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To cite this article: Christopher Gilley (2017) Beyond Petliura: the Ukrainian national movement and the 1919 pogroms, *East European Jewish Affairs*, 47:1, 45-61, DOI: [10.1080/13501674.2017.1306403](https://doi.org/10.1080/13501674.2017.1306403)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501674.2017.1306403>



Published online: 15 Jun 2017.



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RESEARCH ARTICLE



Beyond Petliura: the Ukrainian national movement and the 1919 pogroms

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ABSTRACT

On the basis of largely unused archival materials in Kyiv, this article re-examines the responsibility of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) for the pogroms of 1919. It consciously puts aside the question of Symon Petliura's personal guilt, preferring to concentrate on the broader responsibility of members of the Ukrainian national movement for propagating antisemitic stereotypes and engaging in anti-Jewish violence. This approach reveals a widely held belief among members of the UNR that they were fighting a Jewish Bolshevik enemy. This led to pogroms but also probably prevented the UNR from punishing its soldiers who had perpetrated them. Despite the declarations by UNR figures condemning pogroms and the creation of an organ to investigate them, there were apparently very few, if any, convictions, at least in 1919, the year of the worst pogroms.

KEYWORDS

Judeo-Bolshevism; Petliura; pogroms; Russian Civil War; Ukraine; Ukrainian People's Republic

Introduction

On May 25, 1926, Sholem Schwarzbard, a Jewish anarchist who had fought in the Civil War in Ukraine, shot dead Symon Petliura, the head of the Directory of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR), on a Paris street. He did not run from the scene of the crime, waiting instead for the arrival of the police, whom he told, "I came to kill a murderer." He blamed Petliura for the pogroms that had swept Ukraine during the recent Civil War, to which many of his own family members had fallen victim. In the ensuing trial, Schwarzbard's lawyer did not contest his client's guilt in killing Petliura, but rather focused the case on Petliura's culpability for the anti-Jewish violence in Ukraine in order to present Schwarzbard's act as a crime of passion. Scores of witnesses testified to the atrocities suffered by the Jewish population. This line of defense was successful. The jury acquitted Schwarzbard. He had to pay Petliura's wife and brother, who had brought a civil suit against him, one franc in damages; they in return had to pay the court costs.¹

Petliura's killing and Schwarzbard's trial symbolize the way in which the pogroms in Ukraine became associated with the question of one man's guilt or innocence. However, there were thousands of perpetrators. During the Civil War, Ukraine saw some of the worst anti-Jewish violence before the Holocaust. Based on materials gathered during the period, scholar Nakhum Gergel estimated conservatively that between

50,000 and 60,000 Jews were killed.² Many, many more were severely wounded, raped, and/or lost their property. The power vacuum created by the multisided conflict in the country made this violence possible. Petliura's forces had first risen against a German puppet regime at the end of 1918, then over 1919 came into conflict with both the Bolsheviks and the Whites, who, in parallel, were engaged in a war against one another. All these warring parties committed pogroms, including the Red Army, whose commanders were the keenest to combat them. However, according to Gergel's estimates, soldiers of the army of the UNR under Petliura, together with the autonomous warlords who entered into on-off alliances with him, committed 40% of the pogroms in Ukraine. Moreover, the pogroms perpetrated by UNR troops were often more murderous than those perpetrated by Whites or Bolsheviks, on average claiming 38 lives per pogrom in comparison with 25 and seven for the latter two groups, respectively.³

For all these differences, there were also numerous similarities between the pogromists, regardless of their political allegiance. As Oleg Budnitskii has convincingly shown, the Civil War perpetrators of the antisemitic violence were largely soldiers. Many had served in the recent World War. The Tsar's troops had become inculcated with the belief that Jews were supporting the Germans; they conducted pogroms from the very first days of the war. Fearing Jewish treachery, the Russian High Command deported thousands of Jews (and other groups) from the area of the front; violence, rape, and pillaging accompanied the deportations. By the Civil War the image of Jews as traitors was common among both soldiers and civilians. Indeed, the combatants on all sides of the Civil War spread the same tropes – for example of Jewish snipers shooting retreating soldiers in the back – as had the soldiers in the Tsar's army.⁴

The 1917 revolution added to this a new motive: the canard of Judeo-Bolshevism. Ullrich Herbeck describes how the pre-1917 association of Jews and revolution, the response to Jewish emancipation, and an Orthodox apocalyptic tradition created an anti-modern and antisemitic ideology that identified Jews and Bolsheviks as being one and the same. The Bolsheviks' opponents employed this myth to mobilize support by giving their enemy a tangible face. Self-proclaimed supporters of revolution also used it; by condemning the "Jewish commissars," they could attack those parts of the revolution they thought were going wrong. This created a cumulative radicalization, whereby everyone from Ukrainian warlords heading peasant bands to the White generals used the same myth, creating an exterminatory antisemitism.⁵ Violence against Jews became normalized as all sides employed it, sometimes against the same communities in succession as settlements changed hands.⁶

The charge of Jewish betrayal was certainly present in the most notorious pogrom executed by UNR troops, which took place in Proskuriv. The culprit was Ivan Semesenko, commander of the Symon Petliura Zaporozhian Brigade. On February 15, local Bolsheviks initiated an anti-UNR uprising in the settlement, where his troops were based. Semesenko put this rebellion down and proceeded to exact retribution on the Jewish population he believed to be behind the unrest. The Ukrainian commander had already marked the Jews as treacherous even before the rebellion took place. On February 6, he had issued a proclamation telling the local Jews:

Know that you are a people unloved by all, and you create such discord among people, as if you do not want to live, as if you are unconcerned for your nation. So long as nobody touches you, sit quietly, unhappy nation that troubles poor people.⁷

Semesenko's troops dispersed through the town fully armed with rifles, sabers, bombs, and even machine guns. They broke into the houses of Jews celebrating the Sabbath and murdered their occupants. They then moved on to the nearby town of Fel'shtyn, where another pogrom took place. Unlike in many other pogroms, the perpetrators apparently rejected bribes offered to spare individual Jews. Even the official UNR report into the pogrom found that the massacre had been deliberately planned by Semesenko. This put the number of victims at 800; other accounts named a figure of 1500, making it one of the bloodiest single pogroms of the period.⁸

