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MANIFESTATIONS OF THE COSSACK IDEA IN MODERN UKRAINIAN HISTORY: THE COSSACK LEGACY AND ITS IMPACT*

Introduction

The making of the modern Ukrainian nation was profoundly influenced and moulded by the Cossack heritage. The Ukrainian Cossackdom had flourished for three centuries (approximately 1500—1800) during which time it constituted the mainstream of the Ukrainian historical experience.¹ Its traditions, symbolisms and myths, when translated into socio-political ideas of the 19th and 20th centuries, stood for such concepts as social justice, individual freedom, patriotism and territorial sovereignty. The significant currents of the Ukrainian political thought and action drew heavily on selected aspects of that legacy. Elements of the Cossack tradition can be readily found in most of the major developments in recent times, be they of substantive or superficial nature. It is, however, critical to the comprehension of modern manifestations (19th and 20th centuries) of the Ukrainian Cossack phenomenon (*kozachyna*) to recognize the duality of Cossackdom. Ukrainian Cossackdom functioned on two parallel and distinct levels — that of the Zaporozhian Sich and that of the *Hetmanshchyna*. It is with this problem in mind that the paper will focus on the historic nature of the Ukrainian Cossacks before proceeding to delineate their legacy.

Background

Historical evidence indicates that the Ukrainian Cossackdom was a direct result of the colonization movement by the Ukrainian population of the southern steppe region which began in the late 15th century.² Although threatened by the predatory Tatars, that rich and dangerous frontier had always attracted

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¹ For a debate on the role and uniqueness of the Ukrainian Cossackdom, see I. L. Rudnytsky's review of P. Longworth's *Cossacks* in *Slavic Review*, December, 1972, and Longworth's "Letter" and Rudnytsky's "Reply" in *Slavic Review*, June, 1974, 411—416.

² The following studies are relevant to the origins and development of the Ukrainian Cossackdom: D. I. Evarnytskii, *Istoriia Zaporozskikh Kozakov*, 3 vols., St. Petersburg, 1892—1897; A. Lazarevski, *Opysanie Staroi Malorossii*,

hardy souls in search of adventure, wealth or freedom. Socio-economic conditions of Lithuania, to which Ukrainian lands belonged, encouraged the penetration and colonization of the steppe. But Lithuania was unable to protect the frontier and the necessities of survival taught the new-comers, called "Cossacks" by the Tatars, military and organizational skills. Cossack bands evolved into formidable fighting units which not only protected the population from the Tatar brigandage but on occasions took the offensive themselves. Cossacks even became internationally famous as first rate mercenaries.³

In its initial stages the Cossack movement in Ukraine was not uniform, but contained several distinct forms. The most famous component consisted of the Zaporozhian Cossacks who established their stronghold, Sich, on the lower Dnieper River and created a military republic.⁴ It consisted mainly of bachelor warriors with their own elected government, including the supreme leader, the hetman, and a rigid, almost Spartan, code of rules. Frequent Zaporozhian campaigns against the Moslem Tatars and Turks who raided Ukraine for slaves developed a messianic outlook and gave the Zaporozhian Sich an honorable reputation as the defender of Christians and their faith. Furthermore, Zaporozhian open door policy established for centuries to come a proud reputation as a refuge of the oppressed. Next in importance were the town Cossacks (*Horodovi Kozaky*) and the Registered Cossacks. The former consisted of the richer, more conservative elements and functioned as local militia; the latter represented a partially successful effort of the Polish crown to transform limited numbers of Cossacks into the soldiers of the king.⁵ Finally, there sporadically appeared independent Cossack bands (*druzhyyny*).

The growth of the Cossack movement coincided with and was influenced by changes in the political administration of Ukrainian lands. The Polish-Lithuanian Union of 1569 opened Ukraine to Polish colonization and serfdom. The Union of Brest in 1596 forcibly introduced Catholicism into traditionally Orthodox regions. New social and religious grievances combined to provide the Cossacks with a new focus. Polish policies politicised the Cossack leadership to

2 vols., Kiev, 1888—93; M. Hrushevskiy, *Istoriia ukrainskoho kozachestva*, 2 vols., Kiev, 1913—14; V. A. Golubutskii, *Zaporozhskoe Kozachestvo*, Kiev, 1957; V. O. Holubutskiy, *Zaporizka Sich*, Kiev, 1961; L. Wynar, *Ohtiad istorychnoi literatury pro pochatky ukrainskoi kozachchyny*, Munich, 1966; P. Longworth, *The Cossacks*, London, 1970; Y. March, "The Cossacks of Zaporozhe," Georgetown University 1965, unpublished Ph. D. thesis.

³ Examples of Cossack mercenary activities can be found in E. Lassota von Steblau, *Habsburgs and Zaporozhian Cossacks: The Diary of Lassota von Steblau, 1594*, edited by L. Wynar and translated by O. Subtelny, Lettleton, Col., 1975; G. Gajecky and A. Baram, *The Cossacks in the Thirty Year War*, vol. I, Rome, 1969.

⁴ The recognized founder of Zaporozhia was Prince "Baida" Vyshnevetskyi, L. Wynar, *Kniaz Dmytro Vyshnevetskyi*, Munich, 1966, 20—36.

⁵ L. Wynar, "Pochatky ukrainskoho reiestrovanoho kozatstva," *Ukrainskyi istoryk*, no. 2—3, 1966, 12—17; I. Krypiakievych, *Istoriia Ukrainskoho viiska*, Winnipeg, 1953, 254—56.

such a degree that under Hetman Sahaidachnyi the Zaporozhian Sich officially assumed the protectorship of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and won the attention of the Polish government as spokesman of Ukrainian interests. The new role of the Zaporozhians placed the Polish government in a quandary. On one hand, the Cossacks constituted a vital military tool, but on the other, their independent action caused international difficulties while their support of the rebellious peasants created major problems in administering the newly acquired Polish dominions.

