiles like to refer to what they term 'Polatskaia-Rus'' as 'a completely independent old-Belarusian state, with all the corresponding attributes – a sovereign ruler and assembly [*kniaz' i vecha*], administration, capital, armed forces, monetary system, etc.'. ⁵⁰ It is even argued that Polatsk was founded before Kiev, and that elements of Belarusian statehood existed as early as the sixth century AD.⁵¹ A separate 'eparchy' of the Kievan Church was supposedly established at Polatsk in 922 AD.⁵²

Polatskaia-Rus' flourished under the dynasty established by Prince Rahvalod, especially Usiaslaŭ (1044–1101), and reached its apogee as a centre of culture and learning under the patronage of St Euphrosyne/Eŭfrasinnia (1104–73).⁵³ During this 'Golden Age', the territories under Polatsk's control reached as far as modern Poland and the upper Volga. Only during the reign of Volodymyr the Great (980–1015) were Polatsk and Kiev under the same single authority; at other times, as in 1127–9, the two were at war.

Myths of descent: Ukraine

It is important that a national history should be continuous. 'Statehood' is therefore found where previously it was held to be missing, and myths of institutional, societal or cultural continuity are used to link together otherwise disparate links in the national chain of descent.⁵⁴ The 'claim to

statehood' (in Ukrainian *derzhavnist'*, in Belarusian *dziarzhavnasts'*) became a particularly strong theme after independence in 1991, as, in comparison to nineteenth-century populist historians, the main task was to legitimate political institutions inherited from the Soviet era rather than to identify the national character of a stateless people in the under-culture of the *narod*.

The task is easier for Ukrainophiles. If Kievan Rus' is included, the period after 1990–1 is routinely described as Ukraine's *fourth* period of statehood,⁵⁵ after the Cossack Hetmanate of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the Ukrainian People's Republic of 1917–20. Historians merely have to plug the gaps in between. For Belarusophiles, however, statehood has to be reclaimed from different historiographical traditions (the Belarusian People's Republic of 1918 is difficult to depict as a real state).

According to Ukrainophiles, the effect of the Tatar incursion in the thirteenth century has been exaggerated by Russian historians seeking to claim that nothing of significance survived in the Kievan territories after 1240, and that the traditions of Rus' were forced to transfer to the north.⁵⁶ On the contrary, it now tends to be argued that Ukrainian society and Ukrainian institutions survived largely unscathed after 1240. In the west the 'centre of [Ukrainian] statehood passed to' the Kingdom of Galicia-Volhynia, which flourished until the 1340s.⁵⁷ Further to the east, the territories around Kiev enjoyed virtually complete autonomy under Lithuanian rule from the fourteenth century until the Union of Lublin in 1569. According to one account,

the Grand Principality of Lithuania was a polyethnic state. The Lithuanians' main priority was that the ruling Gediminas dynasty should come from the Lithuanian feudal order. In the other spheres of state and social life Ukrainians and Belarusians were equal with Lithuanians (the feudal classes as a semi-sovereign state, the Orthodox clergy, military retinues and so on). The languages of government, the courts and education were old Belarusian and old Ukrainian. All this provides the basis to consider the Grand Principality of Lithuania as a form of Ukrainian statehood which was lost [only] as a consequence of the Union of Lublin in 1569.⁵⁸

This in turn makes it easier to claim the Cossack period was a direct revival of the traditions of Rus', rather than a phenomenon unique to the seventeenth century.⁵⁹

The Cossack era is therefore the crucial link in Ukrainian historical mythology. Three myths stand out in particular. First, the Cossack rebellion led by Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi in 1648 is depicted as an ethnic Ukrainian 'war of liberation', rather than a mere *jacquerie*.⁶⁰ Secondly, it is argued that the 'Hetmanate' established by Khmel'nyts'kyi was in fact

a Ukrainian 'state', rather than merely the semi-autonomous military encampment of the Cossack army, the Zaporozhian Host (despite the views of some Ukrainian historians such as Panteleimon Kulish and Volodymyr Antonovych, who criticised the Cossacks for their inattention to 'state-building').⁶¹ Thirdly, elements of that statehood supposedly persisted until the late eighteenth century,⁶² leaving a relatively short gap before national revival in the nineteenth century culminated in the establishment of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) and West Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR) in 1917–18.

The UNR, in turn, has assumed increasing importance in the post-Soviet period. Unlike the Baltic states, modern Ukraine does not claim legal descent from its post-revolutionary 'predecessor',⁶³ but the state symbols, hymn and currency of the UNR (themselves supposedly descending from the Kievan and Cossack periods) have all been appropriated to underpin the legitimacy of the modern state. In the historiography of the period, the UNR and ZUNR are idealised and their internal problems (and failure to co-operate) downplayed. Other events unfolding on Ukrainian territory after the 1917 revolution are less prominent in the analysis, and local support for the Bolsheviks is minimised.⁶⁴ Once such cross-currents are pushed to the margins, it can be asserted that 'what we are used to calling a civil war in Ukraine in 1917–20 was in fact a Russian–Ukrainian war – an imperialist [war of] conquest on the part of Russia, a [war of] liberation on the part of Ukraine',⁶⁵ and that the eventual collapse of the UNR in 1920 was due to 'Russian chauvinist Bolshevism unleashing a war of conquest against the young Ukrainian state',⁶⁶ rather than the inherent weaknesses of the Ukrainian national movement. The drama of 'us' (Ukraine) against 'them' (Russia) is therefore replayed.

Even the autocrat Pavlo Skoropads'kyi, who temporarily usurped power from the UNR in 1918 and eventually sought refederation with Russia, is described as earning 'himself a separate page in the history of the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people in the twentieth century' through his support for the development of Ukrainian education and culture.⁶⁷

Myths of descent: Belarus

Belarusophiles divide national history into four key periods: Polatskaia-Rus' from the ninth to the thirteenth centuries; a Lithuanian-Belarusian period from the reign of Mendaũh (Mindaugas) to the Union of Lublin in 1569; a Polish-Belarusian period from 1569 to 1795; and the

Russian/Soviet period from 1795 to 1991.⁶⁸ They argue that continuity of Belarusian quasi-statehood was maintained throughout the first three periods, and was only finally extinguished in the 1790s. The 1994 constitution of Belarus therefore referred proudly to the 'centuries-long tradition of the development of Belarusian statehood'.⁶⁹

The rudiments of statehood bequeathed by Polatskaia-Rus' were supposedly relatively well preserved after the Tatar onslaught of the thirteenth century, as the north-western territories of Rus' were the only ones to escape occupation. Many Belarusophiles argue that this is the origin of the prefix to their proper name: Bela-rus' or White Rus', meaning pure or unoccupied.⁷⁰ The key role in establishing the early Lithuanian kingdom in 1316–85 was played by the principalities of Polatsk and Novaharadok, not by ethnic Lithuanians.⁷¹

Supposedly, therefore, 'Belarusian was the state language of the Lithuanian Kingdom, because the Belarusian ethnic element dominated the political, economic and cultural life of the Kingdom, and our [Belarusian] lands were the basis of its greatness.'⁷² The name for the inhabitants of the state (*litviny*) referred at that time to the Slavic Belarusians, not to the Lithuanians, who were known as *zhamoity* (*zhmudziny*).⁷³

The Union of Krevo in 1385 which formed a dynastic union (only) between the Lithuanian-Belarusian and Polish kingdoms did not materially change the situation, as it was primarily a defensive measure designed to resist the pressure of the Teutonic Knights,⁷⁴ gloriously defeated by an international army depicted as under Belarusian leadership at the Battle of Grunwald in 1410.⁷⁵ Only with the (political) Union of Lublin in 1569 did Belarus begin to experience serious Polonising pressure, although even then elements of Belarusian independence persisted right up until final incorporation into the Russian Empire in 1793–5.⁷⁶ The Belarusian writer Maksim Bahdanovich was therefore able to claim in 1914 that Belarusian language and culture had remained fundamentally unchanged from the earliest times to the beginnings of forcible Russification in the 1840s.⁷⁷

Belarusophiles have also attempted to play up the importance of the Belarusian People's Republic (BNR) established in 1918, portraying it, like the UNR in Ukraine, as a manifestation of the popular will towards national self-determination.⁷⁸ However, its existence was brief and the influence of German occupying forces more manifest than is the case of the UNR. Emphasis is therefore also placed on the 1920 'Slutsk rebellion' of Belarusian forces against the Red Army in order to promote the myth of forcible (re)incorporation into the Russian sphere.⁷⁹

Homeland myths: Ukraine

Nationalist historiographies tend to develop myths of irrevocable association between a people and a particular territory, 'a rightful possession from one's forefathers through the generations'.⁸⁰ The states of post-communist eastern Europe, however, tend to have newly established boundaries, few of which neatly coincide with the territorial limits of nations as 'imagined communities'. The local nationalist vision of the Ukrainian and Belarusian 'homeland' is therefore both expansive, in so far as its definition of the national patrimony includes territory now occupied by other states (including each other), and defensive, as the national homeland must be protected from the claims made by rival nationalisms.

In the Ukrainian case, the current borders of the state do not coincide with any previous incarnation of Ukraine. The claim to long-standing occupation of particular territories therefore ranges far and wide, especially with reference to what is now southern and eastern Ukraine. Some Ukrainophiles go as far back as the Scythian and Sarmatian periods, as their centre of gravity lay more in the open steppe than in the lands around the middle Dnieper.⁸¹ Most accounts, however, begin with Kievan Rus', whose western borders are deemed to have included Transcarpathia, Bukovyna and TransDniester and reached as far as the regions of Peremyshyl and Cherven (now in Poland and Slovakia respectively).⁸² In the south-west the Galician kingdom is depicted as controlling the region around Bessarabia. In the south-east, it is argued that Rus' succeeded in dominating the steppe, establishing mini-states in the eastern Crimea (on the basis of the earlier Bosphoran kingdom) and at Tmutorokan' in the Kuban' after the defeat of the Khazars. The latter supposedly lasted from 965 to 1117 AD.⁸³

However, the key period for establishing a Ukrainian presence in the steppe and Crimea is the Cossack era. In the south-east it is argued that two waves of Cossack settlement to the east (Kharkiv or Slobids'ka Ukraine) and south-east (the Don basin) established a Ukrainian presence *before* the rival wave of Russian colonisation from the north, and in much greater numbers.⁸⁴ In the south, Ukrainophiles stress the role of Kiev in helping to establish the Crimean Tatar state in the fifteenth century, and the importance of subsequent links between the Cossacks and Tatars.⁸⁵ The Ukrainian orientalist Ahatanhel Kryms'kyi even argued in the 1920s that the Ukrainians/Slavs played a vital role in establishing and running the Ottoman Empire.⁸⁶ The Russophile myth that Slavic settlement of both regions began only after Russia's defeat of the Crimean Tatars and Ottoman Turks in the late eighteenth century is therefore rejected.⁸⁷

Homeland myths: Belarus

As in Ukraine, Belarusian nationalists have relied on a mixture of history and ethnography to construct their image of homeland, which, like that of Ukrainian nationalists, is not contained by the current borders of the state.⁸⁸ In the East, it is pointed out that the state borders of 'Lithuania-Belarus' extended east of Smolensk, which was only definitively lost to Russia in 1667.⁸⁹ Belarus' natural ethnographic borders therefore reach to within 200 miles of Moscow. In the West, it is stressed that Vil'nia (Vilnius) was established as the state capital of the *litviny* in the fourteenth century when it was already an ethnically 'Belarusian city'.⁹⁰ In the Belarusian case, the shrinkage of national territory in the present is therefore felt more acutely than in Ukraine, where the shoring up of the national territorial imagination is mainly a defensive task.

