PAUL R. MAGOCSI

The Ruthenian Decision to Unite with Czechoslovakia

During the last months of 1918 profound political and social changes took place throughout the Austro-Hungarian Empire. After the dissolution of Habsburg administrative authority in late October, Poles, Ukrainians, Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs, Croats, and Rumanians organized national councils that eventually were to determine the political future of these former subject peoples. Ruthenians living in the northeastern counties of Hungary also participated in this process,1 and from November 1918 to May 1919 they formed many councils which proposed various political alternatives: autonomy within Hungary, complete independence, or union with Russia, the Ukraine, or the new state of Czechoslovakia. Although these choices reflected the political and cultural allegiances that were traditionally attractive to Ruthenian leaders, the particular international situation in 1919 proved favorable to only one—union with Czechoslovakia.

This study will analyze the programs of the several Ruthenian national councils in order to see how they responded on the one hand to national ideals and on the other to contemporary political reality. Indeed, the Ruthenian problem has been studied before, but the existing literature is dominated by Czech, Hungarian, Soviet, and non-Soviet Ukrainian authors who tend to view the events of 1918–19 from the ideological standpoint of a previous or subsequent regime that has ruled the area. Generally these writers have not judiciously compared the activity of all the Ruthenian councils, but rather they have emphasized only those which favored a particular political orientation.

To understand the desires of Ruthenian leaders in 1918–19, it is necessary to review, if briefly, the political and national traditions that have predominated in their homeland. Since the Middle Ages, Subcarpathian Ruthenia had with few exceptions been an integral part of the Hungarian Kingdom.2 According to the 1910 census, Ruthenians numbered 447,566 and lived pri-

1. The Ruthenians have historically been known by many different names: Rusyns, Uhro-Rusyns, Carpatho-Russians, Carpatho-Ukrainians, and so forth. At the suggestion of the editor, the name Ruthenian is used here as an English equivalent for Rusyn, the term employed most often by the inhabitants and their cultural leaders. The present-day official designation, Ukrainian, has only recently come to have widespread use among the population.

2. The term Subcarpathian Ruthenia is meant to describe all territory inhabited by Ruthenians living south of the Carpathians—regions which today comprise the northern half of the Transcarpathian Oblast of the Ukrainian SSR and the Prešov Region (Prišševshchyna) in northeastern Czechoslovakia. Subcarpathian (below the Carpathi-
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primarily in the northern portions of the counties of Szepes, Sáros, Zemplén, Ung, Bereg, Ugocsa, and Máramaros. They were a rural folk, primarily farmers, shepherds, and woodcutters, who struggled to eke out an existence in the valleys and highlands of the Carpathian Mountains. Very few settled in the nearest cities—Prešov (Eperjes), Uzhhorod (Ungvár), and Mukachevo (Munkács)—although it was in these urban areas where the small Ruthenian intelligentsia, primarily Greek Catholic priests, participated in the beginnings of a national movement.

The revolution of 1848–49 had a significant impact on Ruthenian nationalism. During those years, local Subcarpathian leaders led by Adolf Dobriansky met with Slovak and Galician Ruthenian activists in an attempt to improve the lot of their respective peoples. The Subcarpathian Ruthenians hoped, in cooperation with the Slovaks, to achieve autonomy in Hungary, or to join in a territorial union with the Ruthenians in Galicia. Faced with a revolution in Hungary, Habsburg authorities seemed to favor the demands of the national minorities, so that the idea of Slovak and Ruthenian autonomy appeared for a time to be feasible. Dobriansky was even appointed adviser (referent) to the commissar of the so-called Ung District, a territory composed of four Ruthenian counties. But the full restoration of Habsburg authority in 1850 brought an end to these administrative and political experiments.

If in the long run actual political gains were negligible, the years between 1849 and the Austro-Hungarian agreement of 1867 did permit an increase in

3. The names of pre-1918 counties are given in the official language of the time, Hungarian; names of towns and cities in Ukrainian or Slovak, depending on present location. (The former Hungarian form is given in parenthesis.) As for persons, the version of the name will reflect the form favored by that person himself in his writings; hence the Russian form for the Russophile Beskid; the Ukrainian for the Ukrainophile Komarnytsky; the Hungarian for the Magyaron Stefan. Names of Rusyn-American leaders follow the form used in Latin-alphabet émigré publications. The adjective rus'kii is rendered as Russian, russkii as Russian. Transliteration of Ruthenian dialectal publications follows the Library of Congress pattern for Ukrainian with the following addition: ñ = i.

4. Initially, Slovak leaders represented the Ruthenians in Vienna, but the latter sent their own delegation on October 18, 1849, and petitioned the government to create administrative districts according to nationality, to introduce the Ruthenian language in schools, and to appoint Ruthenian officials. Union with the Galician Ruthenians would be postponed until a more opportune time. In 1861 Slovaks and Ruthenians again cooperated closely and presented a joint petition to Vienna. The documents are found in Daniel Rapant, Slovenské povstanie roku 1848–49, 5 vols. in 12 (Bratislava, 1937–68), 4, pt. 3: 173–74. A solid discussion of these and other nineteenth-century Ruthenian developments is given by Ivan Žeguc, Die nationalpolitischen Bestrebungen der Karpato-Ruthenen, 1848–1914 (Wiesbaden, 1965), pp. 32 ff. For a survey of the extensive literature on this problem see Paul R. Magoci, “An Historiographical Guide to Subcarpathian Rus',” Austrian History Yearbook, vol. 9–10 (1974).
cultural activity which resulted in a kind of Ruthenian national renaissance. In Prešov a literary society was founded in 1850, and the following year Ruthenian was introduced as a language of instruction in the Uzhhorod gymnasium. Among the important problems during this embryonic stage of national development was the question of which language should be adopted for new publications. In the early nineteenth century, the official language, Hungarian, or a Slavic composite (iazychie) of Church Slavonic and local dialectal elements was used, but beginning in the 1840s, Subcarpathian authors followed the example of the "national awakener," Alexander Dukhnovych, and employed Carpathian dialects, or more often literary Russian, in their writings. Russia had become an attractive force not only culturally but also politically. In 1849 Subcarpathian Ruthenians were vividly impressed by the strength of the Russian army as it swept across the Carpathians to crush the Hungarian revolution. Dukhnovych recalled: "One thing really gave me joy in life and that was in 1849 when I first saw the glorious Russian army. . . . I can't describe the feeling of gladness at seeing the first Cossack on the streets of Prešov. I danced and cried with delight. . . . It was truly the first, perhaps the last, joy of my life."

