

Old intelligentsia – new intelligentsia – pseudointelligentsia – non-intelligentsia: self-definitions, idealised images, ‘faked’ standings and ‘outdated’ categories among intelligentsia in Lviv (Ukraine).

Intelligentsia in post-1991 Lviv: those ‘yet not dead’

“Of all the social strata, the intelligentsia is the most difficult to define”. One can still agree with this statement by Alexander Gella (1976), made for more than 30 years ago. The interest in this multilevel sociocultural phenomenon has been particularly high after the break of the ‘socialist block’ and the disintegration of the USSR. As a category and as a social actor whose quest for power positions is based on claims of knowledge and expertise in the realm of culture, intelligentsia seemed to be predestined to play crucial role in the so called transformation processes in this part of Europe, in formulation of new ideational trends as well as in actual political processes. Nation-building processes in the former Soviet republics, which previously were stateless or existed as independent political entities only for short periods, further fuelled discussion about intelligentsia. It has been suggested that social trajectories and ideological choices of intelligentsia and intellectuals may predetermine shapes and contents of the national projects (Greenfeld 1992, Brown 2000). Hence, it is important to learn more about East European intelligentsia’s (self)identifications and social roles in the post-1991 reality.

The paper discusses the visions of intelligentsia’s social positions and cultural identifications as presented by the educated Ukrainians of different generations in western Ukrainian city of Lviv. Intelligentsia is a notion widely employed in the public polemics concerning nation-building projects in the post-1991 Ukraine. Simultaneously, it is still an important reference point for personal, social and cultural affiliations. In Lviv this notion has been elaborated in the historical conditions of different political regimes, multiethnic urban environment and nearly century-old strivings of the nationally conscious intelligentsia living in the ‘Ukrainian Piedmont’ to define the ‘national package’ for the whole of Ukraine. These particular historical and structural factors have conditioned the multilayered and contradictory understanding of the socio-cultural phenomenon behind such related notions as intelligentsia, *intelligent*¹, *intelligentnyi* and *intelligentnist*.

This case study has been conducted using, in particular, ethnological methods. Around 40 interviews were conducted with Ukrainian-speaking Lvivites of different ages who were asked to reflect on notions of intelligentsia, intellectuals and nation as well as to define their own social, cultural and national affinities in particular. All the informants had higher education (or studied at some Lviv institution of higher learning at the time when the study was in progress) and were in some way involved into production of cultural discourses (in the capacity of political activists, authors of academic works and articles in local media etc.). It was meant that the chosen informants could be operationalised as representatives of ‘intelligentsia’. The informants who in other situations were expected to talk about the named topics from the professional position of ‘experts’, were

¹ In Ukrainian, as in other Slavic languages, there are particular words for individual representative(s) of intelligentsia: substantives *‘intelligent’* (singular form) and *‘intelligentny’* (plural form). There also exist a word *‘intelligentnist’* which is a noun addressing totality of intelligentsia features and characteristics. Because the English word ‘intelligent’ is an adjective which besides means something else than belongingness to ‘intelligentsia’, I have chosen to circumvent this terminological problem by way of putting the indigenous terms in the Ukrainian spelling (with one ‘l’) in cursive. Besides, aiming not to complicate, but to contextualise and specify the terms, I use an adjective *‘intelligentnyi’* (in its different grammatical forms: *‘intelligentna’*, *‘intelligentni’*) when the informants use it. This adjective has often been translated as ‘cultured’ in English texts, but *‘cul’turnyi* and *‘intelligentnyi’* in Ukrainian language (as well as in Russian) are not equivalents. In order to maintain the connotation of the specific cultural, social and discursive phenomenon evident in this word, I prefer to use the adjective *‘intelligentnyi’* non-translated.

expected to re-frame their narratives according to their individual experiences in the course of a semi-structured interview. It does not necessarily imply that cultural meanings and hierarchies of the everyday life should be viewed as more 'real' or 'basic' than those explicated by the same actors in the spheres of public activity. Rather, in my opinion, along with the publicist and propagandist discursive production it is worthy to pay more attention to these vernacular statements, categorisations and narratives. This may result in a nuanced picture of the post-state socialism intelligentsia's socio-cultural lives as a vital domain, which has been reproduced, transformed, embedded into both new and old social hierarchies, and clustered around certain distinguishable cultural concepts.