Significantly, Belarusian and Ukrainian historians even have conflicting histories of their mutual borderlands. Belarusian nationalists claim that much of the population of north-west Ukraine are in fact denationalised Belarusians who were once part of the medieval 'Lithuanian-Belarusian' state. Ukrainian nationalists, on the other hand, press the counterclaim that the population of areas such as Brest in south-west Belarus are denationalised Ukrainians, as reflected by the decision of the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to grant the area to Ukraine.⁹¹

Myths of national character and myths of the 'other': Ukraine

In terms of their main singular 'other', Ukrainophiles and Belarusophiles share a similar view of Russia (although subsidiary stereotyping exists for Poles, Jews, Lithuanians, etc.). Common themes are that Ukraine and Belarus are by nature 'European' civilisations, the last frontier against 'Asiatic' Russia (as with Poland and Russia, or Germany and Poland, civilisation is deemed to finish at the state's eastern border). Moreover, Russia is characterised as an inherently despotic and expansionist imperial state, in contrast to the strong democratic (and demotic) traditions long nurtured in Ukraine and Belarus. Muscovy/Russia has therefore been forced to use Belarus and Ukraine as a 'bridge to Europe'.

While Rus' was an integral part of European concord of states, and Ukrainian and Belarusian lands in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were open to influence from both the Catholic and later the Protestant worlds, Moscow's contact with Europe proper was limited until the seventeenth century.⁹² The 'Tatar Yoke' therefore served only to widen a cultural gap that was already in existence. Supposedly, 'before its union with Russia, Ukraine was already a European state' with 'a level of

development of literature, music and architecture' far in advance of Moscow, where 'more than half of even the members of the Boyars' Duma were illiterate'.⁹³ The 'Europeanness' of Ukraine and Belarus was reinforced by their long struggle with the East, whereas Moscow was forced to ape its invaders. The idea is often expressed that the rest of Europe owes a common debt to Ukraine and Belarus for their long and spirited defence of 'Christian civilisation',⁹⁴ during the Cossack period in particular.⁹⁵

The democratic cultures of both Ukraine and Belarus were supposedly demonstrated by the practice of Magdeburg Law, and their more limited experience of serfdom, which had to be 'reimposed' after Russian conquest.⁹⁶ Both nations also had traditions of popular assembly and limited government that were supposedly alien to Moscow. For the Ukrainians the self-government practised by the Cossacks exemplified the individualistic Ukrainian national character, marking them off from the aristocratic Poles and collectivist Russians.⁹⁷ The 1710 Cossack constitution of Hetman Pylyp Orlyk is claimed to have been 'the first European constitution in the modern sense of the term', providing a model blueprint for popular democracy well before the American and French Revolutions.⁹⁸

In the religious sphere, Ukrainian nationalists claim that during the six '[eleventh to seventeenth] centuries when the Kievan Metropolitanate was in practice autonomous from Constantinople' a complete 'national style' of Orthodoxy was developed, with Ukraine having its own rituals, mode of administration and style of art, architecture and music, as well as a 'greater tolerance of other believers'.⁹⁹ Moreover, the gap supposedly widened still further after the fifteenth century. Moscow regarded Constantinople itself as apostate after the temporary reunion with Rome in 1439 (the Union of Florence) and clung to an idealised version of original Orthodoxy by unilaterally establishing its own Metropolitanate in 1448,¹⁰⁰ while it has been claimed that most Ukrainians initially accepted the terms of the Union, or were at least unopposed.¹⁰¹ With Constantinople's authority in decline after its occupation by the Ottomans in 1453, the Ukrainians were increasingly open to Renaissance, Reformation and Counter-Reformation influences, producing a 'Golden Age' of Ukrainian Orthodoxy in the seventeenth century, in sharp contrast to the *raskol* in Russia provoked by Patriarch Nikon's reforms.¹⁰²

Although the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was suppressed in 1686, it was revived in 1921–30, 1941–4 and 1990. Ukrainophiles have attempted to 're-Ukrainianise' the Church and restore pre-1686 traditions, but have largely been stalled since the election of Leonid Kuchma as president in 1994, with both hierarchs and faithful divided between supporters of the rival 'Kiev' and 'Moscow' Patriarchies.

Since the Union of Brest in 1596, Ukraine has had a second national Church, the Uniate or Greek Catholic Church.¹⁰³ Historically, the Church has been based in western Ukraine, where nationalists have credited it with preserving national identity under the difficult conditions of first Polish, then Habsburg, next Polish again and finally Soviet rule.¹⁰⁴ However, it is also true that Uniate and Orthodox have frequently been in conflict and that the division between the two creates an awkward fissure in Ukrainian national identity. Tentative attempts at reconciliation between the two Churches have come to naught. Significantly therefore, some nationalists have harked back to the ecumenical unity of the era before 1596,¹⁰⁵ or even flirted with a Ukrainian 'neo-paganism', which glorifies the period before Christianisation in 988 AD as a time when all 'Ukrainians' were spiritually united and Ukrainian culture already highly developed.¹⁰⁶

Myths of national character and myths of the 'other': Belarus

Many of the same points are made about Belarusian national character.¹⁰⁷ Because Belarusian lands escaped Moscow's '240 years under the Golden Horde', native traditions such as the *veche* (assembly), 'the [key] institution of medieval democracy', were able to survive, while 'an Asiatic despotism was established in the Muscovite state'.¹⁰⁸ In contrast to Russophile historians' depiction of Russia's western wars in the three centuries before 1795 as wars to liberate the Orthodox from Catholic oppression, Belarusophile historians have argued that they were in fact wars against the Belarusian people, defending their traditional liberties against the alien Muscovite autocracy. The Union of Lublin in 1569, far from being a 'Polish plot', was therefore essentially a defensive measure against Russian pressure during the Livonian Wars (1558–83), to which the Belarusians happily agreed.¹⁰⁹

Furthermore, Belarusian nationalists argue that Russians and Belarusians, not Russians and Poles, were the main combatants in the wars of this period. During the war of 1512–22 some 30,000 Belarusians supposedly routed 80,000 Muscovites at the Battle of Arsha (Orsha) in 1514, putting 30,000 to 40,000 to the sword. At the battle of Ulla in 1564 Ivan IV was defeated, losing 30,000 men to the Belarusians' 10,000,¹¹⁰ as revenge for the bloody massacre of Polatsk in 1563. On the other hand, it is estimated that during the 'Commonwealth' war of 1654–67 some 53 per cent of the population of Belarus perished (numbers fell from 2.9 million to 1.35 million).¹¹¹

Some Belarusophile historians stress the struggle to preserve local religious traditions in the face of the Moscow Patriarchy's claim to a monopoly inheritance on the Church of Rus' (Protestant influences were also

strong during the Reformation), but in essence the claim to a religious difference between Russians and Belarusians rests on the assertion that most Belarusians adopted the Uniate Catholic faith after the Union of Brest in 1596. Supposedly, '80 per cent of the rural population' were still Uniate in the 1790s and remained so until the Church was forcibly dissolved in 1839.¹¹² However, the desire to maintain Catholic traditions led many Belarusians to assimilate to the Polish nationality in the nineteenth century, and the Uniate Church was extirpated much more thoroughly in Belarus than in Ukraine.

Myths of empire and colonialism

'Empire' and 'colony' are not absolute givens. They are socially constructed concepts whose application to any given context is a matter of social choice.¹¹³ While Ukrainophiles and Belarusophiles have therefore freely characterised the Romanov and Soviet polities as 'empires',¹¹⁴ this claim has been vociferously denied by Russophiles (see below, p. 46). The former have also claimed that it was only the experience of empire that led to a forcible diminution of the cultural gap between Ukrainians, Belarusians and Russians, whereas Russophiles assert that it was cultural closeness that brought them together in the first place.

For Ukrainophiles and Belarusophiles, 'empire' is therefore characterised by *myths of oppression* and forcible 'Russification'. The experience of 'empire', because it led to the abolition of institutions, the assimilation of elites and the suppression of all markers of separate identity, is used to explain the weakness of national identity in the present. National Churches were forcibly dissolved and languages either banned outright or damaged in purity (see also chapter 8 on the Georgian language).¹¹⁵ Physical losses are also stressed and characterised as 'ethnocide', as with the upwards of seven million who died in the 1932–3 Great Famine in Ukraine,¹¹⁶ and the victims of Stalin's repressions in Ukraine and Belarus.¹¹⁷ Economic exploitation is also a standard theme, with both nations being characterised as 'internal colonies' of first the Romanov state and then the USSR.¹¹⁸ Lastly, the 'empire' tends to be characterised as ethnic, a specifically 'Russian' dominion rather than a Romanov *Hausmacht* or an ideology in power, providing a means of characterising Russian behaviour in the present as merely repeating the patterns of the past.

Myths of resistance and revival: Ukraine

The other side of the depiction of the 'imperial' experience is the assumption that oppression and the continuing gap between the cultures of the

metropole and the 'colony' bred strategies of resistance rather than assimilation. As in most nationalist mythologies, heroes and martyrs, and the depiction of the strivings of the nation towards eventual redemption, tend to play a prominent place in the Ukrainophile and Belarushophile schema.

Ukrainophile historiography, in contrast to the 'Little Russian' stereotype of voluntary Ukrainian absorption into the Russian cultural sphere, tends to portray the entire period since 1654 teleologically as one long defensive struggle (*rukh oporu*) for national liberation.¹¹⁹ 'Resistance' (*opir*) can be found in every age, from the struggle of eighteenth-century hetmans such as Ivan Mazepa and Pavlo Polubotok to uphold the rights granted to Ukraine by the Pereiaslav Treaty (Mazepa was traditionally demonised in Russian historiography for siding with Charles XII of Sweden against Peter the Great at the Battle of Poltava in 1709),¹²⁰ through the leaders of the nineteenth century national revival movement and the UNR,¹²¹ Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi in particular (see above, p. 28),¹²² to the dissidents of the 1960s and 1970s.¹²³ The pantheon of national heroes has even been expanded to include socialist leaders of the UNR such as Symon Petliura and Volodymyr Vynnychenko (vilified by nationalists in the 1920s) and the 'national communists' of the Soviet era, in particular Mykola Skrypnyk and Oleksandr Shums'kyi, who promoted Ukrainianisation policies before their removal in the early 1930s.¹²⁴

Otherwise discrete events are made to fit into the schema of national resistance and revival. Peasant rebellions, such as the 1768 *Koliivshchyna*, are now argued to have been provoked by national rather than class grievances.¹²⁵ When women are lauded for their contribution to Ukrainian history, it is characteristically mainly for their role in the national liberation movement.¹²⁶ The workers' movement in 1917–20 is made to seem more pro-nationalist or at least 'passive and neutral' than was undoubtedly the case.¹²⁷

However, the most important, and most controversial, Ukrainian liberation myth concerns the campaigns of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (known by its Ukrainian acronym, UPA) between 1943 and 1954. In Soviet times the UPA was derided as a neo-Nazi and collaborationist force, composed entirely of fanatical Galicians fighting a Red Army composed mainly of other Ukrainians. Now the UPA is lauded for its bravery in fighting against first the Poles and Germans and then continuing to engage Soviet forces against overwhelming odds until the mid-1950s.¹²⁸ Moreover, it is claimed that the vast majority of UPA fighters were simple patriots rather than ideological zealots, and that recruits came from all over Ukraine rather than from Galicia alone.¹²⁹ The total number of UPA

soldiers, estimated at around 90,000 in Western sources, is put as high as 400,000.¹³⁰ The attempt has even been made to rehabilitate those who fought with some degree of direct German support, such as the SS-Galicia division formed in 1944.¹³¹ While this new line is vigorously promoted in western Ukraine and to a lesser extent in Kiev, it is extremely difficult to export to the rest of Ukraine, where the traditional myth of the Second World War as a Soviet Ukrainian victory against fascism and its collaborators still holds sway.¹³²

Myths of resistance and revival: Belarus

In Belarusophile historiography the first major national rebellion occurred in 1794, immediately after the first seizure of Belarusian lands by tsarist Russia in 1793.¹³³ The Russian general, Count Suvorov, who thanks to his traditional depiction in Russophile historiography as the 'liberator' of Belarus from Catholic Poland has scores of streets and squares named after him in Belarusian towns, is painted instead as the uprising's bloody suppressor.¹³⁴ The 1863 Polish revolt is claimed to have been locally primarily a struggle for the re-establishment of Belarusian rather than Polish independence, and its leader Kastys' Kalinoŭski lionised as the founding father of the Belarusian national revival.¹³⁵

However, the Belarusian People's Republic of 1918 enjoyed only a fleeting existence (see above, p. 35). The Belarusian pantheon is not as crowded as the Ukrainian. Moreover, Belarusophiles have no Second World War myth to displace, even at the price of divisive controversy, the Soviet myth of common endeavour against the Germans. The Polish Home Army fought on Belarusian territory,¹³⁶ but there was no Belarusian equivalent of the UPA or Baltic resistance movements.