At the same time, Subcarpathian leaders developed close relations with their brethren in Galicia. It should be noted, however, that these contacts were primarily with those Galician organizations which favored a Russophile cultural orientation. The rapidly growing Ukrainophile trend was consistently rejected by the Subcarpathian intelligentsia. Thus, the two decades following the 1848 revolution produced several lasting traditions among the Ruthenians of Hungary: the idea of political cooperation with the Slovaks, the adoption


6. Russophiles, or Muscophiles, were those persons in Galicia, Bukovina, and Subcarpathian Ruthenia (a territorial unit they called Carpathian Russia) who claimed that the local inhabitants were of Russian nationality and who favored the adoption of the Russian literary language and Russian cultural patterns. Similarly, Ukrainophiles were natives of these territories who considered Ruthenians to be Ukrainians. They formed a Ukrainian literary language based on local dialects and propagated the use of this medium, not Russian, for educational and cultural affairs.

7. Ukrainian writers (both Soviet and non-Soviet) suggest that these contacts with Galicia are indicative of Ukrainian national feeling in Subcarpathian Ruthenia. This was hardly the case. Indeed, Dukhnovych did believe that "those on the other side of the mountains are not foreign," yet at the same time he made clear: "Excuse me, brothers, if I am insulting someone, but I must truthfully say that your Ukrainian stories are not in good taste. . . . I don't understand by what means you could so quickly change the pure Russian language to Ukrainian." From an article in Piestni\\. . . Rusinov avstri\\-iskoi dershavy, no. 11 (Vienna, 1863), cited in Kyrylo Studyns'kyi, "Aleksander Dukhnovych i Halychyna: Studiia, Naukovyi Zbornyk tovarystva 'Pros'vita,'" 3 (1924): 92.
of Russian for local publications, and the deepening of politico-cultural relations with Russophiles in Galicia.

As a result of the Ausgleich of 1867, Magyar politicians secured from Vienna the right to manage their own affairs, but this was to have negative repercussions on all the national minorities living in the Hungarian Kingdom. Despite legal guarantees for nationality rights, the Budapest government soon implemented a policy of forced Magyarization which led to a rapid decline in the number of Ruthenian schools and the national assimilation of many leaders who came to be known as Magyarones. Those few who did not succumb to Magyarization found temporary refuge in Russian culture. They organized several Russian-language publications, although most were soon discontinued for lack of readers. Moreover, the Hungarian government severely restricted contacts with Galicia. Indeed, several Ukrainophile scholars from Galicia did try to maintain relations, but their attempts were either hindered by Budapest officials or consistently rejected by the staunch Subcarpathian Russophiles. Toward the end of the century, a few Subcarpathian leaders (A. Voloshyn, L. Chopei, M. Vrabel) did favor the adoption of a more popular dialectal language for local publications, but they could not accept (even if it were possible in a Magyar chauvinist environment) the introduction of literary Ukrainian into cultural life, as had occurred in Galicia.

To be sure, the majority of illiterate Ruthenian peasants did not at all participate in cultural developments. Adversely affected by a series of poor harvests, a severe shortage of land, a population increase, and the general neglect of the Hungarian government, the Ruthenian masses were mainly concerned with physical survival. A few were persuaded to believe that their salvation lay in conversion to Orthodoxy (an act which also made them exempt from tithes to the Greek Catholic Church), but a larger number sought to improve their lives by emigrating abroad, in particular to the United States.

8. Among the early journals, all published in Uzhhorod, were Sviat (1867-71), Novyi Sviat (1871-72), Karpat (1873-86), and Listok (1885-1903).

9. Among the more influential Ukrainians were Volodymyr Hnatiuk, who wrote six volumes on Subcarpathian Ruthenian ethnography, and Mykhailo Drahomaniv, the national leader from the Russian Ukraine. Subcarpathian Ruthenians responded with respect to the interest expressed by their eastern brethren, but they clearly indicated displeasure with the idea of Ukrainian nationalism. For several explicitly anti-Ukrainian statements by the Subcarpathian intelligentsia see Evgenii Nedziel'sky, Ocherk karpatorusskoi literatury (Uzhhorod, 1932), pp. 256-57.

10. The Greek Catholic or Uniat Church was established in 1595 for Ruthenians living in Poland and in 1642 for those in Subcarpathian Ruthenia. The Roman hierarchical system was adopted, although most of the eastern (Orthodox) traditions were maintained. A “return to Orthodoxy movement,” financed by Russian rubles and Ruthenian-American immigrant dollars, began in Subcarpathian Ruthenia in the late nineteenth century, but was restricted in size because of persecution by the Hungarian government, which in the years before 1914 had come to equate conversion to Orthodoxy with state treason.
Before 1914 there were already about sixty thousand Subcarpathian Ruthenians in America, and before long this immigration was to have a significant political and economic impact on developments in the "old country."

For many Ruthenians who remained at home, the First World War brought conscription into the Hungarian Army. In general, young draftees did not protest their fate, nor did the local intelligentsia react against the further Magyarization of Ruthenian life. Nonetheless, despite the seeming "Hungarian" nature of Subcarpathian Ruthenians, the war experience did bring about a profound change in the mentality of those who served in the army. For the first time, Ruthenian draftees met with Czechs, Serbs, Croats, and other Slavs, who, at a more advanced level of national consciousness, were proud to speak and sing in their own languages. Perhaps a Ruthenian, too, should not be ashamed of his native "dialect," they began to feel. In essence, the Ruthenian was no longer isolated in a Hungarian environment, and this was to have a critical effect not only on his thought patterns but also on the way he would act in the fluid political and social situation after the war.

Thus the seventy-year period from 1848 to 1918 began with a Ruthenian national renaissance but ended on the one hand with the almost complete Magyarization of the local intelligentsia and on the other with the revival of a Slavic consciousness among those who were directly involved in the First World War. In political affairs, subordination to the Hungarian government was the most common solution, though a few Subcarpathians also established the principle of cooperation with the Slovaks or Galician Ruthenians. Culturally, a Magyarone or Russian (and clearly anti-Ukrainian) orientation predominated. All these factors contributed to the Subcarpathian Ruthenian intellectual framework which influenced the political and national demands made during the crucial months of late 1918 and early 1919.

At a time when the national minorities demanded separation from the Habsburg Empire, Hungarian politicians under the leadership of Count Mihály Károlyi also rejected the former regime, and on October 31, 1918, formed a "revolutionary" government in Budapest. This new, liberal-minded government included a Ministry for Nationalities, headed by Oszkár Jábsi, whose task it was to develop a program of autonomy for the national minorities and thus preserve the territorial integrity of Hungary.\(^{11}\) But the many centuries of Hungarian rule, which culminated in an extensive policy of Magyarization and defeat in war, virtually doomed from the start any enlightened policy that the new Hungarian leaders might have proposed. National independence

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closely allied with desires for social liberation made the governments in Prague, Bucharest, and Belgrade seem more attractive than Budapest.

