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Author(s): ALEXANDER J. MOTYL

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ALEXANDER J. MOTYL

Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi and the Ideology and Politics of Ukrainian Monarchism

I

When Ukraine was plunged into chaos in 1919-1920, thousands of its former inhabitants sought refuge abroad in Central and Western Europe. The intense soul-searching that naturally followed the decision to emigrate was an ideal breeding ground for ideologies of all kinds. Galicians grouped about Ievhen Petrushevych, President of the West Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR), and placed their hopes for an independent Galicia on the Entente powers; Socialist Revolutionaries led by the eminent historian Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi leaned towards a Sovietized Ukraine; the writer Volodymyr Vynnychenko broke with the nationalist mainstream and, together with a small group of Communists, embraced the Bolsheviks and awaited a "new era;" Symon Petliura and the adherents of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) "oriented" themselves on Poland.

Almost forgotten amidst this ferment were the Ukrainian monarchists, erstwhile supporters of General Pavlo Skoropads'kyi, a Russified Ukrainian nobleman catapulted to the position of head of state, or Hetman, in April 1918. His declaration, on 14 November, of federation with Russia and his abdication a month later demoralized the monarchists and made a mockery of their commitment to Ukrainian independence. Indeed, the monarchists virtually disappeared from the political arena for a time. But when Skoropads'kyi's democratic successors proved incapable of saving the remnants of the Ukrainian state from the Bolsheviks, a growing number of emigres began to turn back to monarchism. The spearhead of this revival was Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi, Skoropads'kyi's former ambassador to Vienna, a historian and political theorist, whose personal fate was to become inextricably and tragically intertwined with the movement.

II

Viacheslav Kazymyrovych Lypyns'kyi was born in 1882 in Volhynia to Kazimierz Lipinski, a well-to-do Polish landowner, and Klara née Rokicka. Most of Lypyns'kyi's early life was spent in Ukraine, a fact that may account for his affinity for the land. He attended gymnasia in Zhytomyr, Luts'k, and Kiev, and served in a dragoon regiment based in Kremia-

nets'. After completing his university studies in Cracow (agronomy and history) and Geneva (history and sociology), he settled on his inherited estate in Uman' *guberniia*. It was, apparently, in Geneva that he came in contact with the elitist theories of Mosca and Pareto, which were to leave a lasting impression on his work.¹

Although of Polish descent, Lypyns'kyi came to consider himself a Ukrainian and he became one of the earliest proponents of Ukrainian statehood. In particular, he devoted his considerable analytical powers to arguing the view, then unpopular in Ukrainian political circles, that historically it had been the largely non-Ukrainian upper classes that had led the struggle for national independence, and that it was this ethnically mixed elite that should form the basis for state-building in the present. In view of his own ethnic origins, it was not surprising that he desired the future Ukrainian state to include all Ukraine's ethnic groups and thus form the basis of a territorially-defined Ukrainian nation.

The year 1917 marked the beginning of Lypyns'kyi's active involvement in Ukrainian politics. That summer he took part in founding the Ukrainian Democratic Landholders' Party (*Ukrains'ka Demokratychno-Khliborobs'ka Partiiia*), a conservative grouping of patriotically-inclined large and small Ukrainian landowners. One year later, Skoropads'kyi, the newly proclaimed Hetman, appointed Lypyns'kyi as his ambassador to Vienna.

Despite his distaste for Ukrainian Social-Democrats, Lypyns'kyi's strong sense of patriotism led him to remain at his ambassadorial post even after Skoropads'kyi's abdication and the coming to power of the Directory under Vynnychenko and Petliura. It was only in mid-1919, when Otaman Petro Bolbochan, an ambitious army strongman whom Lypyns'kyi considered the "leader most able to restore a State," was executed for insubordination,² that Lypyns'kyi's passive opposition became active. He resigned from his position and did not return to Ukraine.

1. For a discussion of Lypyns'kyi's indebtedness to Western elite theorists, see: Vsevolod Isaiv, "Politychna sotsiologhiia Viacheslava Lypyns'koho," *Suchasnist'*, 1984, No. 6, pp. 81-95; Ivan Lysiak-Rudnyts'kyi, *Mizh istoriieiu y politykoiu* (Munich, 1973), pp. 139-62; Iaroslav Pelens'kyi, "Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi," in *Zbirnyk "Ukrains'koi Literaturnoi Hazety" 1956* (Munich, 1957), pp. 196-213; Ievhen Pyziur, "Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi i politychna dumka zakhidnoho svitu," *Suchasnist'*, 1969, No. 9, pp. 103-115.

2. Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi, *Lysty do brativ-khliborobiv*, 2d ed. (1926; rpt. New York, 1954), p. xxxi.

In the fall of 1919, after a short stay at the Gutenbrunnen sanatorium in Baden, physically exhausted and tuberculous, he retreated to the town of Reichenau, a well known resort situated at the foot of the Alps some forty-five miles south-west of Vienna.³ It was there that, as part of his campaign to revive Ukrainian monarchism in the form of the Hetmanite movement, he began setting down his theoretical views on Ukrainian statehood in *Lysty do brativ-khliborobiv* (*Letters to Brethren Landholders*).

