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HOW THE “IRON MINISTER” KAGANOVICH FAILED TO DISCIPLINE UKRAINIAN HISTORIANS:
A STALINIST IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN RECONSIDERED

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In late February 1947, Stalin’s trusted troubleshooter Lazar’ Kaganovich arrived in Kiev as the Ukrainian Communist Party’s new first secretary. Having served consecutively as the Soviet People’s Commissar of Railroad Transport, Heavy Industry, and Construction Materials, the notoriously heavy-handed Kaganovich had earned the epithet of zheleznyi narkom (“iron minister”). His tenure at the head of the Ukrainian party organization in March–December 1947 was marked by intensified coercive intervention in the economy and ideological purges in culture and scholarship. In Ukraine, Kaganovich’s brief rule is remembered primarily for his relentless attacks on the alleged remnants of “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism.” In the works of post-Soviet Ukrainian historians, the 1947 crusade against “nationalism” appears as a comprehensive campaign masterminded by Stalin, planned by his envoy Kaganovich, faithfully implemented by the servile republican functionaries, and submissively endured by the terrorized Ukrainian intellectuals.1 Clearly, modern Ukrainian historians have adopted the traditional Western concept of Stalinism as a successful totalitarian dictatorship, in which society was no more than a passive object of an all-powerful state.

However, the recently declassified archives of the Ukrainian Communist Party’s Central Committee document the infinitely more complex dynamics of the state–society relationship in Soviet Ukraine. Thus, an examination of the 1947 ideological campaign against “nationalist deviations” in Ukrainian historical scholarship can provide new insights into the functioning of the Stalinist system. This article questions both the planned character and the coherence of the campaign; the traditional distribution of roles among the party hierarchy, republican functionaries, and Ukrainian intellectuals, as well as the accepted view of the campaign’s success. It also proposes to analyze Stalinism as a system seeking to achieve total control over society but in reality often locked into a complex, if unequal, dialogue with its subjects. The notion of “dialogue” is used here in the sense it acquired after the work of Mikhail Bakhtin and Fredric Jameson.2 Its application to Stalinism opens up a new way to study the strategies of resistance within the official discourse, to analyze how various social or ethnic groups can negotiate the meaning of the official language to defend or promote their own agendas. Significantly, students of Soviet social history are also becoming attentive to the linguistic mechanisms of state–society interaction.
Stephen Kotkin has recently argued that the workers came to share Stalinist “civilization” by learning to “speak Bolshevik” and to express their interests in this acceptable language.  

The following analysis will show how the unequal “negotiation” between the functionaries and local intellectuals shaped the 1947 ideological purge in Ukraine, allowing the republic’s historians to downgrade the campaign against them. The article’s last section places the postwar crusade against the “nationalist deviations” in history in a wider social context. A survey of the nationalist underground’s and non-conformist citizens’ reaction to the campaign demonstrates that the hegemonic discourse on the past was entangled in an unescapable dialogue with a suppressed counter-discourse.

The Roots of a “Nationalist Deviation”

Kaganovich’s appointment was determined by his reputation as a specialist on Ukraine. A Ukrainian-born Jew, Kaganovich began his revolutionary work in Ukraine and in 1925–1928 returned to lead the Ukrainian Communist Party. Moscow sent him to the republic to enforce the official policy of Ukrainization, a shortlived Bolshevik program of developing a native high culture, combined with affirmative action measures to advance the indigenous cadres. In spite of its desire to promote Ukrainization, the party was watching carefully to ensure that “healthy” non-Russian ethnolinguistic cultures were being developed without the element of political nationalism. While promoting the Ukrainian language and local cadres, Kaganovich also carried out a fierce campaign against nationalist deviations in culture and scholarship. He targeted Ukrainian communists who were attempting to use the categories of Marxist class analysis to explain the specifics of their nation’s path to the revolution. The leading “national communist” historian Matvii Iavors’kyi, for instance, suffered for suggesting that the peasants, rather than the workers, had led the Ukrainian revolutionary process.

None of the Ukrainian “national communists,” however, professed traditional “bourgeois patriotism” or believed in the cult of the nation’s great ancestors. Indeed, Iavors’kyi and his colleagues themselves relentlessly attacked the dean of prerevolutionary Ukrainian historians, Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1866–1934), for “nationalism” and insufficient attention to the class struggle in the Ukrainian past. By the mid-1930s, Stalin’s “Revolution from Above” brought about a departure from Soviet identification with proletarian internationalism. Diagnosed by contemporary Western observers as the “Great Retreat” to prerevolutionary Russian traditions, and by the later scholars as the “Big Deal” between the authorities and the cultural tastes of the new Soviet middle class, this transformation included the state-sponsored rehabilitation of Russian patriotism, national pride, and tsarist heroes.

From the late 1930s and especially after the beginning of the war in 1941, the rehabilitation of Russian patriotism and the “heroic past” went hand in hand with
similar processes in the non-Russian republics. In Ukraine, official propaganda exalted the Ukrainian equivalents of canonic Stalinist heroes Aleksandr Nevskii, Ivan the Terrible, and Peter the Great—Prince Danylo of Halych (Daniil Galitkii) and the Cossack hetman Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi (Bogdan Khmel’nitskii). The Soviet ideologues attempted to reconcile the Russian and non-Russian patriotic national mythologies within the overarching narrative of the “friendship of peoples.” Nevertheless, after regaining the strategic initiative in the war by 1943–1944, Moscow indicated its unhappiness with the growth of non-Russian partiotisms by denouncing the History of the Kazakh SSR. At about the same time, a special meeting of the Politburo in Moscow discussed Oleksandr Dovzhenko’s novel Ukraine in Flames. Stalin personally accused Dovzhenko of “revising Leninism” by emphasizing national pride over the principle of class struggle. The situation in Ukraine was further complicated by the nationalist insurgency in Western Ukraine, which had recently been incorporated into the Soviet Union. Nationalist propaganda offered a narrative of the Ukrainian patriotic past suspiciously similar to that of the wartime Soviet ideologues, albeit without endorsing the “friendship of peoples” paradigm.

The postwar ideological purges in the republic aimed precisely at the final eradication of any appeal in the official discourse to non-Russian ethnic patriotism and the grand narrative of the nation. In late summer of 1946, the All-Union Communist Party (VKP(b)) Central Committee’s secretary, Andrei Zhdanov, initiated a crusade against liberalism and Western influences in Soviet literature and the arts, which became known as the Zhdanovshchina. But whereas the Moscow and Leningrad writers, composers, and artists were accused of “kowtowing to the West,” their Ukrainian colleagues were castigated primarily for their “harmful idealization” of Ukraine’s prerevolutionary past. The party ideologues accused the Ukrainian litterateurs of following the footsteps of “bourgeois nationalist” Hrushevsk’yi in identifying with the exclusively Ukrainian past, rather than the shared Soviet present. The 1946 campaign did not spread into historical scholarship proper. Nonetheless, the authorities denounced the Survey of the History of Ukrainian Literature (1946) for allegedly not discriminating between the reactionary and progressive Ukrainian prerevolutionary literature. Several historians in Western Ukraine, including Professor Ivan Kryp”iakevych, were accused of espousing Hrushevskian views, but when Kaganovich arrived in the republic the ideological purification of Ukrainian culture was dying out.

As the Ukrainian party leader, Kaganovich replaced Nikita Khrushchev, who until then had held the positions of both first secretary and Ukrainian premier. (He retained the second office.) Whatever the reason for Khrushchev’s sudden demotion, it had nothing to do with “nationalist deviations” in the republic. Khrushchev himself claimed that his requests for food assistance for Ukraine during the 1946 famine caused Stalin’s wrath. Scholars have argued in a similar vein that Khrushchev’s powerful rival in Moscow, Georgii Malenkov, attempted to discredit the Ukrainian leader’s agricultural policies in order to remove him from the succession line.
minutes of the meeting at which the Politburo decided to stop combining the offices of Ukrainian first secretary and premier actually explain that this practice had been “dictated by the specific conditions of the war.” A similar division of positions occurred in the neighboring Belarus, where Panteleimon Ponomarenko also lost the office of first secretary.\textsuperscript{13}

Both Khrushchev and Kaganovich agree in their otherwise remarkably antagonistic memoirs that Kaganovich’s main task was to revitalize Ukrainian agriculture, which had not yet recovered from wartime destruction. Nevertheless, the same Politburo decree also appointed a special Secretary for Agriculture of the Ukrainian Central Committee, Nikolai Patolichev. Agriculture was also a major area of specialization for Premier Khrushchev. Lacking their expertise and eager to demonstrate to Moscow his ability to find and solve problems, Kaganovich began looking for errors elsewhere and especially in ideology, where he had found them so successfully in 1925–1928. In Khrushchev’s words, “From the very beginning of his activities in Ukraine, Kaganovich looked for every opportunity to show off and to throw his weight around.”\textsuperscript{14} This search soon led the new first secretary to the promising field of Ukrainian historiography.