The Russophile version

Conscious Russophile historiography on the Ukrainian and Belarusian 'questions' developed in parallel with the rise of the latter two nations' national movements, as it was in essence an attempt to refute the historical claims they made, although far less attention was paid to the arguments of the much weaker Belarusian movement. Before the late nineteenth century, the assumption of Russian historians such as Karamzin, Soloviev and Kliuchevskii that the three east Slavic peoples were naturally one was more or less unconscious.¹³⁷ In the early nineteenth century, therefore, most Russians had no great antipathy towards 'little Russian' writers such as Mykhailo Maksymovych or Panteleimon

Kulich, although Russian attitudes were predicated on the view of 'Ukraine as different from Russia but at the same time a complement, not a rival, to Great Russian culture' and the assumption that 'little Russian' local patriotism was perfectly compatible with loyalty to the tsar.¹³⁸

However, after the Crimean War, there was a greater sense of the fragility of the empire, and the rise of an organised Ukrainian national movement produced an at first unsympathetic and, after 1905, a distinctly hostile response.¹³⁹ The events of 1917–20 further deepened Russian antipathy to Ukrainian 'separatism',¹⁴⁰ at first amongst Russian émigrés,¹⁴¹ but then also amongst the official Soviet historical establishment from the mid-1930s onwards.¹⁴² Significantly, however, hardly anything new has been produced since 1991, with Russian historians and politicians content to recycle old arguments.

Myths of origin

Russophile historiography begins with a myth of common origin, namely that at the time of Kievan Rus' there existed a single 'ancient Rus' nation' (*drevnii russkii narod* or *tri-edinaia russkaia natsiia*). Even before the foundation of Rus', it is argued that all the eastern Slavs shared 'a single language and a common culture and religion' and were drawn together in collective struggle against common enemies to both the east and the west.¹⁴³ By the time of Vladimir (Volodymyr) the 'national monolith' had therefore 'developed such extraordinary strength and solidity' as to last through the subsequent centuries of division.¹⁴⁴ The sack of Kiev by Andrei Bogoliubskii in 1169 was only due to 'fratricidal struggle amongst the Rurik [the ruling dynasty]'. 'The foreign, threatening power for the Russia [sic] of Kiev was not then Moscow, but the Tatars and Poland', and before them the Khazars, Pechenegs and Polovtsians, against whom all the inhabitants of Rus' fought in a common front.¹⁴⁵

Slightly more sophisticated versions of Russophile history hold that the identity of the inhabitants of Rus' was 'pre-national', and/or that (partial) differentiation between the three east Slavic peoples came about only as a result of artificial political divisions imposed in the thirteenth–fourteenth or even fifteenth–sixteenth centuries.¹⁴⁶ As the Dnieper territories were depopulated (even in Kiev there were 'only 200 houses' at the end of the thirteenth century),¹⁴⁷ they were extremely vulnerable to temporary Polish influence. However, despite 'the denationalisation and Catholicisation of the upper classes . . . the broad popular masses preserved their Russianness [*russkost*] and their desire for unity with the rest of Russia'.¹⁴⁸

Myths of separation and reunion

In the Russophile view, just as Polish domination of the eastern *kresy* was an artificial phenomenon, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was established only by the forcible conquest of Ukrainians and Belarusians, who began to seek reunion with Russia as early as the fourteenth century, after the Union of Krevo in 1385 led to a loss of faith in the Lithuanian state's ability to 'defend the Orthodox and unite all Rus'. The persecuted Orthodox now naturally looked to Moscow for salvation.¹⁴⁹ Reunion in 1654 or 1793–5 is of course prominently celebrated,¹⁵⁰ and would have come earlier, had not 'a new factor came onto the scene, – Polish Imperialism, – and the natural march of events, the political unification of the Russian [sic] people, [been] checked' by the Union of Lublin in 1569.¹⁵¹

The long wars fought against the Rzeczpospolita until 1795 were therefore supposedly fought for the liberation of the Orthodox. The Uniate Church is viewed as a creature of the Vatican, while the idea of 'separate' Ukrainian and even Belarusian branches of Orthodoxy is dismissed as an uncanonical absurdity. Although some local Orthodox magnates may have fought against Muscovy in the wars of 1507–8, 1512–22 and 1534–7, this was in the nature of warfare at the time, which was largely a 'collision of leaderships'. Kindred states often fought one another, but there was no evidence that the popular masses were involved.¹⁵²

As the prime motivation of Belarusians and Ukrainians was then to seek reunion with Russia, there was no point in their establishing separate states. Lithuania was never a Slavic state; 'Lithuania-Belarus' was a fiction invented by nationalist historians. Nor was the Ukrainian Cossack polity ever a 'state'. The anarchic traditions of the Cossacks prevented it from developing an 'administrative apparatus',¹⁵³ and it remained a loose geographical entity occupying a far smaller area than the fictional 'Ukraine of Brest-Litovsk'.¹⁵⁴ Slobids'ka Ukraine had little connection with the Hetmanate, and the Cossacks' military adventures further afield were only 'incursions' that never established 'permanent lordship'.¹⁵⁵ There was therefore no real Ukrainian presence in what is now south-east Ukraine before the area became 'New Russia' after Russia conquered it from the Tatars and Turks at the end of the eighteenth century.

It is worth noting that one of the founding fathers of the 'Eurasian' school in the 1920s, Nikolai Trubetskoi, accepted that Ukrainian and 'Great Russian' culture had indeed diverged to an extent before 1654, but, in an ironic twist to the Ukrainophile argument, argued that 'at the turn of the eighteenth century *the intellectual and spiritual culture of Great Russia was Ukrainianised* [as a result of the reforms of Patriarch Nikon and

Peter I]. The difference between the West Russian [i.e. Ukrainian] and the Muscovite versions of Russian culture were eliminated through the eradication of the latter. Now there was only *one* Russian culture.¹⁵⁶ (The earlier Ukrainian influence from south to north made subsequent 'Russification' from north to south easier.)

Myths of foreign intrigue

For most Russophiles, Ukrainian and Belarusian history therefore ends in 1654 or 1793–5, union with Russia having 'saved the people of Ukraine [and Belarus] from extinction' at the hands of the Poles.¹⁵⁷ On the other hand, subsequent occasional manifestations of 'separatism' are explained away as the result of 'foreign intrigue', originally by Uniate Catholics and Jesuit Poles, then by Habsburg and German 'agents of influence'. For some 'the Poles can really by right be considered the fathers of the Ukrainian doctrine' working through Kharkiv university to re-establish their claim to the eastern *kresy* in the first third of the nineteenth century.¹⁵⁸ For others, 'there is no doubt as to the Austro-German origin of the legend of the existence of a separate Ukrainian nation'; historians should 'look for the Ukrainian Piedmont in the Foreign Offices of Berlin and Vienna, not in dear Galicia'.¹⁵⁹ All would agree, however, that foreign influence moulded the Galicians, introducing an artificial nationalist virus into Ukrainian-Russian relations. By the twentieth century 'in terms of name, blood, belief and culture, Galicia and Ukraine had less in common than Ukraine and Belorussia, or Ukraine and Great Russia'.¹⁶⁰

In any case, the nineteenth-century Ukrainian national revival is depicted as a marginal movement, involving only 'a few tens of youths'.¹⁶¹ Similarly, it is argued that the UNR collapsed within months through lack of popular support and was resurrected only by German force of arms.¹⁶² In any case, the leaders of the UNR were not elected and 'had no formal or moral right to speak in the name of the people of Ukraine'.¹⁶³ The 1918 Belarusian People's Republic (BNR) is dismissed as a rootless 'bourgeois-democratic' experiment, 'formed by an [unrepresentative] group of the intelligentsia on an unconstitutional basis'. It had no support amongst 'the popular masses', as demonstrated by the mere 0.3 per cent of the vote won by the Belarusian national parties in the 1917 Constituent Assembly elections. It existed for so long only by virtue of the support of the 'German occupying administration'.¹⁶⁴

Also dismissed is the idea that the BNR and Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic were 'two parts of the same process'. Instead it was the Bolsheviks who made 'best use of the revolutionary energies of the Belarusian people', who sought and achieved 'self-rule on a Soviet

basis',¹⁶⁵ thereby reiterating the key pan-Slavic myth that the first real Belarusian state/republic was a gift of Soviet rule.

Myths of joint endeavour

Instead of the discourse of 'empire' and 'colony' prevalent in Ukrainophile and Belarusophile historiography, Russophile history aims to present the experience of Ukraine and Belarus since 1654 or 1793–5 as one of 'fraternal union' with Russia and to celebrate their subsequent joint labours to mutual benefit. The link with Russia is also characterised as bringing 'progress' and 'development', economic growth, the spread of literacy and the establishment of modern welfare services,¹⁶⁶ in contrast to the tendency of Ukrainophiles and Belarusophiles to idealise the *status quo ante*. Traditional narratives of 'socialist construction' (or occasionally its opposite, 'joint suffering' under communism)¹⁶⁷ and the three peoples' joint victory in the Second World War therefore loom proportionately larger in Russophile historiography,¹⁶⁸ as does opposition to all attempts to rehabilitate 'outsiders', such as, pre-eminently, the UPA, who are still depicted as tools of the Nazis.¹⁶⁹ The dissolution of the USSR is blamed, when the question of causality is seriously addressed at all, on the machinations of self-interested politicians (in Solzhenitsyn's words, 'the agile Führers of several national republics')¹⁷⁰ and third parties.¹⁷¹

Conclusions

The Russophile schema is totally unwilling to concede any of the building blocks of a separate Ukrainian or Belarusian identity. There is no real engagement with rival narratives, just denial. On the other hand, this very inflexibility has left Russophiles ill equipped to respond to the realities of east Slavic disunion. Since 1991 the Ukrainians at least have therefore had relative freedom to develop their 'national idea', while the only option for ethnic Russians or Russophiles in Ukraine and Belarus has been root-and-branch opposition to the local mythologies.