Recently it has been argued that in view of many factors (e.g., drastically decreased state support of intelligentsia's 'cultured' lifestyles, lost ideological-cultural identity, absence of united political action and common critical discourse which intelligentsia could identify itself with etc.) the intelligentsia in the post-Soviet space has become an almost extinct social species (e.g. Roberts et al. 2005; Gessen 1997). There are, however, some reasons not to agree with this generalising conclusion. Firstly, intelligentsia nowadays, unlike the historical 'stratum of particular social calling' (Gella 1976: 18) in Russia and Eastern Europe, does not necessarily exist as a bounded status group accommodating certain lifestyle and ethos. "Speaking about the dissolution of the older intelligentsia in the course of time... does not prevent looking for its afterlife (in certain concerns and discourses, groups and personalities, even in myths about it)" (Daskalov 1996: 50). Secondly, "who or what intelligentsia is, is more than a matter of self-definition, it is also a matter of historical consciousness and its realization" (Eyerman 1994: 3). I found that when one analyses the informants' narratives, it becomes obvious that many informants share basic notions of moral responsibility, spirituality and service to cultural community typical of the older intelligentsia. Thirdly, the statement about 'intelligentsia's death' is a generalisation which should be proved in every concrete case because intelligentsia's roles are "taken on and reinvented by actors out of the possibilities and constraints provided by tradition and context" (Eyerman 1994: 1). It may be suggested that, for example, in local circumstances of Lviv the intelligentsia is not 'as much dead' as somewhere else because the interplay of specific structural conditions, historical circumstances and cultural models creates conditions for its reproduction. Last but not least, ideological role of the post-1991 intelligentsia and intellectuals as 'legislators and interpreters' (empowering, however, unlike two decades ago, not only the state, but the incipient civil society (Verdery 1999) remains mainly unchanged.

My interlocutors defined intelligentsia and *intelligent* in a quite wide range: from categories of self-description and the pivotal concepts in one's vision of the social world to detached categories which the interlocutor tried to outline in the interview situation. Out of the informants' answers, the cluster of attributes according to which belongingness to intelligentsia may be judged varies greatly. Such a state of affairs is quite predictable and in no way surprising. The diversity in opinions reflects complexity of discourses which the notion of intelligentsia is 'emplotted' into (Borneman 1992). Besides, this diversity discloses internal heterogeneity of the fields of cultural/symbolic production as structured spaces of social relations (Bourdieu 1993). Finally, the local specificity of Lviv as a multiethnic cultural centre in the borderland region of Galicia should be taken into account, as there one can trace narratives on intelligentsia rooted in different national and cultural paradigms.

The informants often preferred to discuss culturally valued powers of character of an *intelligent* rather than collective features of intelligentsia. Such willingness to imagine and describe some concrete persons instead of a discursive category is an interesting detail, which I am going to come back to later. Majority of the informants began their descriptions with statements that such formal characteristic as higher education and a non-manual, 'intellectual' work are important criteria for being regarded as an *intelligent*. Higher education credentials, however, were presented (even by some informants who worked in educational and academic institutions) as neither ultimate nor sufficient feature for a 'genuine' *intelligent*. On the one hand, this wide-spread opinion that formal education does not mean everything, that a person can be 'naturally' *intelligentna* despite absence of

some official certificate, may connote deep distrust to the educational institutions which consecrated and legitimated 'alien' states and regimes (in the 20th century the Polish and the Soviet) and which were all but free harbours of Ukrainian culture, political thought and science. On the other hand, reaction against the Soviet legacy might also play its role. In the USSR the term 'intelligentsia' (and, in particular, 'working' or 'toiling intelligentsia') was "officially used to designate all more or less educated people, ranging from the academician to the clerk of lowest rank" (Gella 1976:11). Also, the higher education after 1991 has been often viewed simply as a 'sorting station' for coming into the job market rather than as an institution that cultivates certain types of 'elite' cultural affiliations and subjectivities. Accordingly, after 1991 intelligentsia in popular opinion could become a mainstream social identification which allows to avoid the class labelling in the situations when, for instance, one is not certain about one's 'definite' class identification (Savage, Bagnall and Longhurst 2001: 875). In a way, when identifying themselves as members of intelligentsia, people stress their ordinariness and 'normality'. In the post-Soviet space this striving to restore 'normal order of things', which takes many shapes and expressions, may be interpreted as a part of efforts of the newly emerged independent nations to emancipate from the Soviet metanarrative that used to stress power, heroism and even superhuman features (Eglitis 2002).