The Enforced Dialogue

The available archives of the All-Union and Ukrainian party Central Committees do not contain any hints regarding Moscow’s masterplan to purge Ukrainian historians, nor do they confirm that Kaganovich himself had such a scheme. In fact, the first secretary’s interest in historical scholarship first surfaced in a rather curious form in April 1947. As the Central Committee was reviewing the working plans of the republican Academy of Sciences, someone apparently brought to Kaganovich’s attention that the Academy’s Institute of History of Ukraine planned to publish a collection of articles, “The Critique of the Bourgeois-Nationalist Theory of Hrushevskyi and His ‘School.’” Listed among the collection’s authors was Professor Ivan Kryp’iakevych, who had not only been Hrushevskyi’s student but remained in L’viv under the German occupation and even published there anti-Soviet works on Ukrainian history. The indignant Kaganovich immediately arranged for an unusual resolution of the Central Committee. The Ukrainian party’s highest body decreed the exclusion of Kryp’iakevych from the plan, denouncing him as “a student and epigone of Hrushevskyi,” as well as the “author of the spiteful anti-Soviet Fascist book \textit{History of Ukraine}, which was published in L’viv under the German occupation.”\textsuperscript{15}

Although Kryp’iakevych continued working at the Institute after the resolution, this decree effectively buried the anti-Hrushevskian collection. While the Institute’s working plan for 1947 had listed most leading researchers as preparing their articles, the five-year report for 1946–1950 did not even mention the project.\textsuperscript{16} Unaware of this effect of his intervention, Kaganovich meanwhile decided to look more closely
KAGANOVICH’S FAILURE TO DISCIPLINE UKRAINIAN HISTORIANS

into the state of Soviet Ukrainian historical scholarship. On 27 April, the Central Committee decreed the holding of a conference of leading historians, with the aim of “discovering the causes of the bourgeois-nationalist deviations” in their recent works. The conference opened on 29 April with a two-day session and continued on 6 May.\(^{17}\)

Probably because of Kaganovich’s personal participation, the 1947 conference left a powerful impression on the postwar generation of Ukrainian historians. By the 1990s, their students would describe it as a major event in the party’s ideological brainwashing of historians, during which Kaganovich intimidated Ukrainian scholars;\(^{18}\) however, the conference’s minutes reveal that historians themselves did most of the talking. The party bosses had neither the primary material, nor the knowledge necessary to analyze what they had designated as “nationalist errors” in historical works. With the expectation that the scholars would criticize themselves, they could, nonetheless, initiate an unequal dialogue with historians.

Although none of his official positions seemed to justify him doing so, the republic’s foreign minister and ideological éminence grise Dmytro Manuil’s’kyi served as chair.\(^{19}\) In a brief introductory speech, he called upon those present to uncover the “bourgeois-nationalist” errors in Ukrainian historiography, the vice that had suddenly surfaced after 30 years of Soviet power. The first speaker, the historian Fedir Los’, recited the catalogue of the principal “mistakes” of the Institute of History which its researchers were prepared to acknowledge. This attempt at self-criticism focused on the coverage of prerevolutionary history in the Institute’s wartime synthetic works: *History of Ukraine: A Short Course* (1940), *Survey of the History of Ukraine* (1942), and *History of Ukraine*, Vol. 1 (1943). Significantly, though, Los’ did not designate the listed shortcomings as “nationalistic.” The first major error was that the periodization of Ukrainian history was not explicitly based on Marxist-Leninist socioeconomic formations such as feudalism and capitalism but relied instead on the evolution of state structures and events of political history. Second, instead of highlighting the historic ties with Russia both before and after Ukraine’s union with Muscovy in 1654, the authors studied Ukrainian history of the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries in connection with events in Lithuania, Poland, and Western Europe. In this context, Ukrainian scholars particularly “overestimated” the historic role of the Galician–Volhynian Principality. Finally, in their portrayal of the seventeenth-century Cossack wars and modern Ukrainian history in general, historians had forgotten that “the category of class is the principal one, and that the national factor is always secondary to the social.”\(^{20}\)

Then the Institute’s director and authority on the Cossack period, Mykola Petrovs’kyi, took the floor. He dwelt at length on Hrushevsky’s heresy and, at the end, briefly repented not sufficiently stressing in his own works that the Cossacks and rebellious peasants fought both the foreign oppressors and the native feudal lords. Professor Mytrofan Brychkevych offered some general thoughts on the importance of education and hard work for combating the lasting influence of
Hrushevs’kyi. At this point, Kaganovich grew tired of waiting for the “real” confessions and interrupted the speaker with a suggestion: “Let us consider the errors of many of our people, who stand by Soviet power, the party, Marxism-Leninism with all their heart and politically [support them], but who are at the same time making mistakes in theoretical scholarship, drag behind Hrushevs’kyi, and approach their subject incorrectly, not as Marxists.”

This remark should have lightened the participants’ mood, for the first secretary clearly had modified Manuil’s’kyi’s menacing introductory call to uncover “bourgeois-nationalist” deviations. Kaganovich seemed to accept the historians’ basic loyalty to the party cause, but subsequent speakers also preferred to denounce the long dead Hrushevs’kyi rather than acknowledge their own errors. Although Kaganovich and the historians used the same ideological lexicon, they pursued different agendas. As a result, the minutes feature some entertaining exchanges between the Ukrainian party leader and the conference participants:

Kaganovich: [T]here are some thin threads that connect [a historian] to the views, which were introduced by Hrushevs’kyi and others. Therefore, to strengthen our position, these thin, invisible threads need to be …

Lavrov: Cut.

Kaganovich: To cut is easy. In this case, we must dissolve them chemically, not simply cut them. But first of all we need to identify them. What are these thin, invisible threads that remain? We have torn the ropes and the cords already. But there are still thin, invisible threads that confuse our people. Some people have good intentions but they cannot and do not want to act against their conscience. They studied history from the texts that were available then and the facts [from those books] filled their heads and confused them. Could you help us here? And I ask everybody to explain: what are those invisible threads remaining from Hrushevs’kyi and his school, [please name] the credible ones.

Kaganovich did not receive clear answers about the ideological ties to the past. The closest the participants came to locating these frightening invisible threads was in tracing the biographic connections of themselves and their colleagues to the Hrushevs’kyi school and other non-party historians. (All this information was, of course, noted on their personal files and known to the party functionaries.) Some speakers noted that Petrovs’kyi’s “mistakes” betrayed him as a former student of Hrushevs’kyi. Kost’ Huslystyti told the audience about his studies under non-Marxist Ukrainian professors Dmytro Iavornyts’kyi and Dmytro Bahali during the 1920s. Mykhailo Rubach confessed to having experienced the influences of the Pokrovskii school and even Trotskyism during the 1920s. Instead of looking for invisible threads to Ukrainian nationalist historiography, several historians directly traced the Institute’s “mistakes” to wartime patriotism and the official elevation of national heroes, eliciting no comments from the party functionaries present.
Amidst all the ideological rhetoric, the Ukrainian scholars acknowledged only a few conceptual “errors,” all characteristic of the patriotic version of Ukrainian past. They also indicated their readiness to modify the grand narrative of the nation’s heroic exploits by using two principal strategies: foregrounding the ancient unity and subsequent close ties with Russia, and stressing that classes, rather than nations, were principal historical agents. Huslystyj admitted to unwittingly “following the bourgeois-nationalist historiography” in his wartime pamphlet on Danylo of Halych, which described the prince as a “Ukrainian monarch, head of the Ukrainian nation-state.” This interpretation, the historian confessed, contradicted the official view of Kievan Rus’ as the common heritage of all Eastern Slavs. A professor of Kiev University, Arsen Bortnikov, acknowledged idealizing the Brotherhood of SS Cyril and Methodius (1845–1847) as a progressive organization of Ukrainian intellectuals. Now, however, he was aware of a class struggle within this first Ukrainian political organization, as well as of a “bourgeois-nationalist” wing among its members.25

The conference participants realized that the narrative strategies of emphasizing class struggle and “ethnic” ties with Russia were potentially contradictory. On some questions proposed for re-evaluation, historians and ideologues often saw the direction of interpretive change differently, even though both sides spoke in the ideologically correct language of class analysis and “friendship of peoples.” For instance, ideological secretary Lytvyn, who chaired the evening session on 30 April, warned the historian Huslystyj not to engage in a re-evaluation of Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi, the seventeenth-century Cossack leader who presided over Ukraine’s incorporation into Russia but whose social background as a feudal lord obviously constituted a liability:

Huslystyj: We did not resolve the question of the War of Liberation yet, so we cannot provide a clear appraisal of Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi. One would think a number of works had been written about that epoch, yet the question is not solved.