In Belarus this is less of a problem, as the Belarusian 'national idea' is comparatively weak and the recycling of old myths is for the moment at least sufficient to keep it at bay. Something more is needed for Russophiles in Ukraine, however. Even in the east and south, Russophile historiography is being squeezed out of the official arena, although it can still be found in the press and in partisan party publications,¹⁷² and there is a much greater need to produce a version of history that addresses the reality of being Russian- (or Russophone-) in-Ukraine (see chapter 6 on the crucial importance of the Russophone Ukrainian identity). Cognitive

dissonance and passive resistance to the Ukrainophile schema amongst Russophones is considerable, but by sticking to traditional all-Russian historiography, which allows virtually no place for any separate Ukrainian identity, Russophiles may well be narrowing their appeal to the large potential middle ground.

In Belarus, national historiography was penetrating the official sphere only gradually before new president Alexander Lukashenka's *de facto* restoration of Russophile mythology in 1995.¹⁷³ Moreover, the comparative weakness of key aspects of Belarusophile mythology has hampered its dissemination.¹⁷⁴ In Ukraine, Ukrainophile ideas have dominated both school texts and official discourse to a much greater extent.¹⁷⁵ Significantly, although new president Kuchma dropped most references to more controversial subjects such as the UPA after his election in 1994, he maintained many key elements of the Ukrainophile schema, in particular the eulogisation of Khmel'nyts'kyi and the UNR.¹⁷⁶

Where it has come to predominate, Ukrainophile and Belarusophile historiography provides a framework for justifying separate development and for characterising Russia's current actions as 'imperial'. On the other hand, it is the very sharpness of the divide it creates against Russia that makes such mythology difficult for many Russophiles and/or Russian-speakers to accept. Even in Ukraine it is unlikely that historians or politicians seeking historical legitimation will speak with one voice.

at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 1994.

- 48 David M. Crowe, *A History of the Gypsies of Eastern Europe and Russia* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1995).

2 NATIONAL HISTORY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN UKRAINE AND BELARUS

- 1 'Myth' is here used in the original Greek sense. 'Mythos' is a narrative, neither necessarily true nor necessarily false.
- 2 The terms are used without any pejorative overtones, and in order to avoid labelling any version of history as more 'nationalist'. It is not argued that the work of every historian in Ukraine, Russia or Belarus conforms to the ideal-types described, although it can certainly be argued that more pluralist and multilayered approaches are in danger of being squeezed out by the extremes.
- 3 See also Andrew Wilson, 'Myths of National History in Belarus and Ukraine', in George Schöpflin and Geoffrey Hosking (eds.), *Myths and Nationhood* (London: Hurst, 1997), pp. 182–97, which concentrates mainly on the relative weakness of Belarusian historiographical mythology.
- 4 See also Anthony D. Smith, 'National Identity and Myths of Ethnic Descent', *Research in Social Movement, Conflict and Change*, vol. 7, 1994, pp. 95–130.
- 5 This chapter is unable to assess the extent of popular belief in the various myths – a task to be undertaken in a further stage of research.
- 6 Soviet theories of 'ethnogenesis', and the teleological fallacy that current ethnic boundaries can be used to delineate historical subjects in an unbroken chain of development, are still a powerful influence on local historians and archaeologists.
- 7 The author is grateful to Vera Rich for making this point.
- 8 On the importance of boundary markers, see Fredrik Barth (ed.), *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organisation of Culture Difference* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969).
- 9 In the nineteenth century Belarusian historiography was limited to occasional works of *landespatriotismus*. See Aliaksandr Ts'vikevich, '*Zapadno-russizm*': narysy z historyi hramadzkaï mys'li na Belarusi ū XIX i pachatku XX v. (Minsk: Navuka i tekhnika, 1993), a reprint of a work first published in 1929.
- 10 Vatslaŭ Lastoŭski, *Karotkaia historyia Belarusi* (Minsk: Universitetskoe, 1993), a reprint of the original 1910 edition; and Usevalad Ihnatoŭski, *Karotki narys historyi Belarusi* (Minsk: Belarus', 1991), from the 1926 edition. See also M. V. Doŭnar-Zapol'ski, *Historyia Belarusi* (Minsk: Belaruskaja entsyklapedyia imia Petrusia Broŭki, 1994), from a manuscript withdrawn from publication in 1926, and Svetlana Sel'verstova-Kul', 'Istoriografiiia polityki tsarizma v belorussii i natsional'noe vozrozhdenie belorusov', *Slavianovedenie*, no. 5, 1996, pp. 3–17.
- 11 Aleh Suvalaŭ, 'Idealohiia i historyia: pra adnosiny idealohii da belaruskai

historychnai navuki z 1917 da kantsa 40-kh hadoŭ', *Belaruskaiia minuŭshchyna*, no. 2, 1994, pp. 3–6.

- 12 See the two in-depth surveys of Ukrainian historiography by Stephen Velychenko, *National History as Cultural Process: The Interpretation of Ukraine's Past in Polish, Ukrainian and Russian Historiography* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (CIUS), 1992), and *Shaping Identity in Eastern Europe and Russia: Soviet and Polish Accounts of Ukrainian History, 1914–1991* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1993). Also useful are Orest Subtelny, 'The Current State of Ukrainian Historiography', *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, vol. 18 (1–2), Summer–Winter 1993, pp. 33–54; and the survey of the various schools of Ukrainian history in V. F. Soldatenko and Iu. A. Levenets', 'Vstup: istoriohrafichni notatky', in Soldatenko, Volodymyr Kryzhaniv's'kyi, Iurii Levenets' et al. (eds.), *Ukraïns'ka ideia: istorychnyi narys* (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1995), pp. 3–16.
- 13 Mykola Kostomarov, *Dve russkie narodnosti* (Kiev: Maidan, 1991), a reprint of the original 1861 edition.
- 14 Hrushevs'kyi's eleven-volume magnum opus, *Istoriia Ukraïny–Rusy*, is being reprinted by Naukova dumka in Kiev with assistance from the CIUS. Volume V appeared in 1995. For some analyses of Hrushevs'kyi's schema, see Thomas M. Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987); Lubomyr R. Wynar, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Ukrainian–Russian Confrontation in Historiography* (Toronto: Ukrainian Historical Association, 1988); and O. L. Kopylenko, 'Ukraïns'ka ideia' M. Hrushevs'koho: istoriia i suchasnist' (Kiev: Lybid', 1991).
- 15 Author's interview with Petro Tolochko, 24 June 1997. See also Natalia Iakovenko, 'Mizh pravdoiu ta slavoïu', *Suchasnist'*, no. 12 (December), 1995, pp. 68–76.
- 16 Volodymyr Kyrychuk, 'Istorychni koreni Ukraïns'koho narodu: do pyttannia etnohenezu Ukraïntsi', *Henezza*, no. 1, 1994, pp. 142–9, at p. 143. See also V. P. Petrov, *Pokhodzhennia Ukraïns'koho narodu* (Kiev: Feniks, 1992); Leonid Zalizniak, *Narysy starodavn'oi istorii Ukraïny* (Kiev: Abrys, 1994); Halyna Lozko, 'Etnohenetychni protsesy v Ukraïni', in her *Ukraïns'ke narodoznavstvo* (Kiev: Zodiak-EKO, 1995), pp. 9–27; O. M. Motsia, 'Starodavnia doba', in V. A. Smolii (ed.), *Istoriia Ukraïny: nove bachennia*, vol. I (Kiev: Ukraïna, 1995), pp. 5–39; and Volodymyr Borysenko, 'Anty. Rusy. Ukraïntsi', *Viche*, no. 7 (July), 1993, pp. 138–48. For a more balanced treatment, see Iurii Pavlenko, *Peredistoriia davnikh rusiv u svitovomu konteksti* (Kiev: Feniks, 1994), and (to an extent) Iaroslav Isaievych, 'Problema pokhodzhennia Ukraïns'koho narodu: istoriohrafichni i politychni aspekt', in Isaievych, *Ukraïna: davna i nova* (L'viv: Kryp''iakovych Institute, 1996), pp. 22–43.
- 17 Victor Shnirelman, 'From Internationalism to Nationalism: Forgotten Pages of Soviet Archaeology in the 1930s and 1940s', in Phillip L. Kohl and Clare Fawcett (eds.), *Nationalism, Politics and the Practice of Archaeology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 120–38. Soviet historians and archaeologists supported the 'autochthonous' theory in order to

reject rival ‘migrationist’ theories that supposedly served German interests by seeking to paint the eastern Slavs as marginal peoples.

- 18 Kyrychuk, ‘Istorychni koreni’, p. 143.
- 19 Ibid., pp. 145 and 144.
- 20 Iurii Shylov, *Prarodina ar’ev* (Kiev: SINTO, 1995). See also the interview with Shylov in *Samostiina Ukraïna*, no. 7 (March), 1994.
- 21 The ‘Indo-European’ theory is associated above all with the émigré author Lev Sylenko. See his *Maha vira* (Spring Glen, NY: Society of the Ukrainian Native Faith, Oriana, 1979), quotes from pp. 59, 116 and 323. For other versions of the ‘Indo-European’ theory, see Iurii Shylov, *Brama bezsmertia* (Kiev: Ukraïns’kyi svit, 1994), and Iurii Kanyhin, *Shliakh ariv: Ukraïna v dukhovnii istorii liudstva*, 2nd edn (Kiev: Ukraïna, 1996).
- 22 See the claim by Serhii Plachynda, leader of the Peasant-Democratic Party of Ukraine, that ‘Ukrainian mythology is the oldest in the world. It became the basis for all Indo-European mythologies, just as the ancient Ukrainian language – Sanskrit [sic] – became the basis [pramatir’ia] for all the Indo-European languages’: *Slovnyk davn’o-ukraïns’koi mifolohii* (Kiev: Ukraïns’kyi pys’mennyk, 1993), p. 6.
- 23 See also Siân Jones, *The Archaeology of Ethnicity: Constructing Identities in the Past and Present* (London: Routledge, 1997), ch. 2.
- 24 Rolle Renate, *The Scythians* (New York, 1989); and Tadeusz Sulimirski and Timothy Taylor, ‘The Scythians’, in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, 2nd edn, vol. III, part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 547–90. See also Pavel M. Dolukhanov, *The Early Slavs: Eastern Europe from the Initial Settlement to the Kievan Rus* (London: Longman, 1996).
- 25 Anatolii Ponomar’ov, ‘Pokhodzhennia ta etnichna istoriia ukraïntsiv’, *Ukraïns’ka etnografii* (Kiev: Lybid’, 1994), pp. 96–111. For a similar Russian point of view, see Boris Rybakov, *Iazychestvo drevnikh slavian*, 2nd edn (Moscow: Nauka, 1994), and his *Nachal’nye veka russkoi istorii* (Moscow: Shik, 1995), the first volume in the series *Istoriia Rossii*.
- 26 Oleksander Montsibovych (ed.), *Herodot pro Skytiv* (Adelaide: Knyha, 1986), p. 9. Herodotus actually depicted the Scythians as a savage race of itinerant horsemen.
- 27 Isaievych, *Ukraïna: davna i nova*, p. 35.
- 28 Compare Tadeusz Sulimirski, *The Sarmatians* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1970).
- 29 Kyrychuk, ‘Istorychni koreni’, pp. 146 and 147.
- 30 V. F. Soldatenko and Iu. V. Syvolob, ‘Vytoky i peredvisnyky ukraïns’koi idei’, in Soldatenko, Syvolob and I. F. Kuras (eds.), *Ukraïns’ka ideia: pershi rechynyky* (Kiev: Znannia, 1994), pp. 5–25, at p. 11.
- 31 Volodymyr Païk (an émigré Ukrainian), ‘“Velyka Skytïia” – Velyka Skolotïia’, *Derzhavnist’*, nos. 1 and 2, 1992.
- 32 V. F. Soldatenko and Iu. V. Syvolob, ‘Vytoky i peredvisnyky ukraïns’koi idei’, p. 8.
- 33 Iaroslav Dashkevych, ‘Osnovi etnichnoi istorii ukraïns’koi natsii: mifolohizatsiia ta demifolohizatsiia’, *Ratusha*, 4–5 September 1991.
- 34 Aliaksandar Miadz’vedzeŭ, ‘Nasel’nitstva Belarusi ŭ zhaleznyim veku (VIII

