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Author(s): JAROSLAW PELENSKI
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The Sack of Kiev of 1482 in Contemporary Muscovite Chronicle Writing

JAROSLAW PELENSKI

On 1 September 1482 (St. Simeon's Day), a Tatar army from the Crimea under the command of Khan Mengli Girey (1468–1478, with interruptions; 1478–1514) conquered and sacked the city of Kiev as part of a major campaign against the Podolian and Kievan lands. The principal facts of this campaign have been reconstructed from the sources by East European and Russian historians, who have provided us with a fairly accurate and composite picture of events leading up to the conquest, the sack itself, and the raid which followed.[1]

Mengli Girey's invasion of the Ukrainian lands and the sack of Kiev resulted from a reversal of alliances in Eastern Europe which brought about a period of Muscovite-Crimean cooperation against the disintegrating Golden Horde and Poland-Lithuania. The cooperation lasted, with several interruptions, for a relatively prolonged period, namely, from 1472 to 1511. This reversal of alliances has been viewed by Russian historians as a great diplomatic achievement on the part of Grand Prince Ivan III.[2]

The stage for the invasion and conquest of Kiev in 1482 was set by seven Muscovite diplomatic missions to Khan Mengli Girey in the years from 1472 to 1482.[3] The documentary evidence — i.e., the diplomatic instructions for the preparation of this invasion — remains among the most

[1] For a discussion of Mengli Girey's campaign of 1482 and the sack of Kiev of 1482, see F. Papée, *Polska i Litwa na przełomie wieków średnich,* vol. 1 (Cracow, 1904), pp. 83–92; M. Hruševs'kyj, *Istorija Ukrajiny-Rusy,* 10 vols. (reprint ed., New York, 1954–58), vol. 4 (2nd ed., 1907/1955), pp. 326–27; K. V. Bazilevič, *Vnešnjaja politika Russkogo centralizovannogo gosudarstva* (Moscow, 1952), pp. 192–99. The best introduction to the history of the Crimean Tatar Khanate, and the literature on the subject, has been provided by A. Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars* (Stanford, 1978), pp. 1–47, 231–55.

[2] Concerning the most recent example of such a view, cf. Bazilevič, *Vnešnjaja politika,* pp. 169–281.

[3] *Sbornik Imperatorskogo russkogo istoričeskogo obščestva* (hereafter *SIRIO*), 41 (1884): 1–9, 9–13, 14–16, 16–24, 25–28, 28–32, 32–34.

complete records preserved for that period. These diplomatic instructions and narrative sources, such as the official grand princely chronicles, leave no doubt whatsoever that Ivan III was the principal instigator of the invasion, and that he suggested a specific area for the Crimean attack. The Muscovite envoy Mixajlo Vasil'evič Kutuzov, who was sent to Mengli Girey in May of 1482, was instructed to request urgently an invasion of the Lithuanian lands and, specifically, of "the Podolian land, or the Kievan localities"[4] by the Crimean Tatars. The account of the official Muscovite chronicles confirms the version of the diplomatic instructions that the invasion was undertaken at the request (*po slovu*) of Ivan III.[5] The latter's appreciation of the Crimean adherence to the alliance and fulfillment of the Crimea's obligations, which obviously included the invasion of the Ukrainian lands, was conveyed to Mengli Girey by Prince Ivan Volodimirovič Lyko-Obolenskij in the spring of 1483.[6]

The great Tatar raid of 1482 was a complete success from the Crimean point of view. Ivan Xodkevyč, the palatine of Kiev, received notice about the advance of the Tatar army only four days prior to the actual attack. He attempted to organize a defense of the city and the castle in which he took refuge along with his family, the abbot and monks of the Monastery of the Caves, and the treasury chest.[7] However, the defenders of Kiev could not withstand the onslaught of the superior Tatar forces, who conquered the city without much difficulty and put it, the suburbs, and the neighboring villages to the torch. Most of those who escaped the fire and death at the hands of the invaders, including the palatine, his wife and their two children, were captured by the Tatars. The palatine's wife and their son Aleksander were later released for appropriate ransom money. The palatine himself and his daughter were less fortunate and died in Tatar captivity. Following the sack of the city of Kiev, the Tatar army devastated the Kievan land, took many captives (*polonu bezčisleno vzja*), and, according to the Pskovian Chronicle, captured and sacked eleven additional border towns of Old Rus'.[8] The sack of Kiev was so terrible that forty years following the event it was still remembered as a shattering experience and portrayed as such in contemporary sources.[9]