A monumental tract finally completed only in 1926, *Lysty* places Lypyns'kyi squarely in the classical political tradition best exemplified by Plato's *Republic*. Although Lypyns'kyi's search for the "ideal" state is tempered by a subtle appreciation of the complexities of history and human experience, *Lysty* clearly reveals that he was not a politician, but a theoretician, for whom abstract reasoning often assumed greater importance than the realities of power. For a political theorist to lead a political movement, however, is well nigh a contradiction in terms and it is not surprising that conflicts should have arisen from Lypyns'kyi's attempt to combine the roles. Even lesser thinkers, such as Dmytro Dontsov, were able to maintain the purity of their thought only by divorcing themselves from practical political involvement.

III

Central to Lypyns'kyi's plans were the elaboration of a coherent ideology and the formation of a powerful organization. His historical studies and his involvement in the unsuccessful Ukrainian attempt at state-building led him to the conclusion that "our tragedy and misfortune lie in the fact that we have only democracy; that we have only progressive and destructive forces, but not our own restraining and constructive national forces."⁴ A state's viability, in his view, depended on a harmonious and balanced relationship between progress and conservation, between destruction and maintenance of the *status quo*. Since Ukraine lacked the conservative half of this formula, Lypyns'kyi set himself the task of "reviving the ideology of Ukrainian conservatism and of organizing its 'last Mohicans' "—the "remnants of the Russified agrarian nobility and the remnants of the Polonized agrarian *szlachta*."⁵

3. Mariian Kozak, "Z zhyttia i diial'nosty Viacheslava Lypyns'koho," *Dzvony*, 1932, No. 6, p. 424.

4. Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi, *Poklykannia "Variakhiv," chy organizatsiia khliborobiv?*, 2d ed (1926; rpt. New York, 1954), pp. 20-21.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

Lypyns'kyi was well aware that the "last Mohicans" of the old elite were far too few and far too weak to be a significant political force on their own. Instead, their primary task was to be supportive: since a new elite was bound to arise and since its most numerous and most reliable elements were bound to come from the Ukraine's largest and strongest class, the landholders (*khliboroby*) who directly worked the land they owned, it was incumbent on the old elite to join forces with the new agrarian elite and to "transfer to it the old Ukrainian state tradition and the fundamentals of Ukrainian conservatism."⁶

Since the old elite consisted primarily of emigres, Lypyns'kyi's immediate task was to organize them and to develop the ideology of Ukrainian conservatism.⁷ Then, at the moment of Bolshevism's "inevitable" collapse, the new agrarian elite (which Lypyns'kyi implied would derive from the wealthier peasants, or kulaks) would be assured of the emigres' support and an ideology fitted to its needs. It could then go about its difficult task of "absorbing, assimilating, and disciplining all the new active elements . . . that would begin to accept its ideology."⁸ Thereupon, the entire elite would pledge its allegiance to a monarch, or Hetman, as the symbol of its unity and the personification of Ukrainian statehood.

Since mutual trust was clearly going to be crucial, Lypyns'kyi insisted that all members of the agrarian elite, both old and new, share a commitment to a religiously-grounded morality as the only possible safeguard of their good faith towards one another, the passive masses, and their Hetman.⁹ In a word, the success of state-building depended on the morality of the state-builders. For Lypyns'kyi, therefore, organizational strength *per se* was a secondary concern, since what mattered most was the ideological content of the organizational form, which could be manipulated as needed in order to advance the ideology. Thus, that Hetmanite organization would be good which produced morally good Hetmanites.

Was Lypyns'kyi's blueprint for Ukrainian monarchism viable? Clearly, history proved him wrong in his assumption that the Ukrainian farming class in general and the kulaks in particular would generate a new elite. Although he cannot be faulted for not having foreseen Stalin's murderous plans for the Ukrainian peasantry, Lypyns'kyi may be justly criticized for having failed to appreciate the magnitude of the social

6. Lypyns'kyi, *Poklykannia*, p. 98.

7. Lypyns'kyi, *Lysty do brativ-khliborobiv*, p. 183.

8. Lypyns'kyi, *Poklykannia*, pp. 90, 106.

9. Lypyns'kyi, *Lysty do brativ-khliborobiv*, p. xxxiv.

changes that would inevitably accompany the industrialization of Ukraine.

More important, perhaps, Lypyns'kyi was completely out of step with the spirit of his times in another sense as well. He appears to have overlooked one of the most important lessons of World War I, namely, that nationalism was the driving force of the new Europe. His call for transcending intra-elite ethnic differences and his evident expectation that the Ukrainian masses would not object to being ruled by an ethnically non-Ukrainian elite were totally out of place in the world of the 1920s and 1930s.

Finally, Lypyns'kyi, like Plato, placed far too much faith in human perfectibility. If the success of his scheme depended so greatly on the elite's being above moral reproach, then, clearly, Lypyns'kyi's formula for an independent Ukrainian state was doomed to failure from the outset.

Although unsuccessful as a politician, Lypyns'kyi did assure himself a place in Ukrainian history as a political thinker and moral visionary who attempted to transcend the limitations of politics and human nature. That he failed in an endeavour that was probably impossible does not diminish the value and importance of his contribution. Indeed, in light of the large number of Russians occupying elite positions in contemporary Ukraine, Lypyns'kyi's most basic insight—that Ukrainian state-building would fail unless all ethnic groups living in Ukraine conferred legitimacy on a Ukrainian state—remains as valid today as it was in the past.