In the informants view, it is not particularly important whether on the individual level a person regarded as *intelligent* adheres to scientific worldview, or to religious faith (or a mixture of them both). In order to be regarded as *intelligent*, one should be first and foremost identifiable, one should look, talk and react in certain ways. What is performed is more important than what this performance is caused by. This view directly relates to the widespread opinion, according to which formal higher education does not necessarily presuppose intellectualism and cultural refinement². Nevertheless, it was widely accepted that *intelligent* cannot dispense with a share of intellectualism and expert knowledge in order to fulfil their social role as 'spiritual leaders'. In this respect the connotative sphere of intelligentsia overlaps the category of intellectuals (Verdery 1991:16).

The word '*intelligent*' usually – and even in many cases primarily - indicates a spectrum of personal qualities and dispositions which become externalised in the form of 'proper' behaviour, good manners and certain socio-cultural choices. The opinions about imagined 'higher', more 'refined' and 'civilised' standards of conduct and reasoning projected in the idealised figure of the 'genuine' representative of intelligentsia corresponds to a popular image of the 'West' and 'Europe' as symbolic generators of ideas on civility (Elias 1994), 'nobleness of spirit' and universal ethical norms. This kind of narrative connecting intelligentsia to the elite, to the aristocracy and to the key symbol (Ortner 1973) of 'Europe' has been quite typical of the Polish cultural tradition. The informants' definitions of intelligentsia often tend to be descriptions of a 'genuine', idealised phenomenon whose 'true' representatives in a way do not belong to this earthly world and therefore can hardly become a source of daily identification for many informants, especially for the younger ones. These highly desirable, but rarely performed in practice characteristics, according to the majority of the statements, are a combination of outer signs of a 'noble', cultivated behaviour, high moral principles and concern about one's cultural community. Notions about what exactly means to behave as a representative of intelligentsia vary on a wide scale. Nevertheless, on the basis of the interview data, one can conclude that the issue of proper conduct is often conflated with issue of language use, of how someone talks. Several informants insisted that the Ukrainian *intelligent* in Lviv must possess a certain 'language culture', i.e. to talk in Ukrainian unpolluted by vulgar expressions and borrowings from Russian. This seems to be, however, not solely a matter of language purism and nationalistic zeal, but a desire to emphasise local Galician specificity inasmuch Polonisms are usually acceptable as tints of this specificity.

² This incongruity between education credentials, occupation and cultural refinement in the Soviet and post-Soviet area contrasts strikingly with the state of affairs in the West (see, for example, Lamont 1992).

In practically every interview *intelligenty* were pointed out as people concerned about wellbeing of their smaller and larger cultural communities, as patriots who work (in symbolical or practical ways) for their city, region, country, people and nation. It is hard to imagine intelligentsia beyond the national frames of reference. Intelligentsia is equally unthinkable without adherence to ‘universal’ moral principles, but, eventually, these principles are unavoidably performed on the distinct arena of national culture and everyday life charged with ethnic/national symbols and ritualised activities. The main subject of the intelligentsia’s loyalty is defined (in overt statements or contextually) as semi-sacralised ‘people’ or ‘folk’ (*narod*). Nation in its various meanings is also often mentioned in this connection. Formulated with almost propagandistic zeal, responsibility of intelligentsia as the nation’s and the people’s spiritual leaders has been one of the central organising themes in the interviews with the older informants.