The debate over the pogroms perpetrated by UNR troops centered on Petliura's degree of culpability because during the Civil War he had become a symbol for the UNR and the Ukrainian national movement as a whole. For Ukrainians, condemning the man of antisemitic violence meant judging the whole nation. This close identification was perhaps further strengthened by his killing and the subsequent trial. In the English-language discussion of Petliura's guilt or innocence, his defenders – most prominently Taras Hunczak – sought to reject the charges by portraying Petliura as a Judeophile who introduced Jewish national–personal autonomy and, in difficult circumstances, tried to combat the pogromist tendencies in his army.⁹ His strongest critics, for example Zosa Szajkowski, not only questioned Petliura's commitment to fighting the pogromists but also claimed that he ordered the Proskuriv pogrom.¹⁰ By contrast, Henry Abramson sought a compromise. He pointed to the unreliability of the sources according responsibility for the Proskuriv massacre to Petliura. Abramson argued that declarations by Petliura and the UNR government had reduced the number of pogroms committed by their troops. However, crucially, the UNR had failed to take a stand against the pogromists between January and April 1919, the period of the most brutal massacres. Petliura lacked the responsibility of agency for the pogroms, but as head of the army must be held accountable for them.¹¹ While these accounts made good use of the memoirs and the materials collected by the great researcher of the pogroms, Elias Tcherikower, they could or did not employ the documents in the Ukrainian archives. Unfortunately, the most recent English-language contribution to the debate even seems to deny the importance of examining the many unused documents that exist,¹² a somewhat hubristic position given that the relevant archives remained closed for so long.

One of the few researchers to have looked at the Ukrainian archival materials in detail is Serhy Yekelchik. He gives a largely positive account of Petliura and the UNR. He argues that the numerous condemnations of pogroms by UNR leaders demonstrate their continued opposition to the antisemitic violence. He mentions proclamations from March 1917, October 1917, November 1917, November 1918, January 1919, two in April 1919, three in August 1919, and during the Winter Raid at the end of 1921. He suggests that there were some attempts to protect the Jewish population, for example in Liats'korun' in June and Khmelnyk in August 1919. He tries to identify UNR efforts to investigate pogroms and punish their perpetrators, for example the creation of the Special Commission of Inquiry for the Investigation of Anti-Jewish Pogroms. He finds some cases where pogromists were indeed executed. Moreover, Yekelchik unearthed five documents signed by Petliura from January to October 1919 in which the leader of the Directory released funds to help pogrom victims. Yekelchik concludes that the military and financial situation made combatting the pogromists and compensating their victims difficult, but that the UNR undertook what it could. However, Yekelchik acknowledges that he found no documents

indicating the successful prosecution of pogromists by the Special Commission. The same is true of many of the examples he cites where the UNR supposedly sought to prevent pogroms.¹³ In addition, much of the evidence for the punishment of pogromists comes from memoirs – i.e. sources written after the facts with the intention of exculpating either the author or the UNR in general from any blame. Arguably, Yekelchyk has found evidence of the UNR leadership's good intentions, at least for outward purposes. However, more research is needed on results of the UNR's measures against pogroms.

This article will try to answer some of the questions left open by Yekelchyk by examining the UNR's attempts to investigate the pogroms and punish their perpetrators. At the same time, it will seek to shift the focus away from the vexed question of Petliura's personal responsibility for the pogroms by taking a broader look at the role of anti-Jewish stereotypes within the worldview of representatives of the UNR military and civil organs of power. The two issues are connected, for, as this article will argue, negative Ukrainian images of Jews may have hindered the attempts to bring the pogromists to justice, at least in 1919, the year of the worst violence.¹⁴

The UNR, the canard of Judeo-Bolshevism and the pogroms

There is indeed much evidence that many serving the UNR viewed the Jews as a hostile body. Several units and members of the UNR army issued declarations that described who they were fighting and why. They envisaged their enemies in simultaneously political and ethnic terms: the Bolsheviks were the main foe, but the Bolsheviks were always Russians (or "Muscovites") and Jews, supported by their Hungarian, Chinese, and Latvian mercenaries; none entertained the idea that Ukrainians could be Bolsheviks, even though this was undoubtedly the case. Some leaflets identified the "Muscovites" as the main adversary, barely mentioning Jews at all.¹⁵ Many talked about both the Russians and the Jews as the foe.¹⁶ However, sometimes, Jews appeared to be enemies on their own account, particularly when the leaflets talked about the Bolsheviks' leaders. Thus, an appeal to the Ukrainian fighters of the Soviet Tarashcha Division told them that "You serve the Communists-Jews, the little commissar Jews supervise you, [you are] ruled by the Jewish Sovnarkom."¹⁷ Another leaflet from the same unit described worker-peasant power as "just a Jewish Qahal," i.e. a Jewish community council.¹⁸ There were also leaflets that explicitly equated the Bolsheviks' opposition to religion with the fact that Jews are not Christians. A group of UNR military chaplains attacked the Bolsheviks' war against God, claiming that "the Jews Lenin and Trotsky are the greatest enemy of Christ."¹⁹ Another leaflet condemned the "Bolshevik-Jews" for closing churches, taking the crosses, and trampling the church banners. This was killing faith, and, consequently, the Orthodox people were dying.²⁰ As other scholars have shown, Orthodox priests had been ascribing "Jewish motives" to the revolutionaries' anti-clerical actions since early 1917.²¹

One also finds several internal documents that identify the Jews as the UNR's enemy. Thus, a telegram from one Ukrainian regional commissar, which was passed on to the UNR leadership, described the "Bolshevik-Jews" attacking lampyl' in May 1919; another, in a telegram accompanying a declaration by Makarenko of the Directory, called on Ukrainians to fight the "Muscovite-Jewish swindlers."²² When the comrades-in-arms of Eduard Preis, a UNR officer who had led an uprising against the Bolsheviks in Podillia in May 1919, sought to gain recognition for his service, they described him as a "principled officer, who

with all the fibers of his soul never wanted the Bolsheviks and the Jews who hold all power in their hands." He had begun organizing the revolt when he had heard that "the Jews in power were terrorizing the Christian population."²³ Such formulations did not harm his rehabilitation by the UNR; the head of the War Ministry's Chancellery of General Affairs wrote in response that Preis had been shot by the Bolsheviks "as a patriot and his work had been genuinely useful for Ukraine."²⁴

In addition, commandants representing the UNR issued orders demanding payments from the Jewish community. In some cases, this was clearly a collective punishment for perceived disloyalty to the UNR. Thus, in February 1919, the commandants in the region of Dubno and Kremenets' came to the conclusion that the city of Dubno's Jewish population was in a "state of permanent opposition to the military authorities, does not carry out their instructions and orders, but, on the contrary, conducts underground work to start a rebellion among the anxious population." The commandants listed their "offenses": the Jews

do not demonstrate solidarity by coming to the call-up, conduct anti-state Bolshevik agitation, refuses to accept Ukrainian currency, refuses horses and carts for military purposes, ply the Cossacks and Riflemen with homemade liquor, buy up and transport arms and ammunition and hide food stocks from the military buyers, and in doing so provoke the Cossacks against them.