Lytvyn: What question about Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi is not resolved?

Huslystyj: The question about the class features in his activities is not resolved. Our previous profile of Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi went as follows: a great son of the Ukrainian people, a person who organized the Ukrainian people for a struggle against the foreign aggressors, who united Ukraine with Russia, etc. When we started working to reveal the class aspects of his activities, we encountered difficulties. Mykola Neonovych [Petrovs’kyi] wrote a section about this, and the situation only became worse. When he began clarifying the class factors, Bohdan Khmel’nytskyi appeared to have been separated from the people. A number of questions became muddled. I believe we will resolve all these questions. First, we ought to abandon the old theory, which was based on nationalistic factors, and move to the correct Marxist concept.
Lytvyn: Why are we, Ukrainian historians, debating about Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi and trying to define his role when the government has long defined it? It is enough that we have the Order of Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi. Our soldiers wear the order, and we, the historians of Ukraine, are raising the question that the role of Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi is unclear.

Huslystyj: This is exactly what is happening. When we read the section by Mykola Neonovych, we began wondering why the order of his name was established in the first place. (Laughter.)

After a protracted discussion, the secretary for ideology made his audience understand that, in the case of the feudal lord Khmel’nyts’kyi, the class analysis should be subordinated to the glorification of the nation’s great leader who united Ukraine with Russia.

Nonetheless, the historians openly challenged the ideological secretary’s pronouncements on other issues. Just before the conference, Lytvyn published in the authoritative Moscow journal *Bol’shevik* the article “On the History of the Ukrainian People.” After dwelling on the sins of Hrushevs’kyi and his school, the article provided a brief summary of the official model of Ukrainian history. Lytvyn pontificated that medieval Kievan Rus’ was the common cradle of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, and that, since its demise, “the Ukrainian people have always striven to unite with the great Russian people.” But, for all its apparent clarity, this scheme did not specify when the Ukrainians as a separate people emerged from the cradle. In the postwar years, the seemingly scholastic problem of the emergence of Ukrainian ethnicity acquired the utmost importance because it underlined the limits of the nation’s appropriation of the past. In 1946, the party ideologues criticized Mykola Bazhan’s poem *Danylo of Halych* for presuming that the thirteenth-century Galician–Volhynian Principality was a Ukrainian land and that Danylo’s regiments were “Ukrainian.” But just how far could one safely stretch the national historical self-identification? Both historians and Ukrainian party functionaries were reluctant to commit themselves.

In one ambiguous sentence, Lytvyn’s article disposed of the problem of Ukrainians’ origins as separate people: “The Ukrainian nationality [narodnost’] began to shape itself in the fourteenth century, and by the sixteenth century the main features of the Ukrainian nation [naroda] (language, culture, etc.) developed.” The historian Huslystyj pointed out that such a statement only obscured the problem. Also, it contradicted the assertion made earlier on the same page: “Three closely related nations [naroda], Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, began to take shape from a single root after the disintegration of Kievan Rus’,” meaning during the thirteenth century at the latest. In addition, the Politburo-approved standard Soviet school textbook under the editorship of A. Shestakov stated that the Ukrainian nationality emerged in the thirteenth century, while other Moscow historians proposed, vari-
ously, the fourteenth century (S. Iushkov), the fifteenth (A. Pankratova), and the sixteenth (V. Picheta). Embattled, the Central Committee’s secretary snarled at his opponent:

Lytvyn: Do you want a date?
Huslysty: I believe the date is being provided by you. You say that the Ukrainian nationality began to take shape in the twelfth century, and at another place, you say in the fourteenth. Your article is published in [the party’s] theoretical journal under your name and this [dating] will undoubtedly cause a debate. Some will say: in the fourteenth, the others [will say]: in the sixteenth.

Lytvyn: And what do you think?
Huslysty: I believe the Ukrainian nationality was emerging and taking shape during the fourteenth through the sixteenth centuries. ... This question is not clarified yet. I hope that you, Kost’ Zakharovych [Lytvyn], will participate in discussing this question.

The argument ended in a stalemate. The historians had demonstrated their ability to fight back by questioning the possibility of clear ideological prescriptions on major problems of Ukrainian history.

At the end of the session on 30 April, Manuil’s’kyi complained that he still had heard nothing about the notorious invisible threads. Moreover, on the evening of 30 April, two deputy premiers clashed in front of the audience on the question of which of them should sum up the proceedings. Manuil’s’kyi invited the last speaker, Mykola Bazhan, to do so. But the poet who authored the faulty Danylo of Halych and who also served as deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers in charge of culture, sarcastically rebuffed the foreign minister: “I will end my speech here, using your proposal as my concluding words.” As a result, the second session ended abruptly.

The last session of the conference, on 6 May, also did not advance the search for invisible threads. Instead, two leading historians used this meeting as an opportunity to promote their personal agendas under the guise of uncovering “deviations.” The participants spent most of the day listening to Rubach’s continuing attacks on Petrovs’kyi as a student of Hrushevsky and a “bourgeois nationalist,” and Petrovs’kyi’s retaliatory tirades about Rubach’s own past Trotskyist errors. Then both professors admitted their respective mistakes. The secretary of the Institute’s party group, Kateryna Stetsiuk, had enough courage to say that the fight was of a personal, rather than theoretical, nature. A specialist on the Soviet period, Oleksandr Sluts’kyi, wondered why the conference was concentrating exclusively on the prerevolutionary period, given that the post-1917 period also contained many unresolved problems.

On the evening of 6 May the conference ended in an impasse. No party functionary made a concluding speech, and no official resolution resulted from the
meetings. The Central Committee’s internal memo hinted at the desirability of replacing Petrovs’kyi as the director of the Institute of History of Ukraine. During the first session, Kaganovich had kept in front of him resumes of the biographies of Rubach and the director of the Institute of Archaeology, Petro Iefymenko, but Petrovs’kyi survived the April storm.\textsuperscript{34}

\textbf{From Dialogue to Diktat}

One of the possible reasons for the impasse was that Kaganovich had been contemplating an ideological purge on a much greater scale. The formerly top secret working files of the Ukrainian Communist Party Politburo reveal that in May 1947 Kaganovich planned a major denunciatory session of the Central Committee. On 28 May, the Politburo approved in principle a draft resolution entitled “On Improving the Ideological and Political Education of the Cadres and on the Struggle against the Manifestations of Bourgeois-Nationalist Ideology.” According to the handwritten note on file, the Ukrainian leadership sent this draft on the same day to the VKP(b) Central Committee. Another note in Kaganovich’s hand read, “Do not send out [the draft to the members of the Ukrainian Central Committee]. Include in the minutes without the title.” Yet another note explained that on 10 June the Ukrainian Politburo had decided to revise the draft, which had been itself removed from the file.\textsuperscript{35} In the end, the “ideological” plenary session was never convened. Apparently, Moscow did not approve Kaganovich’s plan to initiate a comprehensive purge of “bourgeois nationalists” in Ukraine. According to the legendary account circulating among the Ukrainian intellectuals, Stalin dismissed Kaganovich’s plan by stating, “Comrade Kaganovich, you will not embroil me with the Ukrainian people.”\textsuperscript{36}

Having lost his bid for a major ideological purge, Kaganovich unexpectedly initiated a crackdown on Ukrainian historians. Again, no evidence exists that the Ukrainian Politburo planned a purge of historians in advance or that it represented a part of some larger masterplan. On the contrary, during July and early August, Ukrainian ideologues engaged in their usual languid “political education” of the republic’s intelligentsia. Manuil’s’kyi spent considerable time preparing the Central Committee’s “Directives for the Compilers of the \textit{Short Course of the History of Ukraine},” as well as similar instructions regarding the \textit{History of Ukrainian Literature} and the \textit{History of the Communist Party of Ukraine}. The detailed directives spelled out the party line in the humanities and social sciences: regimentation rather than denunciation. On 9 August, the Central Committee adopted the resolution “On the Textbook of the History of Ukraine,” which unrealistically envisaged the publication of an ideologically correct textbook in November of the same year. The party expected historians to work out the Marxist periodization of Ukrainian history; to show Kievian Rus’ as a common cradle of Russians, Ukrainian, and Belarusians; and “finally to dethrone the reactionary romantics that Ukrainian nationalists had created around the Zaporozhian Host.” In modern history, the authors had to pay
special attention to the development of capitalism and the growth of the working class and, in the later times, to the leading role of the Bolshevik party. While discussing the reunification of Ukrainian lands during 1939–1945, the authors should stress that this historic event had become possible only due to the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. In other words, the directive envisioned a further suppression of ethnic patriotism in the narratives of Ukrainian history.