IV

The years 1920 and 1921 marked the high-point of the emigre monarchist movement; 1920 was particularly auspicious, since the political situation in the Ukraine appeared to presage the immediate downfall of the Bolsheviks: Piłsudski and Petliura were pressing from the west, while General Wrangel, who claimed to be favourably disposed to certain Ukrainian aspirations, was attacking from the south.

The first steps towards organizing the "old elite" were taken in early 1920 in Vienna. Several members of the General Board of the Ukrainian Democratic Landholders' Party and their sympathizers met to lay the groundwork for a new monarchist organization.¹⁰ The product of their meeting was the Initiative Group of the Ukrainian Union of Landholding State-Builders (*Ukrains'kyi Soiuz Khliborobiv Derzhavnykiv*—USKhD), consisting of Lypyns'kyi, Dmytro Doroshenko, a prominent historian and Skoropads'kyi's foreign minister, Oleksander Skoropys-Ioltukhovs'kyi,

10. Serhii Shemet, "Do istorii Ukrains'koi Demokratychno-khliborobs'koi Partii," *Khliborobs'ka Ukraina*, No. 1 (1920), p. 78.

a co-founder of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine and the Hetman's superintendent (*starosta*) in Kholm and Pidliashshia provinces, and Serhii Shemet, an East Ukrainian landowner and one of the founders of the Democratic Landholders' Party.

The USKhD itself formally came into existence in December 1920, when the movement's Statute and Regulations were adopted. The documents, which had been composed by Lypyn'skyi, defined the USKhD as a "closed" and hierarchically structured "order" (*orden*), which was to serve as the vanguard of the Hetmanite movement and guard its ideological purity. The "principles of partymindedness, voting, elections, and so on" were rejected and, instead, "length of service, selection, solidarity, and discipline" were adopted as the criteria of membership and advancement in the organization.¹¹

To emphasize the cooperative nature of the venture, the USKhD Regulations termed the organization's members "co-workers" (*spivrobotnyky*). At the apex stood the "Sworn Co-Workers" (*Prysiazhni Spivrobotnyky*), consisting of all the members of the Initiative Group and whomever the Council or its individual members might choose to coopt from among the co-workers at the second organizational level.¹² Sworn Co-Workers had to sign an Oath, in which they vowed to "serve the idea of the Ukrainian Labour Monarchy" for the length of their lives and forswore the use of "party politics for the attainment of personal goals."¹³

All Sworn Co-Workers were members of the Council of the Sworn (*Rada Prysiazhnykh*), an executive body that "bears all responsibility for all actions of the U.S.Kh.D., stands at its head, and guides all of its activity."¹⁴ The Council's resolutions were binding on the entire Union. They were to be passed not by a "majority and not by voting, but by the agreement of the whole Council." The Head of the Council, "proclaimed by a unanimous resolution of the Council," was empowered to preside over meetings of the Council, to determine their time, place, and character (open or closed), and to recess them whenever he deemed it necessary.¹⁵ Indeed, Council meetings and their resolutions were considered legal and binding only if the meetings were held in the presence of the Head or a

11. "Statut i Regliament Ukrains'koho Soiuzu Khliborobiv Derzhavnykiv," *Khliborobs'ka Ukraina*, No. 2-4 (1920-1921), p. 264.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 265.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 266-67.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 265.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 268.

deputy assigned by him. The Head was invested with virtually dictatorial powers, being able to act as the tie-breaker in cases of disagreement. Moreover, his decisions were “categorical and obligatory for the entire Council.”¹⁶ Significantly, whereas the Regulations stipulated how the Head was to be chosen, they did not consider how or if he could be dismissed. Insofar as Council members were required to assist the Head in maintaining the body’s unity, the logical conclusion is that the Head was to remain Head for life.

Evidently, Lypyns'kyi, as both author of the Regulations and Head of the Council, did his best to concentrate as many powers as he could in his own hands. Even in 1920 he was clearly afraid that the USKhD would be incapable of following the correct ideological path without his guidance and that the only way for the organization to be true to these requirements was for him to assume the position of *primus inter pares* and remain in it for the rest of his life. It can hardly have escaped his attention that it was not going to be easy to direct such an organization from a “remote nook amidst the woods” in Reichenau.¹⁷

V

The year 1921 witnessed the greatest expansion of the Landholder ranks. Parallel organizations arose in Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Estonia. In Warsaw, a Union of Landholders of Ukraine was founded in April by a sizable group of Polish or Polonized landowners and noblemen from Ukraine.¹⁸ Among them were Count Adam Montezor, Skoropads'kyi's future brother-in-law, two of the Hetman's superintendents in Chernihiv province—Leontii Kochubei and Vytovt Kryns'kyi, and Volodymyr Kosyns'kyi, Minister of Labour under the Hetman and a member of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.¹⁹ A Union of Ukrainian Landholders in Bucharest was organized on 30 September by a decidedly non-agrarian group of Russian or Russified landowners, industrialists, and

16. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.

17. Osyp Nazaruk, *Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi, Vidnovytel' derzhavnoi ideol'ogii Ukrainy* (Chicago, 1926), p. 8.

18. Serhii Shemet, “Ohliad Ukrain's'koho Khliborobs'koho rukhu na emigratsii v pershii polovyni 1921 roku,” *Khliborobs'ka Ukraina*, No. 5-6 (1921), pp. 171-74.