As all official warnings, both to individuals and to the whole community, had so far failed, the commandants felt that the only possible measure was to place a fine of 100,000 Ukrainian karbovantsi (the UNR currency) on the city's entire Jewish community. This was to be paid within two days.²⁵ The order reveals not only that these particular UNR authorities viewed Jews as opponents of the UNR, but also that they thought the Jews should be punished collectively as such. The UNR army was not the only force to inflict such collective punishments: for example, the White general Andrei Shkuro exacted a contribution from the Jewish community of Stavropol' in the summer 1918.²⁶

Pogroms were generally preceded by such expressions of suspicion toward Jewish loyalty. In this, the pogrom in Berdychiv was typical.²⁷ In their account of the violence that took place here in January 1919, the Jewish Public Council described how an antisemitic mood had developed in the earliest days of the capture of the city by UNR forces. Small "contributions" were demanded from the city because it had supposedly supported the Germans. Then, several days before the pogrom, the local representative of military forces appeared before the city administration. If they did not hand over the money, he would break all relations with the civilian population and could not be held responsible for what would happen next. At the same time, articles appeared in the local press printed in the name of the Informational Bureau of the Ukrainian People's Republic stating that the Jewish people had not yet clarified their relationship to the UNR. The official organ of the local branch of the Ukrainian National Union also published an article insinuating that the city's Jewish bourgeoisie had supported the Germans during the occupation.

On January 5 a group of UNR soldiers arrived in Berdychiv. First, they disarmed any Jewish militiamen, taking them to an unknown destination. Then, they started beating people up on the streets. When the local administration turned to the military commander, he informed them that they should remain calm, as the troops were only taking measures

against Bolsheviks and the peaceful population would not be touched. The violence escalated to plunder, murder, and rape in the afternoon. Many Jews were arrested and taken to railway carriages, whipped, starved for several days, and tormented with cries of “death to the Jews.” The pogromists, when they were unsure if someone was a Jew, ordered the potential victim to cross themselves or show that they were wearing a crucifix. Any non-Jew trying to intervene on the Jews’ behalf was warded off with the cry “Don’t interfere; we are only dealing with the Jews and we will slaughter them all.” The local authorities did nothing against this as the militia had been disarmed or arrested. The commander of Southwestern forces claimed that the cause of the pogrom was the shooting of a UNR soldier while the unit was arriving in the town.²⁸

We cannot know the relationship between the articles identifying the Jews as pro-German and the violence; there is no reason to assume that their authors were involved in organizing the pogrom. However, they are evidence that articles in official organs of the Directory propagated the same stereotypes as the pogromists, i.e. of the Jews as a potentially traitorous group within Ukraine. Moreover, the UNR troops (like the Directory press) initially thought of the city’s Jewish population as suspicious because of their supposed support for the Germans and indeed demanded a “contribution” as punishment. Then, when the troops sought to exact retribution for the failure to pay the “contribution,” the Jews were punished as “Bolsheviks.” Therefore, while the main enemy might change, the Jews were always seen as enemy supporters and opponents of Ukraine. In this way, the Jews appear to have been the constant Other against whom many Ukrainians defined themselves, while the Germans, Russians, Poles, and even Bolsheviks could fade out of view as the political situation shifted. The fact that the same pogromists could first persecute Jews as the supporters of the Germans and then of the Bolsheviks indicates how little antisemitic canards had to do with the actual behavior of individual Jews.

Certainly, not every single text discussing the enemies of the Ukrainian national movement mentioned the Jews. Rather, in every conflict, regardless of who the main enemy was, we find some texts that talk of the Jews as the chief foe’s helper. There is even evidence of Ukrainian soldiers identifying the Jews as the supporters not only of the Germans and Bolsheviks, as in Berdychiv, but also of the old regime. Petliura’s troops were supposedly told at the beginning of 1919 that the Jews “support the old regime and fight for the landowners, that they were firing from the windows at the rebelling people.”²⁹ Of course, the Whites – in many contemporaries’ eyes the representatives of the old regime – cultivated similar views of the Jews: like the UNR pogromists, they saw the Jews as a homogeneous bloc irreconcilably opposed to their state-building efforts; they exacted collective punishments upon Jewish communities, and justified antisemitic violence with the canard of Judeo-Bolshevism.³⁰ Similarly, during Petliura’s rising against the German puppet regime at the end of 1918, both sides accused the Jews of Zhitomir of supporting their opponents.³¹ This further underlines how easily participants in the Civil War could adapt the motive of Jewish treachery to any political context.

The UNR response to the pogroms

There is no evidence that the murder of Jews was official UNR policy. On the contrary, numerous members of the UNR government issued declarations condemning the

pogroms. Following the creation of the government of Borys Martos on April 9, 1919, the UNR press often stressed the socialist composition of the government and linked this to its opposition to the pogroms. Given that the anti-Jewish propaganda claimed that the Jews were opponents of the Ukrainian state, it is perhaps unsurprising that the anti-pogrom declarations sought to stress Ukrainian Jews' loyalty to the UNR. Some emphasized that the support of the population, including Jews, was essential to victory. They do not seem to have argued that Jews actually fought in the ranks of the UNR army, but several did claim that Jews helped to care for wounded Ukrainian soldiers. It was also common to blame the pogroms on provocateurs who were leading honorable Ukrainian fighters astray.³² This explanation seems to have been adopted with the audience in mind, i.e. individuals who saw the Jews en masse as potentially treacherous, and needed convincing that it was in the interest of their own cause to end the anti-Jewish violence. Nevertheless, it is further evidence that the discourse of condemning the pogroms revolved, like that which sought to justify them, around the question of Jewish loyalty. Indeed, certain representatives of the UNR issued declarations that, while promising to punish pogromists, also partially blamed the pogroms on the willingness of some Jews to support the Bolsheviks.³³ This type of appeal presented the Jews as a homogenous bloc who constantly had to prove their loyalty or else face the suspicion of treachery. Only a few UNR statements pointed out that an individual was not responsible for the actions of another of the same ethnicity.³⁴

Certainly, some in the UNR government wanted to back up these condemnations of the pogroms with measures to bring those responsible for them to justice. On April 9, 1919, the UNR Cabinet of Ministers passed a resolution setting up a committee of inquiry to investigate the pogroms of February 15–16 in Proskuriv and February 17 in Fel'shtyn.³⁵ On April 17, the head of the Council, Borys Martos, wrote to the Minister of Justice Andrii Liviys'kyi stating that the anti-Jewish pogroms were spreading because the majority of pogromists went unpunished. Only severe punishments, for both the perpetrators of pogroms themselves and those who enabled the growth of the epidemic of pogroms by any other means, could put an end to this. He called upon the minister to undertake measures to this end.³⁶ On June 14, the Cabinet, after listening to a report from the Ministry of Jewish Affairs,³⁷ passed a resolution calling on Petliura to put an end to the pogroms and on the heads of other ministries to punish those responsible and combat the dissemination of antisemitic propaganda.³⁸ This indicates both the good intentions of some parts of the UNR government to fight the pogroms, yet is also an acknowledgement that they had done very little in the first half of 1919 to combat them.