However, the republican functionaries did not perceive any urgent ideological threat from historians. On 16 and 18 August, the Ukrainian Administration of Propaganda and Agitation held a staff conference to discuss a number of pressing practical problems of propaganda work. Nothing in the minutes indicates serious concern with the state of history writing. At the same time, the participants dwelt on a glitch in the work of the republican Institute of Marx, Engels, and Lenin (IMEL), and discussed the fact that the Politburo had made serious decisions concerning the Institute and fired its director, Fedir Ienevych.

The archival evidence suggests that the ensuing purge of historians, no matter how pregnant the political atmosphere was with the desire for such a campaign, might have been initiated by a single chance denunciation. On 31 July 1947, the demoted Ienevych attempted to restore himself to the Politburo’s favor by sending Kaganovich information compromising the premier Ukrainian poet, Maksym Ryl’s’kyi. Ienevych included a copy of Ryl’s’kyi’s 1943 speech on the history of Kiev, as well as the poet’s introduction to the 1944 edition of Ukrainian historical folk songs, and the 1946 autobiographical article “From the Bygone Years.” All these texts allegedly idealized prerevolutionary Ukraine and did not discriminate between the progressive and bourgeois trends in Ukrainian culture. Somebody (Kaganovich and/or Lytvyn?) extensively underlined with red and black pencils all of Ryl’s’kyi’s writings and Ienevych’s comments. On 20 August 1947, the Secretariat of the Ukrainian Central Committee adopted an unusual retroactive secret resolution, “On M. T. Ryl’s’kyi’s Speech ‘Kiev in the History of Ukraine,’” declaring that the 1943 text “in reality represent[ed] not a speech about Kiev but a statement on the history of Ukraine, in which M. Ryl’s’kyi defends the nationalist mistakes that the party had condemned.”

The republican leadership at once abandoned the relatively constructive approach that characterized the directives of 9 August. Kaganovich charged Manuil’s’kyi with writing a new ideological document and, on 29 August 1947, the Politburo adopted the Central Committee resolution “On Political Mistakes and Unsatisfactory Work of the Institute of History of Ukraine of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences.” Although only 20 days before, the Central Committee had given historians until November to publish the textbook, the new decree condemned them in advance for failing to produce a “scholarly seasoned, Marxist-Leninist History of Ukraine.” Wartime publications of the Institute had been compiled in an “anti-Marxist” spirit and contained gross political mistakes and “bourgeois-nationalist” distortions. The document condemned the historical narratives emphasizing the birth, growth, strug-
gles, and victories of the Ukrainian nation, but the party directives on writing Ukrainian history remained rather confusing. On the one hand, the resolution announced:

The principal mistake of the authors of works on the history of Ukraine is that, instead of considering the history of Ukraine in close connection with the history of the Russian, Belarusian, and other peoples of the Soviet Union, they follow Ukrainian nationalists in treating the history of Ukraine in isolation from the history of other peoples. In so doing, they begin and proceed by following the course of Hrushevsky’s History of Ukraine-Rus’. It is known that Kievan Rus’ was a common cradle of three fraternal peoples, Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian, but Hrushevsky and other nationalists tried to prove that Kievan Rus’ was an exclusively Ukrainian state.41

While this statement seemed to stress the essentially ethnic historic ties with Russia, the one on the Khmelnyts’kyi War clearly demanded more “class history:” “The authors of the works on the history of Ukraine should have explained the Ukrainian people’s War of Liberation in 1648–1654 as primarily the peasant masses’ struggle against the Polish aggressors and the feudal oppression in general.” Moreover, historians failed to show that the whole “history of Ukraine is, first of all, the history of the class struggle, the peasants’ struggle against the feudal lords, the workers’ struggle against the bourgeoisie.”42 The subsequent paragraphs again requested attention to ties with Russia but this time in the ethnically neutral field of revolutionary movement and socialist construction.

The resolution explained these mistakes by the vestiges of “bourgeois-nationalist” views among the Institute’s researchers, singling out the director, Petrovs’kyi. Since the nationalist heresy had made its way into all existing texts on Ukrainian history, it presumably had spoiled the teaching of history in universities, colleges, and schools, even though not a single school and only a small number of colleges were offering the history of Ukraine as a separate course. The concluding part of the decree outlined the urgent measures aimed to remedy the situation, with the administrative changes at the Institute coming first. The resolution proclaimed the creation of the Marxist-Leninist Short Course of the History of Ukraine as the most important task of historians. By 15 October, the Institute should have delivered to the Central Committee the outline and theses of the Short Course that would follow “the Stalinist textbook of the history of VKP(b), the [1934] comments by comrades Stalin, Kirov, and Zhdanov on the questions of history, and the directives of this resolution.”43

The Frustrated Crusade

Although the decree was not published in full until 1994, the official party journal Bil’shovyk Ukrainy carried a lengthy editorial, “To Carry through the Liquidation of the Bourgeois-Nationalist Distortions of the History of Ukraine,” which closely followed the original text. In addition, the official newspaper Radians’ka Ukraina
published an even more verbose editorial, “To Create a Truly Scholarly, Marxist-Leninist History of Ukraine,” which developed the decree’s ideas at greater length. However, Kaganovich wanted to make sure that the republic’s intellectuals had received his message. He requested detailed reports on the party groups’ meetings in all institutes of the Academy of Sciences and on the historians’ conference held on 16, 17, and 19 September. This meeting gathered the historians of the Institute of History, IMEL, Kiev University, and Kiev Pedagogical Institute to discuss the resolution. Kaganovich apparently never read the minutes of this conference, which would have upset him greatly. While all participants dutifully repeated the general ideological formulae of the decree, many questioned their practical application. Petrovs’kyi acknowledged some mistakes but rejected accusations of “anti-Marxist” or “bourgeois-nationalist” views. The Institute’s researchers Oleksandr Sluts’kyi and Pylyp Stoian supported him, causing the Central Committee’s Secretary for Propaganda, Ivan Nazarenko, to intervene:

I do not agree with Comrade Sluts’kyi, who devoted his speech to defending Comrade Petrovs’kyi. The Central Committee wrote down [its decision] pointing out serious mistakes that resulted from both the weak Marxist-Leninist education and the complacency of the Institute’s director, Professor Petrovs’kyi. He made these serious mistakes, he did not organize a struggle against the manifestations of bourgeois-nationalist trends and did not direct the scholarly work on the history of Ukraine sufficiently. This would appear to be perfectly clear. ... That is why I am bewildered by the speeches of comrades Sluts’kyi and Stoian, who attempted to underestimate, to water down, the discussion of this historic document [of the Central Committee].

There was, of course, a difference between the resolution charging Petrovs’kyi personally with “vestiges of bourgeois-nationalist views” and “past serious mistakes of bourgeois-nationalist character,” and Nazarenko’s comments, where the historian appeared guilty of mere “complacency” and not organizing a struggle against “bourgeois nationalism.” The secretary for propaganda himself seemed to have been captivated by the general tone of negotiating or watering down Kaganovich’s resolution. However, the historian Kost’ Huslysty went further than anyone in challenging the authority of the Ukrainian party functionaries themselves:

It is known that during the 1946 conference on propaganda, the work of our Institute of History received a positive appraisal. It was noted that the Institute had done considerable work, that it had published the Short Course, the first volume [of the History of Ukraine], etc. That is, in June of 1946, nobody saw that glitch in historical scholarship in Ukraine.