Ruthenians also expressed desires for national and social liberation, especially after soldiers who returned home told of the revolutions taking place in the former Russian Empire. At secret meetings held in Uzhhorod in September 1918, two former Subcarpathian prisoners of war informed Ruthenian leaders of the recent events in Russia and the Ukraine, and then discussed the feasibility of greater autonomy within Hungary or perhaps union with their brethren beyond the Carpathians. To explore the latter possibility it was decided to send the young gymnasium professor, Avhustyn Shtefan, to Vienna in order to meet with parliamentary representatives from Galicia. The latter suggested that in accord with Wilson’s principle of self-determination the best course of action would be to form national councils throughout the Subcarpathian region.

Following this recommendation, the Ruthenian intelligentsia (primarily priests, lawyers, and teachers) organized around four centers: Prešov, Uzhhorod, Khust (Huszt), and Iasynia (Kőrösmező). The geographical location of these towns interestingly coincided with their proposed political aims. Prešov, to the west, eventually became the center of the pro-Czechoslovak movement; Uzhhorod and later Mukachevo on the central lowlands represented the pro-Hungarian solution; Khust, farther east, declared for union with the Ukraine; and finally Iasynia, in a remote sector of the Carpathians, became the center of a short-lived, independent political entity.

The first national council (Russka Narodna Rada) met on November 8, 1918, in Lubovňa (Ólubló), a small town located in the westernmost portion of Ruthenian ethnographic territory within present-day Czechoslovakia. Delegates from the surrounding counties of Sáros and Szepes gathered under the leadership of a local priest, Emilian Nevytskyi, and drew up a manifesto which stated that those present were “imbued with the democratic spirit of the times” and “in protest against any force from foreign peoples over our Ruthenian [rus’kii] land.” Nevytskyi also wanted to gauge the attitude of the local population, and during the month of November he sent out two questionnaires. In both of these, there was clear evidence that the Lubovňa Council was oriented toward union with the Ruthenians living north of the

12. Avhustyn Shtefan, a Subcarpathian Ukranophile, should not be confused with Dr. Agoston Stefan, the local Magyarone who served as governor of Rus’ka Kraina in 1919.


Carpathians: "We are Ruthenians! Because we live in the Carpathians, we are called Carpathian Ruthenians. But we know that Ruthenians similar to us live beyond the Carpathians. Their speech, customs, and faith are the same as ours, as [they] are our brothers. With them we ethnographically form one great multimillion people." Other questions formulated the issue of Ruthenian political fate as a choice between "remaining with Hungary" or "uniting with Rus' (Ukraine)." The available evidence reveals that Ruthenians in the region around Lubovňa were generally opposed to Hungary, but not necessarily united behind any one political solution: some favored union with Rus' (Ukraine), some complete independence, others union with Czechoslovakia.

An attempt to secure autonomy in Hungary was also initiated in early November by the Greek Catholic priests, Petr Gebei, Avhustyn Voloshyn, and Simeon Sabov. On November 9 more than one hundred persons gathered in Uzhhorod to form a national council. Referring to the "errors" of "Ruthenians in many places who want to unite with the Ukraine," Reverend Sabov declared: "This movement, the Rada uhorus'koho naroda [Council of Uhro-Ruthenian people] is not separatist; on the contrary, it wants in fact to serve the territorial integrity of Hungary." The resolution issued by the Uzhhorod Council began with professions of loyalty, and among the demands were included special autonomy for the Greek Catholic Church, agricultural, social, and industrial reforms, and other privileges for national minorities as proposed by the Károlyi government. The Council claimed itself the sole legal representative for the Ruthenian people and began to negotiate with Hungarian officials in Budapest. Magyarone Ruthenians in both Máramaros and Ugocsa counties met during the subsequent weeks to proclaim loyalty to Hungary and to declare their support for the council in Uzhhorod.

16. M. Tvorydlo analyzed fifty-five completed questionnaires which he had in hand. As for remaining with Hungary, fifty-one were opposed, two were for it, and two abstained. In response to whether union with Rus' (Ukraine) was desired, twenty-eight were favorable, twenty wanted complete independence, two were for Hungary, five were for the Ukraine—but, if not possible, for Czechoslovakia. These figures are only a sample, since it is not known how many questionnaires were completed and returned to Nevytskyi, Ortoskop, Derzhavi zmahannia, pp. 11–12.
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On December 10, 1918, thirty-six members of the Uzhhorod Council were invited to Budapest by Dr. Oreszt Szábo, a native of Subcarpathia and official in the Ministry of Interior who was appointed adviser to the government on Ruthenian affairs. Among those present at the meeting were representatives of a Budapest-based Uhro-Ruthenian political party (formed on December 8) who promised “to stand or fall on the side of Hungary,” and several more skeptical leaders such as Stepan Klochurak and Dr. Mykhalio Brashchaiko, who protested that no decisions should be made without first consulting the population at home. As a result of the meeting a memorandum was addressed to Prime Minister Károlyi expressing “the hope and faith that in its decisions the Peace Conference would devote special attention” to the Ruthenians of Hungary. Until such time, demands were made for national and internal administrative autonomy, and protests lodged “against the taking of territory by Czechs, Slovaks, Rumanians, and other nations.”

In an attempt to satisfy Ruthenian demands, the Károlyi regime adopted an autonomy project, Law No. 10 of December 21, 1918, which called into existence the autonomous province of Rus'ka Kraina. However, this province comprised only those Ruthenians living in the counties of Máramaros, Bereg, Ugocsza, and Ung; the inclusion of other Ruthenian areas (parts of Zemplén, Sáros, Abaúj-Torna, and Szepes counties) would be postponed “until the time for the conclusion of a general peace.” The law further provided for full autonomy in internal matters (education, religion, national language) which were to be clarified after the establishment of a Ruthenian National Assembly (Rus'kii Narodnii Sobor). Executive organs for Rus'ka Kraina were placed in a ministry with headquarters in Budapest and a governor with a seat in Mukachevo.

The activity of the pro-Hungarian Uzhhorod Council and its initial success in negotiations with the Budapest government were met by opposition from various parts of Subcarpathian Ruthenia. On November 19 the


22. The occurrence of anti-Hungarian activity prompted Antonii Papp, the government Bishop of Uzhhorod, to send to all his priests a circular which requested that they aid in controlling the “secret agitation for union with the Ukraine or Czechoslovakia” as well as the “anti-Christian Social-Democratic radical agitation.” The appeal was dated Uzhhorod, November 28, 1918, and is reprinted in Ortoskop, Derzhavnii znanhannya, pp. 22–23, and in an edited version in Tainume state tawnym (Dokumenty pro antynarodnu dial'nist' tserkovnykh na Zakarpatii v period okupatsii) (Uzhhorod, 1965), doc. 51.
Lubovňa Council reconvened in Prešov. About two hundred peasants and forty priests gathered under the leadership of the Beskid family, in particular Dr. Antonii Beskid, who replaced Nevytskyi as chairman. Dr. Beskid was in close contact with Russophile leaders from Galicia (Andrei Gagatko, Dmitrii Vislotsky, and others) who originally wanted the Ruthenian-inhabited lands both north and south of the Carpathians to be united with Russia. The Prešov Council issued a manifesto which included general demands for “self-determination” and “national freedom,” and called for a delegate to be present at the future “international peace conference”; however, it did not yet mention unification with any particular state.28