Rigid boundaries and striving for elitism: the old Galician intelligentsia and its descendants

A part of the informants finds comfort in imagining intelligentsia as a distinct bounded community, which keeps old traditions and holds itself ‘pure’ and impenetrable for ‘strangers’. Such cultural imagination, harbouring retrospective images of the naturalness and purity typical of ‘good old times’, may be viewed as a token of dissatisfaction with the present socio-political circumstances and as a search for an anchor in the turbulent sea of the post-state socialist reality (Tismaneanu 1998). Oftentimes, this stance is evident when the informants ponder over not some abstract, generalised category of intelligentsia, but when they address a concrete - historical and local - type of symbolic referents called ‘Galician intelligentsia’ and its even more symbolically significant variant, the ‘old Galician intelligentsia’. Stories about ‘genuine Galician intelligentsia’ oftentimes appear in the context of tales about ‘good old times’ before the Soviet epoch as well as in heroic narratives about resistance (sometimes in form of dissent, but often as inner protest against ‘brutality’ and ‘immorality’ of the Soviet mores and policies). In a way, this collective figure is a key symbol associated with images of the bygone Lviv as a city endowed with special symbolic significance.

The old Galician intelligentsia has been depicted as persons educated in prestigious European universities (Vienna, Zurich, Berlin and Warszawa were often mentioned), as bearers of conservative ethos and Christian morality, and as ‘sincere’ (*shchyri*) and ‘aware’ (*svidomi*) Ukrainian patriots. Exclusion of socially and ethnically ‘others’ and parochialism notwithstanding, Galician intelligentsia is still viewed as an organic part of the bygone cityscape and an important ingredient of ‘Lviv myth’. The narratives on old Galician intelligentsia generally convey pre-war notions about intelligentsia as a specific social stratum at the centre of a society development that existed in Poland from the latter half of the nineteenth to the middle of twentieth century (Gella 1978: 66). Moreover, the elder informants sometimes describe - somewhat nostalgically – the old Galician intelligentsia not only as a social category or stratum, but also as a special local ‘species’ of people, whose typical features could be formed not only by way of social, but also by a kind of genetic transmission. Several informants regarded that guarding of ‘noble’ and ‘strictly Ukrainian’, pure and heroic iconic identity of the old Galician intelligentsia among certain circles of contemporary Lviv *intelligenty* is worthy of respect and imitation. However, in view of others, this image of ‘genuine’ Lviv intelligentsia is an anachronism which irritates and serves as a target of ironic comments. As it could be easily predicted, this latter group of the informants includes first and foremost the younger persons who were brought up in the late period of the Soviet rule, who cannot boast with their long pedigrees as Lviv urbanites and who internalised more egalitarian concepts.

Old boundaries redrawn: the images of the Soviet intelligentsia

While the ‘old’ intelligentsia is oftentimes associated with the inter-war Galician intelligentsia and its later vestiges, the ‘new’ intelligentsia is a euphemism for the Soviet intelligentsia. Even though the older informants included these actors into the definition of intelligentsia, it was nevertheless

obvious that for them this stretched the boundaries of the acceptable almost to the point of bursting. The younger generations, in their turn, often perceive collective image of intelligentsia through the prism of stereotypes, which have been formed in the Soviet times. These stereotypes are especially evident in urban folklore, where ‘typical *inteligent*’ is a ridiculed figure represented as a poor, deprived, impractical and physically weak ‘academic type’ (see Hawryliuk 2001). Even though present 20-30-years olds are aware about tragic circumstances of the dissenting intelligentsia and about quite harsh reality which rank-and-file *inteligenty* might experience under the Soviets, this derogatory image remains firmly implanted in the daily consciousness of the post-1991 generation.

As a symbolic point of reference this type(s) of *inteligent* can hardly be attractive today. However, the implications of quick career growth, social mobility and boundary-transgression (from peasants and workers to a cultural and professional elite) projected by the figure of the Soviet *inteligent* may not be easily discarded in the post-Soviet society. Thereby, perpetual internal struggles between the symbolic orders incarnated in the figures of the Galician (‘local’, intellectual, belonging to the closed milieu cultivating aristocratic values) and the Soviet (‘newcomers’, poorly educated, transgressing boundaries and demonstrating much flexibility in tastes and strategies) intelligentsia continue in the new circumstances (see Bourdieu 1993: 41). It should be stressed that Soviet intelligentsia itself is an umbrella concept embracing multiple ‘intelligentsias’ and that “(c)onflicting notions about the social and political roles of highly educated citizens coexisted in the Soviet scene, and were themselves the product of differing ideological agendas and periods of Soviet history” (Tromly 2007: 18). Here, nevertheless, we deal with the issue of representations of this socio-cultural phenomenon. Within the domain of folk ideas (Dundes 1972: 96) and everyday discourses the rich texture of incarnations of this category has been inevitably reduced to several schematic images. The stereotypes of a pitiful dystrophic in spectacles – as well as of a rude ‘uncultured’ parvenu with university diploma – are obviously only some of the possible dimensions that Soviet intelligentsia’s (self)image could be developed in. The images of relative wealth, intellectualism and influence of the significant part of the Soviet intelligentsia – in other words, projections of intelligentsia as a relatively successful and not at all disempowered fellow-countrymen – often have been misrecognised (or ‘normalised’) and, thus, were practically absent from folklore and mass consciousness. In the same vein, the presentation of intelligentsia as a social network of freethinkers that had taken root in some milieus of the highly educated by the end of the Soviet period (Tromly 2007: 39) also seems to pass unnoticed in the popular mass discourses.