All of the participants knew full well that the party official who spoke so highly of the Institute’s work in June 1946 was Nazarenko himself. In his concluding remarks, the embarrassed secretary of the Central Committee sounded a call for collaboration, referring to both historians and ideological functionaries as “we:” “We need to compile the outline and theses of the Short Course before the 15th, to develop several methodological directives for instructors, to publish the plans that will help our instructors to teach history properly. ... We need to roll up our sleeves and set
to work.” Neither the incident with Huslystyi nor the opposition from Petrovs’kyi, Slutskyi, and Stoian was recorded in Nazarenko’s report to Kaganovich.

On 22 and 23 September, the Institute’s party group held a special two-day private meeting. The party members actually voted “to ensure that all works on the history of Ukraine are imbued with the idea of unbreakable ties with the history of the Russian, Belarusian, and other peoples of the Soviet Union.” The meeting’s resolution did not mention the further return to the “class approach,” although it requested more attention to the great historic role of the October Revolution. The meeting decided that the authors of the faulty wartime publications—both party members and non-members—Huslystyi, Mykola Suprunenko, Serhii Bilousov, Fedir Iastrebov, Lazar’ Slavin—expiate their errors by speedily producing a proper Marxist textbook. Amazingly, the text did not mention the primary target of the Politburo’s critique, the non-party Petrovs’kyi, who still remained the Institute’s director. Party meetings to discuss the political mistakes of historians were held at all institutes of the republican Academy of Sciences.

Oblast party committees throughout Ukraine organized meetings of propagandists and lectures for local intellectuals to spell out the Central Committee’s resolution. Understandably, the propaganda campaign targeted school teachers, as well as college and university professors. The newspaper of the Ministry of Education, Radians’ka osvita, dutifully carried articles explaining the danger of the “nationalist deviation” in Ukrainian history. The ministry forwarded to all universities and colleges a lengthy circular letter regarding the “struggle with manifestations of nationalism” in the teaching of Ukrainian history. After repeating all the essential points of the Central Committee resolution, the letter requested that all course outlines in the history of Ukraine be revised accordingly by 1 October. Aside from the obligatory theoretical condemnations of nationalism, the local conferences produced little of interest for the authorities. Local historians and educational administrators claimed that they were not involved in spreading the erroneous concepts and used the campaign as an opportunity to press for their own interests. At Poltava Pedagogical Institute, the rector clearly struggled to explain the resolution’s relevance to the faculty: “Our Institute’s program does not contain the History of Ukraine as a separate subject, but we should study it independently.” At Zaporizhzhia Pedagogical Institute, where the subject was offered, its instructor Zhyhalov demanded more hours for the survey. At Uzhhorod University, the professors normally used the 1942 Survey of the History of the Ukrainian SSR as a text; when the resolution on the Institute of History appeared several days before the start of classes, the department decided not to risk using a potentially faulty text and simply cancelled the course. Both Kirovohrad and Stalino Pedagogical Institutes chose to stay on the safe side, reporting that, although they offered a course in Ukrainian history, they allegedly had neither the designated text nor the outline.

School teachers used the occasion to criticize Moscow-approved standard history textbooks. Speaking at the teachers’ seminar in Poltava, the teacher Morhulenko
complained that Chapter Ten of Pankratova’s school textbook of the history of the USSR was entirely unsatisfactory: “[O]ne cannot give this material to the students. In the textbook, the personality of Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi is shown vaguely. Also, [the textbook] does not say that Kievan Rus’ was the cradle of three fraternal peoples, Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusan.” A fellow teacher Meliavs’kyi seconded her complaint that the central authorities did not provide coherent ideological directions in history. He said, “Secondary school teachers are experiencing great difficulties in teaching” because “the existing texts view many problems differently.”\(^{56}\) The School Department of the Ukrainian Central Committee inspected the teaching of history in several oblasts and did not find any nationalistic mistakes in the work of Eastern Ukrainian teachers. The negative examples came from the Western oblasts where the students referred to Kievan Rus’ as “Ukraine” and spoke highly of such petit-bourgeois nationalist prerevolutionary parties as the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (RUP) and the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party. Even the specialists of the L’viv Institute of Teachers’ Professional Development proposed such erroneous examination essay topics as “The Role of the Varangians in the Creation of Kievan State” and “The National Movement in Ukraine in 1905–1907 and the Activities of RUP.” Nonetheless, the School Department defended Western Ukrainians, who were “not sufficiently familiar with the demands and principles of Marxist historical science.” In any case, the Institute of History of Ukraine had been guilty of not developing model course outlines for school teachers.\(^{57}\) An ideological circle closed: teachers were blaming all problems on textbook authors, historians accused the ideologues, and the local functionaries were tacitly downplaying the scale of ideological purification.

Meanwhile, Kaganovich appeared frustrated about the absence of concrete denunciations. On 3 October, the Secretariat of the Central Committee adopted yet another resolution on the progress of the discussion of the previous resolution about the Institute of History. The decree announced that the meetings in the republic’s universities and colleges had reviewed the resolution only superficially without criticizing the nationalist mistakes of their own faculties. The decree demanded more denunciatory sessions in the capital and major cities, as well as a special conference at the Institute of History to discuss the outline of the future textbook.\(^{58}\) Just a day before, on 2 October, Petrovs’kyi (then still the Institute’s director) forwarded the new prospectus of the \textit{Short Course of the History of Ukraine} to the Central Committee. The prospectus was deemed unsatisfactory and, though the Central Committee received a new version on 11 October, Mykola Petrov’s’kyi finally lost his job, being replaced by the loyal party type, Oleksii Kasymenko.\(^{59}\) This administrative solution might have satisfied Kaganovich’s thrust for decisive measures, but the denunciation campaign did not regain momentum.

Whatever the first secretary’s intentions might have been, the drive for ideological purification under Kaganovich did not develop into a blanket cleansing of Ukrainian historical scholarship. The republican bureaucrats and historians alike did not want
a self-destructive ideological battle, and Moscow did not request one. In mid-December 1947, Khrushchev resumed his duties as first secretary, and Kaganovich returned to Moscow as deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. Although the ideological campaign against “nationalistic errors” in Ukrainian historiography died out after Kaganovich’s return to Moscow, his pronouncements were not rescinded. The Sixteenth Congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine (KP(b)U), held in January 1949, praised the party’s successes in fighting the “manifestations of nationalism” in the humanities. In his report to the congress, Khrushchev stressed,

The KP(b)U Central Committee was paying special attention to the struggle with manifestations of bourgeois nationalism, the most harmful and most tacituous capitalist remnant in the consciousness of some our people. It is known that nationalist errors and distortions took place in the works of some Ukrainian scholars, particularly historians and literary scholars. The VKP(b) and KP(b)U Central Committees uncovered and strongly denounced these mistakes. Measures have been taken to strengthen the Institute of History of Ukraine and the Institute of History of Ukrainian Literature of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences. Now the researchers at the Institute of History of Ukraine are working diligently to produce the Short Course of the History of Ukraine. The Institute of Ukrainian Literature of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences is preparing the Survey of the History of Ukrainian Literature.

Although the official denunciations and decrees of 1947 formally remained in force, and Khrushchev continued to use the same anti-nationalist rhetoric as Kaganovich, the republican leadership clearly took a new course in emphasizing that the past problems had been eliminated and the intellectuals were now engaged in useful, error-free work.

The Campaign’s “Nationalistic” Echoes

No archival source contains a special survey of the ordinary citizens’ reaction to the campaign against “nationalism” in history. When average Kievans dared to communicate with the authorities anonymously by writing on the ballots during the elections to the Soviet Union’s Supreme Soviet in December 1947 (and thus, conveniently for the electoral commissions, making the ballots invalid), they were usually concerned with pressing matters of everyday survival: bribery, speculation, low living standards, the alleged predominance of Jews, or, in the sphere of politics, one-party single-candidate elections. However, as we have seen, the teachers, scholars, and even professional ideologues displayed attitudes that differed—from only slightly to very substantially—from the party line as formulated by the Politburo.