The following weeks witnessed a struggle between the Nevytskyi and Beskid factions in the Prešov Council. Nevytskyi still maintained the hope, expressed at smaller meetings in Bardejov (November 27), Svidník (November 29), Stropkov (November 30), Medzilaborce (December 2), and Humenné (December 3), that union with Rus' (Ukraine) should be brought about.24 Beskid, on the other hand, pushed for a more practical solution—association with the new Czechoslovak state. To secure this goal, he met in Turčiansky Svätý Martin with the Slovak National Council. On November 30 that body called upon “our brother Ruthenians”: “With the greatest love, we beg you as a free people to come closer to us, to unite with us.”25

Beskid was supported in his efforts by the Galician Russophiles, who realized that Russia was a lost cause and thus hoped that Czechoslovakia would save Ruthenian lands north of the Carpathians from future Polish control. On December 21 members of the so-called Russian (Galician) Council of Lemki joined with the Beskid faction to form a Carpatho-Russian National Council (Karpato-Russkaia Narodnaia Rada). From the beginning, this group favored unification with Prague; moreover, the continuing political and military instability in both Galicia and the Russian Ukraine made the Czechoslovak solution seem more feasible than ever. Nevytskyi’s protests went unheeded, and by the end of December the arrival of Czech Legionnaires in eastern Slovakia further advanced the aims of Beskid, so that in early January the Prešov Council could declare openly for union with Czechoslovakia.26

24. Ortoskop, Dershavni zmahania, pp. 13–14; Mykola Andrusiak, “Istoriia Kar-
pats’koi Ukrainy,” in Karpatha Ukraïna (Lviv, 1939), p. 98. Unfortunately, the resolutions of these smaller councils have never been published or summarized in any of the existing literature.
25. The Slovaks also promised “full autonomy” in ecclesiastical and educational affairs as well as the establishment of a university in the near future. “Proclamation of the Slovak National Council, Turčiansky Sv. Martin, November 30, 1918,” reprinted in Peška and Markov, “Příspěvek,” pp. 527–28. See also Karol A. Medvecký, Slovensky Preverat, 4 vols. (Trnava, 1930–31), 1:60–61. The failure to fulfill these promises was to be a source of constant friction between Ruthenian leaders and the Czechoslovak government.
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Opposition to the pro-Hungarian Uzhhorod Council was also substantial in the eastern county of Máramaros, where sentiment for the Ukraine was widespread. At a series of three meetings held at Khust on November 3, 7, and 10, the few Hungarian supporters present were overwhelmed by the rhetoric of a Ruthenian lawyer, Dr. Iulii Brashchaiko, who called for union with the Ukraine.27 Similarly, on December 8, 1918, a Carpatho-Ruthenian National Council (Karpats'ka-Rus'ka Narodna Rada) was formed at Svaliava (Szolyva). Those present rejected the Uzhhorod Council, because “it is Magyar,” and decided to address a memorandum to the Peace Conference which in turn should send an armed force “so that the Ruthenian people could free themselves from the thousand-year-old [Hungarian] yoke and unite with the Greater Ukraine where Ruthenians live also.”28

Continued anti-Hungarian sentiment was evident at a meeting in Marmarosh Sighet (Máramarosziget) arranged by the Budapest government on December 18, 1918. In an attempt to engender support for the Hungarian cause, the first speaker proclaimed that “the Ruthenian ... people can find happiness only as a part of Hungary,” but this speech was continually interrupted by cries of “we don’t need anything from the Magyars, long live the Ukraine, let us go to the Ukraine.”29 Consequently, a Marmarosh Ruthenian National Council (Maramoroshs'ka Rus'ka Narodna Rada) was formed under the chairmanship of Mykhailo Brashchaiko and a manifesto adopted which called for union with the Ukraine and the convocation of a new national council to be held at Khust on January 21.

Among the signatories to the Marmarosh manifesto it is interesting to find the name of Dr. Agoston Stefan, a leading member of the Uzhhorod Council, who had just returned from negotiations with Hungarian leaders in Budapest. Stefan, soon to become governor of the autonomous Rus'ka Kraina, was a well-known Magyarone, yet at the same time he signed a resolution calling for union with the Ukraine. In fact, many Ruthenian leaders were participants in councils which professed antithetical political ends. Such a phenomenon not only was indicative of a certain degree of opportunism on the part of these persons but also reflected to a large extent the unstable and rapidly changing conditions in Subcarpathian Ruthenia after the war.

It is perhaps necessary to emphasize what Subcarpathian leaders meant


when they called for unification with the Ukraine. Most held the traditional view that the Ukraine was a Ruthenian (Rus') land similar to their own. The relations they had with Galicia were usually with the Russophile intelligentsia, hence Subcarpathians were either unsympathetic toward or un-aware of actual Ukrainian national and political goals. Many might favor unification of all Ukrainian lands, but not separation from Russia or the use of Ukrainian instead of Russian as a literary language. Hence the head of the Lubovnya Council, Nevysts'kyi, could formulate a manifesto calling for union with Rus' (Ukraine) as well as sign a Galician memorandum which claimed that all Ruthenians were part of the Great Russian nation and that Ukrainianism was a dangerous separatist movement created by Austro-German propaganda.30 On the other hand, Iuli Brashchaiko and his brother Mykhailo were pronounced Ukrainophiles who thought clearly in terms of union with an independent Ukrainian state when they put forth their demands at the meet-ings in Khlust and Marmarosh Sighet.

Ukrainian developments proceeded beyond Subcarpathian expectations. Ukrainophile parliamentarians from Galicia organized a national council in late October, and on November 1, 1918, met in Lviv, where they called into being an independent West Ukrainian Republic.31 The new republic claimed jurisdiction over the “Ukranian parts” of Galicia, Bukovina, and Subcarpathian Ruthenia, but its authority was immediately challenged by Polish forces who by the end of the month pushed the Ukrainians out of the city. Until April 1919 the beleaguered national council of the West Ukrainian Republic met in Stanyslaviv (Stanislawow). The situation in the former Russian Ukraine was not much better. There, the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic (originally based in Kiev) was from December 1918 fighting for survival against the forces of the Soviet and White Russian armies.