The negative baggage that burdens intelligentsia in Lviv since the Soviet times (declined educational standard, ‘provincialisation’ of the humanities and social sciences, internalisation of the ideologized doxa in the scholarship (Grabowicz 2005)) came partly as a result of fostering and selection of its segments as relatively privileged, ‘tamed’ (Dziegiel 1998) and ideologically indoctrinated Soviet ‘legislators and interpreters’. It has been argued that under the state socialism intellectual space was organised in a way that the field of power incorporated mostly the positions organised around the heteronomous principle, while positions legitimated by the ‘inner’, autonomous logic of the field, were gradually marginalised (Verdery 1991). Nevertheless, it neither necessarily means that the ideological Soviet doxa was internalised by all those classified as Soviet intelligentsia without exception – or that those Galician ‘natives’ who tacitly scorned the regime could not resort to the help of the Soviet rhetoric when it was in their interests. Manipulation with Soviet phraseology – and thereby often its mocking – used to be instrumental behaviour as well as resistance practice for many representatives of intelligentsia (Ries 1997: 81).

In view of some informants, phenomenon of the post-Soviet ‘quasi-intelligentsia’ or ‘pseudo-intelligentsia’ occupying lucrative or prestigious positions within academia and other spheres is not only vestiges of the Soviet intelligentsia, but a new hybrid form. Its typical features are combination of Ukrainian patriotism (however, in the majority of cases, coming no further than nationalist rhetoric) and the stiffened ideological paradigms typical of the Soviet period (Hnatiuk 2003). This phenomenon of replacing “discredited ideologies and discourses with new ones (among them

nationalism, negationism, westernism, catastrophism) instead of with reasoned analysis” (Ries 1997: 40) is typical for all the post-Soviet space. However, it looks like such a state of affairs in the field of cultural/symbolic production has been accepted as a troubling, but unavoidable cost of transition connected to processes of generational (dis)continuity.

In the new conditions quite a few younger cultural producers feel themselves strong enough to resist the old categorisations and develop their intellectual autonomy and influence in the field. Although it is tempting to celebrate this resistance as the indicator of the profound changes in the local field of intellectual production, one should not forget that most often those who challenge existing hierarchies do it by way of ‘returning to the sources’ and, thus, confirm the old principles of the field as well the structures of social domination defined by class, ethnicity and gender (Bourdieu 1993, 1984a, 1984b). Nevertheless, notwithstanding the outcome, the significance of intelligentsia as a key symbol, a self-definition and a discursive means of empowerment has been challenged.

The boundaries questioned: what are we going to (never) become?

The tendency of making a stake on cultural rather than economic and social capital is quite typical of newcomers into the field of cultural production, as it was observed by Bourdieu (1993: 41). Relying on the interviews, nowadays in Lviv the ‘newcomers’ in the intellectual/cultural field oftentimes emphasise individual creative abilities, personal autonomy, resistance to enslaving ‘group opinion’ and internalisation of universal moral principles as the guidelines which they themselves view as important. It is also quite typical of this group of the informants to reject the term ‘intelligentsia’ as a category of self-identification on behalf of other definitions, such as intellectual, academician, middle class and bourgeoisie. This finding correlates with statistical data obtained in 2000 in the course of the all-Ukrainian poll on socio-class identification of Ukrainian population. According to these data, ‘self-identification with middle class is most typical of people under 30’ (Brods’ka and Oksamytna 2001: 48).