When the wave of the “anti-nationalist” articles appeared in the press in the autumn of 1947, the official Radians’ka Ukraina started receiving readers’ anonymous letters of protest. After the August–September series of articles explaining the resolution about the Institute of History, the paper received several letters specifically
KAGANOVICH’S FAILURE TO DISCIPLINE UKRAINIAN HISTORIANS

on this topic. By early October, Radians’ka Ukraina found it desirable to reply to its anonymous opponents with a spiteful article by L. Levchenko, “Into the Dustbin of History!” The piece defended the official view on the “nationalist traitors” Mazepa, Hrushevs’kyi, Petliura, Dontsov, and Konovalets’, who, according to the anonymous letters, actually “brought the Ukrainians [as a modern nation] to life.”63 Soon the newspaper received an anonymous letter from the Eastern Ukrainian industrial town of Dniprodzerzhyns’k, arguing against Levchenko’s article:

Good man, you have the right to write [this] in the newspaper, but no matter how much you swear that “Hrushevs’kyi always held the Ukrainian people in contempt,” who will believe you? Whoever raised a voice for our extremely oppressed people, you call this person a traitor and you would probably call me a traitor as well, although I am not one of the nobility. ... And who are those “people” in whose name you speak and who “condemn” Mazepa, Hrushevs’kyi and other glorious but unfortunate sons of Ukraine?64

Not a good writer and probably not a member of the nationalist underground, the author was likely an isolated home-grown Ukrainian patriot, one of the many who would be mobilized by the dissident movement a generation later. Another anonymous tract, signed “The L’viv Group of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine,” displayed a more consistent nationalistic approach. The authors explained that the history of Ukraine as a state and as a nation could not be produced by the official historians because they wrote “from the colonizers’ point of view.” Moreover, such a history was not really necessary, as “the truly national history of Ukraine has long been created and written down in the way it should be by a prominent representative of Ukrainian scholarship, Citizen Hrushevs’kyi.” In general, history writing “should benefit the future development of the truly free and independent Ukrainian state, which should emerge in the near future with help from Western democracies.”65

On 2 October, Radians’ka Ukraina also ran a lengthy article by Fedir Ienevych, “On Maksym Ryl’s’kyi’s Nationalist Mistakes.” The newspaper soon received two very different anonymous responses from Western Ukraine, one non-conformist patriotic and another outright nationalistic. “Ten students from L’viv” wrote to the editor to let Ienevych know that “he is akin to that dog who killed Pushkin, not knowing at whom he was shooting. If Ryl’s’kyi is a nationalist, then the non-nationalist is a person who has completely broken with his people.”66 Another “youth circle from the Western oblasts of Ukraine” took a rather bleak view of the poet: “Ryl’s’kyi sold his soul and was made ‘Stalin’s laureate’ for his black scribble.” Moreover, Ryl’s’kyi publicly renounced his Ukrainianness in favor of Soviet identity when he coined the verse line “My fatherland is not the line of ancestors.” The authors insisted that Ukrainian nationalism was born when the warriors of Kievian Rus’ raised their swords against the aggressors, that the Cossacks fought for the nation rather than for any “theory of production growth,” and that Bohdan Khmel’nyc’s’kyi signed the treaty with Muscovy in order to break up with Poland and not to “sink in the Muscovite abyss.”67
The “nationalist” response to party pronouncements on history demonstrated that the official narrative was not the only version of the past available in postwar Soviet Ukrainian society. As the writer Petro Panch testified during one of the ideological meetings, prerevolutionary books on Ukrainian history, especially the works about hetmans Mazepa and Doroshenko, were much in demand at book bazaars. Panch particularly singled out the works by “bourgeois” historians Mykola Kostomarov, Hryts’ko Kovalenko, and Mykola Arkas, as well as Adrian Kashchenko’s historical novels: “[People] pay ten times more for these books than for our Soviet histories.”

Another concern for the Soviet authorities was the activities of the contemporary nationalists. Until the early 1950s, the Ukrainian nationalist underground conducted an intense propaganda battle against the “Muscovite occupants.” Although scholars have focused primarily on the military and ideological resistance in Western oblasts, nationalist leaflets and pocket-size pamphlets were often discovered in the East. For instance, on the morning of the December 1947 elections in Kiev, a nationalist leaflet was found on the wall of St Volodymyr cathedral in the center of the city. In July 1948, the Ukrainian second secretary Leonid Mel’nikov received an alarmed report from a local party boss in Dnipropetrovs’k oblast, whose name was Leonid Brezhnev. Brezhnev reported that a railway car carrying wooden construction materials had arrived at the Eastern Ukrainian Dnipropetrovs’k oblast from Western Ukraine and appeared to contain an additional cargo of nationalist literature. A disturbed Brezhnev assured his republican superiors that his ideological staff had “intensified the [propaganda] work among the workers and the peasants of the oblast.”

As is easily seen from the examples Brezhnev had attached to his report and from other nationalist publications, the topics of the nation’s heroic past, Ukrainian statehood tradition, and tsarist and Bolshevik oppression occupied a strategic place in nationalist propaganda. Moreover, the nationalist writers seemed to have closely monitored the developments in official historical scholarship, often offering their alternative reading of the recent party pronouncements on history and culture. Thus, the October 1946 typewritten pamphlet of the Ternopil branch of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) attacked the notion of the big brother, the great Russian people, in the process revealing a thorough knowledge of both the local Soviet press and the articles in the party’s central theoretical journal, Bol’shevik. According to the pamphlet’s analysis, after the war,

[T]he Bolsheviks definitely returned to the ways of the old Russian tsarist imperialism. They did so because the idea of the prewar Bolshevik imperialism that was based on the so-called international proletarian revolution had exhausted itself. The Bolsheviks failed to establish [the rule of the proletariat] even in the USSR, not to mention the world. The peoples of the USSR did not merge into the “Soviet people” that was to become a prototype of a nationless society, whereas the peoples of the world preferred to create and defend their nation-states.
During World War II, the author continued, the fighting was not along class lines, but along national lines, as the Bolsheviks themselves recognized by spreading the cult of Russian tsars and tsarist generals during the war. The pamphlet compared the postwar Soviet nationality policy to the colonization efforts of the ancien régime in France and the Turkey of the Sultans. The author appeared to have followed closely the 1946 campaign against the “Hrushevsky school,” referring to the attacks on the Survey of the History of Ukrainian Literature and to Petrovskyi’s newspaper article against Hrushevskyi. The party ideological decrees of 1946 imposed on Ukrainian culture a “programmatic idea,” but, according to the nationalist propagandist, the Mongols, Pechenegians, Cumans, Turks, Tatars, Lithuanians, and Poles all came to Ukraine over the centuries with the same “programmatic idea”—to destroy the Ukrainian nation—and failed. Even today, the traditions of the Ukrainian Cossack republic and the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 lived on in the armed struggle of the nationalists.72 Another OUN communiqué, released in the spring of 1947, commemorated the battle of Hurby, a village in the Kremianets’ region where nationalist forces faced Soviet security detachments in April 1944. The pamphlet compared Hurby to the Cossack battles with the Poles at Korsun, Zhovti Vody, Pyliavtsi, Zbarazh, and Berestechko; to the Cossack action against Russia at Konotop in 1659 and Poltava in 1709; and to the twentieth-century armed encounter with Soviet troops at Kruty (1918).73

In 1947, OUN issued a leaflet commenting on the new composition of the republic’s Supreme Soviet. The author(s) noted the absence of many criticized writers, most notably of Rylskyi, Panch, and Volodymyr Sosiura: “Among the historians, Petrovskyi is not on the list of the deputies. Once the Bolsheviks had glorified him, but now he has fallen into disgrace for his History of Ukraine.”74 In the same year, a person using the pen name “Ievhen Blakytnyi” sent the typescript “Is the Ukrainian Nation Capable of Further Existence and Active Making of Its History? A Reference for Those Studying the History of Ukraine” to the republican Committee for the Arts. The text denounced the official historians for their conformism. The author stressed that Ukrainians were not just “Moscow’s eternal appendage,” and that his nation had always been and still was capable of independent existence.75

The republican authorities treated the nationalist “counter-discourse” on history with the utmost seriousness. Copies of all captured leaflets and anonymous letters were sent to the same senior ideologues who supervised the work of the Institute of History and who had demanded that the official historians rebuff nationalistic interpretations.