19. Dmytro Doroshenko, *Istoriia Ukrainy 1917-1923 rr.*, 2d ed. (1930; rpt. New York, 1954), II, pp. 88, 89, 315, 364.

bankers from Odessa, Kherson, and Kharkiv.²⁰ Yugoslavia was represented by a Union of Landholders in Serbia, while Estonia boasted a Committee of Ukrainian Emigrants in Estonia.²¹

The following year saw the birth of the Union of Landholders of the ČSR, while 1924 witnessed the formation of the Podebrady-based Landholder organization, *Ukrains'kyi Stiah* (Ukrainian Banner), and—what was certainly the Hetmanite movement's greatest coup to date—the affiliation of the mass-membership *Sich* gymnastic organizations in the United States and Canada.²² Smaller, usually short-lived, groups of Landholders were also found in Germany, Bulgaria, France, and Galicia.²³

A special effort was undertaken to recruit cadres among the Ukrainian military emigres, a group whose numbers had vastly expanded at the end of 1920 as a consequence of Petliura's defeat and Wrangel's evacuation from the Crimea. Accordingly, a Hetmanite front organization, the Ukrainian Union of Officers (*Ukrains'kyi Soiuz Starshyn*), was founded on 18 April 1920 in Vienna, and designed as a magnet for Galician officers disillusioned with the ZUNR.²⁴ Some inroads also appear to have been made among Petliura's soldiers. As the Supreme Otaman himself wrote in a letter to his Berlin representative, Roman Smal'-Stots'kyi, on 3 February 1921:

Skoropads'kyi's agents (certain members of the party of "Landholders") are propagating this idea [the restoration of the Hetmanate] in certain military circles among officers. But only individual officers are succumbing to their agitation. . . . All of this Hetmanite agitation . . . would not be

20. "Organizatsiini zbory ukrains'kykh khliborobiv v Bukareshti," *Khliborobs'ka Ukraina*, No. 5-6 (1921), p. 178; "Rezoliutsiia, ukhvalena na 3-mu org. zib. ukr. zeml. i promyslovtiv," *Volia*, II, no. 11/12 (June 1921), p. 468.

21. "Pryvitannia," *Khliborobs'ka Ukraina*, No. 5-6 (1921), pp. 179-80; Shemet, "Ohliad," p. 175.

22. Ivan Korowytsky (Ed.), *Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi. Lysty Dmytra Doroshenka do Viacheslava Lypyns'koho* (Philadelphia, 1973), VI, p. 172; "Do istorii Het'mans'koho rukhu," *Ukrains'kyi Derzhavnyk. Kalendar-Al'manakh na 1942 rik* (Berlin, 1942), pp. 69-70; *Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi. Lysty Osypa Nazaruka do Viacheslava Lypyns'koho* (Philadelphia, 1973), VII, pp. 475-92.

23. *Ukrains'kyi Derzhavnyk*, p. 65; Alexander J. Motyl, *The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919-1929* (Boulder, Col., 1980), pp. 140, 169; Serhii Shemet, "V. K. Lypyns'kyi pry hromads'kii roboti," in *V. Lypyns'kyi iak ideoloh i politik* (Uzhhorod, 1931), p. 27.

24. Motyl, *The Turn to the Right*, p. 98.

worth mentioning if it did not introduce some seeds of decay into our army. Therefore, it must be stopped.²⁵

Like Petliura, the Ukrainian emigre political community could not have failed to notice that the Hetmanites were on the march.

VI

The USKhD's character as an exclusively ideological vanguard and the steady growth of autonomous Landholder organizations made the formation of a coordinating body an urgent necessity. On 19 May 1921, Lypyns'kyi urged the "concretization" of the Hetmanite "idea" and the creation of a "centre of state thought and politics" in association with the former Hetman.²⁶ Since associating a central organ with Skoropads'kyi ran the risk of investing him with substantial powers, Lypyns'kyi insisted that he join the Council of the Sworn and, in this manner, submit to the USKhD's regulations, moral code, and, most important, the formal authority of Lypyns'kyi himself as Head of the Council.²⁷ On 5 November 1921 Lypyns'kyi presented Skoropads'kyi with an "ultimatum . . . regarding political cooperation."²⁸ The Hetman reluctantly submitted and signed the USKhD Oath.

The next year, at a congress in Reichenau, 4-8 June 1922, representatives of the USKhD, Landholder unions in Poland, Germany, and Romania, and the Group of Ukrainian Landholders in Bulgaria assigned the task of coordinating the movement's activities to a Central Board of United Ukrainian Landholder Organizations.²⁹ The congress further endowed Skoropads'kyi with a mandate to "stand at the forefront of the renewed Hetmanite movement, represent it before foreign forces, and guide it by appointing the Head" of the Board.³⁰ Skoropads'kyi chose a certain Ivan Leontovych for the position, while Shemet became deputy.³¹

25. T. Hunczak, *et al.* (Eds.), *Symon Petliura. Statti Lysty Dokumenty* (New York, 1979), II, p. 491.

26. Shemet, "V. K. Lypyns'kyi," p. 28.

27. Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi, "Rozkol sered Het'mantsiv," *Dilo*, 30 September-9 October 1930.