In addition, on May 27, a law was passed, creating a Special Commission of Inquiry for the Investigation of Anti-Jewish Pogroms. Several scholars point to the creation of this body as an example of the UNR's sincerity in fighting pogroms.³⁹ The Ministry of Jewish Affairs would gather information from the Jewish communities on the pogroms. It would then send this to the Ministry of Justice, which – in turn – would pass it on to the Special Commission.⁴⁰ Abramson has argued that Ukrainian Jews viewed the Ministry of Jewish Affairs in the tradition of *shtadlones* (intercession), something incompatible with the UNR's concept of citizenship.⁴¹ However, with regard to the pogroms at least, it seems that the UNR itself ascribed it this role. Apparently, it took over one-and-a-half months before the Special Commission started receiving cases to investigate. Its first sitting was on July 9,⁴² and only on July 19 did the Minister of Justice write to the Special Commission

asking it to investigate the pogroms in 14 towns, including Proskuriv and Fel'shtyn.⁴³ This tardiness indicates that, at a time when the UNR state was fighting for its survival, the investigation and punishment of pogroms was a very low priority.

The stipulation that the Ministry of Jewish Affairs could only request the Special Commission to conduct an investigation via the Ministry of Justice meant that the latter could become a hurdle: if it did not convey the information to the Special Commission, the pogrom would not be investigated. There is evidence that such blockage indeed occurred. For example, on July 12 the Minister of Jewish Affairs wrote to the Ministry of Justice, calling on it to examine the pogroms in Kam'ianets'-Podil's'kyi (June 3–5), Kitai-Horod (June 15–16), and Orynin (May 22 and June 2).⁴⁴ The Ministry of Justice first failed to respond to the initial request and, then, after a query from the Ministry of Jewish Affairs, took nearly a week to reply that it had not received the initial telegram.⁴⁵ Once the Ministry of Jewish Affairs had sent the telegram of July 12 a second time, the Ministry of Justice waited almost two weeks before writing back to say that in order to pass the matter on to the Special Commission it needed not only a request from the Ministry of Jewish Affairs but also all the documents on the pogroms in the ministry's possession.⁴⁶ Consequently, the Ministry of Justice only sent the cases to the Special Commission on August 19, almost one month after the Ministry of Jewish Affairs' first telegram.⁴⁷ Initially, the Ministry of Jewish Affairs did try to circumvent this laborious procedure by turning directly to the Special Commission. However, the Special Commission refused to open the case sent to it by the Ministry of Jewish Affairs, as the statute setting up the body allowed it to examine matters sent on by the Ministry of Justice only.⁴⁸ Not until mid-August did the Ministry of Justice start passing on cases from the Ministry of Jewish Affairs to the Special Commission promptly.⁴⁹

Bureaucratic inertia certainly seems to have hampered the investigation and punishment of the pogroms. Still, one must wonder why in a small town such as Kam'ianets'-Podil's'kyi, where both ministries were based, it took so long to send messages between different government departments. Certainly, it was difficult to conduct investigations during wartime. For example, on July 21, the Commission postponed the investigation of pogroms in four towns, including Proskuriv and Fel'shtyn, as the Directory no longer controlled them.⁵⁰ Investigators working for the Commission had to travel a lawless country traversed by numerous armed bands. They feared violence themselves, which could also lead to the investigation being canceled.⁵¹

However, one also finds reluctance, among some of those responsible for investigating the violence, to take seriously the propagation of antisemitic material and its creation of a mood conducive to pogroms. On August 12, 1919, the Minister of Jewish Affairs sent a selection of antisemitic leaflets for the Ministry of Justice to pass on to the Special Commission.⁵² The Ministry of Justice memorandum on the flyers described them as "appeals to the peasants, workers, and all citizens of Ukraine in general to rise as one for a decisive struggle with the Bolsheviks; they mention that in the ranks of the Bolsheviks fight, amongst others, Jews, and that the Bolshevik regime in the commissariat of Soviet of People's Commissars is mainly made up of Jews; it is clearly underlined that only a part of the Jewish population serve the Bolsheviks, and not all Jewry, and the citizens are called upon to conduct a struggle not with all Jews in general, but only with Jewish Bolsheviks. The appeals are ... expressed passionately, through them shines the powerful, lively, patriotic mood of our army and they cannot by any means be termed pogromist." It

accused the Ministry of Jewish Affairs of seeking to “take under its wing all Jews, even if they are Bolsheviks and even the Trotsky-Bronshsteins.” The memorandum seemed to think that the Ministry of Jewish Affairs was only offended by the word *zhyd*, which the memorandum stressed was not an antisemitic epithet as in the Russian language but rather the correct word for “Jew” in Ukrainian. This is despite the fact that the accompanying telegram from the Ministry of Jewish Affairs did not mention the word choice at all. The memorandum suggested that the Ministry of Jewish Affairs had not sent sufficient evidence for the Special Commission to investigate the matter. It further argued that the Ministry of Jewish Affairs “insults our army, insults our national feelings, and without doubt underlines its hostile relationship to our national cause.”⁵³

Thus, while pro-Petliura scholars may take the existence of a Ministry of Jewish Affairs (alongside the law on national personal autonomy and the participation of Jews in the Directory government) as a sign of the UNR’s “Judeophilia,”⁵⁴ it would seem that some other UNR organs viewed the Ministry of Jewish Affairs as an enemy in their midst. They found the characterization of the Bolshevik enemy as Jewish, in particular its leadership, so natural that they did not see that identifying Jews with the Bolsheviks could legitimate violent assaults on all Jews. Indeed, the memorandum’s claims that the appeals described Jews as only one of the nationalities that supported the Bolsheviks are inaccurate: while some leaflets did speak of Russian and Jewish Bolsheviks, others portrayed the Bolsheviks solely as Jews. None of the leaflets explicitly stated that not all Jews were Bolsheviks. It seems that at least some in the Ministry of Justice held very similar views on the loyalty of Ukraine’s Jewish population to the pogromists themselves. This may explain the ministry’s apparent foot-dragging in the summer with regard to the delivery of cases to the Special Commission. It is unlikely that the Ministry of Justice was the only body that distrusted the interference of the Ministry of Jewish Affairs. For example, Oleksandr Udovychenko, commander of the 3rd Iron Division of the UNR Army, wrote to the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Jewish Affairs, and the commander of the army to refute the general accusations against his troops. The 3rd Division had always combatted any anti-Jewish excesses. He asserted his right as the head of the division to consider any accusations that might arise.⁵⁵

