


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The Holocaust in Ukraine: History— Historiography—Memory

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Abstract and Keywords

Every fourth victim of the Holocaust came from Ukraine. Nonetheless, it is difficult to analyze the Holocaust in this country due to the lack of sources and the various foreign occupation regimes. The Jews of Ukraine had little chance to survive the German campaign of mass murder. Historiography neglected the Holocaust in Ukraine until the 1990s; research on this topic lags far behind research on the Holocaust in Poland. In Ukraine, commemoration of the Holocaust is determined by the country's nation-building process; this, however, focuses on the victims of communist crimes and a partial rehabilitation of wartime right-wing movements.

Keywords: Second World War, Nazi Germany, Soviet Union, Holocaust, German armed forces, Wehrmacht, SS and German police, military administration, civil administration

Approximately 1.5 million of the approximately 5.7 million Jews murdered during the Holocaust came from within the borders of what is today Ukraine.¹ This amounts to every fourth victim. Ukraine was therefore a major sight of the German mass murder of Jews during the Second World War. Nonetheless, it is difficult to speak of a clearly defined “Holocaust in Ukraine,” since what is today independent Ukraine was at the time divided among six different occupation regimes: the German civilian administration known as the Reich Commissariat Ukraine; a military administered zone of occupation under the Wehrmacht (the German armed forces); District Galicia in the General Government (the German authority for central and southeast Poland); Romanian-occupied Transnistria; prewar Romanian territory in northern Bukovina and southern Bessarabia, seized by Moscow in 1940 and recovered by Bucharest in 1941; and Hungarian-annexed Transcarpathia. This chapter touches on all but the last two regimes.² In addition, this chapter addresses how the historiography of the Holocaust in Ukraine has evolved and how the Holocaust is remembered in that country today.

German plans for the invasion of the Soviet Union envisioned a broader use of lethal force against civilians and captured military personnel than was seen in the previous German campaigns of the Second World War. This was clear in the orders drawn up and issued to the Wehrmacht, as well as those of the SS and police formations that would follow behind the lines. To facilitate the swiftest resort to (p.191) firearms, the Wehrmacht, in what is known as the “Jurisdiction Decree,” urged the quickest possible shooting of persons suspected of attacking German soldiers and limited the courts martial to the most glaring offences committed by German soldiers. This decree also legitimized collective reprisal measures against civilians.³ Guidelines distributed to the troops just days before the attack instructed soldiers that the campaign against the Soviet Union would require a “ruthless and energetic crackdown against *Bolshevik agitators, guerillas, saboteurs, Jews* and the utter elimination of every passive and active act of resistance” (emphasis in the original).⁴ In addition, the Wehrmacht had planned to shoot Red Army “political

commissars,” who were considered the ideological backbone of the Soviet regime and predominantly Jews. Not only did Jews fail to constitute a majority among of political commissars, the post had in fact been eliminated in 1940. In the end, the “commissar order” was directed against Soviet party functionaries and political activists in the Red Army in general.⁵ There also exist scattered indications that at least a few Wehrmacht divisions ordered the isolation of Red Army personnel of Jewish origin, the singling out of the craftsmen among them, and the shooting of the rest.⁶

The SS and police formations that had been integrated into the Wehrmacht security structure behind the lines had been issued similar orders for fighting “enemies of the Reich,” meaning above all Communist Party functionaries and Jews. The most notorious of these formations were the Einsatzgruppen, which were led by the Security Police (the secret and criminal investigation police) and the SD (the intelligence branch of the SS). Most historians do not believe that the Einsatzgruppen had been issued a general order to kill *all* Jews prior to the invasion. Nonetheless, in addition to written orders to execute “Jews in party and state positions,” the Einsatzgruppen commanders were given considerable leeway in determining what they viewed as necessary for the security of the areas where they operated.⁷

Nazi ambitions, however, went far beyond these measures. Part of the rationale behind the invasion of the Soviet Union was the seizure of foodstuffs. In order to secure the grain, produce, and meat needed for troops and the home front, German government and military officials had colluded in drafting a plan to starve major cities throughout the western Soviet Union. Thus the Germans accepted as part of their preinvasion deliberations that several million city-dwellers in Ukraine (many millions more in Belarus and Russia) would die of hunger. Since Soviet Jews tended to live in the cities, most of the Soviet Union’s Jewish population had been sentenced to death before the first shot was fired.⁸

The SS and police formations deployed in Ukraine were headed by the higher SS and police leader for “southern Russia” (*Höhere SS und Polizeiführer* (p.192) *Russland-Süd*,

HSSPF Russia South), a post first held by Friedrich Jeckeln and then, from mid-October 1941 on, by Hans Prützmann. The HSSPFs were the representatives of Heinrich Himmler (the leader of the SS and chief of the German police). Jeckeln and Prützmann bore the most responsibility for implementing the genocide directed against the Jews in Ukraine beyond eastern Galicia (in the General Government) and Transnistria (the Romanian-occupied regions of Ukraine). The main formations under the command of the HSSPF included Einsatzgruppe C, which passed through the northern half of Ukraine, and Einsatzgruppe D, which swept through northern Bukovina, Bessarabia, and the Odessa Oblast (region), and then advanced along the coast of the Black and Azov seas, as well as into the Crimea. In addition to the Einsatzgruppen, Jeckeln and Prützmann had at their disposal two regiments of the German Order Police, that is, the German regular police. These were the police battalions 45, 303, and 314, which made up Police Regiment South, and the police battalions 304, 315, and 320, which made up Police Regiment for Special Purposes (the latter deployed for the eventual capture of the Caucasus). All of these battalions contributed to the mass murder of Ukrainian Jews, often assisting Einsatzgruppe C in larger massacres. Einsatzgruppe D operated without the support of Order Police battalions. At the end of July, the 1st SS Infantry Brigade, a formation of the Waffen-SS, the combat arm of the SS, was assigned to the HSSPF Russia South as well.