4 *SIRIO* 41 (1884): 34.
5 For the best version of the account, see the [Nikifor] Simeonov Chronicle (*Sch*), published under the editorship of A. E. Presnjakov in *Polnoe sobranie russkix letopisej* (hereafter *PSRL*), 18 (1913): 270.
6 *SIRIO* 41 (1884): 35.
7 Papée, *Polska i Litwa,* pp. 89–90.
8 A. N. Nasonov, ed., *Pskovskie letopisi,* vols. 1–2 (Moscow, 1941–55), 1: 62–63.
9 Papée, *Polska i Litwa,* p. 91.

In the aftermath of the sack, the ancient city of Kiev became desolate. It lapsed into considerable decay at the end of the fifteenth century, and was partially rebuilt only in the mid-seventeenth century. Consequently, Kievan urban life became centered in another part of the city and assumed a somewhat different character.[10] The three sacks of Kiev by Mongol and Tatar armies (that of Khan Batu in 1240, that of Edigü in 1416, and that of Mengli Girey in 1482) not only undermined considerably its political and economic position, but also significantly contributed to its decline as one of the principal centers of Old Rus'.

The sack of Kiev of 1482 has been viewed in scholarly literature primarily as a significant political and military event in the intricate relationships among Muscovy, Poland-Lithuania, the disintegrating Golden Horde and her Tatar successor states — that is, the Kazan, Crimean, and Astrakhan Khanates. Another important dimension of this event, which has not received the attention it deserves, is its treatment in Muscovite chronicle writing, especially in conjunction with the origins of the official Muscovite claims to the "Kievan inheritance."[11] The sack of Kiev under discussion occurred during the first major phase of the formulation of the Muscovite claims that extended over a period of approximately half a century (1454–1504), and, more specifically, between the second and third stages of their definition. It also happened roughly between the first two phases of a protracted, three-centuries-old contest between Muscovy and Poland-Lithuania for the lands of Old Rus'. The first phase extended from 1449 to 1485, and resulted in the annexation of two Great Russian states — that is, Great Novgorod and the Grand Principality of Tver — by Muscovy. The second phase covered the years 1487–1537, in the course of which five major wars were waged and Muscovy was able to conquer not only Great Russian border areas, but also Belorussian territories and some lands of Ukrainian Rus'.[12]

The first stage of the articulation of official Muscovite claims to Kiev

[10] V. Antonovyč, "Kiev, ego sud'ba i značenie s XIV po XVI stoletie (1362–1569)," *Kievskaja starina* 1 (January 1882): 1–48, especially 42. Antonovyč's seminal essay was reprinted in his *Monografii po istorii zapadnoj i jugo-zapadnoj Rossii,* vol. 1 (Kiev, 1885), pp. 221–64.

[11] For a discussion of the origins of these claims, see J. Pelenski, "The Origins of the Official Muscovite Claims to the 'Kievan Inheritance,'" *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 1, no. 1 (March, 1977): 29–52. The image of Kiev in Muscovite official and semi-official sources of the 1550s and 1560s has been analyzed by J. Pelenski, *Russia and Kazan: Conquest and Imperial Ideology (1438–1560s)* (The Hague and Paris, 1974), pp. 113–17.

[12] An outline of the major methodological and theoretical problems connected with the study of this contest in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is presented in my unpublished study, "The Contest between Muscovite Russia and Poland-Lithuania

coincided with the Muscovite ideological awakening of the 1450s and 1460s, following the Council of Florence (1438–39) and the fall of Constantinople (1453). It was reflected particularly in the *Vita* of Dmitrij Ivanovič [Donskoj] in which the concept of direct and uninterrupted dynastic continuity from the Kievan ruler Vladimir I to the aforesaid Muscovite grand prince was developed in Muscovite official thought for the first time. During the second stage, which belonged to the early 1470s, the editors of the official Muscovite Codex of 1472 not only integrated this *Vita* into their work, but also formulated their own version of the dynastic *translatio* theory from Kiev through Suzdal'-Vladimir to Muscovy. The third stage can be dated to the period from 1493 to 1504, when the Muscovite court formulated its claims to all of Rus' and, specifically, to Kiev in its struggle against the Jagiellonian dual monarchy.[13]