The emergence of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi signalled the transformation of the socio-religious conflict into a war of national liberation. Hetman Khmelnytskyi succeeded in freeing central Ukraine from Polish control and in 1649 established a new body politic — *Hetmanshchyna* or the Cossack Hetman state (hetmanate).⁶ This exercise in state building was a unique achievement of the Ukrainian Cossacks. No Russian Cossack host seriously aspired to statehood until the 20th century. Needing foreign aid to sustain the new state, Khmelnytskyi approached Moscow and in 1654 agreed to the Treaty of Pereiaslav, a very controversial document by which Ukraine came under the protectorate of the Russian Tsar.⁷ Beginning as a sovereign vassal, the *Hetmanshchyna* was gradually reduced in status, first to an autonomous region then to a colony. Finally, in 1781, the territorial unity of Cossack Ukraine on the left Bank was destroyed and replaced by ordinary Russian provinces. However, during its existence the *Hetmanshchyna* possessed definite and separate administrative, financial and judicial forms, and until 1696 its own church.⁸

The creation of the *Hetmanshchyna* meant that the center of power shifted from the Zaporozhian Sich to the hetman's capital. It also meant that with two Cossack focal points — the Zaporozhian Sich and the hetman — the relationship between them would be critically important to the welfare of Ukraine as a whole. That relationship remained tense at the best of times, mainly because the priorities of the two centers were often different. The Zaporozhian Sich returned to its earlier rather narrow military interests while the hetmans became engaged in the more complex politics of state building. The adventurism and the lack of political sophistication on the part of the Sich frequently undermined

⁶ I. P. Krypiakievych, *Bohdan Khmelnytskyi*, Kiev, 1957; V. Lypynskyi, *Ukraina na perelomi*, 1657—59, Vienna, 1920; M. Hrushevskyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusi*, vol. IX, pt. 1 and 2, Kiev, 1928—31; C. B. O'Brien, *Muscovy and the Ukraine, 1654—1667*, Berkley, 1963; G. Vernadsky, *Bohdan, Hetman of Ukraine*, Yale, 1941.

⁷ B. Krupnytsky, "Treaty of Pereyaslav and the Political Orientation of B. Khmelnytskyi," *Ukrainian Quarterly*, 1957, #10, 32—40; A. Iakovliv, "Dohovir Hetmana B. Khmelnytskoho z Moskvoiu roku 1654," *Iuvileinyi Zbirnyk D. Bahaliia*, Kiev, 1927; D. Ohloblyn, *Treaty of Pereyaslav, 1654*, Toronto, 1954.

⁸ These examine the international organization of the hetmanate: B. Krupnytskyi, *Hetman Danylo Apostol*, Augsburg, 1948, 60—171; M. Slabchenko, *Orhanizatsiia hospodarstva Hetmanshchyny XVII—XVIII st.*, 4 vol., Odessa, 1928; A. Pashuk, *Sud i sudochynstvo na Livoberezhni Ukraini v XVII—XVIII st.*, Lviv, 1967.

the statesmanship of the hetmans. That divergence in outlook was skillfully exploited by the agents of centralist tsarism.⁹

The political system of the *Hetmanshchyna* contained elements of democracy, monarchism and dictatorship. The question of the hetman's authority was never resolved constitutionally and consequently remained without acceptable legitimacy. The actual authority of each Hetman depended on his personality, skill and his relationship with the tsar who, as an overlord, held the power of approval of the elected candidate. In these circumstances a fluid situation existed which lent itself to corruption, intrigues and outright military challenges. It was Bohdan Khmelnytskyi who hoped to establish a dynastic and indigenous hetmanship and thus provide it with greater authority and legitimacy, albeit subordinate to the tsar. Shattered by the death of his son Tymish, and frustrated by the selfish interests of the *starshyna* factions, the Khmelnytskyi idea of a Ukrainian hereditary monarchy was periodically though unsuccessfully revived, the last candidate being Hetman Cyril Rozumovskyi. In light of Russian plans for dominating Ukraine, however, a notion of hereditary hetmanship was completely unacceptable. Equally unacceptable would have been the development of a constitutional electoral process to replace the practice of reliance on unwritten and ambiguous traditions.

In the social structure of Hetman Ukraine, the Cossacks constituted a separate and distinct estate. They were an elitist minority distinguished from the peasant majority by a higher material and intellectual level. However the Cossack estate itself was not homogeneous, ranging from the lower stratum of *holota* to the new aristocracy, the *starshyna*, a class derived largely from the *horodovi* Cossacks and the formerly Polonized gentry. The Cossack *starshyna*, the backbone of the *Hetmanshchyna*, filled the socio-economic and political vacuum caused by the preceding Polonization of the old Ukrainian nobility.¹⁰

Originally elected to the position of military leadership by the Cossack rank-and-file as officers, the *starshyna* assumed powerful positions of an administrative nature in the Hetman state. They exercised influence over the hetman through the General Council of Officers.¹¹ In time, traditional electoral procedures became purely nominal, as the hetmans and occasionally tsars preferred to appoint their officials. In the 18th century the *starshyna* could no longer be distinguished from East European gentry, enjoying considerable wealth which, much to the criticism of the Zaporozhian Sich, included peasant servitude.¹²

By all accounts, the cultural level of the *Hetmanshchyna* was quite high, a condition which made the Ukrainian cultural and religious elite so desirable by the emerging Russian empire.¹³ Hetman Ukraine maintained quality schools,

⁹ N. Polonska-Vasylenko, *Zaporizhia XVIII st. ta ioho spadshchyna*, Munich, 1967, 107—126; D. Doroshenko, *A Survey of Ukrainian History*, edited and updated by O. W. Gerus, Winnipeg, 1975, 387—419.

¹⁰ This process is described in Doroshenko, 328—356.

¹¹ G. Gajecy, *The Cossack Administration of the Hetmanate*, 2 vols., Cambridge 1978.

¹² Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, 345.

¹³ V. Sichynsky, *Ukraine in Foreign Comments and Descriptions from the 16th to 20th Century*, New York, 1953.

notably the Mohyla Academy in Kiev which was recognized as the educational center of Eastern Christendom.¹⁴ The practice of studying abroad was also widespread. The Ukrainian "brain drain" furnished Russia with teachers, high churchmen, and government officials. For Ukraine the tragedy lay with the fact that, while absorbing its creative forces for the empire, tsarist political centralism endeavoured to denationalize and assimilate a significant part of the Ukrainian elite much in the manner of earlier Poland.¹⁵ The assimilation process was motivated by political consideration of centralization. It consisted of granting socio-economic privileges to the *starshyna* while simultaneously suppressing traditional Ukrainian institutions, the most important being the office of the hetman in 1764. It was at the end of the 19th century that the political considerations of tsarism were largely supplemented by Russian cultural chauvinism.