The speed of the German advance into Ukraine (although slower than on the central and northern sectors of the front) and the lack of preparedness on the part of the Soviet authorities prevented most Jews in Right-Bank Ukraine from escaping, especially those in the westernmost oblasts. Jews in the prewar Polish regions of Galicia and Volhynia, as well as those in the Vinnytsia and Proskuriv oblasts, lacked the time and means to flee. In the oblasts of Zhytomyr, Kirovohrad, Odessa, and Mykolaiv, just over half the Jews managed to escape. Elsewhere in Ukraine, above all in Left-Bank Ukraine, evacuation rates fluctuated between 75 and 90 percent.⁹ According to estimates based on Soviet statistics, 800,000–900,000 Ukrainian Jews managed to flee in 1941.¹⁰

From the start of the invasion, the SS and German police, as well as German Army units, persecuted and murdered Jews in Ukraine. In Galicia and Volhynia, they were abetted by local inhabitants, as a wave of pogroms swept western Ukraine. In some instances, this anti-Jewish violence was spontaneous; in others, Einsatzgruppe C was also involved. The Germans had anticipated anti-Jewish violence in conjunction with the invasion, and the Einsatzgruppen had even been instructed not just to let pogroms happen but to initiate, accelerate, and steer them. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), an authoritarian, anti-Semitic underground movement, launched (p.193) violent diversions in western Ukraine, including anti-Jewish actions, in part to impede the retreat of the Red Army. The extent to which these actions were coordinated between the SS and police, the Abwehr (German military intelligence), and the OUN remains unclear.

Once it was discovered that the NVKD (the Soviet secret police) had massacred thousands of political prisoners in western Ukraine before retreating, OUN involvement in pogroms became more evident, especially in Galicia, where the overwhelming share of OUN members originated. The Germans, the OUN, and many local Ukrainians blamed these murders on Bolsheviks and NKVD officials of Jewish origin and, by extension, on all Jews. The widespread notion of Jews and Bolsheviks as synonymous provided the psychological foundation for the anti-Jewish violence that erupted in many west Ukrainian towns in June and July. At least 12,000 Jews, mostly men, fell victim to the pogroms in Galicia.¹¹ At the same time, Einsatzgruppe C started killing Jewish men in large numbers, in particular those believed to make up the intelligentsia, such as teachers, party members, and community leaders. These mass shootings were said to be reprisals for the NKVD killings, although the latter had not been directed against the Germans, but against the locals and had included Jewish victims. Outside Galicia and Volhynia, pogroms were comparatively few. By mid-July, Einsatzgruppe C had left the former Polish territories of Ukraine, having turned over Security Police operations to support troops from the General Government.

Throughout June and July of the campaign, the general thrust of the killing was directed at males, especially able-bodied men and members of the intelligentsia, inasmuch as they possessed no other skills as craftsmen. During this phase, mass shootings usually ranged in size from fewer than a dozen to just over a thousand victims. Even though limited to mostly male victims, the cumulative death toll soared into the tens of thousands, reaching roughly 40,000 victims before the end of August. The first mass killings of Jewish women and children in Ukraine appear to have been committed by the 1st SS Infantry Brigade in and to the south of Novhorod-Volynsky between 27 and 30 July 1941.¹² A few weeks later, at the latest, Einsatzgruppe C commando leaders were informed that, in principle, Jewish women and children should be shot as well.¹³

The evolving genocide took on a new dimension in Kamianets-Podilsky on 27–29 August 1941, when, over the course of three days, Police Battalion 320 shot 23,600 Jews, including 14,000 refugees whom the Hungarians had expelled from Transcarpathia a few weeks earlier. This operation took place under Jeckeln's supervision and without the involvement of Einsatzgruppe C. Such large-scale shootings continued into September 1941: in Berdychiv on (p.194) 12 September (12,000 victims), in Vinnytsia on 19 September (15,000 victims), and in the ravine Babi Yar in Kiev on 29–30 September. It was at the latter site that Sonderkommando 4a (a unit of Einsatzgruppe C), together with police battalions 45 and 314, shot 33,771 Jews, the largest massacre of the Holocaust. The next two large massacres in military-occupied Ukraine occurred during the German advance into Left-Bank Ukraine: in Dnipropetrovsk, where 15,000 Jews were slaughtered by Police Battalion 314 on 13–14 October, and in Kharkiv, where 12,000 Jews were murdered by Police Battalion 314 and Sonderkommando 4a in the first days of January 1942. Smaller massacres continued until December 1941, taking place on an almost daily basis, whether in the area of operations of one of the Einsatzgruppen, the police battalions, or the 1st SS Infantry Brigade.