The younger generation of the informants who might objectively share principles of the field of cultural production and take positions within it, did not seem to identify themselves in terms of belonging with some special kind of intelligentsia and even with intelligentsia in general. Here we have an interesting example of how the cultural identification may differ from the sense of belonging (Anthias 2002: 505): a person may have cultural preferences and dispositions ‘typical’ of intelligentsia, but it does not mean that she sees herself as the same. Apparently, refusing to be defined in the terms marked by ‘outdated’ ideological usages, these people also make a kind of ideological statement and challenge symbolic dominance of certain taken-for-granted cultural codes and discursive structures (Ries 1997: 157).

For the younger ‘players in the field’ the word ‘intelligentsia’ alludes to outdated ideological phraseology, connotes group exclusivity, and thereby provokes mostly negative associations. On the one hand, it alludes to the old Galician intelligentsia as a kind of ‘inborn’ group identity emphasising loyalty to collective conservative values of patriotism, religiousness and time-specific bourgeoisness at an expense of individual search and critical reflection. On the other hand, ‘intelligentsia’ wakes associations with Soviet intelligentsia regarded as a docile ‘sub-startum’ whose actual socio-cultural position in the state socialist system used to be in obvious discord with the self-proclaimed position as a spiritual elite. By not accepting either old Galician or Soviet intelligentsia as the reference points for self-identification, the younger informants seem to react against too obvious incongruity between what one of the informants called the ‘myth’ (meaning collective representations constructed for propagandist aims) and the actual content - and context - which these categories of symbolic producers are typically associated with. However, the highly educated youth anyway tends to emphasise and thus reproduce some well-known pivotal notions and points of reference typical of the ‘classical’ intelligentsia.

Intellectuals

As Tromly (2007: 19) notices, '(w)hile intellectual is also a word laden with subjective meanings, it is less loaded than intelligentsia in the Soviet /and post-Soviet –E.N./ cultural space'. Generally, the younger informants more frequently agreed on to be defined as intellectuals and readily discussed what it means to be an intellectual. Unlike the *inteligent*, the intellectual is perceived first and foremost as a definition of an individually achieved status. Unlike 'intelligentsia', this term lacks a connotation of belonging to the community of ascribed virtue (observe: unlike in the case with *inteligent*, correlative collective noun for 'intellectual' does not exist). In principle, the core criterion distinguishing intellectual is, in the first turn, his/her outstanding ability of critical reflection. Such frequently mentioned features of the intellectual as creativity, participation in public debate and pursuit to change actual state of affairs in different spheres of life correlate to this intellectual capacity. However, opinions of the informants about how intellectuals and intelligentsia correlate, which category should be viewed as the other's 'subtype' and which one of them should be valued higher were substantially different.

The interview material reveals that critical reflectivity, civility, 'universal' moral principles and responsibility for the community one identifies oneself with (be it national, local community or community of scholars) are still important landmarks which determine borders of the cultural space and category of membership called 'intellectual'. As Verdery (1991: 247) assumes, in Eastern Europe '(t)he emphasis on moral superiority as integral to cultural and scientific authority was shared by all pretenders to intellectual status, even by those close to the political axis. It rests in part on East European intellectuals' historical sense of "mission", and it appears to have served as a basic entry qualification for occupancy of any corner of the "intellectual space" '. It seems to be that this normative dimension of the intellectual space in this part of the world has been reproduced despite all the circumstances of the transitional period. However, one can detect a constellation of meanings conveyed by the word 'intellectual' that for a long time were suppressed and whose actualization thereby became facilitated by the post-1991 conditions. It is, namely, cultural and ideational relationship with western paradigms of thinking, adherence to liberal values and emphasis on individual intellectual achievement unconstrained by the demands of (moral, cultural etc.) solidarity with one's community. Two informants belonging to different generations clearly stated that in their view 'intellectual' is a notion belonging to the same ideational paradigm as 'the West', modernity, rationalism and secularism. It is extremely significant, however, that these two informants estimated this connection in diametrically opposite ways, and fashioned their statements in line with different narratives about modernity:

I've always thought about intellectuals as about people possessing a cold, western mind. They are erudites, extremely talented people, but they are cynical. They can easily change side in political questions, if it suits their aims. Well, I think they do not feel some moral imperative above themselves. It is a crucial difference between them and intelligentsia (pan Teodor, appr. 70 y.o.).