In regard to the Zaporozhian Sich, the Russian government pursued a very pragmatic policy. As long as the Cossacks were needed in Turkish and Tatar wars they were treated with a degree of favoritism, a practice which deliberately aggravated the relations between the hetman and the Zaporozhian Cossacks to whom they technically belonged until 1709; after the Battle of Poltava, Zaporozhia came under Russian military surveillance and control.¹⁶

The nature of the Zaporozhian political system further lent itself to political interference. In theory all Zaporozhians, approximately 16,000 in the middle of the 18th century,^{16a} were equal and through the instrument of the General Council were entitled to elect or to be elected to the Sich administration, including the top office of *Koshovyi otaman*. Direct democracy, despite its idealization by the 19th century populists, had major flaws. It functioned to the advantage of the more sophisticated who manipulated the passions of the commoners, the *siroma*, and occasionally gave rise to mob rule. Zaporozhian frontier democracy stressed agreement by consensus and discouraged dissent. Critics were not tolerated but intimidated or expelled in the manner similar to the ancient Greek practice of ostracism. Social antagonism had appeared in the second half of the 18th century as more power and wealth was concentrated in the Sich *starshyna*.¹⁷ Despite its unruly socio-political life, the military prestige of the Zaporozhian Sich remained high.¹⁸

In the second half of the 18th century southern Ukraine began to experience a major evolution in social, economic and political developments. With the Tatar power in disarray, St. Petersburg opened the steppe to a systematic coloniza-

¹⁴ I. Krypiakievych, *Istoriia ukrainskoi kultury*, Lviv, 1938, 190.

¹⁵ Ukrainians were particularly active in the religious life of Russia. See F. Korchmariuk, *Dukhovni vplyvy Kieva na Moskovshchynu v dobu Hetmanskoi Ukrainy*, New York, 1964.

¹⁶ O. M. Apanovych, *Zbroini syly Ukrainy*, Kiev, 1969, 109; V. O. Holobutskiy, *Zaporiz'ka Sich, 1734—75*, Kiev, 1961, 74—107.

^{16a} Apanovych estimates the population of the Zaporozhian lands in 1750's at 160,000 of which 10% constituted the actual army, 112.

¹⁷ Polonska, *op. cit.*, *Zaporizhia . . .*, Vol. 1, 107—126.

¹⁸ Apanovych, *op. cit.*, 121—124; I. Krypiakievych, *Istoriia ukrainskoho viiska*, 285—286.

tion.¹⁹ The frontier character of the South began to change. Lands which the Cossacks for generations had regarded as theirs were given to foreign colonists and court favorites. "Civilization" had arrived and the Zaporozhian Sich and its life style stood in the way. Cognizant of the fact that the Sich was becoming a socio-economic anachronism, its leaders hastily proceeded to modernize this distinct republic by broadening its economic base. Despite St. Petersburg's objection, Zaporozhian sponsored colonization with run away serfs and agricultural diversification began to take place.²⁰ In the meantime, the last Zaporozhian chieftan, Petro Kalnysheskyi persistently lobbied St. Petersburg to preserve the Sich.

However, as an antithesis to the autocracy, the radical Zaporozhian Sich had no place in the Russian scheme of things. The successful Russian penetration of the Black Sea and the elimination of the Crimean Tatar threat made the Zaporozhian Sich redundant. In June, 1775 on Empress Catherine's orders the Zaporozhian Sich was surrounded by superior Russian forces. Several thousand Cossacks managed to flee to Turkey while others capitulated.²¹ The leaders were severely punished while the common Cossacks became free state peasants. Although in its history the Sich had been destroyed several times before, in 1775 it was also officially liquidated. Even the name was struck out.²² Catherine, still smarting from the Pugachev explosion in Russia, feared the Zaporozhian Cossacks not because of what they were but of what had always symbolized historically — defiance of authority and the love of individual freedom to the extreme.

Changing military fortunes caused a limited revival of the Zaporozhian Cossacks in 1783 as an integral part of the Russian forces in the form of the Black Sea Cossack Army. In 1793 it was moved to the Kuban region to spearhead the Russian penetration of the Caucasus. There certain organizational Zaporozhian traditions and the Ukrainian language continued.²³ Those Zaporozhians who had settled in the Ottoman Empire at Dobrudja enjoyed the Sultan's protection in return for military service. Corrupt Ottoman bureaucracy and forceful Russian propaganda convinced a sizeable number to defect in 1828. The returning Cossacks were formed into the Cossack Army of Azov which in 1865 was joined with the Kuban Cossacks. The above developments illustrate the skill by which the Russian government was able to harness the military capacity of the Ukrainian Cossacks and, at the same time, by keeping them outside of the traditional

¹⁹ N. Polonska-Vasylenko, *The settlement of the Southern Ukraine, 1770—1775*, New York, 1955.

²⁰ Polonska, *Zaporizhia . . .*, Vol. I, 45—106.

²¹ D. Evarnytskii, "Chislo i poriadok Zaporozhskikh Sechei," *Kievskaiia Starina*, 1884, Vol. 4, 589—608; A. P., "Svideniia o zadunaiskikh zaporozhtsakh v 1826 g.," *Kievskaiia Starina*, Vol. II, 295—299; A. Skalkovskii, *Istoriia Novoi Sechi ili poslednoho Kosha Zaporozhskoho*, 3 Vols., Odessa 1840—1885.

²² The new name was Pokrovska Sloboda.

²³ Polonska, *Zaporizhia . . .*, Vol. I, 231; P. Ivanov, "Pereselenie zaporozhtsev na Taman," *Kievskaiia Starina*, 1891, Vol. 7, 133—141; H. Storozhenko, "K istorii malorossiiskikh kazakov v kontse XVIII i nachale XIX." *Kievskaiia Starina*, 1897, Vol. 4, 124—156; Vol. 6, 460—482; Vol. 10, 115—131; Vol. 11, 143—156; Vol. 12, 332—350.

Ukrainian lands, effectively negated their traditional role in Ukrainian life. In the course of the 19th century these descendents of the freedom-loving Zaporozhians proved to be reliable defenders of tsarism and the empire.

Judging from the rich folklore collected in the 19th century, the liquidation of the Zaporozhian Sich was perceived by the Ukrainian masses as a traumatic catastrophe. Catherine was heartily damned for depriving the increasingly oppressed people of their only symbol of hope and glory. The belief in the Zaporozhian resurrection, however, was unshakeable.²⁴

That other component of Ukrainian Cossackdom the *Hetmanshchyna* itself had been steadily losing its political autonomy from 1709 when Hetman Mazepa had joined Sweden in an unsuccessful and final military effort to break away from Russian control.²⁵ During the course of the 18th century key aspects of Ukrainian life, including traditional economic ties with Europe, were systematically destroyed as the region was converted into a colonial market for the new Russian industry.²⁶

In 1764 Cyril Rozumovsky won the dubious distinction of being the last Hetman of Cossack Ukraine. In 1783 the *Hetmanshchyna* itself was abolished while the *starshyna* was partially placated by being included into the ranks of the Russian nobility. In the 19th century even the notion of a distinct Ukrainian territoriality was eventually destroyed and the area commonly called "Little Russia" was broken up into three Russian provinces.