- st. da n. e. – VIII st. n. e.)', *Belaruski histarychny ahliad*, vol. 1 (1), November 1994, pp. 15–37, at p. 37. See also Liudmila Duchyts, 'Bal' ty i slaviane na terytoryi Belarusi ū pachatku II tysiachahodz' dzia', *Belaruski histarychny ahliad*, vol. 2 (1), October 1995, pp. 15–30, and Aliaksei Mikulin, 'Etnahenez belarusaŭ – pohliad antropolaha', *Litaratura i mastatstva*, no. 22, 2 June 1995. The Russian archaeologist Valentin Sedov has expressed similar views in his *Slaviane v drevnosti* (Moscow: Fond arkheologii, 1994).
- 35 Victor A. Shnirelman, 'The Faces of Nationalist Archaeology in Russia', in Margarita Díaz Andreu and Timothy Champion (eds.), *Nationalism and Archaeology in Europe* (London: University College Press, 1996), pp. 218–42, at p. 229.
- 36 Heorhi Shtykhaŭ, *Kryvichy: pa materyialakh raskopak kurhanou ū Paŭnochnaŭ Belarusi* (Minsk: Navuka i tekhnika, 1992); and 'Vytoki belaruskai narodnasti (IX–XIII stst.)', *Belarускаia minuŭshchyna*, no. 2, 1993, pp. 5–8. See also Leanid Lych, *Nazvy ziarni belaruskai* (Minsk: Universitetskoe, 1994).
- 37 See also the excellent summary by Viktor Shnirelman, 'Natsionalisticheskii mif: osnovnye kharakteristiki (na primere etnogeneticheskikh versii vos-tochnoslavianskykh narodov)', *Slavianovedenie*, no. 6, 1995, pp. 3–13.
- 38 The text can be found in Paul Robert Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), p. 673.
- 39 Significantly, even Petro Tolochko argues against the Normanist theory. See his *Kyivs'ka Rus'* (Kiev: Abrys, 1996), pp. 39–49. Although the 'St Petersburg' school of archaeologists in Russia was able to embrace many elements of the Normanist theory in the 1970s and 1980s, the issue is of greater existential importance to modern Ukraine. Cf. the more balanced survey by A. A. Hors'kyi, 'Shche raz pro rol' normanniv u formuvanni Kyivs'koi Rusi', *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 1, 1994, pp. 3–9.
- 40 Raïsa Ivanchenko, *Kyivs'ka Rus' . Pochatky Ukraïns'koi derzhavy: posibnyk z istorii* (Kiev: Prosvita, 1995); Oleksa Novak, 'Derzhava Ukraïntsiiv – Kyivs'ka Rus'', *Klych*, nos. 6 and 7 (June), 1993; and Iaroslav Dashkevych, 'Natsiia i utvorennia Kyivs'koi Rusi', *Ratusha*, 9 September 1993.
- 41 Petro Kononenko, *Ukraïnoznavstvo* (Kiev: Lybid', 1996), p. 222.
- 42 Or possibly two, as Ukrainian and Belarusian were not yet properly differentiated. On the timing of linguistic differentiation, see Kononenko, *Ukraïnoznavstvo*, pp. 125–9.
- 43 Andrii Buriachok, 'A naspravdi bulo tak . . . movna sytuatsiia v Kyivs'kii Rusi', *Literaturna Ukraïna*, 13 October 1994.
- 44 Vasyl' Levchenko, 'Razom z imperiieiu vmyraiut' fal'shyvi teorii ta mify', *Klych*, nos. 2 and 3 (April), 1993. See Ivan L. Rudnytsky, 'Franciszek Duchynski and His Impact on Ukrainian Political Thought', in his *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History* (Edmonton: CIUS, 1987), pp. 187–202, for the origins of this idea in the nineteenth century.
- 45 Mykola Sytalo, 'Rozvidka pro utvorennia rosiis'koho narodu-natsii v etnichnykh mezhakh', *Respublika*, no. 2, 1995, pp. 40–5.
- 46 Kost' Huslystyï was able to express this idea in Soviet times. See his *Do pytannia pro utvorennia Ukraïns'koi natsii* (Kiev, 1967).
- 47 Petro Tolochko, for example, attacks the 'tendency to limit the under-

standing of “Kievan Rus’” solely to the territory of modern Ukraine’ and continues to argue that between ‘the ninth and thirteenth centuries a relatively united eastern Slavic community was founded, which continued to exist even after the destruction of Rus’ by the Mongol-Tatars’: *Kyïvs’ka Rus’*, pp. 7 and 255.

- 48 O. P. Motsia, ‘Kyïvs’ka Rus’: rezul’taty ta perspektyvy doslidzhen’, *Ukraïns’kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 4, 1996, pp. 41–9, at p. 48.
- 49 S. V. Tarasaŭ, ‘Polatskae kniastva ŭ XI st.’, in Mikalai Kryval’ tsevich et al. (eds.), *Staronki historyi Belarusi* (Minsk: Navuka i tekhnika, 1992), pp. 37–47, at p. 39.
- 50 Mikhas’ Chapniaŭski, ‘Iakiiia belaruskiiia dziazrhavy byli ŭ starazhytnastsii?’, in Z’mitser San’ko, *100 pytanniaŭ i adkazaŭ z historyi Belarusi* (Minsk: Zviazda, 1993), pp. 3–4. See also Mikola Ermalovich, *Starazhytnaia Belarus’: polatski i novaharodski peryiady* (Minsk: Mastatskaia litaratura, 1990).
- 51 Chapniaŭski, ‘Iakiiia belaruskiiia dziazrhavy byli ŭ starazhytnastsii?’
- 52 Siarhei Tarasaŭ, ‘Kali pryishlo na Belarus’ khrystiiianstva?’, in San’ko, *100 pytanniaŭ i adkazaŭ z historyi Belarusi*, pp. 4–5.
- 53 Uladzimir Arloŭ, *Eŭfrasinnia poltskaia* (Minsk: Mastatskaia litaratura, 1992).
- 54 Compare for example Iaroslav Malyk, Borys Vol and Vasyl’ Chupryna, *Istoriia ukraïns’koi derzhavnosti* (L’viv: Svit, 1995), which has chapters on all eras from the time of the Antes, and Mikhas’ Bich, ‘Dziarzhavnasts’ Belarusi: stanauŭenne, strata, barats’ba za adnaŭenne (IX st. – 1918 hod)’, *Belaruskaiia minuŭshchyna*, no. 5–6, 1993, pp. 3–7 and 21, and Radzim Haretski, ‘Dziarzhavnasts’ na Belarusi mae bol’sh chym tysiachahadovuiu historiiu’, *Belaruskaiia minuŭshchyna*, no. 1, 1994, pp. 4–6. See also Uladzimir Arloŭ, *Taiamniŭs’ki polatskai historyi* (Minsk: Belarus’, 1994).
- 55 Leonid Kravchuk in *Komsomol’skoe znamia*, 4 September 1991.
- 56 Soldatenko and Syvolob, ‘Vytoky i peredvisnyky ukraïns’koi ideï’, pp. 10–11.
- 57 R. D. Liakh and N. R. Temirova, ‘Halyts’ko-Volyns’ka derzhava’, in Liakh and Temirova, *Istoriia Ukraïny: z naidavnishykh chasiv do seredyny XIV stolittia* (Kiev: Heneza, 1995), pp. 79–83, at p. 79; Iaroslav Isaievych, ‘Halyts’ko-Volyns’ka derzhava’, in Smolii, *Istoriia Ukraïny: nove bachennia*, vol. I, pp. 95–112. At its height the western kingdom supposedly ruled over ‘90 per cent of the then population’ of Ukraine; Soldatenko and Syvolob, ‘Vytoky i peredvisnyky ukraïns’koi ideï’, p. 15.
- 58 V. I. Naulko, ‘Formuvannia ukraïns’koi narodnosti i natsii’, in Naulko et al. (eds.), *Kul’tura i pobut naselennia Ukraïny* (Kiev: Lybid’, 1991), pp. 13–21, at p. 16. See also O. V. Rusyna et al., *Na perelomi: druha polovyna XV – persha polovyna XVI st.* (Kiev: Ukraïna, 1994).
- 59 See M. F. Kotliar, ‘Davn’orus’ki poperednyky kozatstva’, in the round-table discussion in *Ukraïns’kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 12, 1990, ‘Ukraïns’ke kozatstvo: suchasnyi stan ta perspektyvy doslidzhennia problemy. (Materialy “kruhloho stolu”’, pp. 12–29, at pp. 15–18. Natalia Iakovenko, in ‘Rodova elita – nosii “kontynuïtetu realii” mizh kniazhoiu Russii i kozats’koiu Ukraïnoiu’, *Suchasnist’*, no. 1 (January), 1994, argues that continuity between the two periods was provided by the local Orthodox nobility. For an

- interesting commentary on these two claims, see Stepan Horoshko, 'Lakovanyi obraz Bohdana', *Politolohichni chytannia*, no. 1, 1992, pp. 250–69.
- 60 Naulko, 'Formuvannia ukrains'koï narodnosti i natsii', p. 18. See also Valerii Smolii and Valerii Stepankov, *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi: sotsial'no-politychnyi portret*, 2nd edn (Kiev: Lybid', 1995); Leonid Mel'nyk, *Borot'ba za ukrains'ku derzhavnist' (XVII st.)* (Kiev: Osvita, 1995); and the special issue of *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 4, 1995, on Khmel'nyts'kyi.
- 61 Valerii Shevchuk, *Kozats'ka derzhava* (Kiev: Abrys, 1995); Valerii Smolii, 'Ukrains'ka kozats'ka derzhava', *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 4, 1991, pp. 5–19; 'Ukrains'ke kozatstvo: suchasnyi stan ta perspektivy doslidzhennia problemy. (Materialy "kruhloho stolu")', *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 12, 1990, pp. 12–29; V. S. Stepankov, 'Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi i problemy derzhavnosti Ukraïny', *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, nos. 9 and 11, 1991, pp. 127–39; and V. A. Smolii et al., *Ukrains'ka kozats'ka derzhava: vytoky ta shliakhy istorychnoho rozvytku (Materialy Chetvertykh Vseukrains'kykh istorychnykh chytan')* (Kiev and Cherkasy: Instytut istorii, 1994), esp. pp. 15–29 and 57–66.
- 62 I. Svarnyk, 'Natsional'no-vyzvol'ni rukhy u XVIII st.', in Iurii Zaitsev et al., *Istoriia Ukraïny* (L'viv: Svit, 1996), pp. 141–51; and the chapters on Ivan Mazdenko and Pylyp Orlyk in Soldatenko et al., *Ukrains'ka ideia: pershi rechynyky*, pp. 47–80; and Volodymyr Kryzhaniv's'kyi and L. P. Nahorna, 'Samoutverdzhennia Ukraïny: politychni idealy, vtracheni iliuzii', in Soldatenko et al., *Ukrains'ka ideia: istorychnyi narys*, pp. 33–62.
- 63 Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk nevertheless accepted a symbolic handover of authority from the government of the UNR in exile in 1992; see the commemorations in the special issue of *Rozbudova derzhavy*, no. 3 (August), 1992.
- 64 'Ukrains'ka natsional'no-demokratychna revoliutsiia', and 'Ukraïna v borot'bi za zberezhennia derzhavnoi nezalezhnosti (1918–1920 rr.)', in the tenth-grade textbook by F. H. Turchenko, *Novitnia istoriia Ukraïny: chastyna persha (1917–1945 rr.)* (Kiev: Heneza, 1994), pp. 6–167; Mykola Lytvyn, 'Vyzvol'ni zmahannia 1914–1920 rr.', in Zaitsev et al., *Istoriia Ukraïny*, pp. 213–51; Mykola Lytvyn and Kim Haumenko, *Istoriia ZUNR* (L'viv: Olip, 1995).
- 65 Iurii Badz'o, 'Ukraïna: chetverta sprobha, abo chy vyzhvut' ukraïntsi?', *Rozbudova derzhavy*, no. 9 (September), 1995, p. 10.
- 66 'Zaiava URP do 75-i richnytsi utvorennia 'Tsentral'noi Rady', *Samostiina Ukraïna*, no. 14 (March), 1992. Cf. Mykola Lytvyn, 'Tut vyrishuiet'sia dolia derzhavy', *Samostiina Ukraïna*, no. 29 (August), 1994.
- 67 S. V. Kul'chyts'kyi, 'Ukrains'ka Derzhava chasiv Het'manshchyna', *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 7–8, 1992, pp. 60–79, at p. 79, also denies that Skoropads'kyi's 'administration was at heart a puppet, collaborationist government' (of the occupying German army).
- 68 See for example the pedagogical guide published in early 1993, Mikhas' Bich, 'Ab natsyianal'nai kantseptsyi historyi i historychnai adukatsyi ŭ respubliksy Belarus', *Belaruski historychny chasopis*, no. 1, 1993, pp. 15–24; and Anatol' Hrytskevich's introduction to Ihnatouški, *Karotki narys historyi*