Four different versions and interpretations of the sack of Kiev of 1482 can be found in Muscovite chronicles of the last two decades of the fifteenth century, and one of them reappeared in the same or in a slightly edited form in Muscovite chronicle writing of the sixteenth century. The most factual and extensive of the four is an annalistic tale included as a separate account under the year 1483 in some manuscript copies of what is now referred to as the Vologda-Perm Chronicle (*VPCh*).[14] It reads as follows:

[*About the Conquest of the City of Kiev by the Crimean Tsar (Khan)*]. In the year 1483,[15] because of our sins, the Lord did not spare his own image[s] [the icons] and

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for the Lands of Old Rus' (1450s–1580s)." For a discussion of Polish claims to Kiev and the whole land of Rus' in connection with the incorporation of the Ukrainian lands into Crown Poland in 1569, see J. Pelenski, "The Incorporation of the Ukrainian Lands into Crown Poland (1569): Socio-material Interest and Ideology — A Reexamination," in *American Contributions to the Seventh International Congress of Slavists,* Warsaw, 21–27 August 1973, vol. 3 (The Hague and Paris, 1973), pp. 19–52; and idem, "Inkorporacja ukraińskich ziem dawnej Rusi do Korony w 1569 roku: Ideologia i korzyści — próba nowego spojrzenia," *Przegląd Historyczny* 65, no. 2 (1974): 243–62.

[13] Pelenski, "Origins of the Official Muscovite Claims," pp. 45–52.

[14] The two principal manuscript copies of the *VPCh* are the Copy of the Kirillo-Belozerskij Monastery and the Sinodal Copy. The Copy of the Kirillo-Belozerskij Monastery has been published in a critical edition as the *VPCh* in volume 26 of *PSRL* (Moscow, 1959) under the editorship of M. N. Tixomirov; it includes variants from the Sinodal Copy, as well as other manuscript copies. The Sinodal Copy had already been utilized by N. M. Karamzin in his *Istorija gosudarstva rossijskogo,* 12 vols. in 3 bks., 5th ed. (St. Petersburg, 1842–43).

[15] The correct date of the conquest, namely, 1 September 1482, was provided by the so-called Short Kievan Chronicle, entitled "The Origins of the Princes of the Principality of Rus'" (862–1514), which was incorporated in the chronicle known as the Supras'l' Manuscript, published under the auspices of M. N. Obolenskij, *Supras'l'skaja rukopis', soderžaščaja Novgorodskuju i Kievskuju sokraščennyja letopisi* (Moscow, 1836), pp. 138, 147 (cf. Hruševs'kyj, *Istorija Ukrajiny-Rusy,* 4: 326, fn. 2).

the Holy Sacraments and let loose the godless Tsar Mengli Girey, the son of [Khan] [H]Ači [= Ḥāğğī] Girey, who, having gathered mighty forces, advanced against the Lithuanian land, against the famous city of Kiev. Ivan Xodkevyč was the Viceroy and the Palatine of the city at that time. He received the message about the Tsar's advance from Perekop to Kiev only four days [before his arrival]. He [then] strengthened the fortifications of the city. And many people fled to the city and the abbot with all the monks came from the Monastery of the Caves into the city, and he brought with him the treasury [chest], and the sacred sacramental vessels to the city. And the Tsar reached the city on the day of St. Simeon, who changes years [on the First of September], at one o'clock, arranged his regiments, and approached the city, surrounding it. And because of God's anger, after much struggle, he set fire to the city, and all the people perished and were put to death. And a small number of those who managed to flee from the city were captured, and the suburbs and neighboring villages were burned. Following all this, he did not disband his troops, but departed to his own Horde.[16]

This version, which apparently has not been critically analyzed, brings up questions as to its origins and the context in which it might have been composed. The manuscript copies of the *VPCh* in which the tale was inserted contained materials similar to those included in the Simeonov Chronicle (*SCh*) and other official Muscovite chronicles for the period from 1425 to 1480. However, for the period from 1480 to 1538 they contained more original materials of a mixed nature, some of them praising the policies of the Muscovite court, which was a reflection of the official chronicle writing, and others expressing an independent point of view.[17]

The detailed description of the event, including such precise information as the exact time, suggests that the material for the tale was provided by an eyewitness to the event, or by someone who was familiar with the circumstances of Mengli Girey's invasion and the response to his advance

[16] *PSRL* 26 (1959): 274–75. Excerpts from this tale had been quoted by Karamzin from the Sinodal Copy (*Istorija gosudarstva rossijskogo,* bk. 2 [notes to vol. 6], p. 43, fn. 268). They correspond to the text of the tale included in the Copy of the Kirillo-Belozerskij Monastery.