The memorandum must have found supporters in the Ministry of Justice because the antisemitic leaflets were not initially passed on to the Special Commission. However, by autumn, a change in attitude seems to have taken place. On October 22, the Ministry of Justice sent the collection of antisemitic appeals to the Special Commission for investigation, two-and-a-half months after the Ministry of Jewish Affairs had first brought up the matter. In October, the minister, Livyts’kyi, had moved to Warsaw to head the Ukrainian diplomatic mission there. One can only speculate whether the shift in opinion was connected to his absence from Kam’ianets’-Podil’s’kyi. Certainly, Livyts’kyi did not sign the message passing on the case to the Special Commission.⁵⁶

Nevertheless, such delays took their toll on the Special Commission’s work. On November 5, 1919, the body gave an account of its activity. It had received 35 cases from the Ministry of Justice, only four of which had been investigated to completion. The rest had been handed to local investigatory organs. Of these, the committee had received information that in 10 cases the victims had been questioned, but in only three did the Commission mention that the culprits had been identified. The document did not make clear whether they had in fact been punished. In the case of four pogroms whose victims had been questioned – the pogroms in Kam’ianets’-Podil’s’kyi, Kytai-Horod, Fel’shtyn, and Proskuriv – the committee specifically

stated that there was still no certain evidence of the identity of the perpetrators. In a further five cases, it was still necessary for investigators to travel to the scene of the crime. The committee was unaware of the progress of the rest of the cases due to the difficulties of communication in the country at the time. A further hindrance was the committee's lack of financial means, which meant that since September 30 none of those sent to investigate pogroms had received payment or an advance for travel costs.⁵⁷ In November, the UNR was forced to abandon its capital in Kam'ianets'-Podil's'kyi and the Special Commission does not seem to have left behind any documents after this month.

Thus, there is little evidence that the Special Commission did much to punish the UNR pogromists. Certainly, one reason was that the conditions of war made it difficult to investigate the pogroms, which were a low priority anyway compared with the survival of the UNR. However, there was also an apparent reluctance among some of those charged with punishing the violence to deal with the pogromists, as they seem to have shared the perpetrators' distrust of the loyalty of Ukraine's Jewish population.

The failure to punish Ivan Semesenko in 1919

Certainly, at least one inquiry came to completion after the writing of the above report. On November 15, the member of the circuit court charged with investigating the pogrom in Proskuriv sent his report to the Special Commission. If, 10 days before, the Commission believed that the questioning of the victims had not revealed a perpetrator, this report was unequivocal: Ivan Semesenko had planned and carried out a pogrom that murdered more than 800 Jews, many of them old people, women, and children; for this he should be punished.⁵⁸ Indeed, in some parts of the secondary literature, the execution of Ivan Semesenko has gone down as an example of one of the few cases where Petliura tried and punished a pogromist.⁵⁹ Mykhailo Sereda, a colonel in the army of the UNR, who in the interwar period published a series of articles on the Civil War warlords in the journal for the Ukrainian army in exile, claimed that after the pogrom Petliura imprisoned Semesenko and ordered that his crime be quickly investigated. The investigatory commission had been on the verge of finishing its investigations when the Whites unexpectedly attacked Kam'ianets'-Podil's'kyi, where Semesenko was being held, allowing him to escape. Semesenko made his way to Galicia, where he adopted the name Doroshenko, and even served in a UNR unit for a short time. However, in 1920, the UNR authorities re-arrested and executed him for the Proskuriv pogrom. In its attempt to show Petliura in a positive light as a determined opponent of the pogroms, Sereda's article brushes over some important facts. It gives no dates, but the narrative suggests that Petliura arrested Semesenko immediately after the pogrom in mid-February. Yet Semesenko still had not been punished for the pogrom by the time the Whites captured Kam'ianets'-Podil's'kyi in November – and this despite the fact that Petliura had ordered the investigation to take place quickly.⁶⁰

Semesenko certainly spent much of 1919 in custody, but his arrest had nothing to do with his crime at Proskuriv. Semesenko remained at large until May 11, 1919. In late February and early March, he had received numerous orders to move his troops from Proskuriv to Novohrad-Volyn'skyi, which he evidently ignored. Despite a threat that non-compliance with the orders would lead to his appearing in front of a military field court, nothing seems to have happened to him.⁶¹ Only a month later did the UNR authorities bring Semesenko to heel after an incident at Zdolbuniv station. During this, he had

threatened the local station commandant: Semesenko had objected to the commandant's refusal to allow him to keep "his" locomotive, which he had captured from the Bolsheviks in Poltava province and consequently viewed as his own personal property.⁶² Semesenko was ordered to appear in front of the general staff to explain himself and his behavior, at which point he was arrested.⁶³ Semesenko's threats against a UNR official, not his murder of hundreds of Jews, were the cause of his detention.

However, not only was Semesenko not arrested in connection with the pogroms, the antisemitic violence was also not mentioned in the charges brought against him. All the accounts he wrote in his defense dealt only with the telegrams he had ignored and the incident at Zdolbuniv station – suggesting that this was the matter that the investigators were interested in.⁶⁴ His only mention of the events in Proskuriv was to say that he had put down a Bolshevik rising there in mid-February. He had stayed in the town thereafter because he believed it necessary to defend the rail line.⁶⁵ Moreover, the decision by the investigating judge indicted him only in connection with the orders ignored and the threats to the station commandant.⁶⁶ The pogroms were not mentioned once.

Thus, in May 1919, the UNR arrested Semesenko, but as a deserter rather than a pogromist. One cannot point to Semesenko's incarceration as evidence that the UNR, even half-heartedly, sought to punish pogromists in 1919. Sereda may be correct that the UNR executed Semesenko in 1920. However, given the incorrect assertion that the UNR arrested Semesenko in 1919 in connection with the pogrom, we need documentary evidence before we can know that he was shot for his crime in Proskuriv. He may have been punished for the 1919 charges of disobeying orders. Whatever the reasons for Semesenko's execution, there is clear evidence that in 1919, while the pogroms were still ongoing, the UNR was uninterested in his role in them and only concerned about his refusal to follow orders. Nor is Semesenko an isolated case. Oles' Kozyr-Zirka, perpetrator of the December 1918 pogrom in Ovruch, was arrested in early 1919. The UNR court accused him and his associates of "terrorizing the Volynia area and conducting arbitrary requisitions." The specific infringements included shooting UNR officials, moving his unit from the front, and taking state property. The pogrom was not specifically mentioned.⁶⁷

It has long been argued that Petliura failed to punish those responsible for the pogroms because he lacked the military ability to do so. Any attempt to execute the perpetrators would supposedly have risked undermining support in his own forces.⁶⁸ However, one can turn this on its head. As the Semesenko case shows, pogroms were tied up with other expressions of indiscipline – the refusal to follow orders and treatment of war booty as the commander's personal property. By failing to punish pogroms, Petliura and the UNR command were, arguably, allowing insubordination to flourish. Thus, perhaps it was less that the UNR's military weakness led to its reluctance to discipline pogromists and more that its cautious treatment of those responsible for antisemitic violence undermined its military capability. Undoubtedly, there is need for further research on the UNR's attempts to maintain military discipline, looking at its response to pogroms alongside other expressions of insubordination.