Yet imperial decrees could not eradicate the Cossack tradition. It remained alive in songs and stories of the peasant masses and in the hearts of the Cossack gentry. That tradition became the mainspring of the national revival in the 19th century. While the Zaporozhian legacy, especially its military history, was dramatic, colorful and popular, the legacy of the *Hetmanshchyna* was historically more important. The creation of the Hetman State in fact had renewed and continued the traditions of Ukrainian statehood, albeit incomplete, from 1648 to 1783. Part of ethnographic Ukraine constituted a political entity whose more prominent leaders displayed a definite sense of historical continuity. Hetmans Khmelnytskyi, Vyhovskiyi, Doroshenko, Samoilovych and Mazepa saw themselves as modern extensions of Kievan Rus' and struggled to assure the sovereign-

²⁴ D. I. Evarnytskii, "Malorossiiskiiia narodnye pesni," *Sobranie*, 1878—1905, Ekaterynoslav, 1906; D. H. Revutskiyi, *Ukrainski dumy ta pisni istorychni*, Kiev, 1919; M. Kostomarov, "Istoriia kazachestva v pamiatnykakh juzhno-russkago narodnogo tvorchestva," *Istor. monogr. i izsledov.*, Vol. XXI, St. P., 1905; M. Drahomanov, *Novi ukrainski pisni pro hromadski spravy* (1764—1880), Geneva, 1881.

²⁵ For Mazepa's motives, see O. Subtelny (ed.), *On the Eve of Poltava: The Letters of Ivan Mazepa to Adam Stenianski*, 1704—1708, New York, 1975; O. Ohloblyn, *Hetman Ivan Mazepa ta ioho doba*, New York, 1960; B. Krupnytsky, "The Swedish-Ukrainian Treaties of Alliance, 1708—1709," *Ukr. Quarterly*, 1956, #12, 47—57.

²⁶ O. Ohloblyn, *Ocherki istorii ukrainskoi fabriki. Manufactura v Hetmanshchynе*, Kiev, 1925, 189—220.

ty of their realms and to entrench themselves as legitimate rulers.²⁷ This commitment to the *Hetmanshchyna* remained strong in the Ukrainian circles. In fact, until the second half of the 19th century, the revival of *Hetmanshchyna* was the only serious political goal of the nationally conscious elite.

The National Revival

In general, the nationally conscious elements within the Ukrainian gentry remained profoundly loyal to the regime.²⁸ They deliberately emphasised that loyalty to dispel any suspicions about Ukrainian intentions to secede when lobbying for the restoration of the *Hetmanshchyna* and, indeed, on general occasions it appeared that such prospects were good. Tsar Paul I displayed a definite sympathy for the Ukrainian cause and it was rumoured that his son, Grand Duke Constantine, would be a hetman.²⁹ Paul's assassination, however, ended that dream.

During both the Napoleonic invasion of 1812 and the Polish rebellion of 1831, the continued loyalty of the Ukrainians was essential and the government skillfully exploited their Cossack passions. When the call went out to form voluntary Cossack regiments and to contribute to the war effort in 1812, the response led by the gentry was overwhelming as thousands volunteered for the proposed Cossack regiments.³⁰ However, Alexander I broke his promise to maintain permanent Cossack regiments in Ukraine and the volunteers were disbanded with some 25,000 being sent to Kuban.³¹ A similar situation occurred in 1832, when the Ukrainians responded to the appeal of Governor-General Replin and again enthusiastically formed eight Cossack regiments financed by the gentry to fight Polish rebels only to suffer a bitter disappointment.³² The last Cossack episode occurred during the Crimean War, when the tsar's call for volunteers was interpreted by the Kievan peasantry as an appeal for Cossack restoration

²⁷ Ivan Vyhovskiy, for instance, was confirmed by Poland in the Treaty of Hadiach as "Hetman of the Principedom of Rus'," D. Doroshenko, *History of Ukraine, 1917—1923*, Vol. II, Toronto, 1973, 99.

²⁸ There were, of course, several glaring exceptions — aristocrats Vasyl Kapnist sought Prussian aid and Vasyl Lukashevych saw Napoleon as a potential liberator. O. Ohloblyn, *Liudy Staroi Ukrainy*, Munich, 1959, 91, 219; M. Hrushkevskiy, „Taina misiia ukrainsia v Berlini 1791 roku,” *Zapysky NTS*, 1896, Vol. IX.

²⁹ O. Ohloblyn, *Liudy Staroi Ukrainy*, 14, 84.

³⁰ In all the Ukrainian people contributed, voluntarily and otherwise, a staggering sum: over 9 million rubles, 14.5 pounds of silver, gold, foodstuffs, clothing and gunpowder. Over 80,000 volunteered, 69,000 were conscripted. Akademia Nauk Ukrainskoi R.S.R., *Istoriia Ukrainskoi RSR*, Vol. III, Kiev, 1978, 45—46.

³¹ I. Pavlovskii, "Malorossiiskoe kozachie opolchenie v 1812 g.," *Kievskaiia Starina*, 1906, Vol. IX, Vol. X; L. A. "Mysl imperatora Aleksandra I ob uchrezhdenii v Malorossii kazachykh polkov," *Kievskaiia Starina*, 1890, Vol. I, 119—120.

³² I. Pavlovskii, "Malorossiiskie kozachi polki v borbe s poliakami v 1831 g.," *Trudy Poltavskoi Gubern. Uchen. Arkhivn. Komissii*, Vol. VII, Poltava, 1909.

which they equated with freedom.³³ The misunderstanding generated a major uprising in the region.

As in the rest of East-central Europe, romanticism was the driving force of Ukrainian cultural and subsequently national revival. Ukrainian romanticism was deeply entrenched in the Cossack legacy. Spearheaded by the gentry, it involved largely the development of the modern Ukrainian language and of historiography stressing the separate development of the Ukrainian people.³⁴ Ethnography, with the emphasis on peasant folklore, complemented the Cossack documents as the basis of what was becoming a potent romantic nationalism.