All of these crimes, from the pogroms to the largest massacres, were committed under the authority of the

Wehrmacht. At the front, military administration was divided among the army rear area commandants of the 6th, 17th, and 11th armies. The conquered territory behind the armies was administered in turn by a commander of rear area army group, in the case of Ukraine, Rear Area Army Group South. The Sonderkommandos of Einsatzgruppe C operated within the jurisdiction of the army rear area commandants or close to the front, while its Einsatzkommandos tended to operate within the Rear Area Army Group South, as did the Order Police battalions and the SS brigade. There was of course overlap, as well as the exception of Einsatzgruppe D, which carried out its campaign of murder in the wake of the German 11th Army alone. The military administration was also the authority that introduced the first measures aimed at the disenfranchising and isolation of the Jews. These measures were similar to those that had been implemented in Nazi-occupied Poland. The Jews were placed outside the jurisdiction of the law, obliged to wear identifying armbands marked with the Star of David, and required to turn over their valuables. Men were often conscripted for forced labor. A Wehrmacht order called for the creation of ghettos, but this was apparently only implemented under civil administration.¹⁴

As the Wehrmacht moved east, it turned over swaths of territory to the civilian authority for Ukraine, the Reich Commissariat Ukraine (*Reichskommissariat für die Ukraine*, RKU). The first transfer of Ukrainian territory to German civilian rule was the region of eastern Galicia, which was assigned to the General Government on 1 August 1941. The RKU was established on 1 September 1941 in western Volhynia and the Proskuriv Oblast. A second turnover on 20 October covered most of Right-Bank Ukraine down to the Cherkassy-Pervomaisk rail line. By mid-November 1941, the RKU was in charge of all of Right-Bank Ukraine, save for those lands bequeathed to Germany's ally Romania and (p.195) given the name Transnistria (most of the Odessa Oblast, just under half of the Vinnytsia Oblast, and a part of the Mykolaiv Oblast). At its greatest extent, from September 1942 to March 1943, the RKU covered just over 55 percent of what is today Ukraine.

The transfer to civilian rule did not bring an end to the killing. The support troops that had relieved Einsatzgruppe C in Galicia and Volhynia had continued to carry out shootings throughout the autumn of 1941. In eastern Galicia, these operations peaked in the first half of October with massacres in Nadvirna on 6 October, which claimed 2,000 victims, and in Stanyslaviv (now Ivano-Frankivsk) on 12 October (“Bloody Sunday”), when the local Security Police outpost and Police Battalion 133 killed 12,000 Jews.¹⁵ In the RKU, the pattern was similar. Having reached Kiev at the end of September, Einsatzkommando 5 was broken up into detachments and sent back west to Rivne, Vinnytsia, and Zhytomyr in mid-October, in order to establish stationary regional offices. These detachments carried out dozens of massacres west of the Dniepr before year’s end. The most notorious of these took place in Rivne on 6–9 November. There police battalions 315 and 320, together with the local Einsatzkommando 5 detachment, shot 17,000 Jews in Rivne. The orders for this shooting were connected with the establishment of the local ghetto and the desire of the occupation authorities to reduce the number of Jews in the temporary capital of the RKU.¹⁶

In the final months of 1941, the RKU began creating ghettos in the territory under its jurisdiction. The form of those ghettos varied greatly. Sometimes, they consisted of a few fenced-off buildings; sometimes, they involved a small quarter of town that was declared a ghetto, but was not fenced in or even guarded. Within the ghettos, usually located in a part of town with a minimum of infrastructure, food and medicine were insufficient. Those Jews who lacked access to the black market or assistance from beyond the ghetto were in great danger of succumbing to malnutrition or disease. In each city or town with a large Jewish community, the creation of a Jewish Council, or Judenrat, was also mandatory. The Judenrat had to make sure that German orders were followed and to procure provisions from the German administration and distribute them to the ghetto population. The vast majority of the ghettos were established in the western lands of the RKU. In the other half—roughly the territory east of the line formed by Korosten, Zhytomyr, and Vinnitsia—the formation of ghettos there was largely superfluous, as this marked the point beyond which the

Einsatzgruppen and Order Police had killed almost all of the Jews they had encountered.¹⁷

Parallel to the events in Galicia and the RKU, in Transnistria, the Romanian authorities turned their zone of occupation into a mass graveyard (p.196) for both local Jews and Jews expelled from the regions annexed by the Soviet Union in June 1940. Starting in August 1941, the Romanian government had deported the Jews of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina to Transnistria, where they had to live in camps and ghettos under abysmal circumstances. Not long after the massacre at Babi Yar, the Romanian army and police committed a similar crime, killing around 25,000 Jews in Odessa on 23–24 October. Most of the remaining Jews were then marched north into the ethnic German settlement areas around Berezivka, where they were killed by the ethnic German Self-defense Force (*Selbstschutz*), a formation of the SS Ethnic German Liaison Office (*Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle*). In December, the Romanians murdered the inmates of the Golta camps of Akhmetchetka, Bohdanivka, and Domanivka, where tens of thousands of Jews had been incarcerated. Most of the inmates from these camps had perished by March 1942. Only in August 1942 did Bucharest turn away from active participation in the Holocaust, primarily due to disputes with the Germans over the treatment of Romanian troops on the front and intervention on the part of Romanian public figures and U.S. officials.¹⁸ Of the Bukovinian and Bessarabian Jews expelled into Transnistria, those who survived until the summer of 1942 and the end of the Romanian shootings generally had fair chance of surviving the war.