[17] For a discussion of the materials in the *VPCh* up to the year 1480, see A. A. Šaxmatov, *Obozrenie russkix letopisnyx svodov XIV–XVI vv.* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1938), pp. 346–60; Ja. S. Lur'e, "Nikanorovskaja i Vologodsko-Permskaja letopisi kak otraženie velikoknjažeskogo svoda načala 70-x godov XV v.," *Vspomagatel'nye istoričeskie discipliny* 5 (1973): 219–50; and the relevant discussion in Ja. S. Lur'e, *Obščerusskie letopisi XIV–XV vv.* (Leningrad, 1976), chap. 3 (cf. also my review of this important work in the *American Historical Review* 84, no. 3 [1979]: 805–806). An analysis of the materials in the *VPCh* following 1480 was provided by M. N. Tixomirov, "O Vologodsko-Permskoj letopisi," *Problemy istočnikovedenija* 3 (1940): 225–44. Tixomirov observed that the tale "About the Conquest of the City of Kiev by the Tsar," included in the *VPCh,* was not available in other chronicle compilations. The two accounts of the Short Kievan Chronicle to be found in the Supras'l' Manuscript are brief and lack the information of the account included in *VPCh.*

by Ivan Xodkevyč, the palatine of Kiev, and, in particular, with the reaction of the abbot and the monks of the Kiev Monastery of the Caves. The information could have come from someone in Kiev, possibly in the monastery, or from someone in Muscovy who had close contacts with Kiev and the monastery. The tale was most probably composed soon after the event; it was carefully edited and given a separate title. The exclusively religious interpretation of the sack of Kiev ("because of our sins," "because of God's anger"), and the display of an appropriate empathy for "the famous city of Kiev" which had experienced such a great misfortune indicate that the author/editor of this annalistic tale must have been associated with some Great Russian ecclesiastical circles. At the same time, he carefully avoided any allusions to the political framework in which the event took place, or to the broader ideological ramifications it could have set in motion. Whereas the account was disapproving of the sack per se, it did not, significantly enough, mention either the Polish-Lithuanian ruler or the Muscovite grand prince Ivan III, or, in particular, the latter's role in the Crimean campaign. The tale refrained from any indirect criticism of the Muscovite ruler, which suggests that its author/editor did not wish to present him in an unfavorable light or as someone who had instigated an attack on the most venerable city of Old Rus' and on fellow Orthodox Christians. The author/editor did his utmost to record the event as truthfully as he could and, at the same time, to spare the Muscovite ruler the deserved religious embarrassment.

Curiously enough, the tale in question is included in the copies of the *VPCh* among entries closely connected with the Vologda and Perm areas. More specifically, it appears following the information about the fire in Vologda given under the entry for the year 1481.[18] However, it is unlikely that it was composed at the provincial episcopal chancery of Perm. More probably it was written and edited at a Muscovite monastery which had some connections with Perm. A tale of this sort could not have been included in a chronicle compiled at this bishopric without the permission either of the bishop of Perm himself or of some other appropriate authority. However, the tale was not disseminated widely, and significantly enough, it was not included in its entirety in any of the central Muscovite chronicles.

The remaining three Muscovite versions of the sack of Kiev of 1482 were abbreviated and edited accounts that contained less factual information. Instead, they conveyed a pointed political and ideological interpre-

[18] *PSRL* 26 (1959): 274.

tation. From among the three the official version of the Muscovite court deserves special attention. It was included in the official continuations of the Muscovite Codex of 1479, compiled in the 1480s and 1490s, with the best and probably the earliest text, preserved in the form of an annalistic tale with a separate title in the *SCh*:

About the Great City of Kiev. In the year 1484,[19] on the first day [of September] at the request of Grand Prince Ivan [III] Vasil'evič of all Rus', Tsar [Khan] Mengli Girey of the Perekop Horde of the Crimea arrived with all his mighty [army] and conquered the city of Kiev and set fire to it. And he captured Ivan Xodkevyč, the Palatine of Kiev, and took a countless multitude of prisoners, and he devastated the Kievan land because of the King's [Kazimierz Jagiellończyk's] transgression who brought Tsar [Khan] Ahmet of the Great [Golden] Horde with all his forces against Grand Prince Ivan Vasil'evič, wishing to destroy the Christian faith.[20]