It is customary to begin the cultural revival with the writing of Ivan Kotliarevsky's *Aneida* in the vernacular of Poltava (1798). A travesty of Vergil's classic, this very popular work allegorically depicted the imagined adventures of the Zaporozhian Cossacks who escaped from the Sich in 1775. But it was on the estates of the former Cossack regiment of Novhorod-Siversk where the real and systematic growth of Ukrainian activism began. There the residue of old patriotism was inadvertently reinforced and expanded by the action of the tsarist government. The reorganization of the imperial aristocracy had called into question the legitimacy of the titles enjoyed by the descendants of the Cossack *starshyna*. In the effort to prove its status, the Ukrainian gentry came to rely heavily on historical research. Accordingly, what began as a largely selfishly motivated century into Cossack history grew into a patriotic appreciation of the past and stimulated efforts on collective action to protect Ukrainian corporate rather than individual interests.³⁵ It was in Novhorod-Siversk that the famous and anonymous *Istoriia Rusov* was written and circulated throughout Ukraine in manuscript form until its publication in 1846.³⁶ *Istoriia* was an eloquent expression of Ukrainian patriotism stressing the ideas of Cossack democracy and autonomy. Like the Cossack chronicles of the 17th and 18th centuries (Velychko, Samovydet, Hrabianka) *Istoriia Rusov* maintained the concept of historical continuity of Hetman Ukraine with the Kievan era. All of the leading Ukrainian intellectuals of the day — Maksymovych, Bantysh-Kamensky, Hrebinka, Kostomarov, Kulish and Shevchenko — came under its influence.

Positive as the work of the Cossack gentry was, it became clear by the middle of the 19th century that the gentry did not have enough solidarity nor sufficient political leverage in St. Petersburg to assume open leadership and direc-

³³ L. Dobrovolskyi, "Z kyivskoi kozachynny 1855," *Ukrainskyi Naukovyi Zbirnyk* (Moscow), 1915, Vol. I; D. Doroshenko, *A Survey of Ukrainian History*, 533—534; V. Shcherbyna, "Dolia kozachynny v Livoberezhnii Ukraini," *Zapysky NTSh*, 1930, Vol. 100.

³⁴ M. Kostomarov, "Dve russkii narodnosti," *Osnova*, 1861, Vol. III, details the differences between Ukrainians and Russians formed during the course of history. See also D. Doroshenko, *A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography*, New York, 1957, 106—116.

³⁵ Doroshenko, *A Survey of Ukrainian History*, 270—71.

³⁶ A. Yakovlev, "Istoriya Rusov and Its Author," *The Annals* (UVAN), 1953, Vol. III, 620—669.

tion of the Ukrainian national movement as was the case with the Polish *szlachta*.³⁷ The ideological base of the national revival shifted from the concept of historical legitimacy with its roots in the Treaty of Pereiaslav to that of radical populism spearheaded by the new intelligentsia. Still it must be remembered that the hereditary gentry continued to play a constructive role on the ethno-cultural level as patrons of Ukrainian arts and later as members of the newly created local self-government, the *zemstvo*, especially in Poltava province.

Ukrainian intelligentsia was an offshoot of the Russian radical mainstream. It saw the elevation of social injustice and the restoration of Ukrainian autonomy in the context of the fundamental reorganization of the Russian empire. At this point the Ukrainian goal was not separation, but a democratic and federated Russia.³⁸ Ukrainian intelligentsia was not anti-Russian but antisarist; and, as envisaged by the St. Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood, it aspired to fraternal and equal relationship of all Slavs. However, the intelligentsia assigned a special, almost messianic role to the Ukrainians in the reorganization process.³⁹

The prevailing pro-Zaporozhian and anti-*starshyna* attitude of the intelligentsia gave rise to the populist school in Ukrainian historiography which rather subjectively stressed that the common people were the only creative force in Ukrainian history. The elite was depicted as selfish, unpatriotic and ever-ready to assimilate with the element in power.⁴⁰ The romantic historian M. Kostomarov contended that the Ukrainian upper classes had deserted the peasant masses, thereby leaving the Ukrainian nation uniquely a peasant nation and hence classless. To him and to the intelligentsia the Zaporozhian Cossacks epitomized the Ukrainian virtues and values. The Hetman *starshyna*, on the other hand, was treated with contempt. P. Kulish's indictment of the anarchistic and destructive tendencies of the Zaporozhians was a rare exception to the general idealization of the Cossacks.⁴¹

It was the outstanding national poet, Taras Shevchenko, a former serf of Cossack lineage, who profoundly transformed the Cossack legacy from a legend

³⁷ I. L. Rudnytskyi, *Mizh istoriieiu i politykoiu*, Munich, 1973, 32.

³⁸ The foremost spokesman of Ukrainian federalism was Mykhailo Dragomanov. D. Doroshenko, "Mykhailo Dragomanov and the Ukrainian National Movement," *Slavonic Review*, 1938, Vol. 16, 654—666; I. L. Rudnytskyi (ed.), *Mykhailo Dragomanov: A Symposium of selected writings*, New York, 1952.

³⁹ Kostomarov wrote: "Ukraine shall rise from her grave and shall call upon all her Slavonic brothers, and they will rise . . . And Ukraine will be an independent republic in a Slav Union. Then all will say . . . behold, the stone which the builders rejected has become the cornerstone," *Knyha bytia ukrainskoho narodu*, edited by B. Yanivsky, Augsburg, 1947, 24; M. Vozniak, *Kyrylo-Metodiivske bratstvo*, Lviv, 1921.

⁴⁰ O. Pritsak, "U stolittia narodyn M. Hrushevskoho" in B. Koval (ed.), *Idei i liudy*, New York, 1968, 213.

⁴¹ Panteleimon Kulish, *The Black Council*, abridged and translated by L. S. and M. Luckyj, Littleton, Col. 1973.

of the past to a vital interest of his own time.⁴² In glamorizing the Cossack era as a heroic age, he awakened in his oppressed people a very crucial sense of patriotic pride in their heritage and desire for dignity and national freedom. In denouncing serfdom and autocracy for destroying Ukraine's liberties, Shevchenko focused on the universal human condition and encountered the wrath of Tsar Nicholas I. The regime's concern about the political implication of Shevchenko's representation of the Cossack past was clearly expressed in the government report. It stated that Shevchenko "wants to awaken the hatred of domination by the Russians and recalling old freedoms, successes and exploits of the Cossacks, reproaches his countrymen for their indifference."⁴³ Shevchenko was banished into the army.

The Tsarist government lost no time in launching a persecution of the Ukrainian cultural movement, which lasted in different forms until the Revolution. Not only the romantic political ideas of the Brotherhood of Cyril and Methodius were proscribed but the Ukrainian language itself was banned in 1863 and then by the secret Ems decree of 1876.⁴⁴ The mainstream of the cultural revival became apolitical again using the few loopholes in the censorship regulations to continue ethnographic studies and historical research.

It should be noted that fascination with the Zaporozhian Cossacks was not exclusive to the Ukrainian intelligentsia. It spilled into Russian literary and cultural circles as well. Alexander Herzen stressed the Cossack democratic tradition; Nikolai Gogol romanticised their life style in *Taras Bulba*; Illia Repin vividly conveyed their defiant devil-may-care attitude in his painting "Zaporozhian Letter to the Sultan".