By the spring of 1942, there were almost no Jews left alive in Wehrmacht-administered Left-Bank Ukraine. Over the course of spring 1942, the Jews who had not been killed in 1941 were murdered by Sonderkommando Plath, which was based in Kremenchuk.¹⁹ At the same time Sonderkommando Plath was completing its assignment in Left-Bank Ukraine, mass shootings resumed in Right-Bank Ukraine. All of the Jews in General Commissariat Mykolaiv had been killed by 1 April.²⁰ Farther west, in District Galicia and General Commissariat Volhynia-Podolia, the perpetrators began to classify and

organize the Jews according to their “ability to work.” As a consequence, the murder of women and children was soon stepped up. On 16 March, the Germans began the deportation of Galician Jews to the Bełżec killing center (75 km north of Lviv), where they were asphyxiated gas chambers by means of carbon monoxide from tank engines.²¹ In May, a new wave of shootings began in Volhynia.²²

In July 1942, approximately 600,000 Jews were still alive in the occupied Ukrainian lands, but in the summer of 1942, the killing was again intensified. In Galicia, about 180,000 Jews were deported to Bełżec between August and November. Among them were 60,000 Jews from Lviv: 40,000–50,000 Jews on 10–25 August and another 10,000 on 19–20 November. In December, the Bełżec camp was closed, and the police units in Galicia resumed shooting Jews near their place of residence. In June 1943, all of the remaining ghetto (p.197) inhabitants were killed, and in July, almost all of the remaining forced laborers. The inmates at the Janowska Camp in Lviv were killed on 19 November. The only Jews officially remaining in Galicia were a handful of forced laborers in the Boryslav oil fields. They were evacuated to the west in 1944.²³

In General Commissariat Volhynia-Podolia, most of the Jews fell victim to a campaign of murder that unfolded between July and November 1942. Almost every day the German police, aided by Ukrainian auxiliary policemen, killed thousands of Jews. Almost all of the Jews were annihilated and the ghettos disbanded. The biggest massacres took place in Lutsk on 19–23 August (14,700 victims), Volodymyr-Volynsky in the first days of September (13,500), and Liuboml on 1–2 October (10,000). By early 1943, only small groups of Jewish forced laborers were still alive in the RKU, mostly in camps along Thoroughfare IV (*Durchgangsstrasse* IV), the road from Lviv to Dnipropetrovsk. Those camps were liquidated in the course of 1943, as was the small “labor ghetto” in Volodymyr-Volynsky, whose inmates were killed on 13–14 December.²⁴

Unlike Belarus or the Baltic republics, Ukraine was not the final destination for the systematic deportations of Jews from Germany and the Czech lands. Nonetheless, tens of thousands of foreign Jews were killed in Ukraine. Beyond the 12,000 Jews

who were expelled from Hungary and murdered in Kamianets-Podilsky and tens of thousands of Romanian Jews from Bukovina and Bessarabia who were expelled into Transnistria, where they either died of hunger and exposure or were shot, there was another large group of foreign Jews who were murdered on Ukrainian soil. The Hungarian forces deployed to Ukraine were accompanied by numerous companies of Hungarian Jewish forced laborers. In all, about 50,000 Jews ended up in Ukraine with the Hungarian Army. Most of them died there in combat operations or mass shootings by the German police in 1943.²⁵

Ukraine's Jews appear to have been taken by surprise by the humiliations, terror, and mass murder they experienced. The anti-Semitism of prewar Germany was known in the Soviet Union, but the Hitler-Stalin pact ensured that very little negative information about life in German-occupied Poland or elsewhere in Nazi-occupied Europe appeared in the Soviet press. Until June 1941, knowledge of the German persecution of Jews in Poland had been limited to those Jews who had fled to western Ukraine. Terrorized, destitute, and isolated, the Jews of Ukraine were quickly driven into a helpless situation. The German authorities faced little resistance to the first wave of killings. This changed somewhat in 1942, especially during the ghetto liquidations that summer and autumn. Jews tried to flee en masse to the woods or to find hiding places in the cities and towns. Armed Jewish resistance emerged in western Volhynia in autumn 1942 and later in Galicia in 1943.

However, the preconditions for (p.198) organized Jewish resistance in Ukraine were rather limited due to the lack of favorable terrain, especially outside the woods of Volhynia and Galicia. For the same reason, the non-Jewish resistance movement was largely restricted to western Ukraine and even then was comparatively late in emerging. A few hundred Jews survived the war by joining the partisans (mainly Soviet groups) or by finding their way to "family camps" (under the protection of Soviet partisan units). Ultimately, about 5 percent of the Ukrainian Jews who fell under German and Romanian occupation survived the war.²⁶

While Ukraine's ethnic German population largely harbored anti-Semitic sentiments, the general attitude of other non-Jews

toward the murder of Ukraine's Jews, especially that of the Ukrainians themselves, remains the subject of considerable debate. There certainly existed a degree of anti-Semitism among Ukraine's non-Jewish population, especially in western Ukraine. Before the war, anti-Semitic views were common among some circles in Polish-ruled Ukraine, but these views were radicalized in large part due to Soviet rule in 1939–41. Anti-Semitism could also be found in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. According to German reports in that region, denunciations of Jews were frequent, especially during the early period of the Nazi occupation. The OUN for its part propagated anti-Semitic stereotypes in 1941 and 1942, and although the OUN officially changed its posture on minorities in mid-1943, the impact on the ground within its affiliated partisan force, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (*Ukrains'ka povstans'ka armiiia*, UPA) was marginal. While Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky of the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia spoke out against anti-Jewish violence, some bishops of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in the RKU repeatedly expressed anti-Semitic attitudes.²⁷ Tens of thousands of Russians and Ukrainians profited from the plight of the Jews by plundering or taking over Jewish apartments, furniture, clothes, and businesses. Thousands risked their lives to hide thousands of Jews, especially in the cities and towns. Many such humanitarians were executed when caught. As of 1 January 2013, 2,441 persons from Ukraine have been recognized as Righteous among the Nations by the Yad Vashem Holocaust Martyrs' and Heroes' Remembrance Authority in Jerusalem.²⁸