28. *Dennyk Viacheslava Lypyns'koho No. II za roky 1919-1931*, entry of 5 November 1921 (The Archive of the W. K. Lypynsky East European Research Institute—hereafter referred to as ALEERI).

29. "Tsentral'na Uprava Obiednanykh Ukrain's'kykh Khliborobs'kykh Organizatsii," *Khliborobs'ka Ukraina*, No. 7-8 (1922-1923), p. 302.

30. *Ukrains'kyi Derzhavnyk*, p. 66.

31. "Tsentral'na Uprava," p. 302.

The significance of the June congress went beyond the creation of an executive body for the Hetmanite movement and the formal reinstatement of Skoropads'kyi as Hetman. Above all, the formation of the Board was to mark Lypyns'kyi's departure from active political life and his exclusive dedication to questions of ideology, presumably for reasons of health.³² In fact, however, the opposite occurred. First, the structure of the Hetmanite movement did not permit Lypyns'kyi the luxury of retiring as the movement's ideologue, since it appears to have been generally agreed that the USKhD Council of the Sworn, of which he was still Head, was to supervise the work of the Central Board. Second, Lypyns'kyi, never one to take a back seat, could not resist interfering in its affairs. Inevitably, conflicts arose between him and Skoropads'kyi's appointee, Leontovych, with the result that the latter soon resigned from his post.³³ His successor, Shemet, proved to be no easier to work with for Lypyns'kyi.

It was doubtless as a result of these conflicts that Lypyns'kyi's attitude became increasingly negative in the years that followed the 1922 congress. In November 1926, upon arriving in Berlin, where he was to assume a position in the newly founded Ukrainian Scientific Institute, he recorded the following impressions in his diary:

The attitude I encountered here is worse than I had imagined. It seems that everyone has already forgotten about the Council of the Sworn. Ukrainians are like small children and savages: even in politics they always search for new toys and playthings. Nowadays, one such modern plaything is the so-called "big cause," with the hope of obtaining big money followed by dreams of what to do with this money. Related to which dear Shemet is now dreaming of work in the future general staff (yes!) as a technician, while the *Pan* Hetman is searching for a Cavour to be chairman of the Central Board. In the meantime, they abuse and blacken everyone and everything and think that a Hetmanite Ukraine already exists. . . . Instead of unifying the handful that already exists, they are disuniting and democratizing it.

My plan is as follows: either I will again succeed in placing the *idea* and *organization* in first place, or I will not succeed in overcoming this emigre twaddle and speculation and will then have to leave the cause, for which I cannot assume responsibility.³⁴

32. Shemet, "V. K. Lypyns'kyi," p. 31.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

34. *Dnevnyk No. III (Berlin) 13.XI.1926 — 29.VIII.1927*, entry of 10 November 1926 (ALEERI).

Several months later, on 5 February 1927, completely discouraged by the Berliners' political ruthlessness and his own inability to transform "idiots" into "wise men" and "cripples" into "knights," Lypyns'kyi presented the Council of the Sworn with three options:

- 1) My favourite one: the spirit of the Council of the Sworn of 1920 is re-established and we begin to work with [our] former enthusiasm, mutual love, and trust. But, insofar as I consider such a spiritual resurrection and renewal of that which was killed by the Central Board's political technique to be impossible at present, I do not insist on such a resolution.
- 2) The course of the "political technique" accepted in Berlin is further continued, but the Central Board is supplemented with people of the old spirit: Montrezor or [Mykola] Kochubei. Then I will not give up the leadership of the Council of the Sworn, but I will not convene it until the old spirit is eventually reborn in joint work.
- 3) Everything remains as is and the Central Board is not reformed—then I will abandon my leadership in the Council of the Sworn.³⁵

In spite of Shemet's and Skoropads'kyi's lack of enthusiasm for, if not actual hostility to, his plans for reform, Lypyns'kyi still had enough authority and allies to push through an improved version of the second option.³⁶ As a result, on 21 March 1927, Skoropads'kyi issued a Command, which formally launched a new "Hetmanite Board" and laid down the distribution of powers and functions within the Hetmanite movement.³⁷

For the time being, the Command seems to have satisfied Lypyns'kyi's desire for a return to the "spirit of 1920." The triangular system of checks and balances it instituted appeared to guarantee that neither the Hetman, nor the Board, nor the Council of the Sworn would have excessive power. Moreover, it explicitly acknowledged Lypyns'kyi's right to supervise the entire movement as well as—and this mattered most to him—the Board and the Hetman. Another Command, issued 10 August 1927, declared Mykola Kochubei Head and Skoropys-Ioltukhovs'kyi and Montrezor Members of the Hetmanite Board.³⁸ Since Kochubei and Montrezor were

35. *Ibid.*, entry of 5 February 1927.

36. *Ibid.*, entry of 13 March 1927.

37. "Nakaz Het'mans'kii Upravi na chas perebuvannia na emigratsii, Vannzee, 21.III.1927," *Biuletyn' Het'mans'koi Upravy*, No. 1 (January 1929), pp. 2-3.

38. "Nakaz Tsentral'nii Upravi Obiednanykh Ukrain's'kykh Khliborobs'kykh Organizatsii, Vannzee, 10 serpnia 1927," *Biuletyn' Het'mans'koi Upravy*, No. 2 (March 1929), p. 2.