Belarusi, pp. 9–17. Also author's interviews with the historians Adam Mal'dzis, 31 August 1995, Anatol' Hrytskevich and Valentin Hrytskevich, 2 September 1995, and Uladzimir Arlou, 1 September 1995. Leanid Loika, 'Respublika i iae epokh', *Belaruskaja minuushchyna*, no. 6, 1995, pp. 4–6, divides the Polatsk period in two: before 1132 when it was part of the 'east Slav federation', and true independence thereafter. Much of the material for the sections on Belarusian national historiography was derived from the two popular works, Z'mitser San'ko (ed.), *100 pytanniaŭ i adkazaŭ z historyi Belarusi*, and V. F. Holubeŭ, U. P. Kruk and P. A. Loika, *Tsi vedaetse vy historyiu svajei krajiny?*, 2nd edn (Minsk: Narodnaia asveta, 1995).

- 69 *Kanstyutsyia respubliki Belarus'* (Minsk: Belarus', 1994), p. 66.
- 70 Aleksandr Rogalev, *Belaia Rus' i belorusy: v poiskakh istokov* (Homel': Belorusskoe agentstvo nauchno-tekhnicheskoi i delovoi informatsii, 1994).
- 71 Mikola Ermalovich, *Starazhytnaia Belarus': vilenski peryiad* (Minsk: Bats'kaushchyna/Besiadz', 1994); Ivan Saverchanka, 'Vialikae kniastva Litŭskae: utvarenne dziarzhavy', *Belaruskii histarychny chasopis*, no. 2, 1993, pp. 11–17; Viachaslau Nasevich, *Pachatki Vialikaha kniastva Litoŭskaha: padzei i asoby* (Minsk: Polymia, 1993).
- 72 'Iakaja mova byla dziarzhauŭnai u Vialikim Kniastve Litoŭskim?', in San'ko, *100 pytanniaŭ i adkazaŭ z historyi Belarusi*, pp. 12–13, at p. 12.
- 73 Paula Urban, 'Pra pakhodzhan'ne naimen'nia "Litva"', in his *Da pytan'nia etnichnai prynalezhnas'tsi starazhytnykh lits'vinoŭ* (Minsk: Bats'kaushchyna/Besiadz', 1994); Vitaŭt Charopka, 'Litviny – slavianski narod', *Belaruskaja minuushchyna*, no. 3–4, 1993, pp. 12–14.
- 74 Stanislau Tsiarokhin, 'Taiamnitsy Kreŭskai unii', *Belaruskaja minuushchyna*, no. 3, 1995, pp. 7–10.
- 75 Anatol' Hrytskevich, 'Barats'ba Vialikaha kniastva Litoŭskaha i Ruskaha (belarуска-litoŭskai dziarzhavy) z Teŭtonskim ordenam u kantsy XIV – pershai palove XV st.', in A. Hrytskevich (ed.), *Adradzhenne: histarychny al'manakh. Vypusk 1* (Minsk: Universitetskae, 1995), pp. 36–61.
- 76 Anatol' Hrytskevich has criticised even the venerable Belarusian historian Usevalad Ihnatoŭski for failing to note that the Union of Lublin created not 'a single state', but only 'a federation of two states [Poland and Lithuania-Belarus] with one king': 'Pohliady U. M. Ihnatoŭskaha na historyiu Belarusi feadal'naha peryiadu', in M. U. Tokaraŭ (ed.), *Akademik U. M. Ihnatoŭski: materyialy navukovykh chytanniaŭ, prysvechanykh 110-hoddziu z dnia naradzhennia* (Minsk: Navuka i tekhnika, 1993), pp. 48–56, at p. 54. See also Sh. Glava, 'Liublinskaia uniiia kak zavershenie protsessa formirovaniia federativnoi Rechi Pospolitoi', in Dzmitryi Karaŭ et al., *Nash Radavod*, vol. VI, no. 2 (Hrodna: Belarusian State Museum on the History of Religion et al., 1994), pp. 318–48.
- 77 Maksim Bahdanovich, *Belaruskae adradzhenne* (Minsk: Universitetskae, 1994).
- 78 Kanstantsin Ezavitaŭ, 'Pershy Usebelaruski Kanhres', *Belaruskaja minuushchyna*, no. 1, 1993, pp. 25–9.
- 79 Anatol' Hrytskevich, 'Slutskae paŭstanne 1920 – zbroiny chyn u barats'be za nezalezhnasts' Belarusi', *Spadchyna*, no. 2, 1993, pp. 2–13.

- 80 Colin Williams and Anthony D. Smith, 'The National Construction of Social Space', *Progress in Human Geography*, vol. 7 (4), 1983, pp. 502–18, at p. 509.
- 81 Petro Lavriv, *Istoriia pivdenno-skhidnoi Ukraïny* (L'viv: Slovo, 1992), pp. 9–14.
- 82 Iaroslav Isaievych, 'Do pytannia pro zakhidnyi kordon Kyïvs'koi Rusi', in *Ukraïna: davna i nova*, pp. 81–104.
- 83 Дмитро Білий, *Malynovyi Klyn: narysy z istorii Ukraïntsiiv Kubani* (Kiev: Ukraïna, 1994), pp. 5–11.
- 84 D. I. Bahalii, *Istoriia Slobids'koi Ukraïny* (Kharkiv: Del'ta, 1993), a reprint of the 1918 edition; S. M. Kudelko and S. I. Posokhov, *Kharkiv: nauka, osvita, kul'tura* (Kharkiv: Oho, 1996), p. 5. According to the latter (at p. 4), although the Kharkiv region was first occupied by the Siverianians in the eighth century AD and was mentioned in Rus' chronicles, 'the founders of the town were Ukrainian Cossacks and peasants, who arrived on the territory in the middle of the seventeenth century during the war for the liberation of the Ukrainian people led by Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi against the [Polish] Rzeczpospolita'. On the Don basin, see Andrew Wilson, 'The Donbas Between Ukraine and Russia: The Use of History in Political Disputes', *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 30 (2), April 1995, pp. 265–89.
- 85 Feliks Shabul'do, 'Ukraïna v derzhavotvorchkykh protsesakh u Krymu v kintsii XIV – pershii polovyni XV st.', *Suchasnist'*, no. 5 (May), 1996, pp. 82–8; V. V. Stanislavs'kyi, 'Zaporoz'ka Sich u politychnykh vidnosynakh z Kryms'kym khanstvom (pochatok XVIII st.)', *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 6, 1995, pp. 3–21.
- 86 Ahatanhel Krymsk'yi, *Istoriia Turechchyny* (L'viv: Olip, 1996), a reprint of the original 1924 edition.
- 87 See, for example, 'Krym ot drevneishikh vremen do nachala XX v.', in R. G. Nevedrova (ed.), *Krym mnogonatsional'nyi* (Simferopol': Tavriia, 1988), pp. 5–42.
- 88 Iaïhen Nasytka, "'Tyia zh belarusy . . .": etnichnyia mezhy belarusaï u XIX–pachatku XX st.', *Belaruskaia minuïshchyna*, no. 4, 1994, pp. 11–15; Leï Kasloï and Anatol' Tsitoï, *Belarus' na siami rubiazhakh* (Minsk: Belarus', 1993), p. 25.
- 89 See for example the maps in Vitaït Charopka, 'Liublińskaia uniiia', *Belaruskaia minuïshchyna*, no. 2, 1995, pp. 31–4, between pp. 32 and 33.
- 90 Ermalovich, *Starazhytnaia Belarus': vilenski peryiad*, p. 5, and 'Tsi praïda, shcho litoïtsy zavaïuvali Belarus'?', in San'ko, *100 pytaniiï i adkazaï z historyi Belarusi*, pp. 10–11. Vil'nia was the main centre of the Belarusian national revival until 1917, after which it was seized by the Poles, before being transferred to Lithuania in 1940.
- 91 Iaroslav Dashkevych, 'Etnichni psevdomenshyny v Ukraïni', in Volodymyr Ievtukh and Arnold Suppan (eds.), *Etnichni menshyny Skhidnoi ta Tsentral'noi Ievropy* (Kiev: INTEL, 1994), pp. 65–79, at pp. 76–7.
- 92 Iaroslav Isaievych, 'Cultural Relations Between Belarusians, Russians and Ukrainians (Late Sixteenth Through Early Eighteenth Centuries)', in *Ukraïna: davna i nova*, pp. 198–213.
- 93 'Nova Ukraïna chy nova koloniia?', *Holos Ukraïny*, 12 December 1995.