There is no doubt that the murder of the Jews was committed by the "Third Reich" and organized and implemented primarily by Germans and Austrians. Nevertheless, due to the lack of manpower, the perpetrators from the Reich relied heavily on indigenous auxiliaries.²⁹ The German police had more than 120,000 auxiliary policemen at its disposal in the RKU and military-administered Ukraine, including firefighters. Many of these policemen—predominantly auxiliaries for the German Order Police—participated in the persecution and murder of Ukraine's Jews, especially in 1942. They guarded ghettos, provided (p.199) cordons for most killing actions

starting in August 1941, sometimes took part in the shootings, and later helped hunt down Jews in hiding and delivered them to the German authorities for shooting. At least some of the auxiliary policemen serving in cohesive battalions (*Schutzmannschafts-Bataillone*) also participated in the killing.³⁰

Historiography

There is a substantial body of research on the Holocaust in Ukraine, but compared to that on Poland and the rest of central and western Europe, the historiography is relatively recent. As is well known, there were in the first decade after the war some important first efforts in Eastern and Central Europe to reconstruct the fate of Ukraine's Jews during the Holocaust, such as the works on eastern Galicia by the Historical Commission of Polish Jews,³¹ Matatias Carp's volume on Transnistria,³² and *The Black Book* by the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee.³³ In Soviet Ukraine, the subject was more or less silenced, despite some hints in Soviet literature or in the Yiddish-language journal *Sovetish heymland*. Probably one of the most important fictional treatments of the subject, Vasily Grossman's *Life and Fate*, was confiscated in the early 1960s and could only be published in the west in 1980 after being smuggled out of the Soviet Union.

Although works on the Holocaust in eastern Galicia, Volhynia, and Transnistria were regularly published by the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw until 1968, as well as by some survivors and homeland associations (*landsmanshaftn*),³⁴ modern research started only in the 1970s in Israel with the appearance of important dissertations written by survivors, in particular Aharon Weiss, who wrote about the Jewish ghetto police, including the ghetto police in Galicia,³⁵ and Shmuel Spector, who wrote about the Holocaust and Jewish resistance in western Volhynia.³⁶ Yad Vashem then also published two related volumes within its series *Pinkas Hakehillot*, the memorial book of communities, one on eastern Galicia and the other on Volhynia-Polesia.³⁷ Even in Israel, however, only a few attempts were made to go beyond the westernmost regions of Ukraine.³⁸

While a wave of Holocaust awareness arose in the West at the start of the 1980s, the subject of Ukraine continued to be ignored, although it did gain some attention as a consequence of the controversies that surrounded the investigations and trials of collaborators living in North America. Only with the disintegration of the Soviet Union did the Holocaust in Ukraine start to receive adequate attention, both in the West and in Ukraine. Since then, there (p.200) have been three major directions of research: First, there is an enormous effort underway inside Ukraine, as well as in Moscow, to reconstruct the fate of individual communities of Jews in certain regions and the course of the Holocaust in Ukraine in general. The National Academy of Sciences, Jewish organizations, and other historians, survivors, and activists now publish widely on the subject. Second is a wave of perpetrator research, especially in Germany and the United States, with studies on Nazi institutions and the crimes they committed in different regions.³⁹ Third, there is the inquiry into society and culture in response to the Holocaust in Ukraine, a trend more prevalent in North American historiography. In Israel, research on the Jews under occupation continues. This is but a rough categorization and does not cover all of the research that has been done in recent years.

The Holocaust in Ukraine, as noted at the outset, is a significant part of the Holocaust in general. Nevertheless, documentation on the crime and its circumstances is comparatively small. Dutch historian Karel Berkhoff was the first to provide a comprehensive overview of the literature as of 1996.⁴⁰ In 2005, Ukraine's State Committee on Archives (Derzhkom Arkhiviv) published an impressive overview on all occupation files in Ukrainian archives, which despite the extent of what remains rather underscores what has been lost.⁴¹ Not only were most of the key files of the Nazi regime in Berlin destroyed at the end of the war, so too were almost all of the records from the administration of the Reich Commissariat Ukraine. The same applies to the records of the killing apparatus of the SS and police. The situation is slightly better when it comes to military records, a part of which still exist, even for those military formations stationed in the civil-administrated Ukraine. Other German occupation agencies,

such Organization Todt or private companies, left almost no documentation. It is therefore inevitable that we have to turn to postwar criminal investigations, especially the West German files of the 1960s and 1970s, in order to fill in the gaps in the sources. The situation is much better when it comes to Romanian records, both for those of the central agencies in Bucharest and those of the occupational apparatus in Transnistria.

Fewer files are available on the institutions of collaboration, especially the Ukrainian auxiliary police (*Schutzmannschaften* of the Reich Commissariat Ukraine and the *Ukrainische Hilfspolizei* of Galicia) and the local-level administration. In the long run, all of the related Soviet investigations into collaboration will have to be located and made available to researchers, but such records will need to be used with great caution.