Intelligentsia, intellectuals... Hmm... It's just words. But I would say that intellectual is a western term. Moreover, it's a laic term. It implies that a person should not claim some transcendental essence as a justification for existence of some group of people. Well, I would agree to be call 'intellectual' rather than inteligent. It's because inteligent has to do with something transcendental. He seems to levitate over the heads of the rest of people. It's a typically Eastern European notion. /.../ Intellectual is a professional, while inteligent is almost a saint (Oleh F. appr. 40 y.o.).

It may be suggested that the observed tendency of the younger generation to identify themselves as intellectuals rather than as intelligentsia may be a result of widening scope of intellectual imagination after 1989. The old intelligentsia used to play a (self-appointed) role of "traditional symbol of the unity of the nation" (Daskalov 1996: 71) and explicitly identify itself with their cultural (national,

regional, local) communities. In contrast, identity work of the younger generations of the highly educated East European urbanites tends to address not only wider scope of imagined sites ('European', global, virtual media communities etc.), but these sites are also qualitatively different from those of the 'old' (as well as 'Soviet') intelligentsia. Therefore the identity work of these young and middle-aged people may indeed imply intensive intellectual efforts and, thus, may result in identification rather with intellectuals than with intelligentsia.

Concluding remarks

Despite the social atomisation and downward social mobility after 1991 (resulting, among others, from poor accommodation to the demands of the 'wild' transitional market and meagre material support from the successor of the Ukrainian SSR), intelligentsia nevertheless recovered its existence as a socially significant phenomenon. Presently, however, it lost almost all traditional class-like markers (lifestyle, tendency to 'endogamous' marriages etc.) and exists in more elusive incarnation – namely, not as a group, but first and foremost as a symbolic point of reference and as a sort of dispersed discursive community. The redrawn social boundaries of Lviv intelligentsia (coupled with its downward social mobility, declining high culture standards, and difficulties with keeping a distinct cultured lifestyle) impacted the construction of new symbolic boundaries (most noticeably, those having to do with the Ukrainian project(s) of nation-building). In other words, the Lviv *intelligentny* often attempt to compensate their lost social positions by way of empowerment through discursive practices of nationalism typical for intelligentsia in Central-East Europe.

Hence, symbolic authority of intelligentsia might become unaffected since the ideological restrictions of the Soviet regime disappeared. As the interview data indicate, the informants may have different opinions about how to define such attribute as *intelligentnist'*, but it is, nevertheless, still an extremely honouring estimation. *Intelligentnist'* seems to be a denomination of a cultural competence (in words of a middle-aged respondent, "discretion, restraint and knowledge of how to behave yourself in certain situations, what conventions, what rules of behaviour to apply, how to react adequately in a given situation") which have been traditionally ascribed to the educated and wealthier classes, such as aristocracy and old Galician intelligentsia. In a way, in Lviv *intelligentnist'* addresses such aspects of modern – and, it should be noted, pronouncedly European – social realities as civility and bourgeois control of conduct (Elias 1994). But, alongside with this, it also has a connotation of some universally shared normative notions of modern national societies – for example, patriotism, responsibility and service for the whole of the (national, cultural, regional) community. It is exactly these concepts, values and reference points that 'mismodernized' (Molchanov 2000:265) post-Soviet societies, striving to find their 'proper' place in the new interconnected world, seek to appropriate on the wide scale. Therefore *intelligentnist'* is not rigidly confined to certain groups, social classes and categories, but may be ascribed depending on circumstances and appropriated by various actors as a means of discursive empowerment. However, not only 'external' demands of coming to pace with the Western modernity have been reflected in processes of restructuring the socio-cultural hierarchies inherited after the Soviet epoch and in intensive identity-work actualising discussions about intelligentsia and intellectuals. There are also pronounced retrospective trends expressed, for example, in rhetoric of 'returning Lviv its historical face', that galvanises pre-war concepts and social divisions which used to be part and parcel of the 'Central-European' local colour of Lviv. Ethos of the old Galician intelligentsia associated with patterns of noble conduct and implying embeddedness in rigidly bounded, inducing law and order social hierarchies of urban pre-1944 life, is an important part of this retrospective imagination.

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