The Revolution

The sudden collapse of tsarism in February 1917 caught the young Ukrainian national movement unprepared to take full and effective advantage of the situation. Nevertheless, despite the legacy of repression, the Ukrainian national revolution did occur. Like all colonial revolutions, it embraced both the social and the national goals which culminated in the formation of the socialist Ukrainian National Republic.⁴⁵ It was during the period 1917—21 that manifestations

⁴² Literature on Shevchenko, Ukraine's national poet is voluminous. The following are relevant to the topic: G. S. Luckyj, *Between Gogol and Ševčenko*, Munich, 1971; V. Mijkovskyj and G. Shevelov, *Taras Shevchenko, 1814—1861, A Symposium*, Haque, 1962; R. Zaitsev, *Zhyttia Tarasa Shevchenka*, New York, 1955.

⁴³ Zaitsev, 177.

⁴⁴ F. Savchenko, *Zaborona ukrainstva*, 1876, Kiev, 1930 (reprint Munich, 1970).

⁴⁵ On the subject of Ukrainian Revolution one must still rely extensively on the early publications: P. Khrystiuk, *Ukrainska Revoliutsiia*, 4 vols., Prague, 1922; V. Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia natsii*, 3 vols., Kiev—Vienna, 1920; D. Doroshenko, *Istoriia Ukrainy, 1917—1923*, 2 vols., Uzhhorod, 1930; J. Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution 1917—1920*, Princeton, 1952. See also O. Pidhainy, *The Ukrainian Republic in the Great East-European Revolution: A Bibliography*, Toronto, 1971.

of the Cossack legacy, myth and reality, became most apparent in recent times. Cossack traditions were evoked by practically all of the Ukrainian contenders for power — the democrats of the UNR; the conservatives of the Hetmanate; and the extremists of the Left.⁴⁶ It is clear that political and ideological influences associated with the perceived Cossack history made a profound impact on the nature and the course of the Ukrainian revolution.

On the superficial level, the most vivid examples of the Cossack rebirth occurred in military life where they ranged from Cossack uniforms to military reorganization along Cossack lines. To generate morale and to spread national consciousness among the approximately 5,000,000 Ukrainians in the Russian army, units were Ukrainianized and renamed after famous Cossacks and those hetmans, like Mazepa, known for their patriotism. Beginning with the formation of the Ukrainian Military Club of Hetman Polubotok, organizers made deliberate efforts to identify the new formations with the glories of the Zaporozhian tradition.⁴⁷ Sadly, the revival of the Cossack facade did not revive the old fighting spirit.

A paralleled development occurred outside the "regular" armed forces with the formation of the so called Free Cossacks. The Free Cossack movement originated quite spontaneously in the Kiev province as village self-defense mechanism in the face of the breakdown of law and order. It quickly grew from a local militia to a national body numbering over 60,000 by the fall of 1917. The Free Cossacks were envisaged by the nascent Ukrainian government, the Central Rada, as the prototype of a national militia.⁴⁸ Originally consisting largely of small landowners and peasants, the Free Cossacks became a broadly based movement of nationally conscious Ukrainians. They actively participated in the defense of Ukraine in the face of the Russian Bolshevik invasion. During the German occupation of Ukraine in 1918, however, the Free Cossacks were deemed unreliable and were disbanded.

The populist leadership of Ukrainian democracy, the Central Rada, in many ways saw itself as an extension of the Zaporozhian republican traditions and its social myths. Politically the Rada was autonomist in outlook and embraced complete separation from Russia only after the Bolshevik seizure of power. But like the hetmans of old, the Central Rada was unable to defend the sovereignty of Ukraine alone and was forced to seek foreign aid. This led to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the arrival of the Austro-German armies which quickly turned from allies to occupation forces reducing Ukraine's real position to that of a German satellite. Divergent priorities and the Rada's social radicalism resulted in the overthrow of the Rada. The details of the coup d'état of April 29, 1918 engineered by the Germans and the Ukrainian and Russian conservative circles (The Landowner's Alliance) which elevated General Pavlo Skoropadskyi,

⁴⁶ The Bolsheviks, for example, exploited the popular appeal of Cossackdom in Ukraine by forming regiments of "Red" Cossacks, I. Dubynskyi, H. Shevchuk, *Chervone Kozatstvo*, Kiev, 1965.

⁴⁷ I. Krypiakievych, *Istoriia ukrainskoho viiska*, 2nd edition, Winnipeg, 1953, 357—395.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 378.

an indirect descendent of Hetman Ivan Skoropadskyi (1709—22), to the position of "Hetman of all Ukraine and of Cossack armies" are still shrouded in controversy.⁴⁹ In part, the continuing polemical warfare has been responsible for clouding the issue. It suffices to say that the Rada's radical notions about private property alienated segments of the middle and upper peasantry as well as the gentry and industrialists. The idea of restoring the *Hetmanshchyna* seems to have originated with the Ukrainian Democratic-Agrarian party which was founded in Poltava in 1917. The party's program, strong on private property and elitist leadership, was drawn up by a prominent sociologist V. Lypynskyi.⁵⁰ Later in exile Lypynskyi formulated an elaborate ideology for hereditary hetmanship as the key prerequisite for independent statehood. Skoropadskyi's regime of eight months, during which he was a German vassal rather than a mere puppet, constituted a very critical point in modern Ukrainian history.

The profound opposition to the Hetman regime on the part of the socialists formalized the ideological polarization within the Ukrainian society. A period of a bloody, civil conflict ensued in which ultimately both sides lost and the Ukrainian independence effort collapsed. There is no meaningful way of determining the degree of acceptance of the 20th century *hetmanshchyna* by the Ukrainian people. German military control and the reactionary Russian political influences within the Skoropadskyi government make it difficult to distinguish between those who objected to the idea of the *hetmanshchyna* on principle and those who merely opposed the policies of the hetman.

Skoropadskyi was aware of his narrow power base and in his speeches relied heavily on the Cossack legacy, constantly linking the past with his own time and objectives. The most dramatic example of the Cossack idea was the official restoration of the Cossack class. The hetman manifesto of October 16, 1918 read in part:

"We deem it good for strengthening the might of our Ukrainian State to revive the Cossack class in all places of its historical inhabitation in Ukraine, laying as a foundation for the said revival those knightly Cossack traditions of which we have been told by our history..."⁵¹

All the descendants of the old Hetman and Slobidska Ukraine Cossacks were to be regarded as members of the new class. Citizens of other origins could register as Cossacks under special conditions. An elaborate military-administrative structure would be worked out in the future. In practical terms the Cossack class was intended to become Skoropadskyi's source of indigenous political-military power and of legitimacy. The reaction to the hetman's project was

⁴⁹ Taras Hunczak, "The Ukraine under Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky" in *The Ukraine, 1917—21: A Study in Revolution*, Cambridge, 1977; O. Fedyshyn, *Germany's Drive to the East and the Ukrainian Revolution*, New Brunswick, 1971.