- 94 Leonid Zalizniak, 'Ukraina i Rosiia: rizni istorychni doli', *Starozhytnosti*, no. 19, 1991. Cf. Stepan Rudnyts'kyi, 'Ukrains'ka sprava zi stanovyscha politychnoi heohrafiï', in his *Chomu my khochemo samostiinoï Ukrainy?* (L'viv: Svit, 1994; first published in 1920), pp. 93–208.
- 95 Volodymyr Serhiichuk, *Mors'ki pokhody zaporozhtsiv* (Kiev: Biblioteka Ukraïntsia, no. 5, 1992); Andrii Panibud'laska and Borys Kantseliaruk, *Istoriia ukrains'koï zbroï* (Kiev: Biblioteka Ukraïntsia, no. 3–7, 1993); and Vladimir Kravtsevych, *Ukrainskii derzhavnyi flot* (Kiev: Krai, 1992).
- 96 Iazep Iukho, 'Shto takoe mahdeburhskae prava?', in San'ko, *100 pyttanniaï i adkazaï z historyi Belarusi*, pp. 20–1.
- 97 Levko Luk'ianenko, 'Ukraïntsi i ikh konstytutsiia', *Samostiina Ukraïna*, no. 11 (August), 1991; Olena Apanovych, 'Demokratyzm derzhavnoho ustroiu i zhyttia Zaporoz'koï Sichi', in V. F. Huzhva (ed.), *Demokratiiia v Ukraïni: mynule i maibutnie* (Kiev: Ukrains'kyi pys'mennyk, 1993), pp. 93–102.
- 98 A. H. Sliusarenko and M. V. Tomenko, *Istoriia ukrains'koï konstytutsiï* (Kiev: Znannia, 1993), p. 9. See also Iryna Kresina and Oleksii Kresin, *Het'man Pylyp Orlyk i ioho konstytutsiia* (Kiev: Biblioteka Ukraïntsia, no. 3–9, 1993).
- 99 Arsen Zinchenko, 'Ukrains'ke pravoslav'ia iak natsional'no-istorychnyi fenomen', *Henezza*, no. 2, 1994, pp. 242–8, at p. 244.
- 100 Volodymyr Kisyk, 'Pro shliakhy rozvytku tserkvy v Ukraïni i Rosii (XI–XVI st.)', *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, nos. 2–3, 1993, pp. 76–85; V. I. Ul'ianovs'kyi, *Istoriia tserkvy ta relihiinoï dumky v Ukraïni*, vol. I (Kiev: Lybid', 1994), pp. 43–78.
- 101 Nataliia Kochan, 'Florentiis'ka uniiia i Kyïvs'ka mytropoliia: do kharakterystyky rozvytku ta vtliennia idei unii tserkov', *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 1, 1996, pp. 28–45.
- 102 O. S. Onyshchenko et al. (eds.), *Istoriia khrystyians'koï tserkvy na Ukraïni (Relihiieznavchyi dovidkovyi narys)* (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1992), pp. 8–12; Kost' Panas, *Istoriia Ukrains'koï tserkvy* (L'viv: Transintekh, 1992), pp. 45–68; and V. V. Haiuk et al. (eds.), *Istoriia relihii v Ukraïni* (Kiev: Akademiia nauk Ukraïny, 1993), pp. 28–30 and 38–9.
- 103 Borys Gudziak (ed.), *Istorychnyi kontekst, ukladennia Beresteis'koï unii i pershe pouniine pokolinnia* (L'viv: Instytut istorii tserkvy, 1995).
- 104 N. Tsisyk (ed.), *Ukrains'ke vidrodzhennia i natsional'na tserkva* (Kiev: Pam'iatky Ukraïny, 1990).
- 105 Serhii Zdioruk, 'Natsional'na tserkva u konteksti derzhavotvorennia v Ukraïni', *Rozbudova derzhavy*, no. 1, 1994; and Serhii Bilokin, 'Dukhovnist' – nadbannia natsii: derzhavnyts'ka ideolohiia Kyïvs'koho patriarkhatu', *Samostiina Ukraïna*, no. 7 (March), 1994.
- 106 Sylenko, *Maha vira*; Shylov, *Brama bezsmertia*.
- 107 Ihnat Abdzirlovich, *Advechnym shliakham: das'ledzinyi belaruskaha s'vetaliadu* (Minsk: Navuka i tekhnika, 1993); I. V. Kazakova, *Etnichnyia tradytsyi ù dukhoïnai kul'tury belarusai* (Minsk: Universitetskoe, 1995); I. I. Salivon, *Fizichny tyt belarusai: uzrostavaia, tytalahichnaia i ekalahichnaia zmenlivasts'* (Minsk: Navuka i tekhnika, 1994).
- 108 'Tsi byla na Belarusi manhola-tatarskaia niavolia?', in San'ko, *100 pyttanniaï i adkazaï z historyi Belarusi*, pp. 8–9, at p. 9.
- 109 Vitaüt Charopka, 'Liublinskaia uniiia', *Belarускаia minuïshchyna*, no. 2,

- 1995, pp. 31–4; and “‘Braterskaia liuboŭ’”, *Belaruskaia minuŭshchyna*, no. 1, 1995, pp. 7–10.
- 110 Author’s interviews with Anatol’ Hrytskevich and Valentin Hrytskevich, 2 September 1995. See also Yaŭhen Filipovich, ‘Khto zh peremoh u Arshanskai bitve?’, *Nasha slova*, no. 18, 4 May–7 June 1995.
- 111 Henadz’ Sahanovich, *Neviadomaia vaina: 1654–1667* (Minsk: Navuka i tekhnika, 1995), p. 130.
- 112 Anatol’ Hrytskevich, ‘Relihiinae pytanne i zneshniaia palitika tsaryzmu perad padzelami Rechy Paspalitai’, *Věsti AN BSSR*, no. 6, 1973, pp. 62–71, at p. 63; and Hrytskevich, ‘Uniiatskaia tsarkva ŭ kantsy XVII–pachatku XIX stahodz’dzia’, *Khrys’tsiianskaia Dumka*, no. 3, 1993, pp. 18–32; author’s interviews with Anatol’ Hrytskevich, 2 and 5 September 1995.
- 113 Mark R. Beissinger, ‘The Persisting Ambiguity of Empire’, *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 11 (2), April–June 1995, pp. 149–84.
- 114 According to Iurii Badz’o, for example, ‘the words “war” and “occupation” . . . are understood by many to be metaphors or publicists’ exaggerations. Unfortunately they represent the real state of affairs’ between Ukraine and Russia: ‘Ukraïna: chetverta sproba, abo chy vyzhyvut’ ukraïntsi?’, *Rozbudova derzhavy*, no. 9 (September), 1995, p. 9. See also Levko Luk’ianenko, ‘Zvitna dopovid’ z’ izdovi Ukraïns’koï hel’ sins’koï spilky’, in *Virui v boha i v Ukraïnu* (Kiev: Pam’iatky Ukraïny, 1991), pp. 278–90, esp. pp. 278–81.
- 115 Stanislau Stankevich, *Rusifikatsiia belaruskae movy ŭ BSSR i suprasiŭ rusifikatsiynamu pratsesu* (Minsk: Navuka i tekhnika, 1994); Oleksandr Serbezhs’koï (ed.), *Anty-surzhyk* (L’viv: Svit, 1994).
- 116 Iurii Badz’o and Ivan Iushchik (eds.), *Naibil’shyi zlochyn imperii: materialy naukovo-praktychnoi konferentsii ‘Slobozhanshchyna: Holodomor 1932–1933 rokiv’* (Kiev: Prosvita, 1993). See also the open letter to Kravchuk signed by leading nationalists in *Poklyk sumlinnia*, no. 18 (May), 1992.
- 117 Iurii. I. Shapoval, *Ukraïna 20–50-kh rokiv: storinky nenapysanoi istorii* (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1993); ‘Stalinizm i Ukraïna’, *Ukraïns’kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1991 and 1992 *passim*; *Liudyna i systema (shtrykhy do portretu totalitarnoi doby v Ukraïni)* (Kiev: Akademiia nauk Ukraïny, 1994); Mikhas’ Kastsiuk, ‘Stalinshchyna i Belarus’’, *Belaruski istorychny chasopis*, nos. 1 and 2, 1995, pp. 9–14 and 98–106; Uladzimir Adamushka, *Palitychnyia represii 20–50-ykh hadoiŭ na Belarusi* (Minsk: Belarus’, 1994).
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- 119 Oleksandr Boldyrev (ed.), *Istorychni postati Ukraïny* (Odesa: Maiak, 1993); I. Boitsekhiv’s’ka et al., *Istoriia Ukraïny v osobakh: XIX–XX st.* (Kiev: Ukraïna, 1995); and Soldatenko et al., *Ukraïns’ka ideia: pershi rechnyky*.
- 120 Iu. O. Ivanchenka (ed.), *Mazepa* (Kiev: Mystetstvo, 1993); Larysa Bondarenko (ed.), *Ivan Mazepa i Moskva* (Kiev: Rada, 1994); Valerii Shevchuk, ‘Vyzvol’na aktsiia Ivana Mazepa ta ioho systema derzhavotvorennia’, and ‘Borot’ba Pavla Polubotoka za zberezhennia reshtok ukraïns’koï avtonomii’, *Rozbudova derzhavy*, no. 2 (February), 1993, and no. 9 (September), 1994.

- 121 V. H. Sarbei, 'Stanovlennia i konsolidatsiia natsiï ta pidnesennia natsional'noho rukhu na Ukraïni v druhii polovyni XIX st.', *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 5, 1991, pp. 3–16; Taras Hunchak, *Ukraïna: persha polovyna XX stolittia. Narysy politychnoi istorii* (Kiev: Lybid', 1993), pp. 7–78.
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- 123 Anatolii Rusnachenko, 'Tak Ukraïna zdochuvala nezalezhnist' i shcho z toho vykhodyt'', *Suchasnist'*, no. 3–4 (March–April), 1996, pp. 58–64; Ievhen Sverstiuk et al., *Oksana Meshko, kozats'ka matir* (Kiev: URP, 1995); Bohdan Horyn', 'Tykhyi i hromovy holos Vasylia Symonenka', *Samostiina Ukraïna*, nos. 3 and 4 (January), 1995. In particular the poet Vasyl' Stus, who died in the Gulag in 1985, has been turned into something of a national icon: Dmytro Stus, *Zhyttia i tvorchist' Vasyla Stusa* (Kiev: Biblioteka Ukraïntsia, no. 7, 1992); and Iurii Bedryk, *Vasyl' Stus: problema sprymannia* (Kiev: Biblioteka Ukraïntsia, no. 2–5, 1993).
- 124 Liubov Holota (ed.), *Symon Petliura: vybrani tvory ta dokumenty* (Kiev: Dovira, 1994); Natalia Kychyhina, 'Politychna kontseptsiiia V. K. Vynnychenka', *Politolohichni chytannia*, no. 2, 1994, pp. 83–95.
- 125 V. A. Smolii, 'Deiaki dyskusiini pytannia istorii Koliïvshchyny (1768 r.)', *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 10, 1993, pp. 21–9.
- 126 Oles' Kozulia, *Zhinky v istorii Ukraïny* (Kiev: Ukrains'kyi tsentre dukhovnoi kul'tury, 1993).
- 127 O. P. Reient, *Robitnytstvo Ukraïny i Tsentral'na Rada* (Kiev: Akademiia nauk Ukraïny, 1993), p. 45, and Reient, 'Stavlennia proletariatu Ukraïny do Tsentral'noi Rady', *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 4, 1994, pp. 13–18.
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- 129 Volodymyr Serhiichuk, 'V UPA – vsia Ukraïna', *Viis'ko Ukraïny*, no. 6, 1993, pp. 74–84.
- 130 The total includes members of other underground groups: Koval', 'OUN-UPA', p. 101. For some Western estimates, see David R. Marples, *Stalinism in Ukraine in the 1940s* (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 72–9.
- 131 Mykhailo Slaboshpyts'kyi and Valerii Stetsenko, *Ukrains'ka diviziia 'Halychyna': istoryko-publiistsychnyi zbirnyk* (Kiev and Toronto: Visti z Ukraïny, 1994).
- 132 See for example the rolling cycle of fiftieth anniversary commemorations in *Holos Ukraïny*, January to July 1995, *passim*.
- 133 Anatol' Hrytskevich, 'Paũstanne 1794 h.: peradumovy, khod i vyniki', *Belaruski histarychny chasopis*, no. 1, 1994, pp. 39–47.