By carefully selecting the convenient principal points, such as the greatness of Kiev (in the title), the explicit request of Ivan III to attack Kiev, the power of the Crimean khan, and the conquest and the devastation of Kiev and the Kievan land by the Crimean Tatars, the editor of the official account offered his own interpretation. He proposed that the sack of Kiev was undertaken as a retaliation for the Polish-Lithuanian ruler's alleged instigation of Ahmet's invasion of Muscovy in 1480, which ended with the famous *Vigil on the Ugra River* that led to Ahmet's retreat, his subsequent political failure, and the symbolic end of the Golden Horde's overlordship over Muscovy.[21] The juxtaposition of the two events, separated only by two years' time, was a convenient device used by the editor to impose the blame for the Kievan catastrophe and for the intent to harm Christianity on the Polish-Lithuanian ruler. The city of Kiev was treated in the tale as a major city in a foreign country, and no claim to any special relationship of Moscow to that city was intimated in this official account.

[19] The correct date was 1482.

[20] *PSRL* 18 (1913): 270. The text of the official version was also included in several Muscovite chronicle compilations of the late fifteenth century, among them the Uvarov Copy ending with the year 1492 (*PSRL* 25 [1949] [cf. 330]), the Abbreviated Codex of 1493 (*PSRL* 27 [1962] [cf. 286]), and the Abbreviated Codex of 1495 (*PSRL* 27 [1962] [cf. 357–58]). This official version was also inserted in the sixteenth-century chronicles, such as the Ioasaf Chronicle (A. A. Zimin, ed., *Ioasafovskaja letopis'* [Moscow, 1957], p. 124), the Voskresensk Chronicle (*PSRL* 8 [1859]: 215), and the Nikon Chronicle (*PSRL* 12 [1901/1965]: 215).

[21] For a discussion of the Russian literary and ideological writings dealing with the *Vigil on the Ugra River,* consult I. M. Kudrjavcev, "'Poslanie na Ugru' Vassijana Rylo kak pamjatnik publicistiki XV v.," *Trudy Otdela drevnerusskoj literatury* (hereafter *TODRL*), 8 (1951): 158–86, and idem, "'Ugorščina' v pamjatnikax drevnerusskoj literatury," in *Issledovanija i materialy po drevnerusskoj literature* (Moscow, 1961), pp. 23–67.

An obligatory religious interpretation was added at the end of the tale, which charged the Polish-Lithuanian ruler with the intention of destroying Orthodox Christianity without explaining why other Orthodox Christians were selected as victims of the Tatar retaliatory attack.

The second of the three abbreviated accounts of the sack of Kiev by the Crimean Tatars in 1482 is to be found in the so-called Rostov Codex of 1489, which was compiled at the Rostov archbishopric during the tenure of Archbishop Tixon (1489–1505) and later partially included in the *Tipografskaja letopis'*,[22] in the Codex of 1497,[23] and in the Muscovite Codex of 1518.[24] Its text reads as follows:

In the year 1483,[25] because of our sins, Kiev was conquered by Tsar [Khan] Mengli Girey of the Crimea, and the son of [Khan] Azi [< Ači < Ḥāğğī] Girey. And he set the city on fire from two sides. And the people were frightened, and those who fled were captured by the Tatars, and all [those] in the city perished in the fire. And they [the Tatars] captured Lord Ivan Xodkevyč who had fled from the fire in the city, and they took him, together with his wife and children and with the Archmandrite of the Monastery of the Caves, into captivity. This malice occurred in the month of September.[26]

This carefully edited account was evidently prepared by its author/editor from selected elements of the annalistic tale found in some of the manuscript copies of the *VPCh*. In this version the author/editor eliminated all the information pertaining to the military aspects of the campaign and the conquest, and gave the latter a purely religious interpretation. The concluding comment on the sack of Kiev as a malicious act (*zloba*), which was lacking in the extended version, may be interpreted as a device on the part of the author/editor to express a greater degree of disapproval about the misfortune experienced by the city of Kiev, and even as an indirect censure of the Muscovite ruler. However, he avoided any direct criticism of the Muscovite grand prince and refrained from mentioning the Polish-Lithuanian ruler, thus maintaining an absolute impartiality toward the secular authorities involved in the political and military conflicts. The indirect criticism of the Muscovite grand prince in the