⁵⁰ S. Shemet, "Do istorii Ukrainskoi Demokratychno-Khliborobskoi Partii," *Khliborobska Ukraina*, Vol. II, Vienna, 1920.

⁵¹ D. Doroshenko, *A History of Ukraine*, Vol. II: *The Ukrainian Hetman State of 1918*, Winnipeg, 1973, 311.

mixed, ranging from the understandable satisfaction on the part of the intended beneficiaries to indications of serious opposition from the democratic elements to whom the term "Cossack" implied a Zaporozhian connection rather than a privileged status. The subsequent anti-Hetman uprising headed by the Directory of the underground Ukrainian National Republic ended this largely paper experiment, in what appeared to have been a historical anachronism, inconclusively.

Zaporozhian traditions, social myths and symbolisms, at least their 20th century perceptions, made themselves felt mostly in southern Ukraine. Historically, this region, unlike the former Hetman Ukraine, did not contribute directly to the Ukrainian national revival, largely due to its cosmopolitan nature.⁵² The level of national consciousness was low. However, the South was alive with Cossack memories and traditions — notably the legacy of frontier individualism, total personal freedom and propensity to rebel. During the national revolution, the inability of any of the Ukrainian government to exercise effective control over the South allowed it to succumb to anarchistic turmoil. Known as *otamanshchyna*, Ukrainian anarchy revolved around a number of warlords of whom Nestor Makhno and Nykyfor Hryhoriv were the most picturesque and notorious.⁵³ Driven by misguided idealism, personal ambitions and lust for booty, such otamans enjoyed substantial, albeit brief, popularity among the masses and consequently operated important military units which fought indiscriminately against all intruders — the UNR, the Soviets, the Whites and the Entente — in the name of peasant freedom. It was only with the establishment of Soviet power in Ukraine that some of the partisan bands belatedly declared themselves in favor of the UNR and together with the bands of Free Cossacks constituted Ukrainian insurgency which waged an armed struggle against Soviet authorities until 1926.⁵⁴ The destructiveness of *otamanshchyna* undoubtedly played a key part in the demise of Ukrainian independent statehood.

Contemporary Manifestations

The legacy of *kozachyna* continued to manifest itself in the various political, cultural and intellectual forms following the loss of Ukrainian sovereignty. Its political ideology formulated by V. Lypynskyi focused on the principle of hereditary monarchism as identified with the exiled Hetman Skoropadskyi. The Hetmanite's initial high intellectual standards and its emphasis on conservatism, elitism and "Christian way of life" attracted to it a number of prominent individuals at the time when Ukrainian socialist parties, still smarting from the collapse of the UNR, were in disarray. Hetmanite ideology found

⁵² Polonska, *Zaporizhia . . .*, Vol. II, 231.

⁵³ Makhno's controversial role in the Ukrainian Revolution is discussed by M. Palij, *The Anarchism of Nestor Makhno, 1918—21*, Seattle, 1976; and F. Sydyn, "Nestor Makhno and the Ukrainian Revolution" in *The Ukraine 1917—21*, edited by T. Hunczak, Cambridge, 1977.

⁵⁴ For details, see G. Kulchycky, "The Ukrainian Insurgent Movement 1919 to 1926," Georgetown University, 1970, unpublished Ph. D. thesis.

support in Polish Ukraine and in the centers of Western Ukrainian immigration in North and South America. Paradoxically, the Hetmanite movement, which was based on the traditions of Eastern Ukraine, in diaspora became largely a Western Ukrainian organization. This was partly due to the attraction that the predominant Ukrainian Catholic element of the emigrant groups developed for the Hetmanite banner.⁵⁵

One cannot refer to the American *kozachyna* without noting a curious but a wide spread historical hypothesis to the effect that the Ukrainian Cossack connection with this continent goes back to the 18th century. Agapius Honcharenko, a radical Ukrainian Orthodox priest edited in California *The Alaska Herald* (1868—1874) in which he popularized the unsubstantiated belief that the early Russian explorers of America were, in fact, the Zaporozhian refugees. These adventurers not only opened the Pacific North-West but intermarried with the native Aleuts, thus leaving a permanent legacy.

It appears that the notion of the early Ukrainian presence in North America, predating that of the large scale economic immigration of the 1890's, gave some of the bewildered newcomers a sense of greater self-confidence, so essential at their introductory stage. Honcharenko himself was highly respected by the early Ukrainian radical intelligentsia in Canada who frequently visited his farm "Ukraina" in California. It was there that the short-lived "Ukrainske Bratstvo" based on Zaporozhian ideals of equality and fraternity, came into being.⁵⁶

It is a known fact that the cultural heritage of the Ukrainian immigrants — folklore, music, songs and dances — is saturated with Cossack images and references. That heritage evolved into a highly sophisticated form of performing arts and as such, it, rather than the political tradition, has contributed immensely to the preservation of Ukrainian ethnicity in diaspora. At ethnic festivals, in whatever part of the world Ukrainians live, it is the image of the Cossack that has come to symbolize the Ukrainian identity to others.

Politically, Skoropadskyi's leadership of the Cossack conservatism was challenged in the 1920's by splinter groups of emigré Free Cossacks. One of these factions formed the Ukrainian People's Party which touted the Austrian Archduke Wilhelm von Habsburg, better known by his Ukrainian name of Vasyl Vyshyvanyi, as the monarchist alternative to Skoropadskyi.⁵⁷ In the East Eu-

⁵⁵ In the early 1920's, a network of Ukrainian nationalistic gymnastic societies called "Sitch" were organized in several American and Canadian cities. In 1924 they accepted the Hetmanite ideology. V. Bosyi, "Pochatky Hetmansko rukhu za okeanom," *Za Velych Natsii*, Lviv, 1938, 130—136. In Argentina, the Ukrainian Union of Monarchist-Statists revolved around its organ "Pluh ta Mech" published in Buenos Aires.

⁵⁶ M. Marunchak, *Studii do istorii ukrainsiv Kanady*, Vol. IV, Winnipeg, 1972, 169; T. Luciwi, *Father Agapius Honcharenko, First Ukrainian Priest in America*, New York, 1970.