Conclusion

There is strong evidence that the idea that the Jews were enemies of the Ukrainian state became ingrained among many supporters of Ukrainian independence and this shaped

Ukrainian perceptions long after the Civil War. Indeed, even when supporters of the UNR were trying to defend themselves against charges of antisemitism, they resorted to the canard of Judeo-Bolshevism. During the Schwarzbard trial, the Symon Petliura Society created the Separate Judicial Commission to gather information to defend the good name of Petliura and the UNR. On the one hand, it sought, as one might expect, to collect documents that proved that Petliura had combatted pogroms by “bandit” perpetrators and that “loyal” Ukrainian Jews had supported the UNR. On the other hand, it tried to find materials that demonstrated the “support of significant parts of the Jewish population for the Bolsheviks and their active participation in the murder and torment of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, troops, and Ukrainian population in general.” In addition, they wanted data on the violence committed “by the Bolshevized parts of the Jewish population” against Ukrainian civilians and military units, both “together with the Muscovite Bolsheviks and even without their participation.”⁶⁹ The group seemed to want to disavow pogroms in one breath and justify them in the next. One finds this ambiguous response not only among other participants of the Civil War,⁷⁰ but even in the secondary literature. Thus, Taras Hunczak stressed Petliura’s Judeophilia and vigorous measures against the pogroms, while implying that the Jews had some responsibility for the pogroms due to their lack of loyalty to the Ukrainian state. After describing how Jews preferred to join the Russians, either Denikin or the Bolsheviks, rather than the Ukrainians, he claimed that “there can be no doubt that Jewish actions heavily influenced Jewish–Ukrainian relations.”⁷¹

Thus, numerous UNR units committed pogroms, and both military and civil organs of the UNR published leaflets identifying Jews in general as the enemy of Ukrainian statehood. Certainly, some in the Ukrainian government saw the harm of this and sought to combat it. However, both Abramson and Yekelchik have been too generous in their interpretations of the UNR’s struggle against the pogroms. There is little evidence that, in 1919 at least, pogromists were punished severely. The UNR arrested Semesenko and Kozyr-Zirka not because of their atrocities against Jews but after they disobeyed orders and threatened or killed UNR functionaries. The organ created to investigate pogroms was hampered by bureaucratic inefficiency, and the conditions of war limited its scope for activity. In addition, there is evidence that some in the Ministry of Justice were skeptical of the Ministry of Jewish Affairs’ attempts to investigate and punish the pogroms. Many in the Ukrainian national movement do not seem to have been able to divest themselves of the equation of Jew and Bolshevik. Underlying this belief was the assumption that the Jews were a homogeneous group who had the onus of positively proving their loyalty to avoid suspicion. Even some condemnations of the pogroms talked of Jewish provocations helping cause the violence. The pogroms were not a government-steered campaign of ethnic cleansing, but they were a product of anti-Jewish stereotypes apparently held by many members of the Ukrainian national movement. The fixation on Petliura has, ironically, shifted the focus away from the culpability of the nationally conscious Ukrainians who did perpetrate pogroms.

The article has highlighted the widely held belief in the canard of Judeo-Bolshevism among many military and civilian organs of the UNR. However, the materials studied here also indicate that, regardless of who they viewed to be the current main opponent of Ukrainian statehood, many Ukrainian nationalists always believed that the Jews were helping the enemies of Ukraine: in 1918, the Jews were – in their view – supporting the Germans, from 1919 the Bolsheviks. Thus, the persistence of the Judeo-Bolshevik myth in Ukrainian

nationalist discourse is perhaps less a product of the long-standing association of Jews with revolution and more of the Bolsheviks' enduring place as the enemy of Ukrainian statehood. When opposing a different power, Ukrainian nationalists concocted a different narrative of Jewish betrayal. For example, in the interwar period, the far-right Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) defined its main enemy as the Poles: the OUN was a West Ukrainian movement active in those areas that Poland had taken under its control. Following the outbreak of war between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, the Bolsheviks became the main enemy, as the OUN could now act against them through their collaboration with the Nazis. Yet, throughout the period, the OUN saw the Jews as their enemy as the aides of the oppressors of the Ukrainian people, first of the Poles, then of the Bolsheviks.⁷² Thus, for many Ukrainian nationalists, the Jews were the constant Other. The myth of Judeo-Bolshevism was the most common, but not the only, expression of this.