31. Ukrainian leaders claim that at the October 19 meeting of the National Council in Lviv a letter from Subcarpathian leaders (unnamed) was read; it concluded with the request: “You, our brethren, must stand behind us and unite with us. Our people demand such salvation so that finally we can be liberated from the yoke of another people.” Cited in a work by the Chairman of the Lviv National Council, Kost Levys'kyi, Velikiyi zryv: Do istorii ukrains'koii derzhavnostyi vid bereznia do lystopada 1918 р. na pidstavii spomysov ta dokumentiv (Lviv, 1931), p. 118. See also Mykhailo Lozyn'skyi, Halychyna v r.r. 1918-1920 (Vienna, 1922), p. 29. No work by a Subcarpathian author, however, has mentioned the sending of a letter to Lviv as early as October 1918.
On January 22, 1919, in the midst of a critical military situation, a delegation from the West Ukrainian Republic went to Kiev in order “to unify the century-long separated parts of one Ukraine . . . Galicia, Bukovina, Uhors'ka Rus' [Subcarpathia] with the Great Ukraine beyond the Dnieper.” Actual territorial unification, however, was not to be achieved.

While there was an undeniable sense of kinship felt by Subcarpathian Ruthenians for those peoples in Galicia and Bukovina who spoke a similar language, it was the social issue which especially provoked interest in the lands beyond the Carpathians. Returning soldiers and other refugees, who could be considered Bolshevik “in sentiment, if not by conviction,” spread tales of how the lords were driven away and the land given to the people. Thus, the Svaliava Council manifesto called for union “with the councils in the Ukraine because these Councils give the peasants the gentry and state lands.” Likewise, “in the area around Khlust . . . the movement for emigration to the Ukraine has been strengthened. The landless hope to get there good, fertile land.” A petition from one small mountain village summed up Subcarpathian national and social desires: “We are Ruthenians who live in the Carpathians near the Galician border, we want to unite with the Russian Ukraine where we will use state lands and forests so that everything will be for the common citizen; here we are very poor people because the landlords have pressured us so much that one cannot even survive.”

Another indication of Ruthenian opposition to Hungary took place in the far eastern village of Iasynia. In the early morning of January 7, 1919, a group of demobilized Ruthenian soldiers led by Dmytro and Vasyl Klempush, Stepan Klochurak, Dmytro Nimchuk, and in cooperation with troops sent by the West Ukrainian Republic, drove out the garrison of 250 Hungarian soldiers.

32. The Kiev universal is cited in Lozyn'skyi, Halychyna, pp. 68–69. For the complicated circumstances under which this so-called Fourth Universal was issued see John S. Reshetar, The Ukrainian Revolution (Princeton, 1952), pp. 110–13.

33. Jássí, Revolution, p. 37. “Young soldiers returning from Russia have in particular brought the irresistible Bolshevik propaganda. They are causing an uproar against priests.” From an article entitled “Bolshevism in Máramaros,” Görög-Katholikus Szemle (Uzhhorod), Dec. 15, 1918. On the impact of soldiers returning from the Russian front see also Shliakhom Zhotnia: Zbirnyk dokumentiv, 6 vols. (Uzhhorod, 1957), vol. 1, docs. 17, 19, 20, 22, 26, 28, 29.


militiamen. The new force occupied Marmarosh Sighet for a while, but was soon forced back home by the Rumanian army. The local leaders favored unification with an independent Ukraine, but since this was not yet feasible they established instead on February 5 their own “Hutsul Republic,” which came to control the territory surrounding Iasynia (representing about twenty thousand inhabitants). This “miniature state,” administered by a forty-two-member elected council and a four-man government, existed until June 11, 1919, when Rumanian troops occupied the area.  

Thus by the beginning of 1919 the Subcarpathian Ruthenians responded to the political crisis by creating a series of national councils which proposed four possible solutions: federation with Czechoslovakia (Prešov), autonomy within Hungary (Uzhhorod), union with the Ukraine (Marmarosh Sighet), or independence (Iasynia). The first months of the new year were to witness a struggle between these four orientations, but it was not until spring that the outcome became clear.

Events during the month of January revealed an increase in the influence of the Czechoslovak and Ukrainian orientations. On January 7, 1919, Beskid invited local leaders and Galician Russophiles (the Lemkian Council) to Prešov, where they declared for union with Czechoslovakia. A few days later Beskid conveyed this decision to Czech politicians in Prague, who immediately sent him as the Ruthenian delegate to the Peace Conference in Paris. The Czechoslovak solution was put in writing on January 31 at another meeting of the Prešov Carpatho-Russian National Council. After stating that the Ruthenians were members of the Great Russian people, the manifesto regretted that unfavorable political conditions made union with a united Russia impossible; thus “we desire to live for better or worse with our Czechoslovak brethren.”


39. Manifesto reprinted in Peška and Markov, “Prispěvek,” pp. 531–32. The anti-Ukrainianism of Beskid and his Galician allies was emphasized: “We consider the separatism of Ukrainian politicians a temporary phenomenon—anti-Slavic, anticultural, and antisocial—a product of Austro-German imperialism.” The decision of the Prešov Council was opposed by former chairman Nevytskyi, who issued proclamations the same day calling for union with the Ukraine. Reprinted in Ortoskop, Derashavni zmahanina, pp. 14–16. Despite Nevytskyi’s rhetoric calling for the Ukraine, his discontent was not motivated by displeasure with the Russophile attitude of the Prešov Manifesto, but rather with the usurpation of the Council’s leadership by Beskid and his supporters.
The situation in Uzhhorod was not yet clear, although here, too, the Czechoslovak orientation seemed to be gaining ground. While many Ruthenian leaders had accepted an autonomous status for their land within Hungary, the procrastination of the Budapest government led to increased disillusionment, summed up later by a leading figure in the Uzhhorod Council, Voloshyn: "When it became clear that Magyar autonomy for Rus'ka Kraina was not a serious thing, we met already on January 1, 1919, with Milan Hodža, chief representative of the Czechoslovak Republic in Budapest, and asked whether the Republic would occupy all of Subcarpathian Ruthenia."40

Since November 1918 Milan Hodža had been in Budapest, where he was negotiating with the Károlyi government for the evacuation of Hungarian troops from Slovakia. The Czechoslovak representative was approached by several Ruthenian leaders. The first of these was a delegation of twenty-two members led by Mykhaïlo Komarnytskyi of the Svaliava Council, who "demanded the separation [of Subcarpathian Rus'] from the Hungarian state and union (preferably) with the Ukraine, or if that were not possible, with the Czechoslovak state."41 The Svaliava delegation also left with Hodža a memorandum stating:

The Ruthenian people desire autonomy on the territory of the counties of Ung, Bereg, Ugoca, and Maramaros; as an autonomous body, they request to be attached either to a Ukrainian state or for reasons of an economic and geographic nature, preferably to the Czech-Slovak Republic.

The delegation submits at the same time a request that the High Command of the Allied armies order the occupation of Ruthenian territory in Hungary by a Ukrainian or Czechoslovak army so that the population can freely decide its fate.42

These requests fit in well with Hodža's desire that Czech troops occupy territory at least as far east as the city of Uzhhorod.