Conclusion

The nationalist and non-conformist response helps to contextualize the party line on Ukrainian history by showing that the hegemonic discourse on the past was indeed
locked in a dialogue with a suppressed counter-discourse. The alternative interpretation of the Ukrainian past existed in the shadow of the official version, which was itself shaped by negotiations between the ideologues and intellectuals.

Although the authorities’ ideological *diktat* has seemed to have been the most spectacular feature of scholarly life under Stalinism, a close examination of the 1947 assault on “nationalist deviations” in Ukrainian historiography has demonstrated the limits of the state’s ideological control. It appears that the republican leadership initiated the campaign without Moscow’s support, that at least some local functionaries were reluctant to sponsor a major ideological purge, and that the Ukrainian historians could skillfully “speak Bolshevik” in their defence.

The 1947 attempt to enforce the ideological purification campaign in Ukrainian historical scholarship became bogged down in a dialogue between the functionaries and scholars, in which the two sides spoke the same language and denounced the same “deviations” while pursuing different agendas. The historians generally succeeded in limiting the scope of denunciations and undermining the authority of their immediate ideological supervisors. The functionaries yielded to the historians’ opposition and began downgrading the campaign, which stopped altogether after the changes in Ukrainian leadership. In the end, Kaganovich, Khrushchev, Ukrainian functionaries, and local historians all claimed that the party had successfully carried through its campaign against “nationalist errors” in Ukrainian historiography. Yet that was the first time when all sides genuinely agreed.

**NOTES**

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2. Bakhtin has argued that all language is expressive of social relations, hence all texts are organized as a dialogue that takes account of their perception in a given society. Taking Bakhtin’s theory a step further, Jameson has shown, in his analysis of seventeenth-century Anglicanism, that the perpetual propaganda of hegemonic discourse actually indicates the impossibility of achieving complete ideological hegemony in any society. Although we hear only one hegemonic voice, the hegemonic discourse always remains locked in dialogue with a suppressed counter-discourse. This dialogue is made possible by what Jameson calls the


7. The classic account of the developments around the *History of the Kazakh SSR* is in Tillett, *The Great Friendship*, pp. 70–83. The newly available archives of the VKP(b) Central Committee reveal that the book was nominated for a Stalin Prize, but the reviewer Aleksei Iakovlev objected to its glorification of anti-Russian uprisings in Kazakhstan as heroic anti-colonial struggles. The book’s co-editor, Anna Pankratova, complained to the Central Committee’s Administration of Agitation and Propaganda. However, the Administration’s head, Georgii Aleksandrov, only condemned the work even more vigorously as “anti-Russian.” See Rossiiskii tsentr khraneniia i izucheniiia dokumentov noveisheii istorii (hereafter RTsKhIDNI), fond 17, opis’ 125, delo 224, listy 4, 23–25, 36–43.

8. The text of Stalin’s comments has been recently published as I. V. Stalin, “Ob antilineniskikh oshibkah i natsionalisticheskikh izvrashcheniakh v kinopovesti Dovzhenko ‘Ukraina v ogne,’” *Iskusstvo kino*, No. 4, 1990, pp. 84–96. The novel’s initial negative assessment by the Administration of Agitation and Propaganda is in RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 212, ll. 1–3.


11. See the minutes of the republican conference on the problems of propaganda (24–26 June 1946) in Tsentral’nyi derzhavnyi arkhir hromads’kykh ob”iednan’ Ukrainy (hereafter Ts-DAHO), fond 1, opys 70, sprava 436.


13. The photograph of Kaganovich’s copy of the protocol is reproduced in Lazar’ Kaganovich, *Pamiatnye zapisiki* (Moscow: Vagrius, 1995), between pp. 288 and 289. Ponomarenko recalled that Stalin had decided to divide the offices of party leader and premier in Ukraine, Belarus, and at the federal level because combining them was “no longer necessary” after the war. Then, however, Stalin announced that he would “temporarily” continue holding both positions. See “Otvet P. K. Ponomarenko na voprosy G. A. Kumaneva 2 noiabria 1978 g.,” *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, No. 6, 1998, pp. 133–149, here pp. 148–149.


15. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 6, spr. 1036, ark. 17. It is not clear just how Kryp’iakevych managed to continue his career under Soviet power after the war. A recent Ukrainian documentary publication suggests that either before or during the war he had been the Soviet secret police’s informant in Western Ukrainian ecclesiastical and intellectual circles. In the autumn of 1944, the NKVD “re-established” contacts with him. See Iurii Slyvka, ed., *Kul’turne zhyttia v Ukraini: zakhidni zemli: dokumenty i materialy Vol. 1: 1939–1953* (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1995), p. 217.


17. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 8, spr. 316, ark. 27. Interestingly, the same decree envisaged a conference of literary historians to be held in late May, but the authorities apparently abandoned the idea after the historians’ meeting.


19. Dmytro Manuil’s’kyi (1883–1959) belonged to a small group of well-educated “old Bolsheviks” who survived the Great Purges. Even within this handful of Bolshevik intellectuals, he was probably the only Lenin appointee still enjoying a position of authority after the Second World War. Manuil’s’kyi studied at St Petersburg University and received a law degree from the Sorbonne (1911). After briefly serving as the Ukrainian Communist Party’s general secretary in 1921–1922, he moved to Moscow as secretary of the Comintern’s Executive Committee. In 1944–1950, Manuil’s’kyi served as the Ukrainian republic’s minister of foreign affairs, deputy premier, and head of the Ukrainian delegation to the U.N.
KAGANOVICH’S FAILURE TO DISCIPLINE UKRAINIAN HISTORIANS

20. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 753, ark. 1–2 (Manuil’s’kyi), 4–6 (Los’). Excerpts from the conference minutes have been recently published in V. A. Smolii, ed., U leshchatakh totalityrzu: pershe dvadtsiatyrichchia Instytutu istorii Ukrainy NAN Ukrainy (1936–1956 rr.): zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv (Kiev: Instytut istorii Ukrainy NANU, 1996), Part 2, pp. 31–72, here 31–35.

21. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 753, ark. 14–27 (Petrovs’kyi), 36–38 (Brychkevych), 37 (Kaganovich); U leshchatakh totalityrzu, 2: 38–40 (Petrovs’kyi’s speech is not published). Mykola Petrovs’kyi (1894–1951) belonged to the so-called “old specialists.” A priest’s son, he received his education before the revolution, briefly worked with Hrushev’s’kyi during the 1920s, and was never admitted into the party. In 1942–1947, he served as director of the Institute of History of Ukraine; in 1944–1947, also as chair of Ukrainian history at Kiev University, corresponding member of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences (1945), member of the Ukrainian delegation to the U.N. Assembly in San Francisco (1945) and London (1946), as well as at the Paris Peace Conference (1946). See NAIIU, op. 1L, spr. 115; V. A. Smolii, ed., Vcheni Instytutu istorii Ukrainy: biobibliohrafichniy duidnyk (Kiev: Instytut istorii Ukrainy NANU, 1998), pp. 249–250.

22. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 753, ark. 47; U leshchatakh totalityrzu, 2: 41. Kaganovich had attended only the session on 29 April. Manuil’s’kyi and secretary for ideology Kost’ Lytvyn represented the Central Committee during the 30 April and 6 May sessions.

23. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 753, ark. 59–62, 82–83, 99, 166 (Petrovs’kyi), 248–250 (Huslysty), 159–160 (Rubach). Mikhail Pokrovskii: the leading Russian Marxist historian during the first decade after the revolution. After the Stalinist “Revolution from Above,” he was denounced posthumously for “abstract sociologism.”

24. Ibid., 113–115 (Rubach), 139 (Bortnikov), 254 (Huslysty).

25. Ibid., ark. 255 (Huslysty), 139–152 (Bortnikov).

26. Ibid., 262–263; U leshchatakh totalityrzu, Part 2, p. 60. The Soviet government created the Order of Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi—the only Soviet military order named after a non-Russian historic hero—on 10 October 1943. See Pravda, 11 October 1943, p. 1.


28. See TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 1, spr. 729, ark. 138–141 (Lytvyn’s speech at the August 1946 plenary meeting of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee).


30. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 753, ark. 261–262; U leshchatakh totalityrzu, Part 2, p. 59. During this argument, Lytvyn spoke Russian and Huslysty spoke Ukrainian.

31. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 753, ark. 311; U leshchatakh totalityrzu, Part 2, pp. 70–71.


33. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 757, ark. 49 (Stetsiu), 68 (Sluts’kyi).

34. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 536, ark. 4 (memo); spr. 754, ark. 8–10zv (resumes).

35. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 16, spr. 32, ark. 47 (approved in principle, reported to Moscow on 28 May), 48 (title; decision to revise the draft), 49zv (Kaganovich’s note). Manuil’s’kyi’s personal archive preserved what seems to be the first working draft of the lost anti-“nationalist” resolution. The file contains Manuil’s’kyi’s notes apparently made during the meeting with Kaganovich or the session of the Politburo and his later draft developing these ideas. Aside from general ideological pronouncements after the 1946 model, the text contains few concrete accusations. See Tsentral’nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchychkh orhaniv vlady i
upravlinnia Ukrainy (hereafter TSDAVOV), f. 4669, op. 1, spr. 44, ark. 24–29 (draft), 30–39 (notes).

36. See Shapoval, *Ukraina 20–50-kh rokiv*, p. 271–72 and Lazar Kahanovych, p. 40; Zamlyns’ka, “Ideolohichnyi teror,” pp. 79–80. At the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1962, the then Ukrainian first secretary, Mykola Pidhirny, reported that “As a great master of intrigue and provocation, [Kaganovich] had entirely groundlessly accused the republic’s leading writers and also some top-rank party workers of nationalism. On his directives, the press carried annihilating articles against the writers, who were devoted to the party and the people. But this did not satisfy Kaganovich. He began pushing for a plenary meeting of the Central Committee with the agenda ‘The Struggle against Nationalism, the Main Danger within the CP(b)U,’” although such danger did not exist at all. And could not have existed, for, happily for us, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine had long been headed by the staunch Leninist Nikita Sergeevich Krushchev, who educated the communists and the Ukrainian people in the spirit of internationalism (stormy applause), friendship of peoples, selfless devotion to the great ideas of Leninism (prolonged stormy applause).” See *XXII s’ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza, 17–31 oktiabria 1961 g.: stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1962), Vol. 1, p. 280.

Pidhirny went on to say that Krushchev had destroyed Kaganovich’s evil plans. Ukrainian historians usually take both the legend and Pidhirny’s words at their face value. In contrast, David Marples treats Pidhirny’s pronouncements judiciously and warns that the “image of a mild Krushchev trying to prevent Kaganovich’s repressive policies is essentially a myth.” See Marples, “Krushchev, Kaganovich and the 1947 Crisis,” pp. 90–96, here 90.

37. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 6, spr. 1130, ark. 4 (resolution), 8–23 (directive on history text), 24–73 (resolutions and directives on literature and party history). Manuil’s’kyi’s notes and drafts are in TSDAVOV, f. 4669, op. 1, spr. 23, 43, 134.

38. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 618, ark. 1–125, here 1, 34.

39. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 8, spr. 328, ark. 6–7.

40. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 6, spr. 1073, ark. 16–24. Published in I. F. Kuras, ed., *Natsional’ni vidnosyny v Ukraini u XX st.: zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv* (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1994), pp. 291–96 and *U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu*, Part 2, pp. 80–89. Manuil’s’kyi’s drafts are in TSDAVOV, f. 4669, op. 1, spr. 23, ark. 47–55; the variants of the final draft prepared by the apparatus of the Central Committee, are in TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 980, ark. 3–9.

41. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 6, spr. 1073, ark. 16–17.


43. *Ibid.*, ark. 23. Ukrainian history was not offered as a separate school subject until the 1960s. However, the course on the “History of the USSR” covered the major problems of the Ukrainian prerevolutionary past inasmuch as they related to Russian history.


45. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 621, ark. 166–208.

46. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 760, ark. 168–169. Petrovs’kyi’s speech is recorded on ark. 28–36, comments by Stoian on ark. 44–47, by Sluts’kyi on 132–145. The archives of the Central Committee preserved no less than three copies of the minutes: see also op. 70, spr. 758 and 759.

47. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 760, ark. 76. Huslystyi referred to the 1940 *Short Course*, not the new project underway in the late 1940s. See S. M. Bielousov [Bilousov] et al., eds, *Istoriiia Ukrainy: korotkyi kurs* (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo AN URSR, 1940).


49. See TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 621, ark. 166–174.
KAGANOVICH’S FAILURE TO DISCIPLINE UKRAINIAN HISTORIANS

50. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 744, ark. 52–56; U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu, 2: 104–108. The party committee of Kiev University, where Petrovs’kyi served as chair of the History of Ukraine, reacted more eagerly: it “established control” over the professor’s lectures. See TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 744, ark. 82–83zv.

51. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 621, ark. 175–186; spr. 1090, ark. 1–10; spr. 1494, ark. 1–10; spr. 1620, ark. 1–11.

52. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 4525, ark. 1–8; op. 70, spr. 761, ark. 36–41 (reports to Kaganovich); spr. 1095, ark. 1–11 (Kiev and Mykolaiv); op. 23, spr. 4526 (Poltava, Uzhhorod, Kirovohrad, Stalino). At one of the interoblast seminars, Ienevych was given his chance to denounce all “nationalists” from Dovzhenko and Ryli’s’kyi to Petrovs’kyi at great length: TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 620, ark. 1–34.

53. Radians’ka osvita, 10 October 1947, pp. 1 and 2.

54. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 761, ark. 23–35; U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu, Part 2, pp. 93–100.

55. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 4526, ark. 9 (Poltava), 22 (Zaporizhzhia), 37 (Uzhhorod), 46 (Kirovohrad), 53 (Stalino).

56. Ibid., ark. 25–26.

57. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 73, spr. 398, ark. 1–22, especially 12 and 19 on Western Ukraine.

58. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 8, spr. 340, ark. 13–14; U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu, Part 2, pp. 119–120.

59. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 762, ark. 1–20 (draft); spr. 763, ark. 1 (Petrovs’kyi’s letter), 2–22 (draft), 24–35 (new draft), spr. 764, ark. 1–25 (another copy of a new draft), Kasymenko was appointed director on 25 October 1947 and would remain at this post until 1964. He graduated from the Poltava Institute of People’s Education in 1926 and before the war taught in Poltava and Zhytomyr. During the war, Kasymenko worked in the apparatus of the Ukrainian Central Committee and in 1945–1947 in the republican Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He would publish his first book, The Reunification of Ukraine with Russia and Its Historic Significance, only in 1954. See Smolii, ed., Vcheni Instytutu istorii Ukrainy, pp. 124–125.

59. The offices of the Central Committee’s first secretary and premier remained separated. Khrushchev’s client Dem”ian Korotchenko became Ukraine’s new chairman of the Council of Ministers.

60. XVI z”izd Koministychnoi Partii (bil’shovykov) Ukrainy 25–28 sikhnia 1949 r.: materialy z”izdu (Kiev: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo politychnoi literatury URSR, 1949), p. 46. Note that Khrushchev got the name of the Institute of Ukrainian Literature wrong when he first mentioned it. The editors apparently missed the discrepancy.

61. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 4956, ark. 1–5.

62. Radians’ka Ukraina, 8 October 1947, pp. 2–3. Unfortunately, the first series of anonymous letters is missing from the folder in the archives of the Central Committee, being apparently forwarded to the Ministry of State Security. As more anonymous letters followed, the editor started making copies for his party superiors as well. Ivan Mazepa: the Cossack hetman who, in the early eighteenth century, concluded a union against tsar Peter I with the Swedish king Charles XII. Symon Petliura: one of the leaders of the Ukrainian revolution of 1917–1920. Dmytro Dontsov: the leading theoretician of Ukrainian nationalism in the early twentieth century. Ievhen Konovalets’: prewar head of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists.

63. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 4957, ark. 3. Incidentally, Dniprodzerzhyns’k was known to be a heavily Russified industrial settlement with little if any Ukrainian cultural life. Leonid Brezhnev was born and started his political career there.

64. Ibid., ark. 4–8.

65. Ibid., ark. 2.

66. Ibid., ark. 10–21.
68. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 387, ark. 18. Both Doroshenko and Mazepa fought against Muscovy and were considered “traitors” in Russian historiography.

69. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 4956, ark. 6–7.

70. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 5072, ark. 13.

71. Ibid., ark. 24–25.

72. Ibid., ark. 26–28, 42.

73. Ibid., ark. 46–48.

74. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 4958, ark. 22.

75. Ibid., ark. 27–31.