“his” men, Lypyns’kyi’s second option had clearly been realized and his expectations for reform had been exceeded. Nevertheless, perfectionist that he was, he remained pessimistic about the future. On 23 March 1927, just after the new Board had been announced, Lypyns’kyi sadly noted in his diary:

How poor Kochubei will manage with the two greatest wreckers of our cause—the Hetman and Shemet—I do not know. Characteristically, both of them, for different reasons, did not at one time want to join us and enter the Council of the Sworn. It is apparent that now also they are strangers to our cause and unconsciously harm it all the time. I will do everything possible to help Kochubei under these tragic circumstances, when it is necessary to create a Hetmanate against the Hetman.³⁹

Skoropads’kyi, clearly, was at the core of the problem; indeed, in Lypyns’kyi’s eyes, he *was* the problem. Why?

VII

Following his abdication on 14 December 1918, Hetman Skoropads’kyi and his wife had escaped to Germany. He had settled first in Lausanne, where he remained for approximately two years, and then moved near to Berlin. With the help of some highly placed friends in the German government, especially General Gröner of the Ministry of Defence, he succeeded in acquiring a yearly pension of 10,000 marks, which assured him a comfortable existence in his villa in Wannsee.⁴⁰ Despite his abdication, the ambitious Hetman did not retire from Ukrainian politics. Some time in the winter of 1919-20, a group of his supporters approached him with the suggestion that he “make use of his legal Hetman rights in order to save the dying idea of Ukrainian statehood [. . .] From that moment [. . .] there began the new political activity of the Hetman, conducted at all times together with Ukrainian Hetmanites-monarchists united about his Supreme Leadership.”⁴¹

The Hetman’s unwillingness to accept the mere “symbolhood” Lypyns’kyi wanted to impose on him became increasingly evident in the course of the 1920s. Two years of intense lobbying succeeded in procuring

39. *Dnevnyk No. III*, entry of 23 March 1927.

40. Ihor Kamenets’kyi, “Ukrains’ke pytannia v nimets’kii zovnishni politytsi mizh dvoma svitovymi viinamy,” in *Ievhen Konovalets’ ta ioho doba* (Munich, 1974), pp. 854-56.

41. “Komunikat Tsentral’noi Upravy Obiednanykh Ukrain’s’kykh Khliborobs’kykh Organizatsii,” *Khliborobs’ka Ukraina*, Book 5 (1924-1925), p. 391.

German political and financial support for the Ukrainian Scientific Institute, which opened in Berlin on 10 November 1926.⁴² The Hetman also remained active in non-Ukrainian circles; he appears to have developed ties to several intelligence services, probably those of Germany and Hungary.⁴³ The most persuasive evidence of his growing political involvement, however, is his clandestine meeting, in January 1929, with Hungary's Prime Minister, Count Bethlen, without the knowledge of the Hetmanite Board or Lypyns'kyi. In Skoropads'kyi's words: "I promised to provide a document to the effect that I recognize the former boundaries of Hungary and am not interested in countries lying within its boundaries. He [Bethlen] asked me how much money I needed. 'The more the better, no less than 50 thousand pengö per month.'"⁴⁴ In a word, the Hetman had agreed to renounce the Ukrainian claim to Transcarpathia in return for Hungarian support. Lypyns'kyi, of course, was outraged both by Skoropads'kyi's willingness to surrender Ukrainian territory and, probably even more, by his outright violation of his mandate as "symbol" of Ukrainian monarchism.

The Hungarian incident was only one example of a running feud between the two men that lasted throughout the decade. As early as 1920, for example, Lypyns'kyi had criticized the Hetman in the first chapter of *Lysty* for the federation with Russia.⁴⁵ Lypyns'kyi's insistence on and Skoropads'kyi's resistance to membership in the Council of the Sworn was further evidence of bad blood. Yet Lypyns'kyi's ultimate break with Skoropads'kyi involved far more than a "continual divergence" of opinion between two strong-willed men.⁴⁶ The Hetmanite movement's institutional structure was predicated on a form of "dual sovereignty" that was bound to lead to a collision between the Council of the Sworn, which Lypyns'kyi directed out of Reichenau, and the Board, centred on Skoropads'kyi and located in Berlin. But the real cause of the explosion that tore the Hetmanite movement apart was Lypyns'kyi's fanatical commitment to ideological purity and his moralistic distaste for the political wheeling and dealing that his Berlin colleagues were forced to practise.

42. See *Lysty Dmytra Doroshenka*, pp. 108-245.

43. Sviatoslav Dolenga, *Skoropadshchyna* (Warsaw, 1934), p. 160.

44. "Vypyska z lysta P. P. Skoropads'koho do V. K. Lypyns'koho z d. 16.III. 1929 r." (ALEERI).

45. Lypyns'kyi, *Lysty do brativ-khliborobiv*, p. 8, fn.

46. *Dnevnyk No. III*, entry of 10 November 1926.