Notes

1. There is a detailed account of the trial in a recent PhD on Schwarzbard: Kelly Johnson, "Sholem Schwarzbard: Biography of a Jewish Assassin" (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2012), http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/9830349/Johnson_gsas.harvard_0084L_10644.pdf?sequence=1. See also David Engel, ed., *The Assassination of Symon Petliura and the Trial of Scholem Schwarzbard. A Selection of Documents* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2016).
2. N. Gergel, "The Pogroms in the Ukraine in 1918–21," *Yivo Annual of Jewish Science* 6 (1951): 249.
3. Henry Abramson, *A Prayer for the Government. Ukrainians and Jews in Revolutionary Times, 1917–1920* (Cambridge, MA: HURI, 1999), 115, 118.
4. Oleg Budnitskii, "Shots in the Back: On the Origin of Anti-Jewish Pogroms of 1918–1921," in *Jews in the East European Borderlands. Essays in Honor of John D. Klier*, ed. Eugene M. Avrutin and Harriet Murav (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2012), 187–201.
5. Ulrich Herbeck, *Das Feindbild von "jüdischen Bolschewiken". Zur Geschichte des russischen Antisemitismus vor und während der Russischen Revolution* (Berlin: Metropol, 2009), 438–43.
6. See, for example, the overview of events in the town of Fastiv between August and September 1919 in L.B. Miliakova et al., eds, *Kniga pogromov. Pogromy na Ukraine, v Belorussii i evropeiskoi chasti Rossii v period Grazhdanskoi voiny. 1918–1922 gg.: Sbornik dokumentov* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2008), 244–50.
7. Order of the Symon Petliura Zaporozhian Brigade of the Ukrainian Republican Forces, February 6, 1919, Tsentral'nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Vyshchykh Orhaniv Vlady ta Upravlinnia Ukrainy (TsDAVO), f. 2060 op. 1 spr. 24 ark. 9.
8. Abramson, *Prayer*, 122–31 has an account of the pogrom. The UNR report on the pogrom is Report for the Special Commission of Inquiry for the Investigation of Anti-Jewish Pogroms, November 15, 1919, TsDAVO, f. 1123 op. 1 spr. 1 ark. 10–13. For further materials, see the documents collected in Miliakova, *Kniga pogromov*, 47–84; Volodymyr Serhiichuk, ed., *Pohromy v Ukraini: 1914–1920. Vid shtuchnykh stereotypiv do hirkoï pravdy, prykhovuvanoi v radians'kykh arkhivakh* (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo imeni Oleny Telihy, 1999), 202–37.
9. Taras Hunczak, "A Reappraisal of Symon Petliura and Ukrainian–Jewish Relations, 1917–1921," *Jewish Social Studies* 31, no. 3 (1969): 163–83.
10. Zosa Szajkowski, "'A Reappraisal of Symon Petliura and Ukrainian–Jewish Relations, 1917–1921': A Rebuttal," *Jewish Social Studies* 31, no. 3 (1969): 184–213.
11. Abramson, *Prayer*, 109 ff.
12. Lars Fischer, "Whither *Pogromshchina* – Historiographical Synthesis or Deconstruction?" *East European Jewish Affairs* 38, no. 3 (2003): 311. See also the author's earlier "The Pogromshchina and the Directory: A New Historical Synthesis?" *Revolutionary Russia* 16, no. 2 (2003): 47–93. Fisher is rightly critical of much of the Ukrainian diaspora historiography on the pogroms and correctly states that even people who were not antisemites could disseminate antisemitic

- stereotypes. However, his contributions, which are a response to Henry Abramson's research, are held back by their willingness to read things into Abramson's words which are not there.
13. Serhii lekelchyk, "Trahichna storinka Ukrain's'koi revoliutsii: Symon Petliura ta levreis'ki pogrom v Ukraini (1917–1920)," in *Symon Petliura ta ukrains'ka natsional'na revoliutsiia*, ed. Vasyl Mykhal'chuk (Kyiv: Rada, 1995), 165–217. Unfortunately, many of the footnotes in the second half of the text seem to have become mixed up.
 14. The article is primarily based on documents from the UNR Ministry of Jewish Affairs, Ministry of Justice, and the Special Commission of Inquiry. Yekelchyk had access to some of these materials. However, some were only made available roughly a decade after he wrote his article. The most important are in fond 269 of the former party archive (Tsentral'nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Hromads'kykh Ob'iednan' Ukrainy – hereafter TsDAHO), which contains documents of the Ukrainian Museum in Prague. This was a repository for materials on the Civil War in Ukraine, 1917–22, collected by Ukrainian émigrés based in Prague. In 1945, the Soviet Union confiscated most of its contents. As far as the author knows, this is the first time that these particular documents have been used to examine the pogroms in an English-language article. The article will concentrate on the pogroms of 1919, as this was the year of the worst violence.
 15. "To the Citizens of Podillia," leaflet issued in the name of the Command of the Zaporozhian Army, June 11, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 32 ark. 41 zv.
 16. "To the Peasants," leaflet issued in the name of the Cossacks of the Ukrainian Republican Army, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 32 ark. 46.
 17. "To the Cossacks of the Tarashcha Division," leaflet issued in the name of the Higher Command of the Zaporozhian Army, June 23, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 32 ark. 42.
 18. "The Cossacks Answer," leaflet issued by the Zaporozhian Army, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 32 ark. 45.
 19. "Brothers," leaflet issued in the name of the military chaplains, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 32 ark. 47.
 20. "To the People of Ukraine," leaflet issued in the name of the UNR army, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 32 ark. 44 zv.
 21. Herbeck, *Feindbild*, 231–3.
 22. Proclamations, transcribed May 11, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 32. ark. 40 zv-41.
 23. Statement, TsDAHO, f. 1075 op. 2 spr. 25 ark. 2.
 24. From the Head of the Department of General Affairs of the Chancellery of the Ministry of War to the Administration of the Commandant of Podillia, June 24, 1919, ark. 5.
 25. Serhiichuk, *Pohromy*, 247.
 26. Herbeck, *Feindbild*, 292.
 27. For other examples, see the Proskuriv pogrom mentioned above and the pogrom perpetrated by the Ukrainian commander Oles' Kozyr-Zirka in Ovruch, December and January 1919. In the run-up to the outbreak of violence, Kozyr-Zirka had told the rabbi, "I know that you are a Bolshevik, that all of your relatives are Bolsheviks, that all kikes are Bolsheviks. Know that I will exterminate all the Jews in the city. Gather them in the synagogue and warn them" (Miliakova, *Kniga pogromov*, 34).
 28. Memorandum for the Ministry of Jewish Affairs from the Berdichev Jewish Civic Council, TsDAHO, f. 2060 op. 1 spr. 23 ark. 13–14.
 29. Quoted in Budnitskii, "Origin," 198.
 30. For more on White attitudes to Jews, see O.V. Budnitskii, *Rossiiskie evrei mezhdru krasnymi i belymi* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2006); Peter Kenez, "Pogroms and White ideology in the Russian Civil War," *Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History*, ed. John D. Klier and Shlomo Lambroza (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 293–313.
 31. Miliakova, *Kniga pogromov*, p. 17.
 32. See extracts from Petliura's August declarations in lekelchyk, "Trahichna storinka," p. 176. See also the articles in the Ukrainian front newspaper: "Kozakovi 3-ho Haidamats'koho polku Ivanovi S. pro pohromy," *Ukrains'kyi kozak*, June 8, 1919, 3; "Dieva armia, 13 serpnia 1919 r.," *Ukrains'kyi kozak*, August 13, 1919, 1; "Holovnyi otaman diepublikans'kykh viis'k 27