- 134 'Taki sled u historyi Belarusi pakinuŭ A. Suvoraŭ?', in San'ko, *100 pytanniaŭ i adkazaŭ z historyi Belarusi*, pp. 50–1.
- 135 Viachaslau Shal'kevich, 'Apostal svabody i nezalezhnasti – Kastys' Kalinoŭski', *Belaruskaia minuŭshchyna*, no. 1, 1993, pp. 30–3.
- 136 Iaŭhen Siamashka, *Armiia Kraëva na Belarusi* (Minsk: Khata, 1994).
- 137 Robert F. Byrnes, *V. O. Kliuchevskii, Historian of Russia* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), pp. 145–50.
- 138 Paul Bushkovitch, 'The Ukraine in Russian Culture, 1790–1860: The Evidence of the Journals', *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, vol. 39 (1), 1991, pp. 339–63. The quote is at p. 361.
- 139 S. N. Shchegolev (then the Kiev censor), *Ukrainskoe dvizhenie kak sovremenyi etap yuzhno-russkogo separatizma* (Kiev: L. Idzikovskogo, 1912), and *Sovremennoe ukrainstvo* (Kiev: L. Idzikovskogo, 1914); Petr Struve, 'Obshcherusskaia kul'tura i ukrainskii partikuliarizm: otvet ukrainstu', *Russkaia mysl'*, vol. 33 (1), January 1912. Cf. Vladimir Vernadskii's 1916 essay, 'Ukrainskii vopros i russkoe obshchestvo', reprinted in V. P. Volkov (ed.), *V. I. Vernadskii: publitsisticheskie stat'i* (Moscow: Nauka, 1995), pp. 212–21.
- 140 On the civil war period, see Anna Procyk, *Russian Nationalism and Ukraine: The Nationality Policy of the Volunteer Army During the Civil War* (Edmonton: CIUS, 1995).
- 141 Aleksandr Volkonskii, *Istoricheskaia pravda i ukrainofil'skaia propaganda* (Turin: Vicenti Bona, 1920), published in English as Prince Alexandre Wolkonsky, *The Ukraine Question: The Historic Truth Versus the Separatist Propaganda* (Rome: Ditta E. Armani, 1920); V. M. Levitskii, *Chto kazhdyi dolzhen znat' ob' Ukrainie* (Paris: n.p., 1939); Andrei Dikii, *Neizvrashchennaia istoriia Ukrainy–Rusi*, 2 vols. (New York: Pravda o Rossii, 1960–1); and Nikolai Ul'ianov, *Proiskhozhdenie ukrainskogo separatizma* (Moscow: Indrik, 1996). Significantly, this one modern work is a reprint of an edition first published in New York in 1966. See also the article by Ian Zamoiski, 'Otnoshenie "beloi" russkoi emigratsii k ukrainskim voprosam (1919–1939)', *Slavianovedenie*, no. 4 (July–August), 1993, pp. 39–48.
- 142 Lowell Tillet, *The Great Friendship: Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nationalities* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), provides a useful survey of Soviet historical myths concerning the non-Russian nations. See also the volume produced in Kiev for the 300th anniversary of Pereiaslav in 1954, *Vikovichna druzhba rosiis'koho i ukrains'koho narodiv* (Kiev: Radians'ka shkola, 1954), and official Soviet Ukrainian histories such as the 1948 magnum opus, and the volumes produced in 1965–7 and 1977–9. See the commentary in Velychenko, *Shaping Identity in Eastern Europe and Russia*, pp. 155–8 and 164–76.
- 143 Dikii, *Neizvrashchennaia istoriia Ukrainy–Rusi*, vol. I, p. 15; Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *Rebuilding Russia* (London: Harvill, 1991), pp. 17–18.
- 144 Dikii, *Neizvrashchennaia istoriia Ukrainy–Rusi*, vol. I, p. 28.
- 145 Wolkonsky, *The Ukraine Question*, pp. 45, 43, 51 and 12; Dikii, *Neizvrashchennaia istoriia Ukrainy–Rusi*, vol. I, p. 40. Cf. Lev Gumilev, *Ot Rusi k Rossii* (Moscow: Ekopros, 1992).
- 146 Wolkonsky, *The Ukraine Question*, p. 77. Cf. B. N. Floria, 'Istoricheskie

sud'by Rusi i etnicheskoe samosoznanie vostochnykh slavian v XII–XV vekakh (k voprosu o zarozhdenii vostochnoslavianskikh narodnostei)', *Slavianovedenie*, no. 22 (March–April), 1993, pp. 42–66. Pavel Miliukov and the nineteenth-century 'Moscow school' of Russian historians tended to pass over the period of 'common development' at the time of Kievan Rus'; see Miliukov's *Ocherki po istorii russkoi kul'tury*, 3 vols. (Moscow: Progress, 1993–5).

- 147 Wolkonsky, *The Ukraine Question*, p. 72.
- 148 Dikii, *Neizvrashchennaia istoriia Ukrainy–Rusi*, vol. I, p. 55; Solzhenitsyn, *Rebuilding Russia*, p. 18.
- 149 Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *The Russia Question at the End of the Twentieth Century* (London: Harvill, 1995), p. 26; Dikii, *Neizvrashchennaia istoriia Ukrainy–Rusi*, vol. I, pp. 83 and 87.
- 150 Solzhenitsyn, *The Russia Question*, p. 29–31.
- 151 Wolkonsky, *The Ukraine Question*, p. 99.
- 152 Dikii, *Neizvrashchennaia istoriia Ukrainy–Rusi*, vol. I, pp. 99–101.
- 153 Ul'ianov, *Proiskhozhdenie ukrainskogo separatizma*, p. 22; Dikii, *Neizvrashchennaia istoriia Ukrainy–Rusi*, vol. I, pp. 338–9.
- 154 Wolkonsky, *The Ukraine Question*, pp. 136–8, 121 and 236.
- 155 Dikii, *Neizvrashchennaia istoriia Ukrainy–Rusi*, vol. I, pp. 362–6; Wolkonsky, *The Ukraine Question*, p. 132.
- 156 Nikolai Trubetskoi, 'The Ukrainian Problem', in the collection of his essays, *The Legacy of Genghis Khan and Other Essays on Russia's Identity* (Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Publications, 1991), pp. 245–67, at p. 251. Emphases in original.
- 157 'Zaiavlenie Grazhdanskogo kongressa Ukrainy [on the 340th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereiaslav]', *Grazhdanskii kongress*, no. 2, 1994.
- 158 Ul'ianov, *Proiskhozhdenie ukrainskogo separatizma*, p. 5.
- 159 Wolkonsky, *The Ukraine Question*, pp. 160 and 158.
- 160 Ul'ianov, *Proiskhozhdenie ukrainskogo separatizma*, p. 205.
- 161 Dikii, *Neizvrashchennaia istoriia Ukrainy–Rusi*, vol. II, pp. 4 and 36; Ul'ianov, *Proiskhozhdenie ukrainskogo separatizma*, pp. 4–5.
- 162 Dikii, *Neizvrashchennaia istoriia Ukrainy–Rusi*, vol. II, pp. 120, 123–4 and 136–9.
- 163 *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 67; Solzhenitsyn, *Rebuilding Russia*, p. 18.
- 164 I. M. Ihnatsenka, 'Belarus' napiaredadni i ŭ pershyia hady savetskai ulady', in M. P. Kastsiuk et al., *Narysy historyi Belarusi*, vol. II (Minsk: Belarus', 1995), pp. 8–76, at pp. 58, 59, 51, 60 and 73. Ihnatsenka was a former Soviet procurator.
- 165 Ihnatsenka, 'Belarus' napiaredadni i ŭ pershyia hady savetskai ulady', pp. 65–6 and 73. Ihnatsenka also denies the 'so-called Slutsk rebellion' against Soviet power ever took place (as there were no Soviet troops in the region at the time to fight against): *ibid.*, pp. 71–2.
- 166 Petro Symonenko, "'Natsional'na ideia": mify i real'nist'', *Holos Ukrainy*, 21 March 1996; Volodymyr Hyrn'ov, *Nova Ukraïna: iakoiu ia ŭ bachu* (Kiev: Abrys, 1995), p. 62.
- 167 Solzhenitsyn, *Rebuilding Russia*, p. 18
- 168 A. M. Litvin and Ya. S. Paūlau, 'Belarus' u hady Vialikai Aichynnai vainy', in

- Kastsiuk et al., *Narysy historyi Belarusi*, vol. II, pp. 265–323. See also the view of Myroslav Popovych, a liberal Ukrainian centrist, *Ievropa–Ukraïna – pravi i livi* (Kiev: Kyivs'ke bratstvo, 1997), pp. 93–4.
- 169 Oleksandr Moroz, *Vybir* (Kiev: Postup, 1994), pp. 60–2; Symonenko, “‘Natsional’na ideia”: mify i real’nist’.
- 170 Solzhenitsyn, *The Russia Question*, p. 87.
- 171 See for example V. I. Kozlov, *Istoriia tragedii velikogo naroda* (Moscow: n.p., 1996). For an analysis of the views of Gennadii Ziuganov and the Russian communists, see David Remnick’s essay in the *New York Review of Books*, 23 May 1996, pp. 45–51.
- 172 A. Luzan, ‘Kakoe gosudarstvo my stroim i chemu my uchim nashikh detei?’, *Grazhdanskii kongress*, no. 1, 1994; Fedor Gorelik and Ivan Karachun, ‘Shkola snova v “miasorubke” ideologii’, *Donetskii kriazh*, no. 30, 3–9 September 1993. Crimea is an exception, as it still possesses an autonomous ‘ministry of education’.
- 173 See the Ministry of Education’s *Historyia Belarusi* (Minsk: Narodnaia asveta, 1993), one volume each for the fifth to ninth grades.
- 174 See Wilson, ‘Myths of National History’, for a fuller treatment.
- 175 Considerable use has been made of the following school texts as source materials: M. V. Koval’, S. V. Kul’chyts’kyi and Iu. O. Kurnosov, *Istoriia Ukraïny* (Kiev: Raiduha, 1992), exam primer for tenth and eleventh classes; Iu. M. Alekseev, A. H. Vertehel and V. M. Danylenko, *Istoriia Ukraïny* (Kiev: Teal, 1993), exam primer for final classes and students; *Istoriia Ukraïny dlia ditei shkil’noho viku* (Kiev: Znannia, 1992), a reprint of a 1934 L’viv edition; R. D. Liakh and N. R. Temirova, *Istoriia Ukraïny: z naidavnishykh chasiv do seredyny XIV stolittia* (Kiev: Heneza, 1995), seventh class; F. H. Turchenko, *Novitnia istoriia Ukraïny: chastyna persha (1917–1945 rr.)* (Kiev: Heneza, 1994), tenth class; and Turchenko, P. P. Panchenko and S. M. Tymchenko, *Novitnia istoriia Ukraïny: chastyna druha (1945–1995 rr.)* (Kiev: Heneza, 1995), eleventh class.
- 176 See Kuchma’s speeches in *Holos Ukraïny*, 28 August 1995; *Literaturna Ukraïna*, 28 December 1995 (on the 400th anniversary of the birth of Khmel’nyts’kyi); and *Uriadovyi kur’ier*, 29 August 1996.

3 NATIONAL IDENTITY AND MYTHS OF ETHNOGENESIS IN TRANSCAUCASIA

- 1 Milton Esman, ‘Two Dimensions of Ethnic Politics: Defence of Homelands, Immigrant Rights’, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 8 (3), 1985, pp. 438–9.
- 2 Colin Williams and Anthony D. Smith, ‘The National Construction of Social Space’, *Progress in Human Geography*, vol. 7 (4), 1983, pp. 502–18, at p. 502.
- 3 Stephen Velychenko, ‘National History and the “History of the USSR”: The Persistence and Impact of Categories’, in D. V. Schwartz and R. Panossian (eds.), *Nationalism and History: The Politics of Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia* (Toronto: Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Toronto, 1994), pp. 13–39.
- 4 Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*