VIII

Although he was no friend of Lypyns'kyi, Shemet was probably correct in observing that, "As long as Lypyns'kyi was in charge both of organizational work and of practical politics, that is, until the foundation of a separate organ (the Central Board), he recognized the need for compromise and the necessity to pay attention to real conditions, and not only to ideological principles. . . ." ⁴⁷ But, as he lost his appreciation for compromise, Lypyns'kyi began to meddle in the Board's affairs. According to Shemet, "he began to make proposals and offer advice to the Central Board ever more frequently. He went so far in this direction as to involve himself in resolving a number of practical organizational questions, sanctioning with his authority the creation of new organizations, occasionally giving his approval to unserious [. . .] initiatives without keeping the Central Board informed, and sometimes even acting in opposition to the decisions of the executive organ." ⁴⁸ Of particular interest is Shemet's admission that the "Central Board, in view of the sorry state of Lypyns'kyi's nerves and lungs, never started a quarrel with Lypyns'kyi, but attempted to neutralize these disorganizational instances by means of direct relations with the interested groups or by completely ignoring cases with no serious significance." ⁴⁹ In other words, the Board did more than ignore "cases;" it ignored Lypyns'kyi.

Lypyns'kyi's ten-month stay in Berlin, from 9 November 1926 to 30 August 1927, only exacerbated his relations with Skoropads'kyi, Shemet, and their colleagues. ⁵⁰ The politicking he witnessed further reinforced his conviction that the movement was suffering from advanced moral decay. The Berliners, meanwhile, probably chafed under the all-too-watchful eye of a man with no appreciation of their day-to-day concerns.

His tuberculous condition dangerously aggravated by Berlin's damp climate, Lypyns'kyi returned to Austria, where he spent several months convalescing in a variety of sanatoria. ⁵¹ As soon as his health improved, however, he returned to the fray. For the moment, his principal opponent was Shemet. Although excluded from the Hetmanite Board and thereby stripped of the powers he wielded in the Central Board, Shemet continued

47. Shemet, "V. K. Lypyns'kyi," pp. 30-31.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

49. *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.*

50. *Dennyk Viacheslava Lypyns'koho No. II*, entry of 9 November 1926 and 30 August 1927.

51. Kozak, "Z zhyttia," pp. 425-26.

his opposition to Lypyns'kyi's ideological overlordship by mailing out "semi-official enunciations" to the members of the Council of the Sworn.⁵² Typical of his sentiments was the following: "The attempt to make a Mohammed of Lypyns'kyi and a Koran of his *Lysty do brativ-khliborobiv* is excessive. Such excess only repels realistically attuned elements who seek political knowledge, and not political faith. For these elements, among whom I count myself, *Lysty do brativ-khliborobiv* remains a handbook, and not the Koran."⁵³ In early 1928, Lypyns'kyi responded to Shemet's accusations with a brochure, *Kham i Iafet*, in which he identified himself with Japhet and Shemet with the refractory Ham.⁵⁴

Bitter disappointments also awaited Lypyns'kyi with regard to other leading Hetmanites: his once warm relations with Osyp Nazaruk, a Hetmanite propagandist and editor, since 1927, of the Catholic newspaper *Nova Zoria* in Galicia, sharply deteriorated over questions of ideology and politics. Another vicious dispute developed between Lypyns'kyi and Nazaruk's colleague, a former Hetmanite sympathizer, Stepan Tomashivs'kyi.⁵⁵ Worse still, in Lypyns'kyi's view, in neither case did his allies support him unequivocally. Doroshenko informed him that some of Tomashivs'kyi's arguments might not be incorrect, while Liudvyk Sidlets'kyi and Montrezor, who served as mediators in special negotiations with Nazaruk, proved far too even-handed for Lypyns'kyi's taste.⁵⁶ He denounced them in his diary as "empty traitors who, in order to impress the boor Nazaruk with their 'aristocratism,' did not defend my honour, as I instructed them to do." "All my illusions," added Lypyns'kyi, "are vanishing, one by one."⁵⁷

Perhaps Lypyns'kyi's greatest disillusionment involved his close friend, Mykola Kochubei. Their friendship first underwent a trial in the winter months of 1928-29, when Kochubei's behaviour as Head of the Hetmanite Board for some reason struck Lypyns'kyi as a form of "otamanism" and "betrayal."⁵⁸ In December, however, their friendship received

52. "Rozkol sered Het'mantsiv."

53. *Ibid.*

54. Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi, *Kham i Iafet* (L'viv, 1928).

55. Ivan Lysiak-Rudnyts'kyi, "Nazaruk i Lypyns'kyi: istoriia ikhn'oi druzhby ta konfliktu," in *Lysty Osypa Nazaruka*, pp. xv-xcvii.

56. *Lysty Dmytra Doroshenka*, pp. 348-61; *Lysty Osypa Nazaruka*, pp. 501-503.

57. *Dennyk Viacheslava Lypyns'koho No. II*, entry of 14 October 1929.