The Czechoslovak representative was less well disposed toward Voloshyn and Petr Legeza, whom he met in Budapest on January 1, 1919. Hodža considered these Uzhhorod Council members to be "opportunist," basically satisfied with the concept of autonomy (that is, Rus'ka Kraina) within Hungary, but afraid that the Károlyi government would renege on its promises. Although Voloshyn asked for help from the Prague government,

40. Voloshyn, Špomyny, p. 92, and his Deň politychní rozmovy (Uzhhorod, 1923), pp. 6–7.
he refused to make a written request until Czech troops would occupy Uzhhorod.43

Two days later Hodža met again with Komarnytskyi, whose Svaliava Council he considered to be more representative of the popular will than the pro-Hungarian Uzhhorod Council. Komarnytskyi reiterated the request for Czech troops, and according to Hodža the Ruthenian leader “completely agreed today to the union of Uhors'ka [Hungarian] Rus' to us [Czechoslovakia].”44 Later in Paris, the negotiations between Hodža and Komarnytskyi were to be used as one of the justifications for the incorporation of Subcarpathian Ruthenia into Czechoslovakia.

The arrival of the Czechoslovak Legionnaires in Uzhhorod on January 15 put the city definitely within the new country’s sphere of influence, and two weeks later came the news of the pro-Czechoslovak decision reached by Ruthenian immigrants in the United States. As early as June 1918, immigrant leaders decided to concern themselves with the political fate of the homeland, and on July 23 formed an American National Council of Uhro-Rusins. This body first demanded autonomy within Hungary, union with the Galician and Bukovinian Ruthenians, or complete autonomy; it was not until September that association with the new state of Czechoslovakia was seriously considered. As a result of negotiations between President Wilson, the Ruthenian-American activist Gregory I. Zsatkovich, and the future president of Czechoslovakia, Tomáš G. Masaryk, the idea of union with Czechoslovakia was accepted. This request was incorporated into a resolution signed by Ruthenian leaders in Scranton, Pennsylvania, on November 12 and approved in a plebiscite held the following month among members of the two largest Ruthenian-American fraternal organizations. The pro-Czechoslovak decision was acknowledged by the United States government and was to be of extreme importance in bolstering the arguments of Czech diplomats at the Paris Peace Conference.45

“Only at the end of January,” wrote Voloshyn, “did we find out from

44. Ibid. According to Ortoskop, Derzhavnі zmahanіia, p. 9, and Kaminsky, “Vospominaniia,” no. 49, Komarnytskyi never signed any memorandum requesting union with Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, the latter did sign the December 18, 1918, pročes verbale and later, the May 8, 1919, formal declaration of union with Czechoslovakia.
two Czech captains (Pisecký and Vaka), sent to us in Uzhhorod by President Masaryk, that you, [our] American brothers, already decided that we be united to the Czechoslovak Republic."46 Voloshyn and other members of the Uzhhorod Council continued to maintain relations with the Hungarian government,47 but the presence of Czechoslovak troops in the city, together with knowledge of the Ruthenian immigrant decision, helped persuade many Subcarpathian leaders that their interests could best be safeguarded by reaching an accord with Prague.

The Ukrainian orientation received its strongest and, as it turned out, last impetus during the first weeks of 1919. At the Council of the West Ukrainian Republic held on January 3 in Stanyslaviv, two Subcarpathian representatives proclaimed: "Our hearts long for the Ukraine. Help us. Give us your fraternal hand. Long live one unified Ukraine."48 The most important expression of pro-Ukrainian sentiment, however, was reserved for the General Council of Hungarian Ruthenian-Ukrainians (Vsenarodni Zbory Uhors'-kykh Rusyniv-Ukraintsiv), which met in Khust on January 21. Arranged by Iulii and Mykhailo Brashchaiko, the dominant figures at previous meetings in Khust and Marmarosh Sighet, the General Council was made up of 420 delegates chosen by 175 smaller councils throughout Subcarpathian Ruthenia. The estimated twelve hundred Ruthenians present made Khust the most representative of the many national councils to date.49 Its resolution expressed a desire to belong to a United Ukraine (Soborna Ukraina), requested that Ukrainian armed forces (presumably from the West Ukrainian Republic) occupy their land, and, claiming to represent all Ruthenians south of the Carpathians, rejected Hungarian Law No. 10 and autonomous Rus'ka Kraina.50 Plans were also made to send a delegation to Stanyslaviv and even to Kiev, but the Polish occupation of eastern Galicia and the unstable political situation in the Dnieper Ukraine soon caused a decline in enthusiasm for the Ukrainian solution.

47. As late as February 9–10, 1919, the Uzhhorod Council under Sabov and Voloshyn submitted a memorandum to Rus'ka Kraina's Minister Szábo demanding implementation of Law 10. See Kaminsky, “Vospominanija,” no. 42.
50. The resolution is reprinted in Stercho, Diplomacy, p. 401, and partly in Ortoskop, Derzhavnî znannya, pp. 21–22.
Meanwhile, the Károlyi regime in Budapest, concerned about the widespread pro-Ukrainian sentiment expressed at the Khust Council, made an effort to organize as soon as possible an administration for Rus's'ka Kraina, then centered in Mukachevo. On February 5, 1919, temporary authority was invested in a Council composed of forty-two members drawn from four Ruthenian counties and presided over by Minister Szábo and Governor Agoston Stefan.\(^{51}\) Elections to a thirty-six member Soim (Diet) were held on March 4, and a week later the first session was held, but the representatives adjourned the body until the Hungarian government defined clearly the borders of the province. In fact, the government was also under pressure from conservative factions in Budapest who felt that Károlyi “gave the Ruthenians more than they desired... and that this 'more' was detrimental to Hungary.”\(^{52}\) As for the issue of borders, the minister of the interior declared that “not even a small part of the Magyar population... can ever be left under the authority of an uncultured and economically backward Ruthenian people.”\(^{53}\) Such an opinion did not augur well for any kind of Ruthenian autonomy in Hungary.

Before the Soim was to meet again, Bolshevik elements under Béla Kun replaced the Károlyi regime on March 21. A Soviet Rus's'ka Kraina was proclaimed, but this had little effect on the governing personnel; the non-Communist Stefan was reappointed, this time with the title of commissar. The Kun government hoped that local national councils would administer the area, and elections to such bodies were held on April 6 and 7. As a result, Soviet Hungarian Rus's'ka Kraina, which maintained real authority only in the county of Bereg, had two legislative bodies: the recently elected national councils and the Soim chosen under the Károlyi government. The Soim did meet on April 17, but after a brief session it again refused to conduct further business unless the Hungarian government, within a period of eight days, specified the boundaries of the province.\(^{54}\)

During its few weeks of existence, Rus's'ka Kraina was provided with a constitution “that recognized the independence of the Ruthenian people” within the Hungarian Soviet Republic. With regard to the troublesome question of boundaries, the constitution avoided the issue by stating that “now the establishment of borders for Rus's'ka Kraina is not necessary because the

Soviet Republic does not recognize legally established state borders." Cultural autonomy seemed guaranteed, Ruthenian was declared the official language, a few school texts were published, and a Ruthenian language department was established at the University of Budapest. Under the influence of a generally far-left-oriented political atmosphere, various decrees were promulgated that called for nationalization of mines, industry, and transportation, and for requisition of property from landlords and the church. A Ruthenian Red Guard was also formed as part of the Hungarian Soviet Army and death penalties imposed for "counterrevolutionaries" and "speculators" who withheld foodstuffs.