Concerning documents created by the victims, the situation is worse. The victims were either not able to document their fate or, if they were, the documents are lost. Very little material from the Jewish councils in Ukraine still (p.201) exists, and only a few scattered diaries or letters have been found to date. Thus scholars have to rely on witness statements made since 1944 and on memoirs. Unlike Holocaust survivors elsewhere, Soviet witnesses were interviewed only at war's end—usually by the Extraordinary State Commission for Ascertaining and Investigating Crimes Committed by the German-Fascist Invaders and their Accomplices—and then, for those still residing in Ukraine, only after 1990.

A complete picture of the Holocaust in Ukraine is possible only by integrating all of the remaining bystander material. The examination of Soviet state records—those of the Communist Party, the NKVD, the partisan movements, and the Red Army—for this purpose has only just begun. Little is to be expected at the individual level or in church files.

Memory

The memory of the Holocaust in Ukraine evolved in very different contexts: In the Ukrainian diaspora, especially in

North America and Germany, the Holocaust was not an issue. The reverse is true in the case in the Ukrainian-Jewish diaspora that predated the Holocaust. After the war, the *landsmanshaftn* abroad were almost the only institutions left to commemorate the victims of the Holocaust in their former home towns. In most cases, however, only communities from interwar Poland had such *landsmanshaftn*. The waves of emigration from the Soviet Union since 1971 did not lead to another wave of *yizkor* (memorial) books, although within Israel, they greatly contributed to the knowledge of the Holocaust in Ukraine.⁴²

In Soviet Ukraine, memory of the German mass crimes against the Jews all but vanished during late Stalinism. There the focus was on Soviet citizens in general. After Stalin's death some notable exceptions emerged surrounding the memory of Babi Yar massacre: the controversy over Evgenii Evtushenko's poem, Dmitry Shostakovich's 13th Symphony, and Anatoly Kuznetsov's book on the massacre. Eventually, hundreds of small memorials, in some cases larger ones, were put up at executions sites, but nearly all of these omitted any reference to the Jewish identity of the victims. Nevertheless, there were incidents when the fate of the Jews during the war was made public, for example, during the late war crimes trials in Soviet Ukraine, which continued into the 1990s.

In independent Ukraine, this began to change, starting with the 1991 visit of U.S. President George H. W. Bush and the revival of Jewish institutions in the Ukraine. The new government had to adjust to the Western approach to the Holocaust, especially with regard to relations with the United States and Israel. Thus a state-sponsored approach to Holocaust memory has prevailed, (p.202) which has broadened as civil society has emerged. The Holocaust is now integrated into school curricula, although as a rather isolated incident, and the state strives to support both memorialization and historical research.⁴³

In the West, there is no specific memory of the "Holocaust in Ukraine," rather it tends to be connected to individual places such as the Lviv ghetto or events like the Babi Yar massacre.⁴⁴ From time to time, the perception of Ukrainian nationalism as

profoundly anti-Semitic has surfaced, especially during the controversies surrounding Ukrainian collaborators who emigrated to North America after the war and were later prosecuted. This has been reinforced by the visual perception of the Holocaust in Ukraine, especially the almost iconic series of photographs depicting the Lviv pogrom in early July 1941.

The Holocaust in Ukraine was also a major subject of two exhibitions on the Wehrmacht—the original one from the late 1990s and the revised one from 2001—as it documented, at least where the photos were correctly described, the participation of Wehrmacht units in the mass murder of Jews, especially in the area of operations of the 6th Army. Thus some elements of the Holocaust in Ukraine became central to the public debate in both exhibitions. But also other countries have been affected: The Catholic Church in France now supports a larger research and memorialization project called the “Holocaust by Bullets,” based on the efforts of French priest Patrick Desbois.⁴⁵

Finally, it is necessary to address the current tendencies of Holocaust memorialization in the Ukraine. As historian Omer Bartov has documented dramatically, Holocaust memorialization is almost completely externalized in western Ukraine, where both the number of victims and the participation of Ukrainian locals reached the highest proportions. Instead, memorialization of the right-wing Ukrainian underground has tended to dominate the agenda. In some towns, monuments honoring OUN and UPA leaders have been built on the terrain of former ghettos or execution sites.⁴⁶

It is necessary to point out these current tendencies in Ukraine’s memory policy, but it is even more necessary to deepen historical research on the subject and to put the issue of collaboration in its historical context. The most important perspectives, however, remain the question of why the crimes occurred, which deals with perpetrator history, and of how the victims were affected, which addresses Jewish history.

Notes

(p.205)

Notes:

(1) These 1.5 million victims are from the lands that now make up Ukraine. This figure therefore includes regions of prewar Poland and thus a share of the roughly three million Jewish citizens of the interwar Polish state murdered during the Holocaust. The number of murdered Jews from those interwar Polish lands located in postwar Poland is just under two million.

(2) This text draws on Dieter Pohl, *Die Herrschaft der Wehrmacht* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008), as well as Dieter Pohl, “The Murder of Ukrainian Jews under Military Administration and in Reich Commissariat Ukraine,” in *The Shoah in Ukraine*, ed. Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 23–76.

(3) Pohl, *Herrschaft der Wehrmacht*, 70–71.