- serpnia s.r. zvernuvsia do Ukrain'skykh viis'k z sliduiuchoiu vidozvoiu," *Ukrains'kyi kozak*, August 30, 1919, 1–2.
33. Volodymyr Vynnychenko made such a declaration in January 1919 (quoted in Szajkowski, "Rebittal," 196); see also the text of the appeal by a state inspector of the UNR army in June 1919 in Serhiichuk, *Pohromy*, 303–4.
 34. "Kozakovi 3-ho Haidamats'koho polku Ivanovi S. pro pohromy," *Ukrains'kyi kozak*, June 8, 1919, 3. This is also one of the few statements on the matter to admit that Ukrainians could also be Bolsheviks.
 35. Resolution of the Cabinet of People's Ministers, April 9, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 32 ark. 1.
 36. The Head of the Council of Ministers to the Minister of Justice, April 17, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 32 ark. 2.
 37. The Ministry of Jewish Affairs officially began its work in January 1918, but in practice had started operating in October 1917. It is vaunted as the first institution of its type in a modern nation state. Its main work concentrated on preparing laws to implement the UNR's policy of national personal autonomy and dealing with requests for help from Ukrainian Jews. In reference to the latter aspect, Abramson has written that Ukrainian Jews primarily saw it as an institution of *shtadlones* – intercession. See Abramson, *Prayer*, 67–72.
 38. "Ofitsiial'no," leaflet, June 15, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 32 ark. 4.
 39. Hunczak, "Reappraisal," 178; lekelchik, "Trahichna storinka," 184–91.
 40. Law on the creation of a Special Commission of Inquiry for the Investigation of the Anti-Jewish Pogroms, May 27, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 32 ark. 3-3 zv. See also the Circular to the Jewish Communal Administrations, July 31, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 1123, op. 1 spr. 39 ark. 4.
 41. Abramson, *Prayer*, 71–2.
 42. Minutes of the Special Commission of Inquiry for the Investigation of Anti-Jewish Pogroms, July 9, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 1123 op. 1 spr. 37 ark. 1-1 zv.
 43. Minister of Justice to the Special Commission of Inquiry for the Investigation of Anti-Jewish Pogroms, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 32 ark. 24.
 44. Minister of Jewish Affairs to the Minister of Justice, July 12, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 32 ark. 19.
 45. Minister of Jewish Affairs to the Minister of Justice, July 18, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 32 ark. 23–23 zv; Minister of Jewish Affairs to the Minister of Justice, July 24 and 25, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 32 ark. 27, 28, 29; Director of the Department for General Affairs of Ministry of Jewish Affairs to the Director of the First Department of the Ministry of Justice, July 22, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 32 ark. 25; Minister of Justice to Minister of Jewish Affairs, July 24, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 32 ark. 26.
 46. Minister of Jewish Affairs to the Minister of Justice, July 24, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 32 ark. 27; Minister of Justice to the Minister of Jewish Affairs, August 8, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 32 ark. 35; Minister of Jewish Affairs to the Minister of Justice, August 12, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 32 ark. 37; Director of the Department of General Affairs to the Minister of Justice, August 13, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 32 ark. 48–9.
 47. Minister of Justice to the Special Commission of Inquiry for the Investigation of the Anti-Jewish Pogroms, August 19, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 32 ark. 55-55 zv.
 48. Resolution of the Special Commission, July 14, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 1123 op. 1 spr. 37 ark. 8.
 49. For example, see the communications from the Ministry of Jewish Affairs to the Ministry of Justice and from the Ministry of Justice to the Special Commission in mid-September, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 32 ark. 70–6. The turnaround for these requests is only a couple of days.
 50. Minutes of the Special Commission, No. 7, July 21, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 1123 op. 1 spr. 37 ark. 13–13 zv.
 51. This was the case for the attempt to investigate the pogroms in Liantkorun'. See Report for the Special Investigatory Commission, August 13, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 1123, op.1 spr. 37 ark. 24-24 zv.
 52. Minister of Jewish Affairs to the Minister of Justice, August 12, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 32 ark. 40–47 zv. See footnotes 12–17 for some examples of the leaflets under discussion.
 53. Undated memorandum of the Ministry of Justice, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 32 ark. 39-39 zv.
 54. Hunczak, "Reappraisal," 170, 175.

55. Serhiichuk, *Pohromy*, 348.
56. Minister of Justice to the Special Commission of Inquiry for the Investigation of Anti-Jewish pogroms, October 22, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 32 ark. 91.
57. Special Commission of Inquiry for the Investigation of the Anti-Jewish Pogroms to the Minister of Justice, November 5, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 32 ark. 98–99 zv.
58. Report for the Special Commission of Inquiry for the Investigation of Anti-Jewish Pogroms, November 15, 1919, TsDAVO, f. 1123 op. 1 spr. 1 ark. 10–13.
59. Hunczak, "Reappraisal," 179; Iekelchik, "Trahichna storinka," 191–2; Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine. A History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 364.
60. Mykhailo Sereda, "Otamanshchyna. Otaman Semesenko," *Litopys Chervonoï Kalyny*, April 1930, 12–4.
61. See the various telegrams from Otaman Tiutiunnyk to Otaman Semesenko, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 39 ark. 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20–21 zv. The telegram on ark. 18 has the threat of court martial.
62. Report by Oleksandr Soshyn, May 11, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 39 ark. 24 zv.
63. Appeal by Ivan Semesenko to the Council of People's Ministers of the UNR, July 2, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 39 ark. 5.
64. See, for example, the appeal by Ivan Semesenko to the Council of People's Ministers of the UNR, July 2, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 39 ark. 5–5 zv; Ivan Semesenko's statement of June 13, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 39 ark. 7–8 zv; Semesenko's report, June 17, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 39 ark. 26–27 zv.
65. Resolution No. 2, February 27, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 37 ark. 14; report by the Chairman of the Kyiv Supreme Military Court, February 22, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 262 ark. 82 zv–83.
66. Resolution, August 16–17, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 39 ark. 33–33 zv.
67. Resolution No. 2, February 27, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 47 ark. 14–15; TVO of the Chairman of the Kyiv Supreme Military Court, February 22, 1919, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 262 ark. 80–83.
68. Abramson, *Prayer*, 139.
69. The Main Administration of the Symon Petliura Society to the Main Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian People's Republic, TsDAHO, f. 269 op. 1 spr. 262 ark. 14–20. The quotations are on ark. 17–18.
70. Iurii Tiutiunnyk, "Zymovyi pokhid 1919–1920 rr." in *Zapyskyi heneral-khorunzhoho* (Kyiv: Knyha Rodu, 2008), 183–5.
71. Hunczak, "Reappraisal," 171–2.
72. Franziska Bruder, "*Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen oder sterben.*" *Die Organisation Ukrainischer Nationalisten (OUN) 1929–1948* (Berlin: Metropol, 2007), 45–7, 123–4.

Acknowledgements

I am very grateful to the editors and the anonymous reviewers as well as to Dimitri Tolkatsch for their suggestions on improving the text.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding

This work was supported by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft – DFG) under the [grant number GI 937/1–1].

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