The decrees passed in Rus'ka Kraina during the month of April had only limited effect in the region surrounding the cities of Mukachevo and Berehovo (Beregszasz). Czechoslovak troops were slowly moving eastward from Uzhhorod, while the Hutsul Republic had control over most of Máramaros County. But despite its tenuous existence, the nominally autonomous province of Rus'ka Kraina was to be important in future ideological disputes. Indeed, Marxist historians have overestimated the importance of "Soviet rule" that began in late March. They see the period as an unsuccessful though important precedent for the future dictatorship of the proletariat, which was not to be re-established until 1944. In 1919, however, Soviet rule never established deep roots in the area, and even some Marxists have had to admit that "many [in fact, most—PRM] of the decrees of the Soviet government were not implemented." Of more immediate significance for the subsequent history of Subcarpathian Ruthenia was the fact that in Rus'ka Kraina, Ruthenians legally had their own autonomous province and Soim. During its twenty years of administration in the province, the Czechoslovak regime was to be

58. "Despite the relatively short period of existence of Soviet rule in the Mukachevo area ... its importance was very great. ... [Soviet rule] was an important moral and political victory for Bolshevik ideas. ... The age-long struggle of the workers of Transcarpathia against the internal exploiters and external counterrevolutionaries came to a close in late October 1944 with the liberation of Transcarpathia from fascist occupation by the heroic Red Army and the union with the Soviet Ukraine." See M. V. Troian, "Borot'ba trudiaschykh Mukachivshchyny za Radians'ku vladu v 1918–1919 rr.," Naukovyi Zapysky, 30 (1957): 83–84.
59. Ibid., p. 76. There is no indication in Soviet or other sources that the decrees were greeted with favor by the local populace, and it is quite likely that the forced acquisition of foodstuffs (Shliakhom Zhovtynia, vol. 1, docs. 89–91, 109, 112, 128) was opposed by the peasantry.
continually reproached with the argument: “Our land as Rus'ka Kraina already received autonomy from the Magyars at the end of 1918. . . . In the framework of Rus'ka Avtonomna Kraina the leaders of our people saw a guarantee of our national liberty.”

Fearing the growth of Bolshevik power in East Central Europe, Czechoslovak Legionnaires under the French General Edmond Hennocque were given orders in mid-April to attack Soviet Hungarian troops. Moreover, Soviet rule in the area was at the same time being undermined by a series of “counter-revolutionary” uprisings that were supported by the Rus'ka Kraina commissar himself, Stefan. In conjunction with the Czechoslovak military action, a Romanian army moved in from the southeast, and by the end of the month all governing remnants in Rus'ka Kraina were dissolved. The Hungarian orientation in Subcarpathian Ruthenia was doomed.

Assured that the Soviet and non-Soviet Hungarian apparatus was driven out of the region, the remaining Ruthenian leaders no longer felt threatened by the “Bolshevik menace” and prepared to implement the pro-Czechoslovak solution. Since early March the Ruthenian-American delegate, Zsatkovich, had been negotiating in Uzhhorod with the Ruthenian Club (Rus'kii Klub), a group of local leaders (many of whom only recently favored autonomy within Hungary) under the leadership of Voloshyn. Plans were made to call a general meeting made up of representatives from the former Prešov, Uzhhorod, and Khust Councils.

On May 8, 1919, some two hundred delegates from these councils gathered in Uzhhorod to form a Central Russian National Council (Tsentral'naia Rus'skaia Narodnaia Rada). The proceedings were chaired by Voloshyn, and about twelve hundred people were present. After reviewing the decisions of the previous national councils, the following resolution was unanimously accepted: “The Central Russian National Council publicly declares that in the name of the whole nation it completely endorses the decision of the American Uhro-Rusin Council to unite with the Czecho-Slovak nation on the basis of full national autonomy.” Before adjourning, Beskid was elected (in absentia)

60. I. V. Kaminsky, quoted in “Postupova abo konservativna polytyka?,” Rusyn, Feb. 6, 1923. See also his “Nasha avtonomiia (samouprava),” Russkii Zemled'il'skii Kalender (Uzhhorod, 1922), pp. 69–70.


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chairman and Voloshyn, Miron Strypsky, and Mykhailo Brashchaiko, vice-chairmen.

In five subsequent sessions of the Central Russian National Council held between May 9 and 16 the Ruthenian leaders worked out details regarding the future relationship between the “Russian State” (Russkii Shtat)—as Subcarpathian Ruthenia was called—and Czechoslovakia. The concept of statehood was undoubtedly devised by Zsatkovich, who thought the territory should be internally self-governing—that is, analogous to the political situation in the United States. Already on the first day of debate the Galician Russophiles (well represented on the Central Council) stressed, “Our task is to free and unite all Carpatho-Ruthenians, including the [Galician] Lemkians.” Both Voloshyn and Zsatkovich agreed in principle, but they thought it unwise to deal with matters concerning Galicia until the problem of Subcarpathian Ruthenia was satisfactorily solved. Nevertheless, the Galicians did manage to have a motion passed to request school textbooks from the Russophile Kachkov Society in Lviv. The Central Council also decided to recommend Zsatkovich as “minister with full power for our state.”

The last session made clear the Ruthenian view of Subcarpathia’s future political status. The Council decided to accept a fourteen-point plan (drawn up by Zsatkovich) as the basis for unification with Czechoslovakia. Point 1 stated that “the Ruthenians will form an independent state in the Czechoslovak-Russian Republic [Chesko-Slovensko-Russka Respublika].” Great stress was put on the fact that “in all administrative and internal matters the Ugro-Russian state will be independent” (point 4). The boundaries of this state would eventually be decided on by a joint Ugro-Russian-Czechoslovak Com-

64. Kmitsikevych claims that Beskid was present on May 8, but this is not borne out by the protocols or by another participant, Zsatkovich, who reported that Beskid remained in Prešov awaiting (in vain) to be called by the government to Prague. See “Uriadovyi report Amerykanskei Komissii Rusynov,” Amerykanskie Russkie Vistnyk, July 3, 1919.