58. *Ibid.*, entries of 4 and 20-22 December 1928.

a more serious blow: Kochubei's romantic inclinations towards the Hetman's daughter produced a scandal within the movement and so angered the staid Lypyns'kyi that he broke off all ties with him.⁵⁹ It was only in August 1930, on the very eve of his final break with Skoropads'kyi, that Lypyns'kyi overcame his self-righteousness and again became reconciled with his errant comrade.⁶⁰

The upshot of these incidents was not unexpected: Lypyns'kyi's isolation from well-nigh all the leading Hetmanites. A series of "betrayals" by his colleagues and his deteriorating health led him to seek a resolution of the crisis. As he wrote to Dr. Volodymyr Zalozets'kyi, one of his few remaining allies: "The [next] 10 months are supposed to be either a last attempt to set right the organization in its present forms or a preparation for new organizational forms."⁶¹

Complex negotiations between Lypyns'kyi and Skoropads'kyi followed. The gap between them, however, could no longer be bridged. Both sides had gone too far in their accusations and were in no mood for compromise. The power struggle was finally resolved when Skoropads'kyi decided to stamp his position with the legitimacy of numbers by convening the "First Congress of Hetmanites," a gathering of more than dubious legality. Held 19-21 July in Wannsee and attended by Shemet, Skoropys-Ioltukhovs'kyi, and eight less prominent Hetmanites,⁶² the congress placed the blame for Lypyns'kyi's conflict with the Berlin centre exclusively on his "physical illness" and expressed its "most sincere gratitude to His Majesty the *Pan* Hetman for not having hesitated, at a critical moment in our organizational life, to take upon HIMSELF the odium of the heritage left by the first Hetmanite Board. . . ."⁶³ Lypyns'kyi, clearly, was being squeezed out of the Hetmanite ranks.

Outraged at the "Wannsee cloaca,"⁶⁴ Lypyns'kyi responded with the only weapon he had left: on 18 September he informed the Council of the

59. *Dennyk Viacheslava Lypyns'koho No. II*, entries of 21 and 23 December 1929.

60. *Ibid.*, entry of 22 August 1930.

61. "Lyst Viacheslava Lypyns'koho do Volodymyra Zalozets'koho z 12 veresnia 1929" (ALEERI).

62. "Komunikat. Pershyi Z'izd Het'mantsiv 19-21 lypnia 1930," *Biuletyn' Het'mans'koi Upravy*, No. 7-8 (July-August 1930), pp. 1-2; "Rozkol sered Het'mantsiv."

63. "Rozkol sered Het'mantsiv."

64. *Dennyk Viacheslava Lypyns'koho No. II*, entry of 23 August 1930.

Sworn that he was dissolving it together with the entire USKhD.⁶⁵ Soon afterwards, he set up a new organization, clumsily named the "Brotherhood of Ukrainian Classocrats-Monarchists, Hetmanites" (*Bratstvo Ukrains'kykh Kliasokrativ-Monarkhistiv, Het'mantsiv*).⁶⁶ Ideologically and politically, the Brotherhood differed little from the USKhD, except that it left open the question of who should be Hetman.⁶⁷

Not surprisingly, the Council of the Sworn declared Lypyns'kyi's dissolution of the USKhD null and void and affirmed that the organization "exists and will continue to exist."⁶⁸ A little-known Hetmanite, Iosyp Mel'nyk, was appointed Head of the Council.⁶⁹ Several years later, however, the USKhD was indeed dissolved, but this time by its own members. In its place there arose the Union of Hetmanite State-Builders (*Soiuz Het'mantsiv-Derzhavnykiv*).⁷⁰ Skoropads'kyi assumed leadership of the Union, placed himself in charge of its external policy, and was granted the right to appoint and dismiss the Head of the Hetmanite Board.⁷¹ Lypyns'kyi's fears of Skoropads'kyi's dictatorial ambitions had proved correct. But he was spared the double agony of seeing Skoropads'kyi attain complete control over a moribund, emigre organization, for, on 14 June 1931, Lypyns'kyi had died.

IX

Did Lypyns'kyi, as Head of the Council of the Sworn, actually have the authority to dissolve both the Council and the USKhD? Lypyns'kyi claimed that he did on the grounds that the Head was empowered to resolve disagreements within the Council and that, "after exhausting . . . all means of reconciling the opposing views and setting right the members of the Council of the Sworn who were unfaithful to their Oath," no other way remained out of the impasse.⁷² Clearly, this is an extreme interpretation of

65. "Rozkol sered Het'mantsiv."

66. Kozak, "Z Zhyttia," p. 427.

67. Ivan Lysiak-Rudnyts'kyi, "Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi. Istoryk, politychnyi diiach i myslytel'," *Suchasnist'*, 1961, No. 6, pp. 80-81.

68. "Vid Rady Prysiazhnykh USKhD povidomliaiet'sia," *Biuleten' Het'mans'koi Upravy*, No. 9 (September 1930), p. 1.

69. "Postanova Rady Prysiazhnykh USKhD z 10 zhovtnia 1930," *Biuleten' Het'mans'koi Upravy*, No. 10-11 (October-November 1930), p. 1.

70. *Ukrains'kyi Derzhavnyk*, p. 73.

71. *Ibid.*, p. 73.

72. "Rozkol sered Het'mantsiv."

the USKhD Regulations and hardly seems consistent with their letter or their spirit.

What is more, by his action Lypyns'kyi was ensuring the ultimate failure of Ukrainian monarchism. In an earlier polemic he had stressed that unity was essential to the movement: "If there appear many Ukrainian monarchist organizations, the cause of Ukrainian monarchism, and with it the cause of the Ukrainian State and the Ukrainian Nation, is lost."⁷³ Only five years after he had written these lines, Lypyns'kyi himself shattered the unity of Ukrainian monarchism and reduced it to the mediocrity that so often plagues emigres.

73. Lypyns'kyi, *Poklykannia*, pp. 111-12.