(4) “Betr.: Richtlinien für das Verhalten der Truppe in Russland” (Nuremberg Document NOKW-1692), 4 June 1941, in Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, “Kommissarbefehl und Massenexekutionen der sowjetischer Kriegsgefangener,” in *Anatomie des SS-Staates*, Bd. 2, ed. Martin Broszat et al. (Munich: dtv, 1984), 187–88.

(5) This notion was widespread between the wars, but the share of Jews among the commissars was in fact 8 percent in 1929 and ca. 20 percent in 1938. The figure then declined during Stalin’s purge of the Red Army, see Pohl, *Herrschaft der Wehrmacht*, 75–76. See also the extensive study of the “commissar order” by Felix Römer, *Der Kommissarbefehl. Wehrmacht und NS-Verbrechen an der Ostfront 1941/42* (Paderborn: Schöningh 2008).

(6) This was the case of at least the 22nd Infantry Division, which operated in southern Ukraine, see Pohl, *Herrschaft der Wehrmacht*, 76.

(7) *Ibid.*, 72–73.

(8) On the hunger plan, see Pohl, *Herrschaft der Wehrmacht*, 64–66 and 183–94.

(9) Two oblasts from prewar Soviet Right-Bank Ukraine lost over 50 percent of their prewar Jewish population: Vinnytsia (81 percent) and Proskuriv (94 percent), see Table 8.4 “Jews Who Perished as Part of Prewar Jewish Population,” in Alexander Kruglov, “Jewish Losses in Ukraine, 1941–1944,” in Brandon and Lower, *Shoah in Ukraine*, p. 284. The Kiev Oblast figure should be 25.6 percent, not 61.4 as shown in the table.

(10) Wadim Dubson, “On the Problem of Evacuation of the Soviet Jews in 1941 (New Archival Sources),” *Jews in Eastern Europe* 40, no. 3 (1999), 37–55.

(11) On the pogroms in general, see Pohl, *Herrschaft der Wehrmacht*, 77 and 244–46. For greater detail on east Galicia and the role of the NKVD murders there, see Dieter Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941–1944: Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1997), 54–67. Kai Struve of the University Halle-Wittenberg is working on a study of the pogroms in eastern Poland (western Soviet Union) in 1941.

(12) Martin Cüppers, *Wegbereiter der Shoah: die Waffen-SS, der Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS und die Judenvernichtung, 1939–1945* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005), 165–67.

(13) Pohl, “The Murder of Ukraine’s Jews,” 28.

(14) Pohl, *Herrschaft der Wehrmacht*, 248–49.

(15) Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien*, 139–51.

(16) Pohl, “The Murder of Ukraine’s Jews,” 43.

(17) Pohl, “The Murder of Ukraine’s Jews,” 46–47.

(18) Radu Ioanid, *The Holocaust in Romania. The Destruction of Jews and Gypsies under the Antonescu Regime, 1940–1944*

(New York: I. Dee, 2000); Jean Ancel, *Contributii la istoria Romaniei. Problema evreiasca, 1933-1944* (Bucharest: Editura Hasefer, 2001). In Hebrew: Zhan Ancel, *Toledot has-sho'a: Rumenya* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem 2002); *Rumänien und der Holocaust. Zu den Massenverbrechen in Transnistrien, 1941-1944*, ed. Mariana Hausleitner, Brigitte Mihok, Juliane Wetzel (Berlin: Metropol, 2001); Michael Gesin, "Holocaust: The Reality of Genocide in Southern Ukraine." PhD diss., Brandeis University, 2003.

(19) Pohl, "The Murder of Ukrainian Jews," 38-39.

(20) Pohl, "The Murder of Ukrainian Jews," 48.

(21) Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien, 188-98*.

(22) Pohl, "The Murder of Ukrainian Jews," 48.

(23) Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien, 211-65*.

(24) Pohl, "The Murder of Ukrainian Jews," 49-52.

(25) Martin Broszat, "Die jüdischen Arbeitskompanien in Ungarn," in *Gutachten des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte*, Bd. 1 (Munich: Institut für Zeitgeschichte, 1959), 200-14; Randolph L. Braham, *The Hungarian Labor Service System, 1939-1945* (New York: East European Publications, 1977), 25-27; *The Wartime System of Labor Service in Hungary*, ed. Randolph L. Braham (Boulder, CO: East European Publications, 1995).

(26) Pohl, "The Murder of Ukrainian Jews," 52-53.

(27) Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien, 320-26*; *Metropolyt Andrey Sheptyts'kyi. Dokumenty i materialy, 1941-1944*, ed. Zhanna Kovba (Kiev: Dukh i litera, 2003); Karel C. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair. Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2004), 83-84; Yitzhak Arad, "The Christian Churches and the Persecution of Jews in the Occupied Territories of the USSR," in *Judaism and Christianity Under the Impact of*

National Socialism, 1919–1945, ed. Otto Dov Kulka, Paul Mendes-Flohr (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem 1987), 401–11.

(28) See <http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/righteous/statistics.asp>. The extent to which these figures reflect Poles in western Ukraine is unclear. This subject remains understudied. A rather apologetic examination of rescuers in eastern Galicia is Zhanna Kovba, *Liudianist' u bezodni pekla. Povedinka mistsevoho naselennia Skhidnoï Halychyny v roky "ostatochnoho rozv'iazannia ievreis'koho pytannia,"* 2nd exp. ed. (Kiev: Instytut Judaïky, 2000).