65. Protocol of May 8 in Karpatourusskije Novosti, May 15, 1944. The pro-Czecho- slovak Prešov National Council had all along demanded union with the non-Ukrainophile Galician Ruthenians (or Lemkians as they were called). See the Prešov Council resolutions of January 7 and 31, 1919, and memorandum of May 1, 1919, addressed to President Wilson: reprinted in Peška and Markov, “Příspěvek,” pp. 531–34. Similar demands were formulated by Beskid in a memorandum dated March 12, 1919, to the Czechoslovak government (reprinted in Boj o směr, vol. 1, doc. 54) and one dated April 20, 1919, to the Entente powers: Anthony Beskid and Dimitry Sobin, The Origin of the Lwów, Slavs of Danubian Provenance: Memorandum to the Peace Conference Concerning Their National Claims (no date or place of publication). The second document clearly defined territorial demands which did not include all of Galicia but only the lands of the non-Ukrainian “Russes des Carpathes (Lemkii)—an area north of the Carpathians stretching roughly from Lubovňa in the west to Uzhhorod in the east. The farthest northern extent included the Galician towns of Dukla and Sanok.

mission (point 2). Until such time, the “Russian State” should include not only Ruthenian territories east of the Uh River, but also the northern portions of Szepes, Sáros, and Zemplén counties (point 13)—at that time under Slovak administration. The plan’s last point reserved the right of the “Russian State” to appeal to the projected court of a League of Nations, which would decide on disputes that might arise with the Czechoslovak government.67

On May 23 a delegation of 112 members from the Central Russian National Council arrived in Prague to meet with President Masaryk and to express its desire for union. As Reverend Voloshyn later recalled, great faith was placed in “our Czech brothers”: “Golden Prague solemnly greeted [and] sincerely cared for the Ruthenians, and we returned home with hope for a better future.”68 Nevertheless, the question of internal autonomy, the resolution of the Slovak-Subcarpathian boundary, and the cultural policy to be adopted for the province—issues already raised at several sessions of the Central Russian National Council—developed into serious problems that were to plague relations with the central government for the next two decades.

Thus by May 1919 Czechoslovak troops occupied a significant portion of Subcarpathian Ruthenia, and local leaders had formally demanded unification with the new state. All that remained was that the Czechoslovak solution be accepted in international diplomatic circles.69 Although Subcarpathian Ruthenia had not entered the original plans for a Czechoslovak state,70 the negotiations between Masaryk and Ruthenian immigrants in the United States and the demands of the Prešov and Svaliava National Councils forced Prague officials to revise their ideas concerning the eastern boundary. By February 1919 the Czechoslovak delegation to the Paris Peace Conference formally proposed the inclusion into their state of Ruthenian territory south of the Carpathians.71 Indeed, representatives of Ukrainian, Hungarian, anti-Bolshevik Russian, Russophile Galician, and even the Rumanian governments submitted counterclaims for Subcarpathian territory, but Allied statesmen considered the Ukraine politically unviable, looked upon Hungary as a defeated power which

68. Voloshyn, Spomyny, p. 94.
70. Masaryk originally expected the area would be part of a united Russia. He claimed that only in 1917, during his stay in Kiev, was the problem “discussed many times” with Ukrainian leaders. Supposedly the latter “had no objection to the unification of Subcarpathian Ruthenia with us.” See Tomáš G. Masaryk, Světová revoluce za váleky a ve válece, 1914–1918 (Prague, 1938), p. 290. Curiously, none of the Ukrainian leaders (D. Doroshenko, P. Khrystiuk, A. Margolin, I. Mazepa, V. Petriv, V. Vynnychenko) mention in their memoirs any conversation with Masaryk about Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Nor does O. I. Bochkovsk’kyi in his informative account of Masaryk in Kiev, T. G. Masaryk: Natsional’na problema ta ukrain’s’ka pytannia (Poděbrady, 1930), pp. 135–53, say anything about discussions regarding the Subcarpathian problem. The silence is intriguing, since
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should not be taken seriously, and disregarded Russia because of the continu-
ance of Bolshevik rule and undetermined outcome of the civil war there.72
Furthermore, the influential French delegation to the Peace Conference desired
the creation of a large Czechoslovak state which via Subcarpathian Ruthenia
would have a common border with a future ally, Rumania. In such a situation,
the Czechoslovak delegation had little difficulty in having its demands accepted.
On September 10, 1919, the Treaty of Saint Germain recognized the incorpora-
tion of “Ruthene territory south of the Carpathians” into Czechoslovakia.

The Czechoslovak solution to the problem of Subcarpathian Ruthenia re-
lected not only the requirements of Entente diplomacy but also the demands
of local Ruthenian leaders. During the critical months of late 1918 and early
1919 they formed many national councils which proposed various political
alternatives for the future of their homeland. These choices, whether pro-
Hungarian, pro-Russian, pro-Ukrainian, or pro-Czechoslovak, were not simply
reflections of recent events, but were indicative of Subcarpathian political and
national traditions that were formulated in the late nineteenth century. The
national and social factor, which fostered the desire to unite with Russia or
the Ukraine, was balanced by political realism and the potential of reaching an
accord with the Hungarians or the Czechoslovaks. Hence the decision of May
8, 1919, to unite with Czechoslovakia was not imposed by the “imperialistic”
Entente powers, as Marxist writers suggest, or an unjust stifling of Ukrainian
national desires, as Soviet and some non-Soviet Ukrainians conclude, but
rather was the logical result of a coincidence between traditional Subcarpathian
Ruthenian interests and the particular international circumstances in post-
war Europe.

71. Czechoslovak Delegation, Mémoire No. 6: The Ruthenes of Hungary (Paris,
1919).
72. Mémoire sur l’indépendence de l’Ukraine présenté à la Conférence de la Paix par
la délégation de la République ukrainienne (Paris, 1919); Aide-mémoire adressé aux
puissances alliées et associées (Vienna, 1919)—actually a declaration by Magyaron
Ruthenians living in Budapest, reprinted in The Hungarian Peace Negotiations, 4 vols.
(Budapest, 1921), 1:483–89; “Memorandum of the Russian Political Conference,” May
10, 1919, reprinted in John M. Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism and the Versailles Peace
(Princeton, 1966), p. 399; Dmitrij Markoff, Mémoire sur les aspirations nationales des
Petits-Russiens de l’ancien empire autro-hongrois (Paris, 1919). For Rumania’s claim
to Subcarpathian Ruthenia and its rejection by the Entente see Sherman D. Spector,
Rumania at the Paris Peace Conference: A Study of the Diplomacy of Ioan I. C.
part of territory inhabited by Subcarpathian Ruthenians near Lubovnia: Commission
Polonaise des Travaux Préparatoires au Congrès de la Paix, Le Słowa, l’Orava et le
district de Csaca (Warsaw, 1919) and Territoires polonais en Hongrie septentrionale
(Paris, 1919).