⁵⁷ That the Hetmanites saw Vyshyvanyi as a real threat is underlined by Lypynskyi's article, "Poklykannia 'Variativ' chy Orhanizatsiia Khliborobiv?" *Khliborobska Ukraina*, 1922—23, Vol. 4, No. 7—8, 312—40.

ropean confusion of the 1920's, the Free Cossacks themselves remained fragmented and mutually hostile. There was even an emergence of a fascist current as exemplified by the journal *Ukrainskyi Kozak*.⁵⁸ During World War II the right-wing elements of the Cossacks flirted with the Nazis. The democratic wing, however, reorganized itself in Prague in 1943, reaffirming its earlier commitment to the traditional "Cossack ideals" of independence, liberty and social justice and its belief in the historic mission of the Cossack movement to revive Ukrainian independent statehood. The program, no longer subscribed to the principles of hetmanite monarchism, leaving the future constitutional structure of Ukraine open.

Skoropadskyi, who remained in Berlin during the war, used his influence with the German High Command to intervene, often successfully, on behalf of Ukrainian political inmates in German concentration camps. Nonetheless, the Hetman's efforts to unify the emigré Ukrainian political factions around himself failed. He died in an Allied air raid in 1945. Although the movement itself ceased to be a serious political force in Ukrainian life, the residue of the Hetmanite ideology is still very much alive today as indicated by the constant flow of partisan literature.

The remnants of the Free Cossack factions have also refused to wither away and can be found largely in the enclaves of Ukrainian post-World War II immigration. A degree of coordination has been provided since 1968 by the organization's organ *Ukrainske Kozatstvo* (Chicago). The contemporary Cossack cult, despite its efforts to the contrary, is not treated seriously by the majority of the Ukrainian community. Its tiny (1979 — 655) and aged membership, which now includes women, and its almost mystical belief in the destiny of *kozachyna* conveys a sad image of organized eccentricity.

On the scholarly level, interest in the Cossack heritage blossomed in Soviet Ukraine during the brief period of Ukrainization in the 1920's. Extensive research was undertaken in the area of Cossack history and this helped to correct the romanticized versions of the populists.⁵⁹ Unfortunately, the subsequent era of Stalinist repression subverted historical studies to political ends. Ukrainian history in general, and Cossack in particular, became blatantly exploited to further centralization and Russification. In 1954, as a commemoration of the tricentenary of the Treaty of Pereiaslav, the CPSU laid down new historical theses which provided binding guidelines for the interpretation of Ukrainian history.⁶⁰ The emphasis was placed on the alleged historical affinity of the Ukrainian and Russian people and the Pereiaslav arrangement came to be regarded as a reunion of the "brotherly nations". It was no longer possible to make critical references to the systematic violation of the autonomous status of Hetman Ukraine as recognized by the Treaty.

⁵⁸ A. Motyl, *The Turn to the Right. The ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism*, New York, 1980, 32; Also *Nemezida*, Jan., 1936.

⁵⁹ See Ohloblyn, *Ukrainian Historiography, 1917—1956; The Annals (UVAN)*, 1957, Vol. V—VI, no. 4, 307—372.

⁶⁰ G. Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine after World War II*, New Brunswick, 1962, 205—206.

This and other crude falsifications of the Ukrainian historical process did not go unchallenged by the Soviet Ukrainian intelligentsia in the post-Stalin period of growing dissidence. It appears that the stimulus for criticizing the Kremlin's interpretation of Ukrainian history came in part from the Soviet Ukrainian government itself. Petro Shelest, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, has been compared with some justification to the post-Mazepa hetmans of Ukraine who, while maintaining correct relations with St. Petersburg, attempted at the same time to defend the autonomy of the *Hetmanshchyna*.⁶¹ It appears that Shelest gave tacit approval to a number of controversial studies on Ukrainian-Russian relations.⁶² His own best seller (100,000 copies) and subject of later criticism, *Ukraino Nasha Radianska* set the patriotic tone by praising the constructive historical role of the Cossacks in the nation building process and by holding Russia responsible for the liquidation of Ukrainian autonomy in direct violation of the Treaty of Pereiaslav.⁶³

The historian Mykhailo Braichevskyi questioned the official line of "reunification" and argued along Marxist lines that Russian annexation of Cossack Ukraine retarded rather than benefited the socio-economic progress there.⁶⁴ Other dissident voices emerged, drawing on Cossack history for both patriotic inspiration and legalistic arguments for Ukraine's right to live as a sovereign national entity.⁶⁵ The Kremlin reacted with its patented severity. Shelest's patriotism was obviously judged stronger than his loyalty and he fell from office in 1972. A major campaign of repression was launched against the Ukrainian cultural and intellectual elite.

For reasons of space the above discussion of the Ukrainian Cossack phenomenon was limited to major examples, and these in turn were largely confined to Eastern Ukraine. Nonetheless, they ought to be sufficient to testify to the indelible imprint of the Cossack legacy on recent Ukrainian history. *Kozachyna* (Cossackdom), as a state of mind conjuring up the vivid images and proud glories of the Cossack era, has remained a prominent current in the cultural and literary expression. But, *kozachyna*, as a vehicle of political expression, as a base of political ideology, has been found wanting when confronted with the realities of the 20th century. As the sole indigenous Ukrainian political tradition, *kozachyna*, in its Zaporozhian and Hetmanite forms, quite naturally exerted a powerful force on the pattern and the content of the Ukrain-

⁶¹ J. Pelenski, "Shelest and His Period in Soviet Ukraine 1963—72; A Revival of Controlled Ukrainian Autonomism," in P. I. Potichnyj (ed.), *Ukraine in the Seventies*, Oakville, 1975, 299.

⁶² Ivan Dziuba, *Internationalism or Russification?* (2nd ed.), New York, 1970; V. Chornovil, *The Chornovil Papers*, New York, 1968. The studies circulated in manuscript form and were published abroad.

⁶³ P. Iu. Shelest, *Ukraino nasha Radianska*, Kiev, 1970, 29.

⁶⁴ M. Braichevsky, *Pryiednannia chy voziednannia?* Toronto, 1972.

⁶⁵ A good example of the Cossack themes is Ie. Sverstiuk's *Clandestine Essays* (Cambridge, 1976), which were written in response to O. Honchar's novel, *Sobor*; *The Ukrainian Herald*, issue 6, "Dissent in Ukraine," Toronto, 1977; M. Brown (ed.), *Ferment in the Ukraine*, Woodhaven, 1973.

ian Revolution and the state building process. In so doing, it contributed to the demise of the nascent Ukrainian statehood. Contemporary Ukrainian political thought, the interwar popularity of the Hetmanite movement notwithstanding, quite rightly dismisses the modern cult of *kozachyna* as a form of quaint anachronism.

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