[22] The text of the *Tipografskaja letopis* was published under the editorship of A. A. Šaxmatov and A. E. Presnjakov in *PSRL* 24 (1921).
[23] The Codex of 1497 was published under the editorship of K. N. Serbina in *PSRL* 28 (1963).
[24] The Muscovite Codex of 1518 was also published under the editorship of K. N. Serbina in *PSRL* 28 (1963).
[25] The correct date was 1482.
[26] *PSRL* 24 (1921): 202; *PSRL* 28 (1963): 151, 316. This text was also included in the form of a supplementary account in the Second Sophia Chronicle (*SSCh*) and the Lvov Chronicle (*LCh*), as will be shown later.

account is probably a reflection of the contemporary state of relations between Metropolitan Gerontij and Grand Prince Ivan III, who in 1483 attempted to remove the former from the metropolitanate.[27] This account, with its obviously official religious character, must have been prepared by someone interested in offering an interpretation of the event different from that advocated by the Muscovite court.

The question of the attribution of this account is closely interconnected with one of the major unresolved problems of Muscovite chronicle writing, namely, whether official metropolitan chronicle writing still existed in the second half of the fifteenth century.[28] On the basis of the available evidence, the argument can be made that official metropolitan chronicle writing did continue during the period in question, particularly in view of the fact that it was perpetuated into the sixteenth century, as exemplified by the chronicle writing under the auspices of the metropolitans Daniil and Ioasaf.[29] It is rather doubtful that the writing and editing of this account were undertaken at a local bishopric. On the contrary, the available circumstantial evidence suggests that it was composed at the metropolitan chancery, which at that time was the second principal center of Muscovite chronicle writing, and then disseminated to local centers and included in various chronicle compilations.

Interestingly enough, the editors of the Rostov Codex of 1489 and the Codex of 1497, besides including in their codices the account coming from the metropolitan chancery, also inserted the account from the official continuations of the Muscovite Codex of 1479 under the entry for the year 1484.[30] Thus the reader had two versions of the sack of Kiev of 1482, regardless of their obviously conflicting assessments. This device on the part of the editors sheds light on their general attitudes, as well as those of Archbishop Tixon and his archbishopric chancery, toward the

[27] *PSRL* 24 (1921): 203; *PSRL* 6 (1853): 236; *PSRL* 20, pt. 1 (1910/1971): 351. Cf. also E. Golubinskij, *Istorija russkoj cerkvi,* vol. 2, pt. 1 (Moscow, 1900), pp. 557–58.

[28] A. N. Nasonov maintained that the official metropolitan chronicle writing did continue in the second half of the fifteenth century (*Istorija russkogo letopisanija XI–načala XVIII v.* [Moscow, 1969], pp. 303–308). For similar views, cf. A. A. Zimin, *Russkie letopisi i xronografy konca XV–XVI vv.* (Moscow, 1960), p. 6. Lur'e contends that the official metropolitan chronicle writing was discontinued during the period in question (*Obščerusskie letopisi XIV–XV vv.,* pp. 211–12, 238–40, 258).

[29] For a discussion of the sixteenth-century metropolitan chronicle writing, see B. M. Kloss, "Dejatel'nost' mitropolič'ej knigopisnoj masterskoj v 20–30x godax XVI veka i proisxoždenie Nikonovskoj letopisi," in *Drevnerusskoe iskusstvo: Rukopisnaja kniga* (Moscow, 1972), pp. 318–37; and idem, "Mitropolit Daniil i Nikonovskaja letopis," *TODRL* 28 (1974): 188–201.

[30] *PSRL* 24 (1921): 204; *PSRL* 28 (1963): 152.

policies of Grand Prince Ivan III. When it came to the evaluation of the Tatar sack of the most venerable city of Old Rus', they apparently wished to preserve a certain degree of self-respect and to disassociate themselves from such a pernicious act, but at the same time they wanted to give evidence of their loyalty to the Muscovite grand prince Ivan III.