(29) Dieter Pohl, "Ukrainische Hilfskräfte beim Mord an den Juden," in *Die Täter der Shoah. Fanatische Nationalsozialisten oder ganz normale Deutsche?*, ed. Gerhard Paul (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2002), 205–34.

(30) Pohl, "The Murder of Ukrainian Jews," 55.

(31) Two of the most prominent authors were Philip Friedman and Tatiana Berenstein. Two of Friedman's articles on the Holocaust in Ukraine are available in English in *Roads to Extinction: Essays on the Holocaust* (New York and Philadelphia: Conference on Jewish Social Studies and Jewish Publication Society of America, 1980). Berenstein published the first major study on Galicia in 1953 in Yiddish. A Polish version appeared in 1967: "Eksterminacja ludności żydowskiej w dystrykcie Galicja," *Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego* 61 (1967), 3–58.

(32) *Cartea neagra. Suferintele evreilor din Romania, 1940–1944*, vol. 3: *Transnistria* (Bucharest: Societatea Nationala de Editura si Arte Gratice "Dacia Traiana," 1948).

(33) Excerpts of a version of the manuscript sent to the United States and Romania were published in 1946: *The Black Book: The Nazi Crime against the Jewish People* (New York: Jewish Black Book Committee, 1946). A subsequent edition appeared in 1980, but the full version was published only in 2001: *The Complete Black Book of Russian Jewry* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2001).

(34) J. S. Fisher, *Transnistria: The Forgotten Cemetery* (South Brunswick: Yoseloff, 1969).

(35) *Ha-mishtara ha-yehudit ba-general government u-vi-Shlezya ilit bi-tqufat ha-Sho'a* (Jerusalem: Ha-universiṭa ha-ivrit, 1973).

(36) Shmuel Spector, *Sho'at Yehude Vohlin, 1941–1944*. (Jerusalem: Yad va-shem and ha-Federatsyah shel Yehude Vohlin, 1986).

(37) *Pinqas ha-qehilot: entsiqlopedya shel ha-yishuvim ha-yehudiyim le-min hivasdam ve-'ad le-aḥar sho'at milhemet ha-'olam ha-shniya*, vol. 2, *Galitsiya ha-mizraḥit* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1980), and vol. 5, *Vohlin ve-Polesie* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1990).

(38) Shmuel Spector, [The Fate of Ukrainian Jewry during the Nazi Invasion—Statistics and Estimates], *Shvut* 12 (1987), 55–66 [in Hebrew].

(39) Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien*; Thomas Sandkühler, “*Endlösung*” in *Galizien. Der Judenmord in Ostpolen und die Rettungsaktionen von Berthold Beitz* (Bonn: Dietz, 1996); Frank Golczewski, “Die Revision eines Klischees. Die Rettung von verfolgten Juden im Zweiten Weltkrieg durch Ukrainer,” in *Solidarität und Hilfe für Juden während der NS-Zeit*, Bd. 2, ed. Wolfgang Benz, Juliane Wetzel (Berlin: Metropol, 1998), 9–82; Andrej Angrick, *Besatzungspolitik und Massenmord. Die Einsatzgruppe D in der südlichen Sowjetunion, 1941–1943* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2003); Martin Dean, *Collaboration in the Holocaust. Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941–44* (London: Palgrave, 2000); Wendy Lower, *Nazi Empire-building and the Holocaust in Ukraine* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005).

(40) Karel Berkhoff, “Ukraine under Nazi Rule (1941–1944): Sources and Finding Aids,” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 45, nos. 1–2 (1997), 84–103 and 273–309.

(41) *Archivy okupatsii 1941-1944. Anotovanyi reiestr fondiv derzhavnykh arkhiviv Ukraïny*, CD-ROM (Kiev: Derzhkom archiviv Ukrainy, 2005), online version: <http://www.archives.gov.ua/Publicat/AO-1941-1944.php>.

(42) Cf. New York Public Library: http://legacy.www.nypl.org/research/chss/jws/yizkorbooks_intro.cfm.

(43) Johan Dietsch, *Making Sense of Suffering. Holocaust and Holodomor in Ukrainian Historical Culture* (Lund: Lund University Press, 2006); David R. Marples, *Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine* (Budapest and New York: CEU Press, 2007); and articles by Wilfried Jilge. Cf. the activities of Ukraïns'kyi tsentr vyvchennia istorii Holokostu, and of the Tkuma-Center in Dnipropetrovsk and the Fond Babyn Jar. In particular, *Babii Yar. Chelovek, vlast', istoriia*, t. 1: *Istoricheskaia topografiia. Khronologiia sobytii*, ed. Tat'iana Evstaf'eva, Vitalii Nakhmanovich (Kiev: Vysshtorgizdat, 2004).

(44) Cf. the film by Karl Fruchtmann, "Die Grube" (Radio Bremen 1995); *Die Schoáh von Babij Jar. Das Massaker deutscher Sonderkommandos an der jüdischen Bevölkerung von Kiew 1941—fünfzig Jahre danach zum Gedenken*, ed. Erhard Roy Wiehn (Konstanz: Hartung-Gorre, 1991); and the film "Babi Jar" by Artur Brauner.

(45) Cf. the results of the conference "The Holocaust in Ukraine: New Resources and Perspectives," Paris, 1-3 October 2007.

(46) Omer Bartov, *Erased: Vanishing Traces of Jewish Galicia in Present-Day Ukraine* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