Of all the Muscovite accounts of the sack of Kiev of 1482, the most outspoken in its criticism of the Muscovite grand prince was the version in the oppositional Codex of the 1480s, elements of which can be found in the Second Sophia Chronicle (*SSCh*) and in the L'vov Chronicle (*LCh*). Under the entry for the year 1482, it describes the event in the following terms:

> Grand Prince [Ivan III Vasil'evič] sent [his envoy] to [Khan] Mengli Girey of the Crimea, and ordered him to wage war against the King's [Kazimierz Jagiellończyk's] land. Mengli Girey with his mighty [army] conquered Kiev, took all the people into captivity, and took along with him the governor of Kiev, together with his wife and his children, and caused many calamities. And he ransacked the Church and the Monastery of the Caves. And many fled to the Caves and suffocated [because of the fire]. And he sent the vessels for [the holy] liturgy, the golden chalice and the plate, from the Great Sophia [Church] to the Grand Prince.[31]

In this account the Muscovite ruler was directly referred to as the principal instigator of the sack of Kiev and of the calamities which befell that city. The pillage of the religious places was especially emphasized, and the Muscovite ruler was spared no embarrassment. The author/editor of the account reported that Khan Mengli Girey sent the holy vessels from the Great Sophia as war trophies to Ivan III. From this account the conclusion could be drawn that the Muscovite ruler, by accepting the sacred vessels from a "pagan" war lord, had committed a highly un-Christian and even blasphemous transgression.

Who composed an account so damaging to the reputation of the Muscovite ruler, and who sponsored the compilation of the oppositional Codex of the 1480s included in the *SSCh* and the *LCh*? Those historians who have adhered to the notion that the official metropolitan chronicle writing was continued in the second half of the fifteenth century have been inclined to assume that there existed an official Codex of Metropolitan Gerontij of 1490, and that parts of this codex which might have constituted the oppositional Codex of the 1480s had been included in the *SSCh* and the *LCh*.[32] More recently it has been argued that the oppositional

[31] *PSRL* 6 (1853): 234; *PSRL* 20, pt. 1 (1910/1971): 349.

[32] Nasonov, *Istorija russkogo letopisanija,* pp. 303–315; Zimin, *Russkie letopisi i xronografy,* p. 6.

Codex of the 1480s represented the views of oppositional "militant" ecclesiastics.[33] The attribution of the oppositional Codex of the 1480s, as well as the problem of the relationship between official grand princely, official metropolitan, and unofficial chronicle writing, cannot be solved in this study and are in need of further examination. For the time being, the account in the oppositional Codex of the 1480s must remain attributed to those Muscovite ecclesiastical circles who were strongly opposed to the policies of Ivan III and felt deeply disturbed about his cynical political behavior toward the city of Kiev and the "pagan" Muslims. It deserves to be noted that, in addition to the text most critical of Ivan III, the editors of the oppositional Codex of the 1480s incorporated in their work the official metropolitan version about the sack of Kiev of 1482, apparently to reinforce their criticism of the Muscovite ruler.[34]

The various interpretations of the sack of Kiev of 1482 in contemporary Muscovite chronicle writing reflect a serious division of attitudes in Muscovite ideological thought about the "Kievan inheritance." The accounts originating from the religious circles reveal a basically compassionate attitude on the part of their authors/editors toward Kiev and even a sense of identification with that "famous" city. The authors/editors of these accounts condemned the sack of Kiev in the same manner that they would have castigated an attack on Moscow or on any other city of Muscovite Russia, and some even dared to criticize openly the Muscovite ruler for his involvement in such an infamous deed.

The official account promoted by the grand princely court stressed the political aspects of the sack. Its authors/editors viewed Kiev for all practical purposes as a foreign city, which could be attacked by an ally regardless of his political and religious affiliations. Thus, the sack of Kiev did not quite fit into the evolution of the official Muscovite claims to the "Kievan inheritance" which had been developing over a period of thirty years prior to the event, and might even have contributed to delaying the formulation of such claims.

The sharp conflict of opinion between the Muscovite court and the ecclesiastical circles concerning the sack of Kiev of 1482 indicates not only that fundamental "ideological struggles" were conducted within the Muscovite establishment at the end of the fifteenth century. The conflict also

[33] Ja. S. Lur'e, "Nezavisimyj letopisnyj svod konca XV v. — istočnik Sofijskoj II i L'vovskoj letopisej," *TODRL* 27 (1972): 405–419, especially 418–19; idem, *Obščerusskie letopisi XIV–XV vv.*, pp. 238–40. For his references to the sack of Kiev of 1482, see ibid., pp. 220, 244.

[34] *PSRL* 6 (1853): 235; *PSRL* 20, pt. 1 (1910/1971): 350.

shows that this establishment was struggling with the problem of the "Kievan inheritance," which has never really been resolved.